DOUGLAS R. CAGAS v.

THE COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS and CLAUDE P. BAUTISTA
A party aggrieved by an interlocutory order issued by a COMELEC Division in an
election protest may not directly assail the order before the Supreme Court through a
special civil action for certiorari. The remedy is to to seek the review of said
interlocutory order during the appeal of the decision of the Division.
FACTS:
Petitioner Douglas R. Cagas was proclaimed the winner for the gubernatorial race for the province of
Davao del Sur. Respondent Claude P. Bautista, his rival, filed an electoral protest alleging fraud,
anomalies, irregularities, vote-buying and violations of election laws, rules and resolutions. The protest
was raffled to the COMELEC First Division.
In his affirmative defense, Cagas argued that Bautista did not make the requisite cash deposit on time and
that Bautista did not render a detailed specification of the acts or omissions complained of. The
COMELEC First Division denied the special affirmative defences. Thus, Cagas prayed that the matter be
certified to the COMELEC En Banc. Bautista countered that the assailed orders, being merely
interlocutory, could not be elevated to the COMELEC En Banc. The COMELEC First Division issued an
order denying Cagas motion for reconsideration, prompting him to file a petition for certiorari before the
Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Supreme Court has the power to review on certiorari an interlocutory order issued by a
Division of the COMELEC
HELD:
Petition DENIED.
Although Section 7, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution confers on the Court the power to review any
decision, order or ruling of the COMELEC, it limits such power to a final decision or resolution of the
COMELEC en banc, and does not extend to an interlocutory order issued by a Division of the COMELEC.
Otherwise stated, the Court has no power to review on certiorari an interlocutory order or even a final
resolution issued by a Division of the COMELEC.

There is no question, therefore, that the Court has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the petition for
certiorari assailing the denial by the COMELEC First Division of the special affirmative defenses of the
petitioner. The proper remedy is for the petitioner to wait for the COMELEC First Division to first decide
the protest on its merits, and if the result should aggrieve him, to appeal the denial of his special
affirmative defenses to the COMELEC En Banc along with the other errors committed by the Division
upon the merits.
It is true that there may be an exception to the general rule, which is when an interlocutory order of a
Division of the COMELEC was issued without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion,
as the Court conceded in Kho v. Commission on Elections. However, the said case has no application
herein because the COMELEC First Division had the competence to determine the lack of detailed
specifications of the acts or omissions complained of as required by Rule 6, Section 7 of COMELEC
Resolution No. 8804, and whether such lack called for the outright dismissal of the protest.

Requisites of Judicial Due Process

Case 1b & 1c
Chapter II
MALIKSI VS. COMELEC
March 12, 2013
During the 2010 Elections, the Municipal Board of Canvassers proclaimed Saquilayan
the winner for the position of Mayor of Imus, Cavite. Maliksi, the candidate who
garnered the second highest number of votes, brought an election protest in the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Imus, Cavite alleging that there were irregularities in the
counting of votes in 209 clustered precincts. Subsequently, the RTC held a revision of
the votes, and, based on the results of the revision, declared Maliksi as the duly elected
Mayor of Imus commanding Saquilayan to cease and desist from performing the
functions of said office. Saquilayan appealed to the COMELEC. In the meanwhile, the
RTC granted Maliksis motion for execution pending appeal, and Maliksi was then
installed as Mayor.
In resolving the appeal, the COMELEC First Division, without giving notice to the
parties, decided to recount the ballots through the use of the printouts of the ballot
images from the CF cards. Thus, it issued an order dated March 28, 2012 requiring

Saquilayan to deposit the amount necessary to defray the expenses for the decryption
and printing of the ballot images.
Later, it issued another order dated April 17, 2012 for Saquilayan to augment his cash
deposit.
On August 15, 2012, the First Division issued a resolution nullifying the RTCs decision
and declaring Saquilayan as the duly elected Mayor.
Maliksi filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that he had been denied his right to
due process because he had not been notified of the decryption proceedings. He
argued that the resort to the printouts of the ballot images, which were secondary
evidence, had been unwarranted because there was no proof that the integrity of the
paper ballots had not been preserved.
On September 14, 2012, the COMELEC En Banc resolved to deny Maliksis motion for
reconsideration.
Maliksi then came to the Court via petition for certiorari, reiterating his objections to the
decryption, printing, and examination of the ballot images without prior notice to him,
and to the use of the printouts of the ballot images in the recount proceedings
conducted by the First Division.
In the decision promulgated on March 12, 2013, the Court, by a vote of 8-7, dismissed
Maliksis petition for certiorari. The Court concluded that Maliksi had not been denied
due process because: (a) he had received notices of the decryption, printing, and
examination of the ballot images by the First Division referring to the orders of the
First Division directing Saquilayan to post and augment the cash deposits for the
decryption and printing of the ballot images; and (b) he had been able to raise his
objections to the decryption in his motion for reconsideration. The Court then
pronounced that the First Division did not abuse its discretion in deciding to use the
ballot images instead of the paper ballots, explaining that the printouts of the ballot
images were not secondary images, but considered original documents with the same
evidentiary value as the official ballots under the Rule on Electronic Evidence; and that
the First Divisions finding that the ballots and the ballot boxes had been tampered had
been fully established by the large number of cases of double-shading discovered
during the revision.
Hence, Maliksi filed the petition before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: W/O Maliksi was deprived of due process when the COMELEC First Division
ordered on appeal the decryption, printing, and examination of the ballot images in the
CF cards.
HELD: The petition was dismissed. Maliksi alleged that he was denied due process
when the COMELEC First Division directed the decryption, printing, and examination of

the ballot images in the CF cards for the first time on appeal without notice to him, thus
depriving him of his right to be present and observe the decryption proceedings.
The records also showed that Maliksi was aware of the decryption, printing, and
examination of the ballot images by the COMELEC First Division. The COMELEC First
Division issued an Order dated 28 March 2012 directing Saquilayan to deposit the
required amount for expenses for the supplies, honoraria, and fee for the decryption of
the CF cards, and a copy of the Order was personally delivered to Maliksis counsel.
Maliksis counsel was likewise given a copy of Saquilayans Manifestation of
Compliance with the 28 March 2012 Order. In an Order dated 17 April 2012, the
COMELEC First Division directed Saquilayan to deposit an additional amount for
expenses for the printing of additional ballot images from four clustered precincts, and a
copy of the Order was again personally delivered to Maliksis counsel. The decryption
took weeks to finish.
Clearly, Maliksi was not denied due process. He received notices of the decryption,
printing, and examination of the ballot images by the COMELEC First Division. In
addition, Maliksi raised his objections to the decryption in his motion for reconsideration
before the COMELEC En Banc. The Court has ruled:
x x x. The essence of due process, we have consistently held, is simply the
opportunity to be heard; as applied to administrative proceedings, due
process is the opportunity to explain ones side or the opportunity to seek
a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. A formal or trialtype hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential. The
requirement is satisfied where the parties are afforded fair and reasonable
opportunity to explain their side of the controversy at hand. x x x.
There is no denial of due process where there is opportunity to be heard, either through
oral arguments or pleadings. It is settled that opportunity to be heard does not only
mean oral arguments in court but also written arguments through pleadings. Thus, the
fact that a party was heard on his motion for reconsideration negates any violation of
the right to due process. The Court has ruled that denial of due process cannot be
invoked where a party was given the chance to be heard on his motion for
reconsideration.
MALIKSI VS. COMELEC
April 11, 2013
In Maliksis Extremely Urgent Motion for Reconsideration he argued that the Supreme
Court en banc gravely erred in dismissing the instant petition despite a clear violation of
petitioners constitutional right to due process of law considering that decryption, printing
and examination of the digital images of the ballots, which is the basis for the assailed
14 September 2012 resolution of the public respondent, which in turn affirmed the 15
August 2012 resolution of the COMELEC First Division, were done inconspicuously

upon a motu proprio directive of the COMELEC First Division sans any notice to the
petitioner, and for the first time on appeal.
HELD: The Court grants Maliksis Extremely Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, and
reverses the decision promulgated on March 12, 2013 on the ground that the First
Division of the COMELEC denied to him the right to due process by failing to give due
notice on the decryption and printing of the ballot images. Consequently, the Court
annuls the recount proceedings conducted by the First Division with the use of the
printouts of the ballot images.
It bears stressing at the outset that the First Division should not have conducted the
assailed recount proceedings because it was then exercising appellate jurisdiction as to
which no existing rule of procedure allowed it to conduct a recount in the first instance.
The recount proceedings authorized under Section 6, Rule 15 of COMELEC Resolution
No. 8804, as amended, are to be conducted by the COMELEC Divisions only in the
exercise of their exclusive original jurisdiction over all election protests involving elective
regional (the autonomous regions), provincial and city officials.
As we see it, the First Division arbitrarily arrogated unto itself the conduct of the recount
proceedings, contrary to the regular procedure of remanding the protest to the RTC and
directing the reconstitution of the Revision Committee for the decryption and printing of
the picture images and the revision of the ballots on the basis thereof. Quite
unexpectedly, the COMELEC En Banc upheld the First Divisions unwarranted deviation
from the standard procedures by invoking the COMELECs power to take such
measures as [the Presiding Commissioner] may deem proper, and even citing the
Courts minute resolution in Alliance of Barangay Concerns (ABC) Party-List v.
Commission on Elections5 to the effect that the COMELEC has the power to adopt
procedures that will ensure the speedy resolution of its cases. The Court will not
interfere with its exercise of this prerogative so long as the parties are amply heard on
their opposing claims.
Based on the pronouncement in Alliance of Barangay Concerns (ABC) v. Commission
on Elections, the power of the COMELEC to adopt procedures that will ensure the
speedy resolution of its cases should still be exercised only after giving to all the parties
the opportunity to be heard on their opposing claims. The parties right to be heard upon
adversarial issues and matters is never to be waived or sacrificed, or to be treated so
lightly because of the possibility of the substantial prejudice to be thereby caused to the
parties, or to any of them. Thus, the COMELEC En Banc should not
have upheld the First Divisions deviation from the regular procedure in the guise of
speedily resolving the election protest, in view of its failure to provide the parties with
notice of its proceedings and an opportunity to be heard, the most basic requirements of
due process.