The mind is the brain. This is the theory proposed by type-identity theorists like U. T. Place 1 and J. J.

C. Smart2. A distinct response to Cartesian dualism and behaviourism, it looks to build upon the idea
that the mind and brain might just be the same thing. It seems a natural progression, as the sciences
progress we might get clues to make us think that maybe consciousness is just a brain state (think of
prodding a certain part of the brain and tasting strawberries). At the very most, if there is some
metaphysical difference, the mind supervenes upon the physical.

Types and tokens

To make any discussion of type-identity theory coherent, we need to realise the distinction between
token-identification and type-identification. Type/token identification is fairly simple, the common
example is to use the word “banana” and be asked to count the number of letters in it. One can
either answer that there are 6 letters, the common sense answer, or alternatively one can answer
there are only 3 letters. This is to do with how we choose to count the letter. We can count as most
would and choose each instance of a letter and count one B, two Ns and three As, in doing so we are
counting tokens of letters. If we are counting unique types of letters we would recognise the
instances of B, of N and of A. When discussing types, individual instances are almost irrelevant other
than their requiring at least one token in order for the type to be represented.

There are different tokens of pain – the dull pain we feel in our muscles after exercise is undoubtedly
different to the sharp pain some of us feel when drinking a cold drink. Type identity theory says that
these need not be the exact same mental state, but the same type of mental state. Physical states of
type X identify with mental states of type X, physical state 51 need not match directly with mental
state 329 in order to be considered pain.

Type-identification

Type identity theorists say we can identify general types of mental states, like pain or of having an
experience of a colour, with states of a physical type. That is not to say we can associate general
types of mental states with a particular physical state or even that a particular mental state has a
correlating particular physical state. The hypothesis suggests we can reduce all talk of mental states
to talk of physical states and it is the job of neuroscience and psychologists to discover the bridge
laws that allow us to identify pain with C-fibre stimulation (note that pain would not be the

1 Place (1956)
2 Smart (1959)

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stimulation of a specific C-fibre), or whatever other thing we would reduce a mental state to.

Small discussed the relationship to be like that of lightening and electrical discharge 3. Small draws
our attention to the fact there is not two distinct entities; a flash of light and an electrical discharge.
Rather, there is that with which we are immediately aware (the flash of light) which investigation and
science reveals as an electrical discharge.

One criticism which may be levelled at the type identity theorist is grounded in the private nature of
mental states versus the public nature of physical states. In fact, a scientist familiar with the
technology required to identify mental states with physical states may be aware of the physical states
while we are not; it seems that while we are privately aware that we are thinking about Paris, we are
not aware of the brain state which is identified with it.

This objection is easily dealt with; while it does not follow that because the Romans knew what
water was, they would subsequently know what H 2O was. Because they knew water turned from
liquid to steam when boiled, they know the same of H 2O though they are not in fact aware of it. We
have access to the public brain states indirectly, that is, through the a posteriori knowledge that the
mental state we have has to be correlated with certain types of physical state.

From this we can see that the type identity theorist is committed to believing that type
identifications are a posteriori, the example that is often given is that of similarities between our
identification of physical states as mental and the identification of molecular motion as heat.

Kripke's Assault

Saul Kripke used this identification (of molecular motion as heat) when arguing for his belief there
was a significant problem with the type-identity position 4. This is the first part of what I see as a two
part problem for the type-identity theory consisting of the modal attack from Kripke and the final
blow from Putnam, made possible by the response to Kripke. His argument is perhaps one of the
most damning an advocate of type-type identification can come across and to make any sort of type-
identity position tenable, the proponent will have to come up with a solution.

Kripke's objection rests upon the rigid designations of “pain” and “C-fibre stimulation”. There is
enough philosophical interest in rigid and non-rigid designators, I shall take for granted the

3 Ibid.
4 Kripke (1971)

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application holds. Simply put, a rigid designator is something which describes the same idea in any
possible world. It seeks to identify a thing by its essential, necessary properties. Heat, Kripke
suggests, is a rigid designator as heat will always be heat in any possible world – it will always be a
high temperature even if we feel it to be otherwise. Likewise, the motion of molecules is rigid
because there is no way the motion of molecules (as the idea of temperature, as opposed to simply
moving an object around the room) will always be the motion of molecules – the motion of
molecules cannot in some other world be the lack of motion in molecules.

Related to the philosophy of mind, pain is quite clearly a rigid designator. Pain cannot feel any other
way or else it would not be pain, it would be some other sensation like a tickle or like that of pins and
needles. In order to hope that type-identifications are contingent then C-fibre stimulation cannot be
a rigid designator since if A is necessarily A and B is necessarily B and A is B, then A is necessarily B. C-
fibre stimulation is a rigid designator, there is no possible world in which C-fibre stimulation is X-fibre
stimulation, otherwise it is not C-fibre stimulation. It is necessary that C-fibre stimulation be the
stimulation of C-fibres.

A response

It is difficult for the type-identity theorist to completely refute Kripke's claims. His argument is well
worked and poses difficult questions for the type-identity proponent. More than anything it
questions the contingent nature of the mental/physical relationship the type-identity theorist was
hoping to promote. It seems in light of Kripke's argument the type-identity theorist will have to
release their grasp on contingency and be content with the the a posteriori nature of the mind.

The best claim the type-identity theorist can now make says that while it might be necessary for pain
to be C-fibre stimulation, it is still an a posteriori fact. A child does not know that pain is C-fibre
stimulation, nor does an uneducated adult. It is reasonable to suggest, however, that a scientist or
some other person with the appropriate experience or learning can identify pain as C-fibre
stimulation. The idea is that we cannot come to know the C-fibre stimulation through reflection
alone – experience is essential.

The problem posed by Kripke makes the position of taking mental and physical state identification to
be contingent impossible. The answer given by the type-identity theory, however, suggests the
second part of the two part problem I mentioned earlier. Like some cruel chess move, the opposition
has forked the type-identity theorist. Having been forced to abandon the contingency of their claim,

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the type-identity theorist has to propose there are a posteriori necessary truths - that pain is C-fibre
stimulation, in the same way water is H 2O. Those who would make type-identifications are now faced
with the problem of making their theory multiply realisable; if pain is necessarily C-fibre stimulation
then only those with C-fibres can experience pain; doesn't this risk being too chauvinistic and making
the newer a posteriori and necessary claims implausible?

Multiple Realisable

This attack on type-identity theory was offered by Hilary Putnam in the key papers he had published
during the 1960s5. The argument, as put by Kim6, asks the question “but aren't there pain capable
organisms, like reptiles … with nervous systems very different from human nervous systems?”. This
one question gets to the heart of the problem posed; if pain is C-fibre stimulation, how do we explain
pain in things without C-fibres. There is much discussion of pain in aliens and other non-terrestrial
life, robots and the like, but this is superfluous and raises difficult metaphysical questions (do and
can aliens exist, etc.). The point can be made much simpler with the example of the lizard.

While other mammals have similar nervous systems and brain structures to humans, lizards differ
enough to ask questions of how we can share similar mental phenomena like pain. The lizard has no
C-fibres, so the type-identity theorist will struggle to say what the appropriate physical identification
for their pain reaction actually is.

I would reject the premise of this objection. The lizard has very obvious physical differences, so we
should be wary of accepting and premise which assumes they have similar mental states. While they
might share behaviour, behaviour is by no means the best form of suggesting mental states as
demonstrated by the rarity of its proponents.

Consider the difference between an electric hob and its gas fuelled sibling. Both devices function in
very different ways, one by conducting electricity wastefully and another by burning hydrocarbons.
Still, they produce the same outcome. There are more than even these two ways to achieve the
same outcome, in this case producing enough heat to cook with. If this is true, does the possibility
not arise that in humans the phenomena we call pain is C-fibre stimulation and in lizards a similar
phenomena (at least similar in its accidental properties if not its essential properties, that is, those

5 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy – “Multiple Realisability”

6 Kim (2006)

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properties of which we are directly aware) is actually Z-fibre stimulation. This of course is not an
exhaustive answer to those who suggest multiple realisability will be a problem for the type-identity
theorist, but others have made attempts to expand on this notion more comprehensively 7.

Conclusion

It is certainly plausible that any type-identifications of mental and physical states are a posteriori, we
do not have any more direct access to our physical states than a Roman had means of recognising
molecular motion. We certainly have this indirect access a priori (now that I know pain corresponds
with a brain state, I know I have the brain state when I have pain), but direct and original access
requires investigation.

Like water must be H2O, human pain can only be C-fibre stimulation. The contingency claims made
are clearly implausible, Kripke shows it is actually impossible for type-identifications to be anything
other than necessary. However, if type-identity theory can make any sort of substantial contribution
to philosophy of mind it is beyond doubt that it must be a posteriori.

7 Lewis (1980)

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 Bibliography
− Heil, J., Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology, 2006, New York: Oxford University
Press

− Kripke, S., “Naming and Necessity”

− Smart, J. J. C., “Sensations and Brain Processes”

− Kim, J., Philosophy of Mind, 2nd Ed., 2006, U.S.A: Westview Press

− Lewis, D. K., “Mad Pain and Martian Pain”, Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology,
Vol. I. (1980), N. Block, ed., Harvard University Press, pp. 216-222

− Place, U. T., “Is Consciousness a Brain Process”, British Journal of Psychology, 47:1
(1956), pp. 44-50

− Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

− “Multiple Realisability”, accessed online at

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/multiple-realizability/, last accessed
15/03/2010

− “Rigid Designators”, accessed online at

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rigid-designators/ , last accessed
15/03/2010

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