UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI

Date: 11-May-2010
I, Carrie Galsworthy

hereby submit this original work as part of the requirements for the degree of:

Doctor of Philosophy
in

Classics

It is entitled:

Language and Intent in Empedocles' Cosmic Cycle

Student Signature:

Carrie Galsworthy

This work and its defense approved by:

Committee Chair:

Holt Parker, PhD

Holt Parker, PhD

William Johnson, PhD

William Johnson, PhD

Susan Prince, PhD

Susan Prince, PhD

5/28/2010

621

Language and Intent in Empedocles

Cosmic Cycle

A dissertation submitted to the

Graduate School
of the University of Cincinnati
in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

in the Department of Classics

of the College of Arts and Sciences

by

Carrie Galsworthy
B.A. (Honours) The University of Western Ontario (Canada), 1994
M.A. The University of Western Ontario (Canada), 1996

May 2010

Abstract

In this dissertation, I analyze how Empedocles uses language to present himself and
his intent. Although Empedocles contemporaries and more modern readers present him
as a scientist or magician, he portrays himself as a god and claims that he will teach
others to become a god like him in order to manipulate the universe. In Chapter One, I
examine the concept of science from an Aristotelian bias and from the standpoint of
modern expectations of science to show that, despite verses that describe how the world
works, Empedocles does not follow the patterns of active conversation with other
thinkers that are available. His stated intent (fragment 111) is to teach others how to
control the universe cure disease and old age, affect the weather, and raise the dead
rather than learn about it theoretically. In Chapter Two, I will show that although the
claims that he makes link him to magicians, he does not present himself as one.
Magicians act as intermediaries between men and the gods (at least in the time
contemporary with Empedocles); the gods do as the magicians ask them because the
magicians have built up a successful relationship through sacrifices and incantations.
Empedocles, on the other hand, accomplishes these feats on his own as a god. Chapter
Three sets out what sort of god Empedocles is: he is a mortal, long-lived god in contrast
with the immortal gods Love, Strife, and the four roots (fire, water, air, and earth).
Anyone can become a god, as I illustrate, as long as one is pure enough and wise enough.
Chapter Four returns to Empedocles use of language to express his intent. Since
controlling the world can be a dangerous lesson, Empedocles uses ambiguity and the
model of initiation into a mystery intentionally to conceal the lessons from hoi polloi.
The audience must decode Empedocles message before they can make further
observations of the world on their way to meeting their goal. Following the model for
initiation, the readers will come to the ultimate revelation on their own. Finally, Chapter
Five focuses on what can be determined from Empedocles verses: the readers must learn
how to emulate the actions of Love and Strife since they are the active agents of change
in the world. By learning about how the world works from Empedocles verses and their
own observation, his students, as gods themselves, will also influence the fabric of the
universe to achieve whatever they wish.

ii

iii

Acknowledgements

A project this big is not done without support. My committee has been invaluable as I
developed my own ideas and got my researchers legs under me. Holt Parker handled my
questions with grace; William Johnson asked piercing questions of me and my text;
Susan Prince provided much insight into where this project can go next. My greatest
thanks go to Ann Michelini who started this project with me as I grappled with the
material; this project would not be what it has become without her asking that I push
myself and my ideas further.
For research support, the staff of the John Miller Burnham Classical Library
Jacquie, Mike, David, and Jean manage the best collection and have all been helpful
personally. I have benefited from the generous financial support of the Classics
Department with the Semple Fellowship, teaching assignments, and a summer term with
the American School of Classical Studies at Athens. All the faculty have been supportive
in and out of the classroom, contributing to my development as a scholar and a teacher. A
doctoral fellowship from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of
Canada (SSHRCC) has also assisted me in accomplishing my goals.
My friends have contributed to the successful completion of this project. The
members of the Dissertation Discussion Group over the years Carol Hershenson,
Kathleen Quinn, Julie Hruby, Shari Stocker, Joanne Murphy, Jim Newhard, Susan Wise,
Anne Feltovich, and Allison Sterrett-Krause have listened to my problems, helped me
to solve them, and reminded me just how important friendship is. The same goes for
other friends and colleagues who are too numerous to name in the academic sphere and
out who have lightened the load with stories and laughter in the tearoom, in the
classroom, and in the real world. I need especially to thank my colleagues at Miami
University who have become my friends Judith de Luce, Deborah Lyons, Denise
McCoskey, Steve Nimis, Peter Rose, Zara Torlone, and Steve Tuck.
Finally, I thank my family for their unwavering belief that I could do anything my
grandparents, my parents, Ken and Nancy, who helped in so many ways that it would
take forever to list just a few, and my little boy, Nick, who tells me Im awesome (until I
say that we cant have chocolate for supper). Who rocks, baby? Thats right, we do.

iv

Table of Contents

Abstract

ii

Acknowledgements

iv

Introduction

Chapter 1 Empedocles the Scientist

Part 1: Looking for Reasons Why

11

1.1 Aristotle Judges the Presocratics

12

1.2 Modern Scholars on the Presocratics

16

1.3 Empedocles as Presocratic Scientist

18

Part 2: Communicating with Others

23

2.1 Competition and Debate

2.1.1 Presocratics Respond to Divine Explanations
2.1.2 Presocratics Respond to Other Presocratics

24
29
33

2.2 Empedocles Lessons

2.2.1 Empedocles Criticism Fragment 2
2.2.2 Empedocles Criticism Fragment 39
2.2.3 A Different Focus

38
39
42
46

2.3 Clarity and Persuasion

2.3.1 Aristotle on Uncommon Language and Science

49
54

2.4 Empedocles Intent

59

Chapter 2 Empedocles the Magician

64

Part 1: Why Magic?

65

1.1 Atoning for Wrongs

1.1.1 Repercussions for Unavenged Murder
1.1.2 Helping the Souls of the Dead

69
73
79

1.2 Bewitching People

81

1.3 Curing Disease

84

1.4 Affecting the Environment

88

Part 2: Was Empedocles a Magician?

91

2.1 Empedocles Claims against Magicians Claims

2.1.1 Atoning for Wrongs
2.1.2 Bewitching People
2.1.3 Curing Disease
2.1.4 Affecting Weather

92
93
94
95
96

2.2 Empedocles Presentation and Others Perceptions

97

Chapter 3 Empedocles the God

105

Part 1: What are the Gods?

106

1.1 Unchanging and Immortal

1.1.1 The Roots
1.1.2 Love and Strife

107
108
112

1.2 Empedocles Mortal Gods

1.2.1 Empedocles model for the long-lived gods
1.2.2 The Composition of the Sphere

116
117
119

Part 2: Becoming a god

123

2.1 Transmigration
2.1.1 The daimones
2.1.2 The Necessity of Transmigration

126
128
132

2.2 Escaping the Cycle?

2.2.1 Being Pure
2.2.2 Being Wise

133
134
136

Chapter 4 Empedocles Mystery

141

Part 1: Ambiguity

141

1.1 A Tradition of Ambiguity

1.1.1 Oracles and Ambiguous Language
1.1.2 Allegory and Mystery Relgion

143
144
146

1.2 Empedocles Ambiguity

1.2.1 Not a Tell-All
1.2.2 A Desire to Obscure

153
154
158

1.3 Empedocles Secret

163

Part 2: Empedocles Initiation

169

2.1 The Journey of Initiation

172

vi

2.1.1 Fragment 110

173

2.2 The in Empedocles Text

2.2.1 Fragment 6 An Example

176
178

2.3 The Rest of the Journey The

2.3.1 Sensation
2.3.2 Thinking

185
187
191

Chapter 5 The Revelation

198

Part 1: The Nature of the Cosmic Cycle

199

1.1 Repetition in the Cycle

1.1.1 Fragment 17
1.1.2 Fragment 26

208
209
211

1.2 The Necessity of the Cycle

214

Part 2: How the Cosmic Cycle Operates

215

2.1 The Roots

2.1.1 How the Root Parts Fit Together
2.1.2 The Attraction of Like to Like

217
220
223

2.2 Love
2.2.1 Love Combines Unlike Things
2.2.2 The One

226
227
232

2.3 Strife
2.3.1 Strife Separates Unlike Things
2.3.2 Strifes Ultimate Goal The Many

239
240
243

Conclusion

254

Works Cited

256

vii

Introduction

Empedocles is an enigmatic figure. On the one hand, his efforts to explain how the
world works link him with contemporaries, whom Aristotle calls natural philosophers
( or ). On the other hand, he also writes about the nature of the soul
and claims further that he could manipulate the world at his whim. Empedocles, however,
does not present himself as a man who outlines how the world works for its own sake,
nor does he present himself as a magician. Empedocles claims to be a god and his intent
is to teach others how they, too, can become gods and control the universe. Empedocles,
therefore, has written about how the world operates, so that his students will gain the
knowledge and power they need to control the world as gods. They, moreover, must have
pure souls so that they can ascend to perfection of form; Empedocles, therefore, sets out
how one can achieve sufficient purity. Since this message is too dangerous for the
consumption of , Empedocles followed the tradition of ambiguity used by
archaic authors and by the mysteries in order to conceal his message purposefully, thus
aggravating potential misinterpretation of his verses. These are extraordinary claims that
will affect our understanding of Empedocles.
Various fragments and testimonia reveal the many aspects of Empedocles selfidentity. Fragments that describe phenomena from the cosmic cycle (how the world
comes into being and ends) to his theories on the development of embryos reveal his
interest in what we would call science. On the basis of such evidence, Aristotles
placement of Empedocles in the tradition of presocratic philosophers appears apt. Yet

there is evidence that sets Empedocles apart from them at the same time. There are
references to Empedocles concern for the soul that elucidate his beliefs in reincarnation
and transmigration of the soul linking him to mystery religions and the akousmatikoi of
the Pythagoreans. Finally, the testimonia and fragment 111 establish his ability to
perform magic, for example, controlling the wind and restoring life to the dead.
The various sources that provide a glimpse of Empedocles other characteristics
exacerbate the challenge of interpreting Empedocles and his verses. The sources fail to
give a complete picture individually since they provide both direct quotations and
interpretive descriptions of Empedocles doctrine in accordance with their own interests.
Aristotle and his successors emphasize scientific theories of the universe while the neoPlatonists discuss Empedocles philosophy on the soul, often considered a religious topic;
Empedocles magical powers are preserved in biographical fragments (specifically B111
and B112) and testimonia. There is little overlap among the sources for science, magic, or
religion. Modern scholars then interpreted the various aspects as incompatible, a position
aggravated by contemporary biases, especially Frazers tripartite division of magic,
religion, and science.1
This strict distinction in the sources and modern prejudices made it impossible for the
19th and early 20th century scholars to accept that Empedocles could be a religious figure,
as some sources maintain, since Aristotle insists he is a scientist. Some suggested that
Empedocles was philosophically inconsistent while others proposed that later in life
Empedocles either converted to a life of faith or lost his faith altogether.2 Diogenes
1

Frazer 1922 The Golden Bough.

Rohde 1925 (382-83), Millerd 1908 (89-94), and Jaeger 1947 (132-35) argued that Empedocles did not
fully think through the implications of his philosophy. Diels 1898 (406) and Wilamowitz 1929 (655)
believed that a latter life conversion led to the production of the while Bidez 1894 (160-71) and

Lartius speaks of two poems (

(Lives of Philosophers 8.77 = DK 31A1) His works On
Nature and Purifications extend to 5000 lines)3 and this allowed scholars to separate
the fragments. Editors assigned those fragments that describe the physical world to
and those with religious overtones to , primarily his doctrine of the
souls reincarnation, the hierarchy of souls, and prescriptions associated with
reincarnation, especially those against animal sacrifice and the consumption of meat.4
Scholars originally discounted the claims of magic in fragment 111 altogether or
minimized them because such a label was considered pejorative in the 19th century when
magic was viewed as primitive, the source from which religion and then science
evolved.5
Scholars, however, subsequently argued that the distinction between Empedocles
theories of reincarnation and of how the world works is a mirage.6 The evolutionary
model of magic, religion, and science has been rejected. The problem of unity for
Empedocles thought is now generally set aside and manifests itself primarily in the
question of whether Empedocles wrote one poem or two. If all of Empedocles doctrines
are closely entwined, this might support the belief that he wrote only one poem. 7 Others

Kranz 1935 (111-19) proposed that the later years were marked by a loss of faith and the were
written in his youth.
3

Empedocles addressed the to the citizens of Acragas (Diogenes Lartius Lives 8.54) and
to Pausanias (ibid. 8.60).
4

Long 1949 (144).

Karsten 1838, van Groningen 1956.

Nestle 1906 first argued this position. Other scholars to follow this trend include: Long 1949, Kahn 1960,
Guthrie 1965 (2:134-38, 244-65), Barnes 1967, Babut 1976, Wright 1981 (57-76), Osborne 1987, Inwood
2001, Kingsley 1995a.
7

Osborne 1987 (24-32) made this claim first. Inwood 2001 (8-19), McKirahan 1994 (256-258), and
Trpanier 2004 (1-30) are among supporters for this interpretation. Not everyone shares this interpretation,

argue, on the other hand, that the poems should not be considered separate on the basis of
subject matter, but on the variation between audiences, that is, the was written
for a more general audience (exoteric) and for a more specific and learned
listener (esoteric).8
Despite recognition of the unity of Empedocles thought, the Aristotelian bias
regarding the study of Empedocles physical theories persists:
, ,
. (Aristotle Poetics 1447b17ff. = DK 31A22) And there is
nothing common between Homer and Empedocles except for the metre, wherefore it is
right to call the former a poet, and the latter a physiologos rather than a poet. Aristotle
makes two equally important claims: 1) that Empedocles is a physiologos and, therefore,
seeks simply to describe the nature of the world, and 2) that Empedocles is not a poet,
and this mode of delivery prevents a clear presentation9 of what Aristotle argues is
Empedocles message. Scholars continue to treat Empedocles fragments as though it
were his intent to produce a complete and coherent account of how the world operates as
Aristotle expects of the physikoi, rather than as a means to an end, that is, to gain control
over the world as a god. This is evident in a recent analysis of Empedocles:
The over-arching goal of Empedocles poem, I have argued so far, was to convert the
hearer to a new, unified vision of reality, one whose initial expression was put forth
in fragment 17/ensemble a. By such an undertaking, Empedocles not only sought to
restore legitimacy to the project of inquiry into nature, called into question by

for example, Sedley 1989 (270-74) and OBrien 1995 (431-436). Hesiod, for example, wrote two distinct
poems with closely entwined doctrines (Clay 2003).
8

Kahn 1974 (429ff.). Kingsley 1995a (chapter 23) develops this interpretation more fully; he repeats it in
1996 and 2002 (344-50).
9

Aristotle Rhetoric 1407a31-7.

Parmenides, but also claimed to provide his own final answer to that quest.
(Trpanier 2004: 181).

Empedocles does describe how the world works a significant percentage of the extant
fragments illustrate the cosmic cycle, that is, the framework for creation, and the
construction of various components within the cycle. But his goal is not simply to
establish the structure since fragment 111 constitutes a statement of Empedocles intent.
Aristotles definition of physikos has limited our interpretation of Empedocles. The extant
fragments and Empedocles social and intellectual context reveal a philosophy with
practical implications. Like a mystery religion, Empedocles will help his students, the
initiates, become pure, learn the lessons they require, and acquire the final revelation
control over the world.
Chapter 1 examines the concept of scientist both from a point of view
contemporary with Empedocles and from the more modern definition. In both cases, clear
communication designed to share theories is necessary. Aristotle is right when he claims
that Empedocles is ambiguous and never provided a complete account of how the world
works. What the readers see, however, is a promise to learn how to cure disease, control
the weather, and raise the dead (fragment 111). Chapter 2 investigates the various skills
attributed to magicians roughly contemporary with Empedocles and how they claim to
accomplish these things. Magicians perform these feats by seeking help from the gods;
Empedocles, however, claims to be a god himself and thus does not present himself as a
magician. Chapter 3 explores Empedocles concept of divinity: he posits two kinds of
gods, immortal and mortal. The immortal gods are Love, Strife, and the four roots (fire,
air, water, earth); the mortal gods are compounds that are perfectly balanced in their
composition of roots and have Love spread throughout. Empedocles claims to be a mortal
5

god who achieved this state through living purely and being wise. Chapter 4 examines the
tradition of divine ambiguity in which Empedocles presents his ideas and how he expects
the readers to undergo an initiation of interpreting text balanced with careful examination
of the world in order to understand how the universe really works. Finally chapter 5 looks
at Empedocles cosmological fragments to show that the lesson the readers will derive is
how Love and Strife are able to manipulate the world. If the readers can mimic how Love
unites the roots and Strife separates them while respecting the roots innate attraction of
like to like, they, too, should be able to manipulate the world as Empedocles promises in
fragment 111.

Chapter 1 Empedocles the Scientist

As I note in the introduction, analysis of Empedocles verses have traditionally relied

on putting him into one of two categories scientist or magician. Each seemed natural
to those labeling him thus owing to the content of his verses and the various testimonia
about him; Aristotle, for example, says that Empedocles should be called a scientist
(physiologos) rather than a poet:
,
(Aristotle Poetics 1447b17ff. = DK 31A221) And there is nothing common between
Homer and Empedocles except for the metre, wherefore it is right to call the former a
poet, and the latter a physiologos rather than a poet. The Presocratics recognized that
they were pursuing an investigation of nature that differed from what came before them
in that they did not rely on the gods to explain natural phenomena such as the motion of
the sun or earthquakes.2 But did Empedocles include himself among them? I will explore
this question from two points of view: Aristotle, who is often called the first historian of
science3, and modern historians of science who continue to identify Empedocles as a
scientist.

I use the Diels-Kranz text. I will note any variations.

Various presocratics attempted to remove divine agency from meteorological phenomena in particular,
but they still believed that the gods were part of the world. Anaximander accounted for wind, rain, thunder
and lightning, and storms (Hippolytus Refutatio 1.6.7 = DK 12A11, Aetius 3.3.1-2 = DK 12A23).
Anaximenes accounted for earthquakes (Aristotle Meteorologica 365b6 = DK 13A21) as well as clouds,
rain, and snow (Aetius 3.4.1 = DK 13A17). Democritus accounted for thunder, lightning, and waterspouts
(Aetius 3.3.11 = DK 68A93).
3

Since Aristotle used investigations earlier than his own to illustrate how his own methods were preferable,
he casts a long shadow and it is necessary to look beyond Aristotles bias to give other theories a balanced

Aristotle classifies Empedocles as a physikos () or physiologos ()4,

an individual who studies , nature, along with others now called the Presocratics.
Aristotle considers himself the most recent of all these physikoi seeking knowledge about
how the world works, describing his predecessors as those who have come before us5 in
the investigation of things that are (
Metaphysics 983b1-2). Aristotle believes that the most important thing to do in
studying the things that are ( ) is to preserve the phenomena, that is, to uphold
what one observes about what is, in opposition to Plato and his theory of the Forms.6 It is
also important to pass on clearly ones theories to other people.
Modern historians of science also call Empedocles a scientist together with the
Presocratics.7 Although it would be easy to declare that they were not scientists because

reading. Cherniss 1935 traces this problem with Aristotle as a historian of science. For other treatments, see
Guthrie 1957, who gives a more charitable interpretation of Aristotle as historian, and Collobert 2002, who
argues that Aristotle was not a good historian. Juffras 1989 (199-200) argues that Aristotle is a true
historian of philosophical problems since he provides a focus for his investigation, that is, his own
outcomes.
4

The terms are interchangeable. Physiologos:

,
. (Aristotle Eudemian Ethics 1235a11) And physiologoi arrange the whole
universe taking as a principle that like goes to like, wherefore Empedocles said that the female dog sat on
the tile because it had the most similarity;
, . . . ,
(Aristotle de generatione animalium 763b31) Some people, such as Anaxagoras and other physiologoi,
say that this opposition exists immediately in the semen others, like Empedocles, say it occurs in the
womb. Physikos: , ,
, (Aristotle de mundo
399b25) For it would be said truly that phenomena all that is in the air, upon the earth, and in the water
are the works of god who rules the universe, from whom, as Empedocles the physikos says
5

This may be a nos modestiae or a reference to his audience. Aristotles works may be either esoteric, that
is, not written for consumption by the public, or they may be lecture notes published by his students
(Barnes 1995 (12)).
6

Aristotle describes his method in Physics 1.1 and in Posterior Analytics 2.19. In natural science, one
begins with what is most evident, that is, what is perceived. When enough examples are perceived, it is
possible to draw more general conclusions. See Bolton 1991 for a more in-depth analysis of the passages in
question. See also Nussbaum 1982 on preserving appearances.
7

History of ancient science handbooks often begin from Thales: de Santillana 1961, Furley 1987, Graham
2006, Lindberg 2007. Handbooks on the Presocratics from classicists emphasize the various scientific

they did not come up with the right answers or they made use of descriptions
(qualitative) rather than equations (quantitative) or they had no experimental method to
speak of as triumphalists would argue8, more recent philosophies of science recognize
that definitions of science change with time and location. First, for example, Crombie
1994 (pp. x-xi) argues that as long as the individuals who investigate how the world
works can agree on which phenomena should be studied, which questions are valid, what
evidence is acceptable as proof and how the evidence should be presented, then they are
pursuing a scientific course.9 On the other hand, Karl Popper (1958 (1962) 136) argues
that the purpose of a scientific tradition is simply to understand the world we live in and
to solve problems that arise through observing the world and through critical discussion
(1962, 155). He attributes to the Presocratics the innovation of scrutinizing the received
tradition. In both of these theories, the shared emphasis is on developing theories and
sharing them, whether through presenting evidence or through critical discussion. Finally,
Classical scholars argue that the Presocratics were a revolution in thought and science10
because each Presocratic thinker shared with the others a set of assumptions: that the
world () they lived in was ordered and predictable because it was based on a

views they expound: Burnet 1930, Popper 1958, Guthrie 1962, Hussey 1972, Kirk, Raven, and Schofield
1983, McKirahan 1994, Wright 1995, Curd and Graham 2008.
8

The primary problem here is the assumption that we know the right answers.

Compare Hussey 1995 who argues the Presocratics stand at the beginning of science because they all
followed the rules of the game: unity, economy, and symmetry of theory; analogy and eikos-reasoning;
and the concept of physis.
10

Kahn 1991, reviving the beliefs first put forward by Tannery 1930 and Burnet 1930. Hussey 1995 is
more reserved in seeing the Presocratics as a revolution; for a more enthusiastic version of this thesis,
Graham concludes in his 2006 study: Without our Ionian forebears, the world we live in would be so
different we do not know what it would be like. But probably it would not be a world built on advanced
science and technology. (p. 307) This is against the view represented by Kirk, Raven, and Schofield 1983
in chapter 1, for example, who treat the Presocratics as a continuation of both Homer and Hesiod, on the
one hand, and Near Eastern myth and astronomy on the other.

physical nature () that could be studied through observation and reflected upon
().11 At the very least, the Presocratics are at the beginning of a scientific path.
Although these two points of view are separated by thousands of years, Aristotle and
the historians share similarities in what they seek from ancient scientists. The first part of
this chapter will show that they believe scientists should ask why the world works as it
does, looking for answers from within the very fabric of the world rather than from
supernatural or external forces. The second part of the chapter will investigate the
necessity of unambiguous communication with others who also want to know how the
natural world operates. Aristotle believes that if a scientist does not express his ideas
clearly so that others can understand, then the scientist does not understand himself. The
ideals, on the other hand, of modern institutional science that scientific claims and
results will be tested without reference to the attributes of the person/ people who
advanced them, that results belong to the scientific community as a whole, that every
scientist pursues knowledge for the sake of knowledge, and that final judgment is
postponed until all evidence has been collected12 are often postulated backwards.
Although the ideals do not often apply to the reality13, cooperation tends to be the norm in

11

The importance of the concept of the and has been stressed by Lloyd 1970 (8 ff.), Lloyd
1979, and others including Kahn 1991, Hussey 1995, Graham 2006, and Hankinson 2008.
12

Merton 1942 (The Normative Structure of Science reproduced in Merton 1973) developed these four
norms he calls them universalism, communism, disinterestedness, and organized skepticism on
the basis of noticing that from 17th century England, science became the province of the elite and frequently
had little practical payoff.
13

Kuhn 1962 points out the short-fallings of the ideal since the scientific community tends to propagate the
paradigm of the moment whether it is big bang or relativity to the detriment of scientists who try to
argue a counter-position, such as Dunning-Davies points out in Exploding a Myth: Conventional Wisdom
or Scientific Truth? (Horwood Publishing Limited, 2007). Bucchi 2004 refers to the study published by
Mitroff (1974) that illustrates how Mertons four norms are matched by counter-norms where scientists are
motivated to keep some results secret, thus preserving the integrity of the smaller group in which the
scientist works and maintaining the superiority of ones own theory without all the data (or even in light of
contrary data).

10

the scientific community with co-authored papers and refereed journals; for this reason,
historians emphasize the non-institutional community that the Presocratics shared.
From his own words, Empedocles appears to fulfill the first condition of being a scientist
since he writes about how the world functions; but he does not fulfill the second. When
one tries to fit Empedocles to the second constraint, whether through unambiguous
writing or through dialogue (implicit or explicit) with other scientists, it becomes clear
that Empedocles would not call himself a scientist either.

Part 1: Looking for Reasons Why

Science tries to determine why things happen in the world. The sun rises in the east
and sets in the west. Summer follows winter and summer comes again. A seed is sown in
the ground and a plant grows from it. People have always observed how nature operates
and can exploit it with, for example, agriculture, but do not necessarily understand how
or why it happens. In Greek society, the poets explained all such natural phenomena,
whether those that follow a regular and predictable pattern or extraordinary events such
as plague, lightning, and earthquakes, as coming from the actions of the gods; and rituals
were carried out to preserve an amicable relationship with the gods, thus maintaining the
status quo and attempting to prevent disasters.14 Modern scholars argue that science came
into being when some Greeks looked for an explanation that tried to reduce all
phenomena to natural cause and effect, that is, one thing happened in nature and this led
to an outcome in nature. The Presocratics distinguished themselves from the Near Eastern
thinkers, especially in astronomy, because they moved beyond observing phenomena and

14

See part 1 of chapter 2 for more on this.

11

keeping records15 to postulating how and why things work, and they are separate from
Homer and Hesiod because they do not assign natural events to the province of the gods.
Examination of Empedocles verses illustrates how he has his own interpretation of how
the world works and assumes that it has a physical nature whose regularity can be
studied. According to this first criterion, Empedocles deserves the title scientist.

1.1

ARISTOTLE JUDGES THE PRESOCRATICS

Aristotle studies these Presocratic physikoi and how they study , nature, in order

to compare their activities with his own.16 Aristotle first sets out in Physics the
requirements of what a physikos must do, and that is to determine the causes () of
things.

, ,
( ,

),
.
Aristotle Physics 184a10-16

15

Neugebauer 1957 and 1975.

16

The study of nature is part of the larger field that Aristotle calls , that is, scientific knowledge or
science. This knowledge is always, or for the most part, certain:
; (Aristotle Metaphysics 1027a20-22) For all epistm
is either of what is always or what is for the most part for how will one learn or teach another [if you are
not certain]? Aristotle identifies three categories of . The first two are productive science (),
for example, agriculture and carpentry, and practical science, that is, how do people act whether as an
individual (ethics) or as a society (politics). The third category is theoretical and includes mathematics, the
study of divinity, that is, things that do not change, and natural science, the study of . Natural science
focuses on everything that is below the moon.

12

Since knowing and scientific knowledge about all intellectual pursuits that have
principles, causes, or elements occurs from being acquainted with them for we
think that we know each thing when we are acquainted with the first causes and the
first principles as far as its elements it is clear that one must try first to determine
the principles of knowledge regarding nature (i.e., natural science).

Since Aristotle argues that the Presocratics seek, essentially, to do the same thing as he
does, they too must look for the beginnings and causes of the things that are.17 One
should start with what one can perceive before proceeding to an analysis of why it is that
way; and Aristotle argues that one thing that unites all things in this world is that they
change or are subject to change (Physics 185a12-13), and when the physikos studies
nature, therefore, he is attempting to discover the causes () of change why they
change or do not change by inferring from what is known by perception.18 This change
can be of substance (coming into being or being destroyed), quality (an alteration, for
example, from hard to soft or vice versa), quantity (growing or shrinking), or of place,
that is, motion.
Aristotle identifies four : material, formal, efficient, and final.19 Aristotle claims,
moreover, that to understand and explain change fully, one must understand all four for
each object of study (Physics 198a22-25). The material cause is the substance of which
17

,
.

. (Aristotle Metaphysics
983a33-b6) We have examined sufficiently these things in our work on nature [Physics], but nevertheless
let us take up those who have come before us in the investigation of things that are and who philosophize
about reality. For it is clear that even they speak of certain beginnings and causes. For there will be some
profit to the present inquiry from them, whether we will find some other sort of cause or we will have more
confidence in the causes already stated.
18

Aristotle discusses this primarily in the first book of Physics. See Boas 1947, Bostock 1982, Bolton
1991.
19

Aristotle begins this discussion at Physics 194b17. For a general discussion of the two major modern
interpretations, see Moravcsik 1991 (cause as because or explanation) and Freeland 1991 (cause as
cause).

13

the object of study is composed. The formal cause is the substance actualized its form,
its shape, its pattern. The efficient cause explains why the object changes, or does not
change. It makes clear the relationship between the agent that produces change and the
object, whether the change is imposed from outside or if an internal cause of change is
present. The last cause is called final because it explains the reason for which the object
exists; it is the goal of change. To use a person as an example, in the infant, the form of
the human is present (formal cause) and the infants goal of change (final cause) is to
become an adult. The formal cause and the final cause are entwined. This infant contains
an internal source of change (efficient cause) as it grows, but the father is also an efficient
cause as he provides the form of human, since he possesses this form as well, to the
matter of flesh, blood, and bones. To use a bronze statue as an example, bronze would be
the material cause; the formal cause is the shape that the art of the sculptor (efficient
cause) bestows to the bronze.20
When Aristotle examines his predecessors theories in light of his own criteria, it is
hardly surprising that he is disappointed. Nevertheless, they do attempt to uncover the
underlying principles that unite all of nature and account for the regular cause and effect
that they assume is happening. Aristotle complains that the earliest Presocratics (for
example, Thales, Anaximander, and Anaximenes) address only the material cause
(Metaphysics 983b6-20), but they probably assume that souls are the efficient cause since
possession of a soul distinguishes living from non-living things.21 In general, Aristotle
believes that the Presocratics failed to tackle large gaps in their explanations.
Empedocles, on the other hand, earns praise for both the sophistication of his material
20

Aristotle Physics 2.3, Metaphysics 5.2.

21

Hankinson 2008 (442-3).

14

causes and attempts at efficient causes, although ultimately, for Aristotle, he is not
completely successful.
,
, .
.

,
,
(
,
,
.)
Aristotle Metaphysics 985a21-b3 = DK 31A37
And Empedocles employs the causes more extensively than [Anaxagoras]; not,
however, sufficiently nor does he achieve consistency in the use of them; at any rate
his Love often separates and Strife combines. Empedocles, then, in contrast to his
predecessors was the first to introduce a distinction in the cause by not making the
principle of motion22 one but [making them] different and opposite [to each other].
Moreover, he was the first to say that the so-called material elements were four. But
he does not use the four, but [as though] there were only two; fire on its own and the
opposed elements earth, air, and water as one nature. One may conclude this by
reflection on his verses.

Aristotle claims, therefore, that Empedocles has sought to explain how and why things
change or fail to change by using two of the causes that Aristotle identifies the material

22

Love and Strife, the principles of motion ( ), are Empedocles efficient causes.

15

and the efficient. Empedocles has fulfilled, imperfectly, the primary requirement that
Aristotle set out for physikoi.23

1.2

MODERN SCHOLARS ON THE PRESOCRATICS

Modern scholars also recognize as scientists Empedocles and the other Presocratics

for much the same reason as Aristotle: these individuals sought natural explanations for
things that exist in the natural world. The world was predictable and ordered ()
with a physical nature () that could be studied and described ().24
The word, , originally meant order or orderly, e.g., (
, | |
. (Homer Iliad 10.471-3) Overwhelmed by
fatigue, they [the Thracian soldiers] slept, their gear lay in good order in three rows on
the ground around them, and by each man stood his chariot team.25), thus suggesting
organization, if not the best organization for maximum efficiency. Heraclitus is the first
extant writer to use the term to explicitly mean the world as an organized and regular
system: , , ,
, .
(Clement Stromata 5.104.1 = DK 22B30) This world (order), the same of all26, no one of
gods nor men made, but it always was and is and will be an ever-living fire, kindled in

23

I will examine Empedocles verses in 1.3 below to illustrate in more detail how Aristotle (and modern
scholars) come to the conclusion that Empedocles should be called a scientist.
24

Graham 2006

25

Compare Iliad 11.48 and 12.85, for example, as the Greek and Trojan forces respectively prepare for
battle.
26

See Kirk, Raven, and Schofield 1983 (198 n. 1) regarding the authenticity of the phrase
.

16

turn and extinguished in turn. Although the earlier Presocratics did not use the term (at
least according to the accident of preservation), their fragments illustrate a belief in
regular cause and effect that suggests an implicit acceptance of a predictable world order.
Thales, for example, believed that earthquakes resulted from waves in the water on which
the world rested. Just as a log or ship floats on water and rocks with the waters motion,
so too the earth floats and quakes a predictable cause and effect.27 Since they assume
that the world is ordered and regular, this means that repeated effects, such as lightning or
earthquakes, have repeated causes that can be discovered.
Causes can be discovered for effects because the world has a , a nature with
qualities that are particular to it; each thing in the world has a nature particular to it,
creating an interwoven web of . And the world and everything in it will act
according to its nature ( or ). The Presocratics, therefore, draw a
distinction in causation owing to the predictability of a things nature; they argue that
events in nature ordinary and extraordinary are not random nor the acts of a
capricious god. The Presocratics were confident that they could uncover the of the
to explain through investigation () of how things work and why events
occur.28 They share in common a desire to uncover what tied the nature of the

27

Aristotle relates that Thales described the world as floating on water like a log:
[sc. ]. ,
. (Aristotle de caelo 294a28 = DK 11A14)
Some say (the earth) lies on water. We have received this very old report, which they say that Thales the
Milesian says that it remains floating like a log or some such thing. Seneca says that Thales explained
earthquakes via the floating-earth theory: ait (sc. Thales) enim terrarum orbem aqua sustineri et vehi more
navigii mobilitateque eius fluctare tunc cum dicitur tremere (Seneca Nat. Quaest. 3.14 = DK 11A15) For
he (Thales) says that the earth is held up by water and carried in the manner of a ship and it rocks by that
(waters) motion at the time when it is said to quake.
28

Graham 2006 (302) used this term of the Presocratics. Herodotus is our first use of the word to describe
the investigations he undertook in history and ethnography, and is the root of our word history:
. (Herodotus Histories 1.1) This is the publication of the
investigation of Herodotus of Halicarnassus.

17

together, that is, what made it a unified whole. By reducing the material stuff from which
all things were made whether of one substance, for example, water (Thales) or air
(Anaximenes), or a limited number, for example, water and earth (Xenophanes) or fire,
water, earth, and air (Empedocles), or something undefined from which all else came, for
example, apeiron (Anaximander) every phenomenon would simply be an effect from
that materials natural action and reaction.

1.3

EMPEDOCLES AS PRESOCRATIC SCIENTIST

Aristotle and modern scholars have good reason to believe that Empedocles is a

scientist according to their definitions. Aristotle argues that physikoi should discover the
causes material, formal, efficient, and final of change in the natural world. Modern
scholars expect scientists to describe the world as organized and regular (a ) with
a nature () that acts and reacts in a predictable fashion, without relying on the gods
to explain how the world operates. Both look for reasons that derive from nature to
explain nature.
Although Aristotle does not quote any of Empedocles verses to support his
observations, Simplicius cites fragment 1729 when he comments on Physics 187a21ff,
where Aristotle is discussing how Empedocles describes the world as coming about from
a cycle of mixture from one to many. Empedocles outlines the basic cycle in which the
world comes to be from the constituent elements (the material causes) through the agency
of Love and Strife (the efficient causes).
29

The recent edition of the Strasbourg papyrus (Martin and Primavesi 1999) places fragment 17 within the
poem as a whole. Ensemble a of the papyrus continues this fragment for another 34 lines and a mark at the
final line indicates that it is the 300th. Since Simplicius took the fragment from the first book (
(Simplicius Physics CIAG 9.157.27)), fragment 17 begins at Physics 1.233.

18


, .
,
,
.30

,
,
.
< >
,

10

,
.

,

15

, ,
31 ,

30

I have printed Panzerbieters (1844, 8) emendations following most modern editors and commentators:
Dmmler 1889; Gomperz 1901; Millerd 1908, 44-47; Burnet 1930, 234-5; Solmsen 1965, 138; Guthrie
1965, 167-85; O'Brien (passim); Cleve 1969; Mansfeld 1972, 17; Long 1974, 401; Wright 1981, 41-44;
Graham 1988; Inwood 2001, 44-49; McKirahan 1994, 269-70; Martin and Primavesi 1999, 78-82, 89,
Trpanier 2004. Not all editors use Panzerbieters emendation: von Arnim 1902, 26 and Hlscher 1965, 31
retain ; Bollack's text (fr. 31) differs considerably from other texts ( ).
31

: Plutarch quom. adul. ab amico 22 (p.63D), Clement Strom. 6.17; : Sextus adv. Math. 9.10,
Athenagoras 22, Simplicius Physics 158.17. The earliest editions of Empedocles use as opposed to
(Karsten (1838) verse 103, Panzerbieter (1844) p.9). Diels-Kranz (=B17) set the standard for later
editions (Bollack (1969) fr. 31; Wright (1981) fr. 8; Inwood (2001) fr. 25) on the basis of their
interpretation of Clement Strom. 5.48 (=B38) where is distinct from and they interpret as

19

 , ,
,

20

Simplicius Physics CIAG 9.158.1-19 = DK 31B17.1-20

I will say two-fold things: for at one time, [they]32 grew to be One alone from Many
and at another time, moreover, they grew apart to be Many from One. Double is the
birth of mortal things and double their passing away, for on the one hand the coming
together of all both creates and destroys the one [i.e., ] and on the other
hand, the other [i.e., ], having been nurtured, flies off when [all] separate
again. And these things never cease from constantly alternating, at one time, all
things coming together into One through the agency of Love and at another each
thing being carried apart by the enmity of Strife. In this way, insofar as they have
learned to become One from Many and they end up as Many when the One is divided
again, in this respect they come into being and there is no secure life for them. But
insofar as they never stop changing constantly, in this respect they are always
unchanged in a cycle. But come, listen to my words for learning will increase your
mind. For, as I have said before when I revealed the limits of my words, I will say
two-fold things: for at one time, [they] grew to be One alone from Many and at
another time, moreover, they grew apart to be Many from One fire and water and
earth and the boundless height of air, and destructive Strife apart from them,
equivalent in every respect and Love among them, equal both in length and breadth.

The Many, which Empedocles does not identify by name until line 18, are the material
causes; Aristotle calls them elements ()33 but Empedocles, in fragment 6, calls

fire to keep the fragment as a listing of four elements. Kingsley 1995a (ch. 3) (see also Kingsley 1995c
(1)) argues that Diels and Kranz translation of B38 is flawed. The situation was aggravated by a lack of
understanding of the early use of vs. (Kingsley 1995a ch. 2) was used of air generally
whereas was a wet, heavy air, mist-like. West 1966 (351-2) points out how and were
frequently exchanged in manuscripts, Compare Simplicius own comments on Empedocles use of the
term: (.) , ,
(Simplicius Physics CIAG.9.33.3-4) he calls fire Hephaistos, sun and flame, water rain and air aither.
This shows how was the common term for air for Simplicius as opposed to .
32

Neuter plural subject based on in line 2.

33

See, for example, Aristotle Metaphysics 985a21-b3 = DK 31A37 quoted above.

20

them roots (): fire, water, earth, and air.34 Love and Strife combine and separate
these roots in turn, generating countless combinations to create the world around us and
also destroying it. In Aristotles interpretation, therefore, the efficient causes (Love and
Strife) produce the changes in the world from the material causes (fire, air, water, and
earth).
The fragment begins with a programmatic statement: I will tell two-fold
things. Empedocles reveals a double tale of unification (from Many to One) and
separation (from One to Many). Although unidentified at first, the Many are the roots
named in line 18 of this fragment air, water, fire and earth. Lines 1-2 lay out the thesis
for the fragment, that is, the alternation from One to Many and from Many to One.35
Lines 3-5 are an addition to this central tenet as marked by of line 3: the coming
together and separation of all things cause () the double birth and double destruction
of mortal things. The creation and destruction of mortal things are discrete from these
phases of One and Many. There are two worlds of mortal things within a single cycle
from Many to Many. Mortal things are a by-product of this unification and separation.
The conjunction in lines 6-8 appends a further point, namely that this alternation
occurs over and over again. After the One has been formed, Strife then will separate the
roots into Many, but not until another world of mortal things has been created and
destroyed. Lines 9-13 are a consequence of lines 6-8 (); since the alternation
continues without end, the only stability that mortal things can count on is the process of
the cycle. Although change does not cease as Love and Strife manipulate the roots into

34

See 1.1.1 in chapter 3 and 2.2.1 in chapter 4.

35

I describe the One in 1.2 of chapter 3 and 2.2.1 of chapter 5. I describe the Many in 2.3.2 of chapter

5.

21

One and then Many, a certain stability arises from the consistency of the cycle. The
remainder of this section (lines 14-20) builds on these movements from Many to One and
from One to Many, identifying and describing the components (that is, the roots) and
processes (that is, Love and Strife). Separation following unification becomes a motif that
is repeated throughout this fragment and imitates it while describing it since the world
will be created and destroyed many times. Despite the changes that the roots undergo the
basic stability of the cycle remains untouched. This same pattern is repeated in other
fragments that describe the cosmic cycle.36
Empedocles indicates that the verses quoted above are the (line 15)
the limits of his words. Homer uses a parallel phrase when Nestor explains to his son,
Antilochus, how to drive his chariot in the funeral games of Patroclus:
(Iliad 23.350) he spoke to his son the limits of each thing.37
Nestor has explained all that Antilochus must know for success in the competition. In the
same way, Empedocles has established in these verses all that is necessary to understand
the cycle of creation. There is room to expand on individual points, but Empedocles has
demarcated the essentials within the whole and outlined his general theory.
Aristotle and modern scholars, therefore, have little difficulty using Empedocles own
verses to support their assessment that he is a scientist because he seeks to explain how
an ordered world operates. Fragment 17 shows that the world is ordered and predictable
since the same matter earth, air, water, and fire combine to create all the combinations
36

Guthrie 1965 (167-85) discusses this traditional model of One to created world to Many to another
created world and back to One to begin the cycle again, taking into account changes proposed by OBrien
(1969) before his book was published. Although this model was prevalent before the challenge of various
single creation models in the 1960s, Graham 1988 returned to the cycle, taking into account the logical,
literary, and rhetorical structure of fragment 17 as a whole. I outline Grahams interpretation. Compare also
Cleve 1969, Wright 1981, Osborne 1987, Inwood 2001, McKirahan 1994, Martin and Primavesi 1999.
37

Bollack 1969 (3:63).

22

of mortal things in the world, and when the mortal things perish, they go back to those
same constituents. The forces responsible for these changes also act and react in
predictable ways. But the other requirement, which they establish for scientists that
they communicate and debate with others looking for answers in the natural world,
cannot be found in Empedocles words.

Part 2: Communicating with Others

In addition to trying to figure out why things happen in the world, another element
that some modern scientists find crucial for identifying science and scientific progress is
the presence of some sort of community that shares, tests or verifies, and builds on
ideas.38 Members of a scientific community share ideas through publication and more
informal methods, and peer review is designed to ensure that the research methodology is
sound. If the community, therefore, is non-existent, the science is questionable.39 Modern
historians, therefore, emphasize the competitive nature of presocratic philosophy since
some emphasize the institutional nature of scientific exploration starting in the
Renaissance as the beginning of science.40 Ancient biographers described many
Presocratics as being the pupils of an earlier philosopher41, but modern scholars cast them
instead as responding to earlier theories, shaping their own through debate, and
38

Compare Fishs interpretive communities, a group of individuals who share a set of presumptions
about a text and read it accordingly (Fish 1980). See 2.2 in chapter 4.
39

Kuhn 1962 argues, however, that the existence of scientific revolutions, in which considerable changes
occur, undermines the reliability of the scientific community to be adequate judges. See n. 13 above.
40

Hall 1983, Cohen 1985. Others argue that there would have been no revolution in the Renaissance
without the study of Greek, Latin, and Islamic texts in the Middle Ages: Grant 1996, Gaukroger 2006.
41

The Suda (s.v.), for example, identifies Anaximander as kinsman, student, and successor (
) of Thales; Diogenes Lartius says that Anaximenes was the student of Anaximander
( ) or Parmenides (Lives 2.3) and that Parmenides was the student of Xenophanes
(Lives 9.21). See Fairweather 1974 and Lefkowitz 1981 for scholarly skepticism of such biographical
details.

23

presenting them persuasively through rhetoric.42 Although they were not based in the
same location, the Presocratics were clearly aware of one another and the theories of
each. Aristotle also argues that the Presocratics must express their science clearly so that
others can respond to their criticisms and input.
When trying to identify this criterion in Empedocles words, however, it becomes
clear that Empedocles avoids the openly competitive stance of some of his predecessors
and contemporaries. While he criticizes his predecessors theories, he fails to argue why
those theories are inadequate. Although he does address many of the same topics such as
the composition and creation of the world, he emphasizes that the lesson his audience
will learn is to control the world. As for persuasion and clarity, when Aristotle complains
about Empedocles ambiguity, comparing him to the oracle at Delphi, he inadvertently
points out Empedocles intent: to set out his lessons on how to control the world as a
revelation from a god.

2.1

COMPETITION AND DEBATE

Ideas spread around the ancient Mediterranean not so much by books and

publications in libraries (as happens in more modern scientific communities), but by

itinerant craftsmen plying their trade. With their relative mobility since they were not tied
to the land, they could travel from community to community, offering their services for a
fee.

, ,

42

Lloyd 1979, especially chapter 2.

24

 ,
, .

Homer Odyssey 17.382-386
For who invites a stranger from somewhere else, except one of those who are skilled
craftsmen a prophet or healer of ills or a builder of beams or even a divine singer
who delights with song? For these men are invited all over the earth.

The tradition is a long-standing one and widespread. Solon, the various tyrants of
Corinth, and Themistocles are examples of leaders who invited craftsmen to immigrate to
their city.43 Herodotus describes how Democedes, a doctor originally from Croton on the
southern coast of Italy across the Ionium sea from Corcyra, became a personal physician
to Darius in Susa. As a young man, he moved first to Aegina to practice medicine; from
there he moved to Athens within a few years and then to Samos at the invitation of
Polycrates. Democedes was captured in Sardis when Polycrates was lured there by
Oroetes and brought to Susa.44 Engineers were also invited to various cities. Biton45,
describing the war machinery and catapults of Zopyrus, states that he was originally from
Tarentum and designed machinery in Miletus (62.1 Wescher) and in Cumae (65.2
Wescher).46 Travel, therefore, was common among individuals in specialized trades.
43

Burkert 1992 (23). Solon: Plutarch Solon 24.4; Corinth: Herodotus 2.167.2; Themistocles: Diodorus
Siculus 11.43.3.
44

Herodotus 3.131. In the same chapter, Herodotus mentions that the doctors from Croton and the
musicians from Argos were best. Including musicians in this anecdote has confused some readers, but
makes sense since both were itinerant craftsmen in demand across the Mediterranean. Polycrates, for
example, also brought Anacreon, Ibycus, and Theodorus to his court.
45

Biton . Published in Carle Wescher Poliorctique des

Grecs Paris 1867.
46

Kingsley 1995a dates Zopyrus activities in Cumae to the late 420s (154-5) and in Miletus to between
411 and 402 (150-2). He postulates that Zopyrus may have been in Syracuse in 399 when Dionysius I
invited engineers to develop war machinery for the city. (150, 153)

25

The craftsmen listed by Homer, especially doctors and engineers, are the same men
who need to understand how the world works in order to provide their services. Kingsley
1995a (143-155) argues persuasively that Zopyrus the Pythagorean, whom Clement
(Stromata 1.21.131.3) cites as the author of Krater, is the same person as Zopyrus the
mechanical engineer of war machinery, especially catapults. This suggests that the
mathematical theories developed by some Pythagoreans are being applied in the practical
world by other (or the same) Pythagoreans, since the construction of catapults requires
knowledge of the same tension and harmonics that underlies musical/numerical theory.
The same connection between scientific theory and practice can be observed in doctors.
An early Hippocratic writer, for example, criticizes some doctors because they argue that
one needs to understand the origins of man from his creation in the world in order to treat
disease. He clearly does not agree with this position.47


.
,
,
.
, ,
.
.

47

Lloyd 1979 (86-98) discusses various Hippocratic treatises, which stress the importance of rhetoric for
winning over patients and attacking criticism.

26

Hippocrates48 On Ancient Medicine 20

Some doctors and sophists say that it is not possible to know the medical art unless
one knows what man is, but that it is necessary that the man who intends to cure men
correctly know this. Their reasoning applies to philosophy, just like Empedocles or
others who have written about nature; they say what man is from the beginning and
how he first come into being and from what he was constructed. But I say this: as
many things as have been said or written by a sophist or a doctor about nature, I
believe apply less to the medical art than to painting. I think that one learns
something clear about nature from no other place than the medical art.

This author argues that some doctors develop treatments from hypotheses about how man
functions, and what he comes from. Healing, therefore, would return man to the state he
should be in as determined by, for example, the components from which he was
originally constructed. He, I would argue, does not deny this belief that healing disease
returns the body to a normal state. Rather, he argues that practicing medicine, that is,
returning unhealthy people to a healthy state, is what truly contributes to understanding
nature, not starting from theories. Some doctors, therefore, practiced medicine from a
theoretical rather than an empirical understanding of the world, such as the theories that
the Presocratics produced. Not all doctors and engineers were philosophers; nevertheless,
some would bring theories and ideas as they traveled the Mediterranean just as Zopyrus
did. One can also expect transmission of these ideas as these craftsmen encountered other
doctors and engineers as the disagreement between Hippocrates and Empedocles
illustrates.49 We can argue, therefore, that a loosely bound community links scientists.

48

The treatises attributed to Hippocrates were written by a variety of individuals in the Hippocratic school
(comparable to the Orphic writings, see 1.1.2 in chapter 4). For this dissertation, I will use Hippocrates for
simplicity.
49

This passage suggests that Hippocrates viewed Empedocles as purely theoretical, contrary to
Empedocles presentation of himself.

27

When ideas are shared, science advances as theories are tested and contested through
others observation. Modern historians emphasize the competitive nature of the
Presocratics50, just as Hesiod shows the benefit of competition among people who
practice the same craft whether agriculture, pottery, or poetry is good for men.
,
,
.

,
, ,
[]

20

,

.
,

25

.
Hesiod Works and Days 10-13, 16-26
50

Scholars separate Presocratic philosophy based on geography (Kirk, Raven, and Schofield 1983 East vs
West) and time. In all cases, each philosopher is presented sequentially from the oldest, an implicit
assumption that one philosopher builds off another, although not necessarily sequentially (Burnet 1930,
Guthrie 1962 and1965, Kirk, Raven, and Schofield 1983, McKirahan 1995, Graham 2006). The primary
divisions are the Ionians ([Thales], Anaximander, Anaximenes, and Xenophanes), Parmenides and Zeno
who respond to the Ionians, and the pluralists (Anaxagoras, Empedocles, and the Atomists, Leucippus and
Democritus) who respond to Parmenides. Pythagoras is considered an outlier, as is Heraclitus (as Guthrie
1962 (416), Graham 2006 (113)). Ancient biographers presented the Presocratics as pupils of a predecessor
(see above). Lloyd 1979 (chapter 2) emphasizes the rhetorical nature of the Presocratics writing as they
debate one another.

28

There was not one race of Strife, but there are two upon the earth. He would praise
the one if he know her, the other is worthy of blame they are completely separate in
their temper. Dark Night bore the other (Strife) first, and the high-throned son of
Kronos who dwells in the air placed her in the roots of the earth and she is much
better for me. And she rouses to work even the good for nothing, if one not working
should see the wealth of someone who hastens to plow and plant and establish his
household well. One neighbour vies with the other as he speeds to riches; this Strife
is good for mortals. And potter competes against potter and carpenter against
carpenter; beggar envies beggar and poet poet.

When craftsmen compete with one another, they create better products and strive to
innovate so that their product is preferred. The Presocratics compete with two separate
groups: the mythological explanation of how the world comes to be and functions, and
other Presocratics. I will show how the Presocratics responded to each in order to show
that Empedocles did not follow this pattern. He did not present himself as contributing to
the tradition.

2.1.1

Presocratics Respond to Divine Explanations

Homer and Hesiod presented a mythological view of how the world came to be and
continues to operate through divine intervention. Hesiods Theogony, for example, offers
an organized picture of the world that relies almost exclusively on the gods. The birth of
the gods (theogony) beginning with Gaia is the birth of the world itself (cosmogony)
while the orderly rule of the gods under the direction of Zeus, the father of gods and men,
is the cosmology. The Presocratics criticize such a position in a variety of ways. They
either remove the gods from natural phenomena51, implicitly rejecting this model, or they
criticize Hesiod directly. Anaximander, for example, replaces the justice with which
51

See n. 2 at the beginning.

29

Hesiods Zeus directs the world with the impersonal force of time. Later commentators52
relate that he believed the world comes to be from and is destroyed into apeiron53, a
substance that is not an element such as water or air that would be recognized by these
commentators. No god oversees this creation or transformation of the world, but it
happens Birth for things that exist is from these things, and destruction is into the same
things according to necessity; for they pay penalty and retribution to each other for their
injustice according to the assessment of time ( ,

(Simplicius Physics CIAG 9.24.18-20)).
Heraclitus, on the other hand, made an ad hominem attack on Hesiod, claiming that
learning did not make him knowledgeable:
. (Diogenes Lartius
Lives 9.1 = DK22B40) Much learning does not teach one to have knowledge; for it
would have taught Hesiod and Pythagoras, and moreover, both Xenophanes and
Hecataeus. Considering the individuals with whom Hesiod is connected in this
fragment, Heraclitus is commenting on authors who describe how the world works:

52

Simplicius Physics CIAG 9.24.18-20 = DK 12A9, Pseudo-Plutarch Stromata 2 = DK 12A10, Hippolytus

Refutatio 1.6.1-2 = DK 12A11.
53

The apeiron is something that is without limit and in this case probably also without definition. It was
limitless because all things came to be from it and it was undefined as far as substance goes since it was not
one of the elements but something in between. Aristotle seems to contrast Anaximanders apeiron as an
intermediate among the elements with his originating substance: .
, ,
,
,
. (Aristotle de generatione et corruptione 332a19 ff.) There is no one of these things (i.e.,
elements) from which everything comes. Nor indeed is there anything else besides these things, like
something between air and water or air and fire, something which is thicker than air and fire and finer than
the others. For that will be air and fire with opposition, but the other of the opposites is a lack, with the
result that it is never possible to exist alone, as some say of the infinite and the surrounding.

30

Hesiod and Pythagoras used a mythological framework54 while Xenophanes and

Hecataeus were other early intellectuals who focused on cosmology and geography
respectively. Presumably Heraclitus is contrasting himself with them; wisdom is to know
the whether that is the intelligence or the plan that directs all things (
, , (Diogenes Lartius Lives
9.1 = DK 22B41) The one wise thing (course) is to know the which directs all
things through all things.).55 If the people listed in fragment 40 do not have the correct
learning about how the world works, they do not understand the . This becomes
more clear when Heraclitus is indirectly critical of people who use Hesiod as their teacher
for understanding how the world works:
, .
(Hippolytus Refutatio 9.10.2 = DK 22B57 The teacher of most is Hesiod: they know
that he knows many things, he who did not understand day and night, for it is one. For
Hesiod, Day was the offspring of Night.56 Heraclitus, on the other hand, who saw
connections between opposites because they are interdependent, calls them one, in this
case because they are different stages in a continuum. Hesiod does not possess
understanding, and the people who use Hesiod as a teacher consequently are also
mistaken.

54

For more on Pythagoreans writing as Orpheus and using myth and cosmogony as an allegory for the
nature, origins and fate of man, the gods and the universe, see 1.1.2 in chapter 4.
55

Just as Anaximander replaced Zeus, the director of all, with time, Heraclitus replaced him with the
thunderbolt (B64) which is and is not willing to be called Zeus (B32) as it sits apart from everything
(B108).
56

Hesiod Theogony 123-4.

31

Parmenides also criticizes Hesiod directly, although not by name.57 He chose to write
in dactylic hexameter, like Homer and Hesiod, after the previous generation of scientists
had made a conscious choice to present their ideas in prose to set themselves apart from
traditional literature. In Parmenides proem, the daughters of the Sun take Parmenides by
chariot to the goddess who lives beyond the paths of Night and Day. She promises that by
following this path, the one that carries the man who knows (
(DK28B1.3) [the path] which carries the knowing man over all cities)
beyond the realm of experience, that is, the regular alternation of day and night,
Parmenides will learn both the truth and mortal opinions: |
| , .
(DK 28B1.28-30) It is necessary that you learn all things, both the unshaken heart of
well-rounded Truth and mortals opinions in which there is no true reliance. This
challenges Hesiod who claims in the proem of Theogony that the Muses approached him
and then mocked him, as a mortal, for being ignorant and incapable of distinguishing
truth from falsehood in their words.
, , ,
,
.
Hesiod Theogony 26-28
Boorish shepherds, base reproaches, mere bellies, we know how to tell many lies
just like real things, and we know how, when we want, to utter truth.58

57

Graham 2006 (152).

58

I discuss this passage further in 1.2.2 of chapter 4. Empedocles also approaches a Muse for her skill in
language, but as an equal since he, too, is a good. See 1.2 in chapter 4.

32

Parmenides, therefore, by setting himself up as one who knows in contrast with Hesiods
boorish shepherds, openly criticizes the mythological interpretation reported by the
Muses. The man who knows can distinguish truth and opinion in contrast to people who
fail to use reason and accept uncritically the words they hear. The goddess urges
Parmenides to ignore the things he experiences and to rely instead on reason.


,

,
.
Parmenides DK 28B7
For this will never prevail that things that are not ( ) are; but you, hold back
your thought from this path of inquiry and do not let much-experienced habit force
you down this path, to direct an aimless eye and echoing ear and tongue, but judge by
reasoning the strife-ridden refutation spoken by me.

Parmenides then uses reason in order to show that the scientists explanation of the world
is fundamentally flawed because what is not cannot exist, no matter what our senses have
told us.

2.1.2

Presocratics Respond to Other Presocratics

The Greeks do not simply parrot their predecessors, but make innovations to the
lessons they learn. Although it seems certain that theories moved with relative ease
around the Mediterranean, the only evidence that remains for how the Presocratics

33

responded to one another is in the extant fragments.59 These criticisms range from ad
hominem to more subtle references to specific authors, all with the intent of showing that
the theories of other philosophers lack viability just as supernatural interpretations fail in
their explanations.60
I have already discussed in the previous section (2.1.1) how Heraclitus disparages
the knowledge of other thinkers in fragment 40, specifically Hesiod, Pythagoras,
Xenophanes, and Hecataeus. The first sustained arguments, however, that criticize a
predecessor and then present an alternative come from Parmenides. Parmenides signifies
his target by means of linguistic and stylistic references.61 He also uses such linguistic
and stylistic references to remind the readers of at least one fellow Presocratic,
Heraclitus.62
,
.
<>,
,
,

59

Hippocrates (see note 48 above) gives an enticing hint of public debate among philosophers:
(Hippocrates On the Nature of Man 1) Someone
would know this especially by being present when they speak against one another. I discuss this passage
more fully in 2.3 in this chapter.
60

See 2.1.1.

61

I outline how Parmenides refers to Hesiod in 2.1.1.

62

I give one example for this echo; Graham 2002 discusses other parallels of language. Contra this
position, Gallop 1984 (11) argues, in agreement with Stokes 1971 (109-27, 300-8), that Parmenides need
not refer specifically to Heraclitus, an abstruse Ionian intellectual. This interpretation depends upon
being all men. Others argue that Parmenides is also attacking everyone who believed that things
come into being, change, and are then destroyed (Guthrie 1965 (24-5), McKirahan 1994 (158)). Curd 1998
(39ff.) links Parmenides attacks specifically to Anaximander. The important issue is that Parmenides
criticizes others theories and then replaces them with his own.

34

 , , ,

, .
Simplicius Physics CIAG 9.117 = DK 28B6
To speak and understand what exists must necessarily exist, for existence is and
(speaking and thinking) nothing is not.63 These things I urge to think upon. For I
forbid you from this path of inquiry, but also then from this (path), which mortals
who know nothing wander, two-headed. For helplessness in their breasts steers their
wandering mind, and they are borne along both deaf and blind, astounded, unjudging
tribes, for whom being and not-being are considered the same and not the same, the
path of all things is backward-turning.

Parmenides believes that there are only two possible interpretations of the world, either
something is and so it has to be, or it is not and so it must not exist (fragment 2).64 The
two positions are mutually exclusive. People who rely on observation, therefore, to say
that something is and is not at the same time are completely mistaken. Most people
believe this uncritically because we see things come into being, grow, decline, and then
perish. He criticizes Heraclitus in particular because the latter argued there is an
underlying unity among the opposites that makes them the same, and Parmenides extends
this to being and not being. The term is key:

(Hippolytus Refutatio 9.9.2 = DK 22B51) They do not understand that the thing that
differs with itself is in agreement; it is a back-turning harmony, like that of a bow or

63

My translation reflects that I believe the is existential (x exists), rather than predicative (x is y) or
veridical (x is the case, or x is true). I choose this because Parmenides description of what is or being
emphasizes its uniqueness and lack of change in contrast with what people observe. Graham 2006 (157ff.)
lays out the various interpretations of .
64

See below.

35

lyre.65 There are different kinds of unity66: one thing can produce different reactions, for
example, salt water is toxic to people but not fish (B61); one thing may have opposite
qualities, for example, writing is both straight and crooked (B59); one thing may be
known only because of its opposite, for example, justice cannot be understood without
acts of injustice (B23); and finally some opposites are on a continuum, for example, night
and day (B57). Heraclitus, like other physikoi before Parmenides, relies on observation
when he generates his theories: ,
(Hippolytus Refutatio 9.9.5 = DK 22B55) of whatever things there is sight, hearing, and
experience, these things I prefer.67
Parmenides, on the other hand, discredits this reliance on observation by means of
deductive reasoning.
, ,

,
( ),
,

( )
.
Proclus in Timaeus 1.345 = DK 28B2

65

Kahn 1979 (195-6) defends these textual readings.

66

Guthrie 1962 (445-6).

67

Compare fragments 19, 101a, and 107.

36

Come and I will tell you and you, having heard the tale, bring it forth which are
the only paths of inquiry to consider. The one is that it is and that it is not possible
that it not exist. This is the path of Persuasion, for it attends Truth. The other is that it
is not and that it must not be, this I tell you is an utterly inscrutable path for you
could not know what is not (for it is not possible) nor could you talk about it.

Parmenides uses modus tollens arguments to show that the only path is that it is. Modus
tollens denies the consequent, thus showing that the original claim is untrue. Parts of the
argument here are missing. If something exists, then it should be knowable and
describable, as Parmenides will go on to describe what is68; if P, then Q. One cannot
know what is unobservable since one cannot observe what is not there; not Q. What is
not, therefore, cannot exist; not P. After he eliminates the possibility that what is not
can exist, he shows in fragment 8, again with a series of modus tollens arguments, that
what is can have only certain qualities, that is, uncreated, indestructible, and
unchanging, thus proving that the world we observe is not what we believe.69
Reason, therefore, appears to have demolished our understanding of the world as it is
observed, and replaced it with a model that can be understood only by reason. The
common opinion is that the philosophers who follow Parmenides are forced to face this
logical tour de force with arguments of their own. Zeno, if he was not a follower of
Parmenides, at least follows this technique in his paradoxes of motion and his denial of
plurality. Other philosophers such as Anaxagoras, Empedocles, and Diogenes of

68

Compare also fragment 6.

69

For example, he denies coming into being as follows: ; |

| . (Simplicius Physics CIAG 9.144 =
DK 28B8.7-9) In what way and from what did it increase? I will not allow you to say nor to think from
what is not. For it is not to be said or thought that it is not. In other words, if what is comes into being,
then it comes into being from what is not. But Parmenides has already claimed that what is not cannot
be because it cannot be known or declared. It follows, therefore, that what is has always been as it is
because it cannot come into being.

37

Apollonia, it is argued, posit a plurality of elements to account for the variety we observe
in the world, yet agree with Parmenides criticism that what is not cannot be. In the case
of Empedocles, however, there is no trace of this type of clear argumentation that his
predecessors and contemporaries illustrate.

2.2

EMPEDOCLES LESSONS
I have shown that the other Presocratics reveal their dialogue with their predecessors

and contemporaries, although not always by name, through their writing. Parmenides,
owing to his use of argumentation in verse to attack directly his opponents and their
underlying assumptions, would be an especially important model for Empedocles. We
know, moreover, that Empedocles was familiar with Parmenides poem. Empedocles
appears to address Parmenides through verbal echoes as well; for example, in fragment 2
Empedocles refers in the first line to the road to understanding because the senses are
narrow ( is generally used of roads from Homer), an image which Parmenides
also uses widely (1.2, 2.2, 4, 7.2, 8.1, 18) as he distinguishes between the path of
knowing and the path of opinion. As fragment 2 continues, Empedocles establishes a new
road for his readers to follow, turning away from the path that the majority follow, just as
Parmenides did.70 In addition, Empedocles accepts Parmenides assertion that no thing
comes to be from nothing and no thing is destroyed into nothing, as we see when
Empedocles discusses the true nature of birth and death (for example, fragment 12).
While Empedocles agrees with Parmenides on this point, he implicitly counters the
objections Parmenides addresses to his predecessors, that is, that all things come to be

70

See the discussion of fragment 2 below.

38

only from x, whatever x may be, by positing a plurality of material from which all things
come to be and into which they are destroyed, as he explains in fragment 17 and
elsewhere, for example, fragments 21, 23, and 26. He does not attempt to show why he
does not believe that the world comes from what is as Parmenides proposes contra his
predecessors in fragment 8.

2.2.1

Empedocles Criticism Fragment 2

Fragment 2 suggests that Empedocles was aware of his predecessors and was actively
engaged in debate with them. It appears that Empedocles intends to compare his theories
with all previous theories when he says that everyone claims to understand how the world
works when in fact they do not.

, .
71

,

, <>72

.73 , ,
74 75 .

71

Bollack 1969 (fr. 10) prints (having gathered, collected).

72

was added by Bergk and printed by Diels. Bollack 1969 prints .

73

Inwood 2001 (fr. 8) separates this fragment here because Sextus inserts a comment (
And he clarifies the point by adding this to the lines quoted above.) before he
continues with the quotation. I, along with most editors, do not feel that the separation is necessary.

39

Sextus Empiricus Against the Mathematicians 7.123-4 = DK 31B2

For narrow devices76 are poured throughout the limbs, and many wretched things,
which make our concerns dull, burst in. They, having looked at a small portion of life
in their lifetime, fly off in the manner of smoke when they die early, persuaded of
this thing alone, at whatever each has arrived. They have been driven all over, and
everyone boasts that he has discovered the whole in this way, these things are not to
be seen by men, nor heard, nor embraced with the mind. But you, since you have
stepped aside, will learn. Mortal cunning, at least, has gone no further.

Why does no one know the whole, ?77 Each individual sense is fallible on its own
with distractions that prevent getting a full picture (lines 1-2); you feel, for example, the
heat of the sun, but it is tempered by a cool breeze. Sextus uses this fragment to argue
that Empedocles believes that one should not trust the senses at all, only reason.78 But for
Empedocles the solution lies in using the senses together79; reason is just another sense as
Empedocles includes it in the list with seeing and hearing in lines 7-8.80 The whole (
), now expressed with the general neuter plural subject , cannot be seen alone,
nor heard alone, nor embraced by the mind alone. This is the mistake made by in line
6; everyone boasts that they know the whole, but the paucity of individual senses plus the

74

The punctuation is from Bollack 1969.

75

This text is in the manuscripts.

76

Also palm of hand; see Bollack 1969 (3:8) for a discussion of the importance for touch and the
mechanics of perception to which Empedocles seems to refer. See also 2.3.1 in chapter 4.
77

The general understanding of is the world and, by association, how it operates. Others refer to
this not as , but . Xenophanes DK 21B34.2; Parmenides DK 28B1.31-2, 9.3; Anaxagoras DK
59B1; Diogenes of Apollonia DK 64B2, 5. See also Plato Sophist 242d and Aristotle Metaphysics 982b17,
983b6-11, 988b22-3.
78

(Sextus Empiricus Against the Mathematicians 122) Others say that according to
Empedocles the criterion of truth is not the senses, but right reason.
79

Compare fragments 110 and 3.9-13. See 2.1.1 in chapter 4.

80

Bollack 1969 (3: 16).

40

short duration of a human life81 mean that these people do not, in fact, know the whole.
But you, probably Pausanias82, will learn since he has stepped aside (). The
verb, , means to stray from the path, and in this case Pausanias is straying
from the of line 7 all the generic people who make the mistake of boasting
that they have found the whole. Pausanias makes a conscious choice to do things
differently, to not trust in one sense alone; in this way he will achieve more than people
have before because he will follow Empedocles: mortal cunning at least has gone no
further ( ).83 Empedocles, therefore, disparages
everyone else while praising Pausanias for choosing to follow him.

81

Empedocles emphasizes this shortcoming in men through contrast with Pythagoras who learned in only
one lifetime what most could learn in ten to twenty: , |
| (Porphyry Life of
Pythagoras 30 = DK 31B129.4-6) For wherever he reached with all his thinking organs, he perceived
easily each of all the things that exist over 10 and 20 lifetimes of men.
82

Throughout his verses, the you, whether indicated with a verb or pronoun, is usually Pausanias if
Diogenes Lartius testimony for fragment 1 is trustworthy: , ,
(DK 31B1) And you, Pausanias, shining son of Anchites, listen!; , , |
(DK 31B2.8-9) You then, since you have stepped aside, will learn; (DK 31B3.9) but
come, consider; , (DK 31B3.13) [do not] curb, but understand; (DK 31B4.3)
know; (DK 31B6.1) listen; (DK 31B8.1) but I will tell you;
(DK 31B17.14) but come, hear my words; for learning will
increase your mind; , (DK 31B17.21) you, perceive her
with your mind, do not sit astonished with your eyes; (DK
31B17.26) but you, hear the expedition, which is not deceiving, of my account; ,
(DK 31B21.1) but come, look on this testimony of my earlier words;
(DK 31B23.9) do not let deception overcome you in your mind;
(DK 31B38.1) but come, I will tell you; (DK 31B62.1-3) come now, hear
these things; (DK 31B71.1) and if, in some way, there is
feeble conviction for you concerning these things; |
(DK 31B110.1-3) for if you gaze on [them]all these things will stay completely with
you forever; (DK 31B110.6-8) but if you reach
for other thingsindeed they will leave you; , |
(DK 31B111) you will learn, since I do all these things for
you alone you will stopif you wishyou will bring onyou will placeyou will lead; []
(PStr a(ii)23) I will show you; (PStr b2) whence you will see. If Empedocles refers to
anyone else as you, he uses a vocative in the same line, or very close, to identify the addressed. As it
happens, the only other singular you is the Muse/Calliopeia, see 1.2.2 and 1.3 in chapter 4.
83

Trpanier 2004 (54-5).

41

2.2.2

Empedocles Criticism Fragment 39

It is reasonable to assume that Pausanias will learn , which everyone boasts to

have found. I have already discussed above (1.3) how Empedocles describes how the
world works in fragment 17, and there are other verses in which he discusses the
universe, for example, the creation of the world (DK 31A49A, 31A66A), the creation of
animals (DK 31B35, 31B57, 31B62), and the operation of the eye (DK 31B84). From the
extant evidence, whenever Empedocles discusses his own interpretation of , he
simply states what he believes. Even when he is critical of other theories specifically, as,
for example in fragment 39, he fails to explain why they are wrong before proposing his
own interpretation.
,


Aristotle de caelo 294a 21 = DK 31B39
If indeed the depths of earth and plentiful air are limitless, as is poured out in vain
going from the tongues in the mouths of many, who have seen little of the whole.

According to Empedocles, it is impossible that the earth and sky should extend without
limit. The entire universe is always in the shape of a sphere. This seems surprising
because the only time Empedocles refers to a spherical shape is at the time of the One.84
Commentators emphasized this feature of the One, with the result that some limit the
spherical shape to the One. 85 This led other commentators to postulate that the universe

84

See 1.2 in chapter 3.

85

Eudemus, for example, refers to the time of Loves domination when all things have been brought
together as the time of the sphere ( Simplicius Physics CIAG 10.1183.28), but it is
difficult to say whether Eudemus himself uses the term here or has been paraphrased by

42

takes on different shapes at different times, for example, egg-shaped or an oblate

spheroid.86 There is evidence, however, that suggests that Empedocles thought that the
universe is always spherical: 1) the path of the sun and 2) the lack of void in the universe.
The created worlds are sphere-like in shape. Atius comments that the sun would
travel in a straight line but is prohibited:
(Atius 2.23.2 (Dox. 353) = DK 31A58b)
Empedocles says the sun goes straight as far as possible until prevented by the sphere
surrounding it [i.e., the created world]. Several pieces of evidence contribute to the
interpretation of a spherical created world. Air and fire separate initially from the mixture
Simplicius. Simplicius refers to the One as Sphere most frequently:

,
. (Simplicius de caelo CIAG 7.293.20-23) For example, Empedocles says that Love and Strife
control by turns and that the former brings together all things into One and destroys the universe of Strife
and makes a Sphere from it, and that Strife separates the elements again and makes a universe like this
one; ,
. (Simplicius de caelo CIAG 7.528.1113) And yet Empedocles says that this universe comes into being by Strife separating the elements, just as
the Sphere comes into being by Love bringing together and uniting the elements; ,
, . (Simplicius de
caelo CIAG 7.528.30-32) Nevertheless, even if Strife is in control in this universe just as Love is in
control in the sphere, both are said to be created by both; Simplicius Physics CIAG 10.1184.2 (quoted
above). Simplicius held a neoplatonic view of Empedocles doctrine and believed that the Sphere was the
paradigm for the universe and the world under Strife was its image:
,
,
, , , ,
.
, , ,
, . (Simplicius Physics CIAG
10.1123.26-1124.7) For he supposed that the intelligible and the perceptible universes were formed from
the same four elements, the former as a paradigm and the other clearly its image. The creative cause for the
intelligible is Love because she makes the sphere (which he calls god) through unification and Strife [is the
creative cause] for the perceptible when he is in control, but not completely, making this universe through
separation. It is possible to see both unification and separation in this universe, the former in the heaven
which is rightly called Sphere and god, and the other below the moon which is most properly called the
universe () because it is in need of arrangement ().
86

Atius claims that the universe is egg-shaped:

(Atius 2.31.4 (Dox. 363) = DK 31A50a) for the sky is spread
more widely in this direction (breadth) because the cosmos is placed very much like an egg. Bicknell 1968
proposed that Empedocles believed the created world is an oblate spheroid owing to empirical evidence,
i.e., the stars overhead appear brighter than those at the horizon.

43

of One when Strife draws near to form the sky.87 Since the One is already spherical, the
air and fire moving to the edges and creating the sky form a spherical barrier that
encloses the created world. The sun travels about the sky (
(Macrobius Saturnalia 1.17.46 = DK 31B41) but that which was
gathered together [sc. the sun] travels about the great sky) following the orbit of the
universe (
. (Atius 2.1.4 (Dox. 328) = DK 31A50b) Empedocles says the circuit of the sun
is the limit of the created world). The sky, therefore, is the limit of the created world.
This interpretation depends heavily upon testimonia, but Empedocles also hints that the
created world is spherical. Strife continues to influence the created world although his
own period of domination has passed: |
(DK 31B35.9-10) For he (Strife) did not blamelessly stand out wholly
from these [the roots] at the furthest limits of the circle.
The universe is always spherical. Empedocles says himself that there is neither lack
nor any excess of matter in the universe: .
(Atius 1.18.2 (Dox 316) = DK 31B13). This is normally interpreted simply that there is
no void, but it also entails that matter is evenly distributed throughout the universe. If
there is no void or excess, matter would stretch out equally in all directions and the
universe would be spherical, just as Parmenides insists in his Way of Truth.
,
87

The roots do not move from their arrangement in the One until Strife approaches:
(DK 31B31) for all the limbs of the god begin to shake one after another. When
this occurs:

([Plutarch] Stromata in Eusebius Preparatio Evangelica 1.8.10 = Dox. 582 = DK 31A30) He
(Empedocles) says that air was first separated off from the blend of the elements and poured about in a
circle; fire, coming out with no other place to go, runs out under the solidified air.

44

, ,

Simplicius Physics CIAG 9.146.15-17 = DK 28B8.42-44
Since its limit is the furthest point, it is perfect from every direction, like the bulk of a
spherical ball, in the middle, well matched in every respect.

The One is the element in Empedocles cycle that was most influenced by Parmenides.
While Empedocles roots do possess all the eternal characteristics of Parmenides what
is uncreated, indestructible, and unchanging, the One possesses these features most
visibly in the use of the sphere as Parmenides describes in this passage. Perhaps the
spherical shape was emphasized in the One as a sign of its perfection.88 Nevertheless, the
universe appears to maintain its shape as a sphere since there is no void at any time and
matter is evenly spread without excess or lack in any direction. Since the universe is
always spherical, the Many is spherical as well.

As I have illustrated, Empedocles is critical, but at the same time he does not state
explicitly his own interpretation. If Empedocles considered himself part of the scientist
community, he would follow the patterns visible in the writings of those individuals who
openly criticize the theories of their contemporaries and replace them explicitly with their
own theories. Parmenides pursued this path, and if verbal echoes are indicative of
familiarity, then Empedocles knew Parmenides poem. Despite being familiar with this
pattern, Empedocles does not follow it himself. This suggests that it was not his goal to
replace other theories with his own.
88

Recall too how the One is god in Empedocles scheme (Aristotle Metaphysics 1000b3, Simplicius
Physics CIAG 10.1124.1). See 1.2 in chapter 3.

45

2.2.3

A Different Focus

Although a significant portion of Empedocles extant verses support the interpretation

that he was a scientist, he does not present himself as such, that is, he does not follow the
paradigm that we see among his contemporaries. This lack of argumentation may be no
more than an accident of preservation. But verses have been preserved that state
explicitly what you will learn, and these verses suggest that Empedocles would not
consider himself a scientist, that is, someone who pursues knowledge of how the world
works for the sake of knowledge; he wants to control the world and that entails
understanding how it works.
Diogenes Laertius quotes fragment 111 to support the statement that Empedocles
practiced magic: , ( )
(Diogenes Laertius Lives 8.59) Satyrus says that Gorgias [a
student of Empedocles] said that he was present while Empedocles practiced magic.
Although these verses are used in conjunction with fragment 112 to show that
Empedocles was a magician89, it is within these verses that Empedocles states what
Pausanias will learn.

, .


, , ()
89

Dodds 1951 (145 ff.) and Ogden 2002 use the term shaman, Kingsley 1995a and 1995b, Graf 1997
(33-34), Johnston 1999a (19, 104), Dickie 2001 (32-33). I will counter this in chapter 2.

46


,
, ,

Diogenes Laertius 8.59 = DK 31B111
You will learn as many drugs as have come into being to defend against evils and old
age since I will accomplish all these things for you alone. You will stop the force of
untiring winds which, rushing against the earth, kill the fields with their blasts; and
again, if you wish, you will bring the winds back again. You will make after dark rain
a drought timely for men, and after summer drought you will make tree-nourishing
streams that dwell in the air [i.e., rain]; and you will bring from Hades the strength of
a man who has died.

What will Pausanias learn? How to heal, to the point of raising the dead, and how to
control the weather, specifically the wind and rain. This is definitely outside the scope of
science where the primary goal is descriptive, that is, to determine why the world works
as it does.
Until recently, the solution was to downplay the importance of this fragment. Some
editors placed it in a postulated medical treatise to account for the teaching of cures and
the raising of the dead; this limits the doctrine in to the composition of the
universe, but controlling the weather seems out of place in a medical treatise.90 van
Groningen (1956) eliminated the issue altogether by claiming that fragment 111 and any
others referring to Empedocles divinity were spurious and likely the work of a comic
poet lampooning his character, such as the portrayal of Socrates in Aristophanes Clouds.
The ring composition (cure illness and old age at beginning, conquer death by end),
90

Karsten 1838, 148; Mullach 1860, 14.

47

however, and the manner in which each action in controlling the weather is matched by
its opposite stop and start the winds, stop and start the rain supports the authenticity
of fragment 111.91 The prevalence of the future tense prompted Diels to place fragment
111 at the end of since the powers will follow and are not the true message
of the poem: they are allegories for the sort of influence knowledge can bring92; but the
sort of poetic epilogue that he suggested did not exist at that time.93 Most editors now
place fragment 111 at the front of the poem, believing that it displays the ultimate intent
of the poem94, although not in the sense that Empedocles explained explicitly to
Pausanias how he would accomplish these feats; there are no indications in the extant
fragments, and this would surely be of interest to preserve. The information is simply too
volatile for Empedocles to pass on and is hidden from .
Empedocles, therefore, does not completely fit the second requirement that modern
scholars set for scientists, that is, to be part of a community that moves knowledge
forward through active debate and criticism.95 Empedocles does criticize others, but he
does not attempt to explain their shortfalls and thus elevate his own theories. Moreover,
he is rarely clear about presenting his own conjectures. When one looks more closely for
what Pausanias (you) will learn (fragment 2), it turns out not to be , but how to
control the world (fragment 111), which moves us to the realm of craft and technology.
Empedocles would not consider himself part of the presocratic scientific community
91

Bollack 1969, 3:20-21.

92

Diels 1898, 407-409 (1969 (138-140).

93

van Groningen 1958, 207-8.

94

Bollack 1969 places fragment 111 between fragments 2 and 3. Inwood 2001 (218-219) places the
fragment in the proem, as do McKirahan 1994 (258), Kingsley 1995a (218), and Trpanier 2004 (66).
Contra Wright 1981 (133) who leaves it at the end of the poem.
95

See 2.1 above.

48

because he does present his view of how the world operates with the purpose of proving
his competitors wrong; rather, if you want to control the world, you need first to
understand how the world works.

2.3

CLARITY AND PERSUASION

A scientists goal is to express his theories to others and to persuade them that his

theories are superior. But, as Hippocrates complains in the first chapter of On the Nature
of Man, scientists are often persuasive only in a bad sense, that is, the winner of public
debate tends to be the cleverest speaker. The philosophers who argue that man is made of
one thing only whether water, fire, air, or earth defend their assertions with evidence
and proofs that are unconvincing on their own.

, , , ,
, .
, ,
.


,
, ,
.

49

 ,
.
Hippocrates On the Nature of Man 1
Of these, one declares that this one and the whole is air, another, fire, another, water
and yet another, earth. And each picks out evidence and witnesses, which is nothing,
for the case itself. For when everyone uses the same piece of knowledge and they do
not say the same things, it is clear that they do not know these things. Someone might
learn this especially by being beside those speaking in opposition; for the same men
who speak against one another in front of the same audience, the same man never
prevails in his speech three times in a row, but at one time this fellow comes out on
top, and at another that one, and at yet another time whoever happens to have an
especially fluid tongue before the crowd. But it is just that the one who says that he
knows correctly about matters should present his own argument and it will always
prevail, if he knows these things and displays them correctly.

Hippocrates claims that if the theory was true and the evidence supporting it convincing,
then non-philosophers would always choose that theory as the winner in these public
debates. Aristotle, on the other hand, would claim that the problem is in how they express
their ideas. The audience who chooses the winner in these debates is not learning what
men are formed from, and thus they are swayed by other considerations, such as the
speakers styles.
Aristotle argues that physikoi must explain their theories clearly with common
language to ensure that they are understood because one cannot claim the highest level of
knowledge unless one can teach the hypotheses to others. As the Presocratics interact
with their peers and their ideas, they must present their own theories clearly and
persuasively in order to sway the audience to accept them. The more clearly one can
explain something the more clearly they know what they are explaining. Aristotle is

50

adamant that the whole purpose to studying physis, or any other theoretical science, is to
gain knowledge of it.

, ,
( ,

),
.
Aristotle Physics 184a10-16
Since knowing and scientific knowledge about all intellectual pursuits that have
principles, causes, or elements occurs from being acquainted with them for we
think that we know each thing when we are acquainted with the first causes and the
first principles as far as its elements it is clear that one must try first to determine
the principles of knowledge regarding nature (i.e., natural science).

The knowledge that each physikos should aim for, even if it may be unachievable, is the
highest level of knowledge, . If you possess this level of knowledge, then you
know the causes () of the thing in question, whether it is a man, a tree, or a cow. In
addition, however, you must recognize first that these are the , that is, you
cannot possess this knowledge by chance, and second that the cannot be something
else than what they are.96 If you are unable to know the causes fully, then you cannot yet

96

, ,
, ,
.
, , ,
(Aristotle Posterior Analytics 71b10-15) We think that we know () completely, but
not in the sophistic way by chance, whenever we think that we both know the cause () for which the
matter is, because it is the cause, and that it is not possible to be otherwise. It is clear, therefore, that to
know is something like this. For the ones who do not know and those who do, the former think that they are

51

claim to possess the highest level of knowledge. The only way, moreover, to display that
you have knowledge () of something is to explain it clearly to someone so that
they can also gain knowledge of it:
; (Aristotle Metaphysics 1027a20-22) For
all epistm is either of what is always or what is for the most part for how will one
learn or teach another [if you are not certain]? Science should be expressed clearly
because any exchange of ideas whether written or oral must meet one major
condition, it must make the authors or speakers meaning clear:
, , .
(Rhetoric 1404b1-3) And let the excellence of style be defined as clarity. For the sign of
this is that speech, if it is not clear, will not perform its proper function. Knowledge and
explanation, therefore, are closely bound for Aristotle and he will seek both from his
predecessors if they are to be considered successful physikoi.
Aristotle believes that as long as one uses words that are common and with
undisputed meaning () it is possible to be clear and express ones ideas to any
audience. In general, words correspond simply to the impressions of things we have in
our mind.
,
.
, ,
,

in such a state [i.e., possessing knowledge] and the latter are in such a state, with the result that knowledge
is complete and it cannot be otherwise.

52

 .
Aristotle de interpretatione 16a4 ff.
The things in speech [words spoken] are of the experiences in the soul, and
the things written (are ) of the spoken words. And just as letters are not the
same for all, nor are utterances the same. But these (experiences) of (the words
spoken) are primary signs, the impressions of the soul, which are the same for
everyone, as are also the things of which they are likenesses or representations.

In a political or commercial context, a is a physical representation of a treaty

or a contract. The , a chip, is broken in half and each participant in the
agreement keeps half.97 Aristotle intends a similar agreement when he describes the
spoken word as a of an impression of the soul and the written word as a
of the spoken. The spoken work is a token, a representation, for the idea or
object of which the mind has an impression. Everyone who has observed or had some
other experience regarding the concept or object in question has the same idea of it. The
community of speakers who share the idea therefore agrees upon the meaning of the
word/token. The written word, on the other hand, is a token that represents the spoken
word. The idea of white, for example, is the same for anyone who has experienced white,
whether the community calls it white, blanc, or albus.98 A word, therefore, with

97

Aristotle uses generally of a token of a contract or treaty, even when he does not refer to the
physical chip. Aristotle refers to this physical representation of an agreement in other contexts:
.
(Aristotle Eudemian Ethics 1239b30-33) In a way, love
of the opposite is love of the good. For they strive for one another through the middle, like (the two halves
of) a token strive for one another, because in this way one thing comes into being in the middle from both.
Aristotle uses in a similar sense in scientific contexts within de generatione et corruptione 331a332b .
98

In Aristotles terminology, white is for speakers of English, while blanc and albus would
be (foreign terms) to the same English speakers because, as French and Latin words respectively,
they are foreign and therefore on loan. Cf. Poetics 1457b3

53

undisputed meaning is ideal for communication according to Aristotle, since there is no

question regarding interpretation.99
Language, however, is naturally ambiguous because it relies on words as substitutes
for the actual objects. Although words correspond with mental impressions that are
common to mankind, regardless of the language spoken, a limited supply of words must
be associated with a limitless world of experience. Some words, therefore, can have more
than one meaning (). The potential for ambiguity also increases with
combinations of words.100 Readers, moreover, are forced to make an interpretation with
their own knowledge; and the authors intent may not match the readers understanding.
Since Aristotle mandates that clarity be the highest priority for scientific exposition, he
opposes the use of language that is not common because it will more likely fail to pass on
knowledge.

2.3.1

Aristotle on Uncommon Language and Science

Uncommon language may be desired in moderation in verse to entertain and educate

its audience. Examples of such uncommon () words (Poetics 1458a17ff.) include
invented words, altered words, and metaphor. A good metaphor, for example, requires
that the author be clear and that the audience have sufficient wisdom to grasp the
underlying similarity in things that are not the same on the surface:
(Aristotle Poetics 1459a8) to use metaphor well is to see
what is similar. Metaphors apply to one object a word that properly belongs to

99

Struck 2004 (59-63).

100

Aristotle de Sophisticis Elenchis 165a6-14.

54

another101: (Aristotle Poetics 1457b7)

metaphor is the application of something elses name and make connections via
parallels to other concepts. In Poetics 1457b8ff, Aristotle identifies four types of
metaphor: replacing a specific term with a general, e.g., my
ship stands here: is a general word for standing as opposed to a word specific to
ships, that is, (to anchor); using a specific term instead of a general, e.g.,
ten thousand good deeds Odysseus has done: ten
thousand stands for many; replacing a specific term from one context with another
specific term from another context, e.g., drawing off life with
bronze102 and cutting with indestructible bronze103 can be
interchanged because (to draw off (water)) and (to cut) are different kinds
of taking away104; and metaphor by analogy. This final type is not so much distinct from
the others as it is an extension.105 It is a reciprocal exchange between each of two things
of the same genus: a is to b as c is to d, e.g., old age (a) is to life (b) as evening (c) is to

101

Metaphors are one of the most popular ways to elevate and vary style:
, ,
(Aristotle Rhetoric 1404b34-36) For everyone converses by means of metaphor,
along with proper words and common words with the result that it is clear that if someone uses these (i.e.,
metaphor) well, it will be exotic and he will possibly escape detection and he will be clear.
102

This is fragment 138 of Empedocles and refers to killing an animal. Picot 2004 argues this fragment is
not Empedocles.
103

This is fragment 143 of Empedocles and refers to filling a vessel with water (
<> - cutting from five springs with an indestructible bronze [probably bronze
cupping glasses, Picot 2004]) in order to be purified.
104

The use of two examples from Empedocles in a general discussion of metaphor confirms Aristotles
comment on Empedocles use of metaphor:

(Diogenes Laertius Lives of the Philosophers 8.57 = DK 31A1) In his Concerning the Poets,
[Aristotle] says that Empedocles is Homeric and clever in his speech being both apt at metaphors and using
other things successful to the poetic craft.. The ambiguity in these two metaphors is increased further here
since the adjective refers to different unstated objects.
105

Davis 1992 (118). Davis goes on to suggest that metaphor could be extended indefinitely.

55

day (d); it becomes a metaphor by removing half of the analogy (e.g., the old age of day
is evening, or a is to d).106 Metaphors in particular show how uncommon language can
stretch the knowledge of the audience and be enjoyable at the same time because the
audience must understand the relationship among all the elements of the metaphor in
order to transfer their prior knowledge.107 Such metaphors are a kind of riddle, and clever
riddles are especially agreeable because one learns something (
, . (Aristotle Rhetoric 1412a24-26) good
riddles are sweet for the same reason; for there is learning and a metaphor is stated.).
Aristotle, nevertheless, believes the presence of uncommon language, and especially
metaphor, in scientific explanation is inappropriate. If one uses nothing but metaphors,
the author has formulated a riddle and speaks of real things by linking them to impossible
combinations: ,
, , , .
, (Aristotle Poetics 1458a24-27) But
if someone should compose verse entirely with such things, it will be either a riddle or a
barbarism a riddle if it is from metaphors and a barbarism if it is from loan words. For
this is the very form of a riddle, to attach impossible things to reality. The goal of the
physikos is to exhibit clearly his of how the world works, and the use of
uncommon language will prevent him from reaching this goal.

106

See Nimis 1988 for a Marxist interpretation of Aristotle and analogical metaphor as a rate of exchange.

107

Aristotle emphasizes the rle metaphor plays in education (Aristotle Rhetoric 1412a9-12). This
cognitive element to Aristotelian metaphor has been picked up in more recent studies on Aristotles theory
of metaphor (Lloyd 1987, 183-187; Marcos 1997; Kirby 1997). See also Aristotle Rhetoric 1410b10-17; cf.
Aristotle Poetics 1448b8-19.

56

 ,
. ,

, .
,

.
Aristotle Analytica Posteriora 97b30ff.
Just as in demonstrations it is necessary that there be collection, so too there must be
clarity in the definition. This will happen if there should be a separate definition in
each class through the common features established in each circumstanceand in
this way to arrive at a common definition, taking care not to use terms that can have
different meanings (). If it is necessary that we not argue by means of
metaphor, then it is clear that one does not make a definition either by metaphors or
by metaphorical expressions. Otherwise it will be necessary to make arguments by
metaphor.

Demonstrations and definitions of nature must refer only to the object of knowledge at
hand. A definition reveals in a clear and precise fashion a universal attribute that will
apply to all specific instances and is uncovered through careful observation of these same
specific instances.108 Metaphor is inappropriate since it is the application of something
elses name; one can use metaphor neither in definition nor in demonstrations because the
proof would no longer apply to the object of knowledge in question. A general definition
is preferred because this principle can be applied to any specific example.109 Aristotle,
therefore, expects the physikoi to make demonstrations and definitions of how the world
108

Aristotle Analytica Posteriora 97b7ff.

109

Aristotle Analytica Posteriora 85b4ff.

57

works as clearly as possible in order to explain their theories to any audience. They will
do this primarily through common language because then everyone will understand what
the physikos is explaining.
By examining Empedocles theory of why the sea is salty, Aristotle demonstrates
how the use of metaphor can be inappropriate for teaching because the reader may select
an interpretation that is viable on the basis of the words meaning, but does not reflect the
authors original intent.

,
(
),

,
, ,
.
Aristotle Meteorologica 357a24-31 = DK 31A25d
Similarly it is laughable if someone, saying that the sea is the sweat of the earth,
thinks he has said something clever as Empedocles did; for by speaking in this way
perhaps he has spoken sufficiently for poetry (for metaphor is poetic), but he has not
spoken sufficiently for understanding nature. For it is in no way clear how bitter
sweat arises from a sweet drink, whether only something is lost, e.g., the sweetest
part, or something has been mixed in, as happens with water strained through ashes.

By comparing the sea to sweat and adding further that it comes from the earth,
Empedocles has evoked a powerful image of salty water that emerges owing to the action
of the suns heat on the surface of the earth. Aristotle argues that the metaphor is

58

inappropriate because Empedocles uses an analogy rather than a demonstration.

Empedocles has merely generated more questions; he has not explained why seawater is
salty rather than sweet.110 In this analogy, Empedocles exploits underlying similarities to
make the example more vivid for the reader; but he has failed to clarify the nature of salt
water because the saltiness of sweat is not understood any better than that of seawater.
The metaphor creates ambiguity, or it reveals that Empedocles did not understand the
mechanism behind salt water.111 If Empedocles had used common language, assuming
that his theory was sound, his readers would understand why the sea is salty.

2.4

EMPEDOCLES INTENT
Aristotles comments on clarity and ambiguity seem to respond to the misuse of

language that he sees as widespread in Athens during the fifth and fourth centuries B.C.
Sophists boasted that they could teach others how to use language to make the worse
appear better.112 The phenomenon was common and the emphasis on public speaking in
the political and judicial arenas of Athens led to exploitation of languages ambiguity:
Aristotle complains , ...

110

, .
; .
, , ; (Aristotle Meteorologica 357b10-14)
One must say what process occurred in the earth. And in general, how is it possible that when the earth is
dried and heated that so great an amount of water is produced? For it is necessary that this be a very small
portion of the water left in the earth. Moreover, why doesnt the earth even now, whenever it happens to
dry out, sweat either to a greater or lesser extent?
111

Aristotle makes the same point with Empedocles description of milk:

, .
. (Aristotle de generatione animalium 777a7
(=31B68)) For milk is concocted blood, but not corrupted. Empedocles either did not understand correctly
or he made a bad metaphor when he wrote that a white pus was formed on the tenth day of the eighth
month.
112

Aristotle Rhetoric 1402a23.

59

 (Aristotle Rhetoric
1403b31-35) These skills [volume of voice, harmony, rhythm] carry off most of the
prizes in dramatic contests.so, too in political contests owing to the corruption of the
government. Ambiguity was a consistent feature in rhetoric considering the emphasis
contemporary literature placed on the problem of sophistic elenchus (Plato Apology,
Aristophanes Clouds). Aristotle, however, does not consider a context in which the object
of the communication is too important to state plainly and should be concealed from the
general populace, for example, the skills in fragment 111 that Empedocles promises
Pausanias will learn.113
Although Diogenes Laertius claims that Aristotle praised Empedocles for his use of
metaphor114, Aristotle is generally critical of Empedocles choice to write in verse and use
metaphor, as in 2.3.1 above. He also charged Empedocles with attempting to deceive his
listeners by saying things that can be interpreted in any number of ways to hide the fact
that he does not understand what he himself is saying.
,
,
,
,

113

See 2.2.3 above.

114

(Diogenes Laertius Lives
of the Philosophers 8.57 = DK 31A1) In his Concerning the Poets, [Aristotle] says that Empedocles is
Homeric and clever in his speech being both apt at metaphors and using other things successful to the
poetic craft. When Aristotle praises Empedocles for his use of metaphor, it is probably because he
describes inanimate things as though they were animate, as Homer did (Aristotle Rhetoric 1411b31-32).
Aristotles presentation in Poetics 1457b8 ff. (see 2.3.1 above) of various metaphors that Empedocles
wrote seems to be the only praise if it really is. Davis 1992 (117) points out the ambiguous presentation
linked to specific examples.

60

Aristotle Rhetoric 1407a31-7 = DK 31A25c

The third [way to use proper Greek] is not to use ambiguous statements. Unless, of
course, one prefers the opposite course [i.e., ambiguity] which is what they do
when they are able to say nothing but pretend they can say something. For such men
say these things [i.e., their nothings] in poetry, like Empedocles. For the long, roundabout expression deceives the audience, and they (the audience) experience what
most people experience at the hands of prophets. For whenever they (the prophets)
speak ambiguities, they (the audience) nod assent, approving, e.g., When Croesus
will cross the Halys, he will destroy a great empire.

A speaker/author either has something to say or nothing. If he has something to say,

Aristotle assumes he wants the audience to understand his message; hence there is a need
for clarity of expression. Those with nothing to say attempt to conceal this by using
ambiguous statements that can be interpreted in different ways.115
If a speaker or author chooses an ambiguous style over a clear one, therefore,
Aristotle believes that they do not have a message worth conveying, or in the case of
physikoi, they do not understand their own theories sufficiently to teach them to another.
Aristotle illustrates that Empedocles has not passed on the finer points of his theory when
he comments in Metaphysics 985a21-b3 on Empedocles inconsistent use of Love, Strife,
and the roots116; Aristotle, through no fault of his own, fails to learn what Empedocles is
trying to teach. Empedocles writing forces Aristotle to develop his own interpretation:

115

Aristotle is generally hostile to metaphor.

116

See 1.1 above.

61

, Metaphysics 985a3-4 For if someone were to follow and take it

with a view to his intent and not with a view to the things Empedocles stammers as he
speaks, one would find117 Aristotle recognized that Empedocles had a message for his
readers despite the ambiguity and that it must be drawn out of the text; he did not draw
out the correct interpretation owing to his own preconceptions.118
On the other hand, by comparing Empedocles to the oracle at Delphi, Aristotle
inadvertently explains why Empedocles writes ambiguously. Although it appears at first
sight as I demonstrated in part 1 of this chapter that Empedocles deserves to be called a
physikos, I have also shown in 2.2.3 in this chapter that explaining how the world works
is in fact not his goal, but that Pausanias will learn how to control the world. It is not the
aim of oracles to spell out the future to just anyone. Empedocles may have a similar goal,
that is, to obscure something that should not be widely broadcast to the general public.
Empedocles ambiguity was a cue to the careful reader that attention must be paid to this
text. The reader should take account of every possible interpretation and in this way
proceed to an informed analysis. Perhaps Empedocles intended to deceive those
unworthy of hearing his message, but for others he emphasized through ambiguity a
novel concept that required careful examination. Gods, moreover, who speak through an
oracle, do not want the Truth, to which they alone have access, to come to the ears of
anyone who has not earned the privilege.119 Ambiguity, therefore, need not be negative;
there was also a positive tradition of ambiguity, which I discuss in greater detail below in
chapter 4.
117

Compare also what Aristotle says at Metaphysics 985b3: .

One may conclude this by reflection on his verses.
118

See chapter 5 for my interpretation of Empedocles cosmology.

119

See chapter 3.

62

Empedocles, therefore, is not a physikos, despite the superficial similarities set out in
part 1 of this chapter. Aristotle criticizes Empedocles because he does not write as a
physikos should, according to Aristotle: Empedocles is ambiguous and writes in verse; he
uses metaphor and analogy. Empedocles does address his contemporaries theories; but
he has another goal. Fragment 111 seems to confirm this; Pausanias, who has turned
aside from the common path (fragment 2), will learn not how the world works from these
verses, but how to control the world. Such sensitive lessons, moreover, explain why
Empedocles is a poet who followed the contemporary tradition of ambiguity associated
with oracles; he cannot use common language as Aristotle demands of physikoi or
everyone would learn how to control the world.

63

Chapter 2 Empedocles the Magician

In the first chapter, I illustrated how Empedocles is called a scientist on the basis of
what he writes in his verses, but he does not present himself as one. The lessons that
Pausanias has come to Empedocles to learn (fragment 2.8-9) are not simply to understand
how the world works, but to have power over the world (fragment 111): curing disease,
raising the dead, and controlling the wind and the rain. On the basis of this, Empedocles
has also been identified as a magician. Gorgias claims he witnessed Empedocles
performing the activities of a : , (
) . (Diogenes Laertius Lives 8.59) Satyrus
says that Gorgias [a student of Empedocles] said that he was present while Empedocles
practiced magic. Pliny the Elder said that Empedocles traveled to study with the magi1;
Philostratus also says that Empedocles spent time with the magi.2 Such statements may be
backed up by, or have their origin in, a story that Empedocles wrote about Xerxes
expedition3; Herodotus (book 7) writes about the magi who traveled with Xerxes and his
army.

certe Pythagoras, Empedocles, Democritus, Plato ad hanc [sc. magicen] discendam navigavere exsiliis
verius quam peregrinationibus susceptis. hanc reversi praedicavere, hanc in arcanis habuere. (Pliny
Natural History 30.1.9) Certainly Pythagoras, Empedocles, Democritus, and Plato sailed to learn the
magic art, undertaking an exile rather than a trip. Once they returned, they announced this skill, but they
kept it (i.e., the details) secret.
2

. (Philostratus Life of Apollonius 8.7.8) For Empedocles, Pythagoras
himself, and Democritus kept company with magi, said many divine things, but never made use of the
craft.
3

(Diogenes Lartius Lives 8.57) [He

wrote] other poems, an expedition of Xerxes and a hymn to Apollo.

64

Did, however, Empedocles present himself as a magician? This chapter will examine
the evidence for the activities associated with magicians and how they claimed to do what
they did. A magician could 1) atone for unjust acts committed by the living or the dead,
2) bewitch people by sending the dead against them, 3) cure disease and madness
whether it was caused by the gods or magic, and 4) affect the environment. Magicians did
not profess to do any of these things through their own power; they are agents who
persuade chthonic gods or other supernatural intermediaries to act on their behalf.
Empedocles appears to be a magician since he claims that he will teach Pausanias to cure
disease to the point of raising the dead and controlling weather. But he does not
accomplish these feats by persuading the gods; he intends to teach Pausanias how to do
these things for himself as a god.

Part 1: Why Magic?

The gods were one possible cause for events, especially those that were out of mortal
control4, as was magic, which was effected by a human medium through the gods.
Burkert 1996 (102-28) explores the use of magic and religion to dispel the effects of
disease and other sufferings, e.g., famine, not only in Greek culture, but also Roman,
Jewish, and more modern examples in other cultures. Collins 2003 (29-37) explains how
some Greeks believed that magic was another cause.5 1) The effects that magic produces
with, for example, curse tablets and wax dolls, are indistinguishable from what gods can
cause. Whenever someone failed to respect the gods or their space, or someone or

Dover 1974 (133 ff.).

Collins 2008 (44-9) expands on his earlier article.

65

something that the gods protect, such as oaths or suppliants, divine vengeance followed.6
He has acted unjustly and polluted himself, and the pollution can spread to others through
contact.7 People who believed that they were suffering from divine retribution or
bewitching may experience illness or other negative effects. 2) Magic acts from a
distance in time and/ or space, just as the gods do. Even if there were other possible
proximate causes, such as coming into contact with another sick person, magic is never
an implausible option, and as #1 points, the effects cannot be distinguished from one
cause or another; the result is the same.8 Finally, 3) magic happens because someone
wants it to happen. A consumer approaches the magician, and the magician wants to
persuade people that magicians have this power to help and to hinder.

,
,
.
,
,

Parker 1983 (chapter 5).

Parker 1983 discusses the various ways of becoming polluted and how to become purified.

For example, when a young man had been killed by a javelin, Pericles and Protagoras supposedly debated
whether the javelin itself, the thrower of the javelin or the judges of the contest were to blame (Plutarch
Pericles 36.5). In another case, Herodotus (6.75) claimed that the madness and subsequent suicide of
Cleomenes were clear-cut cases of divine retribution for sacrilege. He listed three possible causes, all
relating to some transgression against the gods: 1) Cleomenes forced the Pythia to state Demaratus was not
the son of Ariston, 2) he invaded the Eleusinion, or 3) he desecrated the temple of Argos. Although one
non-divine reason was given (the Spartans believed his madness arose when he became a drinker of strong
wine ( ) after he associated with the Scythians too much (6.84)), Herodotus does not
accept it: (Histories 6.84) Cleomenes seems
to me to have paid this penalty for his actions to Demaratus.

66

 ,
,
,
.
Plato Laws 933a-b
Another form, by means of certain trickeries and incantations and so-called spells,
persuades those who dare to harm others that they are capable of such a thing and
(persuades) the others that they are wholly harmed by those who are able to bewitch
them. Regarding all such things, it is not easy to know how it is by nature, nor even if
someone should know is it easy to persuade others; and it is not worthwhile to try to
persuade those who are suspicious towards one another in their souls, to order them
to think little of all such things if anyone should ever see some waxen molded image
whether in the door or at a crossroads or at the grave of ancestors since there is no
secure belief about them.

The belief that magic works is found in the magicians and in the clients, although Plato
focuses his harshest criticism on magicians for the act of persuading the victims. Yet the
victims would never be persuaded if they did not already believe in the possibility.
Ultimately, magic requires a believing audience.9
There is an audience, therefore, among the Greeks ready to believe that magic is a
possible cause for events. The first uses of the Greek terms translated as magician, that
is, and , are in the fifth century and rhetorically charged; they are used to
attack individuals to whom the authors are ideologically opposed.10 Graf 1995 argues that
the category of magic did not come into being in Greece until the Greeks named it and
that, moreover, it was defined by its distinction from religion as characterized by Plato
9

Tambiah 1985 emphasizes the performative aspect of ritual.

10

Segal 1981 (351), Braarvig 1999 (28).

67

and scientific medicine as championed by the Hippocratic school, both opposed to the
uses of magic they attack. If this is the case, it is reasonable to look at those terms alone,
that is, and 11, as Dickie 2001 does in his study of the magician as an
individual in society. I, however, agree with Collins 2008 (27) that the category existed
before there were special terms and was taken for granted until there was specific
opposition. Hippocrates and Plato both espoused views that varied from what hoi polloi
traditionally believed.12
Even when an author uses one of the terms we now translate as magician, that is,
or , the magician is connected with other religious specialists who provide
similar services for clients. Religious specialists could be associated with a particular
place, as we see with the Pythia (a ) at Delphi or the physicians () at the
temple of Asclepius, or they could be itinerant craftsmen who take advantage of their
mobility to ply their craft.13 Hippocrates (On the Sacred Disease 10) links to
purifiers (), beggar-priests (), and charlatans (). Teiresias is a
divine seer ( Sophocles OT 298) until Oedipus believes that Creon bribed
Teiresias to implicate him in the murder of Laius and then he calls him a magician who
forms crafty plans ( line 387) and a tricky beggar-priest (
line 388).14 Plato also calls the practitioners of magic and

11

Other terms include and .

12

As I say in chapter 1 in n. 48, by Hippocrates, I mean an individual from the Hippocratic school.

13

See 2.1 in chapter 1. | , ,

| , | , . |
(Homer Odyssey 17.382-6) For who invites a stranger
from somewhere else, except one of those who are skilled craftsmen a prophet or healer of ills or a
builder of beams or even a divine singer who delights with song? For these men are invited all over the
earth.
14

Johnston 2008 (chapter 5) discusses the links between magicians and .

68

(Republic 364b). All these professionals, whether bound to one place or not, can be called
on the solve problems. Since causes could vary from the gods to magic to more mundane
things, it was important to uncover first why the victim was suffering from illness or bad
luck. The gods could say why something was happening, and any of the religious
specialists could be an intermediary between the victim and the god. The primary features
that distinguish magicians from the other specialists according to their critics are 1)
working for fees and 2) wandering from community to community.15 Magicians claim
specifically to 1) atone for wrongs of both the living and the dead, 2) bewitch enemies, 3)
cure disease, and 4) affect the environment.

1.1

ATONING FOR WRONGS

The gods protect suppliants and the murdered, who were unavenged, from those who

abuse their power.16 Unjust acts such as abuse of xenia, breaking an oath or swearing a
false oath17, failing to protect the young and the old18, theft19, and other similar acts
15

Collins 2008 (49-52).

16

For these unavenged souls, see Johnston 1999, especially chapter 4.

17

Sommerstein 2007 examines the notion of oaths that are not really oaths (based on texts to 322 B.C.), and
concludes that even in the case of informal oaths uttered by characters in comedy, there remained, in the
late fifth and early fourth centuries, a significant degree of reluctance to attach an oath-formula to a false or
insincere statement, and an even stronger degree of reluctance to show such an action as being successful to
the detriment of others. (137).
18

The dead also continue to protect their family, especially orphans: ,

(Plato Laws 927b1-4) Next [the guardians will fear] the souls of those who have
died, in whose nature it is to care especially for their descendents, to honour those who are kindly (to them)
and hostile to those who are not.
19

Theognis refers to such punishment: | ,

. | | ,
, | , | ,
. Theognis 197-202 A possession that comes from Zeus with a just man and purely always exists
steadfastly. But if a man should acquire it unjustly and out of season with a heart that is greedy for gain, or
if having seized it with an oath outside of justice, at first he seems to carry off some profit, but it becomes
bad and the mind of the gods has prevailed.

69

threaten the stability of the community and may draw the negative attention of the gods if
retribution is not made.
,
, .
,

,
,

Hesiod Works and Days 274-280

But you, Perses, set these things with your wits, listen to Justice and forget
everything about force. For the son of Kronos arranged this law for men, he granted
to fish, beasts and winged birds to eat one another since justice is not among them,
but to men he granted justice which is best by far.

Zeus will overlook the violent and unjust actions of animals, but he will not tolerate the
same from men, especially those who are in a position of power. This is Hesiods point in
particular; he attacks the bribe-eating judges who granted to Perses a larger portion of the
land inherited by both Hesiod and his brother. The point is true in general, too; acting
justly sets man apart, and is the basis for human civilization in a harsh world. While those
who operate within the boundaries of will prosper, those who do not will face
punishment: , |
. (Works and Days 265-6) The man fashioning evil for another
fashions evil for himself; the evil plan is most evil for the one planning it.

70

The gods were the ultimate arbiters of justice since they alone were omniscient. They
may derive retribution directly through the natural world by means of disease (including
madness20 and infertility) or natural disaster (storm, flood), or indirectly through other
agents and even economic hardship or other bad luck. Magicians, therefore, offered to
atone for wrongs that have led to divine retribution. Since the original act may be
separate from the present suffering in both time and place, the magicians first determine
the cause and atone for the wrong, and then they alleviate the symptoms.

,
, .

,
,
, ,

, , , .

,
, , ,
,
,

20

Madness was considered an extreme manifestation of disease (Burkert 1992 (57-59)).

71

 , ,
, .
Plato Republic 364a-365a
But the strangest of all these speeches are the things they say about the gods and
virtue, how so it is that the gods themselves assign to many good men misfortunes
and an evil life but to their opposites a contrary lot; and begging priests and seers go
to rich men's doors and make them believe that they by means of sacrifices and
incantations have accumulated a treasure of power from the gods that can expiate and
cure with pleasures and festivals any misdeed of a man or his ancestors, and that if a
man wishes to harm an enemy, at slight cost he will injure just and unjust alike with
certain hauntings (sendings) and bindings, persuading the gods, as they say, to serve
them. And for all these sayings they cite the poets as witnesses And they produce
a bushel of books of Musaeus and Orpheus, the offspring of the Moon and of the
Muses, as they affirm, and these books they use in their ritual, and make not only
ordinary men but states believe that there really are remissions of sins and
purifications for deeds of injustice, by means of sacrifice and pleasant sport for the
living, and that there are also special rites for the dead, which they call teletai, that
deliver us from evils in that other world, while terrible things await those who have
neglected to sacrifice.

This passage illustrates the belief that misfortunes () come from the gods, even
to good people, on account of the unjust actions () of an individual or his
ancestors (). The magicians (here and ) have gained powers
owing to the special relationship they have developed with the gods from making
sacrifices and reciting incantations ( ). With this power, they can
atone for unjust acts with pleasures and festivals ( ), which they
learned from their books written by Musaeus and Orpheus, on behalf of private
individuals and states. They offer a similar service to the dead.

72

1.1.1

Repercussions for Unavenged Murder

While any unjust act including sacrilege may lead to divine retribution, historical
examples of paying a penalty to the gods for unavenged murder better illustrate the role
of a magician purifying the victim of divine retribution.21 Cylon, for example, who
intended to establish a tyranny in Athens just as his father-in-law, Theagenes, had in
Megara, and his supporters sought Athenas protection from Megacles in the late 7th
century.
,

,
,
, ,
,
Antiphons Second Tetraology connects the two. The prosecutor argues in his second speech that the
javelin thrower should be punished whether it was a simple mistake or if these acts were associated with
divine retribution for some other act (of himself or an ancestor); it is incumbant on the jurors to ensure that
he pay the penalty: .
, ,
,
. (3.3.8) Nor is it just to acquit him because of the misfortune of an error. For if the misfortune
occurs by no divine commission, as a simple error it is just that there be consequences for the one who errs.
But if divine defilement falls on one who has acted impiously, it is not just to hinder divine attacks. As the
prosecutor continues in section 11, if the jurors do not find the javelin-thrower guilty, they will be acting
impiously and will also be held responsible by the gods for an unavenged murder:
,
. , ,

. ,

, . Since the young man is an
accomplice in murder according to the speech of the defendants, you would acquit him neither justly nor
piously. For we, the one destroyed utterly by this mistake, would not endure pious things, but impious at
our hands if we were charged as the murdeers. If those who killed us were not held back from things that
are not fitting, they would not live piously on account of those who acquit the unholy. With every blemish
taken onto yourselves concerning all these things, much discretion must be made by you for these things. If
you seize him and keep him from the things that law keeps him from, you will be pure from charges, but if
you acquit you are held responsible. See Sewell-Rutter 2007.
21

73

 , ,
,
.
Plutarch Solon 12.1-2
Now the Cylonian pollution had for a long time agitated the city, ever since Megacles
the archon had persuaded Cylon and his fellow-conspirators, who had taken
sanctuary in the temple of Athena, to come down and stand their trial. They fastened
a braided thread to the image of the goddess and kept hold of it, but when they
reached the shrine of the Erinyes on their way down, the thread broke of its own
accord, upon which Megacles and his fellow-archons rushed to seize them, on the
plea that the goddess refused them the rights of suppliants. Those who were outside
of sacred precincts were stoned to death, and those who took refuge at the altars were
slaughtered there; only those were spared who made supplications to the wives of the
archons.

The gods were believed to grant protection to anyone seeking it. The only requirement
was physical proximity to the sacred space of the gods; this is why Cylon and his
supporters maintained their connection with the altar of Athena by descending on a rope
tied to the altar. When the rope broke, however, their protection was severed, as the
Alcmaeonids clearly argued. Megacles killed not only those who landed outside the
precinct of the Erinyes, who would also extend protection to suppliants, but also those
who took refuge at the altars.
Megacles, the Alcmaeonids, and all Athenians by proximity, were punished. Athens
soon suffered from various woes: Diogenes Lartius (1.110) limits the woes to pestilence;
Plutarch refers to military losses at the hands of the Megarians and other phenomena,
specifically superstitious fears and apparitions (
(Plutarch Solon 12.3)). The Athenians learned (from either

74

seers, (Plutarch Solon 12.3), or the Pythia (Diogenes Lartius 1.110)) that the
cause was the murder of Cylon and his supporters. Plutarchs version is especially
interesting. Although Solon convinced the polluted party to undergo trial and then
expelled both the living and the dead, the stain had already infected Athens so much that
further purification steps were required to appease the gods and return Athens to justice.22
The Athenians were told to summon Epimenides to purify Athens of this pollution; he
founded a temple to the Semnai Theai or the Erinyes, at whose altar the men were killed,
in addition to making numerous sheep sacrifices throughout Athens and Attica wherever
each sheep lay down.23

. ,
,

Diogenes Lartius Lives 1.110
He took sheep, some black and others white, and brought them to the Areopagus; and
there he let them go whither they pleased, instructing those who followed them to
mark the spot where each sheep lay down and offer a sacrifice to the local divinity.

[ ]
. , ,
. (Plutarch Solon 12.3-4) Solon
persuaded the men who were called polluted to submit to a trial, and to abide by the decision of 300 jurors
selected from the nobility. With Myron of Phlya accusing, the men were convicted; the living were
expelled, and having dug up the corpses of the dead they cast them beyond the borders.
22

23

Ogden 2002 includes Epimenides in his list of shamans with Pythagoras and Empedocles. Johnston
1999 (279-87) connects the propitiation of the Semnai Theai here to that of the Erinyes by Athena in
Aeschylus Eumenides. These goddesses mediate relations between the living and the dead.

75

Magicians, therefore, can atone for the wrongs that individuals have committed, thus
restoring justice and then erase the pollution that has led to retribution on the suffering
and those in contact with them by means of ritual.24
Hippocrates links the actions of those who claim to cure the sacred disease to the
actions of purifying pollution and eliminating bewitchment.
,
, .

, ,
, .
Hippocrates On the Sacred Disease 1.39-40 (Grensemann)
They use both purifications and incantations, and they do this thing that is both most
unholy and ungodly, as it seems to me. For they purify those with the disease and
other such things as though they have some pollution or avenging ghosts or have
been bewitched by men or have done some unholy deed.

Hippocrates attacks the magicians for purifying those who suffer epilepsy with a
technique that should be used only to cure people who are polluted or suffer from a
similar affliction. Hippocrates does not claim that this technique never works, but that it
does not apply here because the gods are not responsible for this disease, although they
are responsible for the consequences of pollution.25 But the purifiers do believe that the

24

Thucydides (1.134) also relates how the Spartans also suffered retribution in the form of an unspecified
curse when they barricaded Pausanias, because he was a traitor, in the temple of Athena of the Brazen
House as he sought refuge. They left him there and he almost starved to death; when they removed him so
that his death would not pollute the temple, he died immediately and they buried him outside the city. The
oracle at Delphi, however, advised them to bury Pausanias where he died and set up two bronze statues as
compensation to Athena to abate the curse.
,
,
25

76

disease arises from pollution or an attack from the gods or other super-worldly entities;
their clients believe this as well or the purifiers would have no business. As Hippocrates
points out here, if a magicians bewitchment ( ) or
avenging ghosts () caused the victims disease, purification is the correct
treatment.
Purification by blood is the ritual that Hippocrates describes as most unholy and
ungodly ( ). Heraclitus described the purification rites that
are linked to early magicians such as Epimenides and Melampus.

. ,
.
Aristocritus Theosophia 68 = DK 22B5
Polluted, they purify themselves in vain with blood like someone washing mud from
himself by going into the mud. He would seem mad if some man should notice him
acting in this way.

Heraclitus argues that it makes no sense to wash off blood with more bloodshed it is
like removing mud with more mud; he is critical of the religious rationale. Purifying

.
,
, ,
, , .
. ,
, (Hippocrates On the Sacred
Disease 1.44-2.1) I do not believe that the body of man is polluted by a god, the most corruptible by the
most holy; but if it should happen to be polluted or suffer something by another, it would be more likely to
be purified and sanctified by a god rather than polluted. And so the divine is what purifies, sanctifies and is
a soap for us with respect to our greatest and most unholy sins; we, having fixed boundaries for the gods in
their sanctuaries and precincts in order that no one should cross unless he is pure, and we sprinkle ourselves
as we enter not as defiling, but purifying it if we should have some previous pollution. This is how it seems
to me about purifications. But this disease seems to me to be no more divine than the others, but it has a
nature like other diseases, and a cause when each comes.

77

agents fall into two categories. One absorbs the pollution through attraction because they
are impure themselves, especially blood.26 The Canicattini crater shows Melampus
purifying the daughters of Proetus with blood.27 Other examples illustrate the use of a
blood sacrifice such as Orestes carried out after he murdered his mother:
, | |
. | |
. (Aeschylus Eumenides 448-452) There is a law that a murderer be speechless
until someone with the power to purify has besprinkled him with the blood of a young
beast. I have been purified long ago with respect to these things at other houses, both by
beasts and running rivers. The other category of purifying agents is already pure, such as
water, and washes away the pollution, for example, when the Greek army purifies itself
of the plague incurred by Agamemnons failure to return Chryseis:
| (Homer Iliad
1.313-14) The son of Atreus ordered the troops to cleanse themselves by bathing, and
they bathed themselves and cast the off-scourings into the sea. This can be in lieu of or
in addition to purification by blood.28 The other part of the ritual, according to

Parker 1983 (230-1) adds mud, bran mash, eggs, puppies, and wool to the list of agents that absorb
pollution. Appendix 6 (pp. 370-374) in Parker 1983 discusses possible origins of the practice.
26

27

G. Scheider-Herrmann, Das Geheimnis der Artemis in Etrurien Antike Kunst 13 (1970) 67, fig. 1.

28

Strabo (8.3.19.346 ff.) preserves a version of Melampus purification of the Proetids where he uses water
from the Anigrus. According to Bacchylides (11.95-110), Melampus cured the young women in the temple
of Artemis Hemera at Lousoi where there was a pool. Orestes also assures Athena that he has been purified
by sacrifice and the water of clear-running streams.

78

Hippocrates, is to recite an incantation during the physical purification.29 The pollution

must then be carefully disposed so that others do not come into contact with it.30

1.1.2

Helping the Souls of the Dead

Punishment for unjust acts can also occur after death as Pindars Olympian 2
illustrates: | |
| | (Pindar
Olympian 2.57-60) The helpless spirits of those who have died, some have paid the
penalty here straightaway, someone beneath the earth passes judgment on other sins in
this realm of Zeus, declaring a statement with hateful necessity.31 Again the magicians
offer to perform rites for souls: , ,
, . (Plato Republic 365a)
there are also special rites for the dead, which they call teletai, that release us from evils
in that other world, while terrible things await those who did not sacrifice. The Derveni

29

For examples, see R. Heim Incantamenta magica graeca latina Teubner (1892).

30

, ,
, . (Hippocrates On the Sacred Disease 1.42) They
purify them and some of the purifications they bury in the earth, some they cast into the sea, and others
they carry off to the mountains where no one will touch them nor come upon them. Parker 1983 (229
n.130) lists other references to this practice.
31

Compare Pindar fragment 130 of the Threnoi:

, , |
The third path is for those who have lived profanely and lawlessly, thrusting the
souls into a certain darkness and pit: there the sluggish rivers of gloomy night belch out limitless
darkness.

79

papyrus32 preserves fragments of an unnamed cosmogony by Orpheus and provides a less

critical interpretation of this service that magicians33 offer.
.] [] [] [ .
[ ] [] [
[] . [
[ ] [] [] [][
[], . <>
[] [] ,
. []
, [ ] .
[ ]
.
PDerv. column VI.1-10
prayers and sacrifices placate souls. An incantation by the magoi can dislodge
daimones that are in the way. Daimones that are in the way are vengeful to souls
for this reason the magoi make sacrifice, as though paying a blood price. Onto the
offerings they pour libations of water and milk from which they make drinkofferings. And they sacrifice cakes that are countless and many-humped because
even the souls are countless. The initiates sacrifice to the Eumenides just as the
magoi do, for the Eumenides are souls.

The first six columns of the papyrus are dedicated to eschatology and understanding the
nature of the Erinyes, who traditionally have two roles: avengers of the dead or punishers
32

The Derveni papyrus was discovered in 1962 in northern Greece. Kouremenos, Parssoglou, and
Tsantsanoglou published the text in 2006. They date the papyrus to 340-20 B.C. on the basis of the script
and Burkert (1968, 1970, 1986) dates the text to c. 420-400 B.C.
33

Tsantsanoglou (1997) prefers to see the magoi as Persian priests, venerable paradigms of piety and
wisdom (p. 99), although he admits that this choice stems from a lack of positive attitude towards
magicians in the sources (p. 110, n. 25).

80

of the dead. Column VI describes the ritual that either keeps away or changes the
daimones, the vengeful souls that prevent something unidentified from happening. The
commentator (or the poet) argues that these daimones are the Eumenides, or the Erinyes
mentioned in column II, and that they keep other souls from reaching the pleasant part of
Hades.34 The rituals of the magoi, therefore, aid the souls of the dead by paying their
blood price to the Eumenides, that is, they liberate the souls who have sinned from the
terrible things that await them by performing initiation rites for them to avoid the
punishments of Hades. I believe that the Derveni author argues that the magician does
this only for the dead who can no longer act on their own behalf since the mystery
initiates who seek a blessed afterlife make these sacrifices for themselves as the magoi
do.35 As one initiate says in a gold tablet: <>
(A3.4 Zuntz) I have paid the penalty for unjust deeds.36 Magicians petition the
gods by means of ritual on behalf of their clients to remove pollution.

1.2

BEWITCHING PEOPLE
Hippocrates points out that solving problems by magic has a corollary you can

create problems by magic:

, (Hippocrates On the Sacred

34

Tsantsanoglou 1997 (99-100). Johnston 1999 argues that the vengeful souls are not the Erinyes, but the
restless spirits that inhabit the underworld. They threaten the newly dead soul (134, 137-8, 276-77). The
commentator, on the other hand, may have a different (or incorrect) interpretation of who these souls were.
35

The mysteries promise a better afterlife if the soul can remember what it learned from initiation. The
magician who claims to understand the details of the underworld, such as the gold tablets describe (see next
footnote), can also help the living prepare for their journey (Johnston 1999 (106ff.)).
36

See Zuntz 1971 for text and commentary of some tablets; the Hipponion tablet published in 1974 is
analyzed in Cole 1980. The most recent edition of these tablets in English and an analysis of their
importance for mystery religions can be found in Graf and Johnston 2007. Parker 1983 (291-307) argues
that the Orphics and the Pythagoreans achieved this through an ascetic lifestyle.

81

Disease 1.25) For whoever is able to lead away such a disease by purifying and
performing magic, he is also able to bring on others things by skillful execution. The
magicians contribute in two ways to bewitching: 1) they bewitch people themselves, and
2) they can remove a bewitchment. Plato provides evidence that magicians, in addition to
the gods, can be responsible for the bad things that happen to people.
,
,
, , .
Plato Republic 364c
And [these begging priests and seers make rich men believe] that if a man wishes to
harm an enemy, at slight cost he will injure just and unjust alike with hauntings
(sendings) and bindings, persuading the gods, as they say, to serve them.37

The bewitching occurs in two related ways. The magicians allege they send the dead
against their victims (). Those who did not receive appropriate burial rites
could not be completely assimilated among the dead. Just as ritual marked the transition
from childhood to adolescence and from adolescence to adulthood and then parenthood,
the rituals surrounding death, for example, burial and lamentations (), marked the
final transition as the individual left the living family to join family who had already died.
If the dead should be unburied or do not receive burial rites, they linger between the

37

Compare: ,
,
, ,
(Plato Laws 909a-b) As
many as become beast-like with respect to thinking that the gods are uncaring or susceptible to bribe,
because they hate men they charm the souls of many of the living, declaring that they lead up the souls of
the dead and promising to persuade the gods by bewitching them, as it were, with sacrifices, prayers, and
incantations and they attempt to ruin completely both private individuals and whole families and cities for
the sake of money.

82

living and the dead.38 The same principles apply to those who die young brides,
unmarried men, and virgins and who have not received honour because they failed to
live complete lives, that is, they did not produce children, and are thus unable to cross
into a new community.39 Unless they receive honour in the form of ritual, those who fail
to honour this category of restless souls will also incur the wrath of the gods. Those who
are violently murdered are another grouping of souls that the magicians could call on;
they also do not have rest because they seek vengeance. The other technique is binding
(). We see this phenomenon in the archaeological record with curse tablets or
binding spells ( or defixiones), which were common all over the ancient world
in wells or graves, sanctuaries of chthonic deities, or where the intended victim will be.40
They were written on small sheets of lead, probably for the written invocation to be
spoken over and over again41, and then folded or rolled and pierced with a nail to mimic
the binding of the spell. In both cases, the chthonic gods, usually Hecate, Hermes (in his
role as psychagogos), or Persephone, are asked by the magician to enact the spell,
persuading souls who were not completely integrated into the world of the dead to carry
out the act of binding the rival, whether in the law court or in business, against whom the
curse was directed.42 The dead prevents the victims from acting of their free will, and
compels them to the will of the person who paid the magician for the curse.

38

van Gennep 1960 (146-65); Bremmer 1983 (89-94).

39

Johnston 1999 (152-3), Bremmer 1983 (100-104).

40

See Bernand 1991 (107-30), Faraone 1991, Gager 1992, Graf 1997, Giordano 1999, Johnston 1999:
chapters 2 (71 ff.) and 3, Ogden 1999, Versnell 1999 and various individual editions of curse tablets.
41

Frankfurter 1994: 195-6.

42

Another common binding spell that magicians performed for others were love spells, as Theocritus Idyll
2 describes the actions of Simaetha to bring Delphis back to her; compare Virgil Eclogue 2 or Jasons use
of the iunx to seduce Medea as instructed by Aphrodite (Pindar Pythian 4.211-50). Women usually worked
such spells, however, through sympathetic magic, not through the dead. Faraone 1999.

83

Magicians also offer to remove the effects of bewitchment.

,
, .

, ,
, .
Hippocrates On the Sacred Disease 1.39-40 (Grensemann)
They use both purifications and incantations, and they do this thing that is both most
unholy and ungodly, as it seems to me. For they purify those with the disease and
other such things as though they have some pollution or avenging ghosts or have
been bewitched by men or have done some unholy deed.

As Hippocrates links the two together, there seems to be little difference between
removing the effects of a gods displeasure and a bewitchment. As I showed above, some
Greeks believed that magic was a plausible cause for an effect because both magic and
the gods operated at a distance in time and space. Magicians, therefore, can both solve
and create problems with their skills.

1.3

CURING DISEASE
Hippocrates On the Sacred Disease attacks the techniques magicians use to cure

disease. They are the same as those used to atone souls for their wrongs, that is,
purifications and incantations.


,

84

 .


, ,

,


Hippocrates On the Sacred Disease 1.10-12 (Grensemann)
The first men who called this disease sacred, as it seems to me, were such men as the
present day magicians (), purifiers (), beggar priests (), and
charlatans (), as many as pretend to be exceedingly pious and to know
something more. They hold up and allege the divine as a pretext for their ignorance
of not having something which, having applied it, will help and in order that they do
not reveal that they know nothing, they declare that this disease is sacred, and saying
appropriate words in connection with this, they establish a cure that is safe for
themselves, applying purifications and incantations, ordering they avoid baths and
many foods unfit for sick men to eat.

The primary goal of Hippocrates treatise was to show that epilepsy was no more divine
than any other disease, contrary to the claims of magicians.43 Gods, according to
Hippocrates, do not cause disease, nature does; since nature, however, is full of the
divine, all disease is divine.44 One should not treat epilepsy, therefore, any differently

43

, (Hippocrates On the
Sacred Disease 1.2-3 (Grensemann)) It does not seem to me in any way to be more divine or sacred than
other diseases... Men believed it was something divine owing to difficulty and its amazing character,
because it was similar in no way to other diseases.
44

, , , .

85

than any other disease, as Hippocrates goes on to demonstrate. But the very fact that
Hippocrates addresses the magicians illustrates that his views on this were in the
minority.45 Many Greeks believed that magicians could cure them through purifications
() and incantations ().
Illness may be a symptom of something else. Since symptoms were varied and onset
unpredictable, the Greeks believed the gods were one possible source.46 In Mesopotamia,
the healers, ashipu, associated with temples, observed the symptoms of the patient,
determined which divine agent was responsible since in the near east, as well as in
Greece, divinity was everywhere, and then prescribed a treatment (Scurlock 2005). If the
gods are the cause, the sickness may be the retribution for some unjust act committed by
the victim or someone close to him. It is also possible that restless souls those who die
violently, young, or without proper burial are stirred up by the gods and affect the
living with plague or madness as the Cylonian pollution or the plague suffered by the
Spartans with the murder of Pausanias illustrate.47 Other common sources for disease
include poisoning (harmful ) or bewitchment. With all these plausible causes,
the magician, and the religious specialist, needs to figure out what is happening.

, ,
(Hippocrates On the Sacred Disease 18.1-2 (Grensemann)) This disease
called sacred comes from the same causes as the others: from things that come and go (from the body), and
cold and sun and winds that change and never (). These things are divine with the result that it
is not necessary to consider that the () disease is more divine than the rest, but all are divine
and all are human.
45

Lloyd 1979 (16ff.) notes the similarities between Hippocrates and early anthropologists describing the
magical beliefs of so-called primitive cultures or Christian historians discussing witchcraft. As Graf 1995
points out, therefore, the dichotomy between magic and science is present from the beginning for the
Greeks. Laskaris 2002 (73-124) argues that On the Sacred Disease is a rhetorical work designed to lure
clients from the magicians, et al., to whom most people go in such circumstances.
46

Parker 1983 (chapter 8).

47

See 1.1.1 above.

86

Addressing the cause (if distant) that ultimately underlies disease does not preclude
treating the disease symptoms as well. The early healers/magicians understood how roots
and plants could treat wounds. They passed this information to their apprentices orally,
for example, Patroclus, trained by Achilles whom Cheiron taught in turn (Iliad 11.829832), knew which root would stop the bleeding of Eurypylus wound:
| , , | ,
. (Iliad 11.846-8) He put onto it (the wound) a bitter root, having
rubbed it with his hands, a painkiller, which took all the pain from it; the wound dried
and the blood stopped.48 In addition to healing , healers used incantation:
Odysseus grandfather, Autolycus, healed the wound Odysseus received from a boar by
binding it and chanting a spell over it (Odyssey 19.456-8). Another of Cheirons students,
Asclepius (Iliad 4.218-19), was known for his use of .

.
,
,
,

,
, ,
48

The could be beneficial or harmful. Both Helen and Circe had a to make men forget
their troubles (Odyssey 4.219-232, 10.236); Hermes gives to Odysseus (Odyssey 10.301-6) to counter
the effects of Circes . Medea is another mythological character known for her skills with
. Sophocles play, Root-cutters ( ), probably retells the story of Medea (Pearson 1917 II,
pp. 172-7); the scene in Argonautica 3.844-66 where Medea harvests the drug that will defend Jason
against the fire-breathing serpents illustrates the techniques of the root-cutters. See Raven 1990, Lloyd
1983, and Scarborough 1991 for more on the root-cutters.

87


,
,
Pindar Pythian 3.45-53
He (Apollo) carrying him (Asclepius) took him to the Magnesian Centaur (Cheiron)
to learn to heal diseases baneful for men. All who came to him afflicted with natural
sores or with limbs wounded by gray bronze or by a far-flung stone, or with bodies
wracked by summer fever or winter chill, he relieved their various ills and restored
them; some he tended with gentle incantations, while other drank soothing potions, or
he applied to all parts of their bodies; still others he raised up with surgery.

Asclepius used his on both wounds and disease. The emphasis on incantation,
therefore, in treating pollution and the diseases symptoms illustrates why magicians like
other religious specialists were sought to treat disease.

1.4

AFFECTING THE ENVIRONMENT

The same individuals, whom Hippocrates criticizes for treating the sacred disease as

though it comes from the gods, claim to influence the physical world.

Hippocrates On the Sacred Disease 1.29 (Grensemann)

88

For if they (magicians, etc.) claim that they know how to bring down the moon49, to
hide the sun, and to make storm and fair weather, showers and drought, the sea
without passage and the earth barren, and all other such things

The magicians do not accomplish alone the feats that Hippocrates lists, but persuade the
gods to do it for them through rites ( 1.29) or sacrifice ( 1.31); as
Hippocrates complains:
(1.31) The power of the gods is overcome by human ingenuity and
enslaved.50 No source explains why the magicians claim this power, but they may allege
either to reverse other punishments outside of disease the gods bring for unjust acts or
arise from curses, or they offer these services to others for a fee or they may assert both.

The magicians emphasize their piety and superior knowledge (

. (Hippocrates On the Sacred Disease 10) They
pretend to be exceedingly pious and to know something more.), that is, they claim to
understand how divinity operates and how to prevail upon the gods to do as they ask
through purifications, incantations, and sacrifice. Plato confirms this attitude:
, , ,
.
,
,
49

Compare Aristophanes Clouds where Strepsiades proposes a scheme for getting out of paying interest on
a loan. Since interest is determined on a monthly basis, hiding the moon should put an end to calculating
interest: | (Clouds 749-50)
Suppose I, having bought a Thessalian witch, should draw down the moon at night Women would
draw down the moon for erotic attraction magic (Lucian Philopseudes 14) or to collect magical herbs
(Bicknell 1984 67-8.)
50

Hippocrates, therefore, seems to believe with that the gods were responsible for such events
(Collins 2003).

89



, .51
Plato Republic 364c-e
[Magicians persuade rich men and cities that they can atone for wrongs and harm
enemies], persuading them that the gods, as they say, serve them by means of certain
incantations and bindings Other (magicians) provide Homer as a witness of the
persuasion of the gods by men, because even he said: And the gods themselves are
moved by prayer, and men beseeching (the gods) turn them away by sacrifice and
gentle prayers and libation and the savour of sacrifice, whenever they sin and
overstep their bounds.

The magicians, therefore, argue that they have power through the divine because of their
greater piety. To Hippocrates, the magicians claims to piety are impious because their
actions suggest that they defeat and enslave divine power to their will:
, ,
. (Hippocrates On the Sacred Disease 1.31) I, at any
rate, would consider not one of these things divine but human, if indeed the divine power
is overcome and enslaved by human ingenuity. The magicians, however, do not present
themselves as controlling the divine, but asking the divine to accomplish something at
their request.

Magicians, therefore, claim to 1) atone for wrongs, 2) bewitch other people, 3) cure
disease and 4) affect the environment, through their connection with the divine.

51

Homer Iliad 9.497 ff, adapted.

90

Part 2: Was Empedocles a Magician?

It is natural that Empedocles is included among the magicians by ancient and more
modern commentators.52 Magicians claimed to atone for wrongs, bewitch people (or
reverse bewitchment), cure disease, and affect the weather. Empedocles claims in his
own verses to cure disease, to affect the weather, and to lead back the dead (fragment
111). Testimonia support or provide even more evidence of such magical activity:
Empedocles raised a woman from the dead (A1 61), cured a plague (A1 70), redirected
winds (A1 60; A14), and prevented a young man from killing his host by reciting a
Homeric verse (A15). He wandered from community to community and, although he
does not approach people, they seek out his help to cure disease and in other situations
(fragment 112). Pliny the Elder and Philostratus claim that he travelled to the magi to
study with them; Gorgias says that he witnessed Empedocles practicing .53
The question of Empedocles considering himself a magician is similar to the issue of
whether he considered himself a physikos. On the one hand, he claims to do some of the
activities associated with magicians, yet he does not do others. More important, however,
he claims to be a god (B23.11). This concept is so important to understanding
Empedocles that chapter 3 focuses on his notion of divinity. This point also emphasizes
the distinctions between how he presents himself and how others perceive him. By
claiming to be a god, he sets himself apart from religious specialists, including and
, whose power comes from the gods; they are intermediaries between their clients
and the gods, Empedocles is the real deal. But since his idea of divinity varies from that

52

A brief sample: Kingsley 1995a (and others), Graf 1997, Ankarloo and Clark 1999, Johnston 1999,
Dickie 2001, Ogden 2002, Collins 2008, Edmonds 2008.
53

These passages are quoted in the introduction to this chapter.

91

of hoi polloi, his presentation of himself as a god confuses later and even roughly
contemporary commentators. While Empedocles portrays himself as a successful initiate
into a mystery, that is, becoming a god, into which he is now willing to initiate others,
testimonia emphasize his wonder-working and mock those, including Empedocles, who
believed he was a god; they present him as a charlatan, taking on the tone of those who
attack magicians on account of ideological differences as described in part 1 of this
chapter. I will examine his claims and contrast them with those of contemporary
magicians and then I will contrast his presentation with the testimonia.

2.1

EMPEDOCLES CLAIMS AGAINST MAGICIANS CLAIMS

Evidence for linking Empedocles to magic comes from fragments 111 and 112;

fragment 111 states what Pausanias will learn from Empedocles.54

, .


, , ()

,
, ,

Diogenes Laertius 8.59 = DK 31B111
54

In 2.2.3 of chapter 1, I outline the history of scholars reaction to this fragment, from questioning its
authenticity to its present acceptance.

92

You will learn as many drugs as have come into being to defend against evils and old
age since I will accomplish all these things for you alone. You will stop the force of
untiring winds which, rushing against the earth, kill the fields with their blasts; and
again, if you wish, you will bring the winds back again. You will make after dark rain
a drought timely for men, and after summer drought you will make tree-nourishing
streams that dwell in the air [i.e., rain]; and you will bring from Hades the strength of
a man who has died.

When we compare Empedocles to what contemporary magicians claimed, there are some
parallels. Magicians 1) atoned for wrongs, 2) bewitched people, 3) cured disease, and 4)
affected the weather; Empedocles, on the other hand and in the order presented, cured
disease (and old age), affected the weather, and brought back the dead. Since some curses
are accomplished by compelling the spirits of the restless dead to harass the living, this
may be the parallel to bewitching people.55 Empedocles, therefore, does 2, 3, and 4 listed
above, but he does not atone for wrongs. But I will show how he does not realize these
feats in the same way as magicians. He claims elsewhere to be a god (fragment 23.11 and
112) and fragment 111 supports this interpretation.

2.1.1

Atoning for Wrongs

Empedocles does not claim to atone for wrongs. His conception of divinity as I
describe in chapter 3, precludes it. First, Empedocles gods are not the Olympians who
punish people for committing unjust acts; the only immortal gods for Empedocles are the
roots fire, water, earth, and air and Love and Strife.56 There is no need, therefore, to
atone for wrongs as magicians present them because there are no gods who punish unjust
55

See 1.2 above. This is contrary to what Kingsley 1995a (225-6) argues; he says that Empedocles claims
to make the trip himself to the Underworld as shamans did.
56

See 1.1 in chapter 3. Empedocles is a mortal god; see 1.2 in chapter 3.

93

acts. Second, atoning for wrongs appears to be a personal responsibility according to

Empedocles words on living a pure life.57 The price for not living a pure life is continued
wretched existence on the cycle of transmigration. Nowhere does Empedocles offer to
intercede as an intermediary to allow people to become pure. If an individual wants to
escape the cycle of transmigration and become a mortal god, the ultimate goal of being
pure, then it is necessary to make particular lifestyle choices, for example, not eating
meat since such an act perpetuates the cycle of violence that Strife brings about.58
Empedocles is a mortal god, as chapter 3 explains, and as such he is pure and wise.
He can show other people how to achieve sufficient purity and wisdom to follow in his
footsteps, but he will not atone for other peoples wrongs.

2.1.2

Bewitching People

The last thing in fragment 111 Empedocles promises Pausanias will do is to lead back
the dead: (fragment 111.9) you will bring
from Hades the strength of a man who has died. Why would someone lead back the
dead? For an audience familiar with the claims of magicians, the restless dead can harass
the living and this can be used to bewitch people.59 Magicians, however, claim they
accomplish this through incantations and sacrifices to the gods; Empedocles says that
Pausanias himself will do this through his use of the second singular future verb, .
Kingsley 1995a interprets the verb as an actual descent to the underworld as
opposed to an invocation (225-6), thus linking Empedocles even more closely to the
57

See 2.2.1 in chapter 3.

58

See 1.2 and 2.2 in chapter 3.

59

See 1.2 above.

94

Persian magi.60 Kingsley emphasizes the promise of controlling death in conjunction with
controlling life and manipulating our environment as real magical knowledge that
Pausanias will be able to control, but on the basis on how magicians claim to do these
things, whether Pausanias will actually descend does not matter as much as he will do
this with own power as a god. Empedocles is not a magician nor does he promise
Pausanias will become one this is something a god can do successfully.

2.1.3

Curing Disease

Pausansias will also learn about drugs.

, .
Diogenes Laertius 8.59 = DK 31B111.1-2
You will learn as many drugs as have come into being to defend against evils and old
age since I will accomplish all these things for you alone.

It is natural to make a connection to magicians because they, too, use to treat

the symptoms of disease.61 Kingsley 1995a (222-3) points to how Empedocles claims to
use not only against evils but also as a defence against old age ( ).
Mortality is one thing that separates humans from gods, and Empedocles appears to
address the Homeric Hymn to Apollo, which describes men as
, | (HHymn to
Apollo 192-3) They live witless and helpless, nor are they able to find a cure for death
or a defense against old age. Although Kingsley goes on to cite Greek familiarity with
60

See also Kingsley 1994b and 1995b.

61

See 1.3 above.

95

drugs that claim to stop old age62, it seems more likely, in conjunction with the other
things that Empdocles claims, that he emphasizes the skills that have come with his
divinity. He is more like Cheiron who taught Achilles (Homer Iliad 11.829-32) and
Asclepius (Pindar Pythian 3.45-6) how to use .63

2.1.4

Affecting Weather

In addition to learning the , Empedocles promises Pausanias that he will

control the environment.


, , ()

,
,
Diogenes Laertius 8.59 = DK 31B111.3-8
You will stop the force of untiring winds which, rushing against the earth, kill the
fields with their blasts; and again, if you wish, you will bring the winds back again.
You will make after dark rain a drought timely for men, and after summer drought
you will make tree-nourishing streams that dwell in the air

Empedocles focuses on having power over the wind and the rain, made notable
through his use of the second person future: (you will stop line 3),
(you will bring back line 5), and (you will make lines 6 and 7). This is the
same pattern I have pointed to before: Empdocles emphasizes that Pausanias will
62

Kingsley 1995a 223n20.

63

See 1.3 in this chapter.

96

accomplish these things, while magicians claim to have curried favour with the gods who
then do it on the magicians behalf.64 The phrase, (if you want line 5),
elucidates that this can be done at Pausanias will. The future more vivid conditional
echoes Hesiods Muses who claim to tell the truth or lies whenever they want,
(Hesiod Theogony 28); a common way to stress that a gods power is not
restricted.65

Empedocles, therefore, does not accomplish any of these feats as a magician does, but
as a god.

2.2

EMPEDOCLES PRESENTATION AND OTHERS PERCEPTIONS

When Empdocles calls himself a god, the reaction varies depending on the audience.

There are three reactions: 1) they believe he is a god and as of Empedocles, they
know what his claim entails. belong to the same community. They have, therefore
the same context and understand one another better than individuals who are not .66
They also 2) treat him as a magician, or 3) they rationalize Empedocles claims by
treating him as a civil engineer who generates natural solutions and attacking him as a
charlatan.
Fragment 112 describes Empedocles as he wanders from community to community
and what people seek from him.
,
64

See 1.4 above.

65

See West 1966 (163) for other examples in Hesiod and Homer of the gods powers described in this way.
This passage in Hesiod is discussed in more detail below (see 1.2.2 in chapter 4).
66

Nagy 1990. See 1.1.2 in chapter 4.

97

 , ,
, ,
,
, ,

.
,
,
, ,
,

10

,
< >.
Diogenes Lartius Lives of the Philosophers 8.6267 = DK 31B112
Friends, who inhabit the great city by the yellow Acragas in the high parts of the city,
caring for good deeds, harbours that show kindness to strangers, unacquainted with
evil, greetings! I, in your eyes a divine god, no longer mortal, go among all,
honoured, just as I should, adorned with both ribbons and festive garlands. Whenever
I arrive in thriving cities I am revered by all, men and women. And they follow
straightaway, in their ten thousands, asking where is the path to prosperity, some
asking for divinations, others in all sorts of diseases sought to hear a healing oracle,
having been pierced <about by harsh pains> for a long time.

In other verses, Empedocles identifies himself as a god: ,

(DK 31B23.11) But know these things plainly, having heard them
from a god.68 But in these verses, the citizens of Acragas, of whom he is one and so he

67

Diodorus Siculus 13.83.2 supplies verse 3 and verses 10-12 are also found in Clement Stromata 6.30.

68

Nestl 1906 (545-7); Trpanier 2004 (38) also agrees with this reading. Contra Wright 1981 (181) who
argues that the god to whom Empedocles refers is the Muse because the of the physical poem

98

addresses them as (
(Lives of the Philosophers 8.54) That he was an Akragantine from Sicily, he
says himself when he begins the 69), recognize that he is a god (
), and so he is honoured (). Empedocles dresses as a successful
initiate ( (line 6) adorned with both ribbons
and festive garlands) as Theon of Smyrna describes: ,
, , , ,
,
(Theon of Smyrna de utilitate mathematicae 15.1-5 (ed. Hiller)) The fourth step, which
is also the end of the revelation, is the binding of the head and placement of garlands so
that whoever has completed the rites can pass them on to others as well, whether through
the torch bearing ceremony (), the interpretation of sacred things () or
some other priestly work.70 For the people of Acragas, they recognize that he has
successfully become a god ( ), and they know what this entails.
In other communities ( ) he is worshipped or revered ().
Trusting his power, they ask that Empedocles solve their problems whether to reverse bad
luck ( ), tell the future ( ), or cure
disease ( | ). These people want to
know why they are suffering, with the assumption that only a god or his (her)
intermediary would know the answer; they seek a (oracle) as opposed to treatment
comes from the Muse, as we see in fragment 3, and Bollack 1969 (1:265 n.2, 310) who argues that the god
in question is Aphrodite/Love.
69

Editors, therefore, print this fragment as the opening for the , whether they see the as
a distinct poem from the (for example, Wright 1981, Kingsley 1995a, 1996, 2002 and
Bollack 2003), or not (for example, Osborne 1987, Inwood 2001, and Trpanier 2004).
70

See also the beginning of part 2 in chapter 3.

99

of the symptoms with . 71 The phrase (asking for

divinations) is curious in conjunction with the . The verb in the middle is
used of people who consult a god or an oracle. There is little difference with how the
people in thriving cities treat Empedocles on the one hand and magicians on the other
who wander from community to community.72 Does Empedocles consider himself a
magician, therefore? The first part of the fragment suggests that Empedocles may be
contrasting the people outside of Acragas with those in Acragas who know him as a
and therefore understand what it means when he says he is a god, and have shown
themselves to be exceptionally pure.73 The citizens of Acragas understand his message;
the others do not.
The testimonia, on the other hand, mock both the claims that Empedocles is a god and
the people who believe it. If sources do not outright mock Empedocles, they rationalize
his claims. It is reported that Empdocles was called (the wind-stopper,
compare B111.3-5) because he prevented winds from blowing through a region.

,

.
Diogenes Lartius 8.60 = DK 31A1
When the Etesian winds were blowing very strongly, he ordered that asses be skinned
and bags be made of their hides which he stretched about the ridges and mountain
tops to catch the wind. When it ceased, he was called wind-stopper.
71

See 1.1 above.

72

See part 1 of this chapter.

73

See beginning of part 2 in chapter 3.

100

This is not presented as a magical feat, but as an engineering marvel. Although

impressive, it is not divinely related and this undercuts his claims to divinity.74
Sources also mock how he dresses. He dresses as a successful initiate (
(B111.6) adorned with both ribbons and festive
garlands), but sources portray him as wearing a costume. Diodorus of Ephesus describes
him as . (Diogenes Lartius 8.70)
practicing a theatrical disguise and wearing solemn robes. Rather than a meaningful
symbol, Empedocles comportment is reduced to a gimmick:
[sc. ]
, . (Philostratus Life of
Apollonius 8.76 = DK 31A18b) Empedocles even put a headband of the brightest purple
in his hair and swaggered around the streets of Greece composing hymns that said he
would be a god instead of a man.75
Reports of Empedocles death are tied to various examples of his wonder-working,
and portray him as a charlatan who seeks to substantiate what people believe.76 At

74

Compare other reports of this feat:

. (Plutarch On Being
a Busybody 515c = DK 31A14a) The natural philosopher Empedocles, by stopping up a gorge in a
mountain which discharged a heavy and pestilential south wind onto the plains, seems to have shut out a
plague from the region.
. (Plutarch Reply to Colotes 1126b = DK 31A14b) (Empedocles) rid
the region of crop failure and plague by walling up gorges in the mountain through which the south wind
poured over into the plain. .
,
. (Clement Stromata 6.30) Empedocles of Acragas was called
the wind-stopper. For, when a wind, serious and full of ill for the natives and causing sterility in the
women, blew down from the mountain of Acragas, he is said to have stopped the wind.
75

Compare also . (Aelian

Miscellaneous History 12.32 = DK 31A18a) Empedocles of Acragas wore purple clothes and bronze
shoes.
76

Chitwood 1986.

101

Selinus, for example, he cured a plague with what is presented as another engineering
marvel.

,
,

.
,

.
.
Diogenes Lartius 8.70 = DK 31A1
A plague once afflicted the people of Selinus, because of the foul odours from the
adjacent river, so that they died and their wives miscarried; Empedocles got the idea
of diverting, at this own exprense, two of the nearby rivers; thus by mingling their
waters with those of the first river he sweetened the stream. After the plague had
been stopped in this fashion, and the people of Selinus were feasting by the river
bank, Empedocles appeared (like a god). They got up and bowed before him praying
to him as though to a god. Empedocles leaped into the fire, wishing to secure their
belief.

When the citizens bowed down before him he threw himself into the fire to prove them
right. Diodorus of Ephesus, the source for this story, clearly believed that Empedocles
was a charlatan, describing as he does Empedocles action as an act of engineering rather
than one accomplished by a god. Timaeus supports this interpretation elsewhere calling

102

Empedocles an (charlatan) and a (egotist) for calling himself a god in

his own verses (fragment 112).77
Even the stories that he threw himself into Mount Etna to prove his divinity undercut
his claims.

,
,
, ,

. .
Diogenes Lartius 8.69 = DK 31A1
Hippobotos says that he [Empedocles] got up and traveled to Mt. Etna, and having
arrived he leaped into the craters of fire and disappeared, wishing to secure the report
that he had become a god. He was recognized later because one of his sandals was
thrown back out, for he was in the habit of wearing bronze shoes. Pausanias spoke
against these things.

Kingsley 1995a (part III) traces the significance on the intersection between jumping into
Mount Etna, the bronze sandal and the golden thigh as Empedocles presentation as a
shaman. But the poem was addressed to Pausanias; he was a who, presumably,
understood Empedocles message of divinity. That he disputes the story is surely
important. These heroic interpretations of Empedocles burning off his mortal shell
illustrate that Empedocles near contemporaries did not understand his divinity, but

77

Diogenes Lartius 8.66 = DK 31A1.

103

interpreted his claims with their own beliefs in what becoming a god entailed. His
detractors show that they are not .

Although Empedocles appears to do many of the same things that magicians do such
as affecting weather, he does not accomplish the feats he claims in fragment 111 as a
magician would. A magician asks the gods to do these things on his behalf by means of
sacrifices and incantations (part 1); Empedocles claims that he does (and Pausanias will
do) them through his own divine power. Empedocles view of divinity, however, varies
from what many believe, as the next chapter illustrates.

104

Chapter 3 Empedocles the God

The first two chapters have shown that although the evidence suggests that
Empedocles can be called a scientist or a magician on the basis of what he asserts in his
verses or is written about him in the testimonia, he does not present himself as one. He
claims that he is a god, as everyone around him confirms (fragment 112) owing to the
feats he can accomplish (fragment 111). Although it is not uncommon for scholars to
downplay Empedocles claim to be a god or deny it altogether1, I believe we should
approach the text with the understanding that Empedocles considered himself a god.2
Divinity as Empedocles conceives it for himself, however, is not that of the Homeric
gods; it is a state of perfect Harmony that can be achieved by hard work and patience.
Empedocles himself was not always a god, but is a successful model for his audience.
According to testimonia, he jumped into Mt. Etna to prove he had become a god:
,
,
(Diogenes Lartius Lives of the
Philosophers 8.69) Hippobotos says that he [Empedocles] got up and traveled to Mt.
Etna, and having arrived he leaped into the craters of fire and disappeared, wishing to
secure the report that he had become a god.3 It is possible to escape the cycle of
1

For example, van der Ben 1975 (22-25), Wright 1981 (181, 266), McKirahan 1994 (258-9).

This position is taken by Zuntz 1971, Inwood 2001, and Trpanier 2004.

Compare also the story in chapter 70 of Lives of the Philosophers where he jumps into a fire to prove the
same thing to the people of Selinus:

105

transmigration that coincides with the cosmological cycle, and if the readers are
successful in learning Empedocles lessons, they, too, will become gods.

Part 1: What are the Gods?

What does Empedocles mean by god? He clearly has a different idea from the
Olympians, whose existence as gods he denies:
| , | .
(DK 31B128.1-3) Nor was there some god Ares for them, nor Battle-Uproar, nor Zeus
the king nor Kronos nor Poseidon, but Kypris the queen. He does use the names of gods,
but for a different purpose. Sometimes he seems to use the names in order to dispel some
of the common beliefs that men hold, for example, the very existence of the Olympians
as fragment 128 illustrates. At other times, he is using the names to exploit connections
his audience already holds, for example, the riddle in fragment 6.4 As he says when he
applies the terms coming into being () and wretched fate ( ),
that is, destruction, people use the terms incorrectly, but he will follow the convention:
, (DK 31B9.4) It is not right how they call
them, but even I follow the convention.
Empedocles refers to two types of gods. The first are the roots and Love and Strife,
which are unchanging and immortal. These characteristics automatically make them
divine. The second type of god is a compound like any other created thing. Empedocles
,
. . When the plague
stopped in this way and the people of Selinus were feasting by the river, Empedocles appeared. Getting up,
they bowed to him and prayed to him as though he were a god. Wishing to secure this impression, he
jumped into the fire.
4

See 1.1.1 below.

106

lists these gods with other mortal things such as plants, animals, and men. It is to this
group of gods that Empedocles belongs.

1.1

UNCHANGING AND IMMORTAL

The first category of the divine includes the roots, Love, and Strife. These are the

elements of Empedocles universe that always were, are, and will be. Empedocles
explains that he will reveal a good discourse about the gods:
, , | . (DK 31B131.34) stand now beside (me) as I pray again, Kalliope, as I reveal a good story about the
blessed gods) and anyone who holds an incorrect opinion ( shadowy
opinion) about them is wretched (fragment 132). Diels-Kranz placed these fragments in
the Purifications poem owing to the reference to the gods. Wright 1981 (159) places
this fragment at the beginning of Physics, arguing that the Empedocles will describe
are his new mortal gods, as does Inwood 2001 since he places it immediately before
fragment 115, which describes the process of transmigration in other words, the process
of becoming a mortal god. I, however, believe these verses refer to and thus were placed
before the introduction of the roots, Love, and Strife. Physics intends to describe how the
world works; and those gods play an integral part. Empedocles uses the names of gods to
refer to the roots in fragment 6 and he also calls Love by a variety of names associated
with Aphrodite.

107

1.1.1

The Roots

In fragment 6, Empedocles does not identify the roots plainly, but by the names of
familiar gods, so that the readers can determine by means of clues the character of these
components. He compels his readers to solve the riddle.


, .
Sextus Empiricus Adversus Mathematicos 10.315 = DK 31B6
For hear in the first place the four roots of all things: shining Zeus, life-giving Hera,
Aidoneus and Nestis who wets the mortal spring with her tears.

The readers will be told the lesson, but they already know from previous warnings that no
one sense is adequate to learn the truth.5 It is important to listen (), but listening is
insufficient as the readers learn from what follows; the information has been presented in
the form of a metaphor by analogy that must be solved. To learn the lesson presented in
the metaphor, one must fill out the analogy: the roots of all things are to x as Zeus, Hera,
Aidoneus, Nestis are to y.6 As Kingsley (1995, 362) argues, [i]n typical oracular mode
he is neither explicit nor simply silent; instead he adopts a middle course, providing the
seeds of the solution for the discriminating hearer that will lead to growth of
understanding.7
Fragment 17, in addition to containing the most explicit account of the cosmological
cycle, describes the immortal nature of the roots in lines 9-13.
5

See 2.2.1 in chapter 1 above for a brief introduction to this idea in my discussion of fragment 2. It is
discussed in more detail in 2.3 in chapter 4 below.
6

See my discussion on Aristotle and metaphor in 2.3.1 chapter 1.

I discuss the solution to this fragment in 2.2.1 in chapter 4.

108

< >8
,9

,
.
Simplicius Physics CIAG 9.158.9-12 = DK 31B17.9-13
In this way, insofar as they have learned to become One from Many and they end up
as Many when the One is divided again, in this respect they come into being and
there is no secure life for them. But in another way they never stop changing
constantly and in this respect they are always unchanged in a cycle.

The roots come into being () and do not have a secure life, that is, they seem to
be subject to birth and destruction. This appears to contradict what Empedocles states
elsewhere on the nature of the roots. The terminology Empedocles uses, however, is
ambiguous.10 Greek uses in two distinct ways11: 1) coming into being for the
first time either a) from nothing at all (that is, creation ex nihilo) or b) from some other
thing or 2) arriving at a different state or becoming.
Other fragments clarify Empedocles intent. Empedocles emphasizes that no thing
comes into being from nothing nor does any thing perish into nothing:
8

Aristotle quotes these lines separately in his Physics (250b30 ff) to illustrate Empedocles' use of rest and
motion. The first line he quotes (here, line 9) is not present in Simplicius, but he may have been thinking
about another fragment, that is, B26.8-12 quoted in full by Simplicius (Physics CIAG 9.33). Diels-Kranz
(B17), Bignone 1963 (404), Wright 1981 (fr. 8), and Inwood 2001 (fr. 25) include this line; Bollack 1969
(fr. 31) and Martin and Primavesi 1999 (127) do not. The seems required to balance the of the
following line.
9

The neuter plural subject frequently has a singular verb (Smyth 1956 (958)), but it may also be followed
by a plural verb if the author wants to stress that the subject is made up of several parts (Smyth 1956
(959)).
10

Compare Millerd 1908 (39-40), who claims that Empedocles was not specific, that he used the
undefined idea of ordinary experience when he employed the term .
11

Inwood 2001 (32-3) discusses this problem and includes a fourth interpretation.

109

 , | |
. (Plutarch Reply to Colotes 1113c = DK
31B11) Fools, for their meditations are not long-lasting, are those who expect that what
previously was not comes to be or that anything dies and is utterly destroyed.12 Creation
from nothing (meaning 1a), therefore, is impossible. Moreover, the roots do not come
into being for the first time from something else (meaning 1b) because nothing else exists
in addition to or besides the roots (and Love and Strife):
| , |
; ; | ,
; (Simplicius Physics CIAG 9.158.29-159.2 = DK 31B17.30-33) And in addition
to them nothing comes into being nor ceases [to be]; for if they constantly perished they
would no longer be. And what would increase this totality, and whence would it come?
And how would it also be destroyed, since nothing is bereft of them? Since the roots do
not ever come into being for the first time, they must arrive into a different state or
become something (meaning 2). Empedocles clearly has this in mind for the roots.
The roots become compounds. The compound whether One, Many, or mortal thing
comes into being for the first time from something else (meaning 1b) as opposed to
from nothing (meaning 1a) but the roots that make up these compounds are in a
perpetual state of becoming (meaning 2) as Love and Strife manipulate the parts of the

12

Compare also fragment 12: |

| , . ([Aristotle] de Melisso, Xenophane,
Gorgia 975b2-5 = DK 31B12) For it is impossible that there should be coming to be from what is not, and
it cannot be accomplished and is unheard of that what is should be destroyed; for it will always be there,
wherever one may push it on any occasion.

110

roots because they are becoming different things.13 In this way, the roots come into being
and have no secure life: . This process of
becoming and perishing never comes to an end as the cycle goes around because the roots
continually become from Many to a host of mortal things, to One, and then through yet
another host of mortal things until the Many is formed again. The roots become
through their participation in various compounds and they change again when the
compounds are destroyed.14 They themselves, however, are immortal. Since the roots do
not stop changing as Love and Strife manipulate their parts throughout the cycle, they
achieve a certain kind of changelessness ( , |
).
Empedocles continues his account of the roots in more detail in fragment 17 at line 27
after a brief interlude to hymn Philotes (Love).
,
, ,
.
Simplicius Physics CIAG 9.158.26-28 = DK 31B17.27-29

13

Compare Plutarch Reply to Colotes 1111f (= DK 31B8):

| , , | | ,
. I will tell you another thing there is no birth of any of all mortal
things, nor is there any end of destructive death, but there is only mixture and exchange of mixed things.
Birth is the name given by men. Although the use is incorrect, Empedocles will use it himself:
< > , | , | <> ,
. (Plutarch Reply to Colotes 1113a = DK 31B9.3-5) at that time they say this is
coming to be and when they are separated they call this miserable fate. It is not right to call them this, but
even I assent to the convention. Empedocles recognizes that the term is ambiguous, but there is nothing he
can do to change the language. Compare a similar sentiment in Lucretius DRN 1.136-45.
14

Compare line 14 of fragment 35 where things that had learned to be immortal became mortal:
, .

111

For all these things [roots] are equal and of like age in their birth, but one rules over
one privilege and another another and each has its own character and they dominate
in turn as time circles around.

Since the elements are equal and of like age, there is no hierarchic distinction of one
element over another.15 Each also has its own and its own character that does not
change, thus ensuring that the plurality among the roots is more than a number. The roots
are a limited plurality: they do not change, they are not born, nor are they destroyed. By
creating a world through combination of the roots, their integrity is not compromised.

1.1.2

Love and Strife

Love is also assigned Olympian names throughout the verses. Empedocles uses a
variety of names for Love according primarily to context. When he describes the
cosmological cycle in general terms, her refers to her as .16 When Love plays an
active role in the creation of mortal things, he applies names that emphasize this aspect of
her character. Empedocles uses frequently, especially in the context of creating
compounds of mortal things: DK 31B22.5 ( -

15

The question of what Empedocles means by equality is interesting, but lies outside the scope of the
problem at hand. The roots are probably equal to one another in quantity, age, and power; they rule without
injustice despite variations in character. Vlastos 1947 (especially 158-61). Cf. Jaeger 1947, OBrien 1969
(136), Wright 1981 (22ff., 167).
16

(DK 31B17.7 = DK 31B20.2) all things come together into One by

Love; (DK 31B17.20) Love is with the roots; (DK
31B21.8) the roots come together in Love; (DK 31B26.5) the roots
come together through Love; (DK 31B35.4) Love comes to be
in the middle of the whirl, cf. PStrasbourg a(ii)19; (DK
31B35.12-13) as far as Strife goes out, Love follows. Plutarch uses this name once without context: DK
31B19 ( clinging Love). Plutarch also points out a parallel term which
Empedocles uses rarely: it shows up only in ensemble d of the Strasbourg papyrus: [
][] now they have Love and harmonious thought. It is, however, the term preferred
by commentators is used by commentators 46 times as opposed to 10 uses of (the
preferred term by Aristotle). There are three uses of in the commentators (all uses then repeated in
the accompanying fragment) and two uses of .

112

the roots cling together in a compound once they have been made like by Aphrodite), DK
31B66 ( agricultural imagery is used of creation), DK
31B71.4 ( - as many compounds as now exist
that have been joined by Aphrodite), DK 31B86 (
Aphrodite fashioned the eyes), DK 31B87 (
Aphrodite formed (the eye) with dowels of love).17 Kypris (), another
name for Aphrodite also creates compounds: DK 31B73 ( ,
, | ... - Kypris made
compounds from the roots), DK 31B75.2 ( the differences in
animals arise from the work of Kypris), DK 31B95 (
eyes grew together from the work of Kypris), DK 31B98.3 (
the roots come together to be fastened in the perfect
harbours of Kypris).18
The terms for Strife that Empedocles uses are limited compared to Love, and they are
not Olympian names. is the most frequent term used for Strife: DK 31B17.8
( N at another time each is borne apart
by the hatred of Strife), DK 31B17.19 ( Strife is apart
from the roots), DK 31B26.6 (= DK 31B17.8), DK 31B30.1 (
Strife comes to power again at the appointed time), DK 31B35.3
( | Strife moves to the outer edge of the
17

Empedocles always uses line final, but the emphasis is always on her creative power.

18

Empedocles links , too, to the mixture of mortal things: (DK 31B96.3-4

| bones come to be once the roots have been fixed by
the divine glue of Harmony (cf. DK 31B23.4)) and the One (DK 31B27
| - the roots are fixed into a circular sphere by the dense obscurity of
Harmony).

113

whirl; cf. PStrasbourg a(ii)18), DK 31B35.9 ( Strife

holds some roots back from union), DK 31B36 (
while the roots come together, Strife moves to the edge), DK 31B109 (
- we see Strife by means of Strife). Other terms include (DK
31B21.7: all things are separate in
Strife), (DK 31B20.4: the roots
are separated by evil quarrels (cf. DK 31B124 and DK 31B145)) and (DK 31B122:
bloody Battle is in the cave with who is also Love).19
Love and Strife are the agents of change in Empedocles cosmological cycle. Both are
corporeal. The best reconstruction places Love at the centre of the roots and Strife on the
outside.20 When Love dominates, she is spread throughout the roots and Strife is at the
edge until he begins to exert his influence again. On the other hand, when Strife
dominates he extends through the roots and keeps Love in the centre.

, ,
,

, .

,

,
19

10

Although is also used in DK31B27a ( no discord

nor battle in his limbs), its translation as Strife is contested since this is not a cosmological context. See
2.2.2 below.
20

OBrien 1969, chapter 5.

114

 .
,

Simplicius De Caelo CIAG 7.529.3-13 = DK 31B35.3-13
When Strife arrived at the lowest depth of the eddy and Love gets to the middle of
the whirl, in this place all these things come to be one alone, not suddenly, but
coming together willingly, one from one direction and another from another. As they
were being mixed, ten thousand tribes of mortal things poured forth, but many stood
unmixed alternating with mixed things, as many as Strife, still above, held back. For
it has not wholly stood out from these at the edges of the circle, but some of its limbs
remain inside and some have gone out. And as far as it (Strife) moved out, so far did
the immortal and gentle stream of blameless Love come forward.

The first lines emphasize the distinction between Many and the One following
Empedocles established pattern: during the Many, Strife reaches throughout everything,
that is, to the lowest depth, while Love is in the centre. Next Empedocles contrasts the
One where everything comes together. Until that point, however, Love does not yet
completely dominate and Strife continues to have some influence, that is, some of his
limbs are still among the root parts while others have already left. Likewise, one expects
Loves limbs still to be among the roots influencing their behaviour while Strife
marches forward to dominate between the One and the Many. Since they are always
present with the roots, it follows that they, too, are immortal and unchanging.

The only immortal gods in Empedocles system, therefore, are the roots, Love, and
Strife.

115

1.2

EMPEDOCLES MORTAL GODS

There are times, however, when Empedocles refers to gods and he does not mean the

immortal and unchanging elements of his universe, nor the Homeric gods that hoi polloi
tell stories about. Some gods are described as long-lived and linked to men, animals, and
plants.
,
,
,
.
DK 31B21.9-1221
From these (the roots) all things have sprung as many as were, as many as are and
will be hereafter: trees and men and women, and beasts and birds and water-dwelling
fish, and even the long-lived gods, greatest in honours.22

All of the things listed are a variety of compounds of the four roots. The epithet,
, that Empedocles applies to these reveals the greatest difference
between their divinity and that of the roots and Love and Strife they are not immortal.23
Every compound is subject to dissolution, and the gods whom Empedocles includes in

21

These lines are repeated verbatim in the new Strasbourg papyrus (a(1)8-a(ii)2) and in a slightly different
context in fragment 23, which describes the objects in a painted picture as an analogy for the creation of
compounds.
22

Regarding this epithet ( ), compare the reaction of crowds to Empedocles in fragment 112.
This illustrates the extent of the honours offered to him.
23

Primavesi 2005 and 2008 argue that the only gods, including these long-lived ones, are the roots at the
time of the One the sphere and the Many the four concentric spheres. He argues the long-lived is
emphasized owing to the Florentine scholia on Aristotle Physics 250b26-29 (Laur. 87.7) published by
Rashed 2001 and Primavesi 2006. According to this scholia, the time of the One and the Many each last 60
time-units or 6000 years. This interpretation fails to take the context of Empedocles words into account
since the other things listed are compounds in the world we live in.

116

this list of mortal compounds are no different.24 When Empedocles says that he is an
immortal god ( B112.4), the emphasis should be on the ethic
dative (); the people of Acragas believe he is immortal, but they do not yet
understand what Empedocles divinity entails.

1.2.1

Empedocles model for the long-lived gods

Empedocles description of the Sphere, also known as the One, is his example in the
verses for a long-lived god. Fragment 31 tells us that the limbs of the god are shaken:
. From the context of this fragment, we know that
the god whose limbs are shaken is the Sphere when Strife begins to approach (
(Simplicius
CIAG Physics 1184.2) when strife began again to dominate, at that time motion again
occurred in the sphere), and the only time that Strife is apart from the roots is when
Love is in complete control.25 The sphere, therefore, is the One and is also god. Aristotle,
moreover, confirms that the Sphere is the only compound that Love creates on her own
(
(Aristotle Metaphysics 1000a27) but nevertheless he [Strife] seems to
create (all things) outside of the One; for all other things except god proceed from him.).
The Sphere/ god does not resemble the anthropomorphic gods as other authors describe

24

Compare the Epicurean gods who hide in the large spaces of void among the worlds in order to avoid
being dissolved by random blows from the swerves of atoms (Lucretius DRN 1.44-49, 5.146-55).
25

See 1.1.2 above.

117

them26, nor is it winged as one might expect of a compound linked with Eros, that is, a
child of Aphrodite/Love.
,
, (), ,
<>
. 27
For two branches do not spring from his back, he has no feet, no swift knees, no
organs of reproduction, but he is equal to himself in every direction, without any
beginning or end, a rounded sphere, rejoicing in encircling stillness.

The sphere/god is in perfect Harmony, rounded and alone, the most perfect and orderly
arrangement of the roots possible as I show below.
Despite the perfection of this divine compound, even it does not last forever. Love
and Strife have sworn oaths that neither should be in complete control of the roots
forever:

,

(Simplicius Physics CIAG 10.1184.14-16 = DK 31B30)

26

Ammonius quotes fragment 134, claiming that it describes Apollo and divinity in general:
, | , | ,
(), , | , |
. For he is not fitted out in his limbs with a human head, nor do two branches dart
from his back nor feet, nor swift knees nor shaggy genitals; but he is only a sacred and ineffable thought
organ darting through the entire cosmos with swift thoughts. Primavesi 2008 (255-59) argues that the One
and the four roots are long-lived gods since they all have Olympian names.
27

Wright 1981 (fragment 22) collates Hippolytus Refutatio 7.92.15 (= DK 31B29) and Stobaeus 1.15.2 (=
DK 31B28) as one fragment because Hippolytus gives an unmetrical summary of Stobaeus (189); Inwood
2001 (fragment 34) follows Wright and prints the same text.

118

But when Strife had been nourished great within its limbs, and leapt up to its honours
as the time was completed, the time which has been established for each in turn by a
broad oath.28

Strife must return; the Sphere must break up; and this leads to the creation of the
daimones and the world, as we know it, in this period of increasing Strife.

1.2.2

The Composition of the Sphere

The most important part of the long-lived gods perfection lies in the blend of root
parts that combine to form it; the other long-lived gods cannot be the only thing existing
in the universe as we find in the period of the One. In forming the One, Love mixes the
parts of the roots together until they can be mixed no further. Since the One is the
culmination of Loves work, the root parts must be arranged in such a way that no like
part lies next to another.29 The One is wholly and evenly balanced with respect to its
parts. The first line of fragment 2730 confirms this interpretation:
there the swift limbs of the sun are no longer discerned.
Empedocles uses in two distinct ways. At times he refers to the sun itself. In
fragment 38, Empedocles promises to describe for the reader how the universe we see
around us came into being: , |
, | |
28

See n. 56 below.

29

As I discuss with evidence in chapter 5 below, the main function of Love is to overcome the roots
natural inclination of attracting like to like. When Love is in complete control, therefore, no fire will be
next to fire, no water to water, etc. Compare Curd 1998 (162-63).
30

Eudemus says this describes the Sphere:

, (Simplicius Physics CIAG 10.1183.28-9) But Eudemus

says that motionlessness occurs in the domination by Love at the time of the Sphere, when all things have
been combined; but Plutarch (de facie in orbe lunae 926d) also uses it to describe the Many. See 2.3.2 in
chapter 5.

119

 . (Clement Stromata 5.48 = DK 31B38;

Wright 1981, mss; Wright 1981, mss) Come now, I shall tell you first
from what the sun, in the beginning, and all the other things which we see now have
clearly come into being earth and swelling sea and the moist air and the Titan aither
surrounding all things about in a circle.31 Empedocles contrasts the sun with the moon:
(Plutarch de facie in orbe lunae 920c = DK 31B40)
sharp-arrowed sun and gentle moon. Salt is formed by the action of the sun on salt
water: (Hephaestion Handbook 1.3, p. 2.13-14 =
DK 31B56) salt became fixed, pushed by the blows of the sun. During the cycle of
reincarnation, the daimon wanders from life form to life form:
, | , |
, (DK 31B115.9-11) For the strength of the air
pursues him into the sea, and the sea spits him onto the threshold of the earth and the
earth into the beams of the shining sun and it casts him into the eddies of air.
At other times, Empedocles uses to represent the root fire because the sun
represents the most obvious natural accumulation of fiery parts. In fragment 21,
Empedocles lists the roots (one per verse) and then refers to their arrangement in the
following lines: , | |
, | . (Simplicius
Physics CIAG 9.159.15, 19-20 = DK 31B21.3, 7-8) the sun bright to look upon and
warm in every respect In Strife all are spatially distinct and apart, and in Love they
come together and desire one another. We know that Empedocles refers to the roots as

31

For a concise description on the nature and formation of Empedocles sun, see Kingsley 1994a.

120

opposed to the sun because Love and Strife do not mix parts of the sun with rain and
earth. In fragment 71, Aphrodite mixes the roots to create compounds:
, | |
| ,
(Simplicius de caelo CIAG.7.530.1-4 = DK 31B71) If your faith concerning these things
is in any way lacking, how from water, earth, air and sun (=fire) mixing such forms and
colours of mortal things come into being such as now exist having been joined together
by Aphrodite
It is more likely that Empedocles refers here to the sun as an accumulation of the root
fire because Empedocles always uses to indicate the parts of a larger body.
Empedocles frequently uses of the limbs of a man or animal32; he also uses them of
gods.33 Since, however, Empedocles gods are not anthropomorphic, seem to be a
smaller part of the whole as opposed to simply the limbs of an animal. The swift limbs
of the sun can no longer be discerned because there are no concentrations of any one
root. When Love has mixed unlike roots as much as possible, there will be no collection
32

(DK 31B2.1) an individuals senses cannot be trusted

because narrow powers are spread throughout the limbs; , , |
, (DK 31B3.12-13) all individuals are urged to follow the
information presented by their senses, do not prevent trust in any of the other limbs where there is a parth
to understanding; understand each in the way it is clear; |
, (DK 31B20.2-3) the body of a mortal thing is fashioned parallel to the universe, at
another time, all the limbs which have chanced upon a body come together by Love into one [Ensemble c
in the Strasbourg Papyrus reads instead of the participle. Although this has generated much
speculation about whether the first plural is the correct reading, for example Laks 2002, it does not affect
interpretation here.]; (DK 31B61.4) early animals that did not survive ultimately
were outfitted with shadowy limbs; (DK 31B62.8) the first men pushed up from
the earth by fire did not show the limb (part) unique to men; (DK
31B100.22) smooth blood rushes through the limbs like water in a klepsydra;
(DK 31B115.3) whenever someone stains his own limbs with sins and fear [see n.45
below for my choice of this reading] he is condemned to wander for 30 000 years; <>
(DK 31B128.10) the greatest sin of man was to eat their limbs.
33

(DK 31B31) when Strife approaches the One, all the parts of
god begin to tremble one after another; (DK 31B134.1)
for he is not fitted out with a human head throughout his parts.

121

of like root parts anywhere in the One. Although the sun represents an accumulation of
fire, Empedocles does not intend to show that the formation of the One has destroyed the
created world and by consequence the sun.34 The emphasis lies in the arrangement of the
One as opposed to the effects of its creation.
Empedocles confirms this interpretation of an even and balanced compound when he
calls the One a .
,
()
35,

Simplicius Physics CIAG 9.33.21-24 = DK 31B26.3-6
These very things exist, and running through one another they become men and tribes
of other creatures, beasts, at one time coming together into one cosmos by Love and
at another each carried apart by the enmity of Strife

The word is a presocratic term for their new vision of the world, a structured
system that displays order.36 The later sense of created world has coloured the
interpretation of all presocratic passages and created the subsequent interpretation of
linking world with the words primary sense of order.37 This interpretation does not
fit with Empedocles use of the word; cosmology has been imposed on Empedocles
34

Longrigg 1967 (4).

35

This phrase has also appeared in ensemble a of the Strasbourg papyrus which is a continuation of
fragment 17. Although much of the fragment has been reconstructed, the readings are likely and is
clear. [ ] , | [ ]
. (Strasbourg Papyrus ensemble a(i)6 a(i)7) But under Love we unite together to form a single
ordered whole, whereas under Strife, in turn it (i.e., ) grew apart, to become Many out of One.
36

See 1.2 in chapter 1.

37

See Finkelberg 1998 (especially 103-106) for a full discussion of the previous scholarship and some of
the issues surrounding it.

122

vision of mixture. This passage repeats the message of fragment 17 insofar as it

emphasizes the alternation from Many to One and then back to Many.38 cannot
be a world in this context because Empedocles does not describe the creation of mortal
creatures in this line, but the coming together of the One. The One would be the ultimate
expression of order since it is a complete and perfect mixture of the four roots. ,
therefore, is a balanced and ordered arrangement of the roots that can occur only once in
the cosmic cycle, at the time of the One. The roots are in complete agreement despite
their contrary natures owing to the power of Love.

In sum, Empedocles refers to two types of gods: one immortal and the other mortal. Each
is perfect, but in different ways. The immortal gods, that is, the roots, Love, and Strife,
are immortal and unchanging. The mortal gods are long-lived, and therefore not
immortal, but they are in perfect harmony with an even balance of the roots, that is, there
is no discord in the mortal gods. Empedocles is one of these mortal gods.

Part 2: Becoming a god

In the rhetorical setting of fragment 112, Empedocles is before his friends (),
an exclusive group from the citizens of Acragas39, who have gathered to learn his
lessons.40 He has returned, like the hero in an archetypal folktale, with a lesson that will
38

Wright 1981 (183), Finkelberg 1998 (111).

39

Although the audience is thus limited, it is probably only a rhetorical stance since Diogenes Lartius
(Lives of the Philosophers 8.63) tells us that Cleomenes recited the purifications at the Olympic Games.
Trpanier 2004 (47) suggests that, as Empedocles friends, they must listen to him. Primavesi 2005 and
2008 argues that the god who speaks elsewhere in Empedocles verses is Apollo, but the easier reading,
since it is addressed to friends in Acragas by someone who is no longer mortal, is that this is Empedocles.
40

Contra Zuntz 1971 (189) who argues that he does not write from Acragas but sends it to his friends from
abroad. Trpanier 2004 (48) argues that the tone is too vivid for an open letter.

123

save them: any man who makes the effort to purify his daily life and means of thinking
will be able to find the truth himself and become a god.
,
, ,
, ,41
,
, ,

.
42 ,
,
Diogenes Lartius Lives of the Philosophers 8.6243 = DK 31B112.1-8
Friends, who inhabit the great city by the yellow Acragas in the high parts of the city,
caring for good deeds, harbours that show kindness to strangers, unacquainted with
evil, greetings! I, in your eyes a divine god, no longer mortal, go among all,
honoured, just as I should, adorned with both ribbons and festive garlands. Whenever
I arrive in thriving cities I am revered by all, men and women.

Everyone has the potential to become a god, as Empedocles claims for himself, because
even he has not always been a god. His ascension to divinity is relatively recent since he
describes himself as no longer mortal ( , line 4).44
41

Diodorus Siculus 13.83.2 supplies verse 3. Some scholars claim this line is excessive. Zuntz 1971
argues that Diogenes Lartius would not have omitted the line if it were important, and he believes the
fragment is satisfactory and complete without it (187); Trpanier 2004 (48) argues that it serves simply to
inform a wider readership about Acragas, just as Hesiod tells Perses about their father and hometown in
Works and Days.
42

Wright 1981 (266).

43

Verses 10-12 are also found in Clement Stromata 6.30.

44

Heracles is another individual who became immortal and was a benefactor to men upon his apotheosis.
Kinglsey 1995a (252-8) discusses more fully the parallel between the reports of Empedocles death in fire
and Heracles apotheosis on the pyre.

124

His adornment with ribbons and wreaths is reminiscent of a successful initiation into
a mystery.45 Theon of Smyrna sets out all five steps; the fourth is the wearing of
garlands.46 Once the revelation (the is the third step at Eleusis) is made to the
initiate, the initiate has earned the right of wearing the garlands and thus is recognized as
someone who can teach others about the mystery: ,
, , , ,
,
(Theon of Smyrna de utilitate mathematicae 15.1-5 (ed. Hiller)) The fourth step, which
is also the end of the revelation, is the binding of the head and placement of garlands so
that whoever has completed the rites can pass them on to others as well, whether through
the torch bearing ceremony (), the interpretation of sacred things () or
some other priestly work. I will illustrate below in chapter 4 how Empedocles believes
that the way to become a god, in his particular view, and thence to manipulate nature, is
to imitate a mysterys initiation. Empedocles authority to teach how to accomplish
divine feats to his , therefore, derives ultimately from his unique position of having
gone through the process himself.
Empedocles description of his friends ( , |
, caring for good deeds, harbours that show kindness to
strangers, unacquainted with evil) emphasizes their special status, especially that they
are unacquainted with evil, because they are better prepared for the lessons he will impart
than many others are. Others who hear these verses and fit this description should take
45

The blessed in Pindars depiction of the underworld also wear garlands (

| (Ol. 2.74-5) they have entwined their hands with chains
of these (flowers) and wreaths according to the upright judgments of Rhadamanthys.).
46

These steps of initiation are discussed in part 2 of chapter 4.

125

comfort in knowing that salvation is possible for them as well.47 Each body, like
Empedocles, possesses a daimon, which is propelled unwillingly through a series of
transmigrations, which last for the whole period of Strife. But it is also by participating in
this cycle that becoming a god is possible. Once we recognize this divine potential within
ourselves, we will be able to move with purpose through the cycle of transmigration.

2.1

TRANSMIGRATION
Transmigration begins when the One/god breaks up with the return of Strife. One

consequence of the Ones dissolution is the creation of long-lived daimones, who go from
life to life, from one compound to another.
, ,
,
48,
49,
,

,

.
47

Osborne 1987 (34-5) argues the opposite; that in conjunction with fragment 114, which emphasizes that
the truth is hard to persuade people of, fragment 112 illustrates that the citizens of Acragas are not as good
as they think, that they are, very much, ignorant of (true) evil ( (line 3)). But this
assumes that the good deeds they show care for include typical pious acts towards the gods such as
sacrifice, which, according to Empedocles, is not pious at all (cf. fragments 136 and 137) and there is no
clear evidence to support this inclusion.
48

The text from the Plutarch MSS, the only source for this line, prints . Stephanus
(1572) printed [someone] should stain his dear limbs with bloodshed, and most
subsequent editors print this text. Panzerbieter 1844 (2*) proposed (cf. Pindar Pythian
3.24) in the errors of his because of the two datives side by side.
49

Zuntz 1971 (194-6) argues that the line is spurious.

126

 ,
, 10
,
, .
, ,
.
DK 31B11550
It is an affair51 of Necessity, an ancient decree of the gods, eternal, sealed with broad
oaths that whenever someone, in his errors, should stain his dear limbs out of fear
[the text is corrupt] by misdeed swears falsely, [someone, that is,] the daimones52
who have won long-lasting life, he wanders for thrice ten thousand seasons away
from the blessed ones, growing to be all sorts of forms of mortal things through time,
interchanging the hard paths of life. For the strength of aither pursues him into the
sea, and the sea spits [him] onto the surface of the earth and earth into the beams of
the blazing sun, and it throws him into the eddies of the air; and one after another
receives [him], but all hate [him]. I too am now one of these, an exile from the gods
and a wanderer, trusting in mad strife.

Transmigration is an affair () of Necessity. The gods have agreed by majority

() that someone ( line 6) will wander for a long time53 apart from the gods
(), going from body to body: from air to water to earth to fire and back to air.
Transmigration was a commonly known doctrine in the Acragas of Empedocles youth as
50

The lines that Hippolytus Refutatio 7.29.14 ff. preserves begin at the end of the fragment as it has been
assembled: 13, 14, 4-12 (with commentary interspersed), 1-2. Plutarch On Exile 607c prints 1, 3, 5, 6, 13 as
a continuous section. Other authors preserve only individual lines.
51

Most translators render as oracle, but Empedocles would be the only author to use it in this way.

52

Editors print instead of , which would be a partitive genitive with , because the
latter does not fit the line metrically. It is, therefore, construed as being in apposition to the . That all
daimones undergo this transformation may also account for the plural.
53

Thirty thousand seasons (whether 30 000 years or 10 000 years since the year is broken into three )
is simply a length of time that seems impossible to imagine. The Byzantine scholia in an Aristotelian
manuscript published by Rashed 2001 and Primavesi 2005 state that the cycle is of a specific length.

127

Pindars Olympian ode to Theron supports (Ol. 2.56-80), in which transmigration is the
lot for those souls who were not sufficiently pure to attain a blessed place in the
underworld.54 It is so fundamental to Empedocles system that the decree has been sealed
by broad oaths. Breaking an oath is one of the most serious offences a Greek can commit,
as Empedocles readers would recognize. Whether someone swears that a statement is
true or guarantees a future action, oaths are a form of sympathetic magic as a binding
spell; when an oath is not kept, a curse comes down upon the oath breaker.55 The oath,
therefore, emphasizes the weight of transmigration.56

2.1.1

The daimones

The who travels from body to body and from life to life is a daimon. These
daimones are one group of the many things that Strife generates with the destruction of
the One.57 Fragment 124 describes how the race of mortal things and everything but the
roots and Love and Strife is mortal comes into being through acts of conflict: ,
, , | .

54

Whether Empedocles doctrine of transmigration matches Pindars (or Therons) is impossible to

ascertain; Demand 1975 argues that Therons beliefs (and by consequence, those of Acragas) were unique
to this city and that these are the basis for Empedocles beliefs.
55

Faraone 1993. The oath sworn by the gods in Hesiods Theogony is the classic example:
| , |
(Hesiod Theogony 793-5) If someone of the gods who hold the peaks of
snowy Olympus should swear a false oath having poured a libation [of this portion of the Styx that flows
from stone], he lies breathless for a full year and faces exile from the other gods for another nine years
afterwards. A recent collection of essays (Sommerstein and Fletcher 2007) studies the phenomenon of
oaths in Greek society.
56

The oath (in fragment 115) does not refer to the sanctity of life, as van der Ben 1975 (128-9) argues. The
oaths, moreover, that seal the exchange of domination between Love and Strife in the cosmological cycle
(DK 31B30) and the cycle of transmigration are not the same oaths, they simply guarantee that these
actions must occur as any promissory oath would.
57

The traditional use of the term daimon is to refer to a god; Primavesi 2008 (259) sets out how Homer,
Hesiod, and Parmenides all important models for Empedocles use the word.

128

(Clement Stromata 3.14.2) Oh woe! oh wretched, oh unhappy race of mortals from

such quarrels and groans you have come to be. Strife is not named explicitly, but he
encourages such behaviour in individuals, and Aristotle identifies him as an agent of
creation:
(Aristotle Metaphysics 1000a27) but nevertheless he [Strife]
seems to create (all things) outside of the One; for all other things except god proceed
from him. As I show below, Strife creates by dissolving the natural attraction of like to
like.58 Strife, therefore, allows for the existence of individuals through a destructive act,
and they now wander alone, apart from the perfect communion with the other roots in the
One: (DK 31B115.13).59
Empedocles other use of daimon occurs in fragment 59.
,
, ,
.
Simplicius de caelo CIAG 7.587.30, 32-3 = DK 31B59
But when daimon mingled more with daimon, and these things fell together where
each met together, and many other things in addition to these were always coming
into being.

In the context of this quotation, Simplicius says these verses describe the second stage of
zoogony when isolated limbs wander about and form bodies, seemingly at random. Who
are the daimones at this stage? I believe they are the same individuals from fragment 115.
The isolated limbs have been created by Strife separating the perfect union of the roots
58

See 2.3.1 in chapter 5.

59

To say that Strife is the mortal enemy of the daimon exaggerates their relationship (Kahn 1974 (443));
rather, it is a sorrow to be separated from the perfection of the One, a necessary one (Inwood 2001 (62)).

129

found in the One. Although they do not yet resemble what we now see in the world, they
are part of the evolution of living things. It follows, therefore, that if every living thing
that Strife generates has a daimon, then the isolated limbs would have a daimon as well.
Once bodies are formed from isolated limbs, the next stage of zoogony is sexual
reproduction and then each new created thing would also have an individual daimon.60
Strife is an integral component of the daimon; he maintains its status as an individual
and it is his presence that is hated by the roots and forces the daimon from body to body.
Each daimon also has a blend of the four roots since that is required to perceive (
, , | , , |
, . DK 31B109 For we see earth by earth,
water by water, shining air by air, but blazing fire by fire, love by love and strife by
hateful strife) and think ( , |
| . DK
31B105 nurtured in seas of blood [according to fragment 98, blood is an equal blend of
the roots] leaping back and forth, and there especially it is called thought for men, for
mens thought is the blood around the heart.). Love is probably also in the daimon:
(DK 31B17.22) she [Love] is acknowledged
even by mortals to be in-born in their limbs.61

60

Wright 1981 (212) argues that the daimones here are the roots, but there is no problem in using the term
daimon for the roots and the individual that transmigrates. They are both gods; the roots are eternal gods
while the compound gods are not immortal. Primavesi 2008 (260) agrees that the only thing the daimones
could be here are the individual roots that make up the isolated limbs because if the daimones are in the
isolated limbs, then the first and second lines would repeat the same process. It is primarily owing to
fragment 59 that Primavesi argues that the daimones and gods are only the roots during the time of the One
(the Sphere, which he identifies as Apollo according to Ammonius who quotes fragment 134) and the time
of the Many (he uses fragment 6 to illustrate their divine names at that time, and that time only).
61

Inwood 2001 (59-60). Others, for example, Kahn 1974 (443 ff.) and Curd 2005 (143), limit the
composition to the four roots. The earlier theory propounded by Cornford 1930 (563-69) and accepted by
OBrien 1969 (325) that the daimon is a bundle of pure Love seems unlikely owing to the need for thinking

130

The daimon lives for a long time ( (DK 31B115.5)),

probably for the duration of the period of Strife. Fragment 15 chastises anyone with wits
who would not believe that each person lived as an individual before this life and will
live other lives after this one.
,
, ,
, ,
<> , .
Plutarch Reply to Colotes 1113d = DK 31B15
A man wise in his thoughts would not divine such things: that so long as they live
what they call life for that time they exist, and have good and evil things, but before
they are formed as mortals and <when> they are dissolved, they are nothing.

The daimon, therefore, is the part of each creature that transmigrates.62 A female,
probably Necessity since it is by her that transmigration occurs, carries out the
transmigration:
(Plutarch On the eating of flesh 998c =DK 31B126) Nature
changes and changes the dwelling for everything: cloaking [it] in a foreign garment of
flesh. The alien garment represents a way of life that is different from what the daimon
knew before as part of the One.63 Every person, plant and animal contains a daimon:
|
(as fragment 134 supports), which therefore implies all four roots). Darcus 1977 (187-90) argues that the
daimon, like the god/ is not composed of the roots or Love or Strife; this seems unlikely since
Empedocles emphasizes there is nothing outside of these things (fragment 17.30-32).
62

Sources that discuss the daimon call it a , soul, for example, Plutarch On the eating of flesh 998c,
On Exile 607c-d; Porphyry in Stobaeus Eclogae 1.49.60. Owing to the baggage that accompanies the term
soul (Kahn 1974 (436-7)), it is better simply to refer to the daimon as an individual.
63

Wright 1981 (277).

131

. (Diogenes Lartius Lives of the Philosophers 8.77 = DK 31B117) For I have

already become a boy and a girl and a bush and a bird and a [corrupt text] fish from the
sea. Empedocles also relates in verse 10 of fragment 110 that all things have thought and
understanding: .

2.1.2

The Necessity of Transmigration

The daimon has no choice but to undergo transmigration. Empedocles describes

himself as a wanderer and trusting in mad Strife ( ,
, | . DK 31B115.13-14). Strifes influence pervades
everything. Transmigration begins whenever someone defiles his limbs out of fear (line
3)64 or swears a false oath. This does not describe a particular instance of sin by an
individual daimon65, but what happens whenever Strife operates ( + subjunctive). Just
as Strife is not named explicitly in fragment 124 as the agent in creating mortals (see
above), but by the types of acts he inspires, here in fragment 115, too, lines 3 and 4 refer
generally to the period of Strifes influence. In other words, there is a of Necessity
that the daimones will wander from body to body whenever Strife acts, a time that is
recognized by the sorts of things he encourages in individuals (, ).
When the daimon trusts in Strife, he unconsciously participates in the acts that Strife
perpetuates. Plants and animals are incapable of avoiding these acts: plants because those

64

Or murder, see n. 48 above.

65

Contra Osborne 1987 (36-7), Laks 2005 (172-3), Garani 2007 (192-3). Zuntz 1971 (196-7, 240) and van
der Ben 1975 (56-9) argue a similar but different interpretation: the is a myth of personal
and the daimons eventual triumphant return to grace, owing to fragment 115 in combination
with other fragments (fragments 117-121) that describe the terrifying experiences of an I. These
interpretations seem to be unconsciously influenced by the Judeo-Christian belief in original sin.

132

compounds do not possess any organs of thought (a or )66 and animals

because they, even less than men, cannot control their instincts born from Strife to spill
blood. The lion, notably the best animal on the ladder of transmigration (
| (Aelian On Animals 12.7 = DK 31B127)
Among beasts they become mountain-dwelling lions with lairs on the ground), is, for
example, a carnivore. Empedocles, however, has a message of hope for his audience, the
cycle of trusting in Strife can be broken and the time of exile can come to an end. Men
can avoid these urges, and the ultimate goal Empedocles has in these verses is to make
his audience aware of their true nature as daimones, avoid the acts of Strife67, and thereby
transcend the cycle of transmigration by making themselves less hated by the roots and
becoming a god as he claims for himself.

2.2

ESCAPING THE CYCLE?

The daimon goes from life to life without any discernible pattern. The daimon of a

boy who has died, for example, in fragment 137, finds itself in a sacrificial animal, about
to be killed by the boys father. Those who do not understand the nature of transmigration
are doomed to continue wandering until the present world is completely destroyed by the
domination of Strife. It is possible, however, for people who are wise and pure to escape
this cycle and become long-lived gods.

,
.
66

Although it is hard to imagine what a plant could do that would associate it with the acts of Strife.

67

Curd 2005 (141) also suggests that this is the purpose of .

133

Clement Stromata 4.150 = DK 31B146

And finally they become prophets and singers and doctors and leaders among men
who dwell on earth; thence they sprout up as gods, first in their prerogatives.

Empedocles has already become a god, having proven his purity and wisdom by fulfilling
each of these roles successfully: he is a prophet since people approach him seeking
divinations ( B112.10); as a poet he is a singer; he
cures all sorts of diseases according to his claims in fragment 111; and his popularity
among the people of various cities in fragment 112 illustrates his leadership. It is not
sufficient, however, simply to be a doctor, prophet, singer or leader and from there to
become a god in the daimons next incarnation, you must understand how transmigration
works and prepare yourself to be as pure and wise as possible. Each of these roles require
purity and wisdom; according to tradition you must be pure since all these individuals are
dear to the gods, and you must be wise in order to fulfill these roles successfully.

2.2.1

Being Pure

The gold tablets found in Timpone Piccolo (series A1-3 in Zuntz 1971), for example,
support the interpretation that living a pure life is a necessary precondition of moving on
to the next level because they emphasize the purity of the initiates soul (
(line 1) I (the soul) come pure from pure (souls)) and its readiness to
move to the next level since it is already one of the gods ( (line
3) I boast to be the blessed race). Empedocles shared some of these directions with the
Pythagoreans who follow a series of rules called the akousmata heard things68, notably

68

Burkert 1972 (166-92).

134

the prohibitions against killing animals and eating them, stripping trees, eating beans, and
sexual intercourse (Hippolytus Refutatio 7.29.22).
The way to become pure is to avoid the acts of Strife. Empedocles verses emphasize
one way above all the others: avoid bloodshed. In fragment 128, he describes it as the
greatest abomination.
,
,
<> .
DK 31B128.8-10
[Aphrodites] altar is not wetted with the unmixed blood of bulls, but this was the
greatest abomination among men, having ripped out their life-breath and eat their
goodly limbs.

Killing animals is the greatest sin that mankind commits because each individual plant,
animal, and man contains a daimon.69 It is also for this reason that Empedocles insists
that laurels not be stripped: (DK 31B140) keep
away altogether from the leaves of the laurel; and beans be avoided: , ,
(DK 31B141) Wretches, utter wretches, keep your hands
from beans.70 This act perpetuates the cycle of acts that Strife encourages. If man can
refrain from killing and eating animals, he separates himself from Strife, and this makes
him more pure.

69

Compare fragment 136, 137, and 139.

70

The laurel is the highest plant just as the lion is the highest animal (fragment 127) and prophets, singers,
doctors, and leaders are highest among men (fragment 146). Beans, according to the Pythagoreans, must be
avoided because they are like genitals, or the gates of Hades, or destructive, or like the nature of the
universe, or are oligarchical (Diogenes Lartius Lives of the Philosophers 8.34)

135

2.2.2

Being Wise

Part of becoming a god and escaping the cycle of transmigration is learning to master
the universe. The roots, Love, and Strife all have their timai, their powers. For the mortal
gods, the powers gained include curing disease, raising the dead, and affecting the
environment (fragment 111). Before one can master one's environment, one must
understand how it functions; the long-lived gods must learn to manipulate the roots, since
they are the building blocks of everything in the world, just as Love and Strife do.
Knowledge of the universe leads to control over it; these two lessons work in tandem.71
Hippocrates criticized Empedocles for believing that one can practice medicine, one
of the functions a person must master on the way to becoming a god, only by
understanding how the universe works and consequently what man is and how he came to
be.
,
,
.
,
, , <>,

,
, .

.
71

Mauss 1950 [2001] (176-78). Nestle 1906 (548) and Kingsley 1995a (229) link Empedocles specifically
to this belief. See chapter 5 below.

136

Hippocrates On Ancient Medicine 20.1 = DK 31A71

Some doctors and sophists say that whoever does not know what man is is not able to
understand the medical art, but that the man who intends to treat men correctly must
understand this (i.e., what man is). Their argument extends into philosophy just as
Empedocles or the others who have written about nature and discuss from the
beginning what man is and how he first came to be and from what he was put
together. But I believe that as many things as have been said by a sophist or a doctor
or written by a doctor about nature is less fitting for medicine than for painting.
Moreover I believe that one learns nothing clear concerning nature from any other
source than from medicine.

In order to treat man, one must understand the nature of man his origins and his
development; by analogy, control over the universe comes from knowing the essence of
the universe where it came from and how it got this way. When the student of the
universe has synthesized this knowledge, he will have power over the universe and can
affect it at his will. Empedocles uses cosmology as a tool: through describing the
universe in his verses he brings to the readers the information they need to manipulate
it.72 Cosmology is not the end, but the means to achieve the end. Empedocles own claims
to success serve as evidence of his own power and knowledge. If one wants to become a
god, one must learn how the universe functions.
Learning the correct things and then keeping ones thought focused on them leads to
understanding even more about nature and the universe because these thoughts build
upon one another.73 It is through learning that man becomes self-aware. Empedocles does
not simply explain how to control the universe. The readers will acquire these abilities
from their own synthesis of the material. Knowledge can be attained through careful
72

Kingsley 1995a (218).

73

See 2.2 in chapter 4 below.

137

attention of the senses in conjunction with application of the mind. Empedocles

recognizes the necessity of reading his poem carefully and exhorts the readers to learn the
ultimate message on their own (fragment 110). The discovery requires two steps first
the readers must interpret successfully Empedocles use of language, literary structure
and rhetorical devices to determine how the universe truly functions and then they must
internalize the lesson to gain the ability to manipulate their environment. With further
reflection comes deeper understanding and eventually true knowledge. In other words,
careful study of the poem might lead the readers to acquire the awareness needed to
manipulate their environment.

God is the wisest and purest thing of all since it is only thought (
, | . (Ammonius
de interpretatione 249.1 = DK 31B134.4-5) but it/he is only a sacred and ineffable
thought organ darting through the entire cosmos with swift thoughts) with no Strife to
pollute it, as the paradigm (the One) shows; Strife is outside the One. In order for a
daimon, therefore, to move up the ladder, he must live a pure life and he must be wise so
that Strife is no longer part of him. Empedocles emphasizes the necessity of wisdom
when he criticizes people who are ignorant whether of their personal nature (DK
31B137) or of the universe (DK 31B11) for being (fools), and the former by
calling (wretched) those who do not live purely (B141, for failing to avoid beans in
ones diet). Empedocles reserves praise for those who do understand their nature as
daimones (DK 31B15) or how nature operates (DK 31B132) as wise () or blessed
().

138

Plutarch preserves a fragment that describes such a harmonious arrangement. Editors

attribute this description to the Sphere, but it may instead provide the link between the
One/sphere/god and Empedocles vision of the long-lived god in the form of a man.74



.
Plutarch Moralia 777d = DK 31B27a
For he, who, through philosophy, finally attains virtue always makes a man who is in
tune with himself, unblamed by himself and full of peace and loving thoughts
towards himself: there is no discord nor unseemly war in his limbs.

Although Plutarch does not associate Empedocles by name with this fragment, it bears
many resemblances with his vocabulary, for example of fragment DK
31B30 and of fragment DK 31B122 in contrast with . If an individual can
observe how the universe works and attempt to live a pure life by following the precepts,
he will be successful in keeping strife from his person because he will imitate the actions
of Love, and thus come to resemble more closely the divinity of the One.
The paradigm for this is Pythagoras. He was so wise that he was wiser than anyone
before or after him.
,
,
<>
,
74

Wright 1981 (255-6).

139


.
Porphyry Life of Pythagoras 30 = DK 31B129
There was among them a man of exceptional knowledge, who indeed obtained the
greatest wealth in his thinking organs, master of all kinds of particularly wise deeds;
for whenever he reached out with all his thinking organs he easily saw each of all the
things which are in ten or twenty human lifetimes.

Pythagoras name was a byword for the concept of transmigration with a number of
anecdotes attached to him. For example, Xenophanes (fragment 7) relates how he once
stopped someone beating a puppy because he claimed to recognize his friends voice.
Pythagoras was also connected to a series of prescriptions for living purely the
akousmata which helped prepare the soul for its journey after death.75

The connections between Pythagoras and Empedocles and Empedocles emphasis on

gaining knowledge and living purely confirm how Empedocles was able to become a
god; and Empedocles shares this knowledge, but not explicitly with his audience since it
is too volatile for hoi polloi.

75

See 2.2.1 above.

140

Chapter 4 Empedocles Mystery

Empedocles presents himself not as a scientist or as a magician, but as a god. The

divinity that he attributes to himself is not the divinity of the Homeric gods, but the
divinity that comes from pure living and true knowledge; with this, Empedocles can raise
the dead, cure disease, and affect the environment (fragment 111). He claims, moreover,
that Pausanias, and any other reader of his verses, will learn how to do these things as
well by reading the poem and following Empedocles path rather than clinging to the
traditional ways. The readers, therefore, can realize the potential of their daimones and
become gods such as he is and, as a result, manipulate the universe as he can. But such
skills are too dangerous for just anyone; Empedocles cannot state simply how to control
the weather and raise the dead. He makes a conscious choice, therefore, to write
ambiguously, not because he has nothing to say as Aristotle argues, but in the tradition of
oracles and mystery religions. The gods never give the unvarnished truth to mortals who
must figure out the gods message to show they are worthy to receive it. Empedocles
subscribes to the raison dtre of the tradition of ambiguity and tells the readers explicitly
that they should not expect a complete account or a clear one. He does not, however,
leave his audience without a solution. He passes along the techniques for interpretation
that the reader must exploit to arrive at the same point he has.

Part 1: Ambiguity
As chapter 1 discusses, Aristotle complained that Empedocles wrote ambiguously.

141

 , ,
, .
.
,
. ,

.
Aristotle Rhetoric 1407a31-7 = DK 31A25c
The third [way to use proper Greek] is not to use ambiguous statements. Unless, of
course, one prefers the opposite course [i.e., ambiguity] which is what they do
when they are able to say nothing but pretend they can say something. For such men
say these things [i.e., their nothings] in poetry, like Empedocles. For the long, roundabout expression deceives the audience, and they (the audience) experience what
most people experience at the hands of prophets. For whenever they (the prophets)
speak ambiguities, they (the audience) nod assent, approving, e.g., When Croesus
will cross the Halys, he will destroy a great empire.

For Aristotle, ambiguity in communication is negative because in his period people have
used ambiguity deliberately in order to deceive, especially in law courts, the political
arena, and business. He is suspicious, therefore, that people who do not speak or write
clearly do not truly understand what they themselves mean. This is unacceptable for
people who study the nature of the world around them since the entire purpose of that
endeavour, Aristotle believes, is to gain knowledge and understand; if one cannot explain
clearly, perhaps one does not, in fact, understand. Ambiguity, however, is not always
treated with suspicion.

142

1.1

A TRADITION OF AMBIGUITY
Aristotles choice to compare Empedocles with the oracle at Delphi reveals one

reason why ambiguity may have positive uses. When people traveled to Delphi, or any
other oracular site, it was generally to ask the gods about the future; mortals are not
meant, however, to know such things. The gods answers, therefore, are couched in
ambiguous language. Another source of ambiguity occurs when the message is intended
only for a select audience. The ultimate revelation of the mysteries, for example, is
disclosed in allegory and also requires interpretation.
,
, ,
.
, .
.
,
Demetrius On Style 100-102
What is implied always strikes more terror, and one person likens it to one thing and
another to another, whereas what is clear and plain is apt to be despised, like men
who are stripped of their clothes. This is why mysteries are revealed in allegories, to
inspire the shuddering and awe associated with darkness and night. In fact allegory is
not unlike darkness and night. Here again in the case of allegory we should avoid a
succession of them, or our words become a riddle.1

If the gods reveal their knowledge promptly, it will no longer have special status and, as
Demetrius phrases it, is apt to be despised ( ). The revelation is

This text and translation comes from the Loeb edition (Doreen C. Innes, 1995).

143

concealed, therefore, in allegory, which is an appropriate mode of communication for

gods since the meaning is not readily apparent.
To interpret ambiguous utterances successfully, one must determine the underlying
meaning rather than rely on the words themselves. The message is not concealed so
completely, however, that it cannot be resolved. In the cases of the oracles and the
revelation of the mysteries, it is uncertain whether the members of the audience will
make the correct analysis, especially since each reader approaches the text with varying
assumptions and knowledge. While such a situation was untenable for Aristotle, his
contemporaries were clearly less incensed over the matter since allegory both
interpretation and composition continued to be popular for the Stoics and later the
Neoplatonists.2 The primary goal behind this tradition was to conceal the underlying
message from those who were not part of the interpretive community.

1.1.1

Oracles and Ambiguous Language

Aristotle links the ambiguity Empedocles practices to the ambiguity of Delphic

oracle:
,
. ,

.
Aristotle Rhetoric 1407a33
For the long, round-about expression deceives the audience, and they (the audience)
experience what most people experience at the hands of prophets. For whenever they
2

Struck 2004 outlines the history of allegorical interpretation and the symbol in poetry.

144

(the prophets) speak ambiguities, they (the audience) nod assent, approving, e.g.,
When Croesus will cross the Halys, he will destroy a great empire.

Aristotle, however, fails to see the connection in the use of ambiguity between
Empedocles and the oracle since Aristotle believes that clarity is always the best course.
Oracles, whether from Apollo at Delphi or Ammon at Siwa, are deliberately ambiguous.
The gods, by their nature, have more knowledge than mortals and it is appropriate that
men must interpret the gods oracle since it provides information about the future, which
is special knowledge and not intended for men. Priests at Delphi transcribe Apollos
response through the Pythia, if it is not yes or no, into verses of dactylic hexameter that
require further interpretation. Ambiguous language plays a vital role in fashioning the
oracle. Herodotus (Histories 1.53ff.) discusses in detail the example to which Aristotle
refers in Rhetoric 1407a33. Croesus believed that he would destroy the empire of the
Persians when he crossed the Halys, but in fact he destroyed his own. If the ambiguity
were removed, that is, if the empire to be destroyed had been identified by name, the
statement would no longer be ambiguous and the meaning would be transparent to all
who heard it. Oracles, therefore, omit details that must be filled in by the recipient, just as
Aristotle complains about poor science writing with metaphor.3
Clear knowledge of the future is the prerogative of the gods. The oracle is not,
however, without solution. Heraclitus refers to the riddling mode in which Apollo
delivers his oracles: , ,
(Plutarch de Pythiae oraculis 404d = DK 22B93) The lord whose oracle
is in Delphi neither declares nor conceals, but makes a sign. It is not Apollos intent to
state outright the answer to the seeker nor to conceal it on purpose, but to point the
3

See 2.3.1 in chapter 1.

145

questioner in the proper direction. It is for the questioner to devise his own interpretation
and determine how best to take the gods response.4 The individual must prove he is
worthy and capable of receiving knowledge that should not be revealed to everyone. The
recipient achieves this through interpreting the ambiguous statement; and, if this is done
correctly, he will have access to special information (although, in the case of the oracle, it
cannot be proven until the event has passed).

1.1.2

Allegory and Mystery Religion

The other tradition of ambiguity lies in the application of allegory. As an extended

metaphor, allegory requires interpretation because the author intends that the story
represent something other than what it says. Ancient authors used allegory to conceal
information intentionally, in part to prevent information from coming to the wrong
audience and in part to confirm the identity of the community through shared (and
special) knowledge. Each allegory, therefore, could have a minimum of two
interpretations a literal one based solely on the level of the story and a hidden one that
is designed for the reader who has special knowledge. The latter is intended for only a
small audience who will understand the message. The reader of the allegory, therefore,
must decipher the authors meaning just as the recipient of an oracle must determine the
sense of the gods message. It may be ambiguous but it is explicable in its context,
whether poetic or social, to a specific audience. The readers special knowledge may
come from shared references with the author owing to birth () or from belonging

See, for example, the anthropological analysis of divination within the Yoruba religion and culture in W.
Bascom Ifa Divination: Communication Between Gods and Men in West Africa (Indiana 1969).

146

to the same community () and therefore with access to an interpreter. Alternatively,

the readers may determine the message through their own wisdom ().5
This practice is prevalent in the texts of archaic authors. It is an old tradition in Greek
literature to use the as a lesson that required analysis on the part of the reader.6
These tales were written to pass a message only to those who have the background
knowledge to decipher them. Hesiod, for example, introduces his fable of the hawk and
the nightingale with the words:
(Works and Days 202) now I will tell a tale for the kings, aware as they are. Hesiod
targets his audience, the kings, and indicates that if they have the tools they will be able
to interpret the message.7 For other readers, they can become , riddles, unless
the readers are wise or have help from another source. Theognis, for example, uses the
image of the ship of state (667-80) to complain that the (nobility) are doing little
to prevent political disaster. The of the ship of state is a tale that must be
interpreted: |
8, . (Theognis 681-682) Let these things be riddled by me, hidden for
the nobility: but anyone might recognize the actual calamity, if he is wise. The answer is
not given explicitly, but the author claims to provide enough information for the reader to
solve the on his own or with the aid of an interpreter.

Nagy 1990 (148).

Nagy has explored the use of the in archaic literature (Nagy 1979 (chapter 1), Nagy 1990 (chapter
6)).
7

Hesiod emphasizes that the kings, along with poets, are blessed with the Muses gift of communication
(Hesiod Theogony 80 ff.).
8

If Bruncks emendation of is accepted, the translation would be: but even a base man can
recognize (the meaning of my words) if he is clever. This emphasizes the failing of the .

147

The Derveni papyrus provides more evidence for the use of allegory in the
tradition and illustrates how one reader approaches a text when an underlying meaning is
assumed. Although many scholars disparage the quality of the commentary and malign
the commentators tools, it allows us to examine the approach of a fifth or fourth century
commentator.9 The goal of the author was to preserve ones faith through allegorical
interpretation of myth as well as ritual: he presents himself as a priest (col. V) who
interprets dreams (col. V), ritual (col. VI and XX), and myth (col. VII). He also believes
that this Orphic cosmogony is riddling on purpose, not simply to confuse the reader, but
to conceal the truth from those who do not have the determination and drive to discover
what lies beneath the literal meaning of the words.
. . ] [] [] [ ]
] , [ ]
] [] . [ ]
[] []. [ ] [] [
] [] , [ ][]
] [] [ ]
] <> [] , [ ]
][ . ] [ ]
] [ ] [ ] ,
] [], [
9

Modern scholars argue that the commentators interpretations are generally poor and contrary to the
grammar and meaning of the text: Merkelbach 1967; West 1983 (79); Henry 1986. As for the commentator,
there are affinities to Anaxagoras (Burkert 1970) and to Diogenes (Janko 1997), but the author does not
subscribe completely to either, but blends the two approaches (Laks 1997). Janko 2001 (6-15) identifies the
author as Diagoras of Melos and proposes this treatise may be . Other suggestions for
authorship include Epigenes (Kapsomenos 1964), Euthryphro (Kahn 1997), and Stesimbrotus of Thasos
(Burkert 1986).

148

P. Derv. Column VII.

(I shall also prove that Orpheus composed a)10 hymn relating sound and permissible
things. For he was allegorizing with his poetry, and he was not able to state the
application of his words and what was meant. The poem is a strange one and riddling
for men. But Orpheus did not want to relate unbelievable11 riddles, but great things in
riddles. Indeed he tells a sacred tale12 from the first word right up to the last, as he
makes clear in the well-known13 verse. For when he has ordered them to shut doors
on their ears, he denies that he makes laws for the majority, but he teaches the pure
with respect to their hearing

The Derveni author emphasizes that the people with access to the texts, that is, the
priests, often do not understand the hidden meaning behind the words or the ritual.14 The
Derveni author has preserved his own faith because he interprets religion allegorically
just as he claims Heraclitus and Orpheus do.15 Within this column is a statement that was
previously connected with the Orphics: having
ordered them to put doors to their ears. This statement, alluded to by Plato, refers to the
custom that those who are not part of the group, that is, who are not , must exclude

10

Janko 2001 (21n.95) restores the missing sense thus. See also Janko 2002 (15).

11

Janko 2001 (21n.100, cf. Janko 2002 (14)) prints ] (unbelievable), changing the of the papyrus to
because he argues the treatise emphasizes the tenet that the gods should be believable. He also suggests
the reading ] (outrageous) which maintains the . Tsantsanoglou 1997 (95) prints ]
(contentious).
12

See Tsantsanoglou 1997 (122-123). Tsantsanoglou claims [w]e see that the connotation of obscurity and
unclarity is added to the basic sense of speech on holy matters. (p. 123).
13

Janko 2001 (21n.102) prints ][ because he argues that the phrase was already commonly
associated with the Orphics. See also Janko 2002 (14). Tsantsanoglou 1997 (95, 124) prints ][,
arguing that the author uses the phrase since he deliberately does not quote a passage.
14

] [] [. (PDerv. VIII.6) That these verses are transposed has not

been noticed, [ | [] (PDerv. IX.2-3) Those who do not
comprehend what is meant suppose..., compare PDerv. XVIII.14, XXVI.8; []
, [] | , | (PDerv.
XXIII.1-3) This verse has been composed in a misleading way, and is unclear to most people, but to those
who know correctly it is clear that...
15

Heraclitus is called an allegorist in column IV.

149

themselves because secret things () are about to be revealed.16 According to the

author, this phrase should alert the reader that the myth conceals secret things meant
solely for those in the group.17 The Derveni author believes that if the readers interpret the
theogony correctly, they will maintain their faith and relieve their concerns about death.18
The commentator, therefore, views himself as an interpreter for his fellow since he
interprets dreams, rituals, and myth, just like the wise men and women Plato describes in
Meno 81a:
the speakers were the priests and priestesses
who find it important to be able to explain what they practice.
A variety of other texts attributed to Orpheus are attested to have been in circulation
by the fourth century B.C.19 and illustrate further the observations of the Derveni papyrus.

.
.

16

. ,
, . (Plato Symposium 218b) For all of you
have shared in the philosophical madness and frenzy, wherefore everyone will listen. For you will
recognize the things done then and the things said now. But the servants, and if there is anyone else
uninitiated and rustic, shut very large doors over your ears.
17

Tsantsanoglou 1997 (124-26).

18

Since this soldier had the papyrus burned with him, he was convinced of it, too. See Most 1997 (131-35)
for a proposal as to how the Derveni author believed his interpretation would alleviate fears of death.
19

Ion was active in the 5th century B.C. in Athens and wrote in a wide variety of genres - tragedy,
dithyrambic poetry, elegies, hymns and more, in addition to prose works (West 1985). The identity and
date of Epigenes is uncertain. In the Hellenistic period, some, e.g., Callimachus (fr. 449), believed that he
wrote the Triagmoi attributed to Ion of Chios, but West 1983 (9n.15) argues that
is not a monograph per se, but a commentary on Ions Triagmoi and any statements will be an
amplification of Ion. Linforth 1941 (114ff.) linked this Epigenes to the companion of Socrates who was
present at his death, but Jacoby (FGrHist IIIb Komm (noten) 131n.108) disagrees. Certainly he can be
dated to a pre-Hellenistic period.

150


, .
Clement Stromata 1.21.131.3-5
[They say] the Krater of Orpheus is by Zopyrus20 of Heraclea and the Descent to
Hades is by Prodikos of Samos. Ion the Chian, in the Triads, says that having written
some things in verse, he (Pythagoras) attributed them to Orpheus. Epigenes, in his
Concerning the Poetry of Orpheus, says that the Descent to Hades and the Hieros
Logos are by Cercops the Pythagorean and the Robe and Physics are by Brontinos.21

Although bare titles are the primary remains, they are evocative of allegorical
composition, especially Krater, Net, and Robe, all of which Clement assigned to Zopyrus
of Heraclea (Kern OF 179). The literal level of the Orphic poem could be consumed by
the largely ignorant public; but for those in the know, or for those who could get
interpretative aid from someone else, there was another level to the myth. Krater suggests
a cosmic principle where things like and unlike are mixed together since a krater is a
mixing bowl for wine and water.22 Aristotle was familiar with Net: the creation of an
animal was likened to the weaving of a net, different strands knit together to form a
whole.23 As for Robe, Epigenes interpreted various expressions of weaving used by
Orpheus as referring to agriculture. The embroidery on the robe, therefore, may represent
the annual process of growth, harvest and subsequent decay24:

20

See 2.1 in chapter 1 for Zopyrus role as a mechanical engineer.

21

See Bernab 2004 for a collection of testimonia and fragments of these Orphic texts.

22

Platos demiurge mixed souls in a krater (Timaeus 35, 41d). Compare Plato Phaedo 111e6-112b1 where
the rivers come together in a large crater and are mixed.
23

(Aristotle de generatione animalium 734a16f.) Just as in the so-called verses of Orpheus: for there
he says the animal is born like the weaving of a net. Cf. Plato Timaeus 78b ff. where the spaces between
the ropes of a net is a parallel for the soul in the body.
24

In the later Rhapsodies, Persephone is weaving a flowery robe when Hades abducts her (Kern OF 192).

151


,
, (Clement Stromata
5.8.49.3) Does not even Epigenes make clear in his Concerning the Poetry of Orpheus,
setting out the peculiarities in Orpheus, that by crooked rods of the loom he means
ploughs, by warp (in loom) furrows, thread (of the warp) is an allegory for seed, and
the tears of Zeus is rain?
The custom of justifying their ritual practices on the basis of books linked to Orpheus
was a distinguishing feature of certain priests in the mystery religions. For example, in
Euripides Hippolytus when Theseus attacks his son, Hippolytus, he links his pious
lifestyle to books and the mysteries of Orpheus.25 Plato also refers to wandering priests
() who claim to base the purification rites they perform on books written by
Musaios and Orpheus.26 Since later Orphic literature focused on the figure and death of
Persephone, it is likely that these texts served as sacred narratives for initiates, especially
in the West where Pythagoreans were priests and priestesses in Persephones mysteries.27
They share not only Orpheus as an authority, but also a similar theme: the nature, origins,
and fate of man, the gods, and the universe. It may seem unusual that these stories which
25

| |
(Euripides Hippolytus 952-954) Boast now then and peddle your trade in
meatless meals and be a bacchant with Orpheus as a lord and honouring the smoke of many writings. Graf
1974 connects the persona of Orpheus to the Eleusinian mysteries as a founder of rites.
26

See 1.3.1 in chapter 2. ,

, , , ,
, ,
, (Plato Republic 364e-365a) And they produce a
hubbub of books of Musaios and Orpheus, the offspring of the Moon and the Muses, as they say, according
to which they perform rites, persuading not only private citizens but also cities that there are remissions of
and purification for sins through sacrifice and games of pleasure not only for the living but also for the dead
which they call rites which release us from the evils of the other world
27

Burkert 1982 (17-18).

152

were clearly mythic (as understood from the scanty evidence) should be used in rites, but
the use of myth in ritual is attested in Near Eastern practice: for example, the priestdentist (The Worm and the Toothache in Akkadian literature28) would first recite a
cosmogony explaining where toothaches come from (the gods granted the food stuck
between a persons teeth to the worm) and then perform the rite to cure the toothache in
question. While the Akkadian priest-dentist focused on the physical condition of the
patient as the text reflects, the mysteries concentrate on giving the initiates a better
afterlife based on information from the gods.
If the titles of these stories, therefore, can be any indication, the message is delivered
through a story that explains the nature of man, the gods, and the universe. Sacred
narratives, therefore, lend themselves naturally to allegorical composition with multiple
layers of meaning. The text is designed primarily for initiates, but owing to the
prohibition against speaking of the mysteries openly29, they must be disguised in allegory.
This keeps the uninitiated from the lessons contained in the stories.

1.2

EMPEDOCLES AMBIGUITY
Not only is there a tradition of ambiguity for Empedocles to draw upon, but in

fragment 3, he also alerts his readers that he writes ambiguously, although not in so many
words; he is ambiguous about his ambiguity. He asks the gods to be his partner as he
reveals the lessons in order to preserve the distinction between mortal and divine
knowledge. Empedocles also approaches a Muse to aid his composition, to pass on the
28

R. Campbell Thompson published a reproduction of the tablet in Cuneiform Texts from Babylonian
Tablets, &c., in the British Museum 17 (1903), pl. 50. Heidel publishes a translation in Babylonian Genesis
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1965), pp. 72-73.
29

See note 71 below.

153

Muses skills in using language because he realizes that ordinary mortals should not
know everything.30 The readers should understand from the beginning, therefore, that not
everything they would like to know will be addressed. Rather, they should re-examine the
world around them, applying their senses as designed, but not relying on them
exclusively. If they hear one thing, for example, since they now expect that the account
will be neither full nor clear, they should apply as much as possible from other sources in
order to arrive at the truth. Empedocles boasts of what Aristotle blames him for.31

1.2.1

Not a Tell-All

Empedocles criticizes those who boast that they understand how the whole universe
works when they really only know a part of the whole (fragment 2).32 As he continues, it
is not their fault that they do not know everything since mortals by their very nature
simply cannot know all. Only gods (like Empedocles and Pythagoras (fragment 129)) can
know everything.33 But as Empedocles says to Pausanias, since he has come to
Empedocles for enlightenment, he will have the opportunity to go further than what
mortal wisdom has acquired ( , , |
. (DK 31B2.8-9) But you will learn, since you have stopped.
Mortal wisdom has not gone further at least.).34

30

I discuss Hesiods Muses (Theogony 26-28) who know how to lie and tell the truth in 1.2.2 below.

31

Mansfield 1995 discusses the intentional ambiguity of Empedocles verses, but limits his investigation to
fragment 6 in the proem.
32

See 2.2.1 in chapter 1.

33

See 2.2.2 in chapter 3.

34

Trpanier 2004 (54-55).

154

Continuing with fragment 3, Empedocles alerts his readers that they are not to expect
a full and complete account, and there is little reason to look for clarity, either. When
Empedocles first addresses the immortal gods in fragment 3, he asks for help in revealing
the truth to his audience.
,

Sextus Empiricus Adversus Mathematicos 7.125 = DK31B3.1-2
But gods turn their madness from my tongue and pour forth a pure stream from holy
mouths.

Considering Empedocles context, the gods to whom he prays are the immortal gods, that
is, the four roots to whom he assigns the names of Zeus, Hera, Aidoneus, and Nestis in
fragment 6.35 He asks that they keep someones madness from his tongue and pour forth a
pure source from his holy mouth. The chiastic juxtaposition of these images , |
, specifically the tongue and mouth illustrates that the madness is
one of speech. Kahn 1974 (n. 10) identifies this madness as saying more than is lawful
for mortals to hear, looking forward in the fragment to the next lines.36 I believe, with
Bollack 1969 (3.26), that Empedocles refers primarily to the madness of those who boast
in fragment 2 that they understand how the world works. Sextus Empiricus says that
Empedocles directs these verses as a criticism against those who claim to know more
( ). These are the same people that Empedocles
denigrates in fragment 2, thus reinforcing Sextus Empiricus claim that the verses

35

Bollack 1969 (3.26).

36

Wright 1981 (157) follows this interpretation as well. Trpanier 2004 (58) argues that the madness that
Empedocles wants to avoid arises from the sin of ritual sacrifice.

155

identified as fragment 3 follow those of fragment 2; the refers back to them. They
say that they know more than anyone else, when in fact they do not. Empedocles, by
contrast, asks the gods, about whom he talks, to ensure that what he says although he
will only say as much as is right is true.
Empedocles opponents do not understand how the world really works because 1)
men are limited by imperfect sensory perception and a short lifespan, and 2) they fail to
recognize these limits. Fragment 39 confirms this interpretation as it echoes the
sentiment.
,


Aristotle de caelo 294a26-28 = DK 31B39
if indeed the depths of earth and abundant aither are unbounded, as is poured out in
vain from mouths, coming from the tongues of many, who have seen little of the
whole.

Those men who argue that the earth and air are without limit speak in vain because they
have seen little of the universe, and further research would prove their claims incorrect.37
Their mistakes lie in what they say. Relating false doxa in this case, however, is
aggravated by boasting that they have seen the whole ( <>
DK 31B2.6) and are therefore reliable sources. Pindar in Olympian 9 equates such
boasting out of turn with madness ( |
lines 38-39) when he outlines Heracles various feats of defeating the gods but prevents
himself from elaborating further because to speak ill ( line 37) of the gods,
37

See 2.2.2 in chapter 1.

156

in this case that a mortal was able to overpower them, is a hateful skill (
line 38), hateful to the gods.38 As one expects with Pindar, he does not explicitly state
what he means by this; the sentiment, however, is reminiscent of the conversation
between Solon and Croesus (Herodotus 1.30-32) about fortune. According to Solon, no
man should be considered fortunate unless he remains so up to the moment of death;
Croesus, boasting of his good fortune too early, ended up losing it all.39 It is madness,
therefore, to boast out of turn about things that are not certain, such as mortal wisdom
about how the world works.
Empedocles contrasts their madness with the pure source from his holy mouth. He is
not asking the gods to tell him what to say because he does not know the truth himself, as
Homer, for example, does when he seeks help with lists.40 Rather, Empedocles presents
himself as a divine teacher ( , (DK
31B23.11) But know these things plainly, having heard them from a god), one who
already knows the lessons and can teach others.41 Empedocles, therefore, approaches the
gods as a partner to show his readers that the information is correct and to ensure that he
provides information that preserves the distinction between divine and human
knowledge. The purity of Empedocles knowledge emphasizes its credibility, in addition
to his own divine status ( ).
38

Bollack 1969 (3:27).

39

Compare also Aeschylus Agamemnon 928-9.

40

Before Homer begins the so-called catalogue of ships (Iliad 2.484 ff.), he calls for the Muses aid; I
could not recount nor name the number, not even if I had ten tongues and ten mouths, an unbreakable voice
and a heart of bronze, if the Olympian Muses, the daughters of aegis-bearing Zeus, did not remind me how
many came under Ilion. ( , | ,
, | , , |
| Iliad 2.488-492). Compare also Homer Iliad 2.7612, 11.218-20, 14.508-10, 16.112-13.
41

Compare the successful initiate Theon portrays (see the beginning of part 2 in chapter 3).

157

1.2.2

A Desire to Obscure

After Empedocles addresses the gods, he turns to a muse, Calliopeia, if she is the
same Muse we find in fragment 131.42
, ,
, ,
.
Sextus Empiricus Adversus Mathematicos 7.125 = DK31B3.3-5
And I beseech you, much-remembering white-armed maiden Muse, send what is
right for mortal creatures to hear, driving your well-reined chariot from (the halls of)
Piety.

Empedocles asks the Muse to come herself to him, driving her chariot43 from the halls of
Piety44 and bringing information that is , divinely ordained, for mortals to hear.
Since her chariot is well-reined (), she will restrict her revelation.45 Not only
should the readers, mortals () who should not know everything, not expect an
explicit report of how to control the world, but the reference to the Muses also alerts the
audience to the skillful use of language that they impart to their favourites as comparison
with Hesiod shows.46
When Empedocles asks the Muse to come with information, he does not ask that she
tell him the story, although the epithet , much-remembering, reminds the

42

See below.

43

Wright 1981 (156) provides a succinct survey of scholarship regarding possession of the chariot.

44

This will suggest to his readers that Empedocles wishes to be reverent to the gods he beseeches in line 1.

45

Kahn 1974 (431).

46

See the discussion of the in 1.1.2 above.

158

reader that the Muse is the ideal source for information.47 He already knows because he is
a god, in opposition to his mortal audience. Contrast with fragment 131 reveals what
Empedocles seeks.48 In this fragment, Empedocles asks Calliopeia to stand by him, just as
he asks in fragment 3 that she come in her chariot.
, ,
< > ,
, ,
.
Hippolytus Refutatio 7.31.4 = DK 31B131
For if, immortal Muse, for the sake of any mortal, it has pleased you that our
concerns come to your thought, stand now, Calliopeia, by me praying again as I
reveal a good discourse about the blessed gods.

Empedocles, here, does not pray to Calliopeia asking for information. Although
Empedocles seems to include himself with the with the possessive adjective
, he in fact contrasts the , that is, if even mortal concerns draw your
attention, then please stand by me, a fellow god, as I relate this tale.49 He emphasizes this
gulf between himself and mortals in fragment 113:
, | ; Why do I press these
things as if I were doing some great thing, if I surpass mortal men who are destroyed
many times?

47

Bollack 1969 (3:28-29).

48

Trpanier 2004 (57-59) emphasizes the parallels with Bacchylides V 176-8 (, , and
) as a connection between fragments 3 and 131. Wright (and Inwood) places fragment 131 after line 5
of fragment 3 because she begins a new fragment with line 6 of fragment 3. I do not believe this is
necessary since Empedocles could conceivably repeat the same sentiment elsewhere.
49

Empedocles uses for men in general in fragment 133 as well (Wright 1981 (159)).

159

Rather than asking for information, he states plainly that he intends to reveal
() a about the gods.50 He already knows what this is, and that it is a
good one as well. He wants her to impart the same skills to him through inspiration as the
Muses grant to Hesiod on Mount Helicon.51 When the Muses give Hesiod the scepter of
laurel to represent their authority and a divine voice to compose and perform songs for
men, they remind him of the vast gulf that lies between men and gods with respect to
knowledge.
, , ,
,
.
Hesiod Theogony 26-28
Boorish shepherds, base reproaches, mere bellies, we know how to tell many lies
just like real things and we know how, when we want, to utter truth.

The Muses can sing two types of song: one is false and the other true. The true songs
() are thoroughly true, emphasizing that the Muses exist outside time and human
experience and can recount perfect knowledge perfectly scrupulously.52 The false songs
(), on the other hand, which can include lies, omissions (inadvertent or
purposeful), and exaggerations53, are impossible to differentiate from those that are

50

I argue above in chapter 3 (1.1) that these gods are the roots, Love, and Strife.

51

Poets frequently request inspiration since poetic ability was a gift granted (or denied) by the gods.
Various divinities (Zeus, Muses, Apollo) are credited with giving the gift to Demodocus (Homer Odyssey
8.44-5, 62-6, 479-81, 488, 496-8), minstrels in general (Odyssey 17.518-20), and the son of Terpes
(Odyssey 22.347-8). Thamyris learned that the Muses can take away the gift when he boasted that he could
out-sing them according to Iliad 2.591-600.
52

Wheeler 2002 (34-5).

53

Levet 1976 (201-14).

160

authentic. The Muses do not comment on the truth of their words54; they emphasize their
superior oratorical skills. They can weave together songs such that men cannot
distinguish what is false from what is true. Other examples of the phrase,
, illustrate this. When Odysseus, for example, posing as Aethon of Crete,
tells Penelope how he knows Odysseus,
(Odyssey 19.203) Telling many lies, he made them like real things (). It is the
plausibility of Odysseus tale that counts; since the beggars description of Odysseus
matches what Penelope knows as real and unchangeable, the remainder of the tale is
plausible to the best of her knowledge.55 Odysseus knowledge allows him to spin a tale
indistinguishable from reality. The Muses false songs, therefore, also seem credible.
Empedocles, like the Muses, possesses divine knowledge that sets him apart from
mortals, and he wants the Muse of fragment 3, therefore, to stand by him and share her
superior oratorical skill with him, not so that he can lie but to obscure his message in such
a way that the readers for whom this message is intended can still learn, just as the Muses
do in Hesiod. He recognizes that the path to learning these lessons through his text will
be difficult.
56, ,

.

54

The Muses do not promise to tell Hesiod the truth, and Hesiod cannot guarantee the truth of what he says.
Clay 2003 (60 ff.) discusses the importance of this ambiguity on the part of the Muses to emphasize the
distinction between mortal and divine.
55

Clay 2003 (62).

56

Because of the use of a plural addressee, some editors place this fragment in . For the purpose
of discussing ambiguity, however, the placement of these verses is not important since I believe that
everything Empedocles wrote shares this ambiguous style.

161

Clement Stromata 5.1.9.1 = DK 31B114

Oh friends, I know that truth is present for the words that I will speak. But the
onslaught of persuasion against the mind happens to be very difficult and
exceedingly jealous for men.

Empedocles must persuade the readers because everyone, perhaps even those who
understand that they must set aside their preconceived notions of how the world works, is
already convinced that they know how the world operates. Persuasion will also be more
challenging for Empedocles here because he cannot reveal the truth plainly.
One way to conceal his message is through allegory. Hesiod displays this skill in the
Works and Days in the he relates to the kings as outlined above.57 Notably Hesiod
also speaks to those who received the same ability from the Muses; the Muses pour sweet
dew ( (Theogony 83)) onto their favourites tongues both poets and
kings, although the kings have used it inappropriately for personal gain58, and Hesiod
expects that owing to this ability they will not be confused but be able to interpret
correctly the message that is intended for them (
(line 202) now I will tell a tale for the kings who themselves understand).
Empedocles plans to use this technique for his readers as well; the targeted community
will understand the intent of his verses while the average reader will not. I will show
below how Empedocles, by asking the Muse to come to him, seeks the skills that will
allow him to write ambiguously and permit him to reveal what is right for his audience.

57

See 1.1.2 in this chapter.

58

| | ,
(Works and Days 37-39) but you [Perses], snatching up the greater portion [of our inheritance],
carry it off, greatly flattering gift-eating kings who wish to judge such a case. When the kings and poets
apply their proficiency with words in a positive way, kings give straight judgments and end disputes
(Theogony 84-93), while poets and lyre players can dissolve a mans cares, making him joyful again
(Theogony 96-103); they distract men from their troubles (Clay 2003 (69-70)).

162

1.3

EMPEDOCLES SECRET
Empedocles has told Pausanias in fragment 111 that Pausanias will learn how to

control the universe just as Empedocles can because he is a god. Such lessons, however,
should not be given explicitly or clearly owing to the potential abuse of power. By
seeking the Muses help in the first part of fragment 3, Empedocles consciously wrote in
an ambiguous way just as they do according to Hesiod to ensure that only the right
audience got the accurate message, provided that they interpret Empedocles verses
correctly. The gods and a Muse will be his partners to guarantee that he does not tell the
whole truth, revealing only what is right for mortals to hear, and to grant him the skillful
use of language that will enable him to conceal his message from those who are unworthy
to learn and convey it to those who are worthy.
As fragment 3 continues, Empedocles repeats the idea that the truth is not for
ordinary mortals.

,
, 59 .
Sextus Empiricus Adversus Mathematicos 7.125 = DK31B3.6-8
Do not let the blossoms60 of fair-seeming honour compel61 you to take (them) from
mortals on the condition that you both say more than is holy out of rashness and that
you dispatch these things upon the peaks of wisdom.
59

Diels-Kranz, Bollack 1969 (2:11), Wright 1981 (95), and Inwood 2001 (216) print . I choose the
reading from Proclus text (On Timaeus 106e20) . The verb is most commonly used as a
transitive verb meaning to dispatch. Empedocles is the primary entry in LSJ for to sit. This
reading preserves more closely the interpretation Proclus provides for this passage. He contrasts Platos
comment in Timaeus 29d that men cannot explain the gods accurately with Heraclitus, Empedocles, and the
Stoics. Empedocles is bold, on the other hand, and, according to Proclus, claims that he announces truth
itself ( ).

163

Empedocles exhorts the addressed not to be enticed into telling more than is holy to those
who offer prizes of honour, nor to dispatch these things (those that are more than holy)
upon the peaks of wisdom. The addressed, therefore, possesses the truth, that is, more
than what is right for mortals to know, and is cautioned against revealing it to those who
do not have it. The only way that mortals can bridge the gap between human and divine
knowledge is by personally taking the journey that Empedocles has set out. Men want to
control their environment, as the vigorous business enjoyed by magicians in the ancient
world illustrates62; and Empedocles warns against those who would like to acquire his
lessons without going through the learning process.
Who is urged not to accept the blossoms of fair-seeming honour in return for telling
more than is holy and sending it forth upon the peaks of wisdom? One candidate, if the
fragment is a continuous section of text, should be the Muse since she is the most recent
you addressed.63 There are a few arguments, however, against this interpretation. First,
it should not be necessary to remind a god about maintaining the gap between mortal and
divine knowledge, considering how the Muses characters are portrayed, especially in
Hesiod. Fair-seeming () honour should not tempt the Muse, since she already

60

The verb is never used impersonally, so either there is a lacuna in the text that contains the
subject, as Wright 1981 (161) argues, or the subject is (DK). I believe the latter is the correct
interpretation since the flowers here represent the enticement of fame, which Empedocles points out only
seems fair (), in contrast perhaps with the true fame that comes from the wreaths one receives with
a successful initiation (see note 10 above in this chapter).
61

The use of + future indicative for the subjunctive in prohibitions has Homeric precedence in Iliad
20.301 and Odyssey 24.544. See Shipp 1972 (144).
62

See chapter 2.

63

Trpanier 2004 (57-65, 70) argues that these lines are addressed to the Muse, but his reading of these
lines varies greatly from my own since he reconstructs and interprets the entire proem around Empedocles
exile in fragment 115 (50, 58).

164

has the genuine article.64 Proclus, moreover, uses line 8 to illustrate the shortcomings of
human wisdom.65 Finally, the tone seems to change from asking for the Muses aid
(), even as a partner in the enterprise, to a command, an attitude that seems
inappropriate, even for a fellow god.
The only other you to whom Empedocles could be speaking is Pausanias; Diogenes
Lartius says the verses on nature were addressed to him: ...
, ,
(Diogenes Lartius Lives of the Philosophers 8.60 = DK 311) It was Pausanias to
whom he addressed On Nature in this way: Pausanias, son of wise Anchites, listen.
Throughout his verses, if the you, whether indicated with a verb or pronoun, varies
from Pausanias (or the general reader whom Empedocles addresses), Empedocles uses a
vocative in the same line, or very close, to identify the addressed. 66 As it happens, the
only other singular you is the Muse/Calliopeia: ,
, | , , | (DK 31B3.3-5)
And I beseech you, much-remembering white-armed maiden Muse, send what is right
for mortal creatures to hear; and , , |
< > , | ,
, | . (DK 31B131) For if,
immortal Muse, for the sake of any mortal, it has pleased you that our concerns come to

64

Clement uses these lines to distinguish opinion from genuine fame and truth:
, ,
<> . (Stromata 5.9.59.2) And perhaps even the two-fold
group, which is called in their writings resting on opinion and scientific, of those from the Peripatetic
school are not far from dividing opinion from fame and truth: <Empedocles fr. 3.6-7>
65

See note 59 above.

66

See n. 82 in chapter 1 for the other uses of you that refer to Pausanias.

165

your thought, stand now by me praying again as I reveal a good discourse about the
blessed gods. To accommodate this, various scholars argue that there is a lacuna in the
text.67 I do not believe the lines should be split up, however, because the verses work as a
cohesive whole together with fragment 2.
If there is no gap in the text, how does Empedocles designate this change of subject?
The use of the particles ( line 6) may signify a change in addressed. Denniston
1954 notes that 68 connects what will follow to an earlier statement, that is, it
introduces a successive point (154). In fragment 2, Empedocles complains that most
people do not understand how the world really works, although they believe they do.
Mans senses are limited (fragment 2.1:
For narrow devices are poured throughout the limbs), a situation aggravated by an
excess of information to be taken in through the senses (fragment 2.2:
, and many wretched things, which make our
concerns dull, burst in). And individuals life span is, moreover, too short to experience
everything (fragment 2.3-4: |
They, having looked at a small portion of life in their
lifetime, fly off in the manner of smoke when they die early) Pausanias, who has
stopped, will learn the truth, therefore going beyond human understanding (fragment 2.89: , , | But you,
since you have stepped aside, will learn. Mortal cunning, at least, has gone no further.).69

67

Wright and Inwood begin a new fragment (#5 and #14 respectively) at line 6. Karsten postulated a lacuna
after and prints and .
68

An author will use if required by metre (Denniston 152); the negative can be or , as
here (Denniston 156).
69

See 2.2.1 in chapter 1.

166

After verse 8 in fragment 3, Empedocles urges the addressed to trust in the senses, but
only as far as each is designed, and in concert with one another.
, ,

,
, ,
, .
Sextus Empiricus Adversus Mathematicos 7.125 = DK 31B3.9-13
Come, consider by means of every device, in the way each is clear, not holding any
vision with more faith than something from hearing, nor echoing hearing over the
clarities of the tongue, do not curb trusting in any of the other limbs, wherever there
is a path to understanding, but consider each thing in the way it is clear.

If my interpretation is correct, therefore, Empedocles returns full circle to the role of the
senses in understanding the world, even repeating from line 1 of fragment 2.
They are limited (fragment 2), but they do give correct information within those
limitations. But when Pausanias has learned by re-evaluating what he perceives70 he
cannot share this information with regular mortals (fragment 3.6-8). Plutarch confirms
this sentiment:
(Table Talk 728e) And (he [Tyndares] said) that he
who shared my name [i.e., Empedocles] recommended to Pausanias in a Pythagorean
way to conceal his teachings within a mute thought organ. Pausanias must preserve
the distinction between divine and mortal knowledge and keep this information secret
because he is, essentially, an initiate in the mysteries that Empedocles offers. Mystery

70

See 2.3.1 below in this chapter.

167

religions, such as the Eleusinian rites, were well known for the secrecy surrounding their
initiation.71 The secrecy attached to the rite and the revelation served a number of related
purposes. First, it treated the divinity with the sort of respect it deserved:
,
(Strabo Geography 10.3.9) The mysterys secrecy about the rites increases
the reverence for the divine because it imitates the nature of the divine that flees from our
perception of it. It is not in the nature of men to understand the gods; secrecy, therefore,
duplicates the unknowable nature of the divine. There are, however, some things known
to gods that man can come to learn as well if they are properly trained and prepared.
Secrecy, therefore, also emphasizes the distinction between initiates and those who are
not part of the community, just as Empedocles hopes to differentiate here between those
who follow his precepts to the truth and those who do not.
The first five lines of fragment 3, therefore, disrupt the flow of Empedocles
argument; the returns to his primary point of these verses that he will show
Pausanias the way to the truth, but Pausanias must conceal it from others.72 Empedocles
uses this same construction in fragment 110 without an interruption between his two
points. In those verses, Empedocles first point (lines 1-5) is that concentration on his

71

This effort at secrecy was successful since we still do not fully understand what happened in the practice
of the mysteries. The artistic sources are more forthcoming; see Clinton 1992. See Simmel 1906 for the
classic study on the sociology of secrecy. That which Demeter revealed to the leaders of Eleusis, for
example, was not to be spoken of or violated: | [,]
, , [] [
,] | . (Homeric Hymn to Demeter 473-479)
Going to the kings who grant justice, (Demeter) showed the service of her rites and she taught the
mysteries to all, holy ones which are not able in any way to be violated nor inquired about nor spoken of
for a great reverence for the gods holds back the voice.
72

Denniston provides Plato Charmides 159d as an example. In his discussion of temperance ()

with Charmides, Socrates discusses a list of that are also ; when he returns to temperance, he
says: ; (Plato Charmides 159d). Compare also Gorgias 497a, 498e, 506e,
Euthydemus 301d, 302e, Meno 96c, Lysis 215b.

168

lessons will lead ultimately to the truth. But, for his second point (lines 6-10), if the
reader fails to concentrate ( (line 6) but if you reach out
for other things), then no lesson will stay.

Part 2: Empedocles Initiation

As a god, Empedocles consciously adopts an ambiguous style to mimic how the gods
disclose oracles and revelations in mystery religions, preserving the distinction between
human and divine knowledge. An individual becomes an initiate in order to gain access
to special knowledge that the gods share with mortals with the result that the members of
the community have knowledge that non-initiates do not. For mystery religions, this
special knowledge sets the initiates apart from other men in life and death.73 In the case of
Empedocles verses, he intends that his readers follow the same process as an initiate in
order to earn the privilege of knowing information that the gods know and of becoming
gods themselves.
Theon of Smyrna describes the three steps of an initiation in his comparison of
philosophy and initiation.

.

73

Isocrates describes the benefits of becoming an initiate in the Eleusinian mysteries:

, ,
, ,
, , , ,
,
(Isocrates Panegyric 28) When Demeter came to our land as she wandered when Kore
was snatched away, she looked kindly upon our ancestors through benefits which others are not able to
hear, only the initiates. She gave two gifts that are the greatest in the world grain, which is responsible for
our not living as beasts, and the rite, from which the participants have sweeter hopes concerning the end of
life and the whole of life Compare the various gold tablets found buried with initiates of other mystery
religions. A brief bibliography: Zuntz 1971, Cole 1980, Cole 1993, Graf 1991, 1993, Burkert 1998.

169

.
,
,
,
.
<>

Theon of Smyrna de utilitate mathematicae 14.18 ff. (ed. Hiller)

For someone might say that philosophy is the initiation of true mystery rite and the
transmission of the true mysteries. There are five parts to initiation. The first part is
the purification (), for there is not participation in the mysteries for all who
want it, but there are some whom it is declared beforehand will be shut out, e.g.,
those who do not have clean [i.e., of murder] hands and are foolish in their speech.
Moreover, it is necessary that those who are not shut out have some sort of
purification beforehand. After the purification, the second part is the transmission
() of the rite. The third is the so-called revelation ().

The purification of the initiate () was required because it was a common step
that preceded any interaction with the gods. The gods will not interact with anyone who
is unclean.74 The information regarding the nature of the rite () was reserved
for initiates and was, therefore, shrouded in secrecy, as was the final revelation
() that will come once the initiate is fully prepared.
Clement provides more information about these three steps, including a fuller
description of what the and the entail.

74

Purification is also one of the services that magicians offer. See 1.3.1 in chapter 2 above.

170


, .

,
, <> ,
.
Clement Stromateis 5.11.71
It is not unreasonable that purifications begin the mysteries among the Greeks, just
like the bath for the barbarians. After this are the little mysteries which provide a
foundation for the things taught and for the preparation of the things to come, and the
great mysteries are concerning the remainder, where there is no longer anything left
to learn, to look upon and consider nature and reality.

In this description of the Eleusinian rites, the little mysteries are the ; the
initiates are taught by those who have already witnessed the revelation what they need to
know to prepare themselves for the . They learn that life and death does not
necessarily function as they believed; they will need to look at the world in a new way
and this grooms them for the special divine knowledge that they are about to receive.
With the , the final revelation, the initiates of the mysteries will now live the
remainder of their days with this new knowledge and it will affect everything that they
experience in the world from that point forward.

171

2.1

THE JOURNEY OF INITIATION

Empedocles presents his text and the interpretation of text as a journey and a form of

initiation to understand how the world truly works and from there to manipulate it.75 The
anthropological analysis by van Gennep (1909) of the steps undertaken by initiates as
they transition from one status within a social group to another emphasizes the parallels
between initiation and interpretation of ambiguous text. First the initiates are separated
from the group of which they were members previously. In the phases of the mysteries
outlined above by Theon and Clement, this is the where the initiates step from
the mundane and the secular. Empedocles readers are told in fragment 2 that most
people believe that they know how the world works, but in fact they have experienced too
little to understand truly. But those who have stepped aside will have an opportunity to
get closer to the truth than normal mortals can: , , |
(DK 31B2.8-9) But you, since you have stepped aside,
will learn. Mortal cunning, at least, has gone no further. The initiate is literally taking
steps as they step over the threshold into a new phase of life and understanding. In the
period of liminality, when the initiates belong to neither group, they receive training for
their new roles in the community from the priests and others who have already been
initiated (). Empedocles readers must learn to reinterpret what their senses tell
them. During the liminal phase, the audience is aware of various interpretations, although
they are not ready to commit to one (fragments 2 and 3). Finally, the initiates are
reintegrated into the community in their new role once the meaning of the mysteries has
been revealed (). With the resolution of the ambiguous text comes the attainment
75

Kingsley 1995a (365-70) argues persuasively that Empedocles two poems together represent an
initiation. Compare Kahn 1974 (429 ff.).

172

of true knowledge; Empedocles readers will at that time understand how to manipulate
the universe and will be capable of the magical feats that Empedocles promises to teach
in fragment 111. All the initiates move from ignorance in their previous state to a new
level of awareness and knowledge.

2.1.1

Fragment 110

In fragment 110, Empedocles describes how he expects Pausanias to learn from his
verses: if you focus and continue to reflect, you will learn even more lessons, but if you
do not, you will not learn anything further. He draws an implicit parallel between
working out the truth and initiation into a mystery religion, using words that should
remind the careful reader of the steps an initiate undertakes. They can arrive at their
ultimate destination becoming a god and controlling the universe only by following
the pattern of initiation: , , and .

76 ,
,

, .
Hippolytus Refutatio 7.29 = DK 31B110.1-5
For if, having planted these things () under your close-packed diaphragm/mind,
you look upon them kindly with pure meditations, every last one of these things will
76

The text as printed here is Diels version with and an aorist subjunctive for a future more vivid
construction. Bollack (fr. 699) prints for (MS authority) and present tense , for a
simple conditional statement: if you do look upon, these things will be present. Wright (fr. 100) and
Inwood (fr. 16) also print for and future tense , for a simple conditional statement in
future time: if you will look upon, these things will be present. This verb is connected to the noun
, which is the third stage of the initiation.

173

be with you forever and you will acquire many other things from these, for these
things themselves will grow into each character, according to its own nature.

Readers must focus their attention on Empedocles verses () with pure meditations
( ). The concept of approaching with purity is parallel to the
of mystery religions. The knowledge that Empedocles shares is a mystery to
which only the purified ( ) can enter. If Kingsleys interpretation that
the would prepare the wider pool of potential initiates for the teaching, then
the emphasis would be to avoid eating souls, or daimones. The readers should already be
undergoing purification in their efforts to rid Strife from their own daimones.77
The addressed to Pausanias, therefore, would be the instruction preparing the
individual initiate for the revelation, that is, the . Not only is Empedocles
ambiguous in his style, but he also provided only a starting point. Empedocles has not
told Pausanias everything he needs to know, but he can show him how to get there.
Empedocles has telegraphed his own ambiguity, but he also describes himself in
fragment 112 wearing ribbons and garlands, that is, dressed as a successful initiate who
was now able to guide others on their own initiation.78 Learning is a journey that involves
multiple readings and careful examination of what the readers observe in the world. As
Empedocles says in fragment 25, for it is noble to say twice what one must (
, , ). Not only does Empedocles emphasize important
lessons through repetition, but he also does not provide all the details in one passage,
forcing the readers of these verses to collect lessons on their own:
| (Plutarch The Obsolence of Oracles
77

See part 2 of chapter 3.

78

See the beginning of part 2 in chapter 3.

174

418c = DK 31B24 by attaching some high points to others, not to finish one path of my
stories. If Pausanias focuses on the lessons in these verses, Empedocles promises that
Pausanias will learn more things.
As Pausanias reads the verses that explain how the world works, he is asked to fix
them under his heart where thinking occurs ( ) and
reflect upon () them. The verb can be used of gods or the dead
looking down on mortals; in other words, they exist on a level that gives them special
knowledge and power, and enables them to overlook in a protective sense.79 In fragment
110, however, the addressed is not a god; , when applied to a human, refers to
someone who has been initiated into the mysteries, for example, at Eleusis, and has
earned the right to look upon the revelation of the god.80 This privilege seems to put the
individual onto a higher plain of knowledge, thus making him better in that sphere of
influence than his fellow mortals.81 The readers must focus on the lessons and acquire
new ones as a consequence; then they will be on a higher plain and ready to receive more
fantastic powers, for example, the power to control weather and raise the dead (DK
31B111), powers that seem beyond the ability of mortals; the initiates, therefore, will
have received their revelation. In other words, the individual who has achieved this state
will appear god-like to his fellow man, as Empedocles claims for himself in fragment
112: , | (DK

79

Gods: Aeschylus Agamemnon 1270, 1579, Choephori 1, 583, 985, 1063, Eumenides 220, 224; Pindar
Olympian 7.11; Bacchylides Anth. Pal. 6.313.3; Callimachus in Delum 62. Dead: Aeschylus Choephori
489.
80

Plato Symposium 210a1, Phaedrus 250c4, Epistula VII 333e4; Philochorus 69-70 (Jacoby 3b, 328, F6970).
81

Cf. Plato Leges 951d where the inspector, having proven his worth, shall become a member of a board of
overseers of the laws ( ).

175

31B112.4-5) But I am an immortal god to you, no longer mortal I wander, honoured by

all. This final step of the revelation, the , does not occur within the poem; it is
the result of the poem. It is only through following Empedocles direction for
interpretation that the readers have any opportunity to understand the nature of the
universe. You will learn how to manipulate the world because you will have the
knowledge and purity required to become a god yourself.

2.2

THE IN EMPEDOCLES TEXT

Empedocles intends that the careful readers will follow the process of initiation with

the text and base their interpretation on the stages of initiation leading up to the
revelation. Demetrius points out that both initiation and allegory are connected to
darkness and night:
, . .
(Demetrius On Style 101) This is why mysteries are revealed in allegories, to inspire the
shuddering and awe associated with darkness and night. In fact allegory is not unlike
darkness and night. The mysteries are associated with darkness in two ways: 1) literally,
as mystery rites are performed at night or at least in darkness with the disclosure
scheduled for dawn or revealed in a flash of light, and 2) metaphorically, since the
initiates are in the darkness of ignorance in their previous state and then proceed to the
light of knowledge when they enter a new phase of life; so, too, with allegory. Before
resolution, the readers are uncertain of its meaning and are therefore in the dark; after a

176

solution is found, the readers enter into the light of knowledge.82 The process of
interpretation is the .
When an ambiguous text is first presented, there is confusion regarding its true
interpretation; this emphasizes the separation between those who can understand skillful
use of language and those who cannot. But Empedocles intends that his readers follow a
process of reading and interpretation that will lead to understanding. When Empedocles
identifies in fragment 17 the four roots, Love, and Strife, he pauses with an aside to
Pausanias: (line 26) but you, hear the
expedition, which is not deceptive, of my account. A , derived from , is a
dynamic process83; it is the steps that the readers must take in order to arrive at the
truth. On the surface, to say that the expedition is not deceptive seems to counter my
claim that Empedocles intends to deceive. Empedocles uses this process to ensure that
this potentially dangerous ability of manipulating the world does not come into the wrong
persons possession84; the dynamic process, therefore, that Empedocles verses require of
their readers is to interpret the ambiguous writing and fill in the incomplete accounts
Empedocles provides. Is it paradoxical to describe an ambiguous account as
? In the context of this statement, Empedocles pauses in the middle of a passage
that is vital to understanding (and from there, controlling) the universe. To the average
reader, the account will not be deceptive because Empedocles is relating a tale that is

82

Seaford 1981 (255).

83

Nnlist 2005, contrasting Empedocles dynamic metaphors with Parmenides (and others)
, examines the poetalogical images which Empedocles uses to describe his program.
84

Contra Nnlist 2005 who argues that Empedocles does not focus on the aesthetic beauty () of his
composition in stark contrast with his predecessors and contemporaries, because he fears the readers may
lose their self-control (81).

177

indistinguishable from reality; just as Odysseus tale to Penelope is plausible85, the

average readers will accept the account. But for those who have stepped aside to learn (as
Pausanias has) the process that Empedocles sets out for a successful journey, they will
understand that the account is deceptive, but the course they follow will enable them to
avoid deception.
Stanley Fishs Reader-Response theory, first presented in Surprised by Sin: the
Reader in Paradise Lost (1967), is similar to this process. Fish calls this effective
stylistics; the text is meant to produce an effect or an alteration in the reader. Fish argues
that Milton forced the readers of Paradise Lost to choose an interpretation by means of
various literary techniques and then led them to realize that this interpretation was
mistaken. The theory, therefore, emphasizes the response of the readers to the text as they
travel in a linear fashion through each word, sentence, paragraph, and chapter in turn,
constantly revising their interpretation as they continue. Reading is a chronological
process that all readers enter with a set of presumptions that influences their
interpretation, and each interpretive community86 will develop its own interpretation of
the text and follow the same path of discovery. Empedocles takes his readers on a similar
journey, from the darkness of ignorance to the light of revelation.

2.2.1

Fragment 6 An Example

Empedocles uses a riddle in fragment 6 to emphasize the value of the roots. The
context of this fragment suggests that Empedocles presents the roots before the cosmic
cycle as a prologue. Diels, for example, placed fragment 6 before fragment 17 in his
85

See 1.2.2 above in this chapter.

86

Stanley Fish 1980.

178

collection because implies that it was one of the first lessons. Tzetzes places the
fragment in the first book of the Physics (
(Tzetzes Exegesis in Homeri Iliadem 53.23) hear a little bit from the first
book of the Physics). The readers must solve the riddle, and the process of coming up
with a solution makes the lesson resonate more than simply being told what the roots are.
As Empedocles points out in fragment 114, persuasion can be difficult when people cling
to their preconceptions87, but in fragment 4, Empedocles suggests a path.

,
.
Clement Stromata 5.18.4 = DK 31B4
But for bad men it is especially important not to be convinced by the strong. But as
the convictions of our muse compel, understand when the discourse has been broken
up in your thinking organs.

The reference to our muse ( ) draws the reader to fragment 3.88 If

Empedocles does indeed establish his ambiguous style in that fragment, the readers will
know that they must approach the text carefully and interpret it. But Empedocles assures
success () as long as the text () is analyzed (broken up ) where
thinking occurs, , just as Empedocles prescribes in fragment 110
( ).

87

See 1.2.2 above.

88

See 1.2 above.

179

Most contexts present this fragment as an introduction to the roots, which all the
sources call (elements).89


, .
Sextus Empiricus Adversus Mathematicos 10.315 = DK 31B6
For hear in the first place the four roots of all things: shining Zeus, life-giving Hera,
Aidoneus and Nestis who wets the mortal spring with her tears.

The readers will learn about the four roots of all things ( ). Roots are
most obviously connected to plants; they make plants stable and are the source of a
plants growth. Hidden below the surface of the earth, roots stabilize the plant, making it
difficult to remove from the earth: |
(Iliad 12.133-134) (oaks) which endure the wind and
rain every day, fixed firmly with great and long roots. This image of the roots stability
can also be used metaphorically. In this passage, Homer compares two men standing their
ground in a gate to oaks. Roots are also a source of growth as plants grow up and out of
the ground away from the roots: (Homeric

89

Atius 1.3.20 (=Diels 286-7): ; Sextus Empiricus Adv.

math. 9.362: < >
Those connected to Empedocles [say that the elements of existing things] are earth, water, air and fire;
Stobaeus 1.10.11 (= DK 31A33b): all things derive from four
elements; Eusebius praep. evan. 14.14.6 (= Atius 1.3.20); Probus Verg. Buc. 11.4: omnem igitur hanc
rerum naturae formam tenui primum et refert in quattuor elementa concretam Therefore I have held
this entire shape of the nature of things foremost and it happens that it is formed from four elements;
Diogenes Laertius Vitae 8.76 (= DK 31A1): , , ,
, ; Hippolytus Ref. 7.29.4 (= DK 31A33c): ,
; Philoponus Physics CIAG 16.88.4:
Empedocles hypothesized four material causes and these are the
famous elements.

180

Hymn to Demeter 12) and from its root 100 blossoms grew (describing the narcissus
which led to Persephone's abduction).
Hesiod used to describe the earth and sea where they extend into the
underworld.


.
Hesiod Theogony 726-728
Around it (Tartaros) is a bronze fence and around this night is poured about the neck
in three rows; but over this the roots of the earth and barren sea grow

The image of the roots stretching into Tartaros is primarily one of stability, nevertheless
there are hints of growth. The roots grow down, but one expects this growth to work both
ways as plants also grow up from the roots.90 Hesiod expands the image of the roots of
earth and sea, but instead of , he calls them and .91


,
,
Hesiod Theogony 736-739

90

Aeschylus also uses the image of root both as source of growth and stability. Source of growth:
, , | , , | (Aeschylus
Seven Against Thebes 412-414) His root comes from the sown men whom Ares spared, Melanippus is
truly of this land (explaining Melanippus' worth to stand against Tydeus at the Proetid Gate). Stability:
| (Aeschylus Prometheus Bound 1046-47) Let the
hurricane wind shake the earth to its very roots.
91

Empedocles describes fragment 17 as the (line 15). See 1.3 in chapter 1.

181

Here are dark earth and misty Tartaros and barren sea and starry sky, the sources and
limits of all these are in a row, troublesome and dank, which even the gods detest.

These have a clear cosmogonic link as other early examples show.92 Not every
scholar believes can be linked to 93, but as a metaphor it is not impossible.
The two terms correspond in meaning and when Hesiod repeats lines 736-739 at lines
807-810, he goes on to describe the source and foundation of Tartaros as roots.94
Empedocles , therefore, act as a source for all things, but also provide stability.
In the context of Empedocles verses, these as yet unidentified sources provide stability
for the universe and provide its source of growth. Kingsley 1995a (6) argues further that
the roots are fundamental to Empedocles entire system.
Beyond other poets use of roots as an image of origins and stability, the readers
might be reminded of the , root cutters, a class of doctors who followed an
arcane set of rules in order to expose roots and use them as cures for particular ailments.95
Sophocles play , related to the story of Medea, illustrates how the profession
was well known to the Greeks.96 The required special knowledge such as that

92

Solmsen 1950 (242-3) supported this reading without evidence. Stokes 1962 (25-33) lays out evidence to
support the interpretation that the are cosmogonic in response to Kirk 1956-57 (10), e.g.,
| , |
. (Aeschylus Prometheus Bound 109-11) I hunted out and stored in fennel the stolen source of
fire which has been a teacher of all crafts to men and a great path (to an ends). Scholars continue to follow
the traditional interpretation: West 1966 (363), Longrigg 1976 (425), Miller 1977 (447), Johnson 1999
(25ff.).
93

Kirk 1956-57 (11), Stokes 1962 (15), Johnson 1999 (15).

94

| |
, | , . |
, | , | (Hesiod Theogony 807-814)
Here dark earth and misty Tartaros and barren sea and starry sky, the sources and limits of all these are in
a row, troublesome and dank, which even the gods detest. Here are the shining gates and the bronze
threshold, fixed unmovingly with long roots, self-growing.
95

Kingsley 1995a (299). For general information on the root-cutters, see Raven 1990 (169-172).

96

Pearson 1917 (2:172-177).

182

found in the manuals used by the ashipu97 (although there is no evidence that the rootcutters maintained a library until the centuries after Empedocles; they relied rather on the
apprentice model to pass on their lore) and they guarded this information jealously. The
profession maintained this secret collection of rules that served to maintain an aura of
mystery around them. They also recognized that the properties of some of these plants
were potent and possibly dangerous, and thus kept them from others.98 In a sense, the
readers are for the duration of the poem as they build up secret knowledge
through their initiation to understand the universe and then conceal it themselves from
others.
To solve the riddle successfully, the reader must correctly associate Nestis, Hera,
Zeus, and Aidoneus with one of air, earth, water or fire. The variety of possible solutions
proposed in the ancient world alone proves that Empedocles did not provide his own
answer.99 Everyone agrees that Nestis is linked to water because she wets the mortal
spring with her tears ( ).100 Life-giving Hera (
) probably refers to earth because the epithet describes the earth in
the Homeric Hymns and Hesiod.101 The adjective is also used of grain, which

97

See 1.2.1 in chapter 2.

98

Theophrastus, our best source for the precepts preserved by the root-cutters, criticizes some of their
practices, but he admits to the wisdom of others. Lloyd 1983 (122-126).
99

Kingsley 1995a (362).

100

Kingsley 1995a (ch. 22) explores full the identity of Nestis and her connection with Aidoneus.

101

, | , , |
(Homeric Hymn to Demeter 450-452) She came to Rharus, once the richest lifebearing land, but at that time it was no longer life-giving but it stood idle and wholly leafless.
(Homeric Hymn to Pythian Apollo (3) 341) And the life-giving earth was moved.
(Homeric Hymn to Earth Mother of All (30) 9) The life-giving earth
was heavy for them; | (Theogony 693-4) The life-giving
earth crashed all about as she burned.

183

is a product of the earths fertility.102 The Homeric allegorists support this

interpretation103; the Theophrastean school, on the other hand, says that Hera is air.104
is an anagram for , according to Plato Cratylus 404c, and since breath is
necessary for life, Empedocles may have transferred the epithet to air. The
Theophrastus interpretation has received more favour from modern scholars because
Diels argued in Doxographi Graeci (89 ff.) that this interpretation dates earlier than the
Homeric allegorists and should be, therefore, more reliable.105 It seems best, however, to
stick with the traditional interpretation of since Empedocles goal is to be
interpreted, not to confuse his audience.
The identification of Zeus and Aidoneus (Hades) is less straightforward. The
Theophrastus school links Aidoneus with earth because it is natural to connect the
underworld and the earth beneath our feet. If we choose the natural link for the adjective
, however, this interpretation is not viable. The Homeric allegorists say that
Aidoneus is air, using an etymology of Hades meaning the invisible one: as Hippolytus
argues, (Refutatio 7.29)
although we look at everything through him, we do not see him alone. Another
interpretation of Aidoneus as air emphasizes the darkness of Hades and how it lacks its
own light, a property of air (Stobaeus Eclogae 1.10.11b = 31A33b DK). This would leave
Zeus to be associated with fire.

102

[ ] (Homeric Hymn to Demeter (2) 469) Increase for men

straightaway the life-giving grain (or grain that is life-giving for men).
103

Stobaeus (1.10.11b (= DK 31A33b)), Diogenes Laertius (Vitae 8.76 (= DK 31A1)), Hippolytus

(Refutatio 7.29.4 (= DK 31A33c), [Heraclitus] (Allegory 24, 41).
104

Atius (1.3.20 (= DG 286-287)), Eusebius (praep. evan. 14.4.6).

105

Bignone 1963 (542-44), Millerd 1908 (30-32), Guthrie 1965 (144-46), Bollack 1969 (3:170-71), Wright
1981 (165), McKirahan 1994 (259).

184

This interpretation by the Homeric allegorists is unacceptable as well. Kingsley has

revived a 19th century interpretation106 of the riddle that assigns fire to Aidoneus and air to
Zeus by addressing the charges concerning the use of and in Empedocles.107
Aither was used of atmospheric air at the time Empedocles was writing while aer was
heavy mist. Since Zeus is a sky god, it is natural to associate him with atmospheric air.108
As far as the connection between Aidoneus/Hades and fire, the Sicilians were quite aware
of the presence of fire under the earth owing to the prevalence of hot springs and other
volcanic activity in the area. Therefore, it seems best to link Nestis with water, Hera with
earth, Zeus with air, and Aidoneus with fire. By working through such a riddle about
roots, the readers have become root-cutters with special knowledge.

2.3

THE REST OF THE JOURNEY THE

Reading the text is only the beginning of the initiates journey. It is the responsibility

of each reader to draw the proper conclusions and hence learn further lessons. The
readers must take what they have learned and observe the world through their senses.
Empedocles has not taught everything required to understand the universe, only the
basics ( - DK 31B110.4 You will acquire many other
things from these). Knowledge is physical growth:
. (Aristotle de anima 427a22ff. = DK 31B106) For mens cunning increases
in relation to what is present. When the initiates gain confirmation about the lessons
they have learned and they draw further conclusions, the lessons take root and bloom in
106

Knatz 1891, Thiele 1897, Burnet 1930 (229n.3).

107

See note 31 in chapter 1.

108

Kingsley 1995c (26-9); 1995a (part 1).

185

the initiate as B17.14 confirms: for learning will increase

your mind. Once the readers have internalized these lessons and remain attuned with
them, they will be able to take on more lessons and receive the ultimate revelation. As
fragment 110 continues, Empedocles reminds the readers of the consequences of not
focusing on these lessons:
,
,


.
Hippolytus Refutatio 7.29 = DK 31B110.6-10
If, on the other hand, you will reach for different things, as many thousands of
terrible things come among men which blunt their meditations, straightway the
former will leave you as time comes around, desiring to reach their own dear kind;
for know that all things have thought and a portion of mind.

The lessons that are learned must be concentrated upon in the real world through
observation. The initiates no longer look at the world in the same way, and further
lessons will come as they increase in purity and wisdom.109 If they fail to focus, the
lessons will leave of their own accord and the initiates will not escape the mortal coil of
transmigration.

109

Compare Clement Stromata 5.11.71 at the beginning of part 2.

186

2.3.1

Sensation

Empedocles describes sensation as a direct physical process. Each object gives off
effluences, something that flows off of something else ( ,
(Plutarch Natural Phenomena 916d = DK 31B89) All things, as many as have
come into being, have effluences) that come into contact with certain passages/ pores
() that every object contains (
(Theophrastus de sensu 7 =
DK 31A86) Empedocles says the same thing concerning all (the senses) and claims that
perception occurs by (things) fitting into the pores of each (sense)).110 The and
react only if there is symmetry between them. Sounds, for example, cannot be
picked up by the eyes; the effluences that sound creates do not fit into the pores of the
eye.
,
, ,

.
Theophrastus de sensu 7 = DK 31A86
And it is for this reason that (the senses) are not able to perceive the (effluences) of
one another; because some pores happen to be wider and others more narrow with
respect to the object perceived, the result is that the things that do not touch pass
through and others are not able to enter at all.

If the pore is too large for the effluence with the result that the effluences pass through
the pore without contact, there will be no perception. If the effluences are too large for
110

This connection between effluences and pores accounts not only for sensation but also for magnetism
(DK 31A89), reflections in mirrors (DK 31A88), and physical growth (DK 31B37).

187

the pore with the result that they cannot even enter, there will be no perception at that
time either. Perception is dependent upon the proper fit between and
, (Aristotle de
generatione et corruptione 324b32 ff = 31A87a) he says that only things whose pores
are symmetrical mix. Perception, therefore, occurs by means of contact, on the one
hand, but also by means of like things. As Empedocles says,
, ,
, ,
, .
Aristotle de anima 404b8 = DK 31B109
For we see earth by means of earth, water by water, divine air by air, destructive fire
by fire, love by love and strife by hateful strife.

The effluence will be perceived only if the pores that receive it contain the same roots
that the effluence is made up of. Each root can perceive only its like.
Empedocles description of the eye illustrates the importance of physical contact for
perception as well as the role each root plays in the process.

, ,
,
,
, ,

188

 <> ,111
<>
,
, .

10

Aristotle de sensu 437b23 = DK 31B84

As when someone has planned a journey through the winter night and prepared a
lamp, with the gleam of fire blazing forth, by fastening linen grates against all sorts
of winds to scatter the wind of the blowing breezes, the light leapt forth, as much as
was finer, and shone across the threshold with tireless beams; in just the same way
primal fire at that time conceals itself112 with respect to the pupil in the eye, enclosed
in the membranes and fine linens. And [the linens] covered the depth of the
surrounding water, and they sent forth the fire, as much as was finer.

The description of the eye comes in the second part of the fragment. All four roots are
present: fire is the most important part, emphasized by its prominent position; water
surrounds the pupil; and, the membranes that protect the fire from the water are
comprised of earth and air. I argue that these membranes () are made of earth and
air because linen is a material with a loose weave. There is no mention of pores or
passages per se, but the description of how the eye works implies their existence.
Aristotle quotes this passage to show the inconsistency of Empedocles description of
how the eye operates, that is, sometimes we see on account of effluences (
) and at others because light goes out from the eye
( ). The contrast Empedocles makes in this passage, however, is the

111

DK include after line 8 a line of text, which Blass included from a reading in P of line 5 (<>
which are pierced right through with marvelous funnels). I have excluded it
on account of the syntax of the relative pronoun that Bollack 1969 (3:326-7) and Wright 1981 (241) point
out.
112

See Wright 1981 (240-41).

189

function of the screen on the lantern to protect the flame from breezes and the membranes
that shield the fire in the eye from the surrounding water.113 Empedocles does not claim
that we see on account of beams of light coming from our eyes, despite the phrase
. Rather, as Long argues, the light penetrates the other roots, which permits the
effluences to be received on the eye and then perceived by all the roots. Fire is vital to
vision because it is the proportion of internal light in the eye and external light that
dictates what is seen.114
Since sense perception is purely a physical process, it faces significant drawbacks.
The largest one is the constant barrage of effluences striking the pores.115

, .
Sextus Empiricus Adversus Mathematicos 7.122-4 = DK 31B2.1-2
For the powers spread throughout the limbs are narrow and many worthless things
burst in which dull their concerns.

These pores, called , passages, in this fragment, are everywhere in the body. It is
by these means that sensory information is received; but the passages are narrow and can
process only so much information at one time. Owing to the abundance of effluences, it is
difficult for the passages to collect the data proper to it. This keeps the average person
from concentrating on what is important, thus leading to a misinterpretation of the

113

It is possible that Empedocles was familiar with the structure of the eye owing to dissection. See Wright
1981 (241-42).
114

Long 1966 (262-64).

115

See 1.3 in this chapter and 2.2.1 in chapter 1.

190

information received. The senses, however, are reliable as long as one uses each sense as
it was designed, as Empedocles points out in fragment 3.116
, ,

,
, ,
, .
Sextus Empiricus Adversus Mathematicos 7.125 = DK 31B3.9-13
But come, consider by every passage how each thing is clear, not holding any vision
as more reliable than what you hear, nor the echoes of hearing than the piercings of
the tongue, and do not in any way curb the reliability of the other limbs by which
there is a passage for understanding, but understand each thing in the way it is clear.

Each sense receives dependable information, but to interpret that data correctly and not
rely on it to the exclusion of other senses is vital. A stick in the water illustrates what
Empedocles means. To look at the stick, it appears bent; but when you explore further
with touch, it becomes clear that it is straighter, and smaller, than it looks. In this case,
information from touch is more reliable and should take precedence over sight.

2.3.2

Thinking

The five senses are still insufficient. One must also reflect upon what one perceives in
order to come to the correct conclusions. Ensemble a of the Strasbourg Papyrus reinforces
this idea.

116

See 1.3 above.

191

 [][]
[] ..
[] []
.
[]
[].
Strasbourg Papyrus a(ii)21-24, a(ii)29-30
so that not the ears alonehearing me about true things I will show you as
many things with a larger body first the coming together and the unfolding From
these stories carry proofs that are not false to your mind; for you will see the coming
together and unfolding of offspring.

Empedocles emphasizes hearing at first, because reading was generally performative. The
readers, therefore, hear Empedocles as he tells them how the world works in his verses.
Next the readers will see things through their own eyes as they observe the world around
them. Finally the readers will present all the collected evidence to the mind (). As
Empedocles urges his readers in the first five lines of fragment 110, if they focus on the
lessons they learn, the lessons will remain with the readers forever and they will learn
more. With the greater knowledge that sets Empedocles readers apart from ,
they must think in addition to perceive their way to the next level.
Thinking is as much a physical process as sensation is.
.
, ,
.
, ,

192

 |
[B 107].
<117>
.
Theophrastus de sensibus 9-10 = DK 31A86
He speaks in this same way about thought and ignorance. For thinking is by means of
like things and ignorance by unlike things, as though thought is the same as or similar
to perception. For, having enumerated how we recognize each thing by each [a
reference to B109], he adds at the end that from these things all things have been
fitted together and by means of these things they think and take delight and feel
pain. Wherefore thinking is especially by means of blood; for in this especially it is
accomplished where the elements of the parts are equal.

Since thinking is similar to sense perception, thoughts must have a physical nature just as
effluences are physical in order to be perceived by the sense organs. The organ for
thinking is blood as Theophrastus states. An extant fragment confirms this claim:
,

.
Stobaeus Eclogues 1.49.53 = DK 31B105
[the heart] nourished in seas of blood that leaps back and forth; in this place
especially it is called thought by men, for mens thought is the blood around the
heart.

The noun with is not specified; most editors understand since this
organ is formed first in the embryo: Empedocles, quem in hoc Aristoteles secutus est,
ante omnia cor iudicavit increscere, quod hominis vitam maxime contineat. (Censorinus
117

A. Frenkian proposed this emendation in Theophrast de sensu Kap. 10 Philologus 107 (1963) 313.

193

6.1 = DK 31A84) Empedocles, whom Aristotle followed in this, believed that the heart,
which especially contains the life of man, grew before all things.
Theophrastus emphasizes the role of like things in thinking and knowledge. Since one
finds all four roots in the organs of perception as Empedocles description of the eye
illustrates, one would therefore expect that all four roots are in blood in order to perceive
the thought. Empedocles words corroborate this. On the one hand, blood possesses the
most even mix of the roots.

,
,

.
Simplicius Physics CIAG 9.32.6-10 = DK 31B98
And earth happened to meet with these most equally, Hephaistos and rain and allgleaming aither, anchored in the perfect harbours of Kypris, whether a little more or
less among the more. From these blood came into being and other forms of flesh.118

Blood also goes everywhere in the body, including the surface of the skin where the
senses pick up effluences ( |
(DK 31B100.1-2) they all have channels of flesh, which the blood leaves, stretched over
the surface of the body). This allows blood to pick up thoughts everywhere and bring
them back to the heart.
Although Empedocles does not explicitly link information derived from the senses
and from thought119, Empedocles examples of concepts that cannot be understood by
118

Compare Theophrastus de sensibus 10

194

sensation alone suggest that thinking was required to make up for situations where the
senses provide no or only partial information, or to determine which senses information
should take precedence. Not only can thinking compensate for the potential shortcomings
of senses, but it can also help the readers of Empedocles verses who face too short a
lifetime to perceive everything (fragment 2). By thinking about the data with guidance
from one who knows, that is, Empedocles, the reader will be able to overcome the
deficiency of a short lifespan and link together the seemingly incongruent information
from the senses. The totality of being is too vast for an individual to grasp. Yet
Empedocles can show the readers how the universe works if they focus on the lessons he
provides. The mind overarches the other senses.
At the same time, thought is required to perceive things that the senses cannot.

,
.
Clement Stromata 5.81 = DK 31B133
It is not possible to approach [the divine] with the reach of our eyes nor to take it up
in our hands, by means of which the greatest road to persuasion for men leads to the
mind.

Although the senses like sight and touch are the most persuasive for men, they are not
capable of perceiving everything. Clement cites this passage as evidence, for example,
that the divine is invisible. The only way that insensible things can be understood is
through the mind. In fragment 17, for example, Empedocles emphasizes that the only
way the readers can perceive Love is by focusing their thoughts on her.
119

Solmsen 1961 (157).

195

 ,
,
,


.
Simplicius Physics CIAG 9.158.20-25 = DK 31B17.21-26
But you, gaze on her (Love) with your understanding and do not sit stunned with
eyes. For she is deemed even by mortals to be inborn in [their] joints and by her they
think loving thoughts and accomplish works of unity calling her by the names Joy
and Aphrodite. No mortal man has perceived her whirling among them. But you
(contrary to ), hear the true expedition of my account.

An individual may not be able to perceive such things with their senses, but they are able
to perceive the effects that they produce. Love may not be visible, but she affects men.
Drawing conclusions from the effect will lead to an understanding of Love and her rle in
the cosmic cycle. By paying attention to Empedocles account and applying their mind at
the same time, the reader has an opportunity to understand Love. It is also only through
the mind, for example, that an individual can understand how birth and death operate.
People who rely primarily on their senses and believe, for example, that things are utterly
destroyed at death, are described as (fools DK 31B11) because, in fact, if
everything were completely destroyed nothing new could come into being. Death is
simply dissolution into the roots, or component parts, just as birth is the mixture of the
roots (DK 31B8). People, on the other hand, who accept as true that death is not utter
annihilation, are (wise in their wits DK 31B15).

196

Empedocles readers, therefore, must take the appropriate information from the
various sensations of the sensible world and interpret it correctly. In this way they will
look beyond the surface impressions that appear to contradict one another to the
underlying nature of the world that is actually consistent. Once the readers come to
understand all things in the universe ( ) according to Empedocles lessons, they
will know more than the others who brag that they themselves understand (fragment 2).
In concert with the purification from following the precepts in and becoming
wise from understanding how the world really works, the readers can become gods like
Empedocles and manipulate the world.

197

Chapter 5 The Revelation

If Pausanias and others hope to become initiated in the techniques of controlling the
world, they must first read Empedocles verses and resolve his ambiguous writing. It will
soon become apparent to them that the key to controlling the universe as a god is to
understand how it functions. It is not Empedocles intention to contribute to the open
discussion about how the world works (chapter 1) or to act as an intermediary between
the gods and men (chapter 2), but to use language and literary techniques to conceal his
lessons from everyone except those who are sufficiently wise and pure to become gods
and thence to manipulate the world (chapters 3 and 4). Empedocles expects the readers
will deduce how the world functions from these verses and learn further lessons from
their continued observations. Love and Strife manipulate the parts of the roots in a neverending cycle from Many to created world to One to created world and back to Many; then
the cycle continues. If the readers, therefore, seek to control the world as gods, they must
act like the immortal gods Love and Strife. I will show below how Love and Strife are
constrained by the oaths they take to function within this cosmic cycle and by the
principle of like to like attraction.
It becomes clear as one reads the extant verses of Empedocles that the cosmic cycle
as a whole and the individual players in it are emphasized various phases of the
universe repeatedly come into being and are destroyed. Empedocles emphasizes this
aspect when he describes the cosmic cycle, returning repeatedly to the motif and
maintaining its basic structure each time mixture into One followed by separation into

198

Many.1 This unification and division, therefore, is the most important lesson to be learned
from the cosmic cycle. Empedocles introduces the four roots fire, water, air, and earth
in a riddle at the beginning of Physics in fragment 6. Not only does this riddle reveal their
role as immortal gods in his interpretation of the world2, but it also emphasizes
Empedocles technique of ambiguity to challenge his readers to uncover the true nature
of the roots.3 And although Empedocles does not solve for the reader the riddle in his
verses, the identity of the roots is made clear in later fragments. The other eternal
components and immortal gods in Empedocles system are Love and Strife. Their
role, as Empedocles emphasizes through the literary technique of repetition, is to
combine and separate the roots into the various components of the universe.4 Each time
that Empedocles reveals that Love unites the roots into One and Strife separates them into
Many, the readers pass through the cycle themselves. And over many verses the readers
experience the cycle many times, and the nature of the cycle becomes more clear with
each reading.

Part 1: The Nature of the Cosmic Cycle

Although the very nature of a recurring cycle invalidates the question of a starting
point, in the fragments that outline the general cycle Empedocles himself always begins
with the Many as it unites into One: the roots combine into One and then they separate
into Many. Although it is possible to draw together evidence that established how

See 1.3 in chapter 1 with fragment 17, but see below also.

See 1.1 in chapter 3.

See 2.2.1 in chapter 4.

Graham 1988; Michelini 1993, Trpanier 2003, Primavesi 2005. See 1.1 below.

199

Empedocles envisioned the world, this evidence is either widespread throughout the
verses or missing altogether and is postulated in the assumption that the symmetry of the
cycle means that opposite phases have opposite processes. Empedocles does not appear
to have packaged his theories neatly for the readers, thus confirming my argument in
chapter 1 about Empedocles self-presentation.
During the phase of Many which I describe more fully below in 2.3.2, Strife is at the
peak of its influence and spread throughout the roots, which are arranged in concentric
spheres with earth at the core, then water, air, and finally fire as the lightest of the roots,
and Love is confined to the centre.5
Fragment 35 describes the phase when Love begins to manipulate the roots again, but
Strife has not completely left.
,
, ,

, ,
,
, .

,

,
.

See 1.1.2 in chapter 3.

200

 ,

, ,
.
,
, .
Simplicius De Caelo CIAG 7.529.1-15 = DK 31B35
But I will go back to the passage of songs that I told before, channeling that account
to another. When Strife arrived at the lowest depth of the eddy and Love gets to the
middle of the whirl, in this place all these things come to be one alone, not suddenly,
but coming together willingly, one from one direction and another from another. As
they were being mixed, ten thousand tribes of mortals things poured forth, but many
stood unmixed alternating with mixed things, as many as Strife, still above, held
back. For it has not wholly stood out from these at the edges of the circle, but some
of its limbs remain inside and some have gone out. And as far as it (Strife) moved
out, so far did the immortal and gentle stream of blameless Love come forward. And
straightaway things grew mortal that had learned before to be immortal and things
were mixed which were unmixed before, changing paths. As they were mixed, ten
thousand tribes of mortal things, fitted together in all sorts of forms, a wonder to
behold.

Loves power is on the increase while Strifes is waning; Strife, nevertheless, does not
retreat immediately, but continues to influence the roots. This contact leads to the making
of mortal things. At the same time, Strifes influence, especially while it is greater closer
to the Many, will continue to allow unlike things to be separate as line 8 reveals:
many stood unmixed alternating with mixed
things.

201

There is little scholarly consensus on what the physical world looked like at this time
while the roots were in the process of coming together into One from Many since
Empedocles words on the beginning of this stage have not survived6, if they even existed
in the first place. Aristotle complains that Empedocles did not describe a cosmogony in
the period following the Many because he could not.
.


,
.
.
Aristotle de caelo 301a14-20 = DK 31A42a
It is not sensible to produce creation from things that are separate and in motion. It is
for this reason that Empedocles omits creation in the period of Love. For he was not
able to form the sky, fashioning it on the one hand from separated things and on the
other producing a compound through Love. The (present) world has been formed
from separated elements, with the result that it [the world] had to come into being
from one combined thing.

I would argue that simply because Empedocles did not describe such a cosmogony does
not mean that he could not. It is not his goal to give a clear description of the universe as
Aristotle expects him to. A world is created, nevertheless, and is soon populated with a
variety of creatures owing to the interaction of root parts as Love and Strife compete.

Although Empedocles does not describe a cosmogony here (if Aristotles testimony in de caelo 301a1420 is correct), the ordering of the Many, as outlined in 2.3.2 below, would be a perfect springboard for the
world since earth is likely at the centre of the concentric spheres, followed by water, air, and fire.

202

Although a model with only one created world was popular in the 1960s and 1970s7,
Empedocles use of in fragment 17 supports the model with two worlds.

, .
,
,
.
Simplicius Physics CIAG 9.158.1-5 = DK 31B17.1-5
I will say two-fold things: for at one time, [they] grew to be One alone from Many
and at another time, moreover, they grew apart to be Many from One. Double is the
birth of mortal things and double their passing away, for on the one hand the coming
together of all both creates and destroys the one and on the other, the other, having
been nurtured, flies off when [all] separate again.

The word can either be a noun meaning doubt or an adjective from - -

double. From the context, is not a noun, for birth is not doubt, nor is destruction.8

Despite the variations in their models, each scholar argues that there is only one zoogony and one
cosmogony. Bollack 1965 (1:95-122) argued that since the powers of Love and Strife are inherently
opposite, it is impossible that each should create a world. Only Love can create a world (after the Many)
and her ultimate goal is to return the elements to the One. Solmsen 1965 claimed that our world is created
in two stages: Strife creates the physical frame of the universe (Earth proper) while Love is responsible for
its zoogony. Hlscher 1965 posited that our world is created after the destruction of the sphere and never
returns to that state. The struggle between Love and Strife manifests itself in the lifecycle of animals. van
der Ben 1984 follows Hlscher closely, adding that it is nonsense that Love would desire to return to the
One since this would destroy her handiwork. Barnes 1979, Mansfeld 1972, Kirk, Raven, and Schofield
1982, and Brown 1984 all agree with this linear cycle of creation.
8

Bollack 1969 (3:52) argues that the two of line 3 do not refer to a double creation and destruction,
but each birth and death are ambivalent. By being born, both Many (i.e., anything that is not One) and a
mortal being are created; by dying there is death of the mortal and death of the Many through the return to
the unity of the Sphere. On this see also Mansfeld 1972. Bollack also prints another text,
, thus eliminating the reference to birth () and replacing it with a mere decline of
mortal things. Long 1974 (402 ff.) emphasizes the ambiguous nature of birth and death as well. The
in question, according to Long, are not the creatures formed by Love (men, trees, races of beasts and
various monsters), but solely the roots as well as Love and Strife as described in lines 18-20. He argues that
the nature of the double birth and double death of is simply the growth () of One from
Many and the coming to be () of Many from One. Each birth is at the same time death: Many
comes into being and the One dies and when the One is born, the Many is destroyed. With the cycle

203

 is an adjective, therefore, but the use of the singular is rare considering the
meaning9; before this passage it does not occur and there are few extant examples
afterward.10 Nevertheless, this is the best way of reading the text since two creations of
mortal things align with the symmetrical antithesis of unification and separation.11
The recent publication of the Strasbourg papyrus confirms the double creation model.
There is a passage in ensemble a that follows the pattern of fragment 21 where a creation
of mortal things follows immediately on a description of the One (see below), but it
mentions Strife as opposed to Love immediately before the creation of mortal things.
[ ] ,
[ ]
[ () () ]
[ ] ,
[] [ ] [ ]
[] [] [ .]12
Strasbourg Papyrus a(i)6 a(ii)2 (Martin and Primavesi)
alternating between One and Many ceaselessly, Long describes this as a mortal (his italics) condition (402)
since birth and death are in reality mixture and separation.
9

Hlscher 1965 (202 ff.), therefore, sees in Empedocles only the two processes of coming together and
growing apart. In creating mortal things, the sphere is destroyed; the destruction of mortal things through
separation will lead to reconstitution of the Sphere. He does not see that these processes are merely the
context for birth and death of mortal things.
10

Simias Grammaticus Epigrammata 6.113: |

As the second horn of a wild thick-haired bounding goat (ibex), I was
formerly garlanded with green leaves. Callimachus Epigrammata 7.89: ,
| , | . Dear sir, two marriages call
me one bride is equal to me in wealth and birth, the other surpasses me; Moschus Europa 48-9:
| . They stood aloft
upon the brows of the double strand and in a crowd the men watch the sea-traveling bull. Second century
A.D. grammarian Aelius Herodianus links with (Partitiones 24.14, 216.8) and to
consider in two ways ( vol. 3.2, 280.20).
11

Graham 1988 (306). See 1.1.1 below.

12

These verses are supplemented on the basis of parallels in fragment 21.

204

But under Love we come together into a single ordered whole, whereas under Strife,
in turn it (i.e., ) grew apart, to become Many out of One, out of which (i.e.,
) come all beings that were and that are and that will be hereafter: trees sprang
forth and men and women, and beasts and birds and fishes nurtured in water, and also
long-lived gods, preeminent in their honours.

Although the wording of the second line is only postulated, it seems certain that it refers
to Strife owing to the context of the line, that is, something is from the One, a phrase
common to Empedocles to describe the formation of Many, for example,
(DK 31B17.2). If the placement of Love is fragment 21 is
significant, then the same interpretation must be applied here, that is, that there are two
created worlds, one under the influence of Love and another under Strife after the One
begins to dissipate (Martin and Primavesi 1999, 180-182). This is supported, moreover,
by one so-called context for fragment 21, although I argue below that Aristotle may be
quoting from the lines that the papyrus adds to fragment 17.
,

.
,
,
,

Aristotle Metaphysics 1000a27ff.
For he (Empedocles) establishes strife as a principle cause of destruction, but it
seems, nevertheless, to produce this (i.e., everything) outside of the One; for all other
things except God comes from this: at any rate he says: all things are from these, as
many as were, as many as are and as many as will be hereafter. Trees sprout up and

205

men and women and beasts and birds and water-nourished fish and the long-lived
gods.

It has been assumed that Aristotle here was quoting part of fragment 21 and
misunderstood Empedocles intent and, in addition, misquoted the first line (Cherniss
1935, 231n62). Some editors, for example, Inwood, replaced the line transmitted in the
manuscripts with the line quoted by Aristotle. The discovery of this papyrus, however,
shows that Aristotle did not twist Empedocles' words to fit his own interpretation a(i)8
and the parallel with Aristotle shows that this excerpt from ensemble a may have been the
passage Aristotle quoted.13
The mixing continues until Love has complete influence as she permeates the roots
and Strife is spread out over the edge of the circumference, at the lowest depth of the
eddy. She has arranged the root parts into the One, which I describe more fully in
2.2.214, a sphere that is whole and perfect in its harmony.
Once Strife begins to exert influence again, he initiates motion in the Sphere (
(DK 31B31) for one after another all the limbs of the
god were shaken) at a time predicted by an oath (fragment 30).15 As Strifes influence
over the roots increases, another world is created.
,
, ,
,

13

It is ironic that Aristotle would quote a passage that supports what he says cannot happen in de caelo
301a14-20.
14

See also 1.2.2 in chapter 3.

15

I discuss the role of the oath in 1.2 and the question of rest and motion during the One in 2.2.2.

206

 ,
, .
Atius 2.6.3 (Dox 334) = DK 31A49b
Empedocles says that aither was separated first, then fire and then earth from which
water sprang forth as it was squeezed out by the force of the rotation. From water,
air16 was vapourized and the sky came into being from the aither, the sun from fire
and the things about the earth were condensed from the others.

The emphasis in this passage is on the separation () of the roots as they come
together into masses of like root parts. It is the motion that Strife introduces and is
described by Atius as rotation () that brings about this separation. It is more
likely that the first motion is shaking (compare fragment 30 above) and that rotation
begins with the creation of the sun.17 It is also evident from this passage that this
centrifugal force separates the lightest roots, aither and fire, first while earth and water
remain in the middle. Plants and animals are also created in this phase of the cycle.
,
.
,
,

10

,
.
Simplicius Physics CIAG 9.159.19-24 = DK 31B21.7-12
In Wrath all things are separate and apart, and they come together in Love and desire
one another. From these are all things as many as were, as many as are and will be,
16

See note 31 in chapter 1 for the distinction between aer and aither.

17

Kingsley 1994a.

207

trees come forth and men and women and beasts and birds and water-nurtured fish
and long-lived gods, preeminent in their honours.

As I argue above, the mention of the One immediately before this creation suggests that
this world is fashioned at that time. The cycle continues until Strifes control over the
roots is complete and the Many is formed; the cycle begins again.

1.1

REPETITION IN THE CYCLE

Empedocles uses repetition within fragment 17 and among various other points in the

poem to emphasize for the readers the importance of the cosmic cycle for his doctrine. As
Graham 1988 first noted, the cyclic repetition of Empedocles verses and words that
mimic the nature of Empedocles cosmological cycle is another representation of this
journey that the readers take. Empedocles expects that the readers will have to go over his
verses many times in order to resolve ambiguities and he refuses to give a full and
complete lesson at any one moment. He acquaints the reader with the cycle gradually in
order to aid with interpretation, thus following his own precept (fragment 110) discussed
in chapter 4 that the lesson should grow within the reader. He declares, moreover, his
intent to move the reader in a circular fashion throughout the poem:
| (DK 31B24) linking different high
points to others with the result that I don't complete one path of my story. Repetition
emphasizes important points and when used on a larger scale, that is, over very many
lines, brings the reader back to the original point to emphasize it anew. As Empedocles
says, it is good to repeat a point more than once: , ,
(DK 31B25) For it is a good thing to say twice what one must.

208

1.1.1

Fragment 17

Fragment 17, now continued by ensemble a of the Strasbourg Papyrus, is the most
explicit description of the cosmic cycle.18

, .
,
,
.
Simplicius Physics CIAG 9.158.1-5 = DK 31B17.1-5
I will say two-fold things: for at one time, [they] grew to be One alone from Many
and at another time, moreover, they grew apart to be Many from One. Double is the
birth of mortal things and double their passing away, for on the one hand the coming
together of all both creates and destroys the one and on the other, the other, having
been nurtured, flies off when [all] separate again.

Beginning with Many, the cycle moves to One, and then the cycle goes from One to
Many. Between Many and One, there are mortal creatures and between One and Many
there are other mortal creatures the birth and destruction of mortal creatures is double.
The symmetry of the cycle as initially established requires a matching balance in the
mortal things.
The unification and separation of the roots is expressed twice in the first five lines. In
line 1 they grow together to be One ( ); Empedocles matches this in
line 2 with their separation: .19 The use of in line 2 also
emphasizes that this separation from One to Many has happened before. After a brief
18

See also 1.3 in chapter 1.

19

These lines are repeated in lines 16-17.

209

interlude to include the creation and destruction of mortal things in line 3, Empedocles
returns to the unification of the roots into One in line 4 ( ) and their
separation into Many in line 5 ( (a genitive absolute with a substantive such
as or understood)). The variations in how Empedocles expresses it each
time may indicate further that the created worlds are different each time.20 As fragment 17
continues, the cycle repeats a number of times in a variety of ways. This emphasizes that
the cycle happens over and over.
,
,
.
< >
,

Simplicius Physics CIAG 9.158.6-10 = DK 31B17.6-11
And these things never cease from constantly alternating, at one time, all things
coming together into One through Love and at another each thing being carried apart
by the enmity of Strife. In this way, insofar as they have learned to become One from
Many and they end up as Many when the One is divided again, in this respect they
come into being and there is no secure life for them.

Although Empedocles varies the expressions of unification and separation, the pattern of
unification of the roots into One, presumably from a state of Many, followed by their
separation into Many remains consistent. Empedocles emphasizes by means of verbs the
process of how Love and Strife influence the roots rather than the states of One and
20

Owing to the nature of Loves influence in the One and the nature of the roots in the Many, the One and
the Many will always take the same form. The various root parts, however, will be in different positions.

210

Many. The continuation of One to Many to One to Many also emphasizes the variable
consistency Empedocles points out in lines 12-13:
, | . But insofar as they never stop
changing constantly, in this respect they are always unchanged in a cycle.
After Empedocles tells the readers again in lines 16 and 17 that the roots combine
into One and separate into Many, he goes on to describe the nature of the roots, Love, and
Strife. But the cycle is not far from Empedocles mind because, with the lines that the
Strasbourg Papyrus now provide, the motifs of unification and separation continue.
[ ] ,
[ ]
Strasbourg Papyrus a(i)6-a(i)8 (Martin and Primavesi)
But under Love we come together into a single ordered whole, whereas under Strife,
in turn it (i.e., ) grew apart, to become Many out of One

The papyrus describes the creation of the world and animals as the roots interact after the
formation of the Many (a(i)8 and following) until they finally come together to form the
One (a(ii)15-a(ii)20). Empedocles promises to match what is essentially an expansion of
the motif of the roots eventually combining into One with an account of their separation
into Many through another created world: [] [] |
[] [. (Strasbourg Papyrus a(ii) 24-5) First the
coming together and the unfoldingand as many as now still remain of this

211

1.1.2

Fragment 26

Fragment 26 focuses on the roots, but the emphasis lies more within the cosmological
cycle as a whole rather than in the created worlds as was seen in fragment 17 and
ensemble a.
,
.
,
()
,

,
.

,

10

,
.
Simplicius Physics CIAG 9.33.19-34.3 = DK 31B26
And in turn they dominate as the cycle turns about, and they wane into one another
and they increase according to the turn of the lot. For these things are, running
through one another they become men and tribes of other beasts, at one time coming
together in Love into one ordered whole, and at another time each carried apart by
the enmity of Strife, until growing together as One the whole becomes subordinated.
In this way they learn to grow into One from Many and when the One grows apart
again they end up as Many, in this respect they come into being and life is not secure
for them; but as these things never cease in the constant interchanging, in this way
they are always unchanged in the cycle.

212

The roots begin this fragment as line 3 indicates: it is the roots that make up compounds.
This may refer to times closer to the One and the Many as the roots look less like the
created world with which we are familiar, especially since in line 4 there may be a fresh
emphasis on how they become mortal things.
Fragment 26 repeats almost verbatim lines 7-10 from fragment 17. This continues the
emphasis on unification and separation; variations in the text, however, are significant.
Line 5 of fragment 26 repeats line 7 of fragment 17, except the unification here is
, thus emphasizing the ordered nature of the One21, as opposed to the focus on all
things coming into One that we see in fragment 17. This introduces a
new point to consider for careful readers, and gives insight into the nature of the One. As
fragment 26 continues the motifs of separation and into unification again, Empedocles
inserts: (line 7) until growing together as
One the whole becomes subordinated. Just as describing the One as a in line 5
alerts the readers to the nature of the One, this emphasizes that the nature of the roots
have become completely dominated by the influence of Love.22
Once again, the roots are the foundation of this cycle as it returns to them. They
participate without rest: part of created things; coming together into the One; separating
again to form the created world until they have wholly come apart into the Many. And so
the cycle continues through the phases without stopping.

21

See 1.2.2 in chapter 3.

22

See 2.2.2 below.

213

1.2

THE NECESSITY OF THE CYCLE

Love and Strife have sworn an oath to one another that no one of them would

dominate the roots forever. As Empedocles describes, in Strifes time he takes up his
honours, which are mentioned in fragment 17: ,
, | . (lines 28-9) one rules over one
honour and another another, each has its character, and they rule in turn as time circles
around.

,

Simplicius Physics CIAG 10.1184.14-16 = DK 31B30
But when Strife had been nourished great within its limbs, and leapt up to its honours
as the time was completed, an equal time that has been established for each by a
broad oath.

The honours that Love and Strife have are the control over the roots; Love brings
together roots that are unlike to create compounds as her power increases until the One is
formed23 and Strife separates the roots so that like root parts can follow their natural
attraction to one another until the Many is generated.24 That an oath maintains this
alternation of influence emphasizes how important this concept is for the cycle.25 When
Aristotle introduces this fragment, he emphasizes the necessity of this back and forth
between Love and Strife:
: B30 (Aristotle Metaphysics 1000b12) And at the same time he gives no
23

See 2.2 below.

24

See 2.3 below.

25

Transmigration is similarly important and is also kept by an oath. See 2.1 in chapter 3.

214

cause for this change except that it happens in this way by nature. This alternation
between Love and Strife is as important for the readers to understand as the attraction of
like root parts that I describe below.

Part 2: How the Cosmic Cycle Operates

Empedocles provides the outline for the cosmic cycle many times, even within the
extant verses, and in a variety of ways to show that the cycle remains consistent in
essence, but the details are open to variation. The most consistent part of the cycle is that
which Empedocles identifies as the immortal gods Love, Strife, and the four roots.
Love and Strife manipulate the four roots to create the world as well as the phases called
One and Many.
, ,
,
,
,

.
,
.
,
,
,
.

215

10

 ,
.
Simplicius Physics CIAG 9.159.13-26 = DK 31B21
But come, gaze upon this witness of my earlier words, if something was lacking in
form in the earlier (words) the sun, bright to look upon and warm in every respect,
and as many immortals as are drenched in heat and shining light, and rain both dark
and chilling in everything; and from the earth flows forth dense and solid things. In
Wrath all things are separate and apart, and they come together in Love and desire
one another. From these are all things as many as were, as many as are and will be,
trees come forth and men and women and beasts and birds and water-nurtured fish
and long-lived gods, preeminent in their honours. For these things are, running
through one another they become different things for the blending changes them.

This fragment focuses on the role of the roots within the cycle and how they interact with
one another as the fragment begins and ends with the roots in compounds, as Simplicius
excerpted it. The roots are described with their qualities: fire (the sun) is warm, air is
bright26, water is cold, and earth is solid. They are fundamentally different from one
another. The nature of the roots themselves, moreover, is reflected in the character of the
compounds they are part of. Lines 7 and 8 return to the poles of the cycle the Many and
the One. While Empedocles description of the cycle, especially in fragments 17 and 26,
focuses on the process of becoming One and then becoming Many, here he emphasizes
the states of the Many and the One; it only appears, therefore, that he has switched the
order I pointed out above, that is, uniting into One and then separating into Many.27 Under
the influence of Wrath (Strife), all things, specifically all the roots just described, are
separate, that is, Many. Under the influence of Love, on the other hand, all these same
26

See note 31 in chapter 1 on the distinction between aither and the heavy and wet aer.

27

See 1.1 above.

216

things come together and desire one another as the One. As the fragment continues, when
the created worlds come into being, all that we see around us is made up of the roots in
varying patterns to account for the diversity of life and landscape. It has happened in the
past, is happening now, and it will happen in the future. The cycle continues.
If the readers hope to control the world, they must understand the properties of the
players before they attempt to mimic the actions of Love and Strife over the roots.

2.1

THE ROOTS
The roots, as we have already seen briefly in the fragments that focus on the

cosmological cycle, are the players that are manipulated throughout the phases into
varying configurations, whether beast or landscape while worlds are created, into distinct
categories during the Many, or united together when the One has been formed. They are
four in number and called air, earth, water, and fire. For the roots, however, to become a
part of a compound, whether the One, the Many, or any number of created things, they
must consist of smaller parts, contrary to the continuous nature of Parmenides what is.
,
,
.
Simplicius Physics CIAG 160.28-161.1 = DK 31B22.1-3
For all these things sun and earth and sky and sea are united with their own parts,
as many as were born in mortal things once they had been separated.

Root parts are clearly what comes together to form compounds; bone, for example, is
composed of two parts earth, two parts water and four parts fire (
| , |
217

 |
(Simplicius Physics CIAG 9.300.21-24 = DK 31B96) And pleasant earth in her wellbuilt channels received two parts of gleaming Nestis out of the eight and four of
Hephaistos. And they become white bones fitted together with the divine glues of
Harmony.).
Empedocles, however, never states how small these parts are.28 Atius links
Empedocles to Anaxagoras, the atomists, and Epicureans, saying that the roots can be
separated into homoiomerous parts, that is, into smaller parts whose nature is consistent
throughout (
. (Atius 1.13.1 = Doxographi graeci 312 = DK
31A43b) Empedocles said that prior to the four elements there were very small pieces,
as though there were elements like to each other and the whole prior to the elements.)
and that these parts are very small (
, . (Atius 1.17.3
= Doxographi Graeci 315 = DK 31A43c) Xenocrates and Empedocles join the elements
from very small masses which are minimal and, as it were, elements of elements.).
Unlike the atomists, however, Empedocles does not say there is a point beyond which the
roots cannot become smaller, nor does he specify that there will always be a smaller part
as Anaxagoras does ( , (
) .
, . (Simplicius
Physics CIAG 9.164.17-20 = DK 59B3) There is no smallest part of the small, but there

28

Sorabji 1988 (66).

218

is always a smaller part (for it is not possible that what is should not be). But there is
always something bigger than even the large, and its number is equal to the small, and
with respect to itself each thing is big and small.) Rather, as Aristotle concludes,
Empedocles implies that they could be divided in theory, but in practice they are not:
, ,
, . (Aristotle de
caelo 305a1-4 = DK 31A43Aa) And if the division stops, either the body at which it
stops will be indivisible (i.e., atomic) or it will be divisible but it will never be divided, as
Empedocles wishes to say.
The roots, therefore, address many of the shortcomings that plagued Parmenides
predecessors as they attempted to combine the change we perceive in the world with the
permanence of a material source for all things although Empedocles does not present
them as a solution. They exist permanently without change to their nature.
() ,
.
Simplicius Physics CIAG 9.159.3-4 = DK 31B17.34-35
But these things [roots] are real, and running through each other they become
different things at different times and are always, perpetually alike.

The roots exist as they are ( 29), yet they become different things at
different times ( ). I discuss the various connotations of becoming
for the roots in 1.1.1 in chapter 3. Empedocles tells us that the roots become different
things (meaning 2) or change as the result of mixture (
(DK 31B21.14) they become different in appearance, so much does the
29

Compare DK 31B21.13 (=DK 31B26.3) .

219

mixture change them) as they become compounds and mortal things such as men and
tribes of other creatures ( (DK 31B26.4)).
Becoming, therefore, is an external transformation, as the roots become compounds.30 At
all times the roots themselves remain internally consistent because the roots are always
the same throughout: . Each root preserves its character despite the
changes it undergoes through the process of becoming something else.31

2.1.1

How the Root Parts Fit Together

Although Empedocles does state that root parts make up compounds, he does not
specify the nature of these parts nor how they form compounds. It is vital, however, that
the parts not lose their unique characteristics in the process since the components must be
capable of later reuse once the compound is wholly broken.32 Empedocles describes how
root parts come together to form compounds in two ways: 1) they run through one
another ( (DK 31B17.34, 31B21.13, 31B26.3)) and 2) they are
fitted together ( (DK 31B71.4) as many
things as now exist, having been fitted together by Aphrodite).
The image of root parts running through one another brings to mind the description of
how sensation and thinking work, that is, by means of symmetry between the sensor and
the sensed.33 Testimonia clearly link pores to compounds, but there is no evidence to

30

The compounds, on the other hand, come into being from something else (meaning 1b). Nothing comes
into being from nothing (meaning 1a). See 1.1.1 in chapter 3.
31

Guthrie 1965, 147; Wright 1981, 172; Inwood 2001, 26. Bollack 1969 (3:79), on the other hand,
interprets the sameness as the creation of the same different things as the cycle repeats.
32

Curd 2002 (147-153).

33

Theophrastus de sensu 7ff. (= Doxographi Graeci 500); Long 1966. See 2.3 in chapter 4 above.

220

associate pores with the parts of roots themselves. Philoponus provides a passage from
Empedocles to illustrate how mixture depends upon symmetry among the things about to
be blended.
,
, ,
, , ,
,
, .


Philoponus de generatione animalium CIAG 14(3).123.16-21
Empedocles claimed that there is mixture and blending of those things whose solid
parts and pores, i.e., hollows and dense parts, are symmetrical with the result they go
through one another; for example, water and wine. But he claimed that things in
which they are asymmetrical are unmixed, for example, oil and water. For he says
that water is more easily fitted to wine, but with oil it does not want [to mix]. He
says this about every body and gives it as the cause of the sterility of mules.

Even this passage relates to mixing of compounds: water is the visible body most closely
associated with the root but here is probably not purely root; wine and oil are also
compounds. It is important, moreover, because it is an example beyond those of
sensation. There is no reason, however, to believe that this passage illustrates that mixture
occurs because of pores in compounds as Philoponus claims. The natural attraction of
like for like, which is discussed below in part 2.1.2, is a better candidate. Water and wine,
for example, mix well because of the high proportion of water parts in both. Water and
oil, on the other hand, do not mix because there are few water parts in oil and there is,

221

therefore, no attraction of parts. Although pores and dense bits would both fit together
and appear to run through one another, there is insufficient evidence to support the
existence of pores in the roots.
Empedocles also describes the formation of compounds as the fitting together of root
parts. In every instance where Empedocles uses this image, Love is the agent and she acts
upon the parts as a carpenter would.34 Compounds are made up of unlike parts, which are
not naturally attracted to one another and are fit together by Love whose influence then
remains within the compound. Compounds, therefore, are not formed of parts that come
together under their own power.35 Aristotles description of how compounds are formed
illustrates well the particulate nature of the roots. His account, however, is flawed owing
to the lack of a passage from Empedocles to support it.
;

,

.
Aristotle de generatione et corruptione 334a26 ff. = DK 31A43a
What will be the manner [of coming to be for compounds] for those who speak as
Empedocles? It is necessary that there be a combination, like a wall from bricks and
stones, and this mixture will be from elements that have been preserved in small bits
and lying close by one another. In this way there is flesh and every other thing.

34

See 2.2.1 below.

35

Love takes on such an active role in order to overcome the natural attraction of like to like. See 2.1.2
below.

222

The comparison of parts in a compound to bricks in a wall illustrates a particulate

structure. Each root part will retain its unique characteristics and when Loves influence
has left the compound, each part will be free to join another compound. Further, each part
will be so small that the compound does not seem to be a mass of root parts sitting side
by side: , ,
( , ,
(Aristotle de generatione et corruptione 328a12-16) But if
mixing is a composition of small particles, none of these things will happen [i.e., the
mixture will not be uniform throughout so that any part of the mixture is the same as the
whole], but the ingredients will only be mixed according to the standard of sense
perception, and the same thing will be a mixture to one man, if he has not sharp sight, but
to the eyes of Lynceus will not be mixed.

2.1.2

The Attraction of Like to Like

The natural attraction of like root parts lies at the heart of Empedocles theory of
mixture and separation; the tradition of this attraction can be seen at the very beginning
of Greek literature from Homer onwards.36 The affinity of like for like is mentioned in the
Odyssey: , |
. (Odyssey 17.217-218) Now indeed the vile leads the vile, just as the god
always leads like to like. Plato indicates that this point of view was common and
associates it with early philosophers:

36

Mller 1965 studies the history of the concept of like to like in philosophical authors from the Milesians
to the sophists.

223


,
;
.
Plato Lysis 214b
And isnt it also the case with the writings of those very wise men which tell the
same story, namely that it is necessary that like be dear to like? They are, I believe,
the ones who talk and write on the nature of the universe.

For Empedocles, this attraction occurs on the level of the parts of the roots. Aristotle
relates an anecdote about the attraction of a dog to one particular tile that not only
underscores Empedocles conviction in the attraction of like to like but also reveals the
cause for it.

,
.
Aristotle Eudemian Ethics 1235a10-12 = DK 31A20Aa
The natural philosophers also arrange the whole of nature taking as a principle that
like goes to like; that is why Empedocles said that the bitch sat on the tile, because it
had the greatest similarity.37

A different version of the same anecdote builds on the similarity that attracted the dog to
the tile.38 How can two things that seem so different one is alive, the other inanimate;

37

For a discussion of those passages in Aristotle that scholars have used to deny Empedocles belief in this
principle (de generatione et corruptione 323b1-12 and de anima 410a21-26), see OBrien 1969 (301-04).
38

, ,
, ,
. ([Aristotle] Magna Moralia 1208b11-15) There was once a bitch that always

224

the one is soft, the other hard have anything in common that would attract them? Only
roots and being composed of them connect the dog and the tile. The attraction, therefore,
must lie in the roots. This attraction goes beyond conscious choice. Aristotle, discussing
the nature of friendship, links the principle of like to like to Empedocles again.
.
,
, ,
.
Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics 1155a32-b8
But there is much difference of opinion as to the nature of friendship. Some define it
as a matter of similarity; they say that we love those who are like ourselves, whence
the proverbs like finds like and birds of a feather flock together and so on.
Empedocles especially declares that like seeks after like.

Like actively seeks like for its own sake, not at the impetus of another force whether
Love or Strife.
Empedocles confirms that neither Love nor Strife is responsible for the attraction of
like to like when he expresses elsewhere this general principle without specifying an
external agent. Thinking and perception by senses both depend on similarity between
received and receptor as outlined in 2.3 of chapter 4. The mixture of liquids described
by Philoponus above (fragment 91) also appears to operate on this notion. The principle

slept on the same tile, and Empedocles, when he was asked why the dog slept on the same tile, said that the
dog had something similar to the tile, as though the dog were going on account of the similarity.

225

of like to like participates in the initial creation of mortals: fire pushes the first mortal
things after the One out of the earth in its desire to join with other parts of fire.39
,


Simplicius Physics CIAG 9.381.34-382.1= DK 31B62.4-6
first there came whole-natured outlines from the earth, having a share of water and
heat both fire sent them up wishing to reach its like.

Growth also depends on the attraction of like parts: ,

(DK 31B37) and earth expands its own bulk and aither (expands)
aither, as does nutrition: , , |
, (DK 31B90) thus sweet grasped sweet
and bitter rushed to bitter, sharp went to sharp and hot mated with hot. In each of these
examples like actively seeks out like. Empedocles identifies no other agent responsible
for bringing likes together. The attraction of like root parts, therefore, seems to be a
natural process that lies beyond the powers of Love and Strife. They must operate,
therefore, within the confines of the roots innate properties; if the readers hope to
emulate Love and Strife, they must understand these properties as well.

2.2

LOVE
In the overall view of the cycle, Love brings the root parts together to form the One

while Strife separates them to form the Many. Empedocles illustrates Loves influence
39

Since fire is described earlier in the same fragment as (line 2) separating, OBrien 1969
(204, 312-13) argues that fire here represents Strife. The pushing out of the first living things, however,
seems rather a by-product of fire going forth to unite with fire.

226

with - compounds: (DK 31B17.7, 31B26.5, PStr. a(ii)20), (DK

31B21.8), and (DK 31B17.4). On the other hand, - compounds mark the
influence of Strife: (DK 31B17.2, 5, 10, 17, 31B26.9) and (DK 31B17.8,
31B26.6). Some argue, therefore, that at all times Love unites all root parts to one
another, and that Strife separates all roots parts from one another.40 Such an interpretation
is possible only because Empedocles does not specify here what Love unites and what
Strife separates. Love unites root parts that are unlike because the attraction of like to like
is the roots natural movement41; the role of Strife is to break up this natural attraction so
that other compounds can be created.

2.2.1

Love Combines Unlike Things

Empedocles depictions of Love and her interaction with the roots emphasize her
creative role. Not only does Love unite the four roots into the One, but she is also
responsible for the union of this limited variety of roots into the limitless variety of
compounds with the same terms that Empedocles used with the general outline of the
cosmic cycle: (DK 31B20.2) and (DK 31B98.1, 31B104). I have
shown above in 1.1 of chapter 3 how Empedocles frequently calls Love Aphrodite or
Kypris, especially when emphasizing this productive aspect of her role in the cosmic
cycle. In Empedocles vision of the universe, Love makes the unlike root parts desire one
another ( (DK 31B21.8) they [the roots]
come together in Love and desire one another), by making them like (

40

Bollack 1965 (1:48-52), Hlscher 1965 (7-8), Solmsen 1965 (112-18), Mller 1965 (31), Long 1974
(415-16).
41

See 2.1.2 above.

227

 (DK 31B22.5) they [the roots] cling to one another

having been made like by Aphrodite).
Empedocles also compares Love to a variety of craftsmen where each craft involves
mixing things in order to create something that seems wholly new. In the clearest
example, Empedocles likens Love to a potter.
, ,

Simplicius de caelo CIAG 7.530.6-7 = DK 31B73
As at that time Kypris, when she moistened earth in the rain, gave it to fierce fire to
strengthen, while preparing shapes

Earth, water, and fire are three of the four roots, yet with these three elements, Love, like
a potter, can create an indefinite number of forms. The creation of vases or terracotta
figures relies on the mixture of clay (earth) and water and the further application of
intense heat (fire). The use of three of the four roots also emphasizes how Love brings
together things that are not homogenous, and indeed not harmonious, to create things.
Empedocles also appears to compare Love to a painter.

,
,
, ,
,



228


, , ,
, .
Simplicius Physics CIAG 9.160.1-11 = DK 31B23
As when painters embellish votive offerings, men well-learned in their craft because
of cunning; and so when they have taken hold of the many coloured paints in their
hands, having mixed in harmony some colours more and others less, they prepare
from them forms resembling all things, fashioning trees and men and women and
beasts and birds and water-nourished fish and long-lived gods first in their
prerogatives. In this way let not deceit surpass you in your thinking (by convincing
you) that the source of mortal things, as unspeakably many as have clearly come to
be, is from some other thing [than the elements], but know these things clearly,
having heard the story from a god.

Although Love is not named explicitly, the mention of in line 4 and the
consistent linking of Love to the creation of plants and animals in fragment 71 and
elsewhere suggest that that this interpretation is valid. Painting, although the techniques
of Empedocles period are poorly understood42, produces a multitude of forms and images
with only a limited palette, just as pottery does. This passage also emphasizes the varying
ratios of root parts that make up various things since some colours would be used more
and others less.
Finally, Empedocles associates Love with the crafts of carpentry and cheese-making.
Carpentry depends upon joining unlike parts together:
(DK 31B87) Aphrodite fashioned [eyes, according to the context] with
dowels of love. Love also juxtaposes unlike root parts and fits them together:
42

Painters may have applied thin layers of wash to achieve the desired colour and shade (Wright 1981, 389), but at any rate, there could be no blending of the colours beforehand, as this would make the analogy
less effective (Mourelatos 1987, 141).

229

 , | (DK 31B35.16-17)
as they (roots) were mixed, a great many tribes of mortal things poured forth, fitted
together in all sorts of forms; <> (DK
31B107) for from these things (i.e., roots), all things having been fit together are fixed;
(DK 31B71.4) as many as have now come to
be having been fitted together by Aphrodite;
(DK 31B86) from which divine Aphrodite fixed together tireless eyes;
<> , (DK 31B15.4) Before they are fixed as mortals
and after they are dissolved, they are nothing. Empedocles expands upon the image of
joining; not only does Love use dowels, but her influence is compared to glue (
| (DK 31B96.3-4) And
they become white bones fitted together with the divine glues of harmony; compare DK
31B34: gluing barley meal with water) and the rennet that
makes cheese ( (DK 31B33) as when
rennet riveted white milk and bound it43).
The effects from Loves uniting power appear to remain within the compound:
, |
(DK 31B17.22-3) she (Love) is thought by mortals to be inborn in their limbs, by whom
they think loving thoughts and accomplish works of unity. This last image brings to the
fore Loves most potent influence over mortal things and reinforces the analogy with

43

Although the context of this fragment discusses the unity that arises from friendship, this effect is
ultimately produced by Love.

230

Aphrodite: sex. Once successful compounds are produced, sex takes over the
construction of mortals.44

, ,
,
,
, ,
,

Atius 5.19.5 (Dox. Gr. 430) = DK 31A72a
Empedocles says that the first generation of animals and plants were in no way
complete, but separate with parts not growing together. The second was of dream
images with parts growing together. The third was of whole-shaped things and the
fourth generation was no longer from similar things, e.g., from earth and water, but
was produced through one another, for some by the compression of nourishment and
for others the shapeliness of women produced stimulation of the movement of the
seed.

Such production requires a male and a female of the same species, thus emphasizing the
way that Love brings together things that are not homogenous to create a greater variety
of things. Fragment 64 also illustrates this final stage of the zoogony:
(Plutarch Natural Phenomena 917c = DK 31B64) And desire
comes upon him too, through sight, for intercourse.

44

There is disagreement as to whether all stages set out by Atius occur in a single phase of the cycle or
over the whole. OBrien 1969 (ch. 9) outlines possible interpretations of the evidence.

231

2.2.2

The One

The One is the final result of Love mixing the root parts45 until she eventually creates
the One, a mixture of root parts that can be mixed no further. The One, therefore, is the
greatest compound in the cycle of creation because the entire universe is a single
compound at that time. We possess Empedocles own description of the universe when
Love dominates the cycle of creation.

,



.46
Simplicius Physics CIAG 10.1183.28-1184.1
But Eudemus47 says that motionlessness occurs in the domination by Love at the time
of the Sphere, when all things have been combined when the swift limbs of the sun
can no longer be distinguished, but, as he says, the circular Sphere has been made

45

See 2.1.1 above.

46

Diels and Kranz 1951 (31B27) following Panzerbieter 1844 (27) and Millerd 1908 (60n3) conflates this
passage from Simplicius with a passage quoted by Plutarch in de facie in orbe lunae 926d owing to partial
repetition of the first line: , | ,
there the shining form of the sun is not discerned nor indeed the shaggy might of earth nor
the sea. The two contexts, however, are polar opposites: the lines preserved in Simplicius refer to the
period when Love dominates, that is, the One, and those quoted by Plutarch refer to the phase when Strifes
influence is at its peak, that is, the Many. Most editors and translators have separated the two texts Karsten 1838 (92, 96), Bignone 1963 (599-605), Bollack 1969 (fr. 92, fr. 171), OBrien 1969 (149ff),
Wright 1981 (fr. 19, fr. 21), Inwood 2001 (fr. 31, fr. 33).
47

Eudemus was a student and friend of Aristotle and apparently a candidate to succeed Aristotle as head of
the Lyceum.

232

fast in the well-constructed obscurity48 of Harmony, rejoicing in his circular

solitude.

There are three things to note about the One from this passage. First, the One is
spherical in shape and Empedocles emphasizes this characteristic with and
.49 Next, the universe is at rest while Love controls the roots without interference
from Strife. Finally, Love has arranged the parts of the roots in such a way that the
individual characteristics can no longer be discerned. The state of rest and the
arrangement of the root parts are closely linked.
Descriptions of the One in fragment 26 confirm this picture of a compound that is
wholly ordered: (line 5) with the root
parts arranged 1:1:1:1.50 Empedocles also describes the One as a state where everything
becomes subordinated into the One: (line
7). Aristotle describes the One.

, ,
,
.

Aristotle de generatione et corruptione 315a4ff.
For (Empedocles) says that no one of the elements comes into being one from
another, but that all other things come into being from them, but at the same time
when she (Love) brings together all nature except Strife, he says that each thing
48

This translation is discussed below.

49

See 2.2.2 in chapter 1 for my discussion that the universe is always spherical.

50

See 1.2.2 in chapter 3.

233

comes into being again from the One. The result clearly is that when things were
separated on account of certain differences and qualities out of a certain One, one
thing became water and another fire

The verb has two distinct meanings in Greek: 1) to come into being for the first
time ((a) from nothing or (b) from something else) and 2) to arrive at a different state, to
become.51 Here, Aristotle understands that one root cannot come into being from another
root ( ). When Aristotle claims
that each root comes into being () when the One separates again, the roots do not
come into being (meaning 1), but they do become something different when they mix in
different compounds (meaning 2). It is the mortal things that come into being when the
One begins to separate. The One, therefore, does not represent a phase of the cycle where
the elements return to some primordial state. Rather, it is the ultimate mixture of root
parts that do not lose any of their innate qualities.
When Aristotle considers the question of rest and movement in the universe, he uses
Empedocles as a model for alternating periods of rest and motion:
,
,

Aristotle Physics 250b24ff.
Or as Empedocles says, there is motion and then rest again in turn there is motion
whenever Love produces the one from many or when Strife makes many from one
and there is no motion in the in-between times.

51

See 1.1.1 in chapter 3.

234

It is generally accepted that the One is at rest.52 Eudemus states as much and the passage
he quotes reinforces this interpretation the circular sphere is fixed fast ().
The passive of indicates that the internal parts of the One are held together.
Simplicius supports that there is no motion while Love is in complete control over the
roots until Strife restores his influence:
(Physics CIAG 10.1184.2) when Strife begins again
to assert control, at that time motion begins again in the sphere. Although the whole
could rotate, one piece of testimony suggests that the whole does not begin to rotate until
the sun is formed53: <>
. (Eusebius in praep. evang. 1.8.10 = DK 31A30)
The beginning of the motion occurs because the aggregation meets with the downward
pressure of fire <in a certain part>.54

52

Contra Trpanier 2002 who proposes that Empedocles is part of the tradition that posits continuous
motion in the universe. When Aristotle uses Empedocles as an example of rest and motion alternating
throughout the cosmic cycles, Aristotle treats Empedocles theory as though they share underlying
assumptions regarding the nature of motion. Aristotle associates rest with unity and movement with
plurality and thus believes that the universe is always in motion. Even if Empedocles does not share
Aristotles assumption about the nature of motion, the concept of rest may be elsewhere in Empedocles
verses and hence picked up by Aristotle. There is certainly no mention of rest in fragment 17 which sets out
the most important doctrine, that is, the ongoing alternation of mixture and separation from Many to One
and from One to Many. Trpanier 2002 (350) argues that the cumulative force [of statements on continual
motion, i.e., DK 31B17.5 (cf. DK 31B17.12, Strasbourg papyrus ensemble a(ii)3 and a(ii)8, DK 31B26.12)
and DK 31B17.34-35 (cf. DK 31B21.13 and DK 31B26.3)] must be taken into account. Motion is the
mark of forming both the One and the Many because the roots are moving into and out of compounds.
Empedocles account in fragment 17 emphasizes the processes of mixture and separation (cf. especially
lines 7-8), not the states of One and Many except insofar as One is the ultimate mixture and Many the
ultimate division. These statements of continual motion refer to the action of the roots as they mix and
separate to form various compounds through the whole of the cosmic cycle. The status of the One and the
Many with respect to motion must be determined elsewhere.
53

OBrien 1969, 21; Kingsley 1994a, 321.

54

Scholars have traditionally used to mean stillness as well, deriving the noun from the verb .
Guthrie 1965 (169n3) summarizes the history of the dispute between deriving an interpretation from
(alone) or (rest). Bollack 1969 (3:137) and Wright 1981 (111) argue that Empedocles intends both
meanings. Slings 1994 (413), however, points out that can derive only from owing to an
ironclad rule of word formation, that is, to derive an action noun from a one-syllable stem the suffix - is
compulsory if the derivation is a simplex word; if it is a compound, one must use -. in Homer

235

Empedocles also describes the sphere as held fast . has been

translated as a further metaphor for stillness; for example, Diels (DK 31B27) translates it
as dungeon (Verlie) and Bignone 1916 (421) as fort (ricetto).55 Wright 1981 (188) cites
Parmenides description of the bonds of Necessity holding his sphere of Being in place as
parallel.

,
, .


, .
Simplicius Physics CIAG 9.145.27-146.4 = DK 28B8.26-31
But changeless within the limits of great bonds it exists without beginning or ceasing,
since coming to be and perishing have wandered very far away, and true conviction
has thrust them off. Remaining the same and in the same place it lies on its own and
thus fixed it will remain. For strong Necessity holds it within the bonds of a limit,
which keeps it in on every side.

Parmenides own use of language supports Diels and Bignones translations.

Parmenides sphere is held still by means of bonds, . This suggests that the sphere
is not held in place willingly, especially since strong Necessity, , holds it
there.

(Iliad 22.257, 23.661), which means perseverance or steadfastness, comes from whereas
cannot. means, therefore, that the One is alone in the universe, or rather, the One is the universe.
55

Since Wright 1981 (188) does not approve of such metaphors of constraint for the rejoicing, intelligent
god, she translates as covering.

236

It is not the case, however, that the One holds still because Love constrains it; rather,
the stillness results from Loves influence over the roots. Love has mixed the parts of the
roots so perfectly that combination can go no further. In this state, further mixture, hence
movement, is not possible until Strife comes forward again. does not refer to
stillness as much as the obscurity of the true nature of the compound. Comparison to
Pindar illustrates this.56
,
, ,

,
Pindar Olympian 2.95-98
But tedious excess, which does not accompany justice but wishes to babble because
of greedy men, sets upon praise and places obscurity upon the good deeds of good
men.

Pindars goal is to praise Theron of Akragas who won the chariot race in the Olympian
games of 476 B.C. and thus illuminate Therons victory. The unjust behaviour of others
who tire of hearing Therons acclaim, however, attacks praise. When praise cannot come
forth, good deeds are obscured. In Pindar, it is the lack of praise that results in obscurity.
In Empedocles, on the other hand, the circumstances that created the obscurity results
also in the stillness of the sphere. The mixing of Love has two final results. On the one
hand, the root parts can no longer move since they can be mixed no further, at least by
Loves influence. At the same time, this unique mixture of the roots arranged so that no
like part lies beside another has the effect of obscuring the nature of the One. It is not a
56

Bollack 1969 (3:135).

237

visible obscurity as much as logical or intellectual, such as led Parmenides to his

conclusions on the world of change and seeming. The parts of the roots do not lose their
qualities but they are indiscernible because no single part can be united with any other.
The adjective emphasizes the inability of the One to move. does not
entail that the roots in the One are arranged more densely than at any other point in the
cycle. This is not possible because there is no void in the universe (
(Atius 1.18.2 (Dox. 316.1) = DK 31B13) nor is any of the
whole empty nor in excess) and a variable density among the root parts implies the
existence of void that has been expelled. Rather, Love holds together the whole, spread
through all the parts since the universe is one compound, as opposed to other phases
where at least some like roots are attracted naturally to one another. The One, therefore,
is not close so much as it is well-built or well-mixed, as one would expect from an
artificial union.57 The parts of the roots are held motionless as a result of Loves
unification that has led to a strongly constructed compound.
Not only can the root parts no longer move, but the nature of the roots can also no
longer be observed because the roots are arranged in a ratio of 1:1:1:1.58 It is the
perfection of the mix that obscures the nature of the One. The characteristics of each root
are visible only when there is sufficient accumulation. Empedocles was not specific about
how small the parts of the roots were59, but they must be very small since one sees only
the compound, for example, bone, not the parts of the roots that make up the compound.

57

Cf. Iliad 10.267: Autolykos, having broken into the well-built

home and Odyssey 10.283: Odysseus companions are like
pigs held in well-built pens.
58

See 1.2.2 in chapter 3.

59

See 2.1 above.

238

With this arrangement, that is, no collection of like root parts, the nature of the One is
obscured because it cannot be seen. This situation is aggravated by no accumulation of
fire (cf. ), the only root capable of producing light
when gathered together. The obscurity of the One is achieved through this evenly
balanced disposition of the root parts.

When Empedocles first introduces the outline of the cosmic cycle in fragment 17, the
One represents the best example of Loves interaction with the parts of the roots. Since it
is the terminus of Loves uniting activity, the One is the greatest mixture Love can
achieve. By seeing how far mixture can be carried, readers have a better idea of how
mixture occurs although Empedocles has yet to describe how other compounds come into
being.

2.3

STRIFE
Strife does not play as prominent a role as Love in the extant fragments. Owing to the

emphasis that Empedocles places on separation as I described above in 2.2, it seems a

reasonable assumption that Strife would be an agent solely of destruction. This pattern of
separation persists as well on the level of compounds: (DK 31B20.5), (DK
31B22.5) and (DK 31B20.4). But Aristotle complains that Empedocles is not
consistent with his use of Love and Strife, thus suggesting that the manipulation of the
various roots by Love and Strife is more complicated.

239

2.3.1

Strife Separates Unlike Roots

I have already shown above how Love unites roots that are unlike. Aristotle states
that when Strife creates the Many by separating the roots, he also unites them.
,
.
,
,
.
Aristotle Metaphysics 985a24-29 = DK 31A37
Many times, according to him (Empedocles), Love separates and Strife unites. For on
the one hand, whenever the universe is separated into the elements (i.e., roots), fire
and each of the other elements is united into one. And whenever they come together
because of Love, it is necessary that the parts be separated again from each.

Aristotle misunderstands Empedocles. Aristotle considers the formation of the One and
the Many from the viewpoint of the roots, but Empedocles looks at the actions of Love
and Strife because they are who the potential gods have to emulate. When the Many is
formed while Strife is in complete control of the cycle, all the fire roots are united, all the
water is united, and so on.60 It appears from the roots point of view, therefore, that Strife
has united the roots because they have come together when Strife is at the height of its
influence, but Empedocles says that Strife separates them. With the formation of the One,
on the other hand, the various root parts separate so that no two like parts are together;
according to this point of view, therefore, Love appears to separate the roots because they
are not united (with their likes) when Love is most powerful. Careful study of what

60

See 2.3.2 below.

240

Empedocles does say about the unification and separation processes in the general outline
reveals the answer. Empedocles focuses on the actions of Love and Strife in the
formation of One and Many, as opposed to the reactions of the roots in the same. Love,
therefore, unites the roots to form One and Strife separates them to produce the Many.
Unification and separation are two sides of the same coin and mutually inclusive: for
unlike to unite, especially to the point where no like root is side by side (One), like must
separate from like; for unlike to separate until no unlike roots are together (Many), like
will unite to like. It does not follow, however, that separation and unification are active
powers at the same time. Strife actively separates unlike roots, but does not actively unite
like roots because like to like is a natural attraction as I describe above.61 Aristotle
misinterprets Empedocles because Aristotle fails to give sufficient credit to the role of the
natural attraction of likes. Since Empedocles wants the mortal gods to emulate the actions
of Love and Strife if they want to control the world, he focuses on what they do, rather
than what the roots do on their own power. The gods have to counter the roots natural
tendencies. Strife only separates, therefore, contrary to Aristotles statement, and he only
separates unlike root parts. Empedocles emphasizes Loves powers of unification to
balance Strife. Strife separates unlike while Love unites unlike.
Aristotle, however, claims that Strife also is a creative force and that the universe
would always be One if there were no Strife. Here, Aristotle puts forward his
interpretation of what Empedocles meant ( ).
,

61

Inwood 2001 (50) argues that Strife actively separates and works with the natural attraction of like to
like.

241

 . ...
,
Aristotle Metaphysics 1000a26-b1
He (Empedocles) sets Strife as a principle that is the cause of destruction, but
nevertheless he seems to create all things outside of the One; for everything except
god proceeds from him. For if Strife were not present in things, all would be one.

Strife, however, is not directly responsible for the creation of all things.62 The formation
of most compounds requires the combination of roots that are unlike and Strife is
incapable of such an act. Uniting unlike roots, as shown above, is the primary function of
Love. Strifes primary function is to separate what Love has joined.
,
,
.
Simplicius Physics CIAG 160.28-161.1 = DK 31B22.1-3
For all these things sun and earth and sky and sea are united with their own parts,
as many as were born in mortal things once they had been separated.

Compounds cannot be formed until the parts are available. This fragment describes in
general Strifes role with the roots. He separates the parts, which are then free to be born
in mortal things, from their compounds whether it is the One or plant or animal. The role
of Strife, if his limited mentions in the extant fragments are indicative of meaning, is a
passive one. He does separate unlike roots, but he does not in turn unite like ones. Strife,
therefore, is responsible for creation only in the sense of splitting up compounds so that
new ones can be produced. Fragment 124 reinforces how Strife destroys for something to
62

See also 2.1.1 in chapter 4.

242

be created: , , , |
. Oh shame, or wretched race of mortals, oh unfortunate (race), from
what strife and from what groanings have you come into being. The connection of Strife
to the creation of mortal things emphasizes their lack of perfection.

2.3.2

Strifes Ultimate Goal The Many

Lines 1-3 of fragment 22 also describes the formation of the Many when Strife is
ascendant and has no more compounds to separate since the root parts have been united
with their own parts. The Many may be the starting point for the cosmic cycle since
Empedocles emphasizes it by usually beginning his narrative from that point. The Many
is also the natural state of the roots since Empedocles defines the Many as the four roots:
air, earth, water and fire:

, ,
.
Simplicius Physics CIAG 9.15-17 = DK 31B17.16-18
I will tell two-fold things: for at one time, [they] were increased to be One alone from
Many and at another time, moreover, they grew apart to be Many from One fire and
water and earth and the boundless height of air

Empedocles establishes in fragment 17 how the process of forming the One is matched
by an equal but opposite process of forming the Many. Since the One is a distinct phase,
the Many is separate as well. Description of the Many, however, is limited and depends
heavily on commentators interpretation and contrast with the One. On the one hand,
Love mixes the parts of the roots together until they unite into a perfect mixture. Strife,

243

on the other hand, separates the roots until they can be separated no further. This
separation does not resemble a chaotic tohu-bohu of unlinked root parts.63 Rather, all the
like root parts collect together into individual masses, that is, all the parts of fire are
together and so on for each root. This is the true opposite of One. The One is a single
compound of all four roots arranged so that no like root lies by another; the Many is four
(many) compounds, one for each root.
Since neither the One nor the Many are the worlds of mortal compound beings, they
share characteristics that set them apart. At the same time, they differ greatly from one
another. The One and the Many lie opposite one another in the cosmic cycle. Only Love
has power in the One; Strife rules the Many alone. Description of the One focuses on a
passage preserved by Eudemus; all three features that characterize the One are included
evenly balanced mixture, at rest, and spherical.64 Other passages reinforce these
characteristics, but Empedocles covers the essence of the One in three lines. No extant
passage describes the Many as efficiently. Interpretation depends mainly upon the
Manys relationship with the One. The three main qualities of the One are matched in the
Many. 1) Since Love can combine the root parts no further, the internal arrangement of
the One is one part of fire to one of air to one of water to one of earth. Strife, on the other
hand, separates the root parts so that no unlike root parts are together all the fire parts
are united, all the water parts, etc. 2) The One is wholly at rest; the parts of the roots no
longer move under Loves power owing to the perfection of the mixture. The evidence
suggests that the root parts are still in motion during the Many. 3) The only similarity

63

Long 1974, 414-15.

64

See 2.2.2 above.

244

between the One and the Many lies in their shape both are spherical because the
universe is always spherical.65

Plutarch preserves the only passage that securely describes the Many. In the dialogue
de facie in orbe lunae, Lamprias uses the state of total Strife to attack Apollonides who
argues with the Aristotelians and Stoics that there are natural places for the various
roots. Strife destroys the created world when he returns the roots to their natural
positions.
, , ,
,

,
, ,
, ,
, ,
,
,

,
, .
Plutarch de facie in orbe lunae 926d-f
So, good sir, look out and see to it that you do not, by moving and transferring each
thing to its natural place, produce in your philosophy a dissolution of the cosmos and
65

See 2.2.2 in chapter 1.

245

bring Empedocles strife to bear on things There the shining form of the sun is
not discerned nor indeed the shaggy might of earth nor the sea, as Empedocles says.
Earth had no share in warmth, nor water any share in breath; none of the heavy things
was up nor any of the light things down; but the principles of the universe
unblended, unloving and solitary, not desiring combination or communion with one
another; fleeing and not admitting of blending or communion with one another,
turning away and executing their separate and self-willed movements were just as
everything is when god is absent, according to Plato, i.e., they have bodies with mind
and soul missing.

This passage repeats half a line of those Eudemus used to describe the One.66 Not only
does this emphasize the parallel nature of the One and the Many owing to their similar
status in the cosmic cycle, that is, neither is a created world, but also how they differ. In
the passage describing the One, , the sun refers to
the root fire and to the parts of it. 67 In this passage, however, the sun is the sun of the
created world, that is, one of the more visible manifestations of the root fire. It is the
shining form of the sun that cannot be seen, nor earth nor sea. They cannot be discerned
when Strife controls all the roots because all the fire, earth and water parts are together.
The sun, for example, is visible primarily because of the contrast between the sun and its
surroundings. The sun, as a close manifestation of the root fire, would not be seen in the
Many because it would be indistinct from the aggregate of the root.
Plutarch goes on to paraphrase Empedocles the roots are not mixed together with
unlikes, fire is not mixed with earth nor is air combined with water. The Many, therefore,
is arranged so that no unlike root parts are together. As Plutarch says, the roots are

66

See above (note 46) for a discussion on how some editors conflate the lines preserved by Eudemus and
Simplicius.
67

See 1.2.2 in chapter 3.

246

unblended (), without love (68) and solitary (). They are
unblended because they are not linked to roots unlike them; they are without love because
love forces the roots into combinations with roots unlike themselves; they are solitary
because they are alone with their likes. Aristotle also supports this interpretation:
,
(Aristotle Metaphysics 985a25-27) For whenever the
universe is separated into the elements by Strife, fire is gathered into one as is each of the
other elements.
There is no direct evidence for the structure of the roots during the Many. Since,
however, the roots are arranged in a sphere and each root is distinct, the roots are
probably sorted in concentric spheres.69 The passage from Plutarch hints at the
arrangement of the roots: , (Plutarch de
facie 926e) nothing of the heavy things was up and nothing of the light things down.
Up and down are relative terms that require definition before they have meaning. There
are two ways to examine a sphere. If the sphere rests or rotates on a fixed axis, one can
describe a specific point on the circumference as up or down, but this depends on a fixed
external point of reference. Up and down change according to the point of view. To
describe a sphere along its radius, that is, from the inside out or from our point of view as
we stand of the surface of the earth, does not require an external point of reference. Since
there is nothing outside the sphere of matter, this is the best way to view the sphere. The
centre, equidistant from the edge in every direction is down; the edge, by contrast is up.
68

is a word used for Love in fragment 109: , . (line 4)

(we see) Love by means of Love, and Strife by mournful Strife.
69

Millerd 1908 (56), Bignone 1963 (223, 562n3), Bollack 1965 (1:165-169), Guthrie 1965 (177), OBrien
1969 (chapter 7), Wright 1981 (43-45), Inwood 2001 (52).

247

The spheres, therefore, were probably arranged by weight with earth at the centre as the
heaviest, followed by water, air and fire at the edge as the lightest. Hints scattered
throughout the fragments support such an interpretation. Fire, for example strives to
move upward to reach the fire already aloft.70
,


Simplicius Physics CIAG 9.381.34-382.1 = DK 31B62.4-6
First came up from the earth whole-natured outlines having a share of both water and
heat; fire sent them up, wanting to reach its like

The formation of the created world also shows how the lighter roots move to the edge and
the heavier settle at the centre.
,
, ,

Atius de placita 2.6.3 (Doxographi graeci 334) = DK 31A49b
Empedocles says that aither is separated first and second is fire after which the earth.
From the earth, squeezed all about by the force of the revolution, water gushes
forth.71

70

Eustathius, Commentary on Odyssey 1.321: , .

. : some say invisible, others to be borne
upwards. Empedocles says in the case of fire carried swiftly upwards. As creation after the One
continues, Strife separates the roots until fire is no longer under the earth: ()
(DK 31B52) Many fires burn below the earth.
71

Pseudo-Plutarch confirms this description:

. ([Plutarch] Stromateis 10 (Doxographi graeci 582) = DK 31A30)
[Empedocles] says that from the first mixture of the elements that air, once it was separated, poured about

248

Strife, therefore, separates the elements into natural positions as Plutarch states. The
heaviest roots settle at the centre and the lighter move to the edge of the sphere. The roots
do not communicate with one another, that is, different roots do not mix.
Whether the Many is at rest or in motion is a controversial issue owing to a lack of
direct evidence from Empedocles and the evidence from the commentators can be
contradictory.72 On the one hand, Plutarch states that the roots are in motion when Strife
is in total control:
,
,

Plutarch de facie in orbe lunae 926e-f

The principles of the universe were unblended, unloving and solitary, not desiring
combination or communion with one another, but fleeing and turning away and
carried in their personal and self-willed passages.

This may describe the roots as they move towards the state of Many. Simplicius, on the
other, says that there is rest between opposite motions:
(Physics CIAG 10.1183.27), that is, the One is at rest before the
motion changes from unification (from Many to One) to separation (from One to Many)
and the Many should be at rest when the motion switches again from separation to
unification. The contradiction lies in not understanding Strifes motion: it varies from the
motion that Love and Strife display as they mix and separate the roots.
in a circle. After air, fire runs out [from the mixture] and not having another place runs upward under the
solid part around the air.
72

OBrien 1969 (chapter 2) and 1995 (405-16) discuss all the evidence in depth.

249

Simplicius based his interpretation on statements made by Aristotle. Aristotle

emphasizes the motion of the roots during the processes of unification and separation. At
one point, Aristotle says: ,
,
(Physics 250b24) Or as Empedocles says, there is motion and then
rest again in turn there is motion whenever Love produces the One from Many or when
Strife makes Many from One and there is no motion in the in-between times. When
Aristotle addresses the question of rest and motion again, he states:
,
(Physics 252a7) Love and Strife have control over things and move them
out of necessity and the in-between time is at rest. The controversy focuses on the
differences between these statements, that is, Aristotle first uses a plural and then a
singular for the between time. Each position can use this evidence to support itself. If one
seeks to prove that there is more than one rest period in a cycle73, the plural in-between
times is read as multiple (two) periods of rest in a cycle and the singular as each inbetween time in a cycle, that is, more than one in a cycle. If, on the other hand, one
supports only one rest period per cycle74, the singular indicates one period of rest in a
cycle, specifically when Love dominates the cycle, and the plural reveals that over
numerous cycles, there will be many periods of rest since the One will be formed many
times. Resolution depends on other evidence.

73

Millerd 1908 (53-4), Wright 1981 (42-3), McKirahan 1994 (269f.), Inwood 2001 (51).

74

von Arnim 1902 (17-18), Bignone 1963 (604), OBrien 1969 (chapter 2) and 1995 (405-16), Martin and
Primavesi 1999 (71-74).

250

Plutarch is not the only commentator to argue that the roots are in motion during the
Many. Simplicius distinguishes his own interpretation of two periods of rest in a cycle
with that of Eudemus. The which introduces Eudemus (Simplicius Physics CIAG
10.1183.27-28) diverges from Simplicius own interpretation of Aristotle:
.
. The context clearly compares the issue of
motion and rest in Empedocles cosmic cycle and the way in which Simplicius introduces
Eudemus implies that Eudemus stated there was only one period of rest during the cycle,
that is, when Love dominates.
Moreover, despite the contradictory ways that Aristotles statements above can be
interpreted, Aristotle himself comments on the motion of the roots during the Many. Not
only are the roots separate from one another but they are in some sort of motion.
.
(sc.

,

. .
Aristotle de caelo 301a14-20
It is not reasonable to produce creation from things separate and moving. That is why
Empedocles omits (creation of sky) in the time of Love. For he was not able to form
heaven from the separated roots, making a combination through Love. The created
world is composed of separated elements so that it must have come into being from
One and combination.

251

Aristotle claims that Empedocles did not describe the creation of the world sky, earth,
and so on, in the time of increasing Love, that is, from Many to One, because he could
not. According to Aristotle, creation can occur only when the roots begin from a state of
rest and unity, that is, from the One. Aristotle, therefore, clearly believed that the roots
were in motion during the Many.
The solution lies in determining the sorts of motion within each phase of the cycle.
Aristotle distinguishes clearly between the times when Love and Strife are both active,
that is, during the phases of the created worlds, and the times when each dominates, that
is, the One and the Many respectively. The roots are at rest in the One; Love has mixed
the parts until they can be mixed no further and they do not move again until Strife
approaches with his ability to separate the parts from one another. The root parts are in
motion during the created worlds as mortal things come into being and then pass away.
The motion arises from the endless alternation of mixing and separating on the
microcosmic, that is, individual, level. The Many is not subject to such motion during the
dominance of Strife since the root parts no longer mix with unlike parts. The motion is of
a different sort. Plutarch compares the motion of the root parts to the action of the
universe when Platos demiurge is absent:
(Plato Timaeus 53a) before that time (i.e., when the universe was
organized), all these things were is a state devoid of reason or measure. Together with
Aristotles statement that the roots are separate and moving, it seems likely that the roots
are in motion, but not in the same way motion occurs elsewhere in the cosmic cycle.
Wright 1981 (186) proposes that the root parts vibrate, but no hypothesis can be proven
without direct evidence from Empedocles.

252

If the readers intend to learn how to control the world, they must learn first how the
world works. When Empedocles verses are read, the audience should notice how
important the motifs of unification and separation are. Love and Strife unite and separate
respectively the roots through a never-ending cycle from Many when Strife has complete
control over the roots to One when Love dominates and back to Many. Between these
phases Love and Strife both influence and manipulate the roots into the created world and
various compounds such as plants, animals, and men. During these in-between phases,
Empedocles argues in fragment 111 that the mortal gods are able to manipulate the world
just as Love and Strife, the immortal gods do.

253

Conclusion

Empedocles, therefore, does not present himself as a scientist (chapter 1) or a

magician (chapter 2). He describes how the world works, but he does not do so
systematically or without ambiguity. He also claims the ability to perform miraculous
feats such as controlling the weather, but he does not accomplish them as an intermediary
between men and gods as the magicians do. He accomplishes them as a god (chapter 3).
Anyone who is sufficiently pure and sufficiently wise can escape the cycle of
transmigration that all daimones must undergo; once the cycle is escaped, you become a
mortal god yourself and can do what Empedocles promises in fragment 111.
Not everyone, however, is ready for the skills Empedocles promises to impart. He
exploits the model of initiation into a mystery to exclude people who are not part of his
community or who are not wise enough to learn the lessons set out in his verses (chapter
4). First the initiates to godhead must undergo purification. Next they must learn how the
world really works, so that they can manipulate it. Since these lessons have the potential
to be dangerous, this explains the ambiguity that Empedocles employs in his verses. He
seeks to ensure that only those who are sufficiently wise receive the lessons. Empedocles
expects his audience to decode the lessons and, in addition, to continue further
exploration of the world to receive the ultimate revelation, that is, control over the world.
Empedocles never provides a full answer to how one will control the world (chapter
5). What can be determined is the nature of the cosmic cycle as Love and Strife combine
and separate the roots fire, air, water, and earth into various phases: from the Many to

254

a world that supports life, to the One, to another living world, and then back to the Many
to begin again. The secret to controlling the world is to mimic the actions of Love and
Strife since they are the only active agents of change. Unfortunately for us, Empedocles
never says how the mortal gods can act like them.

255

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