International Society for Fair Elections and

Democracy (ISFED)
Analysis of the Draft Law on Local Self-Governance, International
Experience and Recommendations

January 2014
Tbilisi

International Society for Fair Elections and Democracy (ISFED)

Author: Nino Samvelidze

Responsible for Publishing: Nino Lomjaria

Research was carried out with the financial support of National Endowment for Democracy (NED). The views
expressed in the Research belong to the International Society for Fair Elections and Democracy and do not
reflect views of the National Endowment for Democracy (NED).

International Society for Fair Elections and Democracy (ISFED)

Content
I.

Introduction........................................................................................ Error! Bookmark not defined.

II. Increasing the Number of Self-Governing Divisions and Their Staffing ........................................ 5
III. Direct Election of Executive Branch of the Self-Government and No Confidence Vote ............... 9
IV. Financial Independence and Disposal of Property .........................................................................13
V. Staff Reductions .................................................................................. Error! Bookmark not defined.
VI. Regional Self-Government ................................................................. Error! Bookmark not defined.
VII. Public Councils and District Councils ...........................................................................................22
VIII. Legal and Field Supervision of Self-Governments .......................................................................25
IX. Conclusion .......................................................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined.

International Society for Fair Elections and Democracy (ISFED)

I. Introduction
The new law of self-governance has become the focus of not only political but broad public
discussions as well. Over the years municipal authorities have been facing a number of problems,
including the lack of financial resources, dependence on central authorities as key challenges, which
made it hard to determine local needs and generate financial resources needed to meet these needs for
an effective and timely delivery of services at the municipal level.
Effective local self-government is one of the key preconditions for a democratic development
of a country since it is directly related to participatory democracy and the development of civil
society. Problems in self-government called for fundamental changes in the system.
To this end, the government of Georgia initiated in the parliament a draft law of local selfgovernance elaborated by the Ministry of Regional Development and Infrastructure. Much criticism
has been voiced about novelties envisaged by the draft, mostly about possible risks of introducing
these novelties for the country. The statement of Catholicos Patriarch of All Georgia Ilia II triggered a
particular turmoil. According to the statement, certain novelties offered by the new law could have
posed the risk of separatism. Some of these novelties were removed from the initial draft or modified
following discussions and deliberations, causing the difference of opinion about effectiveness of the
reform itself.
According to the authors of the new law, self-governance reform and the novelties offered by
it serve the purpose of democratization and decentralization of the system of public administration
and formation of an effective system of local self-governance, which also envisages increase of their
powers and financial independence.1 The most important initiative proposed in the draft law is the
office of Gamgebeli elected directly for each self-governing community and the office of Mayor
elected directly for each self-governing city. The draft law also increases budget of municipal
authorities and transfers certain category of property available on self-governing territory into the
ownership of local self-governments. It envisages certain changes in competencies and powers of self-

Explanatory note of the draft law of Georgia on self-government

International Society for Fair Elections and Democracy (ISFED)

governments and in mechanisms of supervision.2 The reform also entails various other changes. 40
million laris will be allocated from the budget for implementation of the proposed changes. The
allocated amount will be increased from 120 to 200 million laris by 2017. 3
ISFED shares its position and recommendations about changes proposed by the draft law. Our
recommendations are based on international practice, including compliance of the proposed changes
with the European Charter of Local Self-Government. With respect to applicable international
practice, we focused more on the experience of central European countries in self-government
reforms as they gradually transformed social and soviet system into the system of democratic selfgovernment and their experience is close to the Georgian reality.

II. Increasing the Number of Self-Governing Divisions and Their Staffing

Proposed Changes
Notably, the initial draft envisaged formation of 18 self-governing cities. Cities with
population of at least 15,000 would be granted the status of a self-governing city. 4 According to these
criteria, 13 new self-governing cities would be added to five self-governing cities that already exist.
However, after deliberations criteria for the status of a self-governing city were modified and now
only seven self-governing cities will be added to the existing five. 5 These seven cities will be granted
the status of a self-governing city solely on the basis of the fact that they serve as regional centers.
Following the changes in the criteria, eight cities with population of at least 15,000 will no longer get
the status of a self-governing cities per initial criteria.6

Explanatory note
Self-Government Reform A New Challenge for Georgia by Georgian Times, December 5, 2013, see
http://www.geotimes.ge/index.php/?m=home&newsid=52479
4
Initial draft, Article 3
5
Telavi, Gori, Mtskheta, Akhaltsikhe, Ambrolauri, Ozurgeti and Zugdidi. However, notably the population of Mtskheta and
Amrbolauri is less than the number envisaged by the initial draft
6
Samtredia, Khashuri, Senaki, Zestaponi, Marneuli, Kobuleti, Tskaltubo and Kaspi
3

International Society for Fair Elections and Democracy (ISFED)

The reform will increase the number of municipalities by separating self-governing cities from
municipalities. 7 Pursuant to the new law settlements and agglomeration of settlements will form selfgoverning divisions - self-governing cities and self-governing communities. Consequently, selfgoverning cities and self-governing communities are referred to in the draft law as municipalities.
Agglomeration of historically developed settlements and/or settlements with homogenous social,
economic and natural-geographic characteristics will also be given the status of a self-governing
community.8
Executive authority of self-governing divisions will be vested in Gamgebeli (for communities)
and Mayor (for cities) elected directly for the term of three years (for the term of four years starting
from 2017). Sakrebulo will serve as a representative agency, elected in a secret ballot voting, through
direct, universal and equal elections.9 Further, the new law proposes premature termination of the
authority of Gamgebelis/Mayors through motion of no-confidence discussed in details below.

Comments:
Changes in local self-governance introduced in 2004-2005 established the level of selfgovernments at the level of districts that existed during Soviet times, subsequently creating 69
municipalities. Local geographic, infrastructural or cultural characteristics had no proper role in
municipal division. Consequently, individual municipalities often contained different interests and
needs, which resulted in ineffectiveness of local self-government and poor reflection of interests of
local population in self-government policies. A number of livelihood problems persist in villages and
cities nowadays that remain unresolved due to the lack of decision-making mandate and financial
independence. Municipal authorities are unable to plan infrastructural or urban development
independently as the process of decision-making entails consultations with central authorities and
undergoing of applicable procedures, delaying the process.
The proposed draft increases the number of self-governing cities and plans for optimization of
municipalities. Effective implementation of proposed changes will essentially increase the quality of
7

Explanatory note
Draft law, Article 3
9
Article 20
8

International Society for Fair Elections and Democracy (ISFED)

self-governance and will make it possible to resolve local problems in a timely manner as selfgovernments themselves will be able to make independent decisions about priority projects and most
importantly, they will be able to mobilize adequate financial resources for funding these projects. In
this respect, the key challenge is setting boundaries of new municipalities in a timely manner.
Article 150 of the draft law explains that the Commission for Regional Development of
Georgia will elaborate criteria for territorial optimization of municipalities within the period of one
months after promulgation of the law; based on the criteria, it will elaborate and submit to the
government of Georgia proposals about municipal division within the period of three months after
promulgation of the law. The government of Georgia in its turn will initiate proposal before the
parliament within the period of 15 days.10 In view of this timeframe, implementation of proposed
changes will take 3-4 months. Considering that the government should provide new municipalities
with corresponding infrastructure, it is hard to imagine that the process will be finished prior to 2014
municipal elections. Further, principles of the European Charter should also be take into account,
stipulating that boundaries of local self-governments should be determined based on prior public
consultations11 which also takes time. Therefore, the governmental commission should utilize the
period for elaboration of criteria as effectively as possible and comply with the requirement by
holding meetings with public and taking comments of stakeholders into consideration.

International Experience
In the Post-Soviet space Poland is one of the best examples of optimization of local selfgovernments and boosting of their powers. Up until 1990 Poland had one level of local selfgovernment gmina, central municipal structure of the government. Following the reform
implemented in 1990, gmina acquired more autonomy on resources and in the process of decisionmaking. 12 However, the major turning point was in 1998 when the new reform divided local self10

Article 150
European Charter of Local Self-Government, see http://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBV0002625/geldigheidsdatum_21-12-2013
12
Local Self-Government in Poland by Andrey Kovalchik. Decentralization: Experiments and Reforms by Tams M. Horvth,
Open Society Institute, Budapest, 2000, pp. 217-254
11

International Society for Fair Elections and Democracy (ISFED)

government into three different levels: 2413 municipalities13 (gmina), 379 districts (powiaty) and 16
regions (wojewdztwo).14 These changes significantly increased public trust in local self-government
and improved service delivery procedures. Notably, the reform statistically increased womens
involvement in politics and increased their number in municipal decision-making authorities.15
Reforms affected diversification of political representation and the quality of democracy and
effectiveness for each level of self-government. Changes introduced with the reform reinforced the
role of civil society and their participation. The reform empowered municipalities and helped them
grow into a key pillar of civil society.16 Significant strides were made in the development of
broadcasting and print media; number of non-governmental organizations increased (from 277 in
1989 to 1078 in 1991, 1332 in 1992 and 5,900 in 199717); so did the number of people actively
involved in initiatives of local organizations; as well as the amount of funds allocated by the
municipality for local organizations. Further, in 1993-1997 number of organizations funded from
local municipalities doubled.

18

Optimization of units of self-government and their empowerment

with resources significantly increased civic engagement.

The local self-government reform in Poland in 1990 was revolutionary in nature, while rest of
the changes implemented gradually was part of the reform as a whole. The reform completely
changed the practice of service delivery at the local level; municipal authorities no longer depended
on central authorities and were able to meet local needs in a more effective and timely manner. 19 We
must also highlight some of the challenges faced by Poland in the process of reforming the local selfgovernment system: decentralization was most opposed by the Ministry of Finance that managed
finances before at the local level. The reform was also opposed by politicians whose influence would
be essentially decreased in the process of local decision-making, and labor unions whose role would
weaken following the reform as they served as the only means of dialogue with the central
13

Size of municipality is now 20 000 instead of 40 000 constituents

Administrative division of Poland, see http://ksng.gugik.gov.pl/pliki/podzial_administracyjny_polski_2011-eng.pdf
15
Decentralization and Women's Status in Regional Polish Institutions by Meg Rincker, Women and Politics magazine, 2009,
pp. 46-69
16
Local Self-Government Reform in Poland by Zherzi Regulski, Local self-government and public service reform, Open
Society Institute, Budapest, 2003 , pp.189-192
17
Regulski, p.194
18
Regulski, p.190
19
Kovalchik, pp. 52-56
14

International Society for Fair Elections and Democracy (ISFED)

authorities. 20 Overcoming these challenges took some time but eventually, consensus was achieved
through rigorous consultations with the involvement of all stakeholders.

Recommendations:
Determining boundaries of self-government units and granting them the status in a timely
manner is the biggest challenge. We recommend that relevant government commission
submit to the government its proposals about municipal division in effective time-frame;
boundaries of municipalities should be determined and the status should be granted a month
before scheduling of the municipal elections;
The process of municipal division should be based on active public consultations at the local
level. Appropriate mechanisms of communication should be introduced to ensure public
involvement periodic meetings with public, stakeholders and keeping all stakeholders
informed about outcomes of these meetings on a systematic basis;
The work of the commission elaborating the criteria must be public and transparent; it should
cooperate with members of civil society with appropriate competencies and the ability to
generate mechanisms and ideas to facilitate not only timely implementation of the changes but
will also ensure quality of implementation;
The government in cooperation with the NGO sector and media should work to promote and
raise public awareness about the issue in the shortest timeframe possible.

III. Direct Election of Executive Branch of the Self-Government and No Confidence

Vote
Proposed Changes
20

Regulovsk, p. 23

International Society for Fair Elections and Democracy (ISFED)

10

One of the most important changes proposed by the reform is direct election of executive
branch of municipalities (Gamgebeli/Mayor). According to the new law, executive power is vested in
Gamgebelis/Mayors while Gamgeobas/Office of the Mayor is an institution that supports realization
of powers of Gamgebeli/Mayor. Mayor/Gamgebeli is the highest official of municipality responsible
and accountable before Sakrebulo and constituents.21
Further, the draft law introduces motion of no confidence against Gamgebeli/Mayor, initiated
by more than half of enlisted members of Sakrebulo as well as based on a written petition of at least
20% of registered constituents of the municipality. Written petition will be reviewed by Sakrebulo
within no later than ten days after submission. Gamgebeli/Mayor is defeated through the motion of
no confidence if the motion is supported by two thirds of enlisted members of Sakrebulo.
Mayor/Gamgebeli may file against the no confidence vote in court. If this is the case, s/he gets to
maintain his/her powers and repeat elections will not be scheduled until after the trial.22

Comments
Under the applicable legislation, with the exception of Tbilisi, Mayors in four self-governing
cities and Gamgebelis in districts of Georgia are appointed by Sakrebulo Chairperson with consent of
Sakrebulo. These officials are appointed rather than elected by local constituents and in most of the
cases candidates have been nominated based on their political affiliation, which has drawn a certain
boundary line between the local population and Gamgebelis over the years.
ISFED welcomes direct election of Gamgebelis/Mayors as a way to increase their role of an
executive branch and their responsibility and before local constituents as well as the responsibility to
be accountable. Direct election of executive authorities also boosts quality of democracy and public
trust in elected officials. Direct elections will create closer ties between constituents and elected
officials (Mayors/Gamgebelis), reducing their dependence on central authorities and the ruling
political force, and ensuring their stable functioning.

21
22

Draft law, Articles 45 and 46

Article 48

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As to the motion of no confidence, we believe that it diminishes the importance of direct

elections of Mayor/Gamgebeli. Consider an example of parliament defeating the government through
the motion of no confidence. The key difference is that the government has been approved by the
parliament itself, as opposed to directly elected by constituents. There is no such relationship
between Sakrebulo and Mayor/Gamgebeli as the letter is delegated with the mandate by constituents.
Motion of no confidence is different from impeachment as the latter involves commission of a crime
or violation of the Constitution. Subsequently, defeating Mayor/Gamgebeli through motion of no
confidence violates the principle of direct elections and key objective of the decentralization reform
to increase citizen engagement in local self-governance. Furthermore, there is a risk of abusing the
mechanism for political influence; additionally, the latest changes do not envisage grounds for
appealing the no confidence vote in court.

International Experience
Procedures and mechanisms of motion of no confidence against Mayors differs across the
countries, and there are three different ways of initiating the motion: voter signatures (followed by
referendum), decision of court about the petition of a council and referendum. The research has
illustrated that in European countries where Mayor is elected directly by constituents, representative
authorities have the right to raise motion of no confidence against Mayor/Gamgebeli without
referendum or courts decision.
2002 reform in Poland introduced direct election of Mayors increasing democratic nature of
the institute, status of the office and simplifying the process of decision-making. As noted above,
municipality (gmina) is the lowest level of self-government where executive power is vested in
Mayors. 23 Considering the number of municipalities in Poland (2478) and the fact that it is the lowest
level in self-government and is the closest to the local population, it is safe to conclude that it best
reflects the principles of participatory democracy considering that Mayors are responsible before each
constituent of gmina. Transformation of local self-governance and the system of municipal elections
has not been easy for Poland as it was criticized by many forces as robust self-government was not in

23

Law of Poland on local self-government, see http://www.urban.org/pdf/pol_locgovfin.pdf

International Society for Fair Elections and Democracy (ISFED)

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their best interests.24 However, introducing direct elections of Mayor significantly boosted public
confidence in municipal government and increased the responsibility to be accountable.
Municipal council in Poland has no right to recall Mayor; however, it is possible to recall
mayor through local referendum. In order to organize such a referendum it is necessary that at least
10% of eligible voters sign the petition. The local referendum in order to be valid requires a minimal
turn-out at the level of more than 2/3 of the last regular elections.25 12 Mayors have been recalled
through referendum since 2010. The mechanism is logically related to the principle of direct election
as it envisages recalling of Mayor by local constituents who have delegated him/her with the mandate
in the first place, and not any other subject that may be motivated by other reasons.
There are two levels of self-government in Hungary municipalities and counties. There are
19 counties and 3175 municipalities in the country. Council of representatives serves as a selfgoverning body of a municipality, led by Mayor directly elected by constituents. Counties have
Assemblies directly elected by constituents, led by President elected by the Assembly itself. 26
Municipality councils are authorized to apply to court for recall of Mayor elected by constituents in
direct elections. If the court finds that Mayor pursued illegal activities or s/he is avoiding the
obligation to make his/her own finances public, s/he will be recalled.27 Another interesting example is
Germany and its federal states or Lander where councils are authorized to motion no confidence vote;
however, decisions are made through referendum in which certain minimum votes are required.28 In
Germany motion of no confidence against Mayor is viewed as a political instrument.29

24

Regulski, p. 48
Global Network of Cities, local self-government in Poland, see http://www.citieslocalgovernments.org/gold/Upload/country_profile/Poland.pdf
26
Self-government in Hungary 2012, Assembly of European Reagions, see
http://www.aer.eu/fileadmin/user_upload/MainIssues/Interinstitutional_Relations/HUNGARY_2012.pdf
27
Local self-government act of Hungary, Article 70. Local Government in Europe: The Fourth Level in the EU MultiLayered System of Governance by Carlo Panara, Michael R. Varney Local Self-Government in Europe: Fourth Level of EU
Governance, 2013, p. 399
28
According to Landers the percentage rate is within the range of 25-50%
29
The direct election and recall of the mayors in Germany: From representative democracy-based to direct democracybased local leadership by Hellmut Wollmann, University of Oslo, 2013, see http://www.uio.no/english/research/interfacultyresearch-areas/democracy/news-and-events/events/conferences/2013/Programme/wollmann-direct-eleciton-of-mayorsdraft.25.12.pdf
25

International Society for Fair Elections and Democracy (ISFED)

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Introduction of directly elected office of Mayor means substituting representative democracy

with direct democracy, key objective of municipal reform for many European countries.
Consequently, recall of Mayor by Council/Sakrebulo, without popular support conflicts with the
principle of direct elections, as noted by many scholars, creating democracy deficit.30

Recommendations:
The mechanism of no-confidence vote against Mayors/Gamgebelis should be removed from
the draft law.

IV. Financial Independence and Disposing of Property

Proposed Changes
Local self-government reform introduces certain budgetary changes. One of the obstacles of
effective functioning of self-government is their lack of financial independence. The new law
increases financial resources of municipal authorities at the expanse of various tax shares and
transfers. The draft introduces local taxes to fill municipal budget together with a share of income tax.
Proportion and mechanisms for distributing income tax between state and municipal budgets as well
as percentage of the whole fund of the equalization transfer to be allocated for municipalities will be
determined by September 2015.31
Municipal budgets in addition to special and targeted transfers will also receive capital transfers as
part of their outside receipts. The capital transfer is carried out from one budget to another budget
for the purpose of implementation of a targeted capital project, which is related to the increase of the

30
31

Ibid
Article 153

International Society for Fair Elections and Democracy (ISFED)

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transfer recipient's non-financial assets.32 The basis for the issuance of capital transfers is the
municipalitys initiative.
Owning a property and having the right to dispose it is important for proper realization of selfgovernance. Management and disposal of property owned by a self-governing unit falls under its
exclusive authorities, also envisaged by the European Charger on Self-Government. The draft law
stipulates that property on the territory of a municipality owned by the Ministry of Economy,
impounded or are considered to be the property of former collective farms will be transferred into the
ownership of the municipality by 2017.33 Transferring the property into the ownership of
municipalities and the income generated from the property will boost financial independence of
municipalities, enabling them to use the resources to better exercise their powers as municipalities
will now have the right to owning and disposing34 their own property. However, it is difficult to
estimate whether municipalities will be able to generate significant revenue from their newly
acquired property.

Comments
There has been the lack of attempts to grow the volume of municipal budgets in Georgia
before the Rose Revolution. Following the Rose Revolution funding for municipal budgets
significantly increased but the amount of funds that municipal authorities were able to make
independent decisions about (i.e. spend independently) was greatly reduced. Further, in some cases
central authorities determined purpose of various funds available for local self-governments.
Subsequently, municipal budgets were not allocated according to local needs which had a direct
impact on effectiveness of municipal governance. One of the criteria for determining effectiveness of
municipal government is its ability to distribute its own financial resources according to local needs
and priorities.

32

Explanatory note
Article 107
34
According to the draft law, disposal of property also entails privatization, transfer with the right of use and transfer into the
ownership of state free of charge
33

International Society for Fair Elections and Democracy (ISFED)

15

We welcome that the draft law proposes changes (capital transfers, elaboration of procedures
and mechanisms for distributing equalization transfer, tax shares and provision of additional
property) that will play important role in increasing financial capabilities and independence of selfgoverning units. However, it is early to estimate the extent to which proposed changes will affect
municipal budgets and whether they are sufficient for meeting the objective local self-governments
meeting local needs and delivering services that are needed.

International Experience
Notably, local revenues in municipal budgets in a number of European countries account for
30-35% of the budget while in countries like France, Switzerland, Sweden, Denmark, they account
for 75% of the budget.35 Local receipts in municipal budgets are directly related to the ability of a selfgovernment to generate necessary finances on its own. Therefore, in countries with high amounts of
local receipts in municipal budgets functioning of self-government is much more effective.
Consequently, leverage and mechanisms of fiscal decentralization should be considered in proportion
to local needs.
An illustrative example of fiscal decentralization is Slovakia where one of the objectives of
fiscal decentralization reform was to increase the share of local receipts and tax shares in municipal
budgets.36 Today municipal revenues in Slovakia are made up of tax shares (70,3% of income tax
remains in local budget), levies, commissions from service and administrative procedures, profit tax,
grants, transfers and loans. There is a special formula for tax shares based on functions of selfgovernment and its mandate.37 Consequently, mechanisms of fiscal decentralization should be taken
into account as much as possible in the process of decentralization.
Municipalities of Poland (gmina) are financially empowered and they are the richest level of
self-government. They have their own diverse receipts and are the only level of government in
35

CoE Local Finance Benchmarking Tool, Centre of Expertise for Local Government Reform, Strasbourg, 2009, see
https://wcd.coe.int/com.instranet.InstraServlet?command=com.instranet.CmdBlobGet&InstranetImage=2318521&SecMode=1
&DocId=2029286&Usage=2
36
Strategy of Slovakias fiscal decentralization reform, see
https://www.finance.gov.sk/en/Components/CategoryDocuments/s_LoadDocument.aspx?categoryId=135&documentId=193
37
Global network of cities, local self-governments, Slovakia, see http://www.citieslocalgovernments.org/gold/Upload/country_profile/Slovakia.pdf

International Society for Fair Elections and Democracy (ISFED)

16

addition to the central government that has the power to levy taxes.38 The most important local tax is
property tax that accounts for more than half of the municipal budget. 39 However, considering that
property tax has always been in the hands of self-government and it does not generate significant
volumes of income, we must think about alternative sources of income or increase share of other
taxes in municipal budgets.

Recommendations:
We welcome the increase of self-government budget but we believe that the extent to which
proposed changes (new tax formulas, modification of shares of capital transfers, equalization
transfers) will increase municipal budgets in general and whether they are sufficient to meet
local needs should be researched, as well as whether separation of budgets of villages and
towns from city budgets will ensure their financial independence.
We believe that concrete formula for calculating share of individual taxes in local and state
budgets, as well as the principle of distribution of equalization transfers should be determined
in a timely manner to allow the analysis discussed in the previous recommendation in a
reasonable timeframe;
It is important to determine and ensure the transfer of property into the ownership of local
self-governments in a timely manner, in order for them to be able to effectively discharge
their legal powers. The process should be conducted with the involvement of all stakeholders.

V. Staff Reductions
Proposed Changes

38

Global network of cities, local self-governments, see http://www.citieslocalgovernments.org/gold/Upload/country_profile/POLAND.PDF

39
Charges in Local Government Services and Budgets in Poland by Piotr Bury, 2008, see
http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/NISPAcee/UNPAN018974.pdf

International Society for Fair Elections and Democracy (ISFED)

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The draft low proposes staff reductions in municipal governments. Number of municipal
employees is determined according to the following criteria: 30 employees plus one employee for
every 500 constituents. Number of part-time municipal employees should not exceed 10% of the
number of employees in Gamgeoba and Sakrebulo office. In self-governing units where 10% of fulltime employees is less than five, number of part-time employees can be increased up to five.40 In this
light, it was estimated that the number of public servants in the regions would be reduced from
13,000 to 8,600;41 however, following the reform (beyond 2017), the number of employees will be
increased again and equal to their initial number. Further, on January 24, 2014, representatives of the
parliament publicly stated that the office of trustees will not be affected by staff reductions. Currently
the number of trustees in various villages of Georgia amounts to one thousand and consequently,
1000 workplaces will be left intact following municipal elections.42 Further, notably the new low
proposes that expenditures for compensating Sakrebulo and Gamgeoba public servants should not
exceed 25% of budgetary expanses of a self-governing unit concerned.

Comments
It is ambiguous as to what the reason for reducing the number of public servants is and
increasing it in 2017. If proposed changes have to do with administrative cuts, it is peculiar that
number of public servants is increased back to their original number in 2017. Further, the purpose of
funds saved by administrative cuts is unclear. There is a risk that proposed changes will trigger a
protest in local population as employment is often one of the issues of concern at the local level. It is
also important that employees are not dismissed on political grounds, which should be controlled
properly.

International Experience

40

Article 155
Explanatory note
42
Guardian.ge, Court to deliver final verdict about termination of authority of elected Mayors and Gamgebelis, January 24,
2014, see http://guardian.ge/48-archeuli-merebisa-da-gamgeblebisathvis-uflebamosilebis-shecherebis-saboloo-msajulisasamarthlo-iqneba.html
41

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In majority of central European countries (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland) municipal

reform focused on capacity building of public servants and consequently, on determining
qualification criteria. Rules and procedures to be met by candidates in order to be hired in public
service was determined. Furthermore, as a result of municipal reform municipal jobs became more
attractive.43 For instance, one of the priorities of local self-government reform in Poland was to
maintain qualified staff and to further increase the level of their qualification. The government
elaborated a concept for ensuring stage by stage capacity building for municipal employees. Number
of municipal employees with higher education grew gradually. Compared to 1990, number of
municipal employees with higher education in 1998 reached 70%. Capacity building for public
servants became a key objective for local self-governments in Poland. Further, employees underwent
various trainings, increasing the level of their qualification and their capacity in order to meet their
new functions introduced with the reform.44 During the reform, similar to other countries it was the
focus of Poland to improve the level of qualification of local self-government employees as opposed to
reducing their number.

Recommendations:
The government should explain the purpose of staff reductions to public, and if it has to do
with administrative cuts, it should specify priorities that the savings will be allocated for;
Criteria that will guide the process of staff reduction should be expressly defined. For
instance, tests can be developed for priority areas to verify qualification and experience of
employees. Results will serve as the basis for staff reductions. Further, the government
should elaborate mechanisms for capacity building, as qualified personnel is one of the key
preconditions for effective self-government.

43

Public Service Administration Reform in Central Europe by Miroslav Beblav, decentralization and public administration
reform in Central and Eastern Europe, Open Society Institute, Budapest, pp. 55-72.
44
Regulski, p. 167

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VI. Regional Self-Government

Changes Proposed
The initial draft introduced regional unions of municipalities for the purpose of ensuring that
interests of member municipalities are reflected in the process of planning and implementing the
development of territories concerned. Boards would serve as a collegial bodies of these unions,
manned by members of Sakerbulo of municipalities within unions (one member of Sakrebulo for
every 10 000 registered voters in each municipality).45 Powers of the board entailed adoption of the
development strategy, election of chairperson and deputy chairperson and recognition of authority of
members and its premature termination.46 However, the most important power of the board was to
initiate a motion to recall the state representative Governor. According to the initial draft,
Governors were accountable not only before the government but also before these boards,
According to the final formulation in the draft law, advisory boards will be set up instead,
manned by Gamgebelis elected directly by constituents of self-governing units on corresponding
territories, Sakrebulo chairperson and their deputies (three representative from each municipality).47
Functions of the board are reduced compared to their original functions as proposed by the initial
draft and entail reviewing of projects proposed by Governor and their budgets, reviewing strategies
for social and economic development of the region and elaborating subsequent recommendations for
submission to Governor. They will no longer have the powers envisaged by the initial draft, including
the power to recall Governor, i.e. the boards functions will be advisory in nature.

Comments
Changes proposed in the initial draft about powers of the regional level of self-government
triggered variety of opinions. Part of political parties and civil society representatives stated that
setting up of regional unions of municipalities is closely linked to formation of autonomous unit and
is suggestive of federalism and therefore, the issue should be examined within the context of
45

Initial draft, Article 169

Initial draft, Article 172
47
Article 145
46

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territorial arrangement of the country and changes in the Constitution. Further, Catholicos Patriarch
of All Georgia stated that the draft would result in dissolution of the country, 48 which triggered broad
discussions. We believe that delegating functions of self-government to regional government in no
way indicates federalism considering that the system is practiced by many unitary states in Europe
and are associated with effectiveness of regional government.49 Furthermore, we believe that
Governor accountable before the regional board as proposed by the initial draft would be free from
political influence of the government and therefore, able to fulfill his/her functions more effectively.
Furthermore, initial draft of the project provided more effective means for checks and balances at the
regional level as the board would be manned by representatives of self-government from various
political forces.
Initiators of the draft law, in consideration of the position of Patriarchy and several opposition
parties as well as civil society representatives decided to make certain changes and abolish elements of
self-government at regional level. According to the final draft, it is the aim of the advisory board to
represent interest of municipality and ensure that these interests are reflected in planning and
realizing of development of the territory concerned. However, benefits of introducing advisory
boards are unclear considering that their functions are purely advisory in nature. It is less likely that a
board with three members will be able to ensure that opinions of minorities and other members of
Sakrebulo (and not only those of Chairperson or Deputy Chairperson) are taken into account.
Further, it is not clear as to what the reasons are for forming a separate agency and spending
resources to have a board that will have no meaningful role in decision-making. Governor
himself/herself can pay a visit to and consult with representatives of other municipalities within the
region. We believe that the board with the competencies that it has will not be able to solve problems
and therefore, will have no meaningful impact.

International Experience

48

Civil.ge Patriarch: New Self-Government Law to Result in Disintegration of the Country, De ember 5, 2013, See
http://www.civil.ge/geo/article.php?id=27635
49
Further discussed in the part about international experience

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There are strong regional units of self-government in some of the unitary countries of Europe
(France, Poland, Greece, Czech Republic, and Croatia). For instance, following a reform in Czech
Republic in 1997, 13 regional self-governments were set up whose representative agencies regional
councils are elected for the term of four years. Regional council is the supreme decision-making
body within the scope of its authority. Council members are elected directly by constituents in a
proportional system by means of a secret ballot. Number of council members depends on the number
of constituents in each region. Executive agency or the board is elected by the council, while board
members elect regional president accountable only before the board and the council.50
Example of Croatia is also interesting. Croatia is a small state but its government is quite
decentralized. There is an administrative unit (county) at the regional level, a self-governing agency
governed by a prefect elected by the regional council. Each region has its own budget adopted by the
regional council. Prefect is accountable before the council within the scope of its authority but it also
oversees activities of the council.51
Regions (wojewdztwo) in Poland are the highest administrative unit of local self-government
in which powers are distributed among self-government and central authorities. Regional council
serves as a self-government agency in the region, elected in direct universal elections for the period of
four years. The council in its turn elects an executive body office of marshal and its chairperson
marshal of the region.52 Council of the region decides about matters of development strategy and
budget of the region. Central government is represented by means of a regional office headed by
Governor of the region appointed by Prime Minister. S/he supervises the work of self-government
and undertakes functions of a coordinator.53 Direct election of regional councils is indicative of the
degree of democracy and legitimization of local authorities. Further, considering the scope of its

50

Global network of cities, local self-governments, Czech Republic, see http://www.citieslocalgovernments.org/gold/Upload/country_profile/Czech_Republic.pdf

51
Global network of cities, local self-governments, Croatia, see http://www.citieslocalgovernments.org/gold/Upload/country_profile/Croatia.pdf
52
Public Investment across Levels of Government: The Case of Wielkopolska, Poland by Marcin Dabrowski and
Dorothe Allain-Dupr, OECD Secretariat, December 2012, see http://www.oecd.org/gov/regionalpolicy/wielkopolskie_edited.pdf
53
Financing of local self-government in Poland by Pyotr Bur and PAvel Svianevich. Financing of local self-governments in
Central Europe by Zelko Sevich, 2008, pp. 319-321

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mandate54, it is safe to conclude that direct election of regional councils ensures that its activities and
strategies are responsive to local needs and improves effectiveness of its work. This way, it empowers
self-government and poses no threat to territorial integrity and sovereignty of a country.

Recommendations:
Ensure better understanding of regional governance and its needs within the context of
self-government reform and determine the scope of authority and competencies of
regional councils. Discussions about powers of a regional council should remain on the
agenda since it is directly related to practicing of decentralization values in the country;
In order for the regional government and the office of Governor to be effective in the
future, a mechanism of checks and balances must exist, which the initial draft endorsed.
The institute of Governor, its functions and the scope of the authority should be revised in
frames of the constitutional reform.

VII. Public Boards and District Boards

Proposed Changes
The initial draft established public boards at rural level to participate in the process of
elaboration of strategic development of villages and their budgets, selection, planning and monitoring
of implementation of projects.55 Thus, it would serve as mechanism for participation in addressing
issues of local importance. The supreme body of the board was general assembly led by a chairperson
elected by the assembly.56 Establishment of public boards was postponed for now in the parliament
and it was stated that the government will revisit the issue probably before 2015.

54

Polish law on local self-government, see

http://www.urban.org/pdf/pol_locgovfin.pdf
55
Initial draft, Article 93
56
Initial draft, Article 95

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Further, the initial draft created district boards in Tbilisi for identifying needs of local
population and defend their interests. District boards were authorized to prepare and approve project
proposals, raise the issue of liability of Governor, convene extraordinary meeting of Sakrebulo and
discharge other delegated powers.57 However, similar to public councils, setting up of district councils
was also removed from the draft law.

Comments
We believe that public councils in rural areas is a mechanism to achieve most important goal
of self-government active citizen participation. Public councils would increase opportunities for
local population to get more actively involved in selection and implementation of priority projects.
Even though the initial draft did not provide explicitly powers of these councils, i.e. whether they
would have a decisive role in reviewing and selecting projects, and left room to improving other
technical issues, 58 it provided a mechanism for direct participation of local population in the process
of resolving issues of local importance.
We believe that public councils will make it easier to determine local needs and will promote
adequate decision-making. Active participation of local population in approval of projects will
increase transparency of the process, degree of legitimization of changes and help mobilize
knowledge in concrete spheres as a necessary precondition for changes to be successful.
As to setting up of district councils in Tbilisi, we believe that it would have empowered local
self-government mechanisms in the city. Even though Tbilisi has quite large and politically most
active population, local self-government mechanisms are poorly developed and mastered, preventing
population from having their own priorities reflected in Gamgeoba agenda. Therefore, in
consideration of functions of district councils, we believe that they would have increased local selfgovernment mechanisms in the city.

57

Initial draft, Article 69

The draft law explained that initiative group with at least ten members (registered voters) had the right to motion for setting
up of a public council; however, it did not specify the number of groups that could petition to Gamgebeli for setting up the
council
58

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International Experience
Slovenia has mechanisms similar to the ones proposed by the initial draft; in particular, local
self-government law in Slovenia allows having lower levels of self-government in municipalities or
public councils, which entails delegation of certain competencies to these councils and their
engagement in administration of matters that they are directly concerned with. Such mechanism also
exists in the city: there are seventeen unions in Ljubljana that function as legal entities of public law.
It was introduced following the referendum in 2000 in which the idea was supported by constituents.
Members of councils are elected by constituents registered in certain settlements. Competencies of
councils

include

participation

in

solving

problems

and

elaboration

of

applicable

recommendations/opinions. The council receives petitions from citizens that it refers to competent
agencies for consideration.59

Recommendations:
The idea should not be abandoned but further deliberated as public councils are a
mechanism for ensuring direct participation of citizens in the process of decision making.
Councils should be formed and developed on a stage by stage basis. It is particularly
important to provide clear definition of the scope of their competencies and their role in
decision-making process. This way, it will ensure that future projects are responsive to
interests and priorities of local population. A separate draft law should be elaborated about
public and district councils based on close consultations with the population and civil
society organizations. Further, a transitional provision can be formulated stipulating that
the government commits itself to presenting the draft law to the parliament by the end of
next year;
Large-scale campaigns raising public awareness about functions, purpose and mandate of
these councils must be conducted to ensure that the initiative is successfully translated into
practice.
59

The System of Local Self-Government in Slovenia by Stane Vlaj, see

http://en.iju.hr/ccpa/ccpa/downloads_files/02%20Vlaj.pdf

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VIII.

25

Legal Supervision and Field Supervision of Self-Governments

Proposed Changes
Final draft of the law delegates the government of Georgia with the function to supervise selfgovernments. A supervising body has the right to evaluate normative acts issued by municipalities
within the scope of their authority and take appropriate measures in compliance with applicable
procedures.60 Administrative and legal acts issued by a municipal agency in frames of the power
delegated to it falls under Field supervision exercised by relevant Ministry that establishes advisory
instructions, requests access to information, inspects and issues instructions, suspends or repeals
administrative-legal acts and substitutes a self-governing agency.61

International Experience
There are different models of supervision in Europe. For instance, central supervision in
Latvia, Czech Republic, Hungary and Romania is exercised by ministries that specialize in
corresponding areas, with leading roles played by the Ministry of Internal affairs in Hungary and
Czech Republic and the Ministry of Regional Development in Romania and Latvia in legal and field
supervision.62 Finland practices a different system characterized with strong decentralization. For
instance, local self-government in Finland is completely independent from the central government
and has autonomy. Municipalities have the right to conduct their administrative and financial matters
independently. The central government engages in supervision only in exceptional cases as prescribed
by applicable law. In particular, regional office of the state is authorized to resort to its function of
supervision only when there has been a complaint lodged against the municipality over alleged illegal
actions. Such complaint can be lodged by an individual but it does not serve as grounds for filing in
60

If supervising agency finds that the normative act in question violates principles of constitution or citizens rights and
liberties, it can file in court
61
Article128
62
Institutional Models of Local Leadership: Comparative Analysis by Agnieszka Pavlovska and Katarzyna Razik, see
http://www.dsp.unito.it/download/summer_paper_radzik.pdf

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court. Regional office of the state can issue instructions only, saying that the municipality should
meet its obligations prescribed by law. It may also order a fine against the municipality but the
central authorities have no right to terminate the mandate or dismiss the elected body or individual at
the local level. Supervision of functioning and public service delivery by municipalities falls under
the purview of parliamentary ombudsman in Finland; however, ombudsmans powers are limited to
issuing a recommendation, a reproof or motioning for a criminal punishment if s/he is able to prove
that an agency or an individual concerned has violated law.63
In Czech Republic the system of local self-government entails independent, delegated and
state-delegated competencies. Control and monitoring of own competences of regions and
municipalities are entrusted to the Ministry of Interior. Municipalities fulfilment of delegated
functions is controlled by the regional administration, while sectored ministries and other central
agencies control delegated functions of regions. However, there are certain mechanisms in Czech
Republic that ensure open communication and exchange of information between the central
authorities and self-governments, including regular meetings and consultations between
representatives of central authorities and representatives of self-governments from all levels. Further,
meetings between sector specialists from local and central authorities are held on a systematic basis.
Notably, there is a union of municipalities and cities in Czech Republic defending interests of local
self-government and manned by representatives of municipalities. Key objective of the union is to
defend interests and rights of self-government and lobby their goals at the central level. Further,
there are hundreds of unions at lower level with the aim of setting goals within the exclusive powers
of local self-government and lobbying their interests.64
Practice of suspension or repeal of legal acts varies according to countries, so does the type of
courts that determine lawfulness of acts. For instance, in Spain, Portugal, France and Hungary
compliance of normative acts with applicable law are determined by court, while in Germany and
Poland supervisory agency examines lawfulness of acts and issues resolutions about their suspension

63

Finlands parliamentary ombudsman, see http://icoaf.org/docs/Finland/parliamentary_ombudsman_finland.pdf

Global network of cities, local self-governments, Czech Republic, see http://www.citieslocalgovernments.org/gold/Upload/country_profile/Czech_Republic.pdf
64

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or repeal while local self-governments have the right to file in court against resolutions of a
supervisory agency.65

Recommendation
The Ministry of Justice should play greater role in the process of legal supervision. Within the
scope of its competencies the Ministry of Justice will be better able to elaborate legal findings
and prepare recommendations considering that it has the practice and can tackle the task more
easily;

IX. Conclusion
The idea of effective implementation of local self-government is the most important value
based on the principles of democratic governance. It allows citizens to participate in planning and
administration of matters of local importance, while local authorities with high degree of
legitimization and a strong mandate serves as a guarantor of proper development of mechanisms for
participatory democracy at the local level. We believe that self-government is the main pillar of
democratic development of a country allowing citizens to exercise their rights as guaranteed by the
Constitution of Georgia and the European Charter of Self-Government ratified by Georgia, which
entails active participation in the process of decision-making in view of local needs and priorities.
Meaningful local self-government means that self-government authorities are acting in view of
interests of local population, are independent of the central authorities and have economic
independence and a broad scope of competencies empowered by applicable legal base.
On March 1, 2013, the Government of Georgia adopted the Main Principles of the Strategy on
Decentralization and Self- Government Development of the Government of Georgia for 2013-2014
stipulating that the key principle of the reform is to facilitate vibrant citizenship and civic

65

Competencies of local self-governments in Europe, CoE, see https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=1377639#P282_55171

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participation in governance.66 However, we believe that changes proposed by the latest draft of the
law do very little to realize this objective. We welcome the fact that offices of Gamgebeli and Mayors
will now be elected offices, which greatly promotes the practice of participatory democracy and
increases responsibility of elected official before constituents; however, it is insufficient to increase
citizen participation in local self-governments. One of the mechanisms that would allow realization
of the objective was formation of public councils to promote vibrant citizenship and allow citizens to
play active role in the process of decision-making and priority setting at the local level. Even though
corresponding proposal in the initial draft was in need of improvement to better define competencies
of public councils, it was improvable. Setting up of public boards has been completely removed from
the final draft and we believe that the law will falls short of objectives of the strategy adopted by the
government itself considering that these mechanisms were to facilitate direct citizen participation in
the work of self-government. Further, by introducing the option of no confidence vote it violates the
principle of direct elections considering that direct elections are related to the higher degree of
citizen participation while dismissal of Mayor/Gamgebeli by Sakrebulo diminishes the principle of
direct and participatory democracy in importance. Therefore, discussions should continue to
implement the reform initiated by the government on a stage by stage basis.
Notably, according to the strategy adopted by the government, key strands of the local selfgovernment reform included 1. Formation of public self-government for each settlement; 2.
Territorial optimization and empowerment of municipal self-governments; 3. Introducing elements
of self-government in regional authorities; 4. Creating effective mechanisms of state supervision; 5.
Providing legal, technical and resources support to the process of reforming.67 Mechanisms envisaged
by the final draft are inadequate for full realization of these objectives. The only objectives realized
are direct election of Mayors and Gamgebelis and increasing the number of self-governing cities.
It is essential to evaluate whether final draft of the law is fully in line with the objectives of
the reform. Further, legislative base should be elaborated in consultation with civil sector on a
systematic basis and their comments must be taken into consideration. It is also important to conduct
66

Main Principles of Decentralization and Self-Government Development of the Government of Georgia, see
http://droa.ge/uploads/files_5_1.pdf
67
Local self-government advisory board, project titled It is Time of Self-Government, see http://droa.ge/?menuid=6&lang=1

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a campaign for raising public awareness about self-government principles and its goals/objectives.
Further, technical support works should be accelerated and the timeframe for elaborating changes to
be introduced prior to the elections should be reasonably reduced.