Case 3:13-cr-00113-JCH Document 117 Filed 09/08/15 Page 1 of 5

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.
RALPH CROZIER,
Defendant.

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CRIMINAL CASE NO.

3:13-CR-00113 (JCH)

SEPTEMBER 8, 2015

RULING RE: MOTION FOR RELEASE PENDING APPEAL (DOC. NO. 111)
On September 25, 2014, following a jury trial, the defendant, Ralph Crozier
(Crozier), was found guilty of one count of conspiracy to launder monetary instruments
and one count of attempt to launder monetary instruments, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
1956(a)(1)(B)(i) and (a)(3)(B). Jury Verdict (Doc. No. 75). On February 12, 2015,
Crozier was sentenced to thirty months imprisonment. Judgment (Doc. No. 99).
Crozier appealed his conviction on February 26, 2015. Notice of Appeal (Doc. No.
100). His appeal is pending before the Second Circuit. See U.S. v. Crozier, 2d Cir.
Doc. No. 15-572. Currently before the court is Croziers Motion for Release Pending
Appeal (Doc. No. 111) (Mot. for Rel.). The government opposes Croziers Motion.
Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Bail Pending Appeal (Doc. No. 113) (Govt
Mem.). For the reasons that follow, Croziers Motion is DENIED.
I.

APPLICABLE LAW
Where a person who has been found guilty of an offense and sentenced to a

term of imprisonment files an appeal, the court shall order that person to be detained
pending the appeal, unless the court finds:

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(A) by clear and convincing evidence that the person is not likely to flee or pose a
danger to the safety of any other person or the community if released under
section 3142(b) or (c) of this title; and
(B) that the appeal is not for the purpose of delay and raises a substantial
question of law or fact likely to result in-(i) reversal,
(ii) an order for a new trial,
(iii) a sentence that does not include a term of imprisonment, or
(iv) a reduced sentence to a term of imprisonment less than the total of the
time already served plus the expected duration of the appeal process.
18 U.S.C. 3143.
A substantial question is one of more substance than would be necessary to a finding
that it was not frivolous. It is a close question or one that very well could be decided
the other way. U.S. v. Randell, 761 F.2d 122, 125 (2d Cir. 1985). If court finds that a
question is substantial, it must then consider whether that question is so integral to the
merits of the conviction on which defendant is to be imprisoned that a contrary appellate
holding is likely to require reversal of the conviction or a new trial. Id. (internal
quotations omitted).
II.

DISCUSSION
The parties dispute whether Crozier has raised a substantial question of law or

fact likely to result in reversal, a new trial, a non-incarceratory sentence, or a sentence

less than the expected duration of the appeal. Crozier argues that he has raised such
a question on appeal, namely, whether the courts prohibition of his acting as
co-counsel with his retained attorney violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel.
Mot. for Rel. at 3-4. Croziers appeal also argues that the evidence was insufficient to
support his convictions.

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A.

Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel

Crozier argues that the Sixth Amendment issue is a close question that could
be decided either way, and one that, if decided in his favor, would result in a reversal of
conviction. Mot. for Rel. at 3. The crux of his argument is that the Sixth Amendment
provided him with a right to act as co-counsel during his criminal trial, and that the
courts prohibition of his filed appearance as an attorney violated that right. However,
Second Circuit case law makes clear that, because a defendant must affirmatively
waive the right to counsel before exercising the right to self-representation, there is no
constitutional or statutory right to hybrid representation. United States v. Bogle, 522
F. App'x 15, 23 (2d Cir. 2013) (summary order) (citing United States v. Tutino, 883 F.2d
1125, 1141 (2d Cir.1989)). Thus, the decision to grant or deny hybrid representation
lies solely within the discretion of the trial court. Tutino, 883 F.2d at 1141.
In denying Croziers request for hybrid representation, the court stated that, while
in some cases there could be a compelling reason to allow hybrid representation, in this
case theres no compelling reason to [allow Crozier to act as co-counsel]. He has very
capable counsel himself, hes very experienced and hes not complaining about
inadequacy of representation. Transcript, Day One of Trial, Tr. 10:17-20. The court
further noted its concern that hybrid representation could be more confusing to the jury
and troublesome, id. at 10:23, and that it would push it in the jurys ability to put out of
their mind an hour, two, three, four hours of heavy leading questions on a
cross-examination in effect by the examining lawyer, i.e., the defendant. Id. at
6:17-20. The courts denial of Croziers request did not violate the Sixth Amendment,
rather, it was within the courts discretion. Thus, the court concludes that Crozier has

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not raised a substantial question of law or fact likely to result in reversal, a new trial, a
non-incarceratory sentence, or a sentence less than the expected duration of the
appeal, with regard to the Sixth Amendment Issue.
B.

Sufficiency of the Evidence

In his Reply, Crozier also argues that his other claim on appeal that the
evidence underlying his convictions is insufficient constitutes a substantial question of
law or fact. Reply to the Governments Memorandum in Opposition (Doc. No. 114).
However, this claim also does not provide a basis for release pending appeal. A
challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence will be denied if, viewing all the evidence in
the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Jones,
393 F.3d 107, 111 (2d Cir. 2004). Based on the evidence presented at trial, which
included testimony from Croziers co-conspirator and recorded conversations, this issue
does not present a close question or one that very well could be decided the other
way. See Randell, 761 F.2d at 125. Thus, Crozier has not raised a substantial
question of law or fact regarding the sufficiency of the evidence issue. 1

The government further argues that Crozier is only entitled to plain error review on appeal,
because he did not move for a judgment of acquittal at the close of all evidence or post-trial. Govt Mem.
at 6; see United States v. Allen, 127 F.3d 260, 264 (2d Cir. 1997) (To preserve the sufficiency issue and
avoid the burden of showing plain error, a defendant must have moved for judgment of acquittal either at
the close of all the evidence pursuant to Rule 29(a) or post-trial in a motion pursuant to Rule 29(c).). As
discussed by Crozier in his Reply, Crozier did move for judgment of acquittal pursuant to Rule 29(a) at
the close of the governments evidence (Doc. No. 67). However, in its Sur Reply, the government
argues that Crozier waived any challenge to the denial of this motion by subsequently presenting
evidence. Governments Sur-Reply (Doc. No. 116) at 2. The court need not address the standard of
review issue because, even assuming de novo review, Crozier has not shown a substantial question of
law or fact on the issue of sufficiency of the evidence underlying his conviction.

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III.

CONCLUSION
Croziers Motion for Release Pending Appeal (Doc. No. 111) is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Dated this 8th day of September, 2015, at New Haven, Connecticut.

/s/Janet C. Hall
Janet C. Hall
United States District Judge