12

originalni
nauni
rad

Prof. dr Vladimir Grbi

Fakultet za meunarodnu
ekonomiju, Univerzitet
Megatrend, Beograd
vgrbic@megatrend.edu.rs

Bankarstvo 2 2014

UDK 338.124.2:339.738(4) ; 339.137.2

KONKURENTNOST
PRIVREDE I
KRIZA EVROPSKE
MONETARNE UNIJE

Prof. dr Dragoljub Todi

Institut za meunarodnu
politiku i privredu, Beograd
d.todic@diplomacy.bg.ac.rs

Rad je realizovan u okviru naunih projekata: Unapreenje javnih politika u Srbiji u

funkciji poboljanja socijalne sigurnosti graana i odrivog privrednog rasta (47004) i
Srbija u savremenim meunarodnim odnosima: strateki pravci razvoja i uvrivanja
poloaja Srbije u meunarodnim integrativnim procesima - spoljnopolitiki,
meunarodni, ekonomski i bezbednosni aspekti (179029), Ministarstva prosvete,
nauke i tehnolokog razvoja Republike Srbije, za period 2011-2014. godine

Rezime
Kriza u Evropskoj Monetarnoj uniju (EMU) otkrila je unutranje slabosti
njenog funkcionisanja. Evolucija EMU nije bila praena odgovarajuim
strukturnim transformacijama. Pretpostavke optimalnog valutnog podruja o
njegovom endogenom karakteru nisu se u dovoljnoj meri potvrdile. Utvreno
je da se konkurentnost privreda evrozone pogorala u odnosu na relevantne
konkurente u svetu. Uniformno delovanje jedinstvene valute doprinelo je i
produbljivanju razlika u konkurentnosti lanica. Na dui rok, postojea recesija
usporava razvoj EMU i otvara pitanje njenog opstanka. Pred lanicama EMU
je dug put strukturnih transformacija. Radi adekvatnijeg prilagoavanja krizi,
visoko zavisne od evra srpske finansije moraju da izaberu odgovarajui reim
deviznog kursa.
Kljune rei: konkurentnost, kriza, Evropska monetarna unija, optimalno
valutno podruje, strukturno prilagoavanje
JEL: E61, E63, F15, F42
Rad primljen: 23.12.2013.
Odobren za tampu: 04.03.2014.

Bankarstvo 2 2014

13

UDC 338.124.2:339.738(4) ; 339.137.2

COMPETITIVENESS
OF THE ECONOMY
AND THE CRISIS
OF THE EUROPEAN
MONETARY UNION

original
scientific
paper

Prof Vladimir Grbi, PhD

Graduate School of International
Economics, Megatrend
University, Belgrade
vgrbic@megatrend.edu.rs

Prof Dragoljub Todi, PhD

This work is made within the framework of the scientific projects: Promotion of public
policies in Serbia in the function of enhancement of social security of citizens and
sustainable economic growth (ev. No. 47004), and Serbia in contemporary international
relations: strategic development objectives and reinforcement of the position of Serbia in
the international integration processes - foreign-political, international, economic, and
security aspects (ev. No. 179029), Ministry of Education, Science and Technological
Development of the Republic of Serbia, for the period 2011-2014.

Institute for International Politics

and Economics, Belgrade
d.todic@diplomacy.bg.ac.rs

Summary
The crisis in the European Monetary Union revealed the internal weaknesses
of its functioning. The evolution of the EMU was not accompanied by
appropriate structural transformations. The prerequisite for optimal currency
area on its endogenous character is not sufficiently confirmed. It was found
that the competitiveness of the euro area economy worsened compared to the
relevant competitors in the world. A uniform operation of the single currency
has contributed to the deepening of the differences in competitiveness among
members. In the longer term, the current recession has slowed the development
of the EMU and raises the question of its survival. In front of the EMUs
members is a long road of the structural adjustments. In order to adapt to the
European crisis adequately, Serbian finance highly dependent on euro must
choose an appropriate exchange rate regime.
Key words: competitiveness, crisis, European Monetary Union, optimum
currency area, structural adjustments.
JEL: E61, E63, F15, F42

Paper received: 23.12.2013

Approved for publishing: 04.03.2014

14

Uvod
Osnovno pitanje na koje elimo u ovom
radu da odgovorimo je da li je funkcionisanje
Evropske monetarne unije (EMU) dovelo do
uspenijeg razvoja realnog sektora i poveanja
konkurentnosti ili nije. U odgovoru na ovo
pitanje, ciljeve i sam rad smo struktuirali
na sledei nain, Prvo, da utvrdimo koje
su pretpostavke pre svega ekonomske, pa
onda i monetarne integracije, oliene u teoriji
optimalnog valutnog podruja, kao i kontraverze
vezane za uvoenje evra, sa kojim se ova kriza
u osnovi identifikuje. Drugo, da analiziramo
tendencije u razvoju konkurentnosti privreda
evrozone, kako u odnosu prema odgovarajuim
konkurentima u svetu (SAD, Japan) , tako, jo i
vie, imeu lanica same integracije. Tree, da
analiziramo mogua reenja i rasplet krize, kao
i njene implikacije na Srbiju.

Integracija i Evropska monetarna

unija
Integracija, kao fenomen, u privrednom,
pa moe se rei i u socijalnom ivotu ima
svoje pretpostavke. Kada se integriu dva
preduzea na jednom privrednom prostoru i
formiraju jednu upravljaku strukturu, kao
pretpostavka, odnosno preduslov javlja se
slian nivo njihove razvijenosti. Ako to nije
sluaj, ako su preduzea odnosno firme na
razliitim ekonomskim nivoima, onda se moe
raditi o akviziciji jednog od strane drugog, a ne
o zajednikom poslovnom poduhvatu.
Ista pretpostavka u osnovi vai za integraciju
meu dravama. U meunarodnoj integracionoj
praksi mogu se identifikovati i razdvojiti tri
integraciona obrazca prema kriterijumima
razvojnog nivoa zemalja lanica integracije:
sever-sever, sever-jug i jug-jug. Pokazalo se
u dosadanjoj praksi da stepen korisnosti i
uspenosti opada od prvog ka poslednjem,
ali isto tako da i svaki od njih moe pozitivno
uticati na razvoj zemlja lanica, zavisno od
konkretnih okolnosti (Grbi, Antevski, Todi,
2013) U dananjoj Evropskoj uniji mogu se
prepoznati praktino sva tri obrazca. lanice
osnivai EU, kao i zemlje EFTE imaju karakter
obrazca sever-sever, nove lanice primljene u
tzv. velikom proirenju 2004. godine i posle, kao

Bankarstvo 2 2014

i neke zemlje juga kontinenta daju Uniji karakter

integracije sever-jug, dok zemlje lanice CEFTE
predstavljaju primer obrazca jug-jug.
Ovo to je reeno moe se interpretirati i na
sledei nain. Prvo utemeljenje EU, odnosno
realizovanje sever-sever obrazca integracija,
bilo je zasnovano na realnijim ekonomskim
kriterijumima, a pre svega, na slinom
nivou privredne razvijenosti i slinostima
privredne strukture koja omoguava razvoj
konkurencije, dok su kasnija proirenja bila vie
inspirisana politikim razlozima i vezana su za
obrazac sever-jug. Konkurentska osnova nije
predstavljala impuls ve eventulno ekonomiju
obima i mogunost lakeg prikupljanja
kapitala, dok su privredne stukture bile
razliite, ostavljajui manje prostora za razvoj
konkurencije na zajednikom tritu. to se
tie poslednjeg integracionog obrazca jug-jug,
olienog danas u zemljama Zapadnog Balkana,
on je i zamiljen kao privremeni, a tako je i
funkcionisao u prethodnim sluajevima.
Procesi proirenja EU su se odvijali u
ambijentu uspenog razvoja svetske privrede.
Period od sredine osamdesetih godina prolog
veka do izbijanja krize 2008. godine karakterie
makroekonomska ravnotea i stabilne
stope rasta bruto domaeg proizvodu u EU.
Realizovana proirenja nisu izazivala posebne
probleme, osim prvog, nemakog ujedinjenja.
Adaptiranje novih lanica u ovom ambijentu
je bilo olakano. Prve analize nisu ukazivale da
je ojaao juni pol zemalja sa niim ueem
industrije u BDP i da se na taj nain debalansirao
obrazac sever-jug evropskih integracija. U tom
makroekonomskom stabilnom miljeu ojaala je
i ideja o formiranju nove novane jedinice, evra,
iako su dva prethodna pokuaja fiksiranja kursa,
u liku vezivanja valuta za dolar, tzv. monetarna
zmija (1972-1977) u prvom, i funkcionisanja
ekija (1979-1993) u drugom pokuaju bila
neuspena (Lui, 2011).
Teorijsku osnovu formiranja evra i etabliranja
Evropske monetarne integracije (EMU) takoe
nalazimo u blioj prolosti; vezuje se za rad
Mundell-a (1961) koji je u raspravi, za i protiv
fleksibilnog deviznog kursa (Friedman, 1953;
Meade, 1957) upotrebio sintagmu: optimalno
valutno podruje (OVP). To je, dakle, podruje
koje ne koincidira sa dravnim granicama
i koje, ako postoji visoka mobilnost radne

Bankarstvo 2 2014

Introduction
The basic question that we wish to answer
in this work is whether the functioning of the
European Monetary Union (EMU) has led
to a more successful development of the real
sector and to an enhanced competitiveness
or not. In the answer to this question we have
structured the objectives and the paper itself
in the following manner. Firstly, to determine
what are the prerequisites, primarily economic
ones, to be followed by monetary integrations
that are embodied in the theory of the optimum
currency area, but also controversies related to
the introduction of euro, with which this crisis
is basically identified. Secondly, to analyze
tendencies in the development of competitiveness
of the euro-zone economies, both with respect
to the adequate competitors in the world (USA,
Japan), but even more so amongst the membercountries of the integration itself. Thirdly, to
analyze possible solutions and resolution of
crisis, and its implications with respect to Serbia.

Integration and the European

Monetary Union
Integration, as a phenomenon, in the
economic and it may be said also in the social life
is having its prerequisites. In case two companies
are merging in a single economic area and are
forming a single managerial structure what
appears as a prerequisite is to have a comparable
level of their development. If this is not the case,
and the companies, i.e. firms are on different
economic levels then it may rather be a case of
acquisition of one company in respect of the
other, and not of a joint business venture.
The same prerequisite basically applies for
integration between states. In the integration
practice what can be identified and distinguished
are the three integration formats according
to the criteria of the development level of the
integration member country: North - North,
North - South, and South - South. The past
practice has shown that the level of benefit
and success declines from the first to the last
format, but also that every one of them can
have a positive influence on the development of
the member countries, depending on concrete
circumstances (Grbic, Antevski, Todic, 2013, 49).

15

In the present-day European Union, it is possible

to identify practically all of the three formats. The
EU founding member countries, but also EFTA
countries, are having the character of the North
- North format, the newly admitted member
countries in the so-called broad expansion of
the year 2004 and thereafter, and some of the
countries in the southern part of the continent
are giving the Union the character of the North
- South integration, while the CEFTA countries
are an example of the South - South format.
The above said may be interpreted also in the
following way. Firstly, founding of the EU, i.e.
creation of the North - North integration format
was based on more realistic economic criteria,
primarily on a comparable level of economic
development and similarities in the economic
structure which allows for the development of
competitiveness, while the later day expansions
were rather inspired by political reasons and
connected with the North - South format. The
competitive basis did not appear to give an
impetus, but rather the economy of scale and the
option of easier access to capital, while economic
structures remained different leaving little space
for development of competition on a common
market. Regarding the last integration format
South - South, embodied today in the countries
of the Western Balkans, it was envisaged as a
temporary one and it did act in such a fashion
in the previous cases.
The EU expansion processes were taking
place in an environment of successful
development of the world market. Period
from the mid-1980s and up to the outbreak of
the crisis in 2008 is characteristics for macroeconomic balance and stable GDP growth
rates in the EU. The expansions made did not
cause any special problems, except for the
first one, German unification. Adaptation of
the new member countries in such a climate
was facilitated. The initial analyses did not
indicate that the southern pole of countries
with the lower share of industry in the GDP
was strengthening, and that it had in this way
disturbed the balance of the North - South
European integrations format. In such a stable
macro-economic milieu what was strengthened
was the idea of formation of a new monetary
unit - euro, although the previous two attempts
at fixing exchange rate in the form of pegging

16

snage, moe fiksirati devizni kurs unutar

njegovih granica, dok bi izvan granica, dakle
prema spoljnjem svetu, trebalo da ostane
fleksibilan. Ako bi se desili spoljnji izazovi,
tzv. asimetrini okovi tranje, kao zamena za
devalvaciju valute predvia se i fleksibilnost
cena i nadnica. Kasnije je teorija proirena na
vie polja. Najreprezentativnija od svih novih
teorija OVP je ona o endogenom karakteru
zone. Tako Frankel i Rose (1997) naglaavaju
da zona ima potencijal da samostalno kreira
svoj razvoj u sferi ekonomije, a neki autori, na
primer Issing (2001) proiruju endogenost i na
politike integracije.
Veliki broj ekonomista je bio skeptian prema
evru. Upozorenja, pre njegovog uvoenja, ili
ak u doba njegovog uspenog funkcionisanja
koncentrisana su na injenicu da evrozona
nema karakteristike optimalnog valutnog
podruja. Krize mogu pogoditi jednu zemlju,
a pogodovati drugoj, dakle asimetrine su.
Fiskalna politika je u nadlenosti lanica i nema
politike volje da se integrie. Na primer, jedna
od studija, koja u istraivanju OVP prezentuje
klasian doprinos analizi konkurentnosti lanica
(Eichgreen, Bayoumi, 1996) i iji su rezultati
kasnije u osnovi potvreni (Joao, Rui, 2011)
istraujui sledee kriterije konvergentnosti:
uticaj asimetrinih okova na proizvod, radnu
mobilnost i transakcionu vrednost jedinstvene
valute, dolazi veoma precizno, po zemljama, do
identifikacije onoga to se kasnije i dogodilo,
ukazujui na:
Prvo, OVP ne predstavlja optimalno valutno
podruje;
Drugo, prema stupnju konvergiranja prema
OVP mogu se izdvojiti tri grupe zemalja:
prva, u koju spadaju Nemaka, Austrija i
zemlje Beneluksa spremne za lanstvo u
EMU; druga, u koje spadaju Velika Britanija,
Danska, Finska, Norveka i Francuska, koje
pokazuju mali stepen konvergencije i tree,
u koje spadaju Italija, Grka, Portugalija i
panija koje postepeno konvergiraju prema
lanstvu u EMU;
Tree, izmeu OVP kriterija i kriterija za
ekonomsku integraciju postoji simbioza,
odnosno potvruje se teza da je integracija
uspena u zemljama koje imaju uporediv
nivo ekonomske razvijenosti i potencijala
za konkurentsku utakmicu.

Bankarstvo 2 2014

Ve ovaj kratak pregled pogleda na

mogunosti funkcionisanja OVP ukazuje na
sloenost i neizvesnost poduhvata uvoenja
evra. U njega se ipak ulo, iako institucionalna
struktura evra nije bila formirana. Mastrihtskim
ugovorom utvreni su kriteriji za lanstvo u
EMU, tzv. kriteriji konvergencije, kao uslovi
postavljeni za pristup njenom lanstvu. To su:
konvergencija stope inflacije i kamatnih stopa,
budetska ogranienja i stabilnost deviznih
kurseva. Formirana je Evropska centralna
banka i formulisana njena politika. Za ispunjenje
kriterija stabilnosti javnih finansija formiran
je Pakt za stabilnost i rast 1997. koji je usvojio
fiskalna pravila i sankcije za drave koje ih ne
potuju (Grbi, 2005). Namee se pitanje kako
je evropska privreda funkcionisala u tom
okruenju, odnosno u uslovima formiranja
monetarne integracije koje je poelo 1999 godine.

Konkurentnost privrede EU
Za istraivanje konkurentne pozicije u
EMU i EU relevantne su razlike u jedininim
trokovima rada i razlike u stopama inflacije.
Ove razlike se mere implicitnim realnim
deviznim kursevima, odnosno paritetom cena.
Za to se koriste realni efektivni devizni kursevi
(REER) Evropske centralne banke (ECB)
dobijeni od nominalnih realnih kurseva putem
tzv. Deflatora. Oni obuhvataju 36 zemalja. Pored
27 lanica EU, tu su jo i Norveka, Australija,
Kanada, Japan, SAD, Meksiko, Novi Zeland,
Turska i vajcarska (European Commission,
2011). Na ovaj nain se omoguava analiziranje
konkurentih pozicija, kako EU i EMU u odnosu
na vanije trgovinske partnere, tako i meu
zemljama lanicama. Pri tome, rast indeksa
znai gubitak konkurentnosti.
Trokovi rada
Smanjenje jedininih trokova rada (JTR)
predstavlja danas osnovno oruje praktino
svih zemalja u svetu u poboljanju konkurentske
pozicije njihovih privreda. Uspeno reduciranje
trokova radne snage poveava prohodnost
robe i usluga na svetskom tritu na jednoj
strani, a na drugoj, ini zemlju atraktivnijom
destinacijom za strane direktne investicije. Stoga
ovo postaje, ne samo politika preduzea, nego i
dravna politika, u globalizacijskom procesu. U

Bankarstvo 2 2014

currencies to the dollar, the so-called monetary

snake (1972-1977) in the first, and functioning of
the equi (1979-1993) in the second attempt, have
proved to be unsuccessful (Lucic, 2011, 56).
Theoretical basis for the formation of euro
and establishment of the European Monetary
Union (EMU) is also to be found in our near
past: in the work of Mundell (1961) who has, in
a discussion on the pros and cons of the flexible
exchange rate (Friedman, 1953, Meade, 1957)
used the syntagm: optimal currency area (OCA).
Hence it is an area which does not coincide
with the state borders, and which, if there is
high work force mobility, can fix the exchange
rate within its borders, while beyond borders,
therefore towards the outside world, would
let the exchange rate remain flexible. If some
exterior challenges are to appear, the so-called
asymmetric demand shocks, as a substitute for
currency devaluation what is foreseen is the
prices and wages flexibility. Later on this theory
was expanded to cover several fields. The most
representative of all the new theories on the
OCA is to be found in the endogenous character
of the zone. Thus Frankel, Rose (1997) underline
that the zone has the potential for creating
independently its own development in the
sphere of economy, while some of the authors,
Issing (2001), are expanding endogenous on to
the political integrations as well.
A large number of economists were
sceptical towards euro. The warnings, before
its introduction, or even at the time of its
successful functioning, are focused on the fact
that euro-zone does not have the character of
an optimum currency area. Crises may impact
one country, yet benefit another one, therefore
they are asymmetric. Fiscal policy is within
the competences of the member countries and
there is no political will for it to integrate. For
example, one study which is presenting, in the
research of the OCA, a classic contribution to
the analysis of competitiveness of the member
countries (Eichgreen, Bayoumi, 1996, p. 6, 7)
and whose results have later on been basically
confirmed (Joao, Rui, 2011), while researching
the following convergence criteria: impact of
asymmetric shocks on product, work mobility
and transaction value of the single currency,
comes very precisely, per countries, to the
identification of what was later on actually to

17

happen, pointing out at the following:

Firstly, OCA does not represent an optimum
currency area.
Secondly, according to the degree of
convergence towards OCA there are three
groups of countries to be distinguished: the
first one, with Germany, Austria and the
Benelux countries, is the group ready for the
membership in the EMU; the second group,
covering United Kingdom, Denmark, Finland,
Norway and France, is the group showing a
small degree of convergence, and the third
group with Italy, Greece, Portugal and Spain
is the group of countries gradually converging
towards the membership in the EMU.
Thirdly, between the OCA criteria and criteria
for economic integration there is a symbiosis,
i.e. the thesis is confirmed that integration
is successful in those countries that have a
comparable level of economic development
and potential for competitive game.
Already this brief survey of the views
on the possibility of functioning of the OCA
shows complexity and uncertainty of the euro
introduction venture. The venture was conducted
nevertheless, although the institutional euro
structure had not as yet been formed. Under the
Maastricht Agreement, criteria were prescribed
for the membership in the EMU, the so-called
convergence criteria, as a requirement for the
access to its membership. They are: inflation
rate and interest rates convergence, budgetary
limitations, and exchange rates stability.
European Central Bank was established and
its policy formulated. For purpose of fulfilling
criteria of public finance stability, the Stability
and Growth Pact 1997 was formed, which
adopted fiscal rules and sanctions for those
states who would fail to comply (Grbic, 2005).
The question is raised here how European
economy functioned in such an environment, i.e.
in the conditions of formation of the monetary
integration which started in the year 1999.

Competitiveness of the EU economy

For the research into competitive position
in the EMU and the EU what is relevant are
the differences in the labour unit cost and
the differences in the inflation rates. These
differences are measured with the implicit real

18

EMU, ova politika ima posebnu teinu jer oblik

interne devalvacije omoguava da lanice
samostalno prilagode svoje cene okolnostima
trita u uslovima datog, fiksnog kursa.
O konkurentnoj poziciji EMU i tendencijama
meu lanicama odgovarajuu informativnu
poruku daju sledei podaci o realnom
efektivnom deviznom kursu (REER) zasnovani
na JTR za ekonomiju kao celinu (Tabela 1. i
Tabela 2)

Bankarstvo 2 2014

Iz prezentovanih podataka mogu se uoiti

sledee tendencije.
Prvo, EMU i EU u celini su pogorali svoju
konkurentnu poziciju u odnosu na osnovne
konkurente SAD i Japan.
Drugo, u EMU su jedino Nemaka i Austrija
smanjila JTR, a u EU samo Velika Britanija, dok
su u vedskoj, JTR u posmatranom periodu
preteno ostali na istom nivou.
Tree, JTR u lanicama EU pridruenim

Tabela 1. Realni efektivni devizni kurs zasnovan na JTR za ukupnu ekonomiju, indeks (1999=100)
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011

MT
100,0
97,3
104,8
105,1
113,0
116,7
113,9
117,1
119,7
121,8
122,4
117,4
110,0

NL
100,0
98,2
101,6
105,7
110,8
111,2
109,1
109,0
110,3
111,6
114,6
111,3
110,9

AT
100,0
95,5
94,4
93,7
96,3
95,8
95,0
95,5
95,5
96,0
97,9
95,7
95,9

PL
100,0
106,0
121,2
111,1
94,5
89,8
99,6
101,0
105,1
118,4
95,7
104,5
103,0

PT
100,0
99,6
101,4
103,5
109,0
109,8
111,6
110,9
111,0
112,3
113,0
110,3
110,8

RO
100,0
129,3
142,3
116,5
118,1
112,3
149,9
160,5
192,1
207,3
171,8
172,0
178,7

SI
100,0
97,4
98,5
99,4
101,0
102,5
101,5
101,8
103,0
105,4
112,2
110,9
110,9

SK
100,0
109,3
107,1
110,6
119,7
128,3
135,8
141,8
154,0
166,5
183,5
177,8
177,7

FI
100,0
94,0
96,3
97,1
101,2
102,1
102,6
102,0
101,7
105,5
111,2
105,9
106,1

SE
100,0
102,9
96,9
97,9
102,5
102,8
99,0
97,5
100,8
97,8
90,1
95,5
101,3

UK
100,0
103,2
102,0
102,4
98,4
104,1
103,6
106,3
108,5
94,3
86,7
83,6
79,2

US
100,0
106,0
110,9
108,4
98,9
93,1
91,9
92,3
88,7
84,4
86,7
83,5
79,2

JP
EA17 EU27
100,0 100,0 100,0
105,4
89,7
89,5
92,1
90,6
91,4
83,2
94,4
96,9
78,6 105,2 108,7
75,9 108,1 115,0
71,5 105,8 113,3
65,0 105,2 114,4
57,8 106,8 120,6
62,7
11,2 122,3
72,1 114,5 117,6
74,5 105,9 108,0
79,0 107,3 112,8

Izvor: European Commission, 2011, str. 84

Tabela 2 Realni efektivni devizni kurs zasnovan na JTR za ukupnu ekonomiju, indeks (1999 =100)
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011

BL
100,0
95,2
97,6
99.1
102,5
102,1
102,0
103,0
104,7
107,5
108,5
106,2
107,7

BG
100,0
97,1
105.4
105,8
108,3
109,9
112,2
115,0
122,8
133,4
147,5
144,5
154,4

CZ
100,0
102,1
109,6
127,9
129,1
132,9
138,6
145,6
150,6
168,0
158,8
162,4
167,4

DK
100,0
94,1
97,3
100,4
105,7
106,9
107,5
108,8
113,2
118,8
122,3
116,8
115,2

Izvor: European Commission, 2011, str. 83

DE
100,0
93,6
91,8
92,1
96,3
96,5
93,3
90,1
88,9
88,7
91,7
87,7
88,9

EE
100,0
97,2
98,5
98,9
105.4
111,5
113,3
121,5
139,2
152,4
152,7
142,0
142,9

GR
100,0
93,3
90,6
99,6
102,8
105,2
106,0
102,6
104,4
108,7
113,8
109,4
106,6

ES
100,0
97,4
98,8
100,8
105,8
108,6
110,1
112,6
116,6
120,2
118,6
112,9
111,4

FR
100,0
95,1
95,6
98,3
103,3
104,9
104,9
105,9
107,4
108,9
109,1
107,3
108,1

IE
100,0
95,5
99,6
100,8
109,9
116,0
120,7
124,3
130,5
141,0
133,9
120,6
116,0

IT
100,0
94,6
95,7
99,1
107,2
110,3
110,3
111,6
112,8
115,6
117,3
113,7
115,2

CY
100,0
97,2
97,8
101,7
113,8
114,9
115,2
115,1
113,5
112,4
114,4
113,7
115,2

LV
100,0
103,5
100,0
94,1
91,5
93,6
101,0
115,4
143,0
165.3
150,3
132,6
134,4

LT
100,0
101,3
98,9
104,0
107,7
111,5
115,1
124,1
128,1
134,8
132,5
121,2
121.0

HU
100,0
103,7
114,4
130,5
133,7
140,9
143,7
136,7
150,4
151,4
137,1
132,6
133,8

19

Bankarstvo 2 2014

exchange rates, i.e. with the price parity. For this

purpose real effective exchange rates (REER)
are used, those of the European Central Bank
(ECB) obtained from the nominal real exchange
rates by means of the so-called deflator. They
cover 36 countries. In addition to the 27 EU
member countries, included are Norway,
Australia, Canada, Japan, USA, Mexico, New
Zealand, Turkey and Switzerland (European
Commission, 2011). In this way an analysis is
enabled of the competitive positions, both those
of EU and EMU in respect to the important
trading partners, and internally, amongst the
member countries themselves. However, this
implies that the growth of index designates loss
of competitiveness.
Labour costs
Lowering of the labour unit costs (LUC)
represents today the basic weapon of
practically all the countries in the world in

the fight to improve competitive position

of their economies. Successful reduction of
the labour force costs is enhancing free flow
of goods and services on the world market
on the one hand, and on the other hand is
making the given country a more attractive
destination for the foreign direct investments.
Therefore this is becoming not only the policy
of companies, but also the state policy in the
process of globalisation. In the EMU, this policy
has a special weight as the form of internal
devaluation is allowing member countries to
independently adjust their prices to the market
conditions under the circumstances of the given
fixed exchange rate.
The competitive position of the EMU and
the tendencies within the member countries
is best illustrated by the informative message
contained in the following data: REER based
on the labour unit cost (LUC) for the economy
as a whole (Table 1 and Table 2).

Table 1 - Real effective exchange rate based on the LUC for the total economy, index (1999.=100)
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011

MT
100.0
97.3
104.8
105.1
113.0
116.7
113.9
117.1
119.7
121.8
122.4
117.4
110.0

NL
100.0
98.2
101.6
105.7
110.8
111.2
109.1
109.0
110.3
111.6
114.6
111.3
110.9

AT
100.0
95.5
94.4
93.7
96.3
95.8
95.0
95.5
95.5
96.0
97.9
95.7
95.9

PL
100.0
106.0
121.2
111.1
94.5
89.8
99.6
101.0
105.1
118.4
95.7
104.5
103.0

PT
100.0
99.6
101.4
103.5
109.0
109.8
111.6
110.9
111.0
112.3
113.0
110.3
110.8

RO
100.0
129.3
142.3
116.5
118.1
112.3
149.9
160.5
192.1
207.3
171.8
172.0
178.7

SI
100.0
97.4
98.5
99.4
101.0
102.5
101.5
101.8
103.0
105.4
112.2
110.9
110.9

SK
100.0
109.3
107.1
110.6
119.7
128.3
135.8
141.8
154.0
166.5
183.5
177.8
177.7

FI
100.0
94.0
96.3
97.1
101.2
102.1
102.6
102.0
101.7
105.5
111.2
105.9
106.1

SE
100.0
102.9
96.9
97.9
102.5
102.8
99.0
97.5
100.8
97.8
90.1
95.5
101.3

UK
100.0
103.2
102.0
102.4
98.4
104.1
103.6
106.3
108.5
94.3
86.7
83.6
79.2

US
100.0
106.0
110.9
108.4
98.9
93.1
91.9
92.3
88.7
84.4
86.7
83.5
79.2

JP
EA17 EU27
100.0 100.0 100.0
105.4
89.7
89.5
92.1
90.6
91.4
83.2
94.4
96.9
78.6 105.2 108.7
75.9 108.1 115.0
71.5 105.8 113.3
65.0 105.2 114.4
57.8 106.8 120.6
62.7
11.2 122.3
72.1 114.5 117.6
74.5 105.9 108.0
79.0 107.3 112.8

Source: European Commission, 2011, p. 84

Table 2 - Real effective exchange rate based on the LUC for the total economy, index (1999.=100)
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011

BL
100.0
95.2
97.6
99.1
102.5
102.1
102.0
103.0
104.7
107.5
108.5
106.2
107.7

BG
100.0
97.1
105.4
105.8
108.3
109.9
112.2
115.0
122.8
133.4
147.5
144.5
154.4

CZ
100.0
102.1
109.6
127.9
129.1
132.9
138.6
145.6
150.6
168.0
158.8
162.4
167.4

DK
100.0
94.1
97.3
100.4
105.7
106.9
107.5
108.8
113.2
118.8
122.3
116.8
115.2

Source: European Commission, 2011, p. 83

DE
100.0
93.6
91.8
92.1
96.3
96.5
93.3
90.1
88.9
88.7
91.7
87.7
88.9

EE
100.0
97.2
98.5
98.9
105.4
111.5
113.3
121.5
139.2
152.4
152.7
142.0
142.9

GR
100.0
93.3
90.6
99.6
102.8
105.2
106.0
102.6
104.4
108.7
113.8
109.4
106.6

ES
100.0
97.4
98.8
100.8
105.8
108.6
110.1
112.6
116.6
120.2
118.6
112.9
111.4

FR
100.0
95.1
95.6
98.3
103.3
104.9
104.9
105.9
107.4
108.9
109.1
107.3
108.1

IE
100.0
95.5
99.6
100.8
109.9
116.0
120.7
124.3
130.5
141.0
133.9
120.6
116.0

IT
100.0
94.6
95.7
99.1
107.2
110.3
110.3
111.6
112.8
115.6
117.3
113.7
115.2

CY
100.0
97.2
97.8
101.7
113.8
114.9
115.2
115.1
113.5
112.4
114.4
113.7
115.2

LV
100.0
103.5
100.0
94.1
91.5
93.6
101.0
115.4
143.0
165.3
150.3
132.6
134.4

LT
100.0
101.3
98.9
104.0
107.7
111.5
115.1
124.1
128.1
134.8
132.5
121.2
121.0

HU
100.0
103.7
114.4
130.5
133.7
140.9
143.7
136.7
150.4
151.4
137.1
132.6
133.8

20

posle 2004. godine su eskalirali, to moe biti

povezano i sa Balaa-Samjuelsonovim efektom
(Balassa-Samuleson Effect).
etvrto, u lanicama koje su zahvaene
dunikom krizom, pre svega, u Grkoj i paniji,
pa i u Italiji, Portugaliji i Irskoj, JTR su rasli
po stopoma slinim kao i u starim lanicama,
Holandiji i Danskoj, a u celini posmatrano,
konkurentska pozicija im se pogorala.
Detaljnija analiza iznetih podataka mogua
je putem uvida u kumulativan rast nominalnih
nadnica, produktivnosti i JTR (Tabela 3).
Tabela 3. Nadnica, produktivnosti i JTR u EMU
(1999=100)

Nemaka
Holandija
Finska
Belgija
Austrija
Francuska
Portugalija
Grka
panija
Irska
Italija

Nominalne
Produktivnost
zarade
111,37
112,89
137,64
112,66
139,06
110,91
130,60
105,58
124,43
115,05
128,96
113,19
142,29
109,98
173,93
129,43
141,96
110,05
164,63
132,57
126,59
100,68

JTR
105,99
127,28
125,19
123,70
111,44
118,46
129,39
137,88
134,58
132,77
131,44

Izvor: OECD, 2010.

Podaci ukazuju, pre svega, na znaajno

poveanje nadnica u Grkoj, paniji i Portugaliji,

Bankarstvo 2 2014

zemljama koje su pristupile Uniji osamdesetih.

Ovaj proces se mogao oekivati poto integracija
podrazumeva fenomen konvergencije cena.
Meutim, rast nominalnih nadnica treba da
prati produktivnost rada, to se ovde nije desilo.
U ovim zemljama postoji znaajan raskorak
izmeu ostvarene produktivnosti, koja je po
pravilu manja, od rasta nominalnih nadnica.
Na ovom mestu treba meutim ukazati i na
sledee elemente relevantne za ocenu iznetih
podataka. U EU postoje znaajna izdavanja
iz budeta u pojedinim sektorima. Veoma
evidentno su to sredstva izdvojena za ekoloke
svrhe i poljoprivredu (Todi, 2010). Ona se
velikim delom plasiraju preko subvencija
farmerima. Poto su oni samozaposleni,
subvencije se iskazuju kroz poveanje nadnica.
One, meutim, predstavljaju rezultat poveanje
transfera iz EU fondova, a ne poveanja trokova
farmera (Malliaropulos, 2010). Ovo se vie
odnosi na zemlje juga Evropske unije, poto
one predstavljaju neto budetske korisnike
ekolokih i poljoprivrednih subvencija.
Inflacija
Drugi relevantni element istraivanja
konkurentnosti je visina inflacije. Podaci u
tabelama 4. i 5. Odnose se na REER zasnovan
na CPI (indeks potroakih cena)

Tabela 4. Realni efektivni devizni kurs zasnovan na CPI (1999 =100)

1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011

MT
100,0
99,1
100,3
101,8
104,7
107,4
107,3
108,8
110,7
114,7
114,9
110,9
111,0

NL
100,0
96,9
100,4
103,2
107,4
107,6
106,6
106,2
106,6
107,3
109,2
105,6
105,5

AT
100,0
96,5
96,6
96,8
99,8
100,3
99,4
99,2
99,9
100,4
101,3
98,6
99,4

Izvor: European Commission, 2011.

PL
100,0
110,6
124,8
119,0
105,6
104,6
117,2
120,0
124,2
136,1
115,5
123,7
121,3

PT
100,0
97,6
100,0
102,3
107,0
108,2
107,7
108,6
109,9
110,6
109,8
107,2
108,3

RO
100,0
112,4
114,4
114,6
110,6
112,8
133,3
143,1
155,1
147,4
136,3
139,3
143,7

SI
100,0
97,8
98,3
100,1
102,9
102,8
101,8
102,2
103,8
106,1
108,1
106,2
105,7

SK
100,0
110,7
112,9
115,8
130,4
143,2
147,4
155,8
171,0
185,8
198,0
191,4
194,0

FI
100,0
95,7
97,3
98,6
103,1
102,8
101,0
100,5
101,3
103,6
105,9
101,6
102,2

SE
100,0
98,2
90,3
92,3
98,5
99,6
96,0
96,0
97,1
95,2
88,0
94,8
99,1

UK
100,0
100,9
98,1
98,0
93,2
96,6
95,1
96,1
98.0
85,5
77,1
78,7
79,6

US
100,0
105,2
111,2
109,5
99,7
93,9
93,3
93,6
89,6
86,4
90,6
87,6
83,6

JP
EA17 EU27
100,0 100,0 100,0
107,9
90,1
88,6
94,5
91,6
89,9
87,0
94,4
93,8
84,6 104,7 104,1
84,0 107,7 109,8
79,6 106,1 108,2
73,2 106,8 110,4
67,2 109,9 117,2
73,1 113,4 118,1
83,1 115,3 111,9
86,2 106,6 103,4
88,7 107,0 105,2

21

Bankarstvo 2 2014

From the data presented above it is possible

to note the following tendencies:
Firstly, EMU and the EU in general have
deteriorated their competitive position in respect
to their basic competitors the U.S.A. and Japan.
Secondly, in the EMU, only Germany and
Austria have reduced their LUC, and in the EU
only the United Kingdom, while in Sweden the
LUC in the observed period mostly remained
on the same level.
Thirdly, LUC in the EU countries that have
joined after 2004 have escalated, which may be
linked with the Balasha-Samuelson effect.
Fourthly, in the member countries that have
been impacted by the debt crisis, primarily in
Greece and Spain, and even in Italy, Portugal and
Ireland, LUCs have growth at the rates similar to
those in the old member countries, Netherlands
and Denmark, and globally observed, their
competitive position has deteriorated.
A more detailed analysis of the above
stated data is possible through an insight into
the cumulative growth of the nominal wages,
productivity and the LUC (Table 3).
Table 3 - Wages, productivity and the LUC in the
EMU (1999=100)

Germany
Netherlands
Finland
Belgium
Austria
France
Portugal
Greece
Spain
Ireland
Italy

Nominal
earnings
111.37
137.64
139.06
130.60
124.43
128.96
142.29
173.93
141.96
164.63
126.59

Source: OECD, 2010.

Productivity
112.89
112.66
110.91
105.58
115.05
113.19
109.98
129.43
110.05
132.57
100.68

LUC
105.99
127.28
125.19
123.70
111.44
118.46
129.39
137.88
134.58
132.77
131.44

Data indicates, most of all, that there is a

significant increase of wages in Greece, Spain
and Portugal, countries that have joined
the Union in the 1980s. This process was to
be expected as the integration assumes the
phenomenon of price convergence. However,
the growth of nominal wages should be
followed by work productivity which had
failed to happen in this case. In these countries
there is a significant mismatch between the
productivity achieved which is as a rule lower
than the growth of nominal wages.
It is necessary to point out here also at the
following elements which are relevant for the
evaluation of the above data. In the EU, there
is significant budgetary spending in certain
sectors. Highly evident are the funds allocated
for environment protection and for agriculture
(Todic, 2010, 129). They are in great part placed
through the farmers subsidies. As the farmers
are self-employed, subsidies are expressed
through increase of wages. However, they
represent the result of an increase of transfers
from the EU funds, and not the increase of the
farmers costs (Mallaropulos, 2010, 11). This
rather applies to the countries of the southern
part of the European Union as they represent
net budgetary beneficiaries of environmental
and farming subsidies.
Inflation
The second relevant element in the research
into competitiveness is the level of inflation.
Data given in Tables 4 and 5 offer the following
indications: REER based on CPI (consumer
price index).

22

Bankarstvo 2 2014

Tabela 5. Realni efektivni devizni kurs zasnovan na CPI, indeks (1999 =100)
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011

BL
100,0
96,8
97,6
98,1
101,8
102,7
102,8
103,3
104,1
107,2
107,5
105,4
106,5

BG
100,0
103,8
111,5
115,4
118,6
123,6
125,8
132,2
138,8
151,4
156,9
153,2
156,1

CZ
100,0
102,3
109,0
120,6
117,6
118,4
124,9
131,2
135,0
155,4
149,2
152,0
155,5

DK
100,0
95,8
97,2
98,9
103,6
103,8
103,0
103,0
104,0
106,3
108,9
105,5
104,7

DE
100,0
93,8
93,7
94,2
98,5
99,7
98,7
98,7
100,4
101,2
101,9
97,6
97,5

EE
100,0
97,6
101,9
103,9
106,7
109,0
111,1
113,6
119,4
127,9
129,1
126,5
129,0

GR
100,0
93,2
94,2
96,4
101,5
103,1
103,0
104,1
105,1
107,2
109,4
109,5
110,3

ES
100,0
97,6
98,6
101,0
106,2
108,2
109,0
110,7
112,8
115,7
116,0
113,3
114,8

FR
100,0
94,8
94,9
96,1
101,1
102,7
101,9
101,9
102,8
104,6
104,8
101,5
101.3

IE
100,0
97,2
99,7
104,5
114,2
117,2
117,0
118,1
122,0
126,5
124,5
116,0
114,8

IT
100,0
95,5
96,1
98,0
104,0
105,6
104,8
105,2
106,5
108,3
109,4
105,6
106,1

CY
100,0
98,5
99,1
100,8
106,7
107,3
107,8
108,2
107,6
110,5
111,6
108,9
109,7

LV
100,0
107,5
108,4
105,0
99,9
100,9
100,4
104,7
112,1
124,6
129,9
122,0
123,7

LT
100,0
109,5
112,2
115,2
116,8
116,9
116,4
117,9
122,1
130,7
138,1
133,9
135,7

HU
100,0
101,6
109,9
120,5
122,1
129,4
131,7
125,8
139,7
143,9
135,9
139,3
139,2

Izvor: European Commission, 2011.

Iako se najvei doprinos rada ECB smatra

dranje inflacije pod kontrolom u evrozoni,
njen ukupni rezultat, odnosno injenica da je u
pojedinim lanicama inflacija imala sopstvene
putanje, dovelo je do pogoranje konkurentne
pozicije EMU i EU u odnosu na SAD i Japan.
U EMU, jedino su Nemaka i Austrija imale
uspeha u kontroli inflacije u odnosu na poetak
stvaranja evrozone, a u EU jo vedska i Velika
Britanija.
Ove podatke testirajmo jo jedanput, sada
kroz kumulativno kretanja JTR i inflacije u
nominalnim vrednostima (Tabela 6).

Raspoloivi podaci ukazuju na to da su

identifikovane neravnotee u raunu tekuih
plaanja izmeu severnih i junih lanica EMU
zemalja, a pre svega izmeu Grke, panije,
Italije i Irske, determinisane razlikama nastalim
iz razlika izmeu nivoa JTR i inflacije. Ove
razlike nisu mogle da budu kompenzovane
prilagoavanjem realnog deviznog kursa.
Meutim, ova analiza koja pokriva ekonomske
izraze unutranjih neravnotea indicira i na
potrebu istraivanja kretanja unutar privreda
ovih lanica, odnosno zaostajanja u promenama
u strukturama njihovih privreda, tj. nedostatka
razmenljivih dobara u junim zemljama
Evrope.

Tabela 6. Inflacija, jedinini trokovi rada i tekua

plaanja kao % BDP
CPI inflacija
Nemaka
Holandija
Finska
Belgija
Austrija
Francuska
Portugalija
Grka
panija
Irska
Italija

1999-2012
21,8
30,3
26,4
29,9
26,4
24,5
35,1
43,1
38,4
32,1
30,9

JTR% promena

CA/BDP*100

1999-2010

1999-2012

1,4
4,2
-19,9
8
-1,5
2,4
11,1
54,9
24,8
-22,5
28,5

52
79,6
66
32,5
28,1
-3,4
-132,2
-123,2
-75,5
-19,1
-24,4

CPI= index potroakih cena, JTR= jedinini trokovi rada, CA= Bilans
tekuih rauna
Izvor: za CPI inflaciju CA i BDP (International Monetary Fund, World
Economic Outlook Database 2012), za UCL (OECD, Main economics
indicator, 2012), za 2012. godinu procena iz istih izvora

Bruto domai proizvod

Analizirajmo sada sumarno stanje
konkurentnosti koristei BDP.

23

Bankarstvo 2 2014

Table 4 - Real effective exchange rate based on the CPI, (1999.=100)

1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011

MT
100.0
99.1
100.3
101.8
104.7
107.4
107.3
108.8
110.7
114.7
114.9
110.9
111.0

NL
100.0
96.9
100.4
103.2
107.4
107.6
106.6
106.2
106.6
107.3
109.2
105.6
105.5

AT
100.0
96.5
96.6
96.8
99.8
100.3
99.4
99.2
99.9
100.4
101.3
98.6
99.4

PL
100.0
110.6
124.8
119.0
105.6
104.6
117.2
120.0
124.2
136.1
115.5
123.7
121.3

PT
100.0
97.6
100.0
102.3
107.0
108.2
107.7
108.6
109.9
110.6
109.8
107.2
108.3

RO
100.0
112.4
114.4
114.6
110.6
112.8
133.3
143.1
155.1
147.4
136.3
139.3
143.7

SI
100.0
97.8
98.3
100.1
102.9
102.8
101.8
102.2
103.8
106.1
108.1
106.2
105.7

SK
100.0
110.7
112.9
115.8
130.4
143.2
147.4
155.8
171.0
185.8
198.0
191.4
194.0

FI
100.0
95.7
97.3
98.6
103.1
102.8
101.0
100.5
101.3
103.6
105.9
101.6
102.2

SE
100.0
98.2
90.3
92.3
98.5
99.6
96.0
96.0
97.1
95.2
88.0
94.8
99.1

UK
100.0
100.9
98.1
98.0
93.2
96.6
95.1
96.1
98.0
85.5
77.1
78.7
79.6

US
100.0
105.2
111.2
109.5
99.7
93.9
93.3
93.6
89.6
86.4
90.6
87.6
83.6

JP
EA17 EU27
100.0 100.0 100.0
107.9
90.1
88.6
94.5
91.6
89.9
87.0
94.4
93.8
84.6 104.7 104.1
84.0 107.7 109.8
79.6 106.1 108.2
73.2 106.8 110.4
67.2 109.9 117.2
73.1 113.4 118.1
83.1 115.3 111.9
86.2 106.6 103.4
88.7 107.0 105.2

IE
100.0
97.2
99.7
104.5
114.2
117.2
117.0
118.1
122.0
126.5
124.5
116.0
114.8

IT
100.0
95.5
96.1
98.0
104.0
105.6
104.8
105.2
106.5
108.3
109.4
105.6
106.1

CY
100.0
98.5
99.1
100.8
106.7
107.3
107.8
108.2
107.6
110.5
111.6
108.9
109.7

LV
100.0
107.5
108.4
105.0
99.9
100.9
100.4
104.7
112.1
124.6
129.9
122.0
123.7

Source: European Commission, 2011.

Table 5 - Real effective exchange rate based on CPI, index (1999.=100)

1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011

BL
100.0
96.8
97.6
98.1
101.8
102.7
102.8
103.3
104.1
107.2
107.5
105.4
106.5

BG
100.0
103.8
111.5
115.4
118.6
123.6
125.8
132.2
138.8
151.4
156.9
153.2
156.1

CZ
100.0
102.3
109.0
120.6
117.6
118.4
124.9
131.2
135.0
155.4
149.2
152.0
155.5

DK
100.0
95.8
97.2
98.9
103.6
103.8
103.0
103.0
104.0
106.3
108.9
105.5
104.7

DE
100.0
93.8
93.7
94.2
98.5
99.7
98.7
98.7
100.4
101.2
101.9
97.6
97.5

EE
100.0
97.6
101.9
103.9
106.7
109.0
111.1
113.6
119.4
127.9
129.1
126.5
129.0

GR
100.0
93.2
94.2
96.4
101.5
103.1
103.0
104.1
105.1
107.2
109.4
109.5
110.3

ES
100.0
97.6
98.6
101.0
106.2
108.2
109.0
110.7
112.8
115.7
116.0
113.3
114.8

FR
100.0
94.8
94.9
96.1
101.1
102.7
101.9
101.9
102.8
104.6
104.8
101.5
101.3

LT
100.0
109.5
112.2
115.2
116.8
116.9
116.4
117.9
122.1
130.7
138.1
133.9
135.7

HU
100.0
101.6
109.9
120.5
122.1
129.4
131.7
125.8
139.7
143.9
135.9
139.3
139.2

Source: European Commission, 2011.

Table 4 - Real effective exchange

rate based on the Although the greatest
contribution of the ECB work is attributed
to its holding of inflation under control in
the euro-zone, its overall result, i.e. the fact
that certain member countries had taken
their own individual routes did bring
about the deterioration in the competitive
position of the EMU and the EU in respect
to the USA and Japan. In the EMU, only
Germany and Austria had success in
controlling inflation at the beginning of
creation of the euro-zone, and in the EU
it was also Sweden and United Kingdom
that were successful.
Let us test these data once again, this
time through the cumulative movement
of the LUC and inflation in the nominal
values (Table 6).

Table 6 - Inflation, labour unit costs and current

payments as the % of the GDP
CPI inflation
Germany
Netherlands
Finland
Belgium
Austria
France
Portugal
Greece
Spain
Ireland
Italy

1999-2012
21.8
30.3
26.4
29.9
26.4
24.5
35.1
43.1
38.4
32,1
30.9

LUC% change

CA/GDP*100

1999-2010

1999-2012

1.4
4.2
-19.9
8
-1.5
2.4
11.1
54.9
24.8
-22,5
28.5

52
79.6
66
32.5
28.1
-3.4
-132.2
-123.2
-75.5
-19,1
-24.4

CPI = consumer price index, LUC = labour unit cost, CA = current account
balance
Source: for CPI inflation CA and GDP, (International Monetary Fund,
World Economic Outlook Database 2012), for UCL (OECD, Main
economics indicator, 2012), the 2012 estimate from the same sources.

24

Bankarstvo 2 2014

Tabela 7. Realni efektivni devizni kurs zasnovan na BDP, indeks (1999=100)

1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011

MT
100.0
101,3
103,5
105,7
109,9
111,0
111,2
113,3,
117,9
121,2
121,7
119,7
121,0

NL
100,0
99,3
103,1
105,7
109,9
109,3
109,5
109,5
110,0
112,0
112,0
109,6
109,5

AT
100,0
96,5
96,4
96,0
98,4
98,9
98,4
98,6
99,0
99,2
100,2
98,6
99,0

PL
100,0
108,6
120,7
115,3
101,8
101,4
114,3
117,5
123,0
134,7
113,9
121,3
119,6

PT
100,0
98,5
100,1
102,1
106,3
107,3
107,1
107,6
109,4
110,3
110,7
108,8
108,7

RO
100,0
111,4
116,4
116,7
120.6
126,8
154,6
172,6
202,5
207,5
188,7
191,6
197,9

SI
100,0
95,3
96,1
97,9
100,4
100,0
98,6
98,8
100,6
102,5
106,3
102,0
100,5

SK
100,0
109,2
109,5
112,4
122,6
132,8
136,9
143,3
155,8
169,6
176,3
171,6
174,3

FI
100,0
95,7
97,8
98,4
100,8
100,7
98,6
97.5
99,4
100,7
103,1
98,5
98,9

SE
100,0
98,1
90,2
92,0
97,5
97,5
93,6
93,6
95,4
93,8
87,0
93,4
98,5

UK
100,0
101,2
98,9
100,0
96,1
100,7
99,4
101,2
103,0
90,6
81,0
83,1
83,6

US
100,0
103,7
109,6
108,0
97,6
91,4
90,7
90,6
86,3
82,2
87,9
85,1
80,2

JP
EA17 EU27
100,0 100,0 100,0
107,4
90,0
88,4
94,0
91,8
90,4
86,0
94,7
95,2
82,3 104,9 106,0
80,7 107,0 111,2
75,7 105,0 109,1
68,7 104,8 110,6
62,3 107,5 117,4
66,9 109,9 117,5
76,5 112,3 111,6
79,4 104,4 103,8
82,4 103,6 104,0

IT
100,0
96,2
97,5
99,9
106,2
107,9
106,8
106,6
108,0
109,8
112,1
107,9
107,7

CY
100,0
97,5
100,0
100,0
106,4
108,1
109,7
111,3
112,8
116,8
117,4
115,1
116,8

LV
100,0
109,7
110,3
107,9
103,4
105.0
107,3
116,3
135,8
149,5
150,3
140,5
143,5

Izvor: European Commission, 2011.

Tabela 8. Realni efektivni devizni kurs zasnovan na BDP, indeks (1999=100)

1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011

BL
100,0
96,6
97,0
97,8
102,2
103,4
103,6
104,6
105,9
107,9
109,1
107,7
108,6

BG
100,0
100,9
107,6
11,6
113,4
115,7
119,6
125,1
133,1
141.3
146,8
146,8
154,8

CZ
100,0
100,9
108,1
121,1
119,1
121,8
126,5
131,3
135,3
151,1
146,6
146,1
149,1

DK
100,0
96,1
98,0
99,7
103,9
105,5
105,8
105,9
107,2
110,7
112,8
110,8
109,6

DE
100,0
92,1
91,4
91,9
96.0
96,4
94,1
92,6
93,1
92,8
94,3
90,6
89,6

EE
100,0
98,3
102,4
103,1
108,9
112,1
116,5
123,8
134,6
138,6
139,2
135,1
136,7

GR
ES
100,0 100,0
94,4
97,9
95,1 100,5
97,0 103,6
102,3 109,9
103,7 113,0
103,0 115,1
103,3 117,6
104,4 119,8
107,9 121,9
111,3 122,2
109,2 118,,4
109,1 118,5

FR
100,0
95,2
95,6
96,9
101,5
102,3
101,4
102,0
103,8
106,1
106,3
103,0
102,7

IE
100,0
98,3
103,5
108,5
117,3
120,0
121,0
123,0
124,9
123,8
118,6
110,4
107,8

LT
100,0
100,9
110,7
113,5
115,1
116,5
120,3
124,7
131,2
140,2
137,5
135,3
138,1

HU
100,0
102,4
113,4
128,0
131.0
137,3
137,8
131,2
141,9
146,6
137,4
139,7
138,9

Izvor: European Commission, 2011

Podaci Tabele 7. indiciraju da je

konkurentnost EU i EMU u odnosu na SAD i
Japan, analizirana kroz kretanje BDP, znaajno
smanjena od formiranja EMU. Godina 2003.
predstavlja prekretnicu (kao i u sluaju JTP i
inflacije), kako u EU i EMU tako i u Japanu,
a posebno u SAD. Od te godine pogorava

se konkurentna pozicija EU i EMU, a sa

druge strane raste, odnosno poboljava se
konkurentnost Japana i SAD.
Od te, 2004. godine, poinje i irenje deficita
tekuih rauna najveeg broja lanica (Tabela
9), a od 2007. i poveanje zaduenja u odnosu
na BDP (Tabela 10).

25

Bankarstvo 2 2014

The available data indicate that imbalances

identified in the current account payments that
were established between northern and southern
EMU members, most of all Greece, Spain, Italy and
Ireland, were determined by the differentiations
incurred from the mismatch between the level
of the LUC and the inflation. These differences
could not have been compensated for through the
adjustment of the real exchange rate. However,
this analysis which is covering economic
expressions of the interior imbalances indicates
that there is also a need for researching the interior
content of economies of the member countries, i.e.
lagging behind in making structural changes in
the economy, and the absence of exchangeable
goods in the southern countries of Europe.
Gross Domestic Product
Let us now analyze summary state of
competitiveness by using the GDP.

Data presented in Table 7 indicate that the

competitiveness of the EU and EMU in respect
to the USA and Japan, when analyzed through
the GDP movement, was significantly lowered
with the formation of the EMU. The year 2003
represents a turning point (as was also the case
with the LUC and inflation), both in the EU
and the EMU and also in Japan, but especially
in the USA. From that year onwards, there
is deterioration in the competitive position
of the EU and the EMU, while on the other
hand there is growth, i.e. improvement in the
competitiveness of Japan and the USA.
From 2004 what begins is also expansion of
the current account deficit in the major number
of the member countries (Table 9), and from
2007 onwards increased borrowing started in
respect to the GDP (Table 10).

Table 7 - Real effective exchange rate based on the GDP, index (1999=100)
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011

MT
100.0
101.3
103.5
105.7
109.9
111.0
111.2
113.3.
117.9
121.2
121.7
119.7
121.0

NL
100.0
99.3
103.1
105.7
109.9
109.3
109.5
109.5
110.0
112.0
112.0
109.6
109.5

AT
100.0
96.5
96.4
96.0
98.4
98.9
98.4
98.6
99.0
99.2
100.2
98.6
99.0

PL
100.0
108.6
120.7
115.3
101.8
101.4
114.3
117.5
123.0
134.7
113.9
121.3
119.6

PT
100.0
98.5
100.1
102.1
106.3
107.3
107.1
107.6
109.4
110.3
110.7
108.8
108.7

RO
100.0
111.4
116.4
116.7
120.6
126.8
154.6
172.6
202.5
207.5
188.7
191.6
197.9

SI
100.0
95.3
96.1
97.9
100.4
100.0
98.6
98.8
100.6
102.5
106.3
102.0
100.5

SK
100.0
109.2
109.5
112.4
122.6
132.8
136.9
143.3
155.8
169.6
176.3
171.6
174.3

FI
100.0
95.7
97.8
98.4
100.8
100.7
98.6
97.5
99.4
100.7
103.1
98.5
98.9

SE
100.0
98.1
90.2
92.0
97.5
97.5
93.6
93.6
95.4
93.8
87.0
93.4
98.5

UK
100.0
101.2
98.9
100.0
96.1
100.7
99.4
101.2
103.0
90.6
81.0
83.1
83.6

US
100.0
103.7
109.6
108.0
97.6
91.4
90.7
90.6
86.3
82.2
87.9
85.1
80.2

JP
EA17 EU27
100.0 100.0 100.0
107.4
90.0
88.4
94.0
91.8
90.4
86.0
94.7
95.2
82.3 104.9 106.0
80.7 107.0 111.2
75.7 105.0 109.1
68.7 104.8 110.6
62.3 107.5 117.4
66.9 109.9 117.5
76.5 112.3 111.6
79.4 104.4 103.8
82.4 103.6 104.0

IT
100.0
96.2
97.5
99.9
106.2
107.9
106.8
106.6
108.0
109.8
112.1
107.9
107.7

CY
100.0
97.5
100.0
100.0
106.4
108.1
109.7
111.3
112.8
116.8
117.4
115.1
116.8

LV
100.0
109.7
110.3
107.9
103.4
105.0
107.3
116.3
135.8
149.5
150.3
140.5
143.5

Source: European Commission, 2011.

Table 8 - Real effective exchange rate based on the GDP, index (1999=100)
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011

BL
100.0
96.6
97.0
97.8
102.2
103.4
103.6
104.6
105.9
107.9
109.1
107.7
108.6

BG
100.0
100.9
107.6
11.6
113.4
115.7
119.6
125.1
133.1
141.3
146.8
146.8
154.8

CZ
100.0
100.9
108.1
121.1
119.1
121.8
126.5
131.3
135.3
151.1
146.6
146.1
149.1

Source: European Commission, 2011

DK
100.0
96.1
98.0
99.7
103.9
105.5
105.8
105.9
107.2
110.7
112.8
110.8
109.6

DE
100.0
92.1
91.4
91.9
96.0
96.4
94.1
92.6
93.1
92.8
94.3
90.6
89.6

EE
100.0
98.3
102.4
103.1
108.9
112.1
116.5
123.8
134.6
138.6
139.2
135.1
136.7

GR
ES
100.0 100.0
94.4
97.9
95.1 100.5
97.0 103.6
102.3 109.9
103.7 113.0
103.0 115.1
103.3 117.6
104.4 119.8
107.9 121.9
111.3 122.2
109.2 118..4
109.1 118.5

FR
100.0
95.2
95.6
96.9
101.5
102.3
101.4
102.0
103.8
106.1
106.3
103.0
102.7

IE
100.0
98.3
103.5
108.5
117.3
120.0
121.0
123.0
124.9
123.8
118.6
110.4
107.8

LT
100.0
100.9
110.7
113.5
115.1
116.5
120.3
124.7
131.2
140.2
137.5
135.3
138.1

HU
100.0
102.4
113.4
128.0
131.0
137.3
137.8
131.2
141.9
146.6
137.4
139.7
138.9

26

Bankarstvo 2 2014

Tabela 9. Bilans tekuih rauna (u milijardama evra)

EU 27
EMU
Belgija
Bugarska
eka
Danska
Nemacka
Estonija
Irska
Grcka
panija
Francuska
Italija
Kipar
Latvija
Litvanija
Luksemburg
Maarska
Malta
Holandija
Austrija
Poljska
Portugalija
Rumunija
Slovenija
Slovaka
Finska
vedska
V. Britanija
Island
Norveka
Hrvatska
Turska
Japan
SAD

2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
-93,8 -16,2 -30,8 -35,7 -83.5 -139,6 -125.9 -261.5 -90.3 -82.2 -66.6
-27,2
46,1
20.7
60.8
10.8 -12.6
7.4 -143,5 -21,9
-6.8
-2.3
8.8
12.0
9.4
9.3
6.0
5.9
5.4
-5.7
-5,3
5.0
-3.7
-0,9
-0,4
-0,1
-1,3
-2,7
-4,6
-7,8
-8,2
-3,1
-0,4
0.4
-3,7
-4,4
-5,0
-4,7
-1,0
-2,4
-5,7
-3.3
-3,4
-5,9
-4,5
5.6
4,6
6,5
5,9
9,0
6,5
3,1
6,8
7,3
13,0
15,5
0,0
42,7
40,5 102,4 112,6 144,7 180,9 153,6 140,6 150,7 147,7
-0,4
-0,8
-0,1
-1,1
-1,1
-2,1
-2,6
-1,6
0,5
0,5
0,5
-0,8
-1,3
0,0
-0,9
-5,7
-6,3 -10,1 -10,2
-4,7
0,8
1.1
-10,6 -10,2 -11,3 -10,7 -14,7 -23,8 -32,6 -34,8 -25,8 -23,0 -21,1
-26,8 -23,8 -27,5 -44,2 -66,9 -88,3 -105,3 -104,7 -50,5 -47,4 -37,5
26.3
19.2
11.5
9.0
-8,3 -10,3 -18,9 -33,7 -25,1 -30,2 -38,9
3,4
-5,6 -10,4
-4,6 -12,6 -22.3 -19,9 -45,2 -30,1
54,7 -50,3
-0,4
-0,4
-0,3
-0,6
-0,8
-1,0
-1,9
-2,7
-1,8
-1,7
-1,9
-0,7
-0,7
-0,8-1,4
-1,6
-3,6
-4,7
-3,0
1,6
0,5
-0,2
-0,6
-0,8
-1,1
-1,4
-1,5
-2,6
-4,1
-4,2
1,2
O,4
-0,5
2,0
2,5
2,1
3,3
3,5
3,5
3,8
2,0
2,4
3,1
3,0
-3,6
-4,9
-5,9
-6,8
-6,4
-6,6
-7,2
-7,7
-0,1
1,2
1,4
-0,2
0,1
-0,1
-0,3
-0,4
-0,5
-0,3
-0,3
-0,5
-0,4
-0,2
11,6
12,3
26,4
37,5
38,0
50,4
38,4
25,5
23,5
41,5
52,4
-1,8
5,9
3,8
5,2
5,3
7,3
9,6
13,8
7,5
8,6
5,9
-6,6
-5,9
-4,9 -10,8
-5,9 -10,4 -19,3 -23,8 -12,1 -16,5 -16,0
-13,9 -11,8
-9,2 -12,4 -15,9 -17,1 -17,2 -21,7 -18,4 -17,2 -11,0
-2,5
-1,6
-3,1
-5,1
-6,9 -10,2 -16,8 -16,2
-4,9
-5,5
-6,0
0,0
0,3
-0,2
-0,7
-0,5
-0,8
-1,6
-2,3
-0,2
-0,2
0,0
-2,0
-2,1
-1,7
-2,7
-3,3
-3,5
-2,9
-4,0
-1,6
-1,6
0,0
11,6
12,1
7,0
9,4
5,3
6,9
7,7
4,9
3,1
2,6
-2,2
12,7
12,5
19,5
19,1
20,2
26,8
31,2
29,4
20,5
24,0
27,2
-34,0 -29,2 -25,7 -37,4 -47,7 -66,8 -51,6 -25,1 -23,1 -56,7 -33,5
-0,4
0,1
-0,5
-1,1
-2.2
-3,2
-2,3
-2,8
-1,0
-0,8
-0,7
29,2
26,0
24,5
26,5
39,7
46,2
40,1
54,5
35,8
38,7
-0,8
-2,0
-1,8
-1,4
-1,9
-2,6
-3,1
-4,1
-2,2
-0,4
-0,4
-25,6 -27,9 -28,1
-9,6 -35,1 -55,4
4,3
-0,7
-6,6 -11,5 -17,8
97,8 120,0 120,3 138,5 133,3 136,5 154,9 107,0 105,0 153,7
85,6
-443,3 -482,4 -505,4 -505,4 -602,2 -637,1 -519,7 -460,5 -269,2 -357,0 -339,8

Izvor: Eurostat (online data codes:bdp_q_euro and bdp_q_c_), ECB

Tabela 10. Javni dug kao % BDP

Belgija
Nemaka
Estonija
Irska
Grka
panija
Francuska
Italija
Luksemburg
Holandija
Austrija
Portugalija
Slovenija
Finska
Malta
Kipar
Slovaka
EA-17
EU -27

1998
117,1
60,3
53,6
105,8
64,1
59,4
114,9
7,1
65,7
64,8
52,1
48,2
53,4
58,6
34,5
73,1
66,5

2007
84,2
64,9
3,7
25,0
105,4
36,1
63,9
103,6
6,7
45,3
60,7
68,3
23,1
35,2
62,0
58,3
29,6
66,3
59,0

2008
89,6
66,3
4,6
44,4
110,7
29,8
67,7
106,3
13,6
58,2
63,8
71,6
21,9
34,1
61,5
48,3
27,8
70,0
62,3

2009
96,2
73,5
7,2
65,6
127,1
53,3
78,3
115,1
14,6
60,8
69,6
83,0
35,2
43,8
67,6
58,0
35,4
79,4
74,4

2010
96,8
83,2
6,6
96,2
142,8
60,1
81,7
119,0
18,4
62,7
72,3
93,0
38,0
48,4
68,0
60,8
41,0
85,5
80,2

Izvor: European Commission, Economic and Financial Affairs, Public Finance, 2011, 2

2011
97,0
82,4
6,1
112,0
157,7
68,1
84,7
120,3
17,2
63,9
73,8
101,7
42,8
50,6
68,0
62,3
44,8
87,9
82,3

2012
97,5
81,1
6,9
117,9
166,1
71,0
86,8
119,8
19,0
64,0
75,4
107,4
46,0
52,2
67,9
64,3
46,8
88,7
83,3

27

Bankarstvo 2 2014

Table 9 - Current accounts balance (in billion euros)

EU 27
EMU
Belgium
Bulgaria
Czech Rep.
Denmark
Geramny
Estonia
Ireland
Greece
Spain
France
Italy
Cyprus
Latvia
Lithuania
Luxembourg
Hungary
Malta
Netherlands
Austria
Poland
Portugal
Romania
Slovenia
Slovakia
Finland
Sweden
UK
Island
Norway
Croatia
Turkey
Japan
USA

2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
-93.8 -16.2 -30.8 -35.7 -83.5 -139.6 -125.9 -261.5 -90.3 -82.2 -66.6
-27.2
46.1
20.7
60.8
10.8 -12.6
7.4 -143.5 -21.9
-6.8
-2.3
8.8
12.0
9.4
9.3
6.0
5.9
5.4
-5.7
-5.3
5.0
-3.7
-0.9
-0.4
-0.1
-1.3
-2.7
-4.6
-7.8
-8.2
-3.1
-0.4
0.4
-3.7
-4.4
-5.0
-4.7
-1.0
-2.4
-5.7
-3.3
-3.4
-5.9
-4.5
5.6
4.6
6.5
5.9
9.0
6.5
3.1
6.8
7.3
13.0
15.5
0.0
42.7
40.5 102.4 112.6 144.7 180.9 153.6 140.6 150.7 147.7
-0.4
-0.8
-0.1
-1.1
-1.1
-2.1
-2.6
-1.6
0.5
0.5
0.5
-0.8
-1.3
0.0
-0.9
-5.7
-6.3 -10.1 -10.2
-4.7
0.8
1.1
-10.6 -10.2 -11.3 -10.7 -14.7 -23.8 -32.6 -34.8 -25.8 -23.0 -21.1
-26.8 -23.8 -27.5 -44.2 -66.9 -88.3 -105.3 -104.7 -50.5 -47.4 -37.5
26.3
19.2
11.5
9.0
-8.3 -10.3 -18.9 -33.7 -25.1 -30.2 -38.9
3.4
-5.6 -10.4
-4.6 -12.6 -22.3 -19.9 -45.2 -30.1
54.7 -50.3
-0.4
-0.4
-0.3
-0.6
-0.8
-1.0
-1.9
-2.7
-1.8
-1.7
-1.9
-0.7
-0.7
-0.8-1.4
-1.6
-3.6
-4.7
-3.0
1.6
0.5
-0.2
-0.6
-0.8
-1.1
-1.4
-1.5
-2.6
-4.1
-4.2
1.2
O.4
-0.5
2.0
2.5
2.1
3.3
3.5
3.5
3.8
2.0
2.4
3.1
3.0
-3.6
-4.9
-5.9
-6.8
-6.4
-6.6
-7.2
-7.7
-0.1
1.2
1.4
-0.2
0.1
-0.1
-0.3
-0.4
-0.5
-0.3
-0.3
-0.5
-0.4
-0.2
11.6
12.3
26.4
37.5
38.0
50.4
38.4
25.5
23.5
41.5
52.4
-1.8
5.9
3.8
5.2
5.3
7.3
9.6
13.8
7.5
8.6
5.9
-6.6
-5.9
-4.9 -10.8
-5.9 -10.4 -19.3 -23.8 -12.1 -16.5 -16.0
-13.9 -11.8
-9.2 -12.4 -15.9 -17.1 -17.2 -21.7 -18.4 -17.2 -11.0
-2.5
-1.6
-3.1
-5.1
-6.9 -10.2 -16.8 -16.2
-4.9
-5.5
-6.0
0.0
0.3
-0.2
-0.7
-0.5
-0.8
-1.6
-2.3
-0.2
-0.2
0.0
-2.0
-2.1
-1.7
-2.7
-3.3
-3.5
-2.9
-4.0
-1.6
-1.6
0.0
11.6
12.1
7.0
9.4
5.3
6.9
7.7
4.9
3.1
2.6
-2.2
12.7
12.5
19.5
19.1
20.2
26.8
31.2
29.4
20.5
24.0
27.2
-34.0 -29.2 -25.7 -37.4 -47.7 -66.8 -51.6 -25.1 -23.1 -56.7 -33.5
-0.4
0.1
-0.5
-1.1
-2.2
-3.2
-2.3
-2.8
-1.0
-0.8
-0.7
29.2
26.0
24.5
26.5
39.7
46.2
40.1
54.5
35.8
38.7
-0.8
-2.0
-1.8
-1.4
-1.9
-2.6
-3.1
-4.1
-2.2
-0.4
-0.4
-25.6 -27.9 -28.1
-9.6 -35.1 -55.4
4.3
-0.7
-6.6 -11.5 -17.8
97.8 120.0 120.3 138.5 133.3 136.5 154.9 107.0 105.0 153.7
85.6
-443.3 -482.4 -505.4 -505.4 -602.2 -637.1 -519.7 -460.5 -269.2 -357.0 -339.8

Source: Eurostat (online data codes:bdp_q_euro and bdp_q_c_), ECB

Table 10 - Public debt in the GDP %

Belgium
Germany
Estonia
Ireland
Greece
Spain
France
Italy
Luxembourg
Netherlands
Austria
Portugal
Slovenia
Finland
Malta
Cyprus
Slovakia
EA-17
EU -27

1998
117.1
60.3
53.6
105.8
64.1
59.4
114.9
7.1
65.7
64.8
52.1
48.2
53.4
58.6
34.5
73.1
66.5

2007
84.2
64.9
3.7
25.0
105.4
36.1
63.9
103.6
6.7
45.3
60.7
68.3
23.1
35.2
62.0
58.3
29.6
66.3
59.0

2008
89.6
66.3
4.6
44.4
110.7
29.8
67.7
106.3
13.6
58.2
63.8
71.6
21.9
34.1
61.5
48.3
27.8
70.0
62.3

2009
96.2
73.5
7.2
65.6
127.1
53.3
78.3
115.1
14.6
60.8
69.6
83.0
35.2
43.8
67.6
58.0
35.4
79.4
74.4

2010
96.8
83.2
6.6
96.2
142.8
60.1
81.7
119.0
18.4
62.7
72.3
93.0
38.0
48.4
68.0
60.8
41.0
85.5
80.2

Source: European Commission, Economic and Financial Affairs, Public Finance, 2011, 2

2011
97.0
82.4
6.1
112.0
157.7
68.1
84.7
120.3
17.2
63.9
73.8
101.7
42.8
50.6
68.0
62.3
44.8
87.9
82.3

2012
97.5
81.1
6.9
117.9
166.1
71.0
86.8
119.8
19.0
64.0
75.4
107.4
46.0
52.2
67.9
64.3
46.8
88.7
83.3

28

Pored analize konkurentnosti EU i EMU

u odnosu na glavne i uporedive svetske
konkurente tabele 7. i 8. omoguavaju praenje
konkurentnosti unutar EU i EMU. Vidljivo je
da su konkurentnu poziciju poboljale samo
Nemaka, Austrija i Finska meu lanicama
EMU, a meu drugim lanicama EU samo
vedska. Na drugoj strani, meu lanicaama
EMU, poseban gubitak konkurentnosti
zabeleen je kod panije. Dodatan problem
predstavlja gubitak konkurentnosti starih
industrijskih nacija: Italije, Holandije, Francuske.
Jednom reju, tendencije konkurentnosti
praene preko BDP potvruju prethodne nalaze
utvrene u sluajevima JTR i inflacije.
Na kraju ovog dela ukaimo i na sledee.
Kriza u zemljama EU se, pre svega, identifikuje
sa velikim javnim dugom i budetskim
deficitom, tek potom se ukazuje na probleme
vezane za deficite u raunima tekuih
plaanja. Ovi potonji deficiti su direktniji
rezultatat razliitog stepena konkurentnosti
privreda evrozone. Proistekli su iz razliitih
privrednih struktura lanica, gde se industrijski
produktivnija proizvodnja koncentrisala u
nekoliko zemlja severa Evrope, dok su druge
privredne delatnosti sa istorijski uslovljenim
zaostajanjem produktivnosti situirane u junim
zemljama. Pored toga, vremenski se ranije
javljaju problemi sa deficitom tekuih plaanja
(2004), od krize javnog duga (2007) i u tom
smislu konincidiruju sa padom konkurentnosti
evropskih privreda. Uniformna vrednost evra
jasno je ocrtala ovaj strukturni debalans.

Redizajniranje EMU
Struktura EU je graena dugo
i strpljivo. Osnovu pristupa
njenoj izgradnji predstavljao
je
funkcionalni
pristup.
Zemlje lanice su prenosile na
Uniju samo mali deo svojih
nadlenosti, to je obezbeivalo
uvanje njihovog integriteta i
trajnost Unije, najee na tetu
efikasnosti delovanja. Uvoenje
EMU je predstavljalo tektonsku
promenu u tom procesu.
Nacionalna samostalnost u
voenju monetarne politike

Bankarstvo 2 2014

je preputena ECB. Na drugoj strani nisu

uspostavljeni
odgovarajui
mehanizmi
koordinacije sa drugim ekonomskim politikama.
Reju, nisu postojale institucije u EMU za
uspene odgovore na asimetrine okove.
Pojava krize stavila je, pre svega EMU, na
proveru. Prvi odgovor je bio na prvi pogled
efikasan. Olien je u koncentraciji kapitala
i konstituisanju nove institucije: Evropskog
finansijskog stabilizacionog fonda (ESFS), koja je
sprovedena 2010 godine. Odlukom Evropskog
saveta iz 2011. godine, kapitalna osnova Fonda
iznosi 750 milijardi evra, a kreditni potencijal
500 milijardi evra. Meunarodni monetarni
fond je obezbedio 250 milijardi evra. Od njega su
preuzeti uslovi korienja sredstava. Smanjenje
javnog duga se sprovodi budetskim utedama
i to, na rashodnoj strani, smanjenjem trokova
socijalnih beneficija, zdravstvene zatite i
penzija, smanjenjem zarada slubenika u javnom
sektoru, a na prihodnoj strani, poveanjem
indirektnih poreza, a posebno poreza na dodatu
vrednost. Pored ovih, predviena su jo neke
institucionalne promene: supervizija (Momirovi,
2012), koordinacija i monitoring (Kuenzel, 2011).
Namee, se pitanje koji su rezultati ovih
mera?
Iako je ovaj proces u toku, mogu se ipak
izvesti sledei zakljuci.
Prvo, jo uvek nije dolo do smanjenja javnog
duga. Za 2012. godinu predvia se njegovo
dalje poveanje, mereno ueem u BDP i to sa
82,3% u 2011. na 83,3% u 2012. godini (Public
Finance, EMU, 2011).
Drugo, dolo je do smanjenja deficita tekuih
rauna u zemljama GIIPSa (Grka, Italija, Irska,
Portugla, panija (Graf 1).

Grafikon 1. Bilans tekuih plaanja, % BDP

Izvor: IMF, 2012.

Bankarstvo 2 2014

In addition to the analysis of competitiveness

of the EU and EMU in respect to the main and
comparable world competitors, Tables 7 and
8 allow the competitiveness to be followed up
within the EU and the EMU. It is obvious that
the competitive position was improved only by
Germany, Austria and Finland from amongst
the EMU members, and amongst the other EU
member countries only Sweden was successful.
On the other hand, the EMU member country
that recorded a particular loss of competitiveness
was Spain. An additional problem is the loss of
competitiveness of the old industrial nations:
Italy, Netherlands, and France. In a word,
competitiveness tendencies followed through
the GDP confirm previous finds determined in
the cases of the LUC and inflation.
In conclusion of this part of work, let us
highlight the following. Crisis in the EU is
primarily identified with the large public debt
and budgetary deficit, and only thereafter the
problems related to the deficit in the current
account payments are pointed out. This latter
deficit is a direct result of different competitive
levels of the euro-zone economies. They have
derived from different economic structures of the
member countries, where an industrially more
productive manufacture had concentrated in
several countries of northern Europe, while other
economic sectors with historically conditioned
lagging behind of productivity are situated in
the southern countries. In addition, problems
with the current payment deficit appear earlier
in time (2004) than the public debt crisis (2007)
and in that sense coincide with the fall of
competitiveness of the European economies.
Uniform euro value had clearly outlined this
structural imbalance.

Redesigning EMU
The EU structure was constructed over a
long period of time and patiently. The basic
approach to its creation was the functional
approach. Member countries were transferring
on to the Union only a small part of their
competencies, which provided for the safeguard
of their integrity and the longevity of the Union,
most often at the expense of the efficient action.
Introduction of the EMU represented a tectonic
change in this process. National independence

29

in conducting monetary policy was left in the

hands of the ECB. On the other hand, no other
corresponding mechanisms have been set in
place for coordination with other economic
policies. In a word, there were no institutions
in the EMU to successfully respond to the
asymmetric shocks.
With the emergence of the crisis, EMU
was actually the first one to be put to a test.
The first response was, as it seemed, rather
successful. The response was embodied in the
concentration of capital and in the constitution
of the new institution: the European Financial
Stability Fund (ESFS), which was established in
2010. In the decision of the European Council
in 2011, it was prescribed that the capital basis
of the fund will amount to 750 billion euros,
while the credit potential will be 500 billion
euros. International Monetary Fund provided
250 billion euros. The IMF conditionalities
will be applied for the use of funds . Austerity
measures including lowering of the public
debt were to be conducted through budgetary
savings and this on the side of expenditures,
cutting down costs of social benefits, health
care and pensions, reducing salaries in the
public sector, and on the earning side, through
the increase of indirect taxation, especially
the value added tax. In addition, some of the
institutional changes were envisaged as well,
those of supervision (Momirovic, 2012, 84),
coordination, and monitoring (Kuenzel, 2011,
p. 8).
The question is raised here what are the
results of these measures?
Bearing in mind that this process is still
ongoing, nevertheless the following may be
concluded:
Firstly, public debt has not as yet been
reduced. It is forecasted for 2012 that there will
be its further increase measured as the share in
the GDP, and this from 82.3% in 2011 to 83.3%
in 2012 (Public Finance EMU, 2011, p. 26).
Secondly, there was a reduction in the
current account deficit in the GIIPS countries
(Greece, Italy, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain)
(Graph 1).

30

Ova povoljna tendencija meutim zasnovana

je, pre svega, na znaajnom opadanju tranje i na
toj osnovi omoguavanju veeg izvoza zemalja
GIIPSa. U proseku, u periodu 2007-2011, tranja je
opala 10% (u Grkoj 18%), dok je u Nemakoj, na
drugoj strani, domaa tranja poveana 3,3%, to
smanjuje prostor za njen izvoz (Dadush, Wyne,
2012). Kao rezultat smo dobili smanjenje gepa
u tekuim raunima izmeu lanica, odnosno
mere EU su se pokazale efikasnim. Meutim,
efikasnost na tom planu dovela je do niza
negativnih posledica, odnosno nije obezbedila
odrivi razvoj. Kao najoitija konsekvenca je
porast nezaposlenosti na preko 11 % (Graf 2 ),
ali i pad BDP.
Grafikon.2. Stopa nezaposlenosti u Evrozoni i EU 27

Izvor: Eurostat, 2012.

U GIIPS zemljama stope rasta nezaposlenosti

se dramatino poveavaju. Tako, na primer,
u paniji od stope nezaposlenosti od 8,3% u
2007. godini, ona se poveava na 21,7% u 2011,
u Grkoj od 8,3% na 17,7%, a u Irskoj od 4,6%
na 14,4%. U celini, najveu nezaposlenost u
zrmljama EU imaju panija, Italija i Grka sa
preko 25% (Dugali, 2012). Na drugoj strani, u
zemljama severnog dela evrozone: Nemakoj,
Belgiji, Holandiji, Austriji stope nezaposlenosti
posmatrano u celini ostaju na predkriznom
nivou. Kao rezultat, u 2012. godini bila je
predviena blaga recesija u EMU od -0,4 rasta
GDP (IMF, 2013 October).
Tree, nije dolo do zaokruivanja
institucionalnog sistema. I dalje nedostaju
vane karike za njegovo uvrivanje. Postoje
odreeni predlozi kako da se to uradi. U ovim
razmiljanjima u osnovi postoje dva pravca.

Bankarstvo 2 2014

Prvi pravac je vezan za uvoenje

evroobveznica kao sredstva zaduivanja lanica
EMU. Ovo reenje pretpostavlja zajedniku
odgovornost lanica za obaveze pojedinih
drava Ovaj pravac pretpostavlja i centralizaciju
fiskalne funkcije. Sa njom bi se monetarna unija
kompletirala sa transfernom budetskom
funkcijom, koju imaju druge federalne drave,
kao na primer SAD, a aktivirali bi se i mehanizmi
fiskalne kontrole, kao i automatski stabilizatori.
Oba ova reenja trasiraju put ka federalistikoj
budunosti EU, dakle politikoj uniji. U prilog
ovom pravcu, zasnovanom na zajednikoj
odgovornosti u EMU, govori jaanje evra kao
svetske valute i reduciranje prelivanja meu
lanicama, dok protivargumenti
lee u injenici da se nacionalne
razlike u ekonomskoj strukturi i
preferencijama mogu eksponirati
samo posredno.
Drugi pravac nudi parcijalna
reenja, koja u uslovima
neprihvatanja
fiskalnog
federalizma, politike integracije,
pa i evroobveznica, pre svega, od
Nemake, predstavlja realniji
pristup. U osnovi i analiza
izneta u ovom radu se nalazi
na tom tragu. Konvergencija
zemalja EMU, merena OVP
kriterijumima
ili
nivoom
ekonomskog razvoja je mogua,
pre svega, izmeu starih petnaest lanica EU
i/ili lanica koje imaju suficite tekuih rauna.
Na taj nain se osnauje ideja Evrope klubova
ili Evrope u dve ili vie brzina, prezentovana
jo Amsterdamskim ugovorom. Na ovoj liniji se
nalaze i druge ideje koje nude parcijalna reenja:
saniranje dugova prezaduenih lanica, pa onda
njihov izlazak iz zone; uvoenje Evropskog
stabilizacionog mehanizma (ESM) 2012, Fonda
sa kapitalom od 500 milijardi evra za saniranje
eventualnih buduih finansijskih problema;
etabliranje meuvladinog sporazuma: Ugovora
o stabilizaciji, kordinaciji i upravljanju u
Evropskoj i monetarnoj uniji (TSCG) iz 2012.
Ovaj ugovor nije potpisan od strane Velike
Britanije i eke, i treba pre svega da ojaa
fiskalnu disciplinu. Meutim, ovaj pristup kao i
prethodni, u osnovi se ne bavi razvojem realnog
sektora ekonomije, nego kreira uslove za njegov

Bankarstvo 2 2014

31

In the GIIPS countries

unemployment growth rates
are dramatically on the rise.
Thus for example in Spain, from
the unemployment rate of 8.3%
in 2007 it is now increased to
21.7% in 2011, in Greece from
8.3% to 17.7%, and in Ireland
from 4.6% to 14.4%. In general,
the highest unemployment in
the EU countries is experienced
by Spain, Italy and Greece, with
over 25% (Dugalic, 2012, 8). On
Source: IMF, 2012
the other hand, in the countries
of the northern part of the euroThis positive tendency however is based
zone: Germany, Belgium, Netherlands and
primarily on the significant fall in demand and
Austria, the unemployment, globally speaking,
on that basis is allowing for higher exports in
has remained at the pre-crisis level. As a result,
in the year 2012 a mild recession in the EMU is
the GIIPS countries. In the period 2007-2911, on
an average, demand has fallen for 10%, and in
forecasted, of -0.4% of the GDP growth (IMF,
Greece for 18%, while in Germany on the other
2013 October).
hand, domestic demand has grown for 3.3.%
Thirdly, rounding up of the institutional
system has failed to take place. Important
which is narrowing down space for its exports
links in the chain are still missing for its
(Dadush, Wyne, 2012). As a result what was
reinforcement. There are certain proposals
obtained is the lowering of the gap in current
accounts between the member countries, i.e.
as to how to proceed in this respect. In these
the EU measures have proved to have been
deliberations there are basically two lines of
efficient. However, the efficiency in this sense
thought.
has caused a series of negative consequences, i.e.
The first one is connected with the
introduction of euro-bonds as the means for
it did not provide for sustainable development.
The most obvious consequence is the growth in
borrowing of the EMU members. Prerequisite
unemployment of over 11% (Graph 2), but also
for this solution is the joint and common
the fall in the GDP.
responsibility of the member countries for
the liabilities of individual
countries. This line of thought
Graph 2 - Unemployment rate in the euro-zone and the
also assumes centralization of
the fiscal function. With the eurobond, monetary union would
be complete with the transfer
budgetary function, like the ones
in the hands of the other federal
states, for example, the USA, and
the mechanisms of its control
would be activated, but also
the automatic stabilizers. Both
of these solutions are paving
the road towards a federalist
future of the EU, therefore,
Source: Eurostat, 2012
towards a political union. In
support of this line, based on
the joint responsibility in the EMU, speaks the
Graph 1 - Current payments balance, in the GDP %

32

funkcionisanje. Kakve, videli smo u sluaju

GIIPS zemlja. Dakle, potrebne su aktivnije
razvojne mere usmerene na promenu privredne
strukture u prezaduenim i deficitima tekuih
rauna optereenim zemljama. Budetski
fondovi na nivou EU fokusirani na: odrivi
razvoj. Konkretno, za rast konkurentnosti
i zaposlenosti izdvajanja iz ovih fondova
su mala i iznose oko 15% budeta EU na
godinjem nivou, a koji sam ne prelazi 1,2%
BDP realizovanog u EU, dok su interna sredstva
ovih lanica usmerena na vraanje dugova.
Imajui sve gore izneto u vidu, kao i sporost
reformi u EU vezanu za duge procedure
usaglaavanja, na srednji rok, ne mogu se
oekivati neke bitnije izmene u odnosu na
stanje u EMU. Ta ocena ima teinu za Srbiju.
Ona proistie iz velikog stepena finansijske
zavisnosti od evra. Ovo se dokumentuje
sledeim injenicama: u vlasnitvu inostranih
banaka je 74% bankarskog sektora Srbije, od
ega 72% pripada bankama poreklom iz EMU
(Narodna Banka Srbije, 2012); u ukupnim
kreditima banaka krediti denominirani u
evru u 2011. u privredi uestvuju sa 68,1%,
a kod stanovnitva sa 69,5%, dok doznake iz
inostranstva, preteno iz evrozone iznose 3,5
milijardi evra godinje (Vasiljevi, Gobelji,
2011). Zadravanje evrozone u istim uslovima u

Bankarstvo 2 2014

narednom periodu namee Srbiji da prilagoava

kurs dinara evru i to u uem rasponu nego
to predvia EMU II, to je mogue u reimu
valutnog odbora.

Zakljuak
Utvreno je da kriteriji optimalnog valutnog
podruja daju analitiku osnovu za istraivanje
Evropske monetarne unije. Analiza trokovne
i cenovne konkurentnosti je indicirala da se
konkurentnost u evrozoni pogorala u odnosu
na konkurentnost u SAD-u i Japanu. Jo otriji
raskorak u konkurentnosti identifikovan je
meu lanicama EMU. Antikrizni mehanizmi
EMU, posebno Evropski fond za finansijsku
stabilizaciju doprineli su smanjenju gepa u
deficitima tekuih rauna i jaanju finansijske
odgovornosti. Meutim, implementacija
ovih mehanizama doprinela je i produenju
recesije, posebno poveanju nezaposlenosti.
Na dui rok, primena strukturnih mera treba
da obezbedi poveanje konkurentske pozicije
lanica. Na srednji rok, imajuu u vidu
institucionalnu sporost u prilagoavanju, ne
oekuju se znaajnije promene u funkcionisanju
EMU. Visoko zavisna od evra privreda Srbije
stoga treba da novim mehanizmima obezbedi
striktnije praenje kursa evra.

Bankarstvo 2 2014

strengthening of euro as the world currency

and the reduction in the spilling over among the
member countries, while the counter argument
rests on the fact that the national differences in
the economic structure and in preferences can
be exposed only indirectly.
The second line of thought offers partial
solutions which in the climate of reluctance to
accept fiscal federalism, political integration,
and even euro-bonds, primarily by Germany
represents a more realistic approach. Basically
the analysis presented in this paper is to be
found along this track. Convergence of EMU
countries measured by OCA criteria or the
level of economic development is possible
primarily between the old fifteen EU member
countries and/or members having surplus
on their current account. This is the way to
strengthen the idea of an Europe of clubs, or
Europe in two or more gears, as presented
early in the Amsterdam Agreement. Along
this line of thought some other ideas are also
to be found that are offering partial solutions:
solution of debts of the over-indebted member
countries, and then their exit from the zone;
introduction of the European Stabilization
Mechanism (ESM 2012), a fund with the capital
of 500 billion euro for the solution of eventual
future financial problems; establishment of
the inter-governmental agreement: Treaty on

33

Stabilization, Coordination and Governance

(TSCG) in the European and Monetary
Union, of 2012. This treaty was not signed
by United Kingdom and the Czech Republic,
and is primarily aimed at strengthening fiscal
discipline. However, this approach just like
the previous one basically does not deal with
the development of the real sector of economy,
but is creating conditions for its functioning.
What conditions, we have best seen in the
case of the GIIPS countries. Hence, more
active development measures are necessary
to be focused on the changes of the economic
structure in the heavily indebted countries and
those burdened with the current account deficit.
Budgetary funds on the level of the EU that are
focused on sustainable development, especially
growth of competitiveness and employment,
are small and amount to some 15% of the EU
budget at the annual level, which itself does
not exceed 1.2% of the GDP achieved in the
EU, while the internal funds of these members
countries are allocated for debt repayment.
In view of the above stated, but also
mindful of the slow motion of reforms in the
EU dependent on the long harmonization
procedure, in the medium term it is hard to
expect some more significant changes in respect
to the situation in the EU. This is an assessment
that has its implications for Serbia. It derives

34

Bankarstvo 2 2014

Literatura / References
1. Dadush U., Wyne, Z., (2012), Is the euro
rescue succeeding. An update, voxeu.org,
april
2. Dugali, V., (2012), Bauk nezaposlenosti
krui Evropom, Bankarstvo, br. 6. str. 6-9.
3. Eischengreen B., Bayoumi, T., (1996), Closer
to Heaven?, An optimum-Currency-Area
Index for European Countries Departments of
Economics, UCB Berkeley
4. European Commission, (2011), Price and
cost competitiveness, European commission,
Fourth quarter. Brissel
5. European Commission, (2011), Economic
and Financial Affairs, Public Finance - 2011
6. European Commission, 2011(1), Quarterly
Report on the Euro Area,
7. Eurostat, (2012), (online date codes, bop_q_
euro and bop_q_c) ECB
8. Frankel, J, Rose, A., (1997), Is EMU more
justifiable ex post than ex ante?, European
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9. Friedman, M., (1953), The Case for Flexible
Echange Rates, in Friesamn, M, (ed), Essay
in Positive Economics, University of Chicago
Press, 157-203
10. Grbi V, (2005), Ekonomija Evropske unije,
Megatrend, Beograd
11. Grbi, V, Antevski, M, Todi, D, (2013)
Finansiranje i zajednike politike Evropske
unije, Institut za meunarodnu politiku i
privredu, Beograd
12. Hitiris, T., (2003), European Union
Economics, Fifth edition, Pearson Education
13. International Monetary Fund, (2012), World
Economic Outlook Database
14. International Monetary Fund, (2013), World
Economic Outlook
15. Issing, O., (2001), Economic and Monetary
Union in Europe: political priority versus
economic integration? Paper for the
Conference 2001 of the European Society for
the History of Economic Thought, February

16. Joso R, B and Rui, H, A., (2011), The Euro

Area Ten Years after Its Creation: (Divergent)
Competitiveness and the Optimum
Currency Area Theory, Panoeconomicus,
Special Issue, 5, pp. 605-629.
17. Kuenzel, R., (2011), The EUs comprehensive
policy response to the crisis, Quarterly report
on the euro area, European Commission, pp.
7-15.
18. Malliaropulos, D., (2010), How much did
competitiveness of the Greek economy
decline since EMU entry? Economy and
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The Economic Journal, 67., 379-396.
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Area, American Economic Review, September,
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21. Momirovi, D, (2012) Nova arhitektura
regulativnog i nadzornog dizajna Evropske
unije - makro i mikro prudencijalni pristup,
Bankarstvo, br. 1, 82-109
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Currencies Areas, American Economic Review.
657-665
23. Lui, Lj, (2011), Evropska monetarna unija i
Srbija, Bankarstvo, br. 9-10, str. 52-75
24. Narodna Banka Srbije, (2012), http://www.
nbs.rs/internet/cirilica/50/index.html
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nauka, 6. 159-175

Bankarstvo 2 2014

from the high degree of financial dependence

on euro. This may be documented by the
following facts: some 74% of the banking sector
in Serbia is in the ownership of the foreign
banks, from this number 72% belonging to
the banks originating from the EMU (National
Bank of Serbia, 2012), in the total banking
loans, loans denominated in euro in 2011 have
a corporate share of 68.1%, and a retail share
of 69.5%, while the remittances from abroad
are mostly arriving from the euro-zone and
amount to 3.5 billion euro annually (Vasiljevic,
Gobeljic, 2011, 172). The euro-zone remaining
in the same circumstances over the forthcoming
period will force Serbia to adjust its exchange
rate to euro, and this within a narrower margin
than foreseen by the EMU II, which is possible
in the regime of the currency board.

Conclusion
It was determined that the criteria of
the optimum currency area are providing
analytic ground for research into the

35

European Monetary Union. The analysis of

cost and price competitiveness indicated that
the competitiveness in the euro-zone had
deteriorated in respect to the competitiveness
of the USA and Japan. An even sharper
disparity in the competitiveness was identified
among the EMU members. The EMU anticrisis mechanisms and especially the European
Financial Stabilization Fund have help to
reduce the gap in the current account deficits
and strengthening of financial responsibility.
However, implementation of these mechanisms
had also contributed to the extension of recession,
especially the growth of unemployment. In
a longer-term, implementation of structural
measures should provide an enhancement
for the competitive position of the member
countries. In medium-term, bearing in mind
institutional time-consuming pace of the
harmonization, no significant changes are to
be expected in the EMU functioning. Hence
the economy of Serbia, with high Eurisation,
should secure, through new mechanisms, a
stricter tracking of the euro exchange rate.