PART ONE:

INTROCUTION TO THE STUDY OF

CIVIL LAW PROPERTY

1 September 2004
Legal terminology: proper use is very important. There are two levels of duality of language in Quebec:
There are two languages (English and French)
There are two terminologies: one of CVL and one of CML (different legal traditions).
CVL: is not entirely in the CCQ. It is influenced by the Roman law (the law that applied to the citizens of
Rome).
Law = droit ; lois
Property = right (droit) : droit objectif = the law
Droit subjectif = the rights of the individual
=biens; proprit (only one kind of property: ownership)

CHAPTER I:
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Justinians Institutions represented the main influence on the European Romano-Germanic legal system.
It was read by the scholars and the institutions were borrowed in the Middle Ages.
In the Middle Ages the notion of ownership as understood in the Roman Law replaced the feudal law of
property.

CHAPTER II:
THE THEORY OF PATRIMONY
patrimoine (sustainable development) = heritage
Patrimony is a civil law concept. It serves structural purposes (to classify the rights of a person) and
embodies an economic reality (a persons property is used to pay the debts of tat person).
II.1 ORIGINS OF THEORY:
The concept didnt exist in the Roman law as we understand it today in the CVL tradition
The notion and definition of patrimony is relatively recent (see p.25 CP)
The concept originated in Germany (author: Zachariae) in 1810. Aubry & Rau brought it to France
later on. It was fast accepted by all the CVL countries. Actually, as an idea, a feeling, it existed before
that explains the fast acceptance.
Zachariaes theory (adopted by Aubry et Rau): thorie personnaliste/subjective: le patrimoine comme
manation de la personnalit
The usual difference between the French law tradition and the Germanic legal tradition can also be
seen in the approach to the theory of patrimony (see text 2)
Aubry et Rau: criticized as too abstract the objective theory of patrimony (thorie de laffctation)
II.2 DEFINITION OF PATRIMONY:
The CCQ provides no definition of the term, but mentions the notion. The CCQ adopts the objective
view, as it recognizes the patrimony without a subject
2 Every person has a patrimony. The patrimony may be divided or appropriated to a purpose,
but only to the extent provided by law.
302 Every person has a patrimony. The patrimony may be divided or appropriated to a
purpose, but only to the extent provided by law.
2644 The property of a debtor is charged with the performance of his obligations and is the
common pledge of his creditors.
2645. Any person under a personal obligation charges, for its performance, all his property,
movable and immovable, present and future, except property which is exempt from seizure or
property which is the object of a division of patrimony permitted by law.
However, the debtor may agree with his creditor to be bound to fulfil his obligation only from
the property they designate.
This last article is as close as the CCQ gets to a definition of the patrimony.
Aubry et Rau: ensemble des droits dune personne, envisag comme formant une universalit de
droit (p.25)
Ghestin : le patrimoine est universalit de droit, donc ensemble des droits et charges, actuels et
futurs, dans lequel les droits rpondent des charges (p.28-29) (legal universality)
Legal universality = grouping of rights and obligations in which the rights guarantee the obligations (see
art. 2644 CCQ):
Le patrimoine doit tre considr sans sarrter a prendre en compte sa composition. Les
fluctuations dans la composition du patrimoine nentranent aucun effet sur son existence (S.N.)
3

De plus, le patrimoine ne se limite pas aux lment qui sy trouvent a une poque dtermin, il
prend en compte aussi les biens qui , dans le futur, pourront sy ajouter. (S.N.) : see art. 2645.

Patrimony = legal universality. Within this context, they mean the same thing. But in the CCQ, there are
other uses of the two notions.
e.g.: patrimony as only the whole of rights, but liabilities as well (art.414:family patrimony)
universality as the whole of the assets : de facto universality (when a business without
moral/legal personality is set up)

The legal concept of patrimony formulates an economic reality

Nevertheless, patrimony is an abstract concept. Its content is abstract as well: the patrimony is
composed of rights, not of objects!
Link between rights and liabilities (obligations): essential element of the concept of patrimony. There
are, however, exceptions to this rule.
e.g.: property that is unseizable
Patrimony is a dynamic concept: its content is in continuous movement. It is connected to the legal
capacity of a person to enter a K (which will influence the content of the K/P unless the person
becomes insolvent)
13 September 2004
II.3 ROLE AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE THEORY IN THE CVL TRADITION:
1) Only legal persons and individuals can have a patrimony: this is the rule.
Exception: in Quebec, we recognize the patrimony by appropriation (patrimoine daffectation), that is the
means used in Qc. to introduce the institution of the trust (= patrimoine sans titulaire)
Art.1260: A trust results from an act whereby a person, the settlor, transfers property from
his patrimony to another patrimony constituted by him which he appropriates to a particular
purpose and which a trustee undertakes, by his acceptance, to hold and administer.
= les biens de la fiducie sortent du patrimoine dune personne pour etre transfrs a une fiducie
dont la gestion et confie a un fiduciaire qui ne tire pas davantages personnels de ces biens.
(S.N.)
A trust is different from a foundation (Art. 1256), which has a socially beneficial purpose. The
purpose of the trust is to give limited liability.
The beneficiary of a trust cannot guarantee a bank loan with the assets of the trust (they are not in his
patrimony), but he can guarantee with the revenue from the trust.
The trust is a patrimony without a subject: so is it a third subject of law? Can it enter contracts?
Le patrimoine scind est fond sur le but ou laffectation la thorie se distingue essentiellement de
la thorie personnelle (subjective).
Another exception to the principle is the foundation (art. 1256):
1256. A foundation results from an act whereby a person irrevocably appropriates the whole
or part of his property to the durable fulfillment of a socially beneficial purpose.
It may not have the making of profit or the operation of an enterprise as its main object.
2) Each person has necessarily one patrimony, even if he doesnt possess anything:
CCQ art. 2: for natural persons
CCQ, art. 302: for legal persons
4

3) Only one patrimony per person: unity and indivisibility of the patrimony (art.2644) = tout son actif
rpond de tout son passif (Ghestin, p.30)
In fact, there could be certain elements of the patrimony that can be submitted to specific rules.
Also, within the patrimony there are subgroups of assets (e.g.: the business without legal personality)
4) Le patrimoine est incessible entre vifs. La mort dune personne coupe le lien entre le patrimoine et son
titulaire. Les droits extra-patrimoniaux disparaissent avec le dcs de leur titulaire (art. 3(2) CCQ) (S.N.).
15 September 2004
II.4 CLASSIFICATION OF SUBJECTIVE RIGHTS BASED ON THE CONCEPT OF
PATRIMONY:
As consequence of the classification, the rights falling in one or the other of the categories are submitted
to different regimes:
Patrimonial rights:
1) transmissibility inter vivos (by K) and mortis causa (by will)
2) seizability:
Art. 2648. The movable property of the debtor which furnishes his main residence, used by and
necessary for the life of the household, may be exempted from seizure to the extent fixed by the
Code of Civil Procedure, except where such movables are seized for sums owed on the price.
The same rule applies to instruments of work needed for the personal exercise of a
professional activity, except where such movables are seized by a creditor holding a hypothec
thereon.
Art. 2649. A stipulation of unseizability is without effect, unless it is made in an act by
gratuitous title and is temporary and justified by a serious and legitimate interest.
Nevertheless, the property remains liable to seizure to the extent provided in the Code of Civil
Procedure.
It may be set up against third persons only if it is published in the appropriate register.
3) prescriptibility (extinction by non-use): extinctive prescription
There are exceptions to these general rules:
inalienability of property: there are clauses of inalienability that could be stipulated, but the law
doesnt see them favorably :
Art.1212: No restriction on the exercise of the right to dispose of property may be stipulated,
except by gift or will.
A stipulation of inalienability is made in writing at the time of transfer of ownership of the
property or a dismembered right of ownership in it to a person or to a trust.
The stipulation of inalienability is valid only if it is temporary and justified by a serious and
legitimate interest. Nevertheless, it may be valid for the duration of a substitution or trust.
There are patrimonial rights which extinguish with the person (the rights intuitu personae): the
usufruct
The right of ownership doesnt extinguish by non-use
Extra-patrimonial rights:
1) untransmissible: they extinguish with the person.
2) unseizable
5

3) imprescriptible: extinct at the same time with the person. They are not lost by non-use.
Extra-patrimonial rights are recognized in favour of the legal persons as well:
302. Every legal person has a patrimony which may, to the extent provided by law, be divided
or appropriated to a purpose. It also has the extra-patrimonial rights and obligations
flowing from its nature.
:
Criterion for the classification:
Ghestin : evaluation en argent . There are problems with this criterion. Modern times challenge this
classification.
e.g.: the human body s starting to have an economic value
Cumyn: a better criterion: those subjective rights which represent essential values of our society are
extra-patrimonial: citizenship, life, what relates to civil status, family relationships etc.
CONTENT of the category of extra-patrimonial rights:
1. Expression of the respect for the human being
Art.3: Every person is the holder of personality rights, such as the right to life, the right to the
inviolability and integrity of his person, and the right to the respect of his name, reputation and
privacy.
These rights are inalienable.
The rights comprised in the Qc. Charter are a big part of the extra-patrimonial rights. Furthermore, the
preliminary provisions of the CCQ state that the Civil code in harmony with the Charter, governs
persons, relations between persons, and property.
2. Political rights: the right to vote, citizenship, the rights which enshrine democratic values of our society
Art.21 Qc. Charter
Art. 2, 3 Federal Charter
CCQ is organized in 10 Books:
1- persons: mostly extra-patrimonial rights
2- family: mostly extra-patrimonial rights
3-successions.
This is related to the possibility of making a contract: the contract operates mostly in the case of
patrimonial rights. The effect of the K in the domain of extra-patrimonial rights is quite small. There are
big limits to the contractual arrangements in this domain. (see text CP)
Art. 9: In the exercise of civil rights, derogations may be made from those rules of this Code
which supplement intention, but not from those of public order.
Public order appears very much and mostly in the domain of extra-patrimonial rights, more than in the
domain of patrimonial rights.
e.g.: 2632. No transaction may be made with respect to the status or capacity of persons
or to other matters of public order.
Right to inviolability and integrity of the person:
Art.3: Every person is the holder of personality rights, such as the right to life, the right to the
inviolability and integrity of his person, and the right to the respect of his name, reputation and
privacy.
These rights are inalienable.
Art.10. Every person is inviolable and is entitled to the integrity of his person.
Except in cases provided for by law, no one may interfere with his person without his free and
enlightened consent.
6

Therefore, two exceptions are mentioned to the right to personal integrity:

1. The cases provided for by the law
2. The consent of the person: the consent can be withdrawn anytime: see article in the CP. The
experiment shouldnt give rise to any financial rewards. Also, any contractual arrangements
on this matter have to respect public order.
A C.Cass case declared expressly that the human body is unseizable (case of implant operation. The
patient didnt pay for the operation, can the doctor seize the implant? The answer is clearly no: the human
body is unseizable)
2085: A contract of employment is a contract by which a person, the employee, undertakes for
a limited period to do work for remuneration, according to the instructions and under the
direction or control of another person, the employer. limited time is compulsory. That
doesnt mean determined time, it just means that the contract cannot be for life.
541. Any agreement whereby a woman undertakes to procreate or carry a child for another
person is absolutely null.
538-539: assisted procreation
See Deleury et Goubeau: Le droit a lintegrit physique (p.36)
It is included in this category the respect for the body of the person after death. : art.42-49
Right to the protection of privacy and reputation:
Stated:
CCQ: art.3, 35-41 (Chapter III: Respect of Reputation and Privacy) and
Qc. Charter:
Art.4: Safeguard of dignity: Every person has a right to the safeguard of his dignity, honour
and reputation.
Art.5: Respect for private life. Every person has a right to respect for his private life.
Art.7: A person's home is inviolable.
Art. 8: Respect for private property. No one may enter upon the property of another or take
anything therefrom without his express or implied consent.
Art.9: Right to secrecy. Every person has a right to non-disclosure of confidential information.
No person bound to professional secrecy by law and no priest or other minister of religion
may, even in judicial proceedings, disclose confidential information revealed to him by reason
of his position or profession, unless he is authorized to do so by the person who confided such
information to him or by an express provision of law.
Duty of tribunal: The tribunal must, ex officio, ensure that professional secrecy is respected.
Art.9.1: Exercise of rights and freedoms. In exercising his fundamental freedoms and rights, a
person shall maintain a proper regard for democratic values, public order and the general
well-being of the citizens of Qubec.
In this respect, the scope of the freedoms and rights, and limits to their exercise, may be fixed
by law.
Exceptions: No invasion of the right to privacy is possible unless:
It is provided by the law or
There is personal consent
SOQUIA(App) v. Robert Libman (Resp) [1998] CQ
Facts:
Socomer, a private enterprise, had some dealings with Socit Quebecoise dinitiatives agro-alimentaires (a

public organism)
After Socomer ceased its activity, Libman requested access to the financial documents of Socomer from
SQUIJA
The Commission dacces a linformation ordered SQUIJA to transmit the documents
SQUIJA appealed the decision of the commission
Issue: does a ceased enterprise have the right to the protection of the secret of its financial documents?
Held: Yes
Reasoning/ Ratio:
The financial information about an enterprise is protected by the right to respect of private life (art. 5 Qc.
Charter), which belongs even to legal persons.
The secret of the financial information is therefore an extra-patrimonial right of the company (the right to
respect of the private life).
The right to respect of the private life does not cease with the end of the enterprise.

27 September 2004
Torrito v. Fondation Lise T.
Two sets of infringement
o on the privacy of the child (by taking pictures) sue in the name of the child and
o after the death, towards the parents by the use of the pictures etc of the child privacy
can be infringed through an infringement towards another person
none of the arguments brought by the defendant are given any weight by the Court: good faith of the
act is not taken into account, and the purpose to which the picture was used has no weight in the
reasoning. The argument of public interest is not taken into account (maybe because the necessity that
there be a big enough group of people touched by this decision to make it public)
Laoun v. Malo
CCQ art. 36: relevant here and bases the decision: Every person has a right to the respect of his
reputation and privacy. No one may invade the privacy of a person without the consent of the person
unless authorized by law.
The breach should therefore be authorized by the law or by the plaintiff (consent). Could we think in
this case that the plaintiff implicitly authorized it before? The Court does not think that this could be
presumed.
Good faith has no effect in this case either
Consent is not presumed
Laoun(App) v. Malo (Resp) [2003] CAQ
Facts:
Laoun is distributor of Silhouette glasses frames, for whom Malo has made a commercial in 1990
Laoun gives the photo of Malo to Larosse, the editor of a commercial annauaire in which Laoun wanted to
promote his enterprise (so uses the photo for another purpose than that for which consent was given)
Malo sued Laoun for the prejudice caused by the use of her image for promo without her consent
Issue: did Malo give up her right to the protection of the image (droit a limage) by consenting to have her image
used in the Silhouette promo?
Held: No
Reasoning:

The right to image is untransmittable in Qc civil law, so Malo couldnt have given it up
Laoun should have asked for her consent when using her image for the Larosse promo, but he didnt
patrimonial and moral damages.

Ratio:

The right to image is untransmittable in Qc CVL

The right to image has a patrimonial and an extra-patrimonial component and it is part of the right to
the respect of the private life (art. 5 Qc. Charter)
Any use of the image of a person (no matter how famous that person is) is submitted to her consent. The
consent cannot be presumed

The two decisions go in the same direction: limiting the terms of the contract permitting breach of the

right to image.
The contracts of publicity:
It is not transmitting the right, but the use of it.
This person is renouncing the legal protection of privacy (a basic, fundamental value) this is why
the contract has to be interpreted narrowly.
Laprairie Shopping Center Ltd. v. Pearl
The issue of the right to confidentiality (art.9 Qc. Charter) property or not?
Laprairie Shopping Center Ltd. (Syndic du) v. Pearl [1998] CAQ
Facts:
Pearl has been the lawyer of Laprairie Shopping Centre Ltd., who went bankrupt
The syndic of the bankrupt company (socit en faillite) LSCL asked Pearl to disclose some secret
information about his client, but P. refused invoking the professional secret
The syndic claimed he renounced the right to professional secret in the name of the LSCL
Issue: is the right to professional secret transmitted to the syndic when the company goes bankrupt? Is the right to
confidentiality property or not?
Held: No. No
Reasoning:
The syndic (trustee in bankruptcy) is not a continuation of the legal personality of the company for other rights
than the patrimonial ones
Only the patrimonial rights of the company are transmitted to the syndic
The right to professional secret is an extra-patrimonial right, therefore untransferable
Therefore the syndic didnt receive the right to professional secret from the bankrupt company, so he couldnt
waive it
Ratio:
The right to the respect of professional secrecy (art.5 Qc. Charter) is an extra-patrimonial right, therefore
untransmittable.

Right to respect of family relations:

= the reciprocal rights and obligations between family members
Stated:
CCQ: art.32- 34 (Book one, Title I, Chapter II: Respect of Childrens rights) and art.585-596
(Book II: Family: Title 3: Obligation of Support)
Art.585: Married or civil union spouses, and relatives in the direct line in the first degree, owe each
other support.
9

Qc. Charter : art. 39 to 48 (Economic and Social Rights)

Generally, this obligation is fulfilled voluntarily in the family. When not the obligations take the form
of alimony payments.
The establishment of the amount: criteria established in the CCQ, art.
Problem: is there a patrimonial or extra-patrimonial right to alimony?
Ghestin : Il ne sagit pas dun droit moral, mais bien dun droit a finalit conomique. Plac hors
commerce, il chappe donc a la corrlation avec le passif du patrimoine (p.37: point 207)
This is actually not very different than the other cases. Any violation of an extra-patrimonial right is
sanctioned by money, but we dont see the money as the price of the right.
The pensions have the regime of extra-patrimonial rights: extinguished by death, cannot be
transmitted , unseizable etc.
Exc.: 684: Every creditor of support may within six months after the death claim a financial
contribution from the succession as support.
The right exists even where the creditor is an heir or a legatee by particular title or where
the right to support was not exercised before the date of the death, but does not exist in
favour of a person unworthy of inheriting from the deceased.
Conclusion: the placement of certain rights outside the patrimony is not neutral. It is a question of public
policy, an intention of the law to protect these rights.

REVIEW PART I:
Subjective rights (of a person- human or legal person, or of a trust):
o Patrimonial rights: property
o Extra-patrimonial rights: art.3 Qc. Charter, book I and II CCQ. Can only belong to
persons, not to trust as well. Furthermore, extra-patrimonial rights are innate, while
patrimonial rights are acquired.
Patrimony:
o Rights/ property
o Obligations 2644: The property of a debtor is charged with the performance of his
obligations and is the common pledge of his creditors.

10

PART TWO:

CLASSIFICATION OF PROPERTY
(PATRIMONIAL RIGHTS) AND
OF THINGS

11

29 September 2004
CHAPTER I:
DISTINCTION BETWEEN REAL RIGHTS, PERSONAL RIGHTS,
INTELLECTUAL RIGHTS
The definitions given by Carbonnier, Ghestin, Jobin are different:
Carbonnier: Droit rel= le pouvoir juridique qua une personne de retirer directement tout ou une
partie des utilits conomiques dune chose. Le contact est immdiat entre la personne et la chose.
Droit personnel= pouvoir juridique qui permet a une personne (le crancier) dexiger dune autre
personne (le dbiteur) une prestation, un service, consistant a donner, a faire, ou a ne pas faire quelque
chose.
Baudoin : Droit rel= droits patrimoniaux qui sexercent directement sur une chose ou un objet
(normalement il sagit dun bien corporel et dtermin). Caractristiques : opposable a tous, droit de
de suite, droit de prfrence.
Droit personnel= droits patrimoniaux qui permettent a leur titulaire (le crancier) dexiger dune
autre personne (le dbiteur) une prestation.. Il existe un triptyque : le crancier, le dbiteur et un objet.
I.1 REAL RIGHTS (jus in re)
Real right (jus in re)= has a thing as its object and establishes a direct and immediate link between the
titulary of the right and the thing.
= le droit quune personne a directement sur un bien, corporel ou incorporel, mobilier ou immobilier. Le
titulaire dun droit rel tire directement avantage du bien objet de son droit sans devoir recourir a
lintervention dune autre personne.(S.N.) Cumyn does not accept the possibility of an incorporeal
object as the object of the real right.
Characteristics:
The object of the right is a material, corporeal object. Carbonnier agrees on this point. Baudoin and
Jobin introduce the possibility of an incorporeal object. This issue is debatable: recently appeared
intellectual property is placed by some in the category of real rights.
Two components: the titulary of the right (person or trust) and the object (between which it
establishes an immediate and direct link). This legal relationship that it establishes between the two is
direct, without intermediary. This is less obvious in the case of the dismemberments of ownership. No
obstacle (except the legal incapacity) can intervene in this direct link.
RGIME JURIDIQUE:
953. The owner of property has a right to revendicate it against the possessor or the person
detaining it without right, and may object to any encroachment or to any use not authorized
by him or by law.
1. Opposabilit = facult du titulaire dopposer son droit erga omnes, de faire valoir son droit de
proprit et se dfendre de tout empitement caus par toute autre personne (art. 953)
Limite (dans la vue de F. Terr) : lopposabilit est soumise dans le cas des biens immobiliers a la
condition de la publicit (art. 2938)
12

2. Droit de suite = droit du titulaire de suivre son bien et de la revendiquer du possesseur ou de celui qui
le dtient sans droit.
Ne peut pas tre tabli par convention
3. Droit de prfrence = sil y a conflit entre le titulaire dun droit rel et le titulaire dun droit
personnel, a propos dune chose, le premier, ayant un droit absolu, sera prfr au second. (F. Terr)
e.g. : droit du crancier hypothcaire par exemple dtre prfr a tout autre crancier chirographaire.
4. Facult dabandon
I.2 PERSONAL RIGHTS OR DROITS DE CRANCE (jus in personam)
Personal right (jus in personam) = describes the legal relationship between two subjects: one, the
creditor is thereby able to obtain from the other, the debtor, the performance of a service or the execution
of a prestation.
= un pouvoir reconnu a une personne dexiger un bien ou un service dune autre personne (S.N.)
Characteristics:
What is included in this category of personal rights is the exchange of services between two subjects.
There are three components: the creditor, the debtor and the prestation (the service that must be
performed by the debtor).
[obligation in CVL = debt, even if it is not a prestation in money]
The obligation can be: to do something, to transfer something or not to do something (to abstain from
something)
[there are different uses of the word personal]
The object (the prestation) can only be obtained from the debtor inopposabilit (as opposed to real
rights)
4 October 2004
Ouimet (P) v. Guilbault(D) [1972] C.S. (p.108)
Facts:
O and G. have signed a promise of sale (promesse de vente) of a property from G to O
The property was expropriated from G before the sale was completed
O sues G for compensation
Issue: Is G liable to O for is promise even though he no longer owns the property?
Held: Yes
Reasoning:
The promise of sale is not transferring property: it creates an obligation to do, not an obligation to give
The expropriation affected the real rights of G. but not the personal rights and his obligation
Expropriation is force majeure and it affects the possibility of transferring ownership
G was cited (mis en demeurre) by O before the expropriation his obligation was not extinct by the force
majeure
Ratio:
The promise of sale and the sale dont have the same object: in the sale, the debtor promises to give an
object, to transfer ownership while in the promise he promises to pass a titre de vente to the other
(passation de titre conforme) difference between petitory action and action in passation of title
(personal action)
Rights created (transferred) in the sale K are real rights, rights created by a promise of sale are personal
rights
The expropriation is a cas de force majeure (superior force), but it only affects the right of ownership, not
the promise to pass a titre conforme.

13

Comments:
The judge starts from the definition of the K of sale: CCQ art.1708. Sale is a contract by which a person, the seller,
transfers ownership of property to another person, the buyer, for a price in money which the latter obligates
himself to pay. object: transfer ownership different from a promise of sale (which gives a personal right, not a
real one)

I.3 COMPARISON BETWEEN REAL RIGHT AND THE PERSONAL RIGHT:

Both are patrimonial rights

Object

REAL RIGHT
Determined, specific, and real it must be a
thing that exists
e.g.: sale of a house that will be built in the
future doesnt create a real right, it is a
mere promise to transfer property in the
future.

PERSONAL RIGHT
Possible that the obligation be
undetermined at the time of the K (and
still bind the debtor), provided that is
determinable by the term of the K. (art.
1373, 1374 CCQ)
1373. The object of an obligation is the
prestation that the debtor is bound to
render to the creditor and which consists
in doing or not doing something.
The debtor is bound to render a
prestation that is possible and
determinate or determinable and that is
neither forbidden by law nor contrary to
public order.
1374. The prestation may relate to any
property, even future property, provided
that the property is determinate as to kind
and determinable as to quantity.
Source: contracts and torts

Number

1453. The transfer of a real right in a certain

and determinate property, or in several
properties considered as a universality, vests
the acquirer with the right upon the formation
of the contract, even though the property is not
delivered immediately and the price remains to
be determined.
The transfer of a real right in a property
determined only as to kind vests the acquirer
with that right as soon as he is notified that the
property is certain and determinate.
1454. If a party transfers the same real right
in the same movable property to different
acquirers successively, the acquirer in good
faith who is first given possession of the
property is vested with the real right in that
property, even though his title may be later in
time.
Limited in number (principe de Innumerable
lnumeration limitative des droits rels)
The distinction is not all that clear: there is no
list of real rights that mentions the limitation:
CCQArt.1119. Usufruct, use, servitude and
emphyteusis are dismemberments of the right
of ownership and are real rights.
See Mining Act: new real rights granted (real
rights outside the CCQ).
S.N.: au Qc. la doctrine et la jurisprudence
admettent que le nombre de modalits et de
14

dmembrements de la proprit nest pas

limitatif. De plus, la loi peut qualifier de
droits rels certains droits dont elle prvoit la
reconnaissance ou la cration.(p.32)
Moveable/i
May be moveable or immoveable, according The object of a personal right is an
mmovable
to its object
obligation personal rights are
moveable.
Opposability Opposability = the real right creates a direct Inopposability = the creditor may only
and immediate relationship with the object. obtain the prestation from his debtor.
should be respected by everyone else.
Notion connected with the situation of
Droit de suite
insolvency of the debtor no droit de
Droit de prfrence
suite or droit de preference, no facult
1455. The transfer of a real right in an dabandon.
immovable property may not be set up against
third persons except in accordance with the 1440. A contract has effect only between
the contracting parties; it does not affect
rules concerning the publication of rights.
(Art. 2934-2938 CCQ for mode of third persons, except where provided by
law.
publication)
PRINCIPAL and ACCESSORY RIGHTS ON THE IMMOVABLES:
Droits rels principaux = ils ont trait a la matrialit du bien. Le titulaire dun tel droit a donc lobjet
mme de son droit sous sa gouverne.
1) Droit de proprit
2) Les dmembrements de la proprit : usufruit, servitude, emphytose
3) Les droits rels innoms = cres par la loi (v. la Loi des mines)
4) Modalits de la proprit : coproprit et superficie.
Droits rels accessoires = fonds sur la valeur pcuniaire du bien. Le titulaire ne bnficie pas des
prrogatives de la proprit, mais jouit davantage par rapport aux cranciers ordinaires.
Seulement lhypothque
La priorit ne constitue pas un droit rel complet, tant donn quelle ne confre pas de droit de suite
a son titulaire, parce quelle nest pas soumise au rgime de la publicit des droits (art. 2655)
OPPOSABILITY: publication and priority:
Real rights: A buys a piece of land from X in 1980, which is registered. B is the owner of the
neighbouring land and he has a servitude of view (real right) on Xs land, that he acquired from him in
1975 (The servitude is registered). C acquires a usufruct on the land from A in 1985 (registered
immediately). D (the neighbour on the other side) has acquired a servitude of passage from A in 1990
(immediately registered) A and C have to respect Bs right; Ds right is not opposable to C (he
should have granted the servitude as long as he had the usufruct). The other way around, if C would
have granted the servitude, Ds right wouldnt have been opposable to A after C finished his usufruct.
Personal rights v. real rights: In the same case: add E creditor of A (when A purchased the land
from X, E financed him). E also has a hypothque on the purchased land (registered the same day as
the sale).
F: simple creditor of A (entered into K in 1975). G: also creditor of A (relationship dating from 1990).
H: creditor of A ever since 2002.
A becomes insolvent in 2003.
15

Real rights have a date: the date of registration, from which on they are opposable to third parties.
2646. Creditors may institute judicial proceedings to cause the property of their debtor to be
seized and sold.
If the creditors rank equally, the price is distributed proportionately to their claims, unless
some of them have a legal cause of preference.
2647. Prior claims and hypothecs are the legal causes of preference.

Mercier c. Blais [1991] C.A. (p.115-119)

Facts :
D. Mercier owned a chalet that he usually rented
His sister, S.Mercier (the appellant) offered to rent it herself and even mentioned that she would be interested
in buying it
Blais offered to buy the chalet; D.Mercier made him a counter-offer, that B. accepted
S.Mercier was mad because she wanted to keep the property in the family, so she conspired with the family to
create a fictitious option to buy, get D. S.Mercier was mad because she wanted to keep the property in the
family, so she conspired with the family to create a fictitious option to buy, get D. Mercier to sell the property
to her and then register the sale before Blais could find out
Question: Can the court overturn this registration and require that D. Mercier carry out the sale to Mercier?
Held: Yes
Reasoning:
It is obvious from the proof presented that there was no real option to buy created in favour of S.Mercier
So, the sale between D.Mercier and S.Mercier is based on a fraudulent act
The sale is invalid and the registration is rebutted
Ratio:

The fraudulent sale, even if registered, is not valid and can be annulled and the registration can be
rebutted.
Il est ncessaire que lacqureur soit de bonne foi et quil achte pour valables considrations, car, sil y a fraude,
la vente, mme enregistre nest pas valide. (p.118)

6 October 2004

The date at which the personal rights of F, G and H were established are irrelevant (in insolvency
case). The money is to be distributed equally, unless they have some legal cause of preference.

OPTION OF ABANDONMENT (Facult dabandon)

= Feature of real rights, but no of personal rights. The titulary of the real right can abandon his right
without needing any consent. The right extinguishes by abandonment.
Lacte a caractre abdicatif, nest pas translatif dun droit rel. (S.N.)
Lexpression de la volont dabandonner doit tre non quivoque et ne peut pas se prsumer. (S.N.)
Labandon dun droit rel immobilier demande linscription au registre foncier pour etre opposable
aux tiers.
If its a dismemberment, the owner reconstitutes fully his right. It is not considered a transfer.
Usufruct: 1169. A usufructuary may renounce his right, in whole or in part.

16

Servitude: 1185. The owner of the servient land, charged by the title with making the necessary works
for the exercise and preservation of the servitude, may free himself of the charge by abandoning the
entire servient land or any part of it sufficient for the exercise of the servitude to the owner of the
dominant land.
Emphyteusis : Art.1208. Emphyteusis is terminated [] (6) by abandonment.
Personal rights: A creditor cannot renounce to his right without the consent of the debtor remit/
release of the debt (bilateral operation)
13 October 2004
I.4 OTHER SPECIES OF PROPERTY: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY:
Intellectual right describes the relationship between a subject and a creation or a product of the
intellectual activity of that subject.
Object of the intellectual right:
immaterial, abstract. It can be a design, invention, expertise, know-how etc.
The object shouldnt be confused with its support, the material on which is printed (e.g.: a book).
Ghestin: leur objet est une chose incorporelle qui rsulte, dans une mesure variable dailleurs, de
lactivit intellectuelle du sujet.
Art.899 : Property, whether corporeal or incorporeal, is divided into immovables and movables.
Commentaires du Ministre :
La notion de bien n'est pas dfinie, celle-ci tant, dans le Code, utilise gnralement dans son
sens juridique de chose susceptible d'appropriation ou approprie.
Le terme bien englobe en mme temps la chose et le droit que l'on a sur cette chose.
Patrimonial right:
If we apply the criterion mentioned in chapter 1 (the protection of fundamental values and rights by
the extra-patrimonial rights), there is no reason not to qualify intellectual rights as patrimonial rights.
Exception: There are however certain parts of the intellectual rights that qualify as moral rights. This
is an analysis typical to the CVL tradition. The American tradition doesnt recognize moral rights to
authors. The approach is purely economic.
So the intellectual right has a patrimonial aspect and a moral right (which remains with the author
even after death):
Moral rights: Ysolde Gendreau (p.123-134)
Canada is member of the Berne Convention (1886), which recognizes even since 1928 two moral rights:
the right of paternity and the right of integrity. In order to respect its obligations under the Berne
convention, Canada changed its copyright legislation in 1988: the new Copyright Act. The legislator
didnt seek to extend the protection of moral rights beyond the requirements of the Convention.
Moral rights protected by the Act:
a) The right of paternity = the right to be recognized as the author of a work when the work is
disseminated to the public. The right has three forms: the right to have the real name published, the right
to hide behind pseudonym and the right to remain anonymous (s. 14-1).
The right can only be asserted where reasonable in the circumstances.

17

b) The right of integrity = the right to prevent distortion, mutilation or any other modification of the
authors work. It also includes the right to use the work in association with a product, service or
institution (s. 28.2(1)).
Limitation: it is infringed only if the acts have caused some prejudice to the authors honour or reputation.
General regime:
Moral rights are to be exercised by the author (=the person who created the work)
They subsist only for the same term as the copyright in the work
They are inalienable.
Canadian Law:
Copyright is part of the federal competence: p. 137 Copyright Act, Patent Act, Trademark Act
The statutes are based on the copyright legislation (after which the others were copied) the moral
aspect of the right didnt appear until late in Canada.
The Canadian law remains very much bound to the copyright tradition: see p.138, article about the
work made in the course of employment. This creation belongs to the employer (an idea not accepted
in the CVL tradition, where the creation belongs to the creator. The creator cannot be a moral person)
That does not exclude the application of provincial law to the situation. Provincial law applies to all
the situations that are not covered/ provided for by the federal statutory law. The question is then what
kind of right is intellectual right?
The nature of intellectual rights:
Ghestin: nothing in the law constrains us to fit the intellectual right in either personal right or real
right les differences considerable entre un objet materiel et un objet incorporeal interdissent de
calquer sur le regime des droits rels celui des droits intellecteals (p. 121). What they have in
common nonetheless is : he opposability erga omnes.
Nonetheless, CCQ uses the notion of propriet with respect to intellectual rights: Art 458. Intellectual
and industrial property rights are private property, but all fruits and income arising from them and
collected or fallen due during the regime are acquests. But in the English translation we discover that
the notion is used in the sense of property (right) and not ownership. Anyhow, this doesnt prevent us
form creating a special regime for the intellectual right.
Diffusion YFB Inc. c. Les Disques Gamma Lte. [1999] C.S. (p.135-136)
Facts :
E. Lapointe granted to Disques Gamma the rights to all his future creations in 1994
In 1996, L and D.G. had a transaction through which D.G. gave up the rights under the condition to still get a
certain % off the material copyrights off his future works, until a certain sum was reached
In 1998 Diffusion YFB is granted by L a 5 years exclusive right to exploit his future creations
DG asks for a certain percent from these rights
DYFB is contesting the validity of the contract signed in 1994 between L and DG
Question: Can the author grant the right to exploit future creation?
Held: Yes
Reasoning:
There is no specific disposition on this in Canadian law the common law of contracts/of obligations will
apply
Art. 1374 CCQ allows for the existence of obligations whose object is a future object
Therefore, the contract signed in 1994 is valid

18

Ratio:
The transfer of the copyright in a future work is valid and it becomes legal and excutoire from the moment
when the work/creation comes into being.
The general law of obligations is applicable in this kind of transfer, especially art. 1374 CCQ:
1374. The prestation may relate to any property, even future property, provided that the property is
determinate as to kind and determinable as to quantity.
Comments (Cumyn):
The judge bases his decision on the law of obligations. He doesnt take into account the real rights law. The
judge is not really applying the legal regime of personal rights (it gives full effect to the transfer in 1994). So,
the judge creates a new rule, a specific regime for the intellectual right.

The good will (-normally achallandage) and know-how:

Goodwill is always transferable when an enterprise is sold etc
The nature of
The contract of transfer usually contain non-competition clauses (limited in time, of course)

19

18 October 2004
CHAPTER II:
THE OBJECT OF REAL RIGHTS: MOVABLES AND IMMOVABLES
CCLC : three cathegories of immovables were listed in art. 375:
Immovables by nature (includes immovables by integration and immovables by adhesion)
Immovables by destination (this is now the category of the immovables by adhesion)
Immovalbes by reason of the objects to which they are attached.
CCQ:
899. Property, whether corporeal or incorporeal, is divided into immovables and movables.
900. Land, and any constructions and works of a permanent nature located thereon and
anything forming an integral part thereof, are immovables.
Plants and minerals, as long as they are not separated or extracted from the land, are also
immovables. Fruits and other products of the soil may be considered to be movables,
however, when they are the object of an act of alienation.
La nature mobilire ou immobilire dun bien est tablie suivant les critres tablis par la loi. Toute
stipulation contraire comprise dans un acte juridique ne pourrait tre oppose aux tiers(S.N.).
Commentaires du Ministre sur lart. 900 :
Le mot btiments (art. 376 C.C.B.C.) est remplac par les mots constructions et ouvrages, de
faon couvrir tout type de structure, incluant les ponts et les rseaux d'adduction et de
distribution d'eau.
La division formelle des immeubles en immeubles par leur nature, par leur destination, par l'objet
auquel ils s'attachent ou par la dtermination de la loi a t abandonne (art. 375 C.C.B.C.).
Le second alina de cet article est nouveau. Il reconnat formellement la catgorie des meubles par
anticipation.
A. Immovables by nature: art.900 new (before the CCLC used the notion of immovables by nature, but
the new code simply makes a list of them. Also building was replaced by construction.) Art.900-901
cover the ancient category of immovables by nature.
Land and any construction and works of permanent nature: The works have to be immobile as well,
linked with the soil. Mere weight is not sufficient. Also, simple ownership of land and the construction
together is not sufficient in order to recognize the construction as immovable.
Plants and minerals: they are integral parts of the land as long as they are not separated or extracted
from it.
o Minerals considered to be the very land
20

Fruits and other products of the soil: movables when they are sold as a crop (sale of a
future object).
Les immeubles par nature comprennent les fonds de terre et les immeubles par adhsion (S.N.).
The issue of permanency: the duration of the incorporation to the soil is not relevant. So long as the
immovable is fixed to the soil, it is still considered an immovable even though the duration is limited. But
we have make the difference between this situation and the one in which the incorporation to the soil is
merely transient (e.g.: the circus) so, the attachment to the soil is not sufficient to make a movable into
an immovable.
Immeubles par adhsion: constructions et ouvrages, a caractre permanent, situs sur un fond de terre
(art. 900 (1)) S.N. :
Critres pour caractriser comme immeuble une construction a caractre permanent :
1) La construction/ouvrage doit adhrer un immeuble (ne peut simplement reposer sur le sol)
2) Doit acqurir par cette adhsion une assiette fixe
Belair. c. La Ville de Ste.-Rose [1922] C.S. (p.151-154)
Facts :
By statute, B. was authorized to build a bridge
The river bed remained Crown land, over which B. owns a servitude
The statute states that he owns the bridge
B. was taxed for the bridge as an immovable
Question: Is the bridge an immovable?
Held: Yes
Reasoning:
The word building (batiment) in art. 376 CCLC should be interpreted largely, to mean structure
It does not matter whether B. owns the bed of the river and the soil to which the bridge is attached
All property is movable or immovable, and a bridge is certainly not a movable
So the bridge is an immovable
Ratio:
The word buildings in art. 376 C.C. may be taken to mean structures and it follows that a bridge
over a river resting on piers is an immovable by nature because it is a structure permanently affixed to
the soil or bed of the river.
The fact that the owner of the soil and the owner of the object affixed to it are not the same has no
importance to the immovable character of the object affixed to the soil.

901. Movables incorporated with an immovable that lose their individuality and ensure the
utility of the immovable form an integral part of the immovable.
902. Integral parts of an immovable that are temporarily detached therefrom retain their
immovable character if they are destined to be put back.
903. Movables which are permanently physically attached or joined to an immovable without
losing their individuality and without being incorporated with the immovable are
immovables for as long as they remain there.
Immovables by incorporation: the expression in art. 900 anything forming an integral part thereof is
explained in detail in arts. 901 and 903. So immovables by incorporation are still immovables by nature.
21

Criteria:
1.Incorporation in the immovable
2.Loss of individuality
3.Insures the utility of the immovable
Commentaires du Ministre de la Justice:
Une chose est partie intgrante d'une autre lorsqu'elle contribue l'intgrit du tout, sans en
constituer l'essence. Cette chose, incorpore l'autre, entre donc comme partie dans un tout et
perd alors son individualit.
La fonction d'une telle chose est d'assurer l'utilit de l'immeuble et d'en faciliter l'usage.
La notion d'utilit est dterminante pour juger de l'incorporation d'un meuble un immeuble.
Nadeau c. Rousseau [1928] QC. (p.153-154)
Facts :
R. installed 2 furnaces in a building
He stipulated that he remained the owner of the furnaces until they were entirely paid
The building was sold and R. was never paid
R. is claiming the value of the furnaces from the new owner
Question: (1) Are the furnaces immovable? (2) Can the parties stipulate that the objects will remain movables?
Held: (1)Yes (2)No
Reasoning:
In the light of the living conditions at the time of the judgment, the building would be incomplete without a
proper heating system
The furnaces form and integral part of the building (which is immovable), which would be incomplete without
them
Ratio:
Un meuble attach a un immeuble devient immeuble par nature, sil y est attach de telle sorte quil en
fasse dornavant partie intgrante, quil soit indispensable a lexistence mme de limmeuble, et que
limmeuble ne soit pas complet sans lui.
The assessment of utility of what a building needs to be complete and of the utility of the movable to the
immovable to which it is attached should be done in light of the economic and social changes. In this light, a
house without a heating system is incomplete.
The immovable/movable character of an object is established by the law and cannot be changed/ established
by the convention of the parties. No stipulation contrary to the dispositions of the CCQ in this area is
accepted.

Horn Elevator Limited c. Domaine dIberville Lte. [1972] CA (p.155-159)

Facts :
H. sold and installed an elevator system to Community Development Ltd. (C.)
In the sale contract, it was stipulated that H. would remain owner of the elevator until it is fully paid
The elevator was installed in a 16-store building sold by C. to D.
C went bankrupt and did not pay entirely the elevator to H
H is revendicating the elevator from D.
Question: Is the elevator installed in a building an immovable?
Held: Yes.
Reasoning:
The elevator system is integrated in the building and it would be very hard to take it out
A 16-store residence building is incomplete without an elevator
The elevator insures therefore the utility of the building, which would be incomplete without it

22

The elevator is an immovable

Ratio:
Si les escaliers sont immeubles comme le btiment dans lequel ils sont construits, il faut aujourdhui tendre cette
conception aux escaliers roulants, mobiles ou mcaniques, et galement dans mon opinion, aux ascenseurs qui
sont installs pour remplir les mmes fonctions. (p.158)
The fact that a certain thing can be easily removed from the immovable to which it is attached should
not be taken into account in assessing whether it is an immovable by incorporation or not.

Cablevision Inc. c. Deputy Minister of Revenue of the Province of Qc. [1978] SCC (p.161-168)
Facts :
C. has a cable distribution network composed of two antennas anchored to the ground along with wires, cables
and al the necessary material
The network is attached to other networks which are immovable by nature
The minister tried to tax C. for the purchase of the network as if it was a movable
C. claims that the network as a whole must be regarded as an integrated system, which is immovable
Question: Is the cable distribution network immovable?
Held: Yes
Reasoning:
The attachment can be examined either horizontally or vertically, here the fact that they are vertically attached
to the ground is enough to deem them immovable.
Cs wires are attached to poles (owned by Hydro-Quebec) that are immovable by nature
It doesnt matter that the poles and the wires dont belong to the same owner
It doesnt matter that they are easily removable or that the poles wouldnt be incomplete without the wires
The wires attached to the poles form a building, a structure in the sense of art. 375 CCLC. It is therefore
irrelevant to ask whether they are incorporated in a building to the point of becoming an integral part thereof.
Therefore the entire C network is immovable by nature
Ratio:
The attachment to the ground can be considered either vertically or horizontally.
The vertical attachment of a network of wires o the ground is in itself enough to make these wires
immovable.
A construction that adheres to the ground is immovable, even if it is not fixed for permanency. It is
enough that the attachment is not purely transitory and accidental.
The separation of ownership is not a physical characteristic, but a legal characteristic, which is irrelevant to
whether a thing is immovable by nature.
Coments:
The antennas were found immovable, even though they had nothing to do with the physical structure of the
building. The physical reality was such that it partook of the immovable nature of the building because it had to be
secured to it (vertical).
The case considers the existence of two types of attachment: horizontal attachment and vertical attachment. The
case does not refer as a ground for the decision to the horizontal attachment. As long as there is a vertical one, the
judge bases on that one, because it is more solid. No case so far that took into account the horizontal connection

The point of departure of a construction is materials. Once they are structured and stuck to the soil, they
become an immovable. That structure is a gathering together of movables.
Problem: how far are we going with recognizing the nature of immovable? Are all the building materials
immovables? What about windows, shutters, elevator etc? They are not building material, but their
23

association with the construction is strong. Court: these elements are not considered in the same
conditions as the construction materials. It was argued that some of them are easy to remove fro the
construction (see Horn Elevator): for example the shutters. This element is not taken into account when
assessing their immovable character.
Other arguments are taken into account: the purpose of the elements.
Art. 901 must be read in connection with art. 956:
956. The owner of an immovable becomes the owner by accession of the constructions,
works or plantations he has made with materials which do not belong to him, but he is bound
to pay the value, at the time they were incorporated, of the materials used.
The previous owner of the materials has no right to remove them nor any obligation to take
them back.
Incorporation in the construction transfers ownership. No contractual clause can overrule this.
B. Immovables by attachment: art. 903: they are not integrated in the construction. This is the ancient
category of the immovables by destination, which the new CCQ does not have anymore. But there is a
difference between this category and the one of the immovables by destination (the new category is
more restrictive): La notion d'immobilisation ne s'tend pas aux meubles qui visent desservir
l'entreprise exploite dans l'immeuble. Elle s'tend aux meubles qui visent desservir l'immeuble
strictement. (commentaires du Ministre de Justice).
In the case of the former article, for an object to be considered to be immovable by destination, an
intellectual attachment/ link to the immovable was sufficient. Art. 903 demands a physical attachment,
link to the immovable.
They can only be seized with the main immobile, the one which they are attached to.
Conditions for a movable to be considered an immovable under art. 903:
1.Physical attachment or jointure to the immovable, physical attachment that may not be an
incorporation and need not imply a loss of individuality, but has a permanent character
2.The movable object must insure the utility of the immovable (this condition was developed by the
jurisprudence, it is not specified in the article). The Courts ask in every case whether the object serves
the utility of the immovable or just of the ones living in it (see Construtek). In the latter case, the object
does not qualify as an immovable by attachment.
Construtek G.B. Inc. c. Laforge [1998] C.Q. (p.171-174)
Facts :
Ls house was sold in an auction to Construtek
Before leaving the house, L removed from it: the refrigerator, the stove the dishwasher, the curtains and the
light fixtures
Question: Are the refrigerator, the stove, the curtains, the dishwasher, the light fixtures immovables by attachment
under art. 903?
Held: Only the light fixtures are immovable by attachment under art. 903.
Reasoning:
Art. 901 does not apply: the objects did not lose their individuality
Art. 903 asks for a physical attachment and for the object to serve the utlity of the immovable to which it is
attached
Only the light fixtures serve the utility of the house. The rest of the objects serve more the utility of the persons
living in the house.

24

Ratio:
Art. 903: le bien meuble doit assurer lutilit de limmeuble par nature afin de lui permettre dtre
fonctionnel et non servir a lutilit de loccupant seulement.
Il faut donc demander si les objets servent la commodit des occupants ou plutt lutilit de limmeuble. Ce
nest que dans la dernire ventualit que des meubles meublants pourraient devenir immeubles par attache ou
runion. (p. 173)
Comments :
The judge uses the dispositions and interpretation of the former code in order to assess the situation in this cause.
The judge decided differently for the chandeliers they serve the utility of the building. Other lights- considered
movable. It is interesting that the criterion used is not physical attachment, but the utility of the building. Problem
with the decision: it does not clearly explain why article 901 does not apply.

Axor Construction Canada Lte. c 3099-2200 Qc. Inc. [2002] C.Q. (p.171-174)
Facts :
A. a retenu les services de 3099 pour linstallation des rampes dune patinoire
Aprs les travaux, 3099-2200 a inscrit une hypothque lgale sur les rampes
A. conteste la lgalit de lhypothque, au motif que les rampes ne sont pas des immeubles.
Question: Est-ce que les rampes de la patinoire sont des immeubles par attache au sens de larticle 903 CCQ ?
Held: Oui.
Reasoning:
Elles sont attaches l'immeuble tout en conservant leur individualit et sans y tre incorpores.
Elles sont attaches demeure puisque le propritaire a l'intention de faire des bandes un accessoire permanent
de la patinoire.
Utilit : la patinoire serait un immeuble incomplet sans les rampes qui permettent l'immeuble de servir aux
fins premires auxquelles il est destin savoir la pratique du hockey.

20 October 2004
Immovables by attachment and immovables by incorporation:
Which ones of the objects associated with the construction can be viewed as part of that construction:
Question very much raised in the former code, never fully solved
New code brings new aspects: eliminates the category of immobile by destination (that could make a
mobile object, that remained al the time mobile, into an immobile object just because it was used in
the exploitation of the immovable by nature. E.g.: truck)
Relevant : arts. 901 and 903 and the articles from the civil procedure code.
Therefore the movable object in cause can become immovable either under article 901 or under 903
(by attachment). The question then becomes what are the conditions are for the movable to become
immovable in these conditions.
Art. 901: conditions:
1.Incorporation in the immovable
2.Loss of individuality
3.Insures the utility of the immovable
Art. 903: conditions for a movable to be considered an immovable:
1.Physical attachment or jointure to the immovable, physical attachment that may not be an
incorporation and need not imply a loss of individuality, but has a permanent character
25

2.The movable object must insure the utility of the immovable

Difference between the two:
loss of individuality a very much used criterion in jurisprudence, but not to very great effect, as it is
a subjective criterion
the physical link: in one case is incorporation, in the other is attachment. The practical application of
these criteria is not easy see case law ()
The difference is relevant in practice, because the characterization of an object as incorporated in a
construction, into an immobile is permanent. The attachment is not a permanent link. This difference
becomes relevant in the case where property is sold in a contract that doesnt transfer property
immediately the immovable by attachment could be removed from the immovable by nature before the
transfer of ownership on the main immovable (the immovable by nature).
C. Immovables by the object to which they are attached: Real rights with immovable object =
immovables: the former category (CCLC) of the immovable by the object to which it attaches. The
CCLC had a categorization of the immovables. One of the categories not mentioned anymore is the one
of the immovables by determination of the law, which does not imply they cannot exist anymore.
Actually, art.2695: rent from an immovable on which theres an hypothec- treated as immovable rights.
904. Real rights in immovables, as well as actions to assert such rights or to obtain
possession of immovables, are immovables.
Personal rights= movable
Intellectual property = movable
Importance of the classification:
summa divisio: all rights must fall in it
Today, the characterizing a personal/intellectual right as movable: not so important.
But the characterization is important within the category of real rights very important for the
applicable regime (publication, possession etc.).
MOBILE THINGS:
La catgorie des meubles est residuaire: tout ce que la loi ne qualifie pas autrement est meuble.
907. All other property, if not qualified by law, is movable.
Meubles par anticipation: voir art. 900(2) : des immeubles qualifis davance comme meubles par la
volont des parties. Entrent dans cette catgorie les fruits et les produits du sol.

26

CHAPTER III:
OTHER CLASSIFICATIONS
These are secondary classifications: not as important as the one between movable and immovable rights
III.1 CAPITAL & FRUIT OR INCOME
908 Property, according to its relation to other property, is divided into capital, and fruits and
revenues.
909. Property that produces fruits and revenues, property appropriated for the service or
operation of an enterprise, shares of the capital stock or common shares of a legal person or
partnership, the reinvestment of the fruits and revenues, the price for any disposal of capital or
its reinvestment, and expropriation or insurance indemnities in replacement of capital, are
capital.
Capital also includes rights of intellectual or industrial property except sums derived
therefrom without alienation of the rights, bonds and other loan certificates payable in cash
and rights the exercise of which tends to increase the capital, such as the right to subscribe to
securities of a legal person, limited partnership or trust.
910. Fruits and revenues are that which is produced by property without any alteration to its
substance or that which is derived from the use of capital. They also include rights the exercise
of which tends to increase the fruits and revenues of the property. [this last part might refer to
right on stock from different companies]
Fruits comprise things spontaneously produced by property or produced by the cultivation or
working of land, and the produce or increase of animals.
Revenues comprise sums of money yielded by property, such as rents, interest and dividends,
except those representing the distribution of capital of a legal person; they also comprise sums
received by reason of the resiliation or renewal of a lease or of prepayment, or sums allotted or
collected in similar circumstances.
These are articles of general application. More detailed rules are in the Income Tax Act.
Capital: any kind of property can fall in this category, not only sums of money; dividends; stock and
shares; the substance of the object of the right.
The characterization may change over time:
o Fruit and revenue are at first income, but if instead of being spent they are reinvested, they
become capital (see art. 909).
o Also it is possible to find a certain characterization of a certain sum inside a will or a
contract (as falling into one of the two categories, even though by the distinction of the
27

law they would fall in the other): characterization by the will of the person for the purpose
of the K or of the succession. This characterization is legal.
o Through the utilization/exploitation of the asset in case (especially in agriculture): see also
art. 1141 CCQ: trees can be income of the land or part of the capital (the land).
Fruit = natural and agricultural fruit
Income / Revenue = sums of money; corresponds to former civil fruit.
Relevance: in usufruct, substitution, trust, and agricultural leases, in the situations when only the right of
use is granted (emphytheosis).
III.2 FUNGIBLE v. NON-FUNGIBLE AND CONSUMABLE v. NON-CONSUMABLE THINGS:
Definition: according to F.Terr (p. 178):
Choses consomptibles= celles qui se consomment du seul fait que lon sen sert selon leur
destination.
Chose non consomptible = chose susceptible dun usage prolong, alors mme quelle diminuerait
de valeur du fait de cette utilisation.
Choses fongibles= choses envisages dans leur genre ou espce et non dans leur identit. Elles ne
sont dtermines que par leur nombre, leur poids ou leur mesure. Deux ou plusieurs choses fongibles
sont en rapport dquivalence, de sort que lune quelconque dentre elles peu servir a la satisfaction
dun mme besoin.
Choses non fongibles= choses qui, dans un rapport juridique, sont envisages dans leur individualit.
1127. The usufructuary may dispose, as though he were its owner, of all the property under his
usufruct which cannot be used without being consumed, subject to the obligation of returning
similar property in the same quantity and of the same quality at the end of the usufruct.
Where the usufructuary is unable to return similar property he shall pay the value thereof in
cash.
1128. The usufructuary may dispose, as a prudent and diligent administrator, of property
which, though not consumable, rapidly deteriorates with use.
In the case described in the first paragraph, the usufructuary shall, at the end of the usufruct,
return the value of the property at the time he disposed of it.
Consumable = a thing which disappears by first use (an object which gradually looses its value its not
consumable). Les biens consumptibles sont des biens qui se consomment du simple fait de leur usage
(S.N.)
Relevance:
for usufruct: the usufructuary must conserve the substance there is usufruct on consumable objects
quasi-usufruct: Actually, the usufructuary has to return an object of the same nature. In this case in
fact the law has transformed the right of usufruct into a right of ownership.
Also relevant for the loan:
2314. A simple loan is a contract by which the lender hands over a certain quantity of money
or other property that is consumed by the use made of it, to the borrower, who binds himself
to return a like quantity of the same kind and quality to the lender after a certain time.
Change by contract: It is possible to create consumability by destination.
Fungible= a material object which is not determinable; interchangeable with a thing of the same species.
It is an indeterminate asset. Once it is specified, determined, the object becomes non-fungible.
28

Les biens fongibles sont interchangeables. Ils peuvent tre substitus les uns aux autres. Les biens on
fongibles sont considrs dans leur individualit. (S.N.)
No real right or transfer of real right can be created on an indeterminate. Le transfert des droits rels
portant sur un bien fongible na lieu que lorsque lacqureur a t inform de lindividualisation du
bien (art. 1453). (S.N.)
Relates to material objects.
Relevance: to real rights and their transfer: there can only be transferred real rights on determinate
objects. There must be a determination of the fungible asset in cause in order for the K to be created.
Possibility to change the characterization through contract: granted in both cases. Useful in the case of
usufruct when the usufruct bears on stock and shares.

III.3 THINGS SUSCEPTIBLE OF APPROPRIATION OR THINGS IN COMMERCE; res nullius;

Res communes:
THINGS NOT SUSBEPTIBLE OF APPROPRIATION:
Art. 2876 That which is not an object of commerce, not transferable or not susceptible of
appropriation by reason of its nature or appropriation may not be prescribed.
= juridical commerce (K of transfer, will, testament), transfer; not an economical meaning; alienable (in
the nature of property, of patrimonial rights).
S.N. splits them in two categories:
1) Things out of commerce by their nature:
Applicable to extra-patrimonial rights: they are not alienable.
o Human body: not in commerce. Mais la personne peut aliner entre vifs, a titre gratuite, une partie
ou des produits de son corps (art. 22).
2) Things out of commerce by a stipulation of inalienability :
The out of commerce category can also be applicable to patrimonial rights by exception: there is property
that is not alienable: through specific dispositions of the statutes of contractual dispositions:
1212. No restriction on the exercise of the right to dispose of property may be stipulated,
except by gift or will.
A stipulation of inalienability is made in writing at the time of transfer of ownership of the
property or a dismembered right of ownership in it to a person or to a trust.
The stipulation of inalienability is valid only if it is temporary and justified by a serious and
legitimate interest. Nevertheless, it may be valid for the duration of a substitution or trust.(see
following arts.)
The usufructs inalienability is different from the classical one: actually, the right extinguishes
at the death of the usufructuary.
Inalienability is the exception. The effectivity of inalienability clauses is limited with respect to purpose
and time.
3) Res communes
RES NULLIUS:
914. Certain other things, being without an owner, are not the object of any right, but may
nevertheless be appropriated by occupation if the person taking them does so with the
intention of becoming their owner.
29

934. Things without an owner are things belonging to no one, such as animals in the wild, or
formerly in captivity but returned to the wild, and aquatic fauna, and things abandoned by
their owner.
Movables of slight value or in a very deteriorated condition that are left in a public place,
including a public road or a vehicle used for public transportation, are deemed abandoned
things.
= a thing which has no owner, but is susceptible to have one. They can be acquired through occupation
(art.916 CCQ).
Categories (situations):
1. Biens vacants
res nullius: Things which have never had an owner: wild animals, fish in the seas, certain products
from the sea
res derelictae: Abandoned things: things which had previously an owner but not longer have one
In principle, the object in case can be immovable, but usually it is a movable: les immeubles sans maitre
sont la proprit de ltat:
936. An immovable without an owner belongs to the State. Any person may nevertheless
acquire it by natural accession or prescription unless the State has possession of it or is
declared the owner of it by a notice of the Public Curator entered in the land register.
2. Treasures: lattribution de la proprit dun trsor est fonction de la personne qui le dcouvre:
938. Treasure belongs to the finder if he finds it on his own land; if it is found on the land
of another, one-half belongs to the owner of the land and one-half to the finder, unless the
finder was acting for the owner.
RES COMMUNES:
913. Certain things may not be appropriated; their use, common to all, is governed by general
laws and, in certain respects, by this Code.
However, water and air not intended for public utility may be appropriated if collected and
placed in receptacles.
= things which are not susceptible of appropriation. They are not owned and may not be owned by
anyone (not only persons, but also the State). Everyone has an equal right to use the common thing no
one may prevent someone else from using it.
The state has the right and obligation to organize the use of the common things in order to insure the
respect of art. 913. But this is not based on a direct right on the thing, but rather on policy reasons, on
powers of the State to organize the use of common things and on the role of the State in the protection
of the public interest.
Limited to air and water in the civilian tradition.
Art. 913(2): cette exception vise leau et lair qui ne servent pas a approvisionner une population, il
sagit notamment de leau de source, de leau minrale et de lair comprim. En les rendant objets
dappropriation, le lgislateur a fait passer ces lments de la catgorie des choses communes a celle
des biens. (S.N.)
III.4 LEGAL CHARACTERISATION OF WATER: art. 979-983 CCQ
Distinction between water itself, watercourse, and the bed of the river. Watercourse: various rights of
exploitation on it may be granted. Water itself interests us. The bed of the river is not of interest in the
case of res communes (most often it belongs to the state): see Morin v. Morin.
30

Morin c. Morin [1998] CA (p.180-184)

Facts :
JC Morin owned a land on which he made a lake with the waters of a river flowing on his land.
M. Morin acquired property next to JCs lake
The lake was not navigable
Question: Does the riparian owner have a right of access to non-navigable lakes and water courses ?
Held: Yes.
Reasoning:
Art. 913 recognizes water as a res communis, therefore the owner of the bed of the lake (be it a navigable or a
no navigable course) cannot acquire ownership on the waters of the lake.
Art. 920 recognizes a general right of circulation on lakes and watercourses
The right of access to water under art. 920 that would not include recreational uses would be meaningless .
Ratio:
The owner of the bed of a lake or watercourse does not acquire ownership over the waters of that
lake/watercourse, because water is, according to art. 913 a res communis.
The right of access to water under art. 920 includes the right to do recreational activities.

The regime of water as res communis is organized first by articles 913, 920 and 981 CCQ:
Art.913: recognizes that water is a res communis
Art. 920: organizes the general regime of the right of access (and circulation) to
watercourses
Art. 981: determines the right of use of this resource by the riparian owner, limiting
this right in order to conserve it for all the other users.
See Art. 913-2
Consequence of the res communis character: the right is limited to the right to use (without preventing
the use by others and conserving the quality of the water). No one can appropriate it or sell it etc.
Forms of fresh water in nature: spring, watercourse, and underground water. The CCQ has disposition
with respect to each one.
Watercourse:
981. A riparian owner may, for his needs, make use of a lake, the headwaters of a watercourse or
any other watercourse bordering or crossing his land. As the water leaves his land, he shall direct
it, not substantially changed in quality or quantity, into its regular course.
No riparian owner may by his use of the water prevent other riparian owners from exercising the
same right.
Although the article does not mention it literally, it is clear that the watercourse in this case has the
quality of a res communis: (see Morin c. Morin). Historically, there has been a confusion between the
property right of the State with respect to the bed of the river, and the rights on the water. The decision
underlines that any watercourse is a res communis. Who owns the bed of the river is irrelevant to this
issue.
Spring:
980. An owner who has a spring on his land may use it and dispose of it.
He may, for his needs, use water from the lakes and ponds that are entirely on his land, taking
care to preserve their quality.
It has been argued that the mention of use and dispose would recognize the ownership of the water.
But it is not enough in order to conclude there is ownership. This issue is a point of disagreement
among jurists.
31

Lorsque le sol est la proprit dun particulier, il ne serait pas possible de reconnatre aux tiers le
droit dutiliser la source sans autoriser une atteinte trop importante au droit de proprit du fonds.
Do la rgle qui privilgie le propritaire du fonds en excluant les tiers. Cette rgle nentrane pas
comme consquence ncessaire que le propritaire du fonds soit propritaire de leau, comme on le dit
gnralement. (Cumyn, p.188)
The second paragraph is new in the Code. It takes into account the body of water completely enclosed
into ones land: the person may use it, but must preserve quality and quantity: rule similar to art. 981.
What makes the issue even more complicated is art. 951:
951. Ownership of the soil carries with it ownership of what is above and what is below the
surface.
The owner may make such constructions, works or plantations above or below the surface as
he sees fit; he is bound to respect, among other things, the rights of the State in mines, sheets
of water and underground streams.

Underground water: as well a res communis. So when the state issues permits for the commercial
exploitation of underground water, those permits are not based on law.
C.Cumyn: Leau, chose commune, un statut juridique a confirmer (p. 185-188)
The underground water is still res communis, even though there is no express provision in the CCQ on
this issue. But art. 980(1) disposes that the spring is a res communis. There is no scientifical reason for
making any difference between the spring and the underground water: the spring comes actually from
underground sources. Taking into account this fact and the absence of a legal provision on the statute
of underground waters, they should be considered a res communis.

32

PART THREE:

PROPERTY IN RELATION WITH PERSONS

(SUBJECTS OF RIGHTS IN LAND)

33

27 October 2004
Art. 918. Parts of the territory not owned by natural persons or legal persons nor transferred
to a trust patrimony belong to the State and form part of its domain. The State is presumed to
have the original titles to such property.
The legal person can be either a public person or a private one.
CHAPTER I:
PRIVATE OWNERSHIP AND ITS ORIGINS
I.1 THE SEIGNEURIAL SYSTEM AND ITS ABOLITION:
There is no limitation to the ownership of land by legal persons anymore we can look at legal and
natural persons on the same ground now.
1533: J. Cartier took possession of the E. territory of Canada in the name of the King of France
The King started to grant lands in the seigniorial system for settlement. The system chosen and
imposed was the seigniorial tenure within the Coutume du Paris. The first grant was in 1607.
The seigniorial system: see Marler, The Law of Real Property (p.192): the grant involves 3 levels of
title:
o Eminent domain: the Crown
o Direct domain: the title of the seigneur no ownership
o Useful domain (domaine utile): title of the censitaire no ownership
There was the possibility of another type of grant: grant en censire: with only 2 levels of title (no
seigneur). Fewer grants were made under that form.
Few grants were also made in ownership, outside the seigniorial system: en franc aleu gave full
title
The title in the seigniorial tenure system was a limited title, with a limited content.
King of Great Britain replaces the one of France, but this has no effect on land tenure and its system.
The King even granted some titles under the Coutume de Paris.
Soon after, the grants made by the English Crown were in free and common soccage, so outside the
seigniorial system.
Charges affecting the title in the seigniorial system:
34

The seigneur:
o had to pay respect to the Crown, pay an annual due to the Crown and recognize that he
owned his land from the Crown.
o Obligations towards the censitaire: obliged to grant to them parts of the area he got from
the Crown
Censitaire: his obligations can be divided in: casual obligations and the annual payments
o Obligation to use the seigneurs mill
o If he wanted to transfer his title, the seigneur had pre-emption right and he also had to pay
a tax to the seigneur
o Jour de corv
o Annual rent payable to the seigneur
When the grant was en censire, the censitaire only had to pay an annual rent (to the Crown)

Mid 19th century: A number of statutes were passed but with limited spatial application (only the Island of
Mtl.). Provided only a voluntary conversion.
1854: The Seigniorial Act: compulsory abolition of the seigniorial system imposed that all land
tenure be transformed in franc aleu.
o The seigneur becomes thus the full owner of the land that was in his title before.
o Each censitaire became full owner of the land to which he had title at the time. He nevertheless had to
pay an annual sum that represented the capital resulted from the evaluation of his obligations to the
seigneur perpetual rent. This was liquidated in the 1930s. The rent was redeemable at any time by
giving the whole capital owed to the seigneur.
o The Crown renounced the eminent domain and the obligation of the seigneur to pay the annual rent to
the Crown.
I.2 PERMANENT CONSEQUENCES OF ABOLITION OF TENURE SYSTEM:
Only full owners exist now. But there are also some other consequences of the abolition, consequences
which are still operative (see caselaw):
1) There is a prohibition to try to recreate directly or indirectly (by including clauses in a transferring
contract on land, imposing obligations on the acquirer) a system of tenure. This influences how we define
real servitude today.
2) Prohibition to have perpetual rents (maximum is 100 years) or of perpetual lease (max. 100 years art.
1880 CCQ).
2374. Where a life annuity is set up for the lifetime of several persons successively, it has effect
only if the first of those persons exists on the day the debtor is to begin paying the annuity or if
he is conceived at that time and is born alive and viable.
It terminates where the persons concerned are dead or are not born alive and viable, but not
later than one hundred years after it is constituted.
3) The ownership is now the ultimate title over material objects it is perpetual, it cannot be
extinguished, there is no one above the owner; cannot disappear through non-use. (If the Crown wants to
gain ownership over land, it can only do it through expropriation and has to pay therefore).
4) There is only one type of ownership whatever real one might one to claim over land (other than the
right of ownership), that right is going to be a lesser right than the right of ownership.
Scotland will have abolished the feudal seigniorial land tenure by 29 November 2004. the right of
ownership will therefore be similar to the Canadian one.

35

I.3 PRIVATE OWNERSHIP OF LAND; MULTIPLE SOURCES; CONTENT OF TITLE:

Five possible sources to land rights in the Province:
The forms of seigniorial title
The grants and free and common soccage
He grants in franc aleu outside the seigniorial system
The more recent grants made under various provincial statutes
Today, new grants can be made to private persons:
under Act Respecting Agricultural Lands in the domain of the State (p.205): the right of ownership,
but also lesser right could be granted [applies to the lands South of the 50th parallel]
under Act Respecting Lands in the Domain of the State: [applies to the N of the 50th parallel]
Forest Act and Mining Act (p. 106-107): provides only for grants of lesser rights (dismemberments)
Relevance of the old seigniorial law in todays case law: necessity to go back to the original title:
1) Trying to determine the fishing rights, more exactly the rights of the riparian owner:
The Watercourse Act art. 2: related to the historical debate in jurisprudence concerning the rights of
the Crown to make grants with respect to water beds. Art.3: only Hydro-Qc. can exploit the hydraulic
power of the province.
In order to determine the rights: necessary to determine whether the watercourse is navigable or not.
o If its navigable, the bed of the watercourse is in the public domain, belongs to the state.
o If its not navigable, the original grant matters very much in determining the right to the
water bed.
919. The beds of navigable and floatable lakes and watercourses are property of the State up
to the high-water line.
The beds of non-navigable and non-floatable lakes and watercourses bordering lands
alienated by the State after 9 February 1918 also are property of the State up to the high-water
line; before that date, ownership of the riparian land carried with it, upon alienation,
ownership of the beds of non-navigable and non-floatable watercourses.
If the original title is anterior to 9.02.1918 the right of the riparian owner extends to the middle of the
water bed.
Exception: In all cases, the law or the act of concession may provide otherwise (see case law: p. 215).
Navigability and floatability: fixed definition by the jurisprudence:
It is floatable when it can be used for the formal ways of carrying timber (the way they used to be
transported before, in history)
Navigable= relates to commercial navigation: Cependant , le critre dterminant constamment raffirm
par la jurisprudence est demeur toutefois celui de lutilit du cours deau en matire de navigation
commerciale. (Qc. v. Houde)
When the watercourse is not navigable, the grants made after 9 February 1918, the grants in non-navigable
zones are in the same situation as the ones in non-navigable zones. But before this time,
Qc. c. Houde [1998] CA (p.199-202)
Facts :
Hs predecessor in title bought land on the banks of Petit-Saguenay from the Crown in 1852
The letters patent did not exclude the riverbed from the transfer of ownership
H claimed exclusive fishing rights in a salmon pool located in the river.
Question: Does H own the riverbed? (Does the transfer of ownership in 1852 include the riverbed)?
Held: Yes. (Yes)
Reasoning:

36

Before 1918, owners of the riparian lands had the right of the ownership of the riverbed for non-navigable
watercourses, if this was not expressly excluded from the concession title
The letters patent do not exclude the riverbed

Ratio:
Prior to June 1884, transfers of land on riversides included, if the river was not navigable, ownership of the
riverbed up to the mid-way point of the river, unless the bed was specifically excluded.
On the side of navigable watercourses, the rule is the opposite: the riverbed is not included in the transfer
unless it is expressly specified.
So the main criterion in the distinction of rights of riparian owners over riverbeds is navigability.
In assessing navigability, the determinative criteria are the utility of the river for purposes of commercial
navigation.

Qc. c Auger [1995] CA (p.215-219)

Facts :
In 1982, Auger applied for a judgment confirming their rights to low-water mark of the river bank
The property fronted on navigable watercourses and was granted by an act dating back from 1687
Question: Does As property extend to the lower-water mark?
Held: No
Reasoning:
The river is navigable, so the riverbed belongs to the State, unless in the original concession act it is stipulated
differently
Justice Otis:
o The 1687 concession act stipulates the concession of the shores of around all land belonging to the
ancestors or Auger and that act made it clear that the shore was to extend all the way to the low
water mark.
Justice Rothman (dissenting):
o The 1687 concession act does not explicitly mention either this river of these shores, if they were
intended to be included, they would or should have been explicitly included
Ratio:
The riverbed of navigable watercourses belongs to the State, unless it is expressedly mentioned in the act of
concession of riparian lands that the ownerhips of the riverbed is transferred as well.

2) The rights of private owners to minerals under the surface of the earth:
Art.951. Ownership of the soil carries with it ownership of what is above and what is below
the surface.
The owner may make such constructions, works or plantations above or below the surface as
he sees fit; he is bound to respect, among other things, the rights of the State in mines, sheets
of water and underground streams.
Until 1880,the grant of land included the grant of all minerals, except gold and silver, which belonged to
the state (without even having to mention this exception).
From 1880, we have the Mining Act, there are more exceptions to the elements that are left to the private
owner. In time, the Crown kept adding to the list of minerals reserved to it and excepted from the right of
the private owner.
37

In 1982, the Province passed legislation, a modification to the Mining Act: (p. 212) Loi sur les mines, in
which the legislature proposed to eliminate all distinction with respect to the title on the minerals under
the surface. It aimed at putting everyone on the same footing, actually leaving very little to the owner. In
fact, this is more or less a legislation to abolish mining rights. [This legislation takes back a substantial
part of the object of ownership. But if the state wants to regain ownership to land, it must expropriate, also
by paying a prior indemnity. This revocation of rights does not follow the legal procedure of the
expropriation it is illegal].
3 October 2004
The Mining Act in the form we find it today dates back to 1987. It gives the impression that the right of
the owner of the surface to the underground is very limited. The minerals seem to belong to the state,
which opens the possibility for the State to grant the right to extract minerals from the ground to someone
else than the owner of the surface.
The Mining Act gives the right to the owner of the mining right to expropriate the land from the owner of
the surface: art. 235. The holder of the mining rights gets these rights from the Crown and can take
different legal actions in order to pursue his rights.
I.4 PUBLIC DOMAIN: PROVINCIAL STATE AND MUNICIPALITIES:
= property belonging not only to the State, but also to other public legal persons (municipalities and crown
corporations).
Public legal persons= art. 299 CCQ: Legal persons are constituted in accordance with the
juridical forms provided by law, and sometimes directly by law.
Legal persons exist from the coming into force of the Act or from the time prescribed therein if
they are established in the public interest or if they are constituted directly by law or through
the effect of law; otherwise, they exist from the time provided for in the Acts that are applicable
to them.
The ownership of the public legal persons is the same as the one of the private persons???.
But there re specific rules that apply to the public domain, in particular the Crown prerogatives make sure
that the property of the state is not seizable etc.
Art 916 Property is acquired by contract, succession, occupation, prescription, accession or
any other mode provided by law.
No one may appropriate property of the State for himself by occupation, prescription or
accession except property the State has acquired by succession, vacancy or confiscation, so
long as it has not been mingled with its other property. Nor may anyone acquire for himself
property of legal persons established in the public interest that is appropriated to public utility.
The public legal persons are necessarily established by statute (see CP p. 207-209 for Hydro Qc. and
Caisse de depot et placement). These statutes are somehow ambiguous, because they are influenced by
both CVL and CML traditions.
Hydro Qc.: it is a joint stock company, therefore a legal person according to art. 2188-2 CCQ.
It is a separate entity, but its patrimony belongs to the state and it acts as a mandatory of the state.
umprescriptibility is made applicable to the property of Hydro Qc. Nonetheless, the law provides
exceptions to this rule (very unclear as to the extent of the principle).
Municipalities: = public legal persons.
38

Art. 916 final: excludes the property of public legal persons appropriated to public legal utility from
prescriptibility. Actually, the article distinguishes between 2 types of property belonging to municipalities:
Public municipal domain: mentioned in art. 916. It is the part of the municipal domain appropriated
for public utility. This type of property is unseizable.
Private municipal domain: follows the classical CVL rules governing private ownership.
Batiments Kaladart |Inc. c. Construction DRM Inc. [2000] CA (p.215-219)
Facts :
DRM had been hired by the municipality to build a salt and sand storage facility.
Kaladart (K) supplied the necessary building materials to DRM
DRM failed to pay K
K filed a notice of legal hypothec
DRM argued that K could not file an hypothec against municipally owned property
Question: Is the depot appropriated to public utility and therefore part of the public domain?
Held: Yes
Reasoning:
The depot is essential to the functioning of an important public service (the one that takes care of the streets)
Street maintenance is an essential service for the community
Therefore, using the thorie de laccessoire, the depot is allocated to public utility and therefore part of the
public domain
Ratio:
Art. 916 et les termes affect a lutilit publiquequi sy trouvent devraient recevoir une interprtation large []
De plus, je suis davis que la thorie de laccessoire devrait tre applique au moment de dfinir si un bien est ou
non affect a lutilit publique (p.222)
Selon la thorie de laccessoire, les dpendances et accessoires indissociables des biens qui font partie du
domaine public font aussi partie du domaine public.

Note: there is no contractual relation between the supplier and the municipality. He as to sue the principal
contractor. But art.2726 protects the supplier and creates a legal hypothec for him.
2726. A legal hypothec in favour of the persons having taken part in the construction or
renovation of an immovable may not charge any other immovable. It exists only in favour of
the architect, engineer, supplier of materials, workman and contractor or sub-contractor in
proportion to the work requested by the owner of the immovable or to the materials or
services supplied or prepared by them for the work. It is not necessary to publish a legal
hypothec for it to exist.
But hypothec depends on seizability.
CHAPTER II:
RIGHTS IN LAND OF NATIVE PEOPLES
The Indian Act does not use CVL concepts, as it was drafted from a CML perspective.
Cumyn: the origin of certain reserves in Qc.: the seigniorial tenure system (does not fit into the
nowadays definition). Most reserves predate the enactment of the Indian Act.
Reserve = a tract of land the legal title of which is vested in Her Majesty, that has been set apart by Her
Majesty for the use and benefit of a band. (p.225)
James Bay Convention: concerns land in the N part of the province. The groups concerned by the
Convention are the Inuits and the Naskapis (but is used as a model to solve the claims of other groups of
39

Aboriginals and might even be used outside Qc.). The Convention doesnt yet cover all the groups of
Indians in the province.
The Convention distinguished between the territories on which these groups had claims in 3 categories of
land:
1st category: right of ownership was recognized in favour of the land holding corporation ( a non-profit
corporation, a legal person formed by the group of aboriginals). The natives are free to decide how to
divide the land, what to do with it etc. Nevertheless, the corporation who owns the land is not able to
sell it. If it is to be sold, it must be sold to the province.
Category 2 land: exclusive right of hunting, fishing and tracking recognized in favour of the
community (corporation). It is this corporation who decides how these rights will be exercised by
the members. Exception: the province can intervene in the case of endangered species.
Category 3: land on which the Indian claim/ title was extinguished. But native people have on
this land the same rights as any resident of the province and also specific rights to capture certain
species and have priority in establishing fishing camps etc.

PART FOUR:

THE RIGHT OF OWNERSHIP

40

CHAPTER I:
CONCEPT OF OWNERHIP IN QUEBEC AND IN THE CVL TRADITION
I.1 THE PARAMOUNT REAL RIGHT:
The influence of the Roman law took hold gradually. The Roman law (the Justinian Institutes) was
rediscovered in the 11th century by a monk. The system was so well organized, that it had a compelling
power in argumentation.
So, the abolition of the feudal system at the French Revolution is therefore just the last victory of the
Roman law on the feudal law (in an evolution that started in the 11th century).
After the French Revolution, theres no more competition between feudal ideas and Roman law ideas,
Roman law prevails. No more residual title was left in the state (overriding state title).
Right now, we have a right of ownership characterized as a real right, the paramount real right.
Principal real right, describes a direct relationship between a person and a material object, as any real
right relationship (see Ghestin p.26, ; Carbonnier p. 92, definition of the private law dictionary. 84)
Paramount real right: it is the basis of all the other real rights. The other real rights are defined by
reference to the right of ownership.
947. Ownership is the right to use, enjoy and dispose of property fully and freely, subject to the
limits and conditions for doing so determined by law.
Ownership may be in various modes and dismemberments.
Language:
We use a limited definition of the right of ownership, although it tends to be used more broadly in other
disciplines:
Certain disciplines disregard the distinction between real rights and personal rights and even
patrimonial and extra-patrimonial rights.
Intellectual property: the language used is the owner of the copyright, but this is not the proper
language. One has the copyright, one does not own the copy right [Personal comment: this is a
41

different approach and theory than the classical French one, in which the right of ownership can have
as an object any other right in the patrimony of the person]
Legal definitions in the Code of the right of ownership:
Art. 406 CcLC: Ownership is the right of enjoying and disposing of things in the most
absolute manner, provided that no use be made of them which is prohibited by rules or y
regulations.
Art. 947 CCQ. Ownership is the right to use, enjoy and dispose of property fully and freely,
subject to the limits and conditions for doing so determined by law.
Differences:
Description of manner in which right of ownership is used: now fully and freely
Object of right of ownership: used to be things (choses), now it is property (biens)
Attributes: used to be only enjoy and dispose, now it is use, enjoy and dispose
The change from Things to Property: does that change the fundamental rights?
Some authors say that this has brought a change in the notion of ownership:
I.e.: p.30 Real rights and p.96 right of ownership
Based on the new definition of hypothec in the CCQ: the fact that the hypothec is now extended to any
property is used as a point of departure to defend the idea of a transformation of the right of ownership.
Formerly, hypothec could only apply to immovables.
2660. A hypothec is a real right on a movable or immovable property made liable for the
performance of an obligation. It confers on the creditor the right to follow the property into
whosever hands it may be, to take possession of it or to take it in payment, or to sell it or
cause it to be sold and, in that case, to have a preference upon the proceeds of the sale
ranking as determined in this Code.
But if this has been so transformed, one can say that the distinction between real rights and personal
rights has been erased, since this is the most important of real rights. Cumyn: we can argue that this
view is based on a misunderstanding of what the principal real right is.
There are different levels depending on the size of the dismemberment
Principal real rights are not the same as a hypothec, which is an accessory real right
We can therefore say the a hypothec applying to all property does not at all affect the
principal real rights, and if it did, it would be a huge transformation in our system.
2644. The property of a debtor is charged with the performance of his obligations and is the
common pledge of his creditors.
In art. 2644, property (biens) - referring to all the patrimonial rights of a debtor doesnt make the
same use of the word as art. 947, under the right of ownership.
We have to ask whether the new wording of the CCQ (uses property instead of thing) has affected the
definition of the right of ownership. This change would be essential, therefore probably the legislator did
not intend it because it would have brought a huge change in the structure of the patrimonial rights. Such a
new conception would not be compatible with other articles of the Code. See p.98 CP for further view on
the difference brought by the term property
Ownership:
Principal real right: represents therefore a direct relationship between a person and a material
object: see ghestin, p.86, 121; Carbonnier, p.92, civil law dictionary definition: p.84
The paramount real right

42

Basis for structure of dismemberments, which are all defined by reference to the right of
ownership (lesser right compared to the right of ownership)
No limitations of the content, as opposed to the dismemberments (i.e.: usufruct: right to use, bu
must preserve the value of the substance)
I.2 ATTRIBUTES OF OWNERSHIP:
= The legal content of the right of ownership. Roman law had little to say about it. In Roman law, the
content of the right was confused with the object. What was important for them and defined were the
dismemberments (res incorporealis).
In comparison with the dismemberments, ownership has no limitation of the content of the right.
948. Ownership of property gives a right to what it produces and to what is united to it,
naturally or artificially, from the time of union. This right is called a right of accession.
949. The fruits and revenues of property belong to the owner, who bears the costs he incurred
to produce them.
a) Right to use (usus): = the right of the owner to use the thing personally according to its
destination.
Newly mentioned: wasnt in the CcLC, but this is just a precision, not a real change (use was
formerly part of enjoyment)
Represents the idea that the thing is in the physical control of the owner; includes different uses
that a thing is susceptible of.
It is just an option, a facult: the owner may choose not to use it, he is not obliged to use it.
b) Right to enjoy (fructus): = the right to take the fruits 9in the legal sense of the term) of the
object, to use them and consume them.
May carry agricultural exploitation of the land, may lease etc.
Owner must administer object unless: legally incapable/ granted a dismemberment/ insolvent
Same as use, it is not an obligation, but an option
c) Right to dispose (abusus): = the right to perform material acts of destruction and legal acts of
disposition in relation to the land.
Not specific to ownership: all patrimonial rights are transferable through sale, gift or will
The ability to charge with hypothec is related to this right
abusus- the owner may act in such a way, that diminishes or even completely destroys the
value of the object: active destruction
Material act of disposition: within this right, the following are included: right to extract minerals,
cutting down forest, removing the fruits from the trees, changing the present use of the land, or
the type of exploitation
I.3 CHARACTERISTICS OF OWNERSHIP:
= looks at the manner in which ownership is exercised. The attributes used to be subsumed to the
expression in the most absolute manner, but in the new code the expression is fully and freely.
Reasoning behind the change: see le Commentaire du ministre:
Former code: this language absolute manner was understood without regard to its historical
background, out of context (the French Revolution includes ownership between the fundamental
rights of the individual. To make this an absolute right, revokes Kings absolute right over
everything, including land)

43

But the right of ownership is in fact no more absolute than any other right. Not even fundamental
rights are absolute. The 20th century ideologies presented property in a negative light (see Marxism)
see summary Jason
1) Individual right = definition close to the one of the subjective right (prerogative organized by law in
the interest of its titulary) so right recognized by the law in the interest of a person for the benefit of the
owner. The owner is not bound to take into account the interest of anyone else, not even his family ( so,
differs from the feudal system).
Attenuation:
measures in the Code to protect the family residence: art. 401 and following: obligation of the owner
of the family residence to obtain consent of the spouse before sale
if we recognize that the right of ownership has an inherent social function we would be changing its
fundamental character. Exercising the right of ownership is of course subject to legislation, which is
created for public interest, nevertheless the right of ownership in itself remains an individual right.
Josserand: ownership as incorporation of a social function owner obliged to take it into account in
exercising the real right. Under this view, the individual characteristic of the right of ownership may
be challenged, if owner must conform only to actions which are not detrimental to the society, it
becomes more a collectivist or a socialist ownership than a market economy. This vision has hardly
any practical application.
Limits: the abuse of right
2) Exclusive right = the owner is not legally obliged to allow use by another person; if he tolerates use
by another person, it wont create right. The owner can object to any unauthorized encroachment. The
actions that the owner has: action to revendicate (if deprived of right, he can gain it back in court),
injunction (general recourse for the encroachment to stop) or action in civil liability.
953: The owner of property has a right to revendicate it against the possessor or the person
detaining it without right, and may object to any encroachment or to any use not authorized by
him or by law.
So, owner may tolerate encroachment without formally authorizing it. Tolerance does not create right:
924. Merely facultative acts or acts of sufferance do not found possession.
.1181. A servitude is established by contract, by will, by destination of proprietor or by the
effect of law.
It may not be established without title, and possession, even immemorial, is insufficient for
this purpose.
so servitudes may not be established without title (possession is insufficient). The right must be
actually granted (formally authorized) by the owner. Exception: in certain circumstances, the owner is
required to grant access (e.g.: droit de passage)
Exceptions to the exclusive character:
Legal
Conventional
3) Perpetual right = the word perpetuity has a special meaning when related to the right of ownership.
Normally, with relationship with other rights, it is used to mean indefinite right (its not for life). In the
context of ownership: it does not extinguish by the normal legal modes of extinction of other patrimonial
rights.
Art. 1162:Usufruct is extinguished
(1) by the expiry of the term;
(2) by the death of the usufructuary or the dissolution of the legal person;
44

(3) by the union of the qualities of usufructuary and bare owner in the same person, subject
to the rights of third persons;
(4) by the forfeiture or renunciation of the right or its conversion into an annuity;
(5) by non-user for ten years.
This article lists the legal modes of extinction, which do not apply to the right of ownership.
Even abandonment can be seen as not extinguishing the right:
Abandonment of immovables will transfer ownership to the state:
936. An immovable without an owner belongs to the State. Any person may nevertheless
acquire it by natural accession or prescription unless the State has possession of it or is
declared the owner of it by a notice of the Public Curator entered in the land register.
Abandonment of a movable res nullius.
Cumyn: the perpetual character of the right of ownership explains why there is no ownership
right cannot exist over incorporeal objects (intellectual creation). The rights over intellectual
creations, so intellectual rights are always limited in time, so copyright is not a form of
ownership.
Ownership right disappears only if the object disappears (movable objects more often).
Usual conditions of extinction:
Non-use
Improper use
Extinctive prescription: art. 2920, 2921: Art. 2921 is understood without question not apply to the right
of ownership
2921. Extinctive prescription is a means of extinguishing a right which has not been used or
of pleading the non-admissibility of an action.
Acquisitive prescription: it means the transfer of ownership. The mere fact of not using thing does not
deprive the owner of the right, but the non-use opens the door to someone else taking possession and
acquiring the right.
Temporary right of ownership: is this possible? Can one transfer ownership for a limited period of time?
It is impossible to envisage a temporary right of ownership within our system. In order to have a
temporary right of ownership, there has to be a beneficiary (an eminent domain), but this has been
abolished in Canada.
The only way this can be organized: granting a temporary dismemberment to another person. But when
the owner reacquires the dismemberment, this is not viewed as a transfer. The dismemberments are not
instances of limited temporary ownership.
Conclusion: the right of ownership:
The right of ownership is a right of maximal extension on the objects. But there are situations in which it
is not such: there are limitations:
Dismemberments
Limitations by the law, as well as possibility of the state to expropriate.
The servitude is not perpetual, but of indefinite duration, so not in the same manner as the right of
ownership.
Since the limitations to the right of ownership do not come from within it, there is a presumption that there
is no limitation to the right. The one who claims that there is one has to prove it.

45

There are situations of an owner without use, without fruit or of an owner prevented from destroying the
object of his right. But the owner is always a PERPETUAL owner: this is of the essence of the right of
ownership and it can never be removed.
But this must be paced in the context of 20th century ideologies.
There is no further right above the right of the owner.
The content of the right of ownership is not predetermined: it is complete and full title. Every benefit
available is possible.
The limitations to the right are not presumed, they have to be proved. That is why the courts give a
restrictive interpretation to the sections of the code that bring limitations to the right of ownership.

17 November 2004
CHAPTER II:
RESTRICTIONS IN THE EXERCISE OF THE RIGHT OF OWNERSHIP
Stated: in the CCLC (see p. 576 CP for the content and chapters of CCLC); CCQ: art. 977 and following
Different organization CCLC/CCQ:
In CCLC: the limits are placed in the category of legal and natural servitudes
CCQ: in Chapter 3 on special rules of ownership of immovables: the special regime applicable to the
ownership of immovables. These legal limits are no longer considered to be servitudes.
II.1 RELATIONS BETWEEN NEIGHBOURS: abnormal inconveniences distinguished from abuse
of right and encroachment
= relation between two neighbours, both of them having complete rights to the land (the right to use, enjoy
etc. his land). The use of one owner cannot prevent the other from using and enjoying his own land.
The CCQ and the law in general establish that a certain level of tolerance is necessary between
neighbours. In fact, the judge has to decide each case on its merit (au cas par cas)
Remedies:
Injunction (see p.263 for the dispositions of the Civil Code of Procedure): asking the Court to
give an order to determine the person to stop the nuisance. It can mean stopping the trouble, or
if it is not possible, stopping the activity producing it altogether. The injunction can be:
o Temporary: while the case is heard
o Permanent
46

Damages: repairing the inconvenience coming from the nuisance

A certain level of tolerance is demanded by the law.

976. Neighbours shall suffer the normal neighbourhood annoyances that are not beyond the
limit of tolerance they owe each other, according to the nature or location of their land or
local custom.
This article didnt exist in the former code. It is a codification of the previously established jurisprudence.
Arguments brought in defence:
Legality of the activity: the activity that produces nuisance is not prohibited by the law (Lessard v.
Bernard, Barrette c. Ciment St-Laurent)
Legitimacy of the activity: an activity that benefits the community etc.
No other neighbour complains of the nuisance (Lessard v. Bernard)
No fault: art. 976 is connected to art. 1457 CCQ (Lessard v. Bernard)
Acquiring the right to create the nuisance: the defendant has been doing the same activity for years //
coming to the nuisance (Barrette)
It was not clear in the jurisprudence whether the liability on the basis of troubles de voisinage was a
liability based on fault. Today, the Court adopts the idea of a liability without fault: presumption of
responsibility. But before the new code, the CCLC did not have any dispositions on the issue of abuse of
right, so the judge was using art. 1053 (general liability based on fault).
Cumyn: we should connect art. 976 to art. 950:
950. The owner of the property assumes the risks of loss.
Lessard v. Bernard. : almost an exemplary case.
Lessard v. Bernard [1996] C.S. (p.264-266)
Facts :
Bernard is running an wood-fuelled heating system at the border between his land and the one of Lessard
The system is generally used 10 months per year
The system produces foul smoke that gets on Lessards property
Because of the smoke, Lessard could not enjoy his patio, had the house damaged inside, had to cut short the
outside family reunions etc.
Question: Does this exceed the limits of normal neighbourhood annoyances according to art. 976?
Held: Yes
Reasoning:
The Ls right to use and enjoyment of their property was severely limited (no family reunions, clothsline,
stinky house, no patio, etc).
It is irrelevant that the system conformed to CSA norms or that he had municipal authority to operate the unit.
The fault of Bernard, or the legality of the unit, is not relevant.
Injunction is granted
Ratio:
Dismisses the following defences:
Absence of fault: art. 976 institutes a case of no-fault liability.
Legality of the activity: The fact that the nuisable act conforms to the regulations and is legal,
The fact that there is permit for the activity that causes damage is irrelevant (Meme la preuve dune
autorisation mise par lAdministration municipale ne suffit pas a carter le droit des demandeurs a la

47

jouissance paisible de leur propritp. 213 of the case)

The fact that no other neighbours complain of the nuisance

Gourdeau v. Letellier-de St-Just [2002] C.A. (p.267-272)

Facts :
The author of the respondents (L) built a house on his land in 1923
In 1940, the author of the appellants (G) built a house with 3 floors, having a lateral wall on the line border
between Gs and Ls land. This wall has 2 terraces.
In 1941, L erected two walls 25ft. tall, walls that are right in front of the balconies.
Question: Does the building of the two walls exceed the limits of normal neighbourhood annoyances according to
art. 976?
Held: Yes
Reasoning:
Fault is not necessary for the application of art. 976 (the judge makes the apology of the doctrine in this
domain)
The two walls represent exceeding annoyances: they take away the air and light from the other building; also
they keep G from acceding to their building in order to repair (probably here the judge refers only to that
particular side of the building)
It is true that L had a right to protect his privacy, but he should have found more normal and acceptable way to
do that
If L would have built a house instead of just two walls, the conclusion would have been different, as in this
case we would have been talking about an opposition between Gs right to light and air and Ls right to exploit
his land by building a residence on it.
Dissenting: judge Beauregard:
The CCQ doesnt give G a droit de vue
The fact that L has built a wall and not a house makes no difference. They have built the walls to protect their
privacy: Le fait quils pourraient etre plus charitables ou gnreux ne fait pas quils abusent de leur droit
Ratio:
Art. 976 institutes a case of liability without fault (presumption of responsibility). Arguments:
The article is in the section of the special rules concerning the immovable property, not in the liability
section. So this is more a pseudo-servitude lgale, a limit to the exploitation of the property right on
the imovables
This approaches is better sited for the modern importance that is given in the legislation to the
protection of the environment and to the quality of life [43]
Taking into account the commentaries of the Minister of Justice and of the Office de revision du Code
civil, it clear that this article is a codification of the anterior jurisprudence, that clearly recognizes a
liability without fault for art. 976 [42]
The doctrine has to opposing approaches:
Liability without fault
Presumption of fault , submitted to the general rules of art. 1457

Comments (Cumyn):
the judge in the case confuses the servitude of view and the servitude non edificandi. In this case, the
person didnt have a servitude of view over the adjoining land. The dissenting judge is right.
the decision of the majority was not too convincing. Was this really a case of neighbourhood
inconveniences? What was the inconvenience?
48

What the majority did by its decision is almost create a servitude non edificandi.
The majority excludes the idea of a malicious action: it was the right of the neighbour to protect his
privacy.

Illegal views : see art. 993: the Court assesses the place of art. 976 in relation to civil liability and decides
it is not a regime based on fault.
993. No person may have upon the neighbouring land direct views less than one hundred and
fifty centimetres from the dividing line.
This rule does not apply in the case of views on the public thoroughfare or on a public park
or in the case of panelled doors or doors with translucid glass.
Barrette c. Ciment du St-Laurent Inc. [2003] C.S. (p.273-279)
Facts :
The company (Ciment du St-Laurent Inc.) exploited a cimenterie in a neighbourhood
The dust from the cimenterie was setting on their houses and cars
The neighbours living very close to the company had to paint their houses every year and had to wash their
cars more often
Question: Does this exceed the limits of normal neighbourhood annoyances according to art. 976?
Held: Yes
Reasoning:
The dust coming from the company represents an abnormal neighbourhood annoyance, as it deprived the
plaintiff of the normal use of their land and brought des couts supllmentaires pour lentretien de leur
proprit
Art. 976 sets a presumption of liability, so fault is irrelevant
Irrelevant that the defendant had a permit for its activity
Ratio:
Art. 976 sets a presumption of responsibility without fault. Even before the new code, under CCLC the
jurisprudence was set on this principle (the cases: Drydale c. Dugas, Canada Paper Co. and Katz c. Reitz
expressely mentioned the principle of no-fault liability)
Coming to the nuisance is not a defence.
Art. 976 can be used by the lessee (locataire): art. 976 does not mention the notion of ownership, so the use of
it should not be restricted only to owners: A lart. 976, le mot voisins a une porte gnrale et il doit recevoir
une interpretation large afin dinclure les locataires. En effet, cette disposition [] ne fait aucune reference aux
notions de proprit ou de propritaire.(p. 274)

No fault liability:
Art. 976 doesnt require proof of fault, but just that the inconveniences are excessive. The fact that the
activity is conforming to the municipal regulations etc. is not an excuse.
Art. 976 is an exception to the civil liability system, not being based on fault. The jurisprudence is
almost settled in this area.
This is not yet fully accepted by everybody, still some resistance (especially from the doctrine)
On the other hand, the jurisprudence seems to be getting quit firm on this issue
Barrette c. Ciment du St-Laurent Inc.: dismisses, along with the other cases cited above, a list of
defences: It doesnt matter:
If the activity is permitted by regulation
49

 If there is a specific permit allowing the activity

The effect on the community: the industry creates employment etc.
If the defendant acts prudently and diligently
If other neighbours dont complain
The acquired right to produce nuisance (prior establishment)
simplifies a lot the action based on nuisance. The only defence accepted is the fact that the
inconvenience is not excessive.
The zoning matters: not in all areas the standards of normal neighbourhood annoyance are the same.
Plaintiff: Who is the neighbour (the person who can claim under art. 976)?
Owner
Titulary of real right on the immovable (who have the use of the land)
Lessee: still questionable. In Barrette c. Ciment St-Laurent Inc. the judge considers that the lessee
can be a plaintiff, but Cumyn considers that the action under art. 976 is a real action the lessee
should ask the lessor to provide the peaceful enjoyment that he promised and sue himself: see also art.
1858-1861
1854. The lessor is bound to deliver the leased property to the lessee in a good state of repair
in all respects and to provide him with peaceable enjoyment of the property throughout the
term of the lease.
He is also bound to warrant the lessee that the property may be used for the purpose for which
it was leased and to maintain the property for that purpose throughout the term of the lease.
[personal opinion: but isnt the action of the lessee a possesory action? Can the detenteur precaire have a
action possesoire in Quebec? Isnt the action under art. 976 a possessory action: look in the code civil
anot]
Future damages: can they be claimed?
Difference from bad faith and from the abuse of right:
6. Every person is bound to exercise his civil rights in good faith.
7. No right may be exercised with the intent of injuring another or in an excessive and
unreasonable manner which is contrary to the requirements of good faith.
Art.6 and art.7 are both codifications of the jurisprudence.
Both are fault-based recourses: they fit in art. 1457
Relationship of troubles de voisinage with other articles of CCQ:
Art. 991
Art. 991 is a case of neighbourhood inconvenience (the extreme case of inconvenience). In the
jurisprudence related to it, the Court recognized that no fault is needed to be applied a special
case of art. 976.
991. Where the owner of land erects a construction or works or makes a plantation on his
land, he may not disturb the neighbouring land or undermine the constructions, works or
plantations situated on it.
Art. 990
Art. 990 is not a neighbourhood inconvenience, nothing has happened yet, but there is a risk of damages
happening. Cumyn: art. 990 is not an example for art. 976. It is just a preventive measure which takes into
account the risk that could arise from the lack of maintenance. But the risk of lack of maintenance has to
50

be suffered by the owner also according to art. 950. it is not a question of fault and the owner is not
obliged to maintain.
Art. 990 is connected to art. 950 and to art. 1467. Cumyn: art. 1467 is a no fault liability.
It is not a fault not to repair, but once a damage has come out of the non-repairing, the owner has to
compensate the damage.
990. The owner of land shall do any repair or demolition work needed to prevent the
collapse of a construction or works situated on his land that is in danger of falling onto the
neighbouring land, including a public road.
Art. 953, 977, and 992:
We have to make a difference between 976 and trespassing and encroachment.
Trespassing = the use of someone elses land without authorization.
Encroachment = usually the use of someone elses land for a construction without authorization.
Art. 992 is a new article which limits the application of art. 953
953. The owner of property has a right to revendicate it against the possessor or the person
detaining it without right, and may object to any encroachment or to any use not authorized by
him or by law.
992. Where an owner has, in good faith, built beyond the limits of his land on a parcel of land
belonging to another, he shall, as the owner of the land he has encroached upon elects, acquire
the parcel by paying him its value, or pay him compensation for the temporary loss of use of
the parcel.
If the encroachment is a considerable one, causes serious damage or is made in bad faith, the
owner of the land encroached upon may compel the builder to acquire his immovable and to
pay him its value, or to remove the constructions and to restore the place to its former
condition.
977. The limits of land are determined by the titles, the cadastral plan and the boundary lines
of the land, and by any other useful indication or document, if need be.
Can someone ask only for injunction without damages? Cumyn: yes, having in mind the price of
establishing damages and how hard it is, a person should be given the right just to ask for the
inconvenience to stop for the future.
24 November 2004
See Pateau: historical origins of the right of ownership
The way ancient Roman law conceived the right of ownership: the right was considered so
powerful, that it was impossible to balance it with the same right in the neighbour imposed
certain margins between adjacent properties (no mans lands)
Later on: developed some restrictions, that they called servitudes
Many of the restrictions that exist today are a mixture of Roman law and the tenure system.
II.2 OTHER CODAL RESTRICTIONS:
ENCROACHMENT:
There are encroachments authorized by law:
1) The fruits fallen from the tree:
984. Fruit that falls from a tree onto neighbouring land belongs to the owner of the tree.
So the owner of the tree has to go get the tree.
51

2) Access for the maintenance: art. 987-988:

987. Every owner of land, after having been notified verbally or in writing, shall allow his
neighbour access to it if that is necessary to make or maintain a construction, works or
plantation on the neighbouring land.
988. An owner bound to give access to his land is entitled to compensation for any damage
he sustains as a result of that sole fact and to the restoration of his land to its former
condition.
3) If an animal strays on the land of the neighbour: art. 989
989. Where a thing is carried or strays onto the land of another by the effect of a natural or
superior force, the owner of that land shall allow the thing to be searched for and removed,
unless he immediately searches for it himself and returns it.
The thing, whether object or animal, does not cease to belong to its owner unless he
abandons the search, in which case it is acquired by the owner of the land unless he compels
the owner of the thing to remove it and to restore his land to its former condition.
4) The situation of the enclosed land (fond enclave): right of way has t be granted to the owner of the
enclosed land: art. 997-1001:
997. The owner of land enclosed by that of others in such a way that there is no access or
only an inadequate, difficult or impassable access to it from the public road may, if all his
neighbours refuse to grant him a servitude or another mode of access, require one of them to
provide him with the necessary right of way to use and exploit his land.
Where an owner claims his right under this article, he pays compensation proportionate to
any damage he might cause.
The only thing new in this code is the adding of the inadequate access to the case of no access (but
this case was already recognized by the jurisprudence)
It is an area which produces a lot of jurisprudence.
5) Trees whose branches extend over the neighbours land, which is an encroachment : Art. 985:
985. If branches or roots extend over or upon an owner's land from the neighbouring land
and seriously obstruct its use, the owner may request his neighbour to cut them and, if he
refuses, compel him to do so.
If a tree on the neighbouring land is in danger of falling on the owner's land, he may compel
his neighbour to fell the tree, or to right it.
This article does not authorize this encroachment.
6) Right to sunshine for land that is used for agricultural purposes (decouvert): Art. 986
986. The owner of land used for agricultural purposes may compel his neighbour to fell the
trees along and not over five metres from the dividing line, if they are seriously damaging to
his operations, except trees in an orchard or sugar bush and trees preserved to embellish the
property.
BORNAGE: FORMAL ESTABLISHMENT OF BORDERS: modalities to avoid encroachment:
= official establishment of the division of land between the adjoining lands.
Art. 978: Every owner may compel his neighbour to have the boundaries between their
contiguous lands determined in order to fix the boundary markers, set displaced or missing
52

boundary markers back in place, verify ancient boundary markers or rectify the dividing line
between their properties.
Failing agreement between them, the owner shall first make a demand to his neighbour to
consent to having the boundaries determined and to agree upon the choice of a land
surveyor to carry out the necessary operations according to the rules in the Code of Civil
Procedure.
The minutes of the determination of the boundaries shall be entered in the land register.

The procedure: mentioned in the Code of civil Procedure (CP, p. 284)

The formal procedure cannot be replaced by an informal procedure between neighbours.
Today, not all lands are officially borne, because of the fact that at the beginning of the century there
was a confusion as to whether the unofficial bornage between neighbours was valid; but also
because of the cost.
The cost of the procedure is shared between the two.

Art. 992 has to be considered as an exception to the general rules of encroachment:

Last set of limitations:
Art. 979: Lower land is subject to receiving water flowing onto it naturally from higher land.
The owner of lower land has no right to erect works to prevent the natural flow. The owner of
higher land has no right to aggravate the condition of lower land, and is not presumed to do
so if he carries out work to facilitate the natural run-off or, where his land is devoted to
agriculture, he carries out drainage work.
Obligation to preserve the water for the neighbour
980. An owner who has a spring on his land may use it and dispose of it.
He may, for his needs, use water from the lakes and ponds that are entirely on his land,
taking care to preserve their quality.
981. A riparian owner may, for his needs, make use of a lake, the headwaters of a
watercourse or any other watercourse bordering or crossing his land. As the water leaves his
land, he shall direct it, not substantially changed in quality or quantity, into its regular
course.
No riparian owner may by his use of the water prevent other riparian owners from exercising
the same right.
Water and snow:
983. Roofs are required to be built in such a manner that water, snow and ice fall on the
owner's land.
Preventing the damage caused by the demolition of the construction:
990. The owner of land shall do any repair or demolition work needed to prevent the
collapse of a construction or works situated on his land that is in danger of falling onto the
neighbouring land, including a public road.
View: prohibition to have an opening in the wall: but only openings that permit to see (depends on the
type of glass):
993. No person may have upon the neighbouring land direct views less than one hundred and
fifty centimetres from the dividing line.

53

This rule does not apply in the case of views on the public thoroughfare or on a public park
or in the case of panelled doors or doors with translucid glass.
Obligation to build a fence
1002. Any owner of land may fence it, at his own expense, with walls, ditches, hedges or any
other kind of fence.
He may also require his neighbour to make one-half of or share the cost of making a fence
which is suited to the situation and use made of the premises, on the dividing line to divide
his land from his neighbour's land.
These prescriptions can be modified by the municipal regulations.
All the discussed dispositions can be used for the creation of real servitudes that create a situation that is
different than the one prescribed by these dispositions (for instance, the establishment of a servitude of
view).
II.3 EXPROPRIATION AND OTHER INSTANCES OF NON-CONSENSUAL ACQUISITIONS:
952. No owner may be compelled to transfer his ownership except by expropriation
according to law for public utility and in consideration of a just and prior indemnity.
The title is forcibly transferred to the one who has the power to expropriate.
In most cases, expropriation will lead to the transfer of the right of ownership, but there are also cases in
which only a dismemberment is expropriate (e.g.: a real servitude).
Art. 6 Qc. Charter: gives and added protection against the discretionary power of expropriate, protection
against the improper use of the power to expropriate.
See text Portalis (p. 240-242) on expropriation: based on the obligation of the State to provide the public
with the facilities that are necessary
There are two statutes for the expropriation: one federal and provincial.
Subjects of the power to expropriate:
Federal government
Provincial government
Municipalities
School boards
Even private legal persons (e.g.: Bell Canada)
Conditions: art. 952 imposes 4 requirements in order to properly expropriate:
1. Power to expropriate: the power to expropriate has to be expressly mentioned in the law.
2. The expropriation must be carried for public utility. The notion of public utility is subject to debate
and is evolving in time.
3. A just indemnity must be paid = the market value of the land expropriated.
4. The indemnity has to be prior to the transfer to the right expropriated
There is at times a fine line between expropriation and regulation: see Sula decision: disguised
expropriation.
54

SECTION 4: STATUTORY LIMITATIONS OF PUBLIC INTEREST:

Municipal regulation
Cultural Property Act (reference CP p. 288), in particular section 8: obligation to maintain for the
owner of an object that is considered to be cultural property. It an exceptional disposition.
Agricultural use: legislation for the preservation of agricultural land: An Act to
Preserve Agricultural Land (1998): severely constrained the situation of the owners in the
agricultural zones: the owner can only use the land for agricultural purposes or nothing. There is no
commercial use accepted. There is limitation as to construction on the agricultural land. Exception:
possibility to obtain a permit to do otherwise.
o The agricultural land in the province: the territory from the 49 parallel to the American
border (with certain exceptions)

ADDENDUM:
55

RELEVANT CASE LAW

Art. 900
1. Gnralits:
900/1 La dissociation de proprit du bien et de l'immeuble est une particularit juridique sans pertinence
en matire d'immobilisation par nature. Il importe peu que le btiment ait t rig par le propritaire du
fonds ou par un tiers.
Blair c. Ste-Rose (Ville de), (C.S. Can., 1922-03-29), 63 R.C.S. 526
900/2 Dans la recherche de la qualification d'un immeuble par nature au sens du texte les critres
d'adhrence et d'incorporation sont les seuls critres retenir. Il ne faut pas retenir des critres comme la
proprit du bien immobilis, la complmentarit, la cohrence de l'ensemble ou la perptuit de
l'immobilisation. Il suffit que l'incorporation ou l'adhrence ne soit pas purement passagre ou
accidentelle.
Dionne c. Financire Cooprants prts-pargne inc., (C.Q., 1992-09-11), SOQUIJ AZ-92033062, [1992]
R.D.I. 599
56

900/3 L'immobilisation par nature d'un bien meuble ne peut dpendre d'une convention particulire.
Nadeau c. Rousseau, (B.R., 1928-02-14), 44 B.R. 545
900/4 Un bien meuble peut devenir immeuble par nature, soit parce qu'il se rattache directement au sol,
soit parce qu'il se rattache un btiment qui lui se rattache directement au sol.
Montreal Light, Heat and Power Consolidated c. Westmount (City of), (C.S. Can., 1926-06-14), [1926]
R.C.S. 515, [1926] 3 D.L.R. (n.s.) 466
900/5 Dans l'un et l'autre cas, l'ouvrage est immeuble par nature parce qu'il est naturellement immobile.
Cablevision (Montral) Inc. c. Sous-ministre du Revenu du Qubec, (C.S. Can., 1977-09-30), SOQUIJ
AZ-78111087, [1978] 2 R.C.S. 64
900/6 Il existe deux sortes de rattachement: le rattachement horizontal et le rattachement vertical.
Cablevision (Montral) Inc. c. Sous-ministre du Revenu du Qubec, (C.S. Can., 1977-09-30), SOQUIJ
AZ-78111087, [1978] 2 R.C.S. 64
900/7 Le rattachement est constitu par l'existence d'une relation physique intime sol-bien ou btimentbien, de faon ce que les deux fassent un bloc. Le bien emprunte alors au sol ou au btiment son
caractre d'immeuble par nature.
Grard Gignac Inc. c. Commercial Union Assurance Co., (C.S., 1979-08-30), SOQUIJ AZ-79022490,
J.E. 79-923, [1979] C.S. 974

900/8 Le critre du rattachement est satisfait quand un ouvrage, qu'il est possible de qualifier de
btiment, adhre un fonds de terre ou un autre btiment et acquiert ainsi une assiette fixe.
Cablevision (Montral) Inc. c. Sous-ministre du Revenu du Qubec, (C.S. Can., 1977-09-30), SOQUIJ
AZ-78111087, [1978] 2 R.C.S. 64
900/9 Les immeubles par nature et par destination (par attache ou runion) entrent dans la catgorie des
biens immeubles corporels.
Dionne c. Financire Cooprants prts-pargne inc., (C.Q., 1992-09-11), SOQUIJ AZ-92033062, [1992]
R.D.I. 599
900/10 Un bien peut tre immeuble par nature mme s'il s'avre possible de le transporter ailleurs assez
facilement.
Socit du crdit agricole c. Lambert, (C.S., 1984-03-12), SOQUIJ AZ-84021378, J.E. 84-760
900/11 Le critre du lien dfinitif consiste en l'existence d'un lien physique dfinitif entre le sol et
l'ouvrage ou le btiment et l'ouvrage. Le bien n'a pas tre fix l'immeuble perptuelle demeure. Il
suffit que l'incorporation ne soit pas purement passagre et accidentelle.
Grard Gignac Inc. c. Commercial Union Assurance Co., (C.S., 1979-08-30), SOQUIJ AZ-79022490,
J.E. 79-923, [1979] C.S. 974
900/12 Dans la recherche de la qualification d'un immeuble par rattachement au sol, l'incorporation et
l'adhrence au sol sont les seuls critres retenir. Il suffit que l'adhrence au sol ou l'incorporation ne soit
pas purement passagre ou accidentelle.
57

Dionne c. Financire Cooprants prts-pargne inc., (C.Q., 1992-09-11), SOQUIJ AZ-92033062, [1992]
R.D.I. 599
900/13 Le critre de l'immobilisation est satisfait quand un ouvrage adhre un fonds de terre et acquiert
ainsi une assiette fixe.
Cablevision (Montral) Inc. c. Sous-ministre du Revenu du Qubec, (C.S. Can., 1977-09-30), SOQUIJ
AZ-78111087, [1978] 2 R.C.S. 64
2. Constructions et ouvrages:
900/14 Sont immeubles par nature tous ouvrages, intrieurs ou extrieurs, qui adhrent au sol de faon
tre partie intgrante de celui-ci; ces ouvrages peuvent tre plants dans le sol, y tenir par fondation ou
pilotis, ou y tre enfouis.
Lessard (Syndic de), (C.S., 1988-05-05), SOQUIJ AZ-89021026, J.E. 89-151
900/15 Tout ce qui est attach au sol, de manire faire corps avec lui, est immeuble par nature.
Blair c. Ste-Rose (Ville de), (C.S. Can., 1922-03-29), 63 R.C.S. 526
900/16 Une maison qui adhre au sol et participe de ce fait l'immobilit du sol ne se confond pas
totalement avec lui au point que l'on puisse dire qu'elle a perdu son individualit; elle n'en est pas moins
immeuble par nature.
Cablevision (Montral) Inc. c. Sous-ministre du Revenu du Qubec, (C.S. Can., 1977-09-30), SOQUIJ
AZ-78111087, [1978] 2 R.C.S. 64
900/17 Une unit de logement qui n'est pas incorpore au sol et qui, spare, ne porte pas atteinte
l'intgrit de l'ensemble htelier, celui-ci se retrouvant dans la mme situation qu'avant la sparation, n'est
pas immeuble par nature.
Socit Cl de la rgion de Mont-Laurier Inc. c. Alain, (C.S., 1988-05-19), SOQUIJ AZ-88023030,
[1988] R.D.I. 392
900/18 Un btiment est toute structure et toute construction.
Blair c. Ste-Rose (Ville de), (C.S. Can., 1922-03-29), 63 R.C.S. 526
900/19 Lorsqu'un ouvrage adhre un btiment, le critre de l'immobilisation est celui de l'incorporation
au point d'en faire partie intgrante et de perdre son individualit parce que le btiment serait incomplet
sans lui.
Bell, Rinfret & Cie c. Brasserie La Jonction Inc., (C.S., 1983-05-04), SOQUIJ AZ-83021360, J.E. 83645, [1983] C.S. 347
900/20 Un btiment comprend aussi les accessoires qui sont tellement de son essence qu'en leur absence,
le btiment resterait incomplet et si inachev qu'il serait difficile d'en discerner l'utilit pour laquelle il a
t construit.
Express Plumbing & Heating Contractors Ltd. c. K.M. Restaurant Ltd., (C.S., 1977-01-17), SOQUIJ AZ77022000, [1977] C.S. 11
900/21 Constitue un btiment tout ouvrage pos ou fix en permanence au sol, ou mme au lit d'une
rivire, de faon y adhrer ou s'y incorporer.
58

Montral (Communaut urbaine de) c. Procter & Gamble inc., (C.Q., 1993-03-12), SOQUIJ AZ93031202, J.E. 93-843
900/22 Le sens des termes terrain et btiment doit tre analys en fonction du cadre adopt par le
lgislateur, lequel nuance et tempre les concepts du Code et se dmarque des catgories traditionnelles
du droit civil.
St-Basile, Village Sud (Corp. municipale de) c. Ciment Qubec inc., (C.S. Can., 1993-07-15), SOQUIJ
AZ-93111088, J.E. 93-1324, [1993] 2 R.C.S. 823, 56 Q.A.C. 117, 103 D.L.R. (4th) 449
3. Fin de l'immobilisation:
A. Gnralits:
900/23 Seule une sparation physique de l'immeuble peut faire perdre aux immeubles par nature leur
caractre immobilier.
Sous-ministre du Revenu du Qubec c. Lawrence Caplan Ltd., (C.A., 1979-03-07), SOQUIJ AZ79011060, J.E. 79-256, D.F.Q.E. 79F-35, [1979] R.D.F.Q. 126
900/24 L'immobilit dure tant que l'incorporation existe; par consquent, la simple intention du
propritaire du fonds n'est pas suffisante pour faire cesser l'immobilit.
Lain c. Bland, (C.S. Can., 1896-06-06), 26 R.C.S. 419
4. Meubles par anticipation:
A. Gnralits:
900/25 Le propritaire de fruits et autres produits du sol, non encore recueillis ou abattus, peut aliner ces
biens avec entente qu'ils seront spars du sol. Il les transforme ainsi en meubles par anticipation.
Vzina c. Morneau, (C.S., 1977-06-27), SOQUIJ AZ-77021206, [1977] C.S. 668
900/26 Un bien, mme immeuble par nature, peut devenir meuble si, entre les parties contractantes, il est
considr dans son tat futur.
Frigidaire Corp. c. Duclos, (B.R., 1931-11-26), 52 B.R. 91
900/27 La cession du droit d'extraire les matriaux d'une carrire constitue une vente de meubles par
anticipation.
Silices St-Pierre Lte c. Armand Sicotte et Fils Lte, (C.S., 1976-09-10), SOQUIJ AZ-76021384, [1976]
C.S. 1420
B. Illustrations:
900/28 Le bois en croissance est immeuble tant qu'il n'a pas t dtach du sol.
Cayer-Allen c. Maurice, (C.S., 1979-03-13), SOQUIJ AZ-79022190, J.E. 79-371, [1979] C.S. 374
900/29 Le bois en croissance peut faire l'objet d'un droit distinct de la proprit du fonds.
Cayer-Allen c. Maurice, (C.S., 1979-03-13), SOQUIJ AZ-79022190, J.E. 79-371, [1979] C.S. 374
5. Illustrations:
59

A. Appareil pour lever les vhicules automobiles:

900/30 Un appareil pour lever les vhicules automobiles n'est pas un immeuble par nature. Supportent
cette opinion la composition du bien, son identit propre, la conservation de cette identit (qu'il soit viss
au plancher ou transport d'un garage un autre btiment), le fait que l'immeuble demeure complet sans
cet quipement et la distinction entre l'entreprise et le btiment.
Caisse populaire de St-Hubert c. Service Diron inc., (C.Q., 1995-07-06), SOQUIJ AZ-96033023, [1996]
R.D.I. 283
B. Aqueduc et fosse septique:
900/31 Un aqueduc est immeuble par nature.
Stanton Pipes (Canada) Ltd. c. Sylvain, (B.R., 1966-09-09), SOQUIJ AZ-66011251, [1966] B.R. 860
900/32 Un rservoir souterrain constitue un immeuble par nature puisqu'il s'agit d'une structure complexe
qui est incorpore au sol.
Montral (Communaut urbaine de) c. Procter & Gamble inc., (C.Q., 1993-03-12), SOQUIJ AZ93031202, J.E. 93-843
900/33 Un puits artsien constitue un immeuble par nature ainsi que des installations septiques.
Gestionart inc. c. Jobin, (C.Q., 1994-05-31), SOQUIJ AZ-95121042, [1995] R.L. 538
C. Maison mobile:
900/34 Les maisons mobiles ne sont gnralement pas des immeubles par nature parce qu'elles ne sont
pas intgres ou incorpores au sol et ne font pas corps avec lui.
Communaut rgionale de l'Outaouais c. Groulx, (C.A., 1982-03-08), SOQUIJ AZ-82011081, J.E. 82349
Imagerie Denis inc. c. Caron, (C.Q., 2003-03-28), SOQUIJ AZ-50171628
D. Maison prfabrique:
900/35 Une maison prfabrique, ou une rsidence usine, n'acquiert le caractre d'immeuble que
lorsqu'elle est assemble ou installe de faon permanente. Ainsi l'article 1785 C.C.Q. peut-il s'appliquer
la vente d'une maison prfabrique dans la mesure o le contrat prvoit galement l'installation de la
maison. Il s'agit alors de la vente d'un immeuble btir. L'article 1785 C.C.Q. ne saurait s'appliquer
la vente d'une maison en pices dtaches.
St-Martin c. Rsidences Pro-fab inc., (C.Q., 1996-05-17), SOQUIJ AZ-96033043, [1996] R.D.I. 475
(appel accueilli pour d'autres motifs par (C.A., 1999-03-15), SOQUIJ AZ-50060897, J.E. 99-760, [1999]
R.D.I. 191, R.E.J.B. 1999-11468)
E. Piscine monocoque:
900/36 Une piscine monocoque enfouie dans le sol constitue un immeuble par nature puisqu'elle adhre
au sol de faon en faire partie intgrante.
Lessard (Syndic de), (C.S., 1988-05-05), SOQUIJ AZ-89021026, J.E. 89-151
F. Pont:
60

900/37 Un pont est un immeuble au sens du texte.

Blair c. Ste-Rose (Ville de), (C.S. Can., 1922-03-29), 63 R.C.S. 526
G. Rseau de diffusion par cble:
900/38 Un rseau de diffusion par cble, attach un autre rseau, immeuble par nature vu son
rattachement au sol, est immeuble par nature.
Cablevision (Montral) Inc. c. Sous-ministre du Revenu du Qubec, (C.S. Can., 1977-09-30), SOQUIJ
AZ-78111087, [1978] 2 R.C.S. 64
900/39 Des conduits et cbles souterrains relis un systme tlphonique sont des constructions et
constituent des immeubles par nature.
Mergl Excavation Inc. c. Bouchard, (C.S., 1981-07-08), SOQUIJ AZ-81021483, J.E. 81-889, [1981] C.S.
888
H. Rseau lectrique:
900/40 Un rseau lectrique est immeuble.
Montreal Light, Heat and Power Consolidated c. Westmount (City of), (C.S. Can., 1926-06-14), [1926]
R.C.S. 515, [1926] 3 D.L.R. (n.s.) 466
I. Systme d'ascenseur:
900/41 L'ascenseur qui est incorpor dans la construction d'un difice est un immeuble au sens du texte
puisqu'il est essentiel tout immeuble d'une certaine envergure. De plus, cet ascenseur est un matriau de
construction qui n'a ni identit propre, ni utilit, si ce n'est comme partie intgrante de l'difice qu'il
dessert.
Sidgens Lte c. Blanger, (C.A., 1989-05-23), SOQUIJ AZ-89011682, J.E. 89-1060, [1989] R.R.A. 495,
25 Q.A.C. 96
J. Systme de chauffage ou de rfrigration:
900/42 Une fournaise air chaud (et ses accessoires) devient immeuble par nature, si elle est attache
un immeuble de telle sorte qu'elle en fasse vritablement partie intgrante, qu'elle soit indispensable
l'existence mme de l'immeuble, et que l'immeuble ne soit pas complet sans elle.
Nadeau c. Rousseau, (B.R., 1928-02-14), 44 B.R. 545
K. Thermopompe:
900/43 Une thermopompe qui est incorpore au sol est un immeuble par nature.
Laurin c. D'Amato, (C.S., 1993-01-07), SOQUIJ AZ-93023016, [1993] R.D.I. 142
Voir aussi:

61

Art.901 :
1. Gnralits:
901/1 L'article 48 de la Loi sur l'application de la rforme du Code civil (L.Q. 1992, c. 57) ne constitue
pas une rgle de droit transitoire, mais une rgle de droit substantif. Les articles 901, 903 C.C.Q. et 48 de
la Loi sur l'application de la rforme du Code civil forment un tout et doivent s'interprter les uns par
rapport aux autres en harmonie avec les autres dispositions du Code civil du Qubec.
Axor Construction Canada lte c. 3099-2200 Qubec inc., (C.A., 2002-01-21), SOQUIJ AZ-50110995,
J.E. 2002-266, [2002] R.D.I. 26, [2002] J.Q. No. 55 (Q.L.), R.E.J.B. 2002-27758
901/2 L'immobilisation par nature d'un bien meuble ne peut dpendre d'une convention particulire.
Nadeau c. Rousseau, (B.R., 1928-02-14), 44 B.R. 545
901/3 Dans une vente conditionnelle, le bien meuble incorpor l'immeuble devient immeuble par
nature, et ne peut donc plus tre revendiqu la diffrence de ceux qui ne sont pas encore installs.
Canadian Elevator Co. c. Della Foresta, (C.S., 1975-03-26), SOQUIJ AZ-75021188, [1975] C.S. 574
(appel rejet par C.A.M. no 500-09-000374-751, le 22 juin 1976)
901/4 Un immeuble par nature vendu sans que l'immeuble auquel il se rattache ne soit vendu lui aussi ne
perd pas son caractre immobilier de ce seul fait.
Lawrence Caplan Ltd. c. Ministre du Revenu du Qubec, (C.P., 1977-01-07), SOQUIJ AZ-77033610,
D.F.Q.E. 77F-1, [1977] R.D.F.Q. 141, [1977] C.P. 44 (rs.) (appel rejet par (C.A., 1979-03-07), SOQUIJ
AZ-79011060, J.E. 79-256, D.F.Q.E. 79F-35, [1979] R.D.F.Q. 126)
2. Meuble incorpor l'immeuble:
A. Gnralits:
901/5 Une fois incorpors l'immeuble, les meubles perdent leur caractre mobilier et deviennent
immeubles par nature tant que dure l'incorporation.
Agnico-Eagle Mines Ltd. c. Sous-Ministre du Revenu, (C.P., 1977-03-11), SOQUIJ AZ-77033715,
D.F.Q.E. 77F-12, [1977] R.D.F.Q. 136, [1977] C.P. 291 (rs.)
901/6 Les matriaux qui entrent dans la construction d'une btisse sont meubles au moment o ils sont
employs. mesure de leur incorporation au sol, ils perdent leur individualit et deviennent immeubles
parce qu'anantis, confondus avec l'immeuble dont ils deviennent partie intgrante.
Ruco Enterprises Inc. c. Shink, (B.R., 1966-11-23), SOQUIJ AZ-67011221, [1967] B.R. 638
901/7 C'est une question de fait que de savoir si le meuble est suffisamment incorpor, attach ou non.
Vermette c. Qubec (Sous-ministre du Revenu), (C.P., 1988-02-02), SOQUIJ AZ-88091002, D.F.Q.E. 88F19, [1988] R.D.F.Q. 263
901/8 Pour qu'un bien meuble devienne immeuble, au sens du texte, il est ncessaire qu'il y ait un lien
physique intime entre le btiment et son complment, le bien meuble.
Socit Cl de la rgion de Mont-Laurier Inc. c. Alain, (C.S., 1988-05-19), SOQUIJ AZ-88023030,
[1988] R.D.I. 392
62

901/9 Il faut que le meuble ne puisse tre spar de l'immeuble sans briser l'un et l'autre; le meuble doit
complter l'immeuble de faon indispensable.
Construtek G.B. inc. c. Laforge, (C.Q., 1997-10-21), SOQUIJ AZ-98031007, J.E. 98-1, [1998] R.D.I. 137
901/10 Des installations qui ont t conues et fixes pour s'adapter un immeuble et qui ne peuvent tre
dplaces quelque lieu que ce soit l'intrieur de l'immeuble sont immeubles.
Aliments Monte-Carlo Inc. (Syndic de), (C.S., 1989-08-01), SOQUIJ AZ-89021424, J.E. 89-1500, [1989]
R.D.I. 836
901/11 L'incorporation est une opration matrielle.
Pomerleau c. East Broughton Station (Mun. du village d'), (C.S., 1965-05-08), SOQUIJ AZ-65021048,
[1965] C.S. 337
901/12 L'incorporation suppose la permanence.
Sherbrooke (Cit de) c. Bureau des commissaires d'coles catholiques romains de la cit de Sherbrooke,
(C.S. Can., 1957-05-13), [1957] R.C.S. 476
901/13 Il serait erron de ne considrer immeuble par nature que les seuls biens meubles incorpors la
structure, aux fondations, la toiture ou encore au systme de chauffage et de ventilation.
Qubec inc. c. Socit de dveloppement communautaire Milton Parc inc., (C.S., 1998-01-30), SOQUIJ
AZ-98021241, J.E. 98-574, R.E.J.B. 1998-04601
3. Perte de l'individualit du meuble:
A. Gnralits:
901/14 Un objet mobilier doit faire partie intgrante d'un btiment au point d'en perdre sa propre
individualit pour tre qualifi d'immeuble par nature.
Valco Mtal (1979) lte c. Poissant, Richard et Associs, (C.S., 1990-10-11), SOQUIJ AZ-90021473, J.E.
90-1655, [1990] R.J.Q. 2881, [1991] R.D.I. 1
4. Utilit de l'immeuble assure par le meuble:
A. Gnralits:
901/15 Un bien meuble ne devient pas immeuble par nature du seul fait qu'il soit indispensable la
destination du btiment o il est install.
St-Laurent (Cit de) c. Commission hydrolectrique de Qubec, (C.S. Can., 1978-02-07), SOQUIJ AZ78111114, [1978] 2 R.C.S. 529
901/16 Un btiment comprend aussi les accessoires qui sont tellement de son essence qu'en leur absence,
le btiment resterait incomplet et si inachev qu'il serait difficile d'en discerner l'utilit pour laquelle il a
t construit.
Express Plumbing & Heating Contractors Ltd. c. K.M. Restaurant Ltd., (C.S., 1977-01-17), SOQUIJ AZ77022000, [1977] C.S. 11
901/17 Il y a immobilisation par nature d'un bien meuble si ce bien est indispensable l'existence mme
d'un immeuble et que celui-ci n'est pas complet sans lui.
63

Nadeau c. Rousseau, (B.R., 1928-02-14), 44 B.R. 545

901/18 Seuls les biens qui compltent le btiment en lui-mme peuvent se voir attribuer la qualification
d'immeubles.
Dionne c. Financire Cooprants prts-pargne inc., (C.Q., 1992-09-11), SOQUIJ AZ-92033062, [1992]
R.D.I. 599
901/19 Les biens meubles unis la btisse pour les fins de son utilisation doivent se confondre avec la
btisse pour tre immeubles par nature.
Aliments Monte-Carlo Inc. (Syndic de), (C.S., 1989-08-01), SOQUIJ AZ-89021424, J.E. 89-1500, [1989]
R.D.I. 836
901/20 Seul un immeuble peut servir complter le btiment mme.
Dionne c. Financire Cooprants prts-pargne inc., (C.Q., 1992-09-11), SOQUIJ AZ-92033062, [1992]
R.D.I. 599
5. Illustrations:
901/21 Le courant lectrique constitue un bien meuble assurant l'utilit d'un immeuble.
3296008 Canada inc. c. Groupe Commerce (Le), compagnie d'assurances, (C.S., 2002-05-30), SOQUIJ
AZ-50130186, J.E. 2002-1373, [2002] R.R.A. 894
Bouffard c. Compagnie d'assurances Missisquoi inc., (C.Q., 1999-02-02), SOQUIJ AZ-99031096, J.E.
99-522, [1999] R.J.Q. 621, [1999] R.R.A. 233 (rs.), R.E.J.B. 1999-11147
901/22 Un immeuble d'habitation non muni de systmes d'lectricit et d'eau courante ne saurait tre
complet. Ces systmes sont donc immeubles.
Terreau et Racine Lte c. Htel Loretteville Inc., (C.S., 1965-03-16), SOQUIJ AZ-65021043, [1965] C.S.
313
901/23 L'ascenseur qui est incorpor dans la construction d'un difice est un immeuble par nature,
puisqu'il est essentiel tout immeuble d'une certaine envergure.
Sidgens Lte c. Blanger, (C.A., 1989-05-23), SOQUIJ AZ-89011682, J.E. 89-1060, [1989] R.R.A. 495,
25 Q.A.C. 96
901/24 Au Qubec, un immeuble ne saurait tre qualifi de complet s'il n'est pas pourvu de portes tant
intrieures qu'extrieures. Les portes, ainsi que leurs accessoires, sont des immeubles par nature.
Valco Mtal (1979) lte c. Poissant, Richard et Associs, (C.S., 1990-10-11), SOQUIJ AZ-90021473, J.E.
90-1655, [1990] R.J.Q. 2881, [1991] R.D.I. 1
901/25 Une thermopompe qui n'est pas indispensable l'existence mme d'un immeuble, et sans laquelle
l'immeuble n'est pas incomplet, n'est pas un immeuble.
Systmes techno-pompes inc. c. La Manna, (C.Q., 1991-03-06), J.E. 94-155, [1994] R.J.Q. 47, 60 Q.A.C.
42)
901/26 Lorsque le systme de thermopompe, et ses composantes, ne fait pas corps avec l'immeuble et
peut facilement tre enlev sans nuire au btiment et que celui-ci ne devient pas incomplet sans le
systme, il n'y a pas d'immobilisation par nature d'un bien meuble incorpor un btiment.
Systmes techno-pompes inc. c. La Manna, (C.Q., 1991-03-06), SOQUIJ AZ-91031127, J.E. 91-743,
64

[1991] R.J.Q. 1175 (appel rejet par (C.A., 1993-12-21), SOQUIJ AZ-94011110, J.E. 94-155, [1994]
R.J.Q. 47, 60 Q.A.C. 42)
901/27 Une thermopompe relie un systme de conduits et constituant l'unique systme de chauffage
des locaux est un immeuble par nature.
Qubec inc. c. Socit de dveloppement communautaire Milton Parc inc., (C.S., 1998-01-30), SOQUIJ
AZ-98021241, J.E. 98-574, R.E.J.B. 1998-04601
901/28 Le critre fondamental pour dterminer la nature mobilire ou immobilire d'un objet dans un
logement priv est le caractre essentiel de l'objet au maintien en bon tat de l'immeuble, telle une
fournaise, et non seulement le service des occupants.
Galipeau c. Labelle, (C.S., 1983-06-14), SOQUIJ AZ-83021393, J.E. 83-710, [1983] C.S. 350
901/29 Des accessoires de salle de bain, installs aux murs et aux planchers d'un immeuble commercial,
perdent leur identit propre et deviennent partie intgrante de celui-ci. Il en est ainsi des compartiments
de toilette et de leurs ancrages, des barres d'appui, des distributeurs de papiers hyginiques, mais non des
schoirs mains.
Entreprises Ptro-Gat inc. c. Brennan, (C.S., 2000-12-05), B.E. 2001BE-131
901/30 Le plancher de marqueterie est devenu immeuble par nature ds son intgration physique
l'immeuble.
Boudreau c. Immeubles Jos Pelletier inc., (C.Q., 1995-01-30), SOQUIJ AZ-95031102, J.E. 95-541
901/31 Doivent tre considrs comme devenus immeubles par nature et comme faisant partie intgrante
de la construction, les tuiles, la tapisserie, les lavabos et le systme lectrique.
Terreau et Racine Lte c. Htel Loretteville Inc., (C.S., 1965-03-16), SOQUIJ AZ-65021043, [1965] C.S.
313
901/32 La moquette colle directement sur le ciment devient partie intgrante des planchers, perd son
individualit et assure strictement l'utilit de l'immeuble. Toutefois, mme s'il fallait la considrer comme
tant matriellement attache ou runie l'immeuble demeure, sans perdre son individualit et sans y
tre incorpore, elle serait immeuble jusqu' son dtachement, puisqu'elle vise strictement l'utilit de
l'immeuble.
Entreprises I. Lipman lte c. 3090-8784 Qubec inc., (C.S., 1996-03-14), J.E. 96-1073, [1996] R.J.Q.
1301, [1996] R.D.I. 265 (rs.)
901/33 Un exemple d'intgration d'un bien meuble une construction: un paratonnerre.
Bell, Rinfret & Cie c. Brasserie La Jonction Inc., (C.S., 1983-05-04), SOQUIJ AZ-83021360, J.E. 83645, [1983] C.S. 347
901/34 Des pompes, rservoirs et petits accessoires ne sont pas des biens meubles une fois qu'ils sont
incorpors. En effet, ils n'ont pas d'existence propre en dehors de leur intgration un systme d'eau. Ils
sont rattachs au sol, ils sont intgrs un immeuble et ils sont un complment ncessaire l'utilisation
de l'immeuble. Ce sont donc des immeubles.
Henri Cousineau & Fils Inc. c. Qubec (Sous-ministre du Revenu), (C.P., 1988-03-31), SOQUIJ AZ88091025, D.F.Q.E. 88F-40, [1988] R.D.F.Q. 269
901/35 Dans un systme d'aspiration central, le groupe moteur, le balai lectrique, le boyau et ses
accessoires, qui peuvent tre dplacs facilement, sont des meubles, alors que les prises murales et les
65

tuyaux, qui ne peuvent tre enlevs sans les briser ou briser le btiment, sont des immeubles.
Gagn c. Dorval, (C.P., 1982-04-13), SOQUIJ AZ-82031152, J.E. 82-553, [1982] C.P. 29
Contra:
Brassard c. Roy, (C.Q., 1993-12-06), SOQUIJ AZ-94033011, [1994] R.D.I. 147
901/36 Un systme d'aspiration central fait intrinsquement partie de l'immeuble.
Laurin c. Allaire, (C.Q., 1996-02-27), [1996] R.L. 651
901/37 Une ligne de transmission relie une centrale lectrique est immeuble par nature.
Hydro-Qubec c. Quintin, (C.S., 1984-03-29), J.E. 84-501, [1984] C.S. 550
901/38 Ne sont pas des immeubles par nature des alles de quilles et leurs accessoires.
Corp. d'assurances de personne La Laurentienne c. Qubec (Ville de), (C.Q., 1994-05-05), SOQUIJ AZ94031204, J.E. 94-893, [1994] R.J.Q. 1432
901/39 Un appareil pour lever les vhicules automobiles n'est pas un immeuble par nature. Supportent
cette opinion la composition du bien, son identit propre, la conservation de cette identit (qu'il soit viss
au plancher ou transport d'un garage un autre btiment), le fait que l'immeuble demeure complet sans
cet quipement et la distinction entre l'entreprise et le btiment.
Caisse populaire de St-Hubert c. Service Diron inc., (C.Q., 1995-07-06), SOQUIJ AZ-96033023, [1996]
R.D.I. 283

Art.903
1. Gnralits:
903/1 Pour convertir un bien meuble en bien immeuble, deux lments doivent coexister: soit la volont,
l'intention du propritaire, et le rattachement du bien meuble l'immeuble.
J. Armand Blais inc. c. Victoriaville (Ville de), (C.Q., 1992-01-29), SOQUIJ AZ-92031089, J.E. 92-480,
[1992] R.D.I. 200
903/2 Les immeubles par destination (par attache ou runion) sont des meubles attachs un immeuble
de faon permanente, mais qui ne perdent pas leur individualit propre.
Valco Mtal (1979) lte c. Poissant, Richard et Associs, (C.S., 1990-10-11), J.E. 90-1655, [1990] R.J.Q.
2881, [1991] R.D.I. 1
903/3 Ce qui convient parfaitement l'image de l'immeuble par destination (par attache ou runion) c'est
l'ide d'un bien qui sert l'exploitation de l'immeuble ou qui y est affect d'une quelconque manire pour
son service.
Dionne c. Financire Cooprants prts-pargne inc., (C.Q., 1992-09-11), SOQUIJ AZ-92033062, [1992]
R.D.I. 599
903/4 L'article 48 de la Loi sur l'application de la rforme du Code civil (L.Q. 1992, c. 57) ne constitue
pas une rgle de droit transitoire, mais une rgle de droit substantif. Les articles 901, 903 C.C.Q. et 48 de
la Loi sur l'application de la rforme du Code civil forment un tout et doivent s'interprter les uns par
rapport aux autres en harmonie avec les autres dispositions du Code civil du Qubec.
Axor Construction Canada lte c. 3099-2200 Qubec inc., (C.A., 2002-01-21), J.E. 2002-266, [2002]
R.D.I. 26, [2002] J.Q. No. 55 (Q.L.), R.E.J.B. 2002-27758
66

903/5 La destination ou la vocation particulire d'un immeuble peut tre prise en considration dans le
cadre de la dtermination du caractre immobilier d'un objet.
Laval (Ville de) c. Coimac inc., (C.A., 2001-01-17), J.E. 2001-343, [2001] R.J.Q. 342, [2001] R.D.I. 25
(rs.),, R.E.J.B. 2001-22147, R.E.J.B. 2001-22152, A.E./P.C. 2001-725
903/6 Le lgislateur a apport aux critres d'immobilisation du bien meuble les changements suivants:
l'limination du lien intellectuel au profit du seul lien matriel et la suppression de l'unicit des droits de
proprit du bien meuble et de l'immeuble sur lequel il est attach.
Corp. d'assurances de personne La Laurentienne c. Qubec (Ville de), (C.Q., 1994-05-05), J.E. 94-893,
[1994] R.J.Q. 1432
2. Notion de demeure:
A. Gnralits:
903/7 L'intention de placer demeure est primordiale. Sans elle, l'immobilisation ne peut avoir lieu.
Pomerleau c. East Broughton Station (Mun. du village d'), (C.S., 1965-05-08), [1965] C.S. 337
903/8 L'expression (perptuelle) demeure ne signifie pas que l'immobilisation par nature d'un bien
meuble n'aura pas lieu s'il s'avre possible de prvoir une priode de temps durant laquelle le bien sera
plac sur l'immeuble. Le critre dterminant est l'intention de laisser le bien l tant qu'il sera en tat de
fonctionner, qu'il aura son utilit ou qu'il ne sera pas remplac.
Bureau des commissaires d'coles catholiques de la cit de Sherbrooke c. Sherbrooke (Cit de), (B.R.,
1956-03-28), [1956] B.R. 639 (appel rejet par [1957] R.C.S. 476)
903/9 La notion de (perptuelle) demeure ne signifie pas pour toujours. Elle renferme davantage
l'ide d'une priode de temps indfinie, par opposition un placement temporaire ou passager.
Socit d'aide au dveloppement de la collectivit de Tmiscouata c. 9099-3601 Qubec inc., (C.S., 200311-03), SOQUIJ AZ-50206692, J.E. 2003-2173, [2003] R.D.I. 842
903/10 Le concept d'attache contient implicitement cette intention du propritaire de laisser le bien
attach l'immeuble pour une priode indtermine.
Axor Construction Canada lte c. 3099-2200 Qubec inc., (C.A., 2002-01-21), [2002] R.D.I. 26, [2002]
J.Q. No. 55 (Q.L.), R.E.J.B. 2002-27758
903/11 Pour qu'il y ait immobilisation par destination (par attache ou runion), il ne suffit pas d'tablir
que les objets mobiliers sont affects au service de l'immeuble; il faut absolument ajouter la notion de
(perptuelle) demeure, sans quoi l'objet mobilier demeure meuble.
Kraft General Foods Canada Inc. c. R. Leclerc distribution lte, (C.Q., 1992-10-29), [1992] R.D.I. 597
3. Meuble matriellement attach ou runi l'immeuble:
A. Gnralits:
903/12 Le lgislateur semble avoir opt pour l'exigence d'un lien physique du meuble par nature pour
carter le lien intellectuel.
Construtek G.B. inc. c. Laforge, (C.Q., 1997-10-21), J.E. 98-1, [1998] R.D.I. 137
67

903/13 L'immobilisation se fait au moyen de liens matriels qui attachent perptuelle demeure l'objet
mobilier l'immeuble, sans qu'il fasse partie intgrante de cet immeuble.
Pomerleau c. East Broughton Station (Mun. du village d'), (C.S., 1965-05-08), SOQUIJ AZ-65021048,
[1965] C.S. 337
903/14 On doit considrer le bien meuble comme tant joint, uni, annex, affect au fonds
lorsqu'il est reli celui-ci par un lien matriel.
Bureau des commissaires d'coles catholiques de la cit de Sherbrooke c. Sherbrooke (Cit de), (B.R.,
1956-03-28), [1956] B.R. 639 (appel rejet par [1957] R.C.S. 476)
903/15 Ce lien matriel est moins fort qu'en matire d'immobilisation (par nature) (art. 900 et 901
C.C.Q.). Le bien meuble n'a pas faire partie intgrante de l'immeuble, ni perdre son individualit, car
il deviendrait alors immeuble (par nature) (c'est--dire au sens des articles 900 et 901 C.C.Q.).
Dionne c. Financire Cooprants prts-pargne inc., (C.Q., 1992-09-11), SOQUIJ AZ-92033062, [1992]
R.D.I. 599
903/16 Le volume et le poids d'un objet mobilier ne peuvent constituer eux seuls une attache.
Corp. d'assurances de personne La Laurentienne c. Qubec (Ville de), (C.Q., 1994-05-05), SOQUIJ AZ94031204, J.E. 94-893, [1994] R.J.Q. 1432
903/17 Un objet mobilier immobilis sur ou dans un immeuble ou une partie d'immeuble devient un
objet mobilier attach cet immeuble. C'est trs simplement son immobilisation qui tablit le fait qu'il
est attach.
Qubec (Ville de) c. Corp. d'assurances de personne La Laurentienne, (C.A., 1995-03-06), J.E. 95-589,
[1995] R.J.Q. 731
4. Absence d'incorporation et de perte d'individualit du meuble:
A. Gnralits:
903/18 Un bien est immeuble par destination (par attache ou runion) s'il peut avoir une existence
indpendante comme meuble, une fois dtach de l'immeuble.
Banque d'Hochelaga c. Waterous Engine Works Co., (C.S. Can., 1897-05-01), 27 R.C.S. 406
903/19 Les effets mobiliers devenus immeubles par destination (par attache ou runion) doivent pouvoir
s'enlever facilement sans dtriorer l'immeuble auquel ils se rattachent et sans dommages autres que
mineurs.
Frigidaire Corp. c. Duclos, (B.R., 1931-11-26), 52 B.R. 91
903/20 Les biens immobiliss par destination (par attache ou runion) ne perdent pas leur individualit
propre au point d'tre absorbs par l'immeuble auquel ils se rattachent.
Frigidaire Corp. c. Duclos, (B.R., 1931-11-26), 52 B.R. 91
5. Illustrations:
A. Immeubles par attache ou runion:
903/21 Lustres et plafonniers, ds le moment de leur installation, doivent tre considrs comme faisant
partie de l'immeuble puisqu'ils servent plus son utilit qu' la commodit des occupants.
68

Construtek G.B. inc. c. Laforge, (C.Q., 1997-10-21), J.E. 98-1, [1998] R.D.I. 137
903/22 Les silos lait font partie intgrante d'une fromagerie puisqu'ils ne peuvent tre enlevs sans
dmolir cet immeuble spcialis.
Cegerco Constructeur inc. c. Agropur Cooprative, (C.S., 2003-02-17), SOQUIJ AZ-50162718, J.E.
2003-633, [2003] R.D.I. 267
903/23 Le porte-miroir ou le manteau de la chemine d'une maison.
Bell, Rinfret & Cie c. Brasserie La Jonction Inc., (C.S., 1983-05-04), J.E. 83-645, [1983] C.S. 347
903/24 Un ensemble de balayeuse centrale, comprenant moteur et accessoires, est un immeuble par
destination (par attache ou runion) puisque les conduits qui servent au fonctionnement de l'appareil sont
placs dans les murs et qu'ils ne peuvent tre enlevs sans briser ou dtriorer la partie de l'immeuble
auquel ils sont attachs.
Brassard c. Roy, (C.Q., 1993-12-06), SOQUIJ AZ-94033011, [1994] R.D.I. 147
Contra:
Gagn c. Dorval, (C.P., 1982-04-13), J.E. 82-553, [1982] C.P. 29
903/25 Le tapis et le couvre-plancher de linolum sont devenus immeubles par attache ou runion ds
leur pose.
Boudreau c. Immeubles Jos Pelletier inc., (C.Q., 1995-01-30), J.E. 95-541
903/26 La moquette colle directement sur le ciment devient partie intgrante des planchers, perd son
individualit et assure strictement l'utilit de l'immeuble. Toutefois, mme s'il fallait la considrer comme
tant matriellement attache ou runie l'immeuble demeure, sans perdre son individualit et sans y
tre incorpore, elle serait immeuble jusqu' son dtachement, puisqu'elle vise strictement l'utilit de
l'immeuble.
Entreprises I. Lipman lte c. 3090-8784 Qubec inc., (C.S., 1996-03-14), J.E. 96-1073, [1996] R.J.Q.
1301, [1996] R.D.I. 265 (rs.)
903/27 Un lave-vaisselle encastr fait partie intgrante de la cuisine.
Fuhrmann c. Desjardins, (C.Q., 1995-05-04), SOQUIJ AZ-50187984
903/28 moins d'une stipulation ou d'une entente l'effet contraire, le systme d'irrigation doit tre
inclus dans la vente d'un immeuble. En effet, il s'agit d'un immeuble par attache ou runion puisque sa
tuyauterie souterraine ne peut tre enleve sans endommager le fonds.
Lafrance c. Lanouette, (C.Q., 1997-12-18), J.E. 98-430, [1998] R.D.I. 163, R.E.J.B. 1997-05521
903/29 Sont immeubles, les bandes d'une patinoire d'un arna.
Axor Construction Canada lte c. 3099-2200 Qubec inc., (C.A., 2002-01-21), [2002] R.D.I. 26, [2002]
J.Q. No. 55 (Q.L.), R.E.J.B. 2002-27758
903/30 Une maison prfabrique n'a pas de roues et n'est pas conue pour en avoir; par contre, elle est de
largeur lgale et peut tre installe en moins de une heure sur un fardier. Monte sur blocs, cette
construction est branche sur l'aqueduc municipal, munie d'une fosse septique et d'un champ d'puration,
desservie par une entre d'lectricit de 100 ampres, isole et recouverte de placopltre l'intrieur.
Construite sur place, elle ne fut pas dplace depuis plus de quatre ans et rien n'indique qu'elle le sera. Le
tribunal considre qu'il s'agit d'un immeuble.
Commission de la construction du Qubec c. Coffrages St-Hubert inc., (C.Q., 1996-04-22), J.E. 96-1222
69

903/30.1 Sont immeubles, des units de motels mobiles rassembles en modules matriellement runis
au fonds de terre.
Socit d'aide au dveloppement de la collectivit de Tmiscouata c. 9099-3601 Qubec inc., (C.S., 200311-03), SJ.E. 2003-2173, [2003] R.D.I. 842
903/31 Sont immeubles par attache ou runion une piscine hors terre et sa rampe d'accs, mais non la
toile solaire et le rouleau.
Roy c. Caisse populaire Desjardins de Charlemagne, (C.Q., 2001-10-02), SOQUIJ AZ-50103238, B.E.
2001BE-942, [2001] R.L. 629
B. Meubles:
903/32 Une plaque de cuisson et un four encastr sont des meubles meublants destins seulement au
service des occupants.
Brassard c. Roy, (C.Q., 1993-12-06), SOQUIJ AZ-94033011, [1994] R.D.I. 147
903/33 Un foyer B.B.Q. compos de briques et dont la totalit pse 3 500 livres n'est pas attach
demeure puisqu'il est dmontable et transportable.
Fuhrmann c. Desjardins, (C.Q., 1995-05-04), SOQUIJ AZ-50187984
903/34 Ne peut tre qualifie d'immeuble, la maison mobile situe sur un mme emplacement depuis
quelques annes, mais qui peut tre facilement dplace, qui n'assure pas l'utilit du terrain sur lequel elle
est installe et dont le nouveau propritaire n'a pas manifest l'intention de la garder au mme endroit en
permanence.
Milette c. Trois-Rivire (Ville de), (C.Q., 2001-01-29), B.E. 2001BE-610
C. Meubles servant l'exploitation d'une entreprise:
903/35 Une caisse populaire occupant un immeuble, l'ameublement fabriqu et livr pour son
fonctionnement sert la poursuite d'activits dans l'immeuble plutt qu' l'utilit de l'immeuble mme. De
plus, la plupart de ces meubles sont simplement poss sur le sol, exception faite de l'critoire qui est fixe
par des vis, vraisemblablement pour en assurer la stabilit. Il ne s'agit donc pas de meubles qui sont
demeure, matriellement attachs l'immeuble et qui, de ce fait, deviennent immeubles tant qu'ils y
restent.
Qubec inc. c. Vitrerie universelle & Boissonneault inc., (C.S., 1995-03-04), J.E. 95-727
903/36 Les objets destins l'exploitation d'un bar gr par un locataire dans un htel, ne peuvent tre
considrs comme immeubles, puisqu'ils n'assurent pas l'utilit de l'difice, mais servent simplement
l'exploitation d'un commerce situ l'intrieur de celui-ci.
Harel c. Bertlan inc., (C.S., 2000-05-05), SOQUIJ AZ-00021628, J.E. 2000-1280
6. Cessation de l'immobilisation par attache ou runion:
A. Gnralits:
903/37 Les biens immobiliss deviennent meubles lorsqu'ils sont vendus sparment de l'immeuble.
Qubec (Sous-ministre du Revenu) c. Robin Le Pain Moderne Inc., (C.A., 1989-09-22), J.E. 89-1339,
D.F.Q.E. 89F-120, [1989] R.D.F.Q. 246, [1989] R.D.I. 760, 25 Q.A.C. 226
70

903/38 La volont du propritaire de mettre fin la destination des biens suffit pour faire cesser
l'immobilisation par destination (par attache ou runion) dans la mesure toutefois o cette volont se
traduit par des gestes ou faits matriels concrets.
Canada (Procureur gnral) c. Banque Royale du Canada, (C.A., 1997-04-18), SOQUIJ AZ-97011450,
J.E. 97-944, L.P.J. 97-0319
903/39 Pour qu'il y ait cessation de l'immobilisation par destination (par attache ou runion), il doit y
avoir sparation physique entre le bien meuble et l'immeuble.
Dionne c. Financire Cooprants prts-pargne inc., (C.Q., 1992-09-11), [1992] R.D.I. 599

Art. 913 :
1. Gnralits:
913/1 Tout le monde peut jouir des choses communes comme l'air, la lumire, l'eau, condition de
respecter le fait que ce droit est commun tous.
Laforest c. Ciments du St-Laurent, (C.S., 1974-04-17), SOQUIJ AZ-74021085, [1974] C.S. 289 (rs.)
913/2 L'lectricit ne peut faire l'objet d'une vente entre deux individus. L'article 77 du Rglement
numro 634 sur les conditions de fourniture de l'lectricit (R.R.Q., 1981, c. H-5, r. 0.2) interdit de
revendre l'lectricit fournie ou livre par Hydro-Qubec moins d'tre une entreprise de distribution
d'nergie lectrique autorise.
Ouellette c. Croteau, (C.S., 2002-02-25), SOQUIJ AZ-50114422, J.E. 2002-947
2. Air:
71

A. Gnralits:
913/3 Celui qui, par ses activits, laisse chapper des poussires dans l'atmosphre enfreint, entre
autres, l'article 585 C.C.B.C., et la victime d'un pollueur peut rclamer des dommages-intrts [...].
Lachance c. Carey Canadian Mines Ltd., (C.S., 1982-01-11), [1982] R.L. 362
913/4 Le voisin qui pollue, soit par le bruit de ses activits, par la poussire ou par la dgradation de
l'environnement de quelque manire que ce soit, s'expose au risque que les personnes affectes le
tiendront responsable pour les dommages qui en rsultent.
Gauthier c. Soudure Dub & Frres Inc., (C.S., 1988-04-27), [1988] R.D.I. 263 (appel rejet par C.A.M.
no 500-09-000658-880, le 30 novembre 1993)
B. Illustrations:
913/5 Un propritaire outrepasse ses droits en construisant avec malice et mauvaise foi, sans bnfice
pour lui-mme et dans le but de se venger, sur son terrain prs de la ligne sparative, une clture d'une
hauteur dmesure, de faon empcher la lumire de pntrer et l'air de circuler.
Blais c. Giroux, (C.S., 1958-09-25), [1958] C.S. 569
3. Eau:
A. Gnralits:
913/6 L'article 913 C.C.Q. ne distingue pas suivant le caractre de navigabilit de l'eau.
Morin c. Morin, (C.A., 1997-12-03), J.E. 98-37, [1998] R.J.Q. 23, [1998] R.D.I. 37 (rs.), L.P.J. 98-0014
913/7 Quelles sont l'existence et l'tendue des droits d'accs des riverains des eaux courantes, lacs ou
rivires, non navigables ni flottables? Ils possdent un droit d'accs et d'usage du plan d'eau incluant
l'utilisation rcrative normale comme la natation, le canotage et l'installation d'un quai flottant.
Morin c. Morin, (C.A., 1997-12-03), SOQUIJ AZ-98011038, J.E. 98-37, [1998] R.J.Q. 23, [1998] R.D.I.
37 (rs.), L.P.J. 98-0014
913/8 Le propritaire du lit d'un lac non navigable, ni flottable, se trouve en principe dans la mme
position que les riverains quant l'usage des eaux qui s'y trouvent, rserve tant faite de l'exclusivit de
son droit de pche considr comme un droit rel appartenant au propritaire du lit quoique dissociable de
ce droit de proprit.
Morin c. Morin, (C.A., 1997-12-03), J.E. 98-37, [1998] R.J.Q. 23, [1998] R.D.I. 37 (rs.), L.P.J. 98-0014
B. Illustrations:
913/9 Le propritaire d'un fonds infrieur a le droit de recevoir de l'eau non pollue, non seulement sous
son aspect biologique, mais aussi dans ses caractristiques physiques comme la couleur, l'odeur, le got,
la temprature et la turbidit.
Carey Canadian Mines Ltd. c. Plante, (C.A., 1975-08-18), [1975] C.A. 893
913/10 La pollution des eaux d'un fonds infrieur, rsultant d'un dpt d'amiante par le propritaire d'un
fonds suprieur, donne droit compensation la victime de ce pollueur.
Carey Canadian Mines Ltd. c. Plante, (C.A., 1975-08-18), [1975] C.A. 893
72

4. Moyens de dfense:
913/11 Sont accepts comme moyens de dfense: l'tat du voisinage et l'exonration de responsabilit
rsultant d'une autorisation lgislative.
Laforest c. Ciments du St-Laurent, (C.S., 1974-04-17), [1974] C.S. 289 (rs.)
913/12 La dfense de l'tat du voisinage ne peut valoir que dans les cas o l'usage que l'on fait d'une
proprit dans un quartier quelconque ne va pas au-del de l'homognit de ce quartier.
Laforest c. Ciments du St-Laurent, (C.S., 1974-04-17), [1974] C.S. 289 (rs.)

Art. 980
1. Droit du propritaire d'un fonds contenant une source:
A. Gnralits:
980/1 Le propritaire d'une source a sur ses eaux un droit absolu qui ne peut tre modifi au profit des
fonds infrieurs que par l'effet d'une convention ou d'une prescription acquise. Il peut faire de ses eaux et
sur son fonds tel emploi qui lui plat et leur donner la destination qu'exigent la nature et l'tendue de ses
besoins, droit que ne sauraient entraver et limiter l'intrt gnral et l'intrt priv des propritaires
infrieurs.
Huot c. Garipy, (C.S., 1948-11-04), [1949] C.S. 143
980/2 En l'absence d'une servitude de puisage, le propritaire d'une source peut en user et en disposer
pour ses propres fins mme si le propritaire d'un fonds infrieur s'approvisionne en eau mme le
ruisseau provenant de celle-ci.
Jean c. Ferland, (C.S., 2000-08-31), J.E. 2000-1827, [2000] R.D.I. 605
980/3 Une source peut tre vendue. La vente touche alors un droit rel portant sur une partie d'immeuble.
Le fait, pour le propritaire d'un fonds, de se rserver l'usage de cette source lors de la cession du terrain,
implique qu'il en conserve la proprit et qu'il peut donc en disposer librement.
Simoneau c. Berthiaume, (C.A., 1998-07-13), J.E. 98-1583, [1998] R.D.I. 373, R.E.J.B. 1998-07248
2. Droit du propritaire d'un fonds sur lequel un lac est situ entirement:
A. Gnralits:
980/4 Le propritaire du lit d'un lac non navigable, ni flottable, se trouve en principe dans la mme
position que les riverains quant l'usage des eaux qui s'y trouvent, rserve tant faite de l'exclusivit de
son droit de pche considr comme un droit rel appartenant au propritaire du lit quoique dissociable de
ce droit de proprit.
Morin c. Morin, (C.A., 1997-12-03), J.E. 98-37, [1998] R.J.Q. 23, [1998] R.D.I. 37 (rs.), L.P.J. 98-0014

Art. 981
1. Gnralits:
73

981/1 L'article 981 C.C.Q. ne distingue pas suivant le caractre de navigabilit de l'eau.
Morin c. Morin, (C.A., 1997-12-03), J.E. 98-37, [1998] R.J.Q. 23, [1998] R.D.I. 37 (rs.), L.P.J. 98-0014
981/2 Tout propritaire du lit et des rives d'un cours d'eau peut, en principe, faire dans le cours d'eau, tous
les travaux qu'il lui plat de faire, condition de ne pas empcher les riverains infrieurs de se servir
comme lui de l'eau qui passe et de rendre l'eau son cours ordinaire, la sortie de son fonds.
Atkinson Ltd. c. Beaudoin, (B.R., 1927-12-23), 44 B.R. 424
981/3 Le propritaire d'une partie du lit d'un cours d'eau possde un droit rel de jouir du cours d'eau et
des eaux qui y coulent, et il doit s'assurer que l'utilisation qu'il en fait ne nuira pas aux autres propritaires
riverains situs en aval.
Champs c. Labelle (Corp. municipale de), (C.S., 1991-08-01), J.E. 91-1328, [1991] R.J.Q. 2313, [1991]
R.R.A. 843 (rs.)
981/4 En l'absence d'une servitude de puisage, le propritaire d'une source peut en user et en disposer
pour ses propres fins mme si le propritaire d'un fonds infrieur s'approvisionne en eau mme le
ruisseau provenant de celle-ci.
Jean c. Ferland, (C.S., 2000-08-31), J.E. 2000-1827, [2000] R.D.I. 605
981/4.1 Les droits des propritaires riverains sont, de faon non limitative, les suivants : l'accs l'eau,
qui a pour corollaire le droit la baignade, la pche et le droit de puiser de l'eau; les droits d'usage
domestique; les droits de navigation; les droits d'ancrage et d'amarrage.
Owens c. Ct, (C.Q., 2003-07-11), J.E. 2003-1556, [2003] R.D.I. 693
981/5 Le propritaire riverain d'un lac du domaine public a le droit d'en jouir, d'y naviguer et de s'y
baigner, tout comme les autres riverains du mme lac. Il n'a pas un droit de plage particulier, distinct de
celui de tous les autres citoyens ayant accs au lac, et son droit de baignade n'quivaut pas une servitude
sur le domaine public, car nulle servitude ne s'tablit sans titre.
P.G. du Qubec c. Blanger, (C.A., 1975-07-17), [1975] C.A. 887
981/6 Le riverain d'un cours d'eau faisant partie du domaine public ne peut exercer de recours quant
l'usage de ce cours d'eau, moins qu'il ne s'agisse d'une activit qui constitue une nuisance l'affectant
d'une manire particulire.
Champs c. Labelle (Corp. municipale de), (C.S., 1991-08-01), J.E. 91-1328, [1991] R.J.Q. 2313, [1991]
R.R.A. 843 (rs.)
981/7 Le propritaire d'un emplacement situ sur le bord d'une rivire non navigable possde des droits
riverains s'tendant jusqu'au milieu de la rivire, s'il n'est propritaire que d'un ct, et toute la rivire,
s'il est propritaire des deux cts.
Turgeon c. Dominion Tar & Chemical Co., (C.S., 1971-11-04), [1972] C.S. 647
981/8 Quelles sont l'existence et l'tendue des droits d'accs des riverains des eaux courantes, lacs ou
rivires, non navigables ni flottables? Ils possdent un droit d'accs et d'usage du plan d'eau incluant
l'utilisation rcrative normale comme la natation, le canotage et l'installation d'un quai flottant.
Morin c. Morin, (C.A., 1997-12-03), J.E. 98-37, [1998] R.J.Q. 23, [1998] R.D.I. 37 (rs.), L.P.J. 98-0014
981/9 Celui qui a un droit d'accs un lac, a le droit d'exiger l'enlvement de ce qui fait obstacle
l'exercice de son droit.
Boudreault c. Boily, (C.S., 1994-02-18), J.E. 94-542, [1994] R.D.I. 218
74

981/10 Les propritaires riverains sont responsables envers leurs voisins des dommages causs par un
usage exceptionnel et anormal de leurs droits.
Turgeon c. Dominion Tar & Chemical Co., (C.S., 1971-11-04), SOQUIJ AZ-72021107, [1972] C.S. 647
2. Pollution de l'eau la sortie du fonds:
981/11 Le propritaire du fonds infrieur a le droit de recevoir de l'eau non pollue, non seulement sous
son aspect biologique, mais aussi dans ses caractristiques physiques (couleur, odeur, got, temprature et
turbidit).
Carey Canadian Mines Ltd. c. Plante, (C.A., 1975-08-18), [1975] C.A. 893
981/12 Un propritaire riverain ne peut tre priv de son droit de recevoir de l'eau non pollue par les
propritaires situs en amont de sa proprit que par expropriation et moyennant une juste et pralable
indemnit.
Champs c. Labelle (Corp. municipale de), (C.S., 1991-08-01), J.E. 91-1328, [1991] R.J.Q. 2313, [1991]
R.R.A. 843 (rs.)

1. Gnralits:
947/1 La Charte canadienne n'a pas lev au rang de droits et liberts fondamentales le droit de proprit.
Quant la Charte qubcoise, elle protge, l'article 6, la jouissance des biens d'une personne, mais
ajoute sauf dans la mesure prvue par la loi.
Chamandy c. Westmount (Ville de), (C.S., 2001-06-07), SOQUIJ AZ-01021775, J.E. 2001-1424
947/2 Le terme proprit s'applique indistinctement aux meubles et aux immeubles lorsqu'il est
employ seul dans une disposition lgislative.
Lepage c. Watso, (C. Circuit, 1878-05-22), 8 R.L. 596
947/3 Trois lments ressortent de l'analyse des prrogatives du propritaire: le droit de se servir ou de
jouir de la chose, le droit d'en percevoir les fruits et le droit d'en disposer.
Bouchard c. Tanguay, (C.P., 1987-06-17), SOQUIJ AZ-87031203, J.E. 87-883, [1987] R.J.Q. 1883
2. Attributs du droit de proprit:
A. Usage (jus utendi):
75

947/4 Le droit d'usage est le droit de se servir de la chose, de l'utiliser.

Amos (Corp. mun. de la ville d') c. Descteaux, (C.S., 1983-03-09), SOQUIJ AZ-83021225, J.E. 83-413
947/5 L'usus est une prrogative importante du droit de proprit.
85831 Canada Ltd. c. Bitton, (C.S., 1991-07-02), SOQUIJ AZ-91023035, [1991] R.D.I. 488
947/6 Le droit l'image est extrapatrimonial parce qu'il a les caractres de non-disponibilit,
d'incessibilit et d'imprescriptibilit. Il a aussi, cependant, certains attributs patrimoniaux puisqu'il peut
tre monnay et a donc, dans certaines circonstances, une valeur conomique. Ce droit n'est pas pour
autant stricto sensu un droit de proprit. Le droit l'image, qui a un aspect extrapatrimonial et un aspect
patrimonial, est une composante du droit la vie prive inscrit l'article 5 de la Charte des droits et
liberts de la personne. Dans la mesure o le droit la vie prive cherche protger une sphre
d'autonomie individuelle, ce droit doit inclure la facult de contrler l'usage qui est fait de son image
puisque le droit l'image prend appui sur l'ide d'autonomie individuelle, c'est--dire sur le contrle qui
revient chacun sur son identit.
Aubry c. ditions Vice-Versa inc., (C.S. Can., 1998-04-09), J.E. 98-878, [1998] 1 R.C.S. 591, 157 D.L.R.
(4th) 577, 50 C.R.R. (3d) 225, R.E.J.B. 1998-05646
947/7 En l'absence d'un rglement de zonage, un propritaire peut faire de son terrain l'usage qu'il en
veut, sauf respecter les droits d'autrui.
Groupe Ray Lacroix lte c. Lvesque, (C.S., 1991-04-12), J.E. 91-795
947/7.1 Lorsque l'usage du droit de proprit cause autrui un prjudice qui dpasse la norme
gnralement admise des inconvnients normaux du voisinage, eu gard aux circonstances, l'usager du
droit devient coupable du prjudice caus sans qu'il soit ncessaire de prouver une faute caractrise.
D'Amico c. Brais, (C.S., 2003-10-21), SOQUIJ AZ-50202929, J.E. 2004-5
947/8 On ne doit pas empcher le propritaire de faire de son terrain l'usage qu'autorisent les lois et les
rglements de la collectivit s'il le fait sans malice et sans maladresse et qu'il n'agresse pas les voisins
chez eux.
Bertrand c. Dumoulin, (C.S., 1994-10-07), SOQUIJ AZ-96121022, [1996] R.L. 176
947/8.1 La clause qui interdit l'usage d'un terrain pour une station d'essence n'empche pas l'exploitation
d'un commerce de traitement d'antirouille pour vhicules.
Compagnie Gestimet inc. c. Parkway Investment Corp., (C.S., 2003-07-25), B.E. 2003BE-636
947/9 Les employs en grve ne peuvent empcher l'entreprise d'exploiter son industrie, de se servir de
sa chose, d'y employer des ouvriers, de leur assurer un libre accs l'entreprise. Les grvistes ne peuvent
pas empiter sur le domaine de l'employeur et ne peuvent poser d'actes de nature lui nuire.
Noranda Mines Ltd. c. United Steel Workers of America, (C.S., 1953-10-20), [1954] C.S. 27
B. Jouissance (jus fruendi):
947/10 Le droit la possession est l'un des lments constitutifs du droit de proprit.
Joyal c. Murphy Automobile Inc., (C.S., 1955-10-15), [1956] C.S. 311
947/11 Le propritaire peut s'opposer tout empitement sur son bien.
Gaudet c. Laviolette, (C.S., 1959-04-09), [1959] C.S. 398
76

947/12 Le propritaire d'un terrain peut en jouir pleinement et sans restriction, et supprimer les nuisances
qui pourraient tre causes par des tiers.
R. c. Investissements Contempra Lte, (C.M., 1988-03-10), J.E. 88-512, [1988] R.J.Q. 1147
947/13 Le propritaire d'un terrain, sur lequel une chose est laisse contre son gr par un tiers, peut faire
enlever cette chose de son fonds, mme par la force si ncessaire.
Gaudet c. Laviolette, (C.S., 1959-04-09), [1959] C.S. 398
947/14 Le droit de jouir de la chose est le droit de percevoir les fruits que celle-ci a produits.
P.G. du Qubec c. Bureau, (C.S.P., 1983-09-22), SOQUIJ AZ-83031225, J.E. 83-1000
947/15 Lorsque les restrictions au droit de jouissance et de proprit apportes par des travaux autoriss
par le gouvernement fdral l'ont t dans l'excution de travaux non seulement utiles mais ncessaires
la communaut, il n'y a pas lieu l'octroi d'une compensation pour diminution de jouissance.
Panneton c. Qubec (Procureur gnral), (C.S., 1989-09-29), SOQUIJ AZ-89023054, [1989] R.D.I. 848
947/16 Depuis que le requrant est devenu titulaire d'une servitude lui permettant d'avoir une vue sur le
fleuve Saint-Laurent, la dfenderesse a acquis la proprit du fonds servant et d'un lot intermdiaire sur
lequel poussent des arbres qui bloquent le champ de vision du fonds dominant. On peut imaginer le
conflit de voisinage que peut engendrer une telle situation. Le tribunal considre que la dfenderesse
utilise son droit de proprit dans le cadre traditionnel de l'article 406 C.C.B.C. (976 C.C.Q.) et qu'il n'est
pas convaincu que son comportement transgresse le concept couvert par cette disposition.
Asselin c. Cowan, (C.S., 1994-10-20), SOQUIJ AZ-94021710, J.E. 94-1816
C. Disposition (jus abutendi):
947/17 Le droit de disposer de la chose est le droit d'en faire un usage dfinitif, de la transformer, de la
consommer, de la dtruire ou de l'aliner.
P.G. du Qubec c. Bureau, (C.S.P., 1983-09-22), J.E. 83-1000
947/18 Le propritaire d'un immeuble peut faire de son bien ce que bon lui semble. Il peut le modifier, le
dgrader, l'endommager et y faire tous les travaux qu'il juge propos.
Brodeur c. Choinire, (C.S., 1944-09-05), [1945] C.S. 334
947/19 Tout propritaire est libre de modifier l'tat matriel du fonds qui lui appartient en levant un
difice sur le sol.
Blanger c. Armoires modulaires Cuisi 2000 inc., (C.Q., 1993-04-23), SOQUIJ AZ-93031257, J.E. 931031
947/20 Aucune loi de porte gnrale n'interdit d'abandonner unilatralement un droit de proprit. Une
telle dcision a pour consquence de librer immdiatement son auteur des charges relles affrentes aux
immeubles abandonns, mais non des obligations personnelles qu'il a contractes leur sujet.
Banque Laurentienne du Canada c. 200 Lansdowne Condominium Association, (C.S., 1995-12-07), J.E.
96-184, [1996] R.J.Q. 148, [1996] R.D.I. 99 (rs.)
947/21 Seule la personne jouissant du droit de proprit peut aliner l'entreprise qu'elle possde.
L'alination prsuppose un lien de droit entre la personne bnficiant du droit de proprit et l'acqureur.
77

Ainsi, le propritaire d'un terrain qui le loue une compagnie ptrolire ne peut tre considr
propritaire de l'entreprise exploite sur le site.
Union des employes et employs de la restauration, mtallurgistes unis d'Amrique, section locale 8470
c. Ultramar Canada inc., (C.A., 1998-12-02), J.E. 99-192, D.T.E. 99T-25, [1999] R.J.D.T. 110,, R.E.J.B.
1998-09611, L.P.J. 99-0042
947/22 Le legs d'un REER en pleine et absolue proprit, sous condition d'tre transform en FERR,
prive le liquidateur de la succession d'un droit de regard sur l'administration tant du capital que de la rente
annuelle.
Deschnes c. Gagn, (C.S., 2002-08-23), SOQUIJ AZ-50142048, J.E. 2002-1873
3. Limites et conditions d'exercice fixes par la loi:
A. Gnralits:
947/23 Le droit de proprit ne s'exerce pas de faon absolue; le lgislateur peut, de faon directe ou
dlgue, en restreindre l'exercice.
Carrires Rive-Sud inc. c. Boucherville (Ville de), (C.S., 1992-10-23), J.E. 93-163, [1993] R.J.Q. 130
947/24 L'article 406 C.C.B.C. (947 C.C.Q.) reconnat le caractre fondamental du droit de proprit mais
le soumet aux limitations et interdictions prvues par les lois ou rglements.
Modes Cohoes inc. c. Qubec (Procureur gnral), (C.A., 1993-10-26), SOQUIJ AZ-93011965, J.E. 931799, [1993] R.J.Q. 2801, 59 Q.A.C. 161
947/25 Toute privation de la pleine et libre jouissance du droit de proprit d'un citoyen ncessite un
texte lgislatif clair.
Abitibi (Municipalit rgionale de comt d') c. Ibitiba lte, (C.A., 1993-04-02), J.E. 93-754, [1993] R.J.Q.
1061, [1993] R.D.I. 321 (rs.), 55 Q.A.C. 201
947/26 En cas d'ambigut d'une loi, une interprtation stricte de celle-ci, favorable la proprit, doit lui
tre donne.
Veilleux c. Qubec (Commission de protection du territoire agricole), (C.S. Can., 1989-04-20), J.E. 89638, [1989] R.D.I. 253, [1989] 1 R.C.S. 839, 24 Q.A.C. 115
947/27 Les limitations au droit de proprit peuvent aussi provenir de clauses contractuelles, le contrat
tant la loi des parties.
9047-0758 Qubec inc. c. Phan Ha, (C.S., 2001-01-25), SOQUIJ AZ-01021262, J.E. 2001-532, [2001]
R.D.I. 120
947/28 Le propritaire d'un terrain a un droit prima facie de jouir de la manire la plus absolue de sa
chose. Par ailleurs, on pourrait, si cela n'est pas contraire la loi ou aux rglements, limiter son droit
d'utiliser sa chose comme il l'entend, ou lui imposer certaines normes et critres quant la qualit,
l'importance et la valeur des travaux entreprendre.
Barrette c. Mallette, (C.S., 1990-08-13), SOQUIJ AZ-90023059, [1990] R.D.I. 835
947/29 La prohibition d'aliner est une exception la rgle fondamentale du droit de proprit.
Religieuses du Prcieux-sang de Notre-Dame de Grce, Montral c. Dcarie, (C.S., 1990-03-14),
SOQUIJ AZ-90023028, [1990] R.D.I. 387
78

947/30 Le droit absolu de proprit sans entrave, sans servitude, se prsume; il faut une stipulation claire,
non quivoque pour justifier l'exercice d'une servitude.
Gagnon c. Chartrand, (C.S., 1948-12-24), [1949] C.S. 264
947/31 Parce qu'une servitude est une entrave au droit qu'a un propritaire de jouir de son fonds de la
manire la plus absolue, l'exercice de la servitude doit se faire strictement en la manire stipule dans le
titre constitutif. On ne peut en tendre la porte et l'usage au-del de ce qui avait t prvu lors de sa
cration.
Boulet c. Bisson, (C.S., 1949-06-02), [1949] C.S. 441
947/32 En matire de rglementation municipale, tout usage d'un terrain non prohib ou qui n'empite
pas sur les droits d'autrui est permis.
Groupe Ray Lacroix lte c. Lvesque, (C.S., 1991-04-12), J.E. 91-795
947/33 Des rglements municipaux prohibitifs constituent des charges et crent une sorte de servitude
lgale ou administrative qui impose une limitation au droit de proprit.
Immeubles Maude inc. c. Farazli, (C.A., 1991-07-24), J.E. 91-1264, [1991] R.D.I. 616, 40 Q.A.C. 232
947/34 La vie en socit, surtout en milieu urbain, impose des contraintes et des restrictions et toute
rglementation de zonage est fonde sur l'application de ces principes.
Chamandy c. Westmount (Ville de), (C.S., 2001-06-07), J.E. 2001-1424
947/35 Un rglement de zonage comporte un certain degr de discrimination dans le sens qu'il restreint le
droit du propritaire d'un immeuble d'en faire un usage absolu. Ce genre de discrimination n'est pas en soi
une cause de nullit. Toutefois, la discrimination qui dpasse la limite autorise par la loi rend le
rglement nul.
151951 Canada inc. c. Val-des-Monts (Municipalit de), (C.S., 1990-01-08), SOQUIJ AZ-90021152, J.E.
90-523, [1990] R.J.Q. 834
947/36 L'objet d'une rglementation de zonage est de restreindre le droit autrement absolu d'un
propritaire d'riger une construction ou un btiment et d'en faire l'usage qu'il veut.
Groupe Ray Lacroix lte c. Lvesque, (C.S., 1991-04-12), SOQUIJ AZ-91021266, J.E. 91-795
B. Illustrations:
947/37 La Loi sur l'expropriation impose une limite au droit de proprit.
Rodimax Inc. c. St-Laurent (Ville de), (C.S., 1989-02-27), SOQUIJ AZ-89021158, J.E. 89-621, [1989]
R.D.I. 319
947/38 La Loi sur la protection du territoire agricole ne contraint aucunement une personne cder sa
proprit. Tout au plus limite-t-on ses droits de l'utiliser des fins autres que l'agriculture lorsqu'elle est
incluse dans une zone agricole.
Hefo Entreprises inc. c. Tribunal d'appel en matire de protection du territoire agricole, (C.Q., 1993-1207), SOQUIJ AZ-94031065, J.E. 94-285, [1994] R.J.Q. 479, [1994] R.P.T.A. 65 (rs.)
947/39 Les nuisances ne sont pas un domaine de nature criminelle et le Code municipal du Qubec
autorise les municipalits adopter des rglements sur le sujet.
Caisse populaire Desjardins de St-Rmi c. Bertrand, (C.S., 1994-01-12), SOQUIJ AZ-94021089, J.E. 9479

273
947/40 Les limites au droit de proprit que la Loi sur la qualit de l'environnement peut imposer sont
acceptables dans une socit dmocratique o il existe une volont et un consensus social relatifs la
protection de l'environnement.
Caisse populaire Desjardins de St-Rmi c. Bertrand, (C.S., 1994-01-12), SOQUIJ AZ-94021089, J.E. 94273
947/41 Des modifications la dclaration de coproprit et au rglement d'un immeuble ont t adoptes
lors de l'assemble annuelle des copropritaires, interdisant la prsence de certains animaux tant dans les
parties communes qu'exclusives, alors que cette situation de fait existait depuis treize ans sans
apparemment soulever de difficults. Certains copropritaires cherchent faire invalider ces
modifications. De l'avis du tribunal, le droit de proprit des copropritaires est complet, mais le
lgislateur en subordonne l'exercice au respect du rglement de l'immeuble, aux droits des autres
copropritaires et la destination de l'immeuble. Par ailleurs, la dclaration de coproprit ne peut
imposer aux droits des copropritaires que les restrictions justifies par la destination de l'immeuble, ses
caractres et sa situation. En l'espce, la destination de l'immeuble, dans son ensemble, ne permet pas de
justifier le rglement tel qu'adopt lors de l'assemble des copropritaires. Un tel changement aurait
ncessit une modification la destination de l'immeuble dans la dclaration de coproprit.
Wilson c. Syndicat des copropritaires du condominium Le Champlain, (C.S., 1996-04-03), SOQUIJ AZ96021357, J.E. 96-949, [1996] R.J.Q. 1019, [1996] R.D.I. 261 (rs.)
947/42 La propritaire d'un terrain entreprend des travaux d'excavation qui crent un escarpement aux
deux lignes de division allant jusqu' deux mtres de hauteur. Ce changement dans l'amnagement naturel
des lieux cause et causera des glissements de terrain. La Cour d'appel est d'avis que la propritaire de ce
terrain, tout en jouissant de la libert d'exercice de son droit, ne peut modifier les lieux de manire
causer aux hritages voisins une perte ou une dtrioration prvisible et importante. Elle lui ordonne donc
de construire un muret de soutnement et de restaurer les terrains limitrophes dans l'tat o ils taient
avant que ne dbutent ses travaux d'excavation.
Sirois c. Lvesque-Gagn, (C.A., 1996-09-04), J.E. 96-1797

Art. 976
1. Gnralits:
976/1 La mise en vigueur du Code civil du Qubec a raviv le dbat relatif l'existence possible d'une
prsomption de faute en matire de troubles de voisinage.
Filteau c. Aviation Roger Forgues inc., (C.S., 1997-01-30), J.E. 97-514, L.P.J. 97-0110
976/2 L'article 976 C.C.Q. tablit les critres que les tribunaux doivent examiner dans le cas de litige
entre voisins. La mesure applicable est le caractre anormal et exorbitant des inconvnients. Il n'est plus
question de faute. Le propritaire devient responsable de plein droit, sans qu'il y ait faute, ds que
l'utilisation de son droit a pour effet de causer autrui un prjudice qui dpasse les inconvnients
normaux que chacun est tenu de subir. La lgalit de l'activit ne constitue pas une excuse lgitime.
Gourdeau c. Letellier-de St-Just, (C.A., 2002-04-30), J.E. 2002-856, [2002] R.J.Q. 1195, [2002] R.D.I.
236 (rs.), R.E.J.B. 2002-31486

80

976/3 L'obtention d'un permis d'tablissement ou d'exploitation de l'autorit lgislative ou administrative

ne confre pas une immunit et ne constitue pas une dfense une poursuite pour troubles de voisinage.
Barrette c. Ciment du St-Laurent inc., (C.S., 2003-05-09), J.E. 2003-1225, [2003] R.J.Q. 1883, [2003]
R.R.A. 1012 (rs.)
976/4 Le tribunal n'a pas rechercher de faute spcifique dans le cas d'un trouble de voisinage; il n'a qu'
constater que l'usage que l'un des voisins fait de son droit de proprit est incompatible avec la jouissance
du droit de proprit de l'autre. La balance des droits respectifs en prsence est rompue de sorte qu'il y a
lieu d'en rtablir l'quilibre.
Gagnon c. Caron, (C.S., 1997-10-28), J.E. 97-2168, [1997] R.D.I. 579
976/5 En matire de troubles de voisinage, la thorie de l'abus de droit peut recevoir application.
Gigure c. Comtois, (C.S., 1988-09-06), [1988] R.D.I. 664
976/5.1 Constituent un abus de droit les inconvnients qui dpassent ce qui est gnralement acceptable.
Labine-Forget c. Ionescu, (C.S., 2004-01-09), J.E. 2004-329, [2004] R.D.I. 143
976/6 Cette disposition s'applique galement aux locataires.
Barrette c. Ciment du St-Laurent inc., (C.S., 2003-05-09), J.E. 2003-1225, [2003] R.J.Q. 1883, [2003]
R.R.A. 1012 (rs.)
976/7 Les membres d'un groupe qui habitent des quartiers contigus une usine, des distances qui
varient, mais une proximit suffisante doivent tre considrs comme des voisins aux fins de
l'application des rgles en matire de troubles de voisinage.
Barrette c. Ciment du St-Laurent inc., (C.S., 2003-05-09), J.E. 2003-1225, [2003] R.J.Q. 1883, [2003]
R.R.A. 1012 (rs.)
976/8 Le propritaire ne peut utiliser son droit de proprit d'une faon qui compromette l'utilisation
concurrente du droit de proprit des autres.
Drysdale c. Dugas, (B.R., 1895-01-24), 6 B.R. 278
976/9 Un propritaire doit subir les inconvnients raisonnables qui rsultent du voisinage.
Aubertin c. Montreal Light, Heat & Power Consolidated, (C.S., 1936-02-13), 42 R.L. (n.s.) 424
976/10 Les servitudes que l'on dsignait comme servitudes lgales n'taient pas proprement parler des
servitudes, mais des situations de fait et des aggravations au droit de proprit. L'article 976 C.C.Q. lve
toute ambigut ce sujet et est beaucoup plus conforme la ralit juridique.
Breton c. Hbert, (C.S., 1994-11-16), J.E. 95-92, [1995] R.D.I. 66
976/11 La dmarcation entre ce qui est un inconvnient raisonnable qui rsulte du voisinage et ce qui est
un dommage est une question de faits laisse l'apprciation des tribunaux.
Aubertin c. Montreal Light, Heat & Power Consolidated, (C.S., 1936-02-13), 42 R.L. (n.s.) 424
976/12 Les obligations de voisinage ne s'analysent pas d'aprs la mme norme suivant qu'il s'agit d'un
quartier industriel ou rsidentiel; ce qui serait rprhensible dans le dernier cas pourrait ne pas l'tre dans
le premier.
Corriveau c. Golf Horizon inc., (C.Q., 2001-01-22), SOQUIJ AZ-50082891
81

976/13 Un propritaire ne saurait tre empch de faire de son terrain l'usage qu'autorisent les lois et les
rglements de la collectivit s'il le fait sans malice et sans maladresse.
Lande c. Cukier, (C.S., 1988-03-29), SOQUIJ AZ-88023015, [1988] R.D.I. 307
976/14 L'octroi de permis municipaux ou d'autres autorisations administratives ne permet pas
l'exploitant de dpasser la mesure normale des inconvnients, et il peut y avoir abus de droit mme en cas
d'observance de toutes les exigences et prescriptions de la loi et d'adhsion aux techniques les plus
modernes.
Calv c. Gestion Serge Lafrenire inc., (C.S., 1998-10-28), SOQUIJ AZ-98022139, J.E. 98-2373,
R.E.J.B. 1998-08909
976/15 Le tribunal doit tenir compte de tous les faits, notamment de la gravit du prjudice, et de la
tolrance qui doit exister entre les propritaires.
Girard c. Saguenay Terminals Ltd., (C.P., 1973-01-26), [1973] R.L. 264
976/16 Les voisins doivent tolrer les bruits qui ne sont pas dmesurs dans leur tendue ou incongrus
dans le voisinage particulier. Mais lorsque les bruits sont excessifs, extraordinaires ou excdent les limites
de la tolrance mutuelle, le tribunal doit intervenir pour faire cesser ces bruits.
Svigny c. Alimentation G.F. Robin inc., (C.S., 1999-01-25), J.E. 99-584, [1999] R.R.A. 702 (rs.),
R.E.J.B. 1999-11517
976/17 Dans un milieu rural, certains bruits doivent tre tolrs, au mme titre que dans un secteur
rsidentiel urbain. Une injonction ne sera pas accorde pour faire cesser le bruit d'une pompe thermique,
installe selon les rgles de l'art, pour l'usage d'une maison de campagne servant de rsidence permanente
sur le bord d'un lac.
Pietroniro c. Lvesque, (C.S., 1998-05-26), J.E. 98-1437, [1998] R.D.I. 411, R.E.J.B. 1998-07363,
A.J.Q./P.C. 1998-753
976/18 Un propritaire peut faire tous les travaux qu'il dsire sur son terrain, en respectant les exigences
des lois et rglements, mais il ne peut envahir la proprit des voisins.
Boudazza c. Sylvestre, (C.S., 1991-07-16), SOQUIJ AZ-91023041, [1991] R.D.I. 644
976/19 Le propritaire qui entreprend de faire sur son fonds des choses susceptibles de mettre en danger
l'hritage voisin doit adopter les mesures propres prvenir tout dommage cet hritage.
St-Louis c. Goulet, (B.R., 1953-12-04), [1954] B.R. 185
976/20 L'exercice du droit de proprit emporte l'obligation d'indemniser le voisin des dommages causs
lors de l'exercice de ce droit.
Katz c. Reitz, (C.A., 1972-08-23), SOQUIJ AZ-73011046, [1973] C.A. 230
976/21 Lorsque l'usage du droit de proprit cause autrui un prjudice qui dpasse la norme
gnralement admise des inconvnients normaux de voisinage, eu gard aux circonstances, l'usager du
droit commet une faute civile dont il devient comptable.
Poirier c. Labont, (C.Q., 1990-04-18), SOQUIJ AZ-90033040, [1990] R.D.I. 543
976/22 La gravit du dommage doit s'apprcier en fonction des usages locaux, de la situation et de la
nature de l'immeuble.
Girard c. Saguenay Terminals Ltd., (C.P., 1973-01-26), [1973] R.L. 264
82

976/23 L'atteinte la paix et la jouissance de la proprit par le bruit, qu'on la dfinisse en termes de
violation rglementaire ou de nuisance, est difficilement compensable. Le critre de prjudice irrparable
sera donc rencontr si l'atteinte est dmesure en rapport avec ce que l'on peut s'attendre des rgles de bon
voisinage.
St-Eustache (Ville de) c. 149644 Canada inc., (C.S., 1996-03-28), J.E. 96-954
976/24 L'antriorit d'installation ne constitue pas une fin de non-recevoir, mais un facteur que le tribunal
peut prendre en considration pour valuer le montant des dommages qui sont dus.
Girard c. Saguenay Terminals Ltd., (C.P., 1973-01-26), [1973] R.L. 264
976/25 Le tribunal doit tenir compte de la responsabilit du rclamant et de sa rceptivit personnelle au
dommage.
Girard c. Saguenay Terminals Ltd., (C.P., 1973-01-26), [1973] R.L. 264
976/26 Il faut tenir compte de la prvisibilit des inconvnients au moment de l'achat d'une rsidence.
Proietti c. Magnan, (C.Q., 1993-10-15), SOQUIJ AZ-93035058, [1993] R.R.A. 852
976/27 La connaissance d'une situation environnementale dfavorable avant de rsider dans un quartier
ne constitue pas un obstacle l'octroi de dommages, lorsque les inconvnients dpassent largement ceux
envisags.
Barrette c. Ciment du St-Laurent inc., (C.S., 2003-05-09), J.E. 2003-1225, [2003] R.J.Q. 1883, [2003]
R.R.A. 1012 (rs.)
976/28 La connaissance de la situation environnementale d'un terrain avant que l'on s'en porte acqureur
et ne commence subir les inconvnients de l'abus de droit de son voisin peut tre un facteur qui permet
de restreindre les dommages accords.
St-Eustache (Ville de) c. 149644 Canada inc., (C.S., 1996-03-28), J.E. 96-954
976/28.1 Lorsque l'usage du droit de proprit cause autrui un prjudice qui dpasse la norme
gnralement admise des inconvnients normaux du voisinage, eu gard aux circonstances, l'usager du
droit devient coupable du prjudice caus sans qu'il soit ncessaire de prouver une faute caractrise.
D'Amico c. Brais, (C.S., 2003-10-21), SOQUIJ AZ-50202929, J.E. 2004-5
2. Illustrations:
976/29 L'article 983 C.C.Q. ne s'applique pas uniquement aux toits des ouvrages immobiliers rigs en
permanence. Ainsi, les neiges et les glaces du toit d'un abri d'automobile temporaire qui, tout au long de
l'hiver, tombent sur le fonds voisin contreviennent cette disposition et, de plus, excdent les limites de la
tolrance que dterminent les usages locaux.
Moreau c. Gaudet, (C.S., 2003-01-08), J.E. 2003-443, [2003] R.D.I. 147
976/30 La pratique de la motoneige sur les lacs gels dans les rgions septentrionales du Qubec fait
partie des usages locaux avec lesquels les propritaires riverains doivent composer, compte tenu de la
situation de leurs fonds.
Association des rsidents du lac Mercier inc. c. Paradis, (C.S., 1996-08-27), J.E. 96-1756, [1996] R.J.Q.
2370, [1996] R.D.I. 597 (rs.)
976/31 L'une des conclusions d'une requte pour l'autorisation d'exercice d'un recours collectif est
l'effet de dclarer que les activits de certaines entreprises de transport par hydravion constituent des abus
83

de droit et causent des troubles de voisinage sur le lac St-Augustin. Le tribunal autorise le traitement
collectif de cette question. En effet, l'abus de droit et les troubles de voisinage relvent du droit civil, qui
est de comptence lgislative provinciale, puisqu'ils mettent en cause le principe que nul ne peut user de
ses droits d'une manire incompatible avec ceux d'autrui. Comment concevoir, dans un tat de droit
comme le ntre, que les tribunaux ne puissent vrifier si un citoyen assujetti la rglementation de
quelque palier de gouvernement que ce soit abuse de ses droits. En l'occurrence, il s'agit de
rglementation fdrale en matire de contrle de l'aronautique.
Filteau c. Aviation Roger Forgues inc., (C.S., 1997-01-30), J.E. 97-514, L.P.J. 97-0110
976/31.1 Le passage continuel, rptitif et perptuel d'un vhicule sur un terrain ne constitue pas un
inconvnient normal qu'un propritaire peut imposer son voisin. Il ne peut avoir pour effet de crer une
servitude de passage.
Lanart Sales Inc. c. Macnaughton, (C.A., 2004-01-28), J.E. 2004-387
976/32 En matire de droit de passage, le propritaire du fonds servant n'est pas tenu de laisser l'assiette
de la servitude continuellement libre de tout vhicule ou de tout objet. Le propritaire du fonds dominant
doit, compte tenu de l'exploitation commerciale du fonds servant, tolrer les inconvnients rsultant d'une
diminution partielle de son droit lorsque celle-ci n'empche pas l'exercice mme de celui-ci.
Lepage c. Morin, (C.S., 2001-02-07), J.E. 2001-535, [2001] R.D.I. 243
976/34 L'exercice abusif d'un droit de passage, plus particulirement le stationnement d'automobiles dans
l'assiette de la servitude, constitue un inconvnient anormal de voisinage.
Fleurant c. Deraspe, (C.S., 2001-10-26), J.E. 2001-2116, R.E.J.B. 2001-27071
976/35 Depuis que le requrant est devenu titulaire d'une servitude lui permettant d'avoir une vue sur le
fleuve Saint-Laurent, la dfenderesse a acquis la proprit du fonds servant et d'un lot intermdiaire sur
lequel poussent des arbres qui bloquent le champ de vision du fonds dominant. On peut imaginer le
conflit de voisinage que peut engendrer une telle situation. Le tribunal considre que la dfenderesse
utilise son droit de proprit dans le cadre traditionnel de l'article 406 C.C.B.C. (976 C.C.Q.) et qu'il n'est
pas convaincu que son comportement transgresse le concept couvert par cette disposition.
Asselin c. Cowan, (C.S., 1994-10-20), SOQUIJ AZ-94021710, J.E. 94-1816
976/36 Qu'en milieu urbain la prsence d'arbres profite gnralement aux citadins directement voisins
n'attnue aucunement la responsabilit de la municipalit qui en a la garde titre de propritaire; elle doit
donc rparer le prjudice caus par leurs racines.
Pouliot c. Qubec (Ville de), (C.Q., 1996-10-08), SOQUIJ AZ-50188153
976/37 Le propritaire n'a pas droit une indemnit pour compenser la diminution de jouissance de sa
proprit s'il connaissait la destination du fonds voisin (telle une carrire), et s'il a pris tout de mme la
dcision de s'y installer, c'est qu'il en a accept les inconvnients. Il y aura cependant lieu une indemnit
s'il n'y a pas eu une exploitation normale et raisonnable de la carrire.
Hunt c. A. Brousseau & Fils lte, (C.S., 1991-07-05), J.E. 91-1304, [1991] R.R.A. 840 (rs.)
976/38 Il y a des avantages tre voisin d'un collge; il y a aussi des inconvnients qu'on est tenu de
subir. En acqurant leurs proprits, les demandeurs ont acquis l'environnement d'alors, mais aussi
l'environnement futur. La dfenderesse n'a fait que suivre l'volution de la socit et du monde de
l'ducation; elle n'est pas fautive dans l'exercice de son droit de proprit et les inconvnients causs sont
normaux et invitables de la part d'une institution d'enseignement qui doit recourir au transport d'lves
par autobus scolaires. Les demandeurs doivent faire preuve de cette tolrance entre voisins dont traite
84

l'article 976 C.C.Q.

McNamara c. Congrgation des soeurs des Saints Noms de Jsus et de Marie, (C.S., 1995-01-27),
SOQUIJ AZ-95021155, J.E. 95-388
976/39 Constituent des inconvnients normaux du voisinage d'un centre commercial la musique, les
bruits de freinage et de dmarrage d'automobiles, les claquements de portires, ainsi que les odeurs
provenant d'un compacteur dchets.
Veilleux c. Fiduciaires du Fonds de placement immobilier Cominar, (C.S., 2001-12-10), J.E. 2002-196,
[2002] R.D.I. 82
976/40 Mme s'il faut tenir compte de la prvisibilit des inconvnients au moment de l'achat d'un terrain
et de la construction d'une rsidence, lorsque le risque dpasse les inconvnients normaux rsultant, par
exemple, de la proximit d'un terrain de baseball et que ce risque est continu, il peut y avoir abus de droit.
Bouchard c. Mont St-Hilaire (Corp. de la ville de), (C.Q., 1995-02-09), [1996] R.L. 316
976/41 Le fait que des balles de baseball passent par-dessus les filets de 32 pieds entourant un terrain
municipal constitue-t-il un cas de force majeure? Le tribunal est d'avis que l'vnement tait prvisible et
qu'une solution aurait pu lui tre apporte. Il conclut donc la responsabilit de la municipalit qui, en
tant que propritaire d'un terrain o s'exerait une activit susceptible de causer un dommage la
proprit du voisin, n'a pas adopt les mesures propres prvenir une semblable ventualit.
Miltimore c. Manoir des sables inc., (C.Q., 1999-03-19), SOQUIJ AZ-99036592, B.E. 99BE-1114
976/42 Dans la dtermination d'une nuisance, il faut tenir compte des critres du bruit urbain et du bruit
agricole. Ainsi, la paix de la campagne ne peut tre un critre retenir l'gard des oprations d'une
piste de courses d'automobiles. La paix relative, sans bruit nuisible, sera cependant le critre de
coexistence respecter.
St-Eustache (Ville de) c. 149644 Canada inc., (C.S., 1996-06-27), J.E. 96-1552
976/43 Une Ville a l'obligation d'assurer le respect de ses rglements, mais elle n'a aucune comptence
pour dcider en dernier ressort de leur interprtation en cas de conflit, pas plus qu'elle ne peut limiter les
droits de ses contribuables leur gard. Par exemple, une Ville ne peut dcider que pour diverses raisons
d'usage et de tolrance, et notamment cause du bruit ambiant, son rglement sur les nuisances ne
s'appliquera pas. Par consquent, le fait que la Ville se dclare satisfaite du bruit, lorsqu'il est ramen au
niveau du bruit ambiant, ne constitue pas une fin de non-recevoir l'encontre du recours en dommagesintrts intent par un citoyen contre une entreprise voisine dont les oprations produisent un bruit
excessif.
Pilon c. Aerospace Welding Inc., (C.S., 1997-05-13), J.E. 97-1210, R.E.J.B. 1997-00753
976/44 L'exploitation d'une cimenterie, par ailleurs respectueuse des normes en vigueur, peut causer des
inconvnients anormaux excdant les limites de la tolrance entre voisins.
Barrette c. Ciment du St-Laurent inc., (C.S., 2003-05-09), SOQUIJ AZ-50173892, J.E. 2003-1225, [2003]
R.J.Q. 1883, [2003] R.R.A. 1012 (rs.)
976/45 L'exploitation d'une pourvoirie de chasse aux oiseaux migrateurs donne lieu des empitements
continuels sur les terrains voisins. Le tribunal est d'avis que si un oiseau tombe accidentellement sur un
terrain priv, le chasseur pourrait peut-tre aller le chercher; par contre, il ne saurait volontairement se
85

mettre dans une situation o l'abattage de trois oiseaux sur quatre implique la violation d'une proprit
prive, sous prtexte de rcuprer le gibier. Ce n'est pas l un trouble de voisinage que l'on doit tolrer,
mais l'exercice d'une activit commerciale. Ce n'est pas non plus une force naturelle ou une force majeure
qui oblige les chasseurs se rendre sur les terrains voisins, mais ils tirent volontairement sur des oiseaux
qui, selon toute probabilit, y tomberont. Bref, la pourvoirie est exploite sur le terrain lou et sur les
terrains voisins.
Gravel c. Godin, (C.S., 1995-11-15), 200-05-002674-955
976/46 La propritaire d'un terrain entreprend des travaux d'excavation qui crent un escarpement aux
deux lignes de division allant jusqu' deux mtres de hauteur. Ce changement dans l'amnagement naturel
des lieux cause et causera des glissements de terrain. La Cour d'appel est d'avis que la propritaire de ce
terrain, tout en jouissant de la libert d'exercice de son droit, ne peut modifier les lieux de manire
causer aux hritages voisins une perte ou une dtrioration prvisible et importante. Elle lui ordonne donc
de construire un muret de soutnement et de restaurer les terrains limitrophes dans l'tat o ils taient
avant que ne dbutent ses travaux d'excavation.
Sirois c. Lvesque-Gagn, (C.A., 1996-09-04), J.E. 96-1797
976/47 La construction d'un deuxime tage une maison jumele ne constitue pas, en soi, un
inconvnient anormal pour le voisin.
Grimard c. Binet, (C.S., 2002-12-05), B.E. 2003BE-224
976/48 Dpassent les inconvnients normaux du voisinage, l'abandon d'une proprit et d'un terrain dans
un quartier rsidentiel pour le propritaire d'une maison jumele.
Fortier c. Laroche, (C.S., 2003-02-03), SOQUIJ AZ-50160769, B.E. 2003BE-326
976/49 Le dneigement du stationnement d'un centre commercial, en zone urbaine, effectu en violation
de la convention intervenue avec les propritaires voisins, constitue un inconvnient anormal et exorbitant
justifiant l'mission d'une injonction interlocutoire.
Veilleux c. Fiduciaires du Fonds de placement immobilier Cominar, (C.S., 2001-12-10), J.E. 2002-196,
[2002] R.D.I. 82
976/50 La prsence rpte du chien du voisin sur le terrain du demandeur constitue un inconvnient
anormal de voisinage.
Fleurant c. Deraspe, (C.S., 2001-10-26), J.E. 2001-2116, R.E.J.B. 2001-27071
976/51 Constitue un dpassement des inconvnients normaux du voisinage, l'rection d'un mur
sparateur en blocs de bton d'une hauteur de 13 pieds qui diminue considrablement l'ensoleillement du
voisin.
Johnson c. Chauvette, (C.S., 2002-07-08), SOQUIJ AZ-50137482, B.E. 2002BE-673
976/51.1 Constitue un dpassement des inconvnients normaux du voisinage, l'clairage intensif d'une
proprit par un projecteur de surveillance install sur le terrain voisin, et qui a pour effet de nuire au
sommeil du requrant.
Dufour c. Parent, (C.Q., 2003-09-24), B.E. 2003BE-779
976/51.2 La chute constante d'aiguilles de pin et de rsine constitue un inconvnient qui dpasse les
exigences de tolrance.
86

Labine-Forget c. Ionescu, (C.S., 2004-01-09), J.E. 2004-329, [2004] R.D.I. 143

3. Prescription:
A. Gnralits:
976/52 La prescription du droit commun couvre l'action en responsabilit pour troubles de voisinage
contre une municipalit. La courte prescription de l'article 586 de la Loi sur les cits et villes (L.R.Q., c.
C-19) ne s'applique pas en l'espce puisqu'il ne s'agit pas d'un accident au sens de cette loi.
Vivaces de chez nous inc. c. Laval (Ville de), (C.S., 2002-07-18), B.E. 2002BE-700
4. Procdure:
A. Recours possibles:
976/53 La victime d'un abus du droit du voisinage peut se pourvoir en justice pour exiger la fois
compensation du dommage subi et cessation de la situation qui lui cause prjudice. L'ordonnance
d'injonction a pour effet d'viter la continuation du prjudice pour l'avenir, alors que la condamnation en
dommages vise la rparation du prjudice subi depuis le dbut des inconvnients.
Lessard c. Bernard, (C.S., 1996-04-19), J.E. 96-1081, [1996] R.D.I. 210
976/54 Il y a abus de droit si le voisin prouve soit (i) absence de droit de faire une telle chose; (ii) malice,
intention de nuire; (iii) inconvnients anormaux, indpendamment du caractre fautif ou non de l'acte.
Cette troisime catgorie dmontre que mme si l'auteur des inconvnients suit les normes et rglements
et n'encourt aucune sanction administrative ou policire, il peut tre reconnu responsable d'abus de droit
lorsqu'il y a inconvnients anormaux. En vertu de ce principe, il apparat logique de conclure que le
locataire aura droit une diminution de loyer, mme si l'entrepreneur qui effectue des travaux sur un
terrain voisin a suivi les normes et rglements, et mme si le locateur a tent sans succs de faire cesser
les inconvnients dans la mesure o ces derniers sont anormaux.
Trahan c. Toupin, (C.Q., 1998-05-11), J.E. 98-1492, R.E.J.B. 1998-08367
976/55 Les voisins d'un centre commercial peuvent demander l'mission d'une injonction interlocutoire,
suite la violation d'une convention intervenue entre les parties quant aux heures de dneigement du
stationnement de l'immeuble. Le non-respect de cette convention constitue une reconnaissance d'un
trouble de voisinage dpassant les limites de la tolrance.
Veilleux c. Fiduciaires du fonds de placement immobilier Cominar, (C.S., 2000-03-01), B.E. 2000BE-396

87

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