Psychoanalysis Aff Answers

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psychoanalysis aff answers
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2ac psychoanalysis k
Their attachment to theory is useless and devolves into dogma
Bird 6, works at the University of the West of England, Bristol, UK, (John, ON THE POVERTY OF
THEORY, http://www.palgrave-journals.com/pcs/journal/v11/n3/pdf/2100097a.pdf)//kap
We could now think about theory and the attachment to theory as a form of psychic retreat,
especially where this attachment avoids contact with reality and gives us a feeling of being
locked in, such that theory becomes an end-in-itself. This allows the free flow of phantasy and
omnipotence in which the community of theorists avidly colludes. Theory allows protection
from external and internal anxieties, [but] at the expense of [the] development and evolution of
meaning (Armstrong, 1998, p 7). Thus, Lacan and Zizek have the answer for everything even
the answer to which is the real Freud and the community of Lacanians and Zizekians colludes
with this and excludes those who are not in the community.
If theory is a form of psychic retreat then what are the anxieties that this retreat is addressing?
With reference to depressive affects, the helplessness and despair of the theorist in the face of
terrible social and political events 9/11, global warming, famine, the Asian Tsunami, 7/7 in
London make theory an attractive retreat, an alternative to engagement with the realities of
despair. With reference to paranoid-schizoid anxieties, the persecution of the theorist when faced
with the call to certainty and a return to fundamental truths may lead to a paranoid attachment
to theory through retreat from both a real and a phantasied persecution. These forms of retreat
may be exacerbated in three ways: first, through the paranoid style in much contemporary
political and social action and thought, a paranoid style exacerbated by the fear engendered by
the war on terror; second, through the peculiar and particular conditions of the social production
of knowledge in the academy (Sibley, 2004), with its attachment to systems of quality control
and assessment, of tenure and promotion, of user engagement and so on; and third, through
what seem to be the structural conditions of post-modernity, in which the fragmentation of the
self and of identity become, as it were, normal conditions. The structural insecurities of flexible
labour markets, and the constant pressure to change and cultivate identities, feed into forms of
defensive attachment to theory (Bauman, 2005).
False self-relationships to theories
The idea that theory may be a form of psychic retreat implies that we often use theory for
defensive purposes, both as individuals and as members of social organizations. As Belger
suggests (2002), we can approach the difficulties and dangers of theory in another, but related
way, that is, with reference to Winnicotts idea of the False Self:
this False Self functions as the reactive protector of the true core of the individual in an
environmental context in which impingements [infantile and contemporary] and neglect, rather
than attunements, have dominated the developmental field... The False Self is reactive instead of
proactive. (Belger, 2002, p 51)
In the context of theory in this case, the role of theory in the training of analysts Belger
postulates false self-relationships to theory which foreclose potential space and inhibit the
healthy development of the therapist-as-subject (Belger, 2002, p 51). As such, there is an
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elaboration of the intellectual at the expense of the real (p 55). These defensive, false selfrelationships to theory are further analysed by Ogden:
The illusion of knowing is achieved through the creation of a wide range of substitute formations
that fill the potential space in which desire and fear, appetite and fullness, love and hate might
otherwise come into beingy . In the absence of the capacity to generate potential space, one
relies on defensive substitutes for the experience of being alive... (Ogden, 1989, cited in Belger,
2002, p 55).
Theory becomes defensive and delusional and provides us with a phantasy of being all-knowing
and omnipotent. For Belger and Ogden, the problem becomes one of releasing omnipotent
control in much the same way that the infant may find it difficult to release its control in its
relationships with carers. As Belger suggests, following Wheelis (1958), theory becomes a way in
which we foreclose creativity, such that it is not experience which dictates what might be called
truth, but dogma. As we will see later, this release of control and this withdrawal from theoretical
dogma is part of the development of what could be called a healthy relationship to theory.
Psychoanalysis cant describe IR, but the negs insistence that it does
stems from their own anxiety of political impotency and a desire for
control that turns the K.
Rosen-Carole 10 Visiting Professor in the Philosophy Department at Bard College (Adam,
Menu Cards in Time of famine: on Psychoanalysis and Politics, The Psychoanalytic Quarterly,
2010 Volume LXXIX, No. 1)//RZ
The second approach to the problem has to do with psychoanalytic contributions to political
theory that avoid Freuds methodological individualism, but nevertheless run into the same
problem. An expanding trend in social criticism involves a tendency to discuss the death or
aggressive drives, fantasy formations, traumas, projective identifications, defensive repudiations,
and other such psychic phenomena of collective subjects as if such subjects were ontologically
discrete and determinate. Take the following passage from iek (1993) as symptomatic of the
trend I have in mind:
In Eastern Europe, the West seeks for its own lost origins, its own lost original experience of
democratic invention. In other words, Eastern Europe functions for the West as its Ego-Ideal
(Ich-Ideal): the point from which [the] West sees itself in a likable, idealized form, as worthy of
love. The real object of fascination for the West is thus the gaze, namely the supposedly naive
gaze by means of which Eastern Europe stares back at the West, fascinated by its democracy. [p.
201, italics in original]
Also, we might think here of the innumerable discussions of Americas death drive as propelling
the recent invasions in the Middle East, or of the ways in which the motivation for the Persian
Gulf Wars of the 1990s was a collective attempt to kick the Vietnam War Syndrome that is, to
solidify a national sense of power and prominence in the recognitive regard of the international
communityor of the psychoanalytic speculations concerning the psychodynamics of various
nations involved in the Cold War (here, of course, I have in mind Segals [1997] work), or of the
collective racist fantasies and paranoiac traits that organize various nation-statess domestic and
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foreign policies.7 Here are some further examples from iek, who, as a result of his popularity,
might be said to function as a barometer of incipient trends:
What is therefore at stake in ethnic tensions is always the possession of the national Thing. We
always impute to the other [ethnic group, race, nation, etc.] an excessive enjoyment: he wants
to steal our enjoyment (by ruining our way of life) and/or he has access to some secret, perverse
enjoyment. [1993, pp. 202-203]
Beneath the derision for the new Eastern European postCommunist states, it is easy to discern
the contours of the wounded narcissism of the European great nations. [2004, p. 27, italics
added]
There is in fact something of a neurotic symptom in the Middle Eastern conflicteveryone
recognizes the way to get rid of the obstacle, yet nonetheless, no one wants to remove it, as if
there is some kind of pathological libidinal profit gained by persisting in the deadlock. [2004, p.
39, italics added]
If there was ever a passionate attachment to the lost object, a refusal to come to terms with its
loss, it is the Jewish attachment to their land and Jerusalem . . . . When the Jews lost their land
and elevated it into the mythical lost object, Jerusalem became much more than a piece of
land . . . . It becomes the stand-in for . . . all that we miss in our earthly lives. [2004, p. 41]
Rather than explore collective subjects through analyses of their individual members, this type of
psychoanalytically inclined engagement with politics treats a collective subject (a nation, a
region, an ethnic group, etc.) as if it were simply amenable to explanation, and perhaps even
to intervention, in a manner identical to an individual psyche in a therapeutic context.
But if the transpositions of psychoanalytic concepts into political theory are epistemically
questionable, as I believe they are,8 the question is: why are they so prevalent? Perhaps the
psychoanalytic interpretation of collective subjects (nations, regions, etc.), or even the
psychoanalytic interpretation of powerful political figures, registers a certain anxiety regarding
political impotence and provokes a fantasy that, to an extent, pacifies and modifiesdefends
againstthat anxiety. Perhaps such engagements, which are increasingly prevalent in these
days of excruciating political alienation, operate within a fantasmatic frame wherein the anxiety
of political exclusion and castrationthat is, anxieties pertaining to a sense of oneself as
politically inefficacious, a non-agent in most relevant sensesis both registered and mitigated
by the fantasmatic satisfaction of imagining oneself interpretively intervening in the
lives of political figures or collective political subjects with the efficacy of a clinically
successful psychoanalytic interpretation.
To risk a hypothesis: as alienation from political efficacy increases and becomes more palpable,
as our sense of ourselves as political agents diminishes, fantasies of interpretive intervention
abound. Within such fantasy frames, one approaches a powerful political figure (or collective
subject) as if s/he were on the couch, open and amenable to ones interpretation.9 One
approaches such a powerful political figure or ethnic group or nation as if s/he (or it) desired
ones interpretations and acknowledged her/his suffering, at least implicitly, by her/his very
involvement in the scene of analysis.
Or if such fantasies also provide for the satisfaction of sadistic desires provoked by political
frustration and castration (a sense of oneself as politically voiceless, moot, uninvolved,
irrelevant), as they very well might, then ones place within the fantasy might be that of the all[khirn]
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powerful analyst, the sujet suppos savoir, the analyst presumptively in control of her-/himself
and her/his emotions, etc. Here the analyst becomes the one who directs and organizes the
analytic encounter, who commands psychoanalytic knowledge, who knows the analysand inside
and out, to whom the analysand must speak, upon whom the analysand depends, who is in a
position of having something to offer, whose adviceeven if not directly heededcannot but
make some sort of impact, and in the face of whom the analysand is quite vulnerable, who is
thus powerful, in control . . . perhaps the very figure whom the psychoanalytically inclined
interpreter fears. 9
Minimally, what I want to underscore here is that (1) a sense of political alienation may be
registered and fantasmatically mitigated by treating political subjects, individual or collective, as
if they were on the couch; and (2) expectations concerning the expository and therapeutic
efficacy of psychoanalytic interpretations of political subjects may be conditioned by such a
fantasy.
Sweeping psychoanalytic generalizations lack predictive force and

preclude effective politics defer to specifics
Robinson 5 (Andrew, political theorist University of Nottingham, The Political Theory of
Constitutive Lack: A Critique, Theory & Event Vol. 8, Issue 1. Date: 2005, project muse)
More precisely, I would maintain that "constitutive lack" is an instance of a Barthesian myth. It is,
after all, the function of myth to do exactly what this concept does: to assert the empty facticity
of a particular ideological schema while rejecting any need to argue for its assumptions. 'Myth
does not deny things; on the contrary, its function is to talk about them; simply, it purifies them,
it makes them innocent, it gives them a natural and eternal justification, it is a clarity which is
not that of an explanation but that of a statement of fact'37. This is precisely the status of
"constitutive lack": a supposed fact which is supposed to operate above and beyond explanation,
on an ontological level instantly accessible to those with the courage to accept it. Myths operate
to construct euphoric enjoyment for those who use them, but their operation is in conflict with
the social context with which they interact. This is because their operation is connotative: they
are "received" rather than "read"38, and open only to a "readerly" and not a "writerly"
interpretation. A myth is a second-order signification attached to an already-constructed
denotative sign, and the ideological message projected into this sign is constructed
outside the context of the signified. A myth is therefore, in Alfred Korzybski's sense,
intensional: its meaning derives from a prior linguistic schema, not from interaction with the
world in its complexity39. Furthermore, myths have a repressive social function, carrying in
Barthes's words an 'order not to think'40. They are necessarily projected onto or imposed on
actual people and events, under the cover of this order. The "triumph of literature" in the
Dominici trial41 consists precisely in this projection of an externally-constructed mythical schema
as a way of avoiding engagement with something one does not understand. Lacanian theory, like
Barthesian myths, involves a prior idea of a structural matrix which is not open to change in the
light of the instances to which it is applied. Zizek's writes of a 'pre-ontological dimension which
precedes and eludes the construction of reality'42, while Laclau suggests there is a formal
structure of any chain of equivalences which necessitates the logic of hegemony43. Specific
analyses are referred back to this underlying structure as its necessary expressions, without
apparently being able to alter it; for instance, 'those who triggered the process of
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democratization in eastern Europe... are not those who today enjoy its fruits, not because of a
simple usurpation... but because of a deeper structural logic'44. In most instances, the mythical
operation of the idea of "constitutive lack" is implicit, revealed only by a rhetoric of denunciation.
For instance, Mouffe accuses liberalism of an 'incapacity... to grasp... the irreducible character of
antagonism'45, while Zizek claims that a 'dimension' is 'lost' in Butler's work because of her
failure to conceive of "trouble" as constitutive of "gender"46. This language of "denial" which is
invoked to silence critics is a clear example of Barthes's "order not to think": one is not to think
about the idea of "constitutive lack", one is simply to "accept" it, under pain of invalidation. If
someone else disagrees, s/he can simply be told that there is something crucial missing from
her/his theory. Indeed, critics are as likely to be accused of being "dangerous" as to be accused
of being wrong. One of the functions of myth is to cut out what Trevor Pateman terms the "middle
level" of analytical concepts, establishing a short-circuit between high-level
generalizations and ultra-specific (pseudo-)concrete instances. In Barthes's classic case of an
image of a black soldier saluting the French flag, this individual action is implicitly connected to
highly abstract concepts such as nationalism, without the mediation of the particularities of his
situation. (These particularities, if revealed, could undermine the myth. Perhaps he enlisted
for financial reasons, or due to threats of violence). Thus, while myths provide an analysis of
sorts, their basic operation is anti-analytical: the analytical schema is fixed in advance, and the
relationship between this schema and the instances it organizes is hierarchically ordered to the
exclusive advantage of the former. This is precisely what happens in Lacanian analyses of
specific political and cultural phenomena. Zizek specifically advocates 'sweeping generalisations'
and short-cuts between specific instances and high-level abstractions, evading the "middle
level". 'The correct dialectical procedure... can be best described as a direct jump from the
singular to the universal, bypassing the mid-level of particularity'. He wants a 'direct jump
from the singular to the universal', without reference to particular contexts47. He also has a
concept of a 'notion' which has a reality above and beyond any referent, so that, if reality does
not fit it, 'so much the worse for reality'48. The failure to see what is really going on means that
one sees more, not less, because libidinal perception is not impeded by annoying facts49. Zizek
insists on the necessity of the gesture of externally projecting a conception of an essence onto
phenomena50, even affirming its necessity in the same case (anti-Semitism) in which Reich
denounces its absurdity51. This amounts to an endorsement of myths in the Barthesian sense,
as well as demonstrating the "dialectical" genius of the likes of Kelvin McKenzie. Lacanian
analysis consists mainly of an exercise in projection. As a result, Lacanian "explanations" often
look more propagandistic or pedagogical than explanatory. A particular case is dealt with only in
order to, and to the extent that it can, confirm the already-formulated structural theory. Judith
Butler criticizes Zizek's method on the grounds that 'theory is applied to its examples', as if
'already true, prior to its exemplification'. 'The theory is articulated on its self-sufficiency, and
then shifts register only for the pedagogical purpose of illustrating an already accomplished
truth'. It is therefore 'a theoretical fetish that disavows the conditions of its own emergence'52.
She alleges that Lacanian psychoanalysis 'becomes a theological project' and also 'a way to
avoid the rather messy psychic and social entanglement' involved in studying specific cases53.
Similarly, Dominick LaCapra objects to the idea of constitutive lack because specific 'losses
cannot be adequately addressed when they are enveloped in an overly generalised
discourse of absence... Conversely, absence at a "foundational" level cannot simply be derived
from particular historical losses'54. Attacking 'the long story of conflating absence with loss that
becomes constitutive instead of historical'55, he accuses several theorists of eliding the
difference between absence and loss, with 'confusing and dubious results', including a 'tendency
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to avoid addressing historical problems, including losses, in sufficiently specific terms', and a
tendency to 'enshroud, perhaps even to etherealise, them in a generalised discourse of
absence'56. Daniel Bensaid draws out the political consequences of the projection of
absolutes into politics. 'The fetishism of the absolute event involves... a suppression of
historical intelligibility, necessary to its depoliticization'. The space from which politics is
evacuated 'becomes... a suitable place for abstractions, delusions and hypostases'. Instead of
actual social forces, there are 'shadows and spectres'57. The operation of the logic of
projection is predictable. According to Lacanians, there is a basic structure (sometimes called a
'ground' or 'matrix') from which all social phenomena arise, and this structure, which remains
unchanged in all eventualities, is the reference-point from which particular cases are viewed. The
"fit" between theory and evidence is constructed monologically by the reduction of the latter to
the former, or by selectivity in inclusion and reading of examples. At its simplest, the Lacanian
myth functions by a short-circuit between a particular instance and statements containing words
such as "all", "always", "never", "necessity" and so on. A contingent example or a generic
reference to "experience" is used, misleadingly, to found a claim with supposed universal validity.
For instance, Stavrakakis uses the fact that existing belief-systems are based on exclusions as a
basis to claim that all belief-systems are necessarily based on exclusions58, and claims that
particular traumas express an 'ultimate impossibility'59. Similarly, Laclau and Mouffe use the fact
that a particular antagonism can disrupt a particular fixed identity to claim that the social as
such is penetrated and constituted by antagonism as such60. Phenomena are often analysed as
outgrowths of something exterior to the situation in question. For instance, Zizek's concept of the
"social symptom" depends on a reduction of the acts of one particular series of people (the
"socially excluded", "fundamentalists", Serbian paramilitaries, etc.) to a psychological function in
the psyche of a different group (westerners). The "real" is a supposedly self-identical principle
which is used to reduce any and all qualitative differences between situations to a relation of
formal equivalence. This shows how mythical characteristics can be projected from the outside,
although it also raises different problems: the under-conceptualization of the relationship
between individual psyches and collective phenomena in Lacanian theory, and a related
tendency for psychological concepts to acquire an ersatz agency similar to that of a Marxian
fetish. "The Real" or "antagonism" occurs in phrases which have it doing or causing something.
As Barthes shows, myth offers the psychological benefits of empiricism without the
epistemological costs. Tautology, for instance, is 'a minor ethical salvation, the satisfaction of
having militated in favour of a truth... without having to assume the risks which any somewhat
positive search for truth inevitably involves'61. It dispenses with the need to have ideas, while
treating this release as a stern morality. Tautology is a rationality which simultaneously denies
itself, in which 'the accidental failure of language is magically identified with what one decides is
a natural resistance of the object'62. This passage could almost have been written with the
"Lacanian Real" in mind. The characteristic of the Real is precisely that one can invoke it without
defining it (since it is "beyond symbolization"), and that the accidental failure of language,
or indeed a contingent failure in social praxis, is identified with an ontological
resistance to symbolization projected into Being itself. For instance, Zizek's classification
of the Nation as a Thing rests on the claim that 'the only way we can determine it is by... empty
tautology', and that it is a 'semantic void'63. Similarly, he claims that 'the tautological gesture of
the Master-Signifier', an empty performative which retroactively turns presuppositions into
conclusions, is necessary, and also that tautology is the only way historical change can occur64.
He even declares constitutive lack (in this case, termed the "death drive") to be a tautology65.
Lacanian references to "the Real" or "antagonism" as the cause of a contingent failure are
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reminiscent of Robert Teflon's definition of God: 'an explanation which means "I have no
explanation"'66. An "ethics of the Real" is a minor ethical salvation which says very little in
positive terms, but which can pose in macho terms as a "hard" acceptance of terrifying realities.
It authorizes truth-claims - in Laclau's language, a 'reality' which is 'before our eyes67', or in
Newman's, a 'harsh reality' hidden beneath a protective veil68 - without the attendant risks.
Some Lacanian theorists also show indications of a commitment based on the particular kind of
"euphoric" enjoyment Barthes associates with myths. Laclau in particular emphasizes his belief
in the 'exhilarating' significance of the present69, hinting that he is committed to euphoric
investments generated through the repetition of the same.
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2ac falsifiability/not science

Psychoanalysis is not verifiable continual contradictions and no base
criteria
Tuck, 2014, B.S. from University of Michigan, (Andrew, Why Did American Psychiatry Abandon
Psychoanalysis?, http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/handle/2027.42/107788/antuck.pdf?
sequence=1)
To say that psychoanalysis has grown stagnant as a scientific field may at first seem a sweeping
and completely unwarranted claim. After all, in terms of producing new branches of thought,
psychoanalytic theory has undoubtedly proven an expansive and fruitful domain; to argue that
psychoanalytic progress suddenly stopped after Freud would require answering to object
relations theory, ego psychology, self psychology, and Lacanian psychoanalysis, to name but a
few. Furthermore, rather than dying with Freud in 1939, psychoanalysis produced these subfields
through a variety of different thinkersthe role of Melanie Klein, Anna Freud, Heinz Kohut, and
Jacques Lacan in their respective theories above seem to demonstrate that psychoanalysis was
not a one-man show after all. In fact, it was during the decades immediately following Freuds
death that dynamic psychiatry was at the peak of its influence in the United States. 11,12 Given
the proliferation of new models and theories of psychoanalytic thought under an equally diverse
group of psychoanalysts, on what grounds could the argument that psychoanalysis failed to
produce visible and useful knowledge possibly possess any merit? The answer is in the question:
it was precisely the sheer amount and diversity of psychoanalytic subfields that delegitimized
psychoanalysis as a whole: the presence of such diversity of opinion within the same field
undermined the authority of any one subfield. Rather than adding to a collective fund of
psychoanalytic knowledge, each of these different subfields took a different approach to
psychoanalytic theory and practice. Former American Psychiatric Association president Alan
Stone said: Today, at least in my opinion, and I am not entirely alone in thinking this, neither
Anna Freud's Ego Psychology nor Melanie Klein's Object Relations Theory seem like systematic
advances on Freud's ideas. Rather they seem like divergent schools of thought, no closer to
Freud than Karen Horney who rebelled against Freudian orthodoxy. 13 The frequent emergence of
these competing divergent schools of thought and their dissenting followers, then, made any
developments in psychoanalysis seem to other scientists less like legitimate scientific discoveries
and more like competing hypotheses. In contrast with more established fields like biology,
innovations in psychoanalysis often seemed to contradict earlier psychoanalytic ideas as well as
one another, frequently forming branches and sub-branches without regard to maintaining any
sort of continuity or internal consistency in psychoanalysis as a whole. 14,15 In fact, many of
these developments were reactionary in nature, responding to other trends in psychoanalysis
rather than to new clinical data. This is the case of Heinz Kohuts development of self
psychology, which was a reaction against the subfields of ego psychology and classical drive
theory. The revival of American interest in the work of Melanie Klein in the second half of the
twentieth century has also been described as a reaction against ego psychology. 16 Furthermore,
never did one of these new theories thoroughly abrogate and replace a previous one in the way
that, for example, Einsteins theory of general relativity transformed Newtonian physics. This is
not to say that a new idea in psychoanalysis would not have been met with resistance upon its
introduction; however, it soon proved that psychoanalysis on the whole lacked the tools that
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other disciplines had to debunk or prove new theories. By what criteria could psychoanalysts
reject or accept a new hypothesis? In physics, a new model was expected to be compatible with
currently available data, as well as able to make predictions to be confirmed by observation17;
similarly, a new pharmaceutical drug was expected to prove itself by beating a control in a
double-blind trial. But such criteria, even if psychoanalysts wanted to use them, were not as
conveniently applied to unconscious phenomena proposed by psychoanalysis. Even the
gathering of data from clinical psychotherapy was typically unable to resolve the conflict
between two competing subfields; problematically, any clinical data that could potentially prove
the efficacy of one psychoanalytic school could be interpreted to support others as well. 18 In an
article for Psychoanalytic Psychology, psychologist Robert Holt, even as he argued for the validity
of psychoanalysis as a testable scientific theory,19 admitted the difficulty of producing data
that could settle disputes between psychoanalytic and non-psychoanalytic theories, let alone
between schools within psychoanalysis:
Its junk science that doesnt even work clinically

Ellis 2, PhD in psychology, has written books on the harmfulness of psychoanalysis, (Albert,
revised in 2002, Chapter 5: Psychoanalysis in Theory and Practice: Is Psychoanalysis Harmful
from the book Psychiatric Opinion,
http://studysites.sagepub.com/personalitytheoriesstudy/05/resources2.htm)//kap
Many articles and books have been written which purport to show that psychoanalysis is an
ineffective form of psychotherapy. Behavior therapists, existentialists, physical scientists, rational philosophers, Marxists,
and many other kinds of thinkers have held that psychoanalytic therapy rests on unverified
assumptions and that it is largely a waste of tim e. Relatively few critics, however, have objectively
pointed out some of the actual harm that may occur if an individual enters classical
psychoanalysis or even undergoes intensive psychoanalytic psychotherapy. To give and to document all
the main reasons why virtually any form of truly psychoanalytic therapy is frequently injurious to clients would take a sizable book;
and someday I may write it. For the present,
let me briefly and inadequately outline some ways in which

analysis does more harm than good. SIDETRACKING Probably the greatest harm that psychoanalysis
does is its tendency to sidetrack clients from what they had better do to improve and to give
them a good excuse not to work hard at helping themselves. What disturbed people preferably should do is
fairly simple (although it is not at all easy); namely, to understand precisely what are the self-defeating irrational ideas they firmly
believe and to vigorously contradict them, both verbally and actively. Thus one of the main senseless notions they usually hold is,
Unless I am remarkably competent and popular, and unless I am superior to others, I am rather worthless as an individual.
They
can strongly contradict this philosophy by asking themselves, Why am I no good just because many of my
performances are poor? Where is the evidence that I cannot accept myself if others do not like me? How is my self-acceptance really
they can actively work against their self-defeating attitudes by

performing, even when they may not do very well; by risking social disapproval when they want
to achieve a desired goal; and by experimenting with potentially enjoyable pursuits in spite of
the possibilities of failure and rejection. Psychoanalysis sidetracks health-seeking individuals
verbally by encouraging them to concentrate on innumerable irrelevant events and ideas : such as
dependent on external criteria? And
what happened during their early years, how they came to have an Oedipus complex, the pernicious influence of their unloving
parents, what are the meanings of their dreams, how all-important are their relations with the analyst, how much they now
unconsciously hate their mates, etc. These may all be interesting pieces of information about clients. But they not only do not reveal,
they often seriously obscure, their basic irrational philosophies that originally caused, and that still instigate, their dysfunctional
feelings and behaviors. Being mainly diagnostic and psychodynamic, analysis is practically allergic to philosophy, and therefore often
never gets around to the basic ideological assumptions and value systems with which humans largely create their symptoms. To
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psychoanalysis is essentially a talky, passive, insight-seeking process which

encourages clients mainly to lie on their spine or sit on their behinds in order to get better . Sensible
make matters much worse,
unorthodox analysts frequently supplement this passive procedure by giving advice, directing the clients to do something, helping
them change their environment, etc.; but they do so against psychoanalytic theory, which stoutly insists that they do otherwise.
Meanwhile, the poor analysands, who probably have remained disturbed for most of their lives largely because they will not get
off their asses and take risk after risk, are firmly encouraged, by the analytic procedure and by the non-directive behavior of the
have the excuse that they are actively trying

to help themselves by being analyzed; but this , of course, is a delusion if anything like classical procedures are
being followed; and they consequently tend to become more passive , and possibly even more disturbed, than
analyst, to continue their avoidant behavior. They now, moreover,
before. DEPENDENCY Most clients are overly dependent individuals who are afraid to think and act for themselves and to risk being
criticized for making mistakes. Psychoanalysis is usually a process that greatly fosters dependency . The
sessions are often several times a week; they continue for a period of years; the analyst frequently forbids the clients to make any
the
clients are constantly brainwashed into accepting analytic interpretations, even when they seem
to have a far-fetched relationship to the facts of their lives ; and in analytic group therapy, a family-like setting is
major changes in their life during treatment a positive transference between the analyst and analysand is usually encouraged;
often deliberately fostered and maintained. While many forms of therapy also abet the clients being dependent on the therapist,
classical analysis is surely one of the worst, and psychoanalytically-oriented psychotherapy one of the second-worst modes, in this
respect. Several activity-directed forms of therapy, on the other hand such as assertivenesstraining therapy, rational emotive
behavior therapy, and structured therapy urge clients, as soon as feasible, into independent action and teach them how to t hink
clearly for themselves. EMPHASIS ON FEELINGS Because it heavily emphasizes free association, dream analysis, and the involvement
psychoanalysis inevitably puts a

premium on the expression of feelings rather than the changing of these feelings and the self defeating philosophies behind them. A good deal of the improvement in analytic therapy seems to come from clients
of the client and therapist in transference and counter-transference relations,
feeling better, as a result of catharsis and abreaction, and because they believe that the analyst really understands and likes them.
This tendency of clients to feel better, however, frequently sabotages their potentiality to get
better. Thus, the analysand who is terribly depressed about his being refused a job and who gets
these feelings off his chest in an individual or a group session will often come away relieved, and feel that at least his
analyst (or the group) heard him out, that someone really cares for him, and that maybe hes not such a worthless slob after all.
Unfortunately, in getting himself to feel good, he forgets to inquire about the self-defeating beliefs he told himself that maintain his
depression: namely, If this employer who interviewed me today doesnt like me, probably no employer will; and if I cant get a very
The expressive,
cathartic-abreactive method that is such a common part of analysis doesnt encourage this client
to stop and think about his philosophic premises; instead, it enables him to feel good at
least momentarily in spite of the fact that he strongly retains these same premises, and in
spite of the fact that he will almost certainly depress himself, because of his holding them, again
and again. In the expression of hostility that psychoanalysis encourages, the situation is even worse. Starting with the
good job like this one, that proves that Im incompetent and that I dont really deserve anything good in life.
assumption that it is bad for the client to feel hostile and to hold in her hostile feelings which is a fairly sensible assumption, since
there is empirical evidence to support it psychoanalysts usually derive from this view another, and rather false, assumption: that
the expression of hostile feelings will release and cure basic hostility. Nothing of the sort is probably true; in fact, just the opposite
frequently happens. The individual who, in analytic sessions, is encouraged to express her hatred for her mother, husband, or boss
may well end up by becoming still more hostile, acting in an overtly nasty fashion to this other person, engendering return hostility,
Expression of hostility, moreover, is one of the best psychological copouts. By convincing herself that other people are awful and that they deserve to be hated, the client can easily ignore her own
and then becoming still more irate.
maladaptive behavior and self-loathing and can nicely avoid doing anything to look into her own heart and to change her irrational
thinking and her dysfunctional feelings and acts. One of the main functions of an effective therapist, moreover, is to help the client
minimize or eliminate her hostility (while keeping her dislike of unfortunate events and nasty people, so that she can do something to
solve her problems connected with them). Psychoanalysis, because it falsely believes that present hostility stems from past
occurrences (rather than largely from the individuals philosophic attitude toward and consequent interpretations about those
occurrences), has almost no method of getting at the main sources of hatred and eradicating them. By failing to show the client how
to change her anger-creating views and by encouraging her to become more hostile in many instances, it tends to harm probably the
majority of analytic clients (or should we say victims?). BOLSTERS CONFORMISM The main reasons why many human beings feel
sufficiently disturbed to come for therapy are their misleading beliefs that they need the love and approval of others, that they cant
possibly be happy at all when they are alone, and that unless they are successful they are no damned good. Because
psychoanalysis is essentially non-philosophic, and because it does not show clients how to
distinguish clearly between their wanting and their needing to be approved and successful , most
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analysands wind up, at best, by becoming better adapted to the popularity-and achievement-demanding culture in which they live
rather than becoming persons in their own right who give themselves permission to think and to enjoy themselves in unconforming
ways. Psychoanalysis basically teaches the client, Since your parents were overly-critical and therefore made you hate yourself, and
since you are able to see that I, your analyst, uncritically accepts you in spite of your poor behavior, you can now accept yourself.
And also: Since you have been achieving on a low level because you were afraid to compete with your father or your brother, and I
have helped you gain insight into this reason for your doing poorly, you can now compete successfully with practically anyone, and
make the million dollars you always wanted to make. What psychoanalysis fails to teach the individual is: You can
always unqualifiedly accept yourself even if I, your analyst, do not particularly like you, because your value to yourself rests on your
existence, on your being, and not on how much anyone approves you. And: There are several reasons why succeeding at vocational
or avocational activities is usually advantageous; but you dont have to be outstanding, ultrasuccessful, or noble in order to accept
yourself. Because analysis is largely concerned with historical events in peoples lives rather than their
ideological reactions to these events; because it encourages passivity and dependency; because it over-emphasizes the personal
relationship between the analyst and analysand for these and other reasons it often encourages clients to be more successful
conformers rather than evergrowing, courageously experimenting, relatively culture-free persons. The analyst himself, rigidly-bound
as he often is by the orthodox rules of the therapeutic game he is playing, and selfcondemned by following these rules to be a nonassertive, undaring individual himself, tends to set a bad example for the client and to encourage her or him to be a reactor rather
than an actor in the drama that we call life. STRENGTHENS IRRATIONALITY Clients basic problems often stem from assuming
irrational premises and making illogical deductions from these premises. If they are to be helped with their basic disturbance, they
had better learn to question their assumptions and think more logically and discriminate more clearly about the various things that
happen to them and the attitudes they take toward these happenings. In particular, theyd better realize that their preferences or
desires are not truly needs or demands and that just because it would be better if something occurred, this is no reason why it
absolutelyshould, ought, or must occur. Instead of helping clients with this kind of realistic and logical analysis,
psychoanalysis
provides them with many unverified premises and irrationalities of its own . It usually insists that they
must be disturbed because of past events in their lives, that they need to be loved and have to become angry when thwarted, that
they must have years of intensive analysis in order to change significantly, that they must get into and finally work through an
intense transference relationship with their analyst, etc. All these assumptions as is the case with most psychoanalytic hypotheses
are either dubious or false; and analysands are given additional irrationalities to cope with over and above their handicapping
crooked thinking with which they come to therapy. In innumerable instances, they become so obsessed with their analytic nonsense
that psychoanalysis becomes their religious creed and their be-all and end-all for existing; and though it may somewhat divert them
from the nonsense with which they first came to therapy, it does not really eliminate it but at best covers it up with this new
Rather than becoming less suggestible and more of a critical

thinker through analysis, they frequently become worse in these respects. ABSORBS AND SABOTAGES
psychoanalytic mode of positive thinking.
HEALTH POTENTIALS When clients come for psychoanalysis, they are usually reasonably young and have considerable potential for
achieving mental health, even though they are now disturbed. Psychoanalysis, particularly in its classical modes, is such a longwinded, time-consuming, expensive process that it often takes many of the best years of clients lives and prevents them from using
these years productively. To make matters much worse, analytic therapy leads in most instances to such abysmally poor results that
analysands are often highly discouraged, are convinced that practically all the time and money they spent for analysis is wasted, that
there is no possibility of their ever changing and that theyd better avoid all other types of psychotherapy for the rest of their lives
and adjust themselves, as best they may, to living with their disturbances. An untold number of ex-analysands have become utterly
disillusioned with all psychological treatment because they wrongly believe that psychoanalysis is psychotherapy, and that if they
received such poor results from being analyzed nothing else could possible work for them. If the facts in this regard could ever be
known, it is likely to be found that analysis harms more people in this way than in any of the other many ways in which it is
deleterious. The number of people in the United States alone who feel that they cannot afford any more therapy because they
fruitlessly spent many thousands of dollars in psychoanalysis is probably considerable. WRONG THERAPEUTIC GOALS The two main
functions of psychotherapy, when it is sanely done, are: (1) to show clients how they can significantly change their disordered
thinking, emoting, and behaving and (2) to help them, once they are no longer severely disturbed, to lead a more creative, fulfilling,
growing existence. Instead of these two goals, psychoanalysis largely follows a third one: to help people understand or gain insight
into themselves and particularly to understand the history of their disturbances. Humans in contradistinction to the analytic
assumptions do not usually modify their basic thoughts and behaviors by insight into their past, by relating to a therapist, or even
by understanding their present irrational assumptions and conflicting value systems. They change mainly by work and efort. They
consequently had better be helped to use their insights which usually means, to concretely understand what they are believing and
assuming right now, in the present, and to actively challenge and question these self-defeating beliefs and assumptions until they
finally change them. They also had better be helped to act, to experiment, to accept discomforts, and to force themselves to do many
things of which they are irrationally afraid, so that their actions effectively depropagandize them to give up their dysfunctional beliefs.
Psychoanalytic therapy, instead of devoting much time to encouraging and teaching clients to dispute and act against their
self-defeating thoughts, feelings, and behaviors, takes them up the garden path into all kinds of irrelevant
(though sometimes accurate) in-sights, which gives them a lovely excuse to cop Out from doing the work, the practice, the effort,
the self-deprivation by which alone they are likely truly to change their basic self-sabotaging philosophies of life. Even if it were a
good method of psychological analysis (which it actually is not), it is an execrable method of synthesis. It does not notably help
people make themselves whole again; and it particularly does not show them how to live more fulfillingly when they have, to some
degree, stopped needlessly upsetting themselves. Because it implicitly and explicitly encourages people to remain pretty much the
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way they are, though perhaps to get a better understanding of themselves (and often to construct better defenses so that they can
live more efficiently with their irrational assumptions about themselves and others), it frequently does more harm, by stopping them
from really making a concerted attack on their fundamental disturbances, than the good that well might come to them if they
received a non-analytic form of psychotherapy or even if they resolutely tried to help themselves by reading, talking to others, and by
Psychoanalysis in general and classical analysis in particular are

mistaken in their assumptions about why human beings become emotionally disturbed and what
can and should be done to help them become less anxious and hostile. Consequently, analytic therapy
largely wastes considerable time teaching clients often-mistaken theories about themselves and
others. Although these theories are frequently highly interesting and diverting, they at best may help the client to feel better rather
doing some hard thinking. CONCLUSION
than to get better. The one thing that analysis usually insures is that analysands will not understand the philosophic core of their
disturbance-creating tendencies and consequently will not work and practice, in both a verbal-theoretical and active-motor way, to
change their basic assumptions about themselves and the world and thereby ameliorate their symptoms and make themselves less
disturbable. Although ostensibly an intensive and ultra-depth-centered form of psychotherapy,
analysis is actually an
exceptionally superficial, palliative form of treatment . Because it deludes clients that they are truly getting better by
following its rules and because it dissuades them from doing the difficult reorganizing of their underlying philosophical assumptions,
psychoanalysis usually (though, of course, not always) does more harm than good and is
contraindicated in the majority of instances in which it is actually used.
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2ac death drive

Death drive is a reductive, dogmatic theory that doesnt explain
behavior their assertions reify violence
Carel 06 Havi Carel is a Senior Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of the West of England. (Life and Death in Freud and Heidegger)
The notion of the death drive is on the one hand too wide, explaining all types of aggression as well as
the putative urge towards complete rest. This leads the notion to be economically incoherent , as
will be discussed in the next section. But a prior point must be examined: are all types of aggression the same ? Freud suggests a
positive answer, but as a psychological taxonomy this approach seems to erase important differences . For example, if
both sadism and masochism stem from the same aggressive source, should they be classified as
belonging to the same group? Should they be clinically approached in a similar fashion ? The answer to
both these questions seems to be no. The problems and symptoms characterising sadism are very different from the ones characterising masochism,
as is their treatment. Another example, group aggression and individual aggression: should we attempt to
describe or treat the two as belonging to the same cluster ? Again, the answer seems to be negative. As to the
second point, one could justifiably ask: what does the death drive mean? Because it is so general, the notion of the death
drive is vague. The death drive cannot explain a given situation because it itself becomes
meaningful only as a collection of situations . On Freud's account, any behaviour meriting the adjective
'aggressive' arises from the death drive. If we take a certain set of aggressive behaviours, say, sadistic ones, the death drive
would come to signify this set. If we take another set of masochistic behaviours, the death drive would mean this set. As it stands, the
significance of the notion seems entirely dependent on the observed phenomenon . If Freud were
never to meet any masochists, would his notion of the death drive exclude masochism ? Any science
relying on observation and empirical data relics on this data and should be willing, in principle, to modify and update its concepts in accordance with new
empirical observations. The opening paragraph of Instincts and Their Vicissitudes describes this process. We have often heard it maintained that
sciences should be built up on clear and sharply defined basic concepts. In actual fact no science, not even the most exact, begins with such definitions.
The true beginning of scientific activity consists rather in describing phenomena and then in proceeding to group, classify and correlate them. Even at
the stage of description it is not possible to avoid applying certain abstract ideas to the material in hand, ideas derived from somewhere or other but
certainly not from the new observations alone [...]. They must at first necessarily possess some degree of indefiniteness; there can be no question of any
clear delimitation of their content. So long as they remain in this condition, we come to an understanding about their meaning by making repeated
references to the material of observation from which they appear to have been derived, but upon which, in fact, they have been imposed <SK 14:1U;GW
There is no
initial restriction on the type of behaviour that could be classified as aggressive or as lowering
tension. Hence we find sadism and masochism, passive-aggressive and substance-induced
aggression, aggression displayed in group situation and aggressive fantasy, all tied to the death
drive as their source. By analogy, any behaviour that leads to discharge of energy or lowering of
tension would be in accordance with the Nirvana principle . One way of responding to this issue is by applying the term
10:210). This seems to be a sophisticated, fruitfully flexible approach. But in the case of the death drive, it seems to be too flexible.
'aggression* purely descriptively. Karli, for example, proposes the following definition: aggression means, "threatening or striking at the physical or
psychic integrity of another living being" (Karli, 1991, p. 10). He sees the danger in the shift from using aggression descriptively to attributing to it an
When accorded a causal role, aggression is reified and becomes a natural

entity, a danger that can be avoided by using the term strictly descriptively. This suggestion makes a lot of sense, but it would be unacceptable for
Freud. For he is proposing a metaphysical view, which cannot be taken to be purely descriptive, because it is
embedded in a physicalist view of the drives as elements connecting body and psyche, and is
meant to have an explanatory and causal role in the explanation of behaviour . Although Freud would reject
explanatory and causal role.
the purely descriptive use of the concept of aggression, this suggestion will be useful when we discuss the reconstruction of the death drive. As to the
third point, it seems that the explanatory value of the death drive is not satisfactory . Because of the two problems set
out above - the excessive promiscuity of the notion of aggression and the fact that it irons significant differences between the various phenomena its
The concept as presented by Freud does allow too much in and lumps together behaviours and
tendencies whose differences are significant. In this sense, those rejecting the death drive as an
unhelpful speculation are justified in their criticism.
explanatory value is limited
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1ar theory wrong

No predictive value the fact it cant be consistently replicated robs it of
explanatory potential
Sadovnikov 7 professor of philosophy at York University (Slava, Escape from Reason: Labels
as Arguments and Theories, Dialogue, September 2007,
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0012217300002249 //DBI
The way McLaughlin shows the rosy prospects of psychoanalytical social theory boils down to
this: there are people who labour at it. He reports on Neil Smelsers lifelong elaborations of
psychoanalytical sociology, which prescribed the use of Freudian theories. Then he presents a
powerful psychoanalytical theory of creativity of Michael Farrell, commenting on how the
theorist usefully utilizes psychoanalytic insights, though McLaughlin does not specify them. He
correctly expects that I might not view his examples as scientific. Their problems begin well
before that. First, due to their informative emptiness, or tautological character, all they amount
to is rewordings of everyday assumptions. Second, due to their vagueness these accounts
are compatible with any outcomes; in other words, they lack explanatory and predictive
power. The proposed ideas are too inarticulate to subject to intersubjective criticism ,
and to call them empirical or scientific theories would be, no matter how comforting, a gross
misuse of words.
On the constructive side, a psychoanalytic theorist may be challenged to unambiguously
formulate her suppositions and specify conditions of their disproof, to leave out what we already
well know and smooth out internal inconsistencies, and revise the theories in view of easily
available counter-examples and competing accounts. Only after having done this can one
present candidate theories to public criticism and thus make them part of science, and fruitfully
discuss their further refinements. Another suggestion is not to label them powerful theories,
classics, or anything else before their real scrutiny begins.
That criticism and disagreement are indispensable for science is not a Popperian orthodoxy,
although Popper does champion this idea; it is the pivot of the tradition (which we owe to the
Greeks) which identifies rationalism with criticism. 4 McLaughlin ostensibly bows to the critical
tradition but does not put it to use. Instead of critical evaluation of the theories in question he
writes of compelling case, powerful analytic model, and useful conceptual tool.
On the methodological side of the issue, we should inquire into the mode of thinking common to
Fromm and all adherents of confirmationism. The trick consists in mere replacement of familiar
words with new, more peculiar ones; customary expressions are substituted by instrumental
intimacy, collaborative circles, and idealization of a self-object. Since the new, funnier, and
pseudo-theoretical tag does the job of naming just as well, it shows how things work. The new
labels in the cases criticized here do not add anything to our knowledge; nor do they explain. We
have seen Fromm routinely abuse this technique. The vacuity of Fromms explanations by
character type was the central point in my analysis of Escape, yet McLaughlin conveniently
ignores it and, like Fromm, uses the method of labelling as somehow supporting his cause.
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The widely popular practice of mistaking new labels for explanations has been exposed by many
methodologists in the history of philosophy, but probably the most famous example of such
critique comes from Moliere. In the now often-quoted passage, his character delivers a vacuous
explanation of opiums property to induce sleep by renaming the property with an offhand
Latinism, virtus dormitiva. The satire acutely points not only at the impostor doctors hiding his
lack of knowledge behind foreign words, but also at the emptiness of his alleged explanation.
(Pseudo-theoretical literature is boring precisely because of its dormitive virtue, its shuffling of
labels without rewarding inquiring minds.)
Let me review notable criticisms of this approach in the twentieth century by Hempel, Homans,
and Weber leaving aside their forerunners. This problem was discussed in the famous debate
between William Dray and Carl Hempel. Dray argues, contra the nomological account of
explanation, that historians and social scientists often try to answer the question, What is this
phenomenon? by giving an explanation-by-concept (Dray 1959, p. 403). A series of events
may be better understood if we call it a social revolution; or the appropriate tag may be found
in the expressions reform, collaboration, class struggle, progress, etc.; or, to take
Fromms suggestions, we may call familiar motives and actions sadomasochistic, and any
political choice save the Marxist escape from freedom.
Hempel agrees with Dray that such concepts may be explanatory, but they are so only if the
chosen labels or classificatory tags refer to some uniformities, or are based on nomic analogies.
In other words, our new label has explanatory force if it states or implies some established
regularity (Hempel 1970, pp. 453-57). For example, you travel to a foreign country and, strolling
along the street, see a boisterous crowd. Your guide may explain the crowd with one of several
terms: that it is the local soccer teams fans celebrating its victory, or it is a local religious
festival, or a teachers strike, etc. The labels applied herecelebration, festival, strike have
explanatory value, because we know that things they refer to usually manifest themselves in
noisy or unruly mass gatherings.
If, on the other hand, by way of explaining the boisterous crowd the guide had invoked some
hidden social or psychological forces, or used expressions such as embodiment, mode of
production, de-centring, simulacra, otherness, etc., its causes would remain obscure.
If she had referred to psychoanalytic character types (say, Fromms authoritarian, anal, or
necrophiliac types), the explanation would not make much sense either. Nothing prevents us
nevertheless from unconditionally attaching all these labels to any event. The mistake
McLaughlin and confirmationists persistently make is in thinking that labelling social phenomena
alone does theoretical and explanatory work.5 George Homans observed the prevalence of this
trick some decades ago:
Much modern sociological theory seems to us to possess every virtue except that of
explaining anything. . . . The theorist shoves various aspects of behavior into his
pigeonholes, cries Ah-ha! and leaves it at that. Like magicians in all times and places,
the theorist thinks he controls phenomena if he is able to give them names,
particularly names of his own invention. (1974, pp. 10-11)
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Psychoanalysis is not inductive or empirical its more religious than

scientific.
Holowchak 12 professor philosophy Rider University (M. Andrew, When Freud (Almost)
Met Chaplin: The Science behind Freud's Especially Simple, Transparent Case", Perspectives on
Science, MIT Press Journals, Spring 2012, Vol. 20, No. 1, Pages 44-74, Project Muse)//RZ
Elsewhere, I have addressed (Holowchak, forthcoming) the difficulties of certainty in analytic therapy, both from the perspective of individual constructions a therapist makes to assure him that each construction is
correct and that his overall etiological assessment is correct. I noted that Freud made special use of a jigsaw-puzzle analogy and disclosed three needed conditions for assuring correctness of any construction and
correctness of etiological assessment: the intelligibility, fittingness, and correspondence conditions. A construction must be intelligible (i.e., meaningful), all of the elements of a construction must t together tightly
like puzzle pieces, and the construction must match the (screen) memory of the patient. The puzzle analogy, I argued, seems prima facie plausible, but on close analysis it is casuistical, because jigsaw puzzles are
unlike constructions in key respects. The conclusion at which I arriveda conclusion I believe Freud himself embraced in mature writings on clinical theory and one which does not show psychoanalytic therapy to be
nothing but boshis that there can be no such thing as certainty in analytic therapy. Yet here I wish to say more. The fittingness condition, I suspect, cannot be met with any degree of reliability. If all three
too much turns

on coherence and the problem of patients being led by suggestion in a manner that matches
the theoretical orientation of a therapistfor Freud, that being Oedipus-rootedis magnified. In short, Freuds clinical therapy
seems more top-down than bottom-up. Theory drives its data. Still, Freud consistently maintained in publications and letters that
conditions are jointly sufficient for the correctness of any construction or end-of-the-day analytic assessment, as I believe they are, then certainty is out of the question. Overall,
system-building in the manner of a philosophical or religious Weltanschauung was not his aim. For instance, in a letter to Putnam (8 July 1915), Freud intimates that he qua scientist is uninterested in any sort of
methodological synthesis of psychoanalytic material. For the time being, psycho-analysis is compatible with various Weltanschauungen, he begins humbly and concessively. But has it yet spoken its last word? For
One can only

wonder whether Freud is being deceitful or deceptive . Overall, Freuds forays into grouppsychology issues, early human history, and metapsychological speculation betray a
preoccupation with system-building. In integrating biology into psychoanalysis through
metapsychological analysis, Freud was system-building i.e., essaying to give psychoanalysis
extraordinary explanatory power and scope in the manner of Newtonian dynamics. There is one
element of system-building, characteristic of philosophical systems more than religions , that is an integral part
of science consistencya needed ingredient of a scientific theory and scientific explanation. Unlike philosophical systems, presumably built
my part I have never been concerned with any comprehensive synthesis, but invariably with certainty alone. And it is worth sacrificing everything to the latter (Freud et al. 1961).24
top-down, Freudian psychoanalysis is said to be data-driven and bottom-up. Following his commitment to Positivism and his inference of the sexual etiology of hysteria from 18 observed cases in Aetiology of
Hysteria (1896, S.E., III: 198, 220),
Freudian psychotherapy is seemingly based on eliminative induction of the Baconian/Millian
sort, which strives both to seek confirmatory evidence for a hypothesis and rule out others through disclosure of disconfirmatory evidencei.e., evidence inconsistent with competing hypotheses. John
Greenwood challenges Freuds presumed eliminative inductivism. He suggests that [Freud]

treated consistency with the empirical data as providing sufficient confirmation of
psychoanalytic theory and ignored those alternative causal hypotheses that the canons
of eliminative induction mandate. Greenwood, adding spice to Poppers condemnation, says that Freud behaved like a Popperian
nave inductivist, in that he seldom took seriously and often ignored alternative explanations. Thus, the question for Greenwood is not whether Freudian psychoanalysis, narrowly construed
as a method for treating patients, workshe thinks it is unquestionably effective if only because of the placebo effectbut whether Freudian psychoanalysis as a method for treating patients works because of
Greenwood leaves good reason to be doubtful . Greenwoods concern is Freuds clinical work, but if
psychoanalysis has a broader application, as I have argued it does, then Greenwoods suspicions
are more fully confirmed. For instance, of his notion of the killing of the primal father and general account of human prehistory, called a Just So Story by an unkind critic, Freud writes,
Freudian theory (1996, pp. 6078).
[B]ut I think it is creditable to such a hypothesis if it proves able to bring coherence and understanding into more and more new regions (1921, S.E., XVIII: 122). Execrating the sort of explanations given by
Freud must be talking about the scientific status of the killing-of-the-primal-father

hypothesis, yet he clearly is not using eliminative induction here. Moreover, saying something is
creditable is not to offer sufficient confirmation of its truth. Freud is appealing to coherence
here and nothing more. Freud is system-building. Seeing psychoanalysis rooted in clinical data ,
Freud must be arguing for veridicality by appealing to coherence through consistency with those
data. Yet we have already seen that the data are likely to be highly unreliable, so coherence with them amounts to
foofaraw. With what are we left? The Freudian psychoanalytic theoretical system seems to be standing alone and it is,
according to Freuds account of Weltanschauungen, as much of a house of cards as he says is
any philosophical or religious system, which can do nothing empirically to rule out or , at least, make
implausible other possible explanationsan important part of eliminative inductivism.
Weltanschauungen,
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Psychoanalysis is a bunk science --- its untestable, produces

contradictory analyses, and cant make predictions
Beystehner 13 --- J.D. from University of Georgia
(Kristen M, Psychoanalysis: Freud's Revolutionary Approach to

Human Personality, http://www.personalityresearch.org/papers/beystehner.html)//trepka
Storr (1981) insists, "Only
a few fundamentalist psychoanalysts of an old-fashioned kind think that Freud was a
scientist or that psychoanalysis was or could be a scientific enterprise," and that, "...to understand persons cannot
be a scientific enterprise" (p. 260). Although many psychoanalysts themselves would undoubtedly consider psychoanalysis to be a
science, many critics would disagree. Popper, by far one of psychoanalysis' most well-known critics and a strong critic of Grnbaum,
psychoanalysis' "socalled predictions are not predictions of overt behavior but of hidden psychological states. This is
why they are so untestable" (Popper, 1986, p. 254). Popper (1986) claims that only when individuals are not neurotic is it
insists that psychoanalysis cannot be considered a science because it is not falsifiable. He claims that
possible to empirically determine if prospective patients are currently neurotic (p. 254). Popper (1986) asserts that
psychoanalysis has often maintained that every individual is neurotic to some degree due to the fact
that everyone has suffered and repressed a trauma at one point or another in his or her life (p. 255). However, this concept of
ubiquitous repression is impossible to test because there is no overt behavioral method of doing
so (p. 254). Other critics claim that psychoanalysis cannot be considered a science due to its lack of
predictions. Psychoanalysts, critics maintain, state that certain childhood experiences , such as abuse or
molestation, produce certain outcomes or states of neurosis. To take this idea one step further, one should
be able to predict that if children experience abuse, for instance, they will become characterized
by certain personality traits. In addition, this concept would theoretically work in reverse. For instance, if individuals are
observed in a particular neurotic state, one should be able to predict that they had this or that childhood experience. However,
neither of these predictions can be made with any accuracy (Colby, 1960, p. 55). Additional critics insist that
psychoanalysis is not a science because of the lack of interpretive rules or regulations. Colby (1960) contends that critics of
psychoanalysis have difficulties with the idea that "there are no clear, intersubjectively shared lines of reasoning between theories
one psychoanalyst will observe one phenomenon and interpret it

one way, whereas another psychoanalyst will observe the same phenomenon and interpret it in a
completely different way that is contradictory to the first psychoanalyst's interpretation (Colby,
1960, p. 54). Colby (1960) concludes that if analysts themselves cannot concur that a certain observation is
an example of a certain theory, then the regulations that govern psychoanalytic interpretation
are undependable (p. 55). Eysenck (1986) maintains:Zizhave always taken it for granted that the obvious failure of Freudian
therapy to significantly improve on spontaneous remission or placebo treatment is the clearest proof we have of
the inadequacy of Freudian theory, closely followed by the success of alternative methods of
treatment, such as behavior therapy. (p. 236) Whereas critics, such as Popper (1986), insist that Freud's theories cannot be
and observations" (p. 54). For instance,
falsified and therefore are not scientific, Eysenck claims that because Freud's theories can be falsified, they are scientific.
Grnbaum (1986) concurs with Eysenck that Freud's theory is falsifiable and therefore scientific, but he
goes one step further and claims that Freud's theory of psychoanalysis has been proven wrong
and is simply bad science.
It ignores larger social forces

LaBier 10, PhD in psychology, psychoanalytic therapist, and Director of the Center for
Progressive Development in Washington, D.C., (Douglas, 10/28/10, Why Psychotherapists Fail To
Help People Today, https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/the-new-resilience/201010/whypsychotherapists-fail-help-people-today)//kap
Many people who enter psychotherapy today aren't helped at all. Some end up more
troubled than when they began treatment. And ironically, some therapists are examples of the kinds of
problems they're trying to treat. In this post I explain why that is and how to become a more informed consumer when
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considering psychotherapy.
The popularity of the TV show "In Treatment (link is external)" is one indicator that there's a
large, market for psychotherapy, today. Despite the decline of the more orthodox psychoanalytic treatment - the kind that Daphne
Merkin described in a recent New York Times article (link is external)about her years in treatment - people continue to seek
competent professional help for dealing with and resolving the enormous emotional challenges and conflicts that impact so many
lives in current times. Beyond healing, they want to grow their capacity for healthy relationships and successful lives. Many skilled
and competent therapists are out there. (I use term "therapist" to describe psychologists, psychiatrists and clinical social workers professionally trained and licensed practitioners.) Moreover, research shows that psychotherapy can be very effective. Either alone,
Yet so often practitioners don't help people very

much. Some struggle for years in therapy with one practitioner after another, and never seem to make any progress. Others resolve
some conflicts, but then are hit with others that hadn't been addressed. I see three reasons for this situation. One is
rooted in the kind of people therapists tend to be today. Their personal values, social
attitudes and how they relate to conventional norms and behavior contrast in several ways
with those of the "pioneers" from Freud's era. That contrast impedes effective help. Then there
are the kinds of problems that people experience. They've evolved over the decades , but especially
since 9-11 and the near-depression that began in the fall of 2008. But many therapists aren't in synch with the
impact of that shift. They fail to understand how 21st Century conditions impact
emotional lives and conflicts. Many are clueless about how life in today's world interweaves with the dysfunctions or
family conflicts that patients bring with them into their adult lives. The third reason is the therapists' vision of the
goals of treatment; what a healthy outcome or resolution of conflicts should look like, and how to
get there. Many remain stuck within an older model - helping patients better manage, cope with
or adjust to change and traumas; build resilience and restore equilibrium. But that's no longer
possible: Our new environment is one of "non-equilibrium" and unpredictability . That
or sometimes in combination with the judicious use of medication.
creates new emotional and life challenges across the board -- for intimate relationships, careers and for engaging with a changing
society - the "remix" that America is now becoming. The Psychotherapist - Past and Present
The early analysts were
pioneers, adventurous explores of uncharted terrain. They were trying to uncover how human personality and
unconscious passions evolve within people to create symptoms and dysfunctions. They courageously risked their careers when they
called attention to the impact of repressed sexuality. Aside from the accuracy of early theories about the causes of emotional
disturbance, the practitioners' aim was to reduce suffering. They wanted to help people develop more love, reason and independence
most were well-read in

literature, history and culture, more so than today's practitioners. That gave them a broad outlook and perspective on life. For
- albeit within the context of the norms of their era that they, themselves, accepted. Moreover,
example, Freud's writings are filled with references from Shakespeare, Goethe and other great works of literature, drama and
mythology. He drew on their themes, plots and character portrayals to help illuminate and understand the motives and moral
dilemmas underlying his patients' emotional problems.
Most contemporaries and followers of Freud possessed a
radical spirit. They wanted to uncover the truth beneath patient's symptoms; see beneath the surface. They shared the view that
successful treatment was based on a love of the truth; that is, emotional reality. And that it must preclude any kind of sham,
deception or illusion. Of course, Freud and his contemporaries interpreted their patients' problems in many ways that were flawed.
They made assumptions about psychological health that were part of the prevailing values and norms of post-Victorian, early-20th
Century society - a largely patriarchal culture. For example, most assumed that a normal, successful life derived from being welladjusted to those norms. Nevertheless,
their spirit of truth-seeking, rooted in broad understanding of

human culture, literature and history, has become lost. Today's practitioners tend to be
technicians, looking for the right technique that will treat the patient's symptoms. Many tend to
be cautious, often disengaged and detached people in their manner and interactions with
patients. They are largely ignorant of philosophical, religious, cultural and socio-economic
forces that shape people's psychological development, especially those in non-Western
societies. And yet, all of those forces in all parts of the globe profoundly impact how and why we learn to think and behave as we
do. Much current world conflict reflects those differences that define what we think in "normal" or "disturbed." Many therapists
today simply assume that adjusting to prevailing values and norms reflects psychological health .
Now that's desirable for those whose conflicts have disabled them from minimally successful functioning. But it misses the mark for
those whose conflicts are linked with their successful adaptation to begin with. The therapist then fails to explore their patients'
definition of "success" - how it's shaped their career and life goals, their conflicts and disappointments. Some therapists will spend
inordinate time ferreting out tiny truths about the patient's family and childhood, without figuring out which have relevance to the
They may ignore the impact of trade-offs and compromises

patients made as they created their sexual and intimate relationship patterns Overall, today's
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person's conflicts today, and which don't.
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Too often,
they uncritically accept good functioning per se, and conventional values like power-seeking, as
psychologically healthy. This blinds them from recognizing that "normal" adjustment can mask repressed feelings of selfpractitioners tend to share in, rather than critique and examine, the social norms, values and anxieties of today's world.
betrayal, self-criticism, and the desire to be freer, more alive. All of those longings can conflict with or oppose parental expectations
People's problems have

evolved. Up through World War II and into the 1950s-early 60s symptoms that were more typical of Freud's time -- hysteria or
or the pressures from social class membership. Emotional Conflicts In Today's World
specific phobias, for example - diminished. People wanted help for fitting in with the apparent paths to success and happiness and for
dealing with conflicts that interfered with or limited it. Therapy often addressed things like guilt, inhibition, the need for approval, and
Desires or longings that deviated too

much from the prevailing norms were troublesome and created conflicts, often unconscious. The
dealing with the conflicts generated by defined, rigid roles for men and women.
popular TV show "Mad Men (link is external)" is a good portrayal of conflicts of that era, especially issues of identity, longing for an
authentic self and gender roles. At the same time, the men enjoyed the surface appearance of power and control. And women chafed
against the limits imposed by gender roles, as the women's movement began to arise. The period of social upheaval of the late 60s
and 70s created more openly conscious conflict and struggle for many people. The theme, here, was seeking more freedom from
therapists were able to address these issues in helpful ways. But others
were bound by their own uncritical embrace of the very norms their patients wanted help to free
themselves from. Partly because of that disconnect, many psychotherapy patients were attracted to the
vision of personal development offered by the rising "new age" movement, although its gurus generally
oppressive relationships and social constraints. Some
lacked any depth of understanding about emotional conflicts or psychological development. Then, from the 1980s to about 2000
more men and women sought help to create more personally fulfilling, engaged relationships, and more personal meaning from their
work. The costs and limits of success (link is external) became visible in patients who wanted help to create greater work-life
"balance" while preserving their relationships and their upward climb in their careers. Dealing with the emotional fallout of the dotcom bubble burst added another dimension to these stresses. During this period of greater fulfillment-seeking, more people turned to
spiritual development as a companion to or substitute for traditional therapy, especially via older traditions like Buddhism and other
emotional conflicts spring more from the psychological impact

of our nonlinear, unpredictable, highly interconnected world . For example, financial and career uncertainties.
Eastern practices. And now, in the current era,
Changing practices in romantic/sexual relationships. Facing one's responsibilities to fellow inhabitants of the planet, and for sustaining
the planet for future generations. The psychological impact of these issues interacts with the legacy of family conflicts and their
dysfunctions that people carry with them into the adult world. It's a new universe of potential pain and confusion that people are now
struggling with.
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1ar death drive

Death drive theory has psychology wrong
Pinker 2011 (Steven [Professor of Psychology @ Harvard; two time Pulitzer finalist]; The Better
angels of our nature: why violence has declined; pp.xxv; kdf)
Many people implicitly believe in the Hydraulic Theory of Violence: that

humans harbor an inner drive toward aggression (a death instinct or thirst for blood), which
builds up inside us and must periodically be discharged. Nothing could be further from a
contemporary scientific understanding of the psychology of violence.Aggression is not a single
motive, let alone a mounting urge. It is the output of several psychological systems that differ in their
environmental triggers, their internal logic, their neurobiological basis, and their social distribution. Chapter 8 is devoted to
Five Inner Demons (chapter 8).
explaining five of them. Predatory or instrumental violence is simply violence deployed as a practical means to an end. Dominance is
the urge for authority, prestige, glory, and power, whether it takes the form of macho posturing among individuals or contests for
supremacy among racial, ethnic, religious, or national groups. Revenge fuels the moralistic urge toward retribution, punishment, and
justice. Sadism is pleasure taken in another's suffering. And ideology is a shared belief system, usually involving a vision of utopia,
that justifies unlimited violence in pursuit of unlimited good.
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1ar no scale up
Psychoanalysis cant explain international relations --- the move from
the clinic to the macro-sphere is too great --- obviously not everyone
shares the exact same fantasies and theres no mechanism to actualize
change
Boucher 2010 --- literary and psychoanalytic studies at Deakin University
(Geoff M., Zizek and Politics:

A Critical Introduction, https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=_hmrBgAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PP1&dq=%C5%BDi
%C5%BEek+and+Politics:
+An+Introduction&ots=3uqgdGUwxC&sig=MNP7oMG7JXgWMj49yz2DHRTs6BI#v=onepage&q&f=false)//trepka
Can we bring some order to this host of criticisms? It is remarkable that, for all the criticisms of Zizek's political
Romanticism, no one has argued that the ultra-extremism of Zizek's political position might reflect his
untenable attempt to shape his model for political action on the curative final moment in
clinical psychoanalysis. The differences between these two realms, listed in Figure 5.1, are nearly too
many and too great to restate - which has perhaps caused the theoretical oversight. The key thing is this. Lacan's
notion of traversing the fantasy involves the radical transformation of people's subjective
structure: a refounding of their most elementary beliefs about themselves, the world, and sexual difference. This is
undertaken in the security of the clinic, on the basis of the analysands' voluntary desire to
overcome their inhibitions, symptoms and anxieties. As a clinical and existential process, it has its own
independent importance and authenticity . The analysands, in transforming their subjective world, change the
way they regard the objective, shared social reality outside the clinic. But they do not transform
the world. The political relevance of the clinic can only be (a) as a supporting moment in
ideology critique or (b) as a fully-fledged model of politics, provided that the political subject and its social object
are ultimately identical. Option ((7), Zizek's option, rests on the idea, not only of a subject who becomes who he is only through his
(mis) recognition of the objective sociopolitical order, but whose 'traversal of the fantasy' is immediately identical with his
according to Zizek, we can analyse the institutional

embodiments of this Other using psychoanalytic categories. In Chapter 4, we saw Zi2ek's resulting elision of
the distinction between the (subjective) Ego Ideal and the (objective) Symbolic Order. This leads him to analyse our
entire culture as a single subject-object, whose perverse (or perhaps even psychotic) structure is
expressed in every manifestation of contemporary life. Zizek's decisive political-theoretic errors, one substantive
and the other methodological, are different (see Figure 5.1) The substantive problem is to equate any political change worth the
name with the total change of the subject-object that is, today, global capitalism. This is a type of change that can only
mean equating politics with violent regime change, and ultimately embracing dictatorial
govermnent, as Zizek now frankly avows (IDLC 412-19). We have seen that the ultra-political form of
Zizek's criticism of everyone else, the theoretical Left and the wider politics, is that no one is
sufficiently radical for him - even, we will discover, Chairman Mao. We now see that this is because Zizek's model of
transformation of the socio-political system or Other. I-Ience,
politics proper is modelled on a pre-critical analogy with the total transformation of a subiect's entire subjective structure, at the end
We have seen that Zizek

equates the individual fantasy with the collective identity of an entire people. The social
fantasy, he says, structures the regime's 'inherent transgressions' : at once subjects' habitual ways of living
the letter of the law, and the regime's myths of origin and of identity. If political action is modelled on the Lacanian
cure, it must involve the complete 'traversal' - in Hegel's terms, the abstract versus the determinate negation - of
of the talking cure. For what could the concrete consequences of this governing analogy be?
all these lived myths, practices and habits. Politics must involve the periodic founding of of entire new subjectobjects. Providing the
model for this set of ideas, the first iekian political subject was Schellings divided God, who gave birth to the entire Symbolic Order
can the political theorist reasonably hope or expect that

subjects will simply give up on all their inherited ways, myths and beliefs, all in one worldcreating moment? And can they be legitimately asked or expected to, on the basis of a set of
ideals whose legitimacy they will only retrospectively see, after they have acceded to the Great
before the beginning of time (IDLC 153; OB 1448). But
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Leap Forward? And if they do not for iek laments that today subjects are politically
disengaged in unprecedented ways what means can the theorist and his allies use to move them
to do so?
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1ar kills politics

Alt fails psychoanalysis cannot be the basis for political change
Sharpe, lecturer, philosophy and psychoanalytic studies, and Goucher, senior lecturer, literary and
psychoanalytic studies Deakin University, 10
(Matthew and Geoff, iek and Politics: An Introduction, p. 182 185,

Figure 1.5 included)
Can we bring some order to this host of criticisms? It is remarkable that, for all the criticisms of ieks political Romanticism, no one has argued that the
ieks political position might reflect his untenable attempt to shape his model for
political action on the curative final moment in clinical psychoanalysis. The differences between
these two realms, listed in Figure 5.1, are nearly too many and too great to restate which has perhaps caused
the theoretical oversight. The key thing is this. Lacans notion of traversing the fantasy involves the radical
transformation of peoples subjective structure: a refounding of their most elementary beliefs about
themselves, the world, and sexual difference. This is undertaken in the security of the clinic , on the basis of the analysands voluntary
ultra- extremism of
desire to overcome their inhibitions, symptoms and anxieties. As a clinical and existential process, it has its own independent importance and
authenticity.
The analysands, in transforming their subjective world, change the way they regard the objective , shared
social reality outside the clinic. But they do not transform the world. The political relevance of the clinic can
only be (a) as a supporting moment in ideology critique or (b) as a fully- fl edged model of politics, provided that the political subject and its social object
rests on the idea, not only of a subject who becomes who he is only through his (mis)
whose traversal of the fantasy is immediately identical with his
transformation of the sociopolitical system or Other. Hence, according to iek, we can analyse the institutional embodiments
are ultimately identical. Option (b), ieks option,
recognition of the objective sociopolitical order, but
of this Other using psychoanalytic categories. In Chapter 4, we saw ieks resulting elision of the distinction between the (subjective) Ego Ideal and the
(objective) Symbolic Order. This leads him to analyse our entire culture as a single subjectobject, whose
perverse (or perhaps even psychotic) structure is expressed in every manifestation of contemporary life. ieks decisive political- theoretic errors, one
The substantive problem is to equate any political

change worth the name with the total change of the subjectobject that is, today, global capitalism. This is a type of change
substantive and the other methodological, are different (see Figure 5.1)
that can only mean equating politics with violent regime change, and ultimately embracing dictatorial government, as iek now frankly avows (IDLC
the theoretical Left and the wider politics,

no one is sufficiently radical for him even, we will discover, Chairman Mao. We now see that this is because
ieks model of politics proper is modelled on a pre- critical analogy with the total transformation of a subjects
41219). We have seen that the ultra- political form of ieks criticism of everyone else,
is that
entire
subjective structure, at the end of the talking cure. For what could the concrete consequences of this governing
analogy be? We have seen that
iek equates the individual fantasy with the collective identity of an entire
people. The social fantasy, he says, structures the regimes inherent transgressions: at once subjects habitual ways of living the letter of the law,
and the regimes myths of origin and of identity. If political action is modelled on the Lacanian cure, it must involve
the complete traversal in Hegels terms, the abstract versus the determinate negation of all these lived myths, practices and
habits. Politics must involve the periodic founding of entire new subjectobjects. Providing the model for this set of ideas, the fi rst iekian political
can the
political theorist reasonably hope or expect that subjects will simply give up on all their inherited
ways, myths and beliefs, all in one worldcreating moment? And can they be legitimately asked or expected to, on the basis of a
set of ideals whose legitimacy they will only retrospectively see, after they have acceded to the Great Leap Forward? And if they do not for
iek laments that today subjects are politically disengaged in unprecedented ways what means can the theorist and his allies
use to move them to do so?
subject was Schellings divided God, who gave birth to the entire Symbolic Order before the beginning of time (IDLC 153; OB 1448). But
Psychoanalytic critique causes passivity and destroys political struggle

Paul Gordon, psychotherapist living and working in London, Race & Class , 2001, v. 42, n. 4,
p. 30-1
All the tragedies of the political project

of emancipation -- the evils of Stalinism in particular -- are seen as the inevitable product of men and women
The postmodernists' problem is that they cannot live with disappointment.
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trying to create a better society. But, rather than engage in a critical assessment of how, for instance, radical
political movements go wrong, they discard the emancipatory project and impulse itself. The postmodernists, as
Sivanandan puts it, blame modernity for having failed them: `the intellectuals and academics have fled into
discourse and deconstruction and representation -- as though to interpret the world is more important than to
change it, as though changing the interpretation is all we could do in a changing world'.58 To justify their flight from
a politics holding out the prospect of radical change through self-activity, the disappointed intellectuals find
abundant intellectual alibis for themselves in the very work they champion, including, in Cohen's case,
psychoanalysis. What Marshall Berman says of Foucault seems true also of psychoanalysis; that it offers à worldhistorical alibi' for the passivity and helplessness felt by many in the 1970s, and that it has nothing but contempt
for those naive enough to imagine that it might be possible for modern human- kind to be free. At every turn for such
theorists, as Berman argues, whether in sexuality, politics, even our imagination, we are nothing but prisoners:
there is no freedom in Foucault's world, because his language forms a seamless web, a cage far more airtight than
anything Weber ever dreamed of, into which no life can break . . . There is no point in trying to resist the oppressions
and injustices of modern life, since even our dreams of freedom only add more links to our chains; however, once we
grasp the futility of it all, at least we can relax.59 Cohen's political defeatism and his conviction in the explanatory
faith of psychoanalysis lead him to be contemptuous and dismissive of any attempt at political
solidarity or collective action. For him, `communities' are always ìmagined', which, in his view, means based on
power of his new
fantasy, while different forms of working-class organisation, from the craft fraternity to the revolutionary group, are
the idea that people might come together,

think together, analyse together and act together as rational beings is impossible. The idea of a genuine
dismissed as `fantasies of self-sufficient combination'.60 In this scenario,
community of equals becomes a pure fantasy, a `symbolic retrieval' of something that never existed in the first place:
`Community is a magical device for conjuring something apparently solidary out of the thin air of modern times, a
mechanism of re-enchantment.' As for history, it is always false, since `We are always dealing with invented
this is not only nonsense, but dangerous nonsense at that. Is history àlways false'? Did the
Judeocide happen or did it not? And did not some people even try to resist it? Did slavery exist or did it not, and did
not people resist that too and, ultimately, bring it to an end? And are communities always ìmagined'? Or, as
Sivanandan states, are they beaten out on the smithy of a people's collective struggle? Furthermore, all attempts to
legislate against ideology are bound to fail because they have to adopt `technologies of surveillance and control
identical to those used by the state'. Note here the Foucauldian language to set up the notion that all `surveillance' is
bad. But is it? No society can function without surveillance of some kind. The point, surely, is that there should be
traditions.'61 Now,
a public conversation about such moves and that those responsible for implementing them be at all times
accountable. To equate, as Cohen does, a council poster about `Stamping out racism' with Orwell's horrendous
prophecy in 1984 of a boot stamping on a human face is ludicrous and insulting. (Orwell's image was intensely
personal and destructive; the other is about the need to challenge not individuals, but a collective evil.) Cohen reveals
himself to be deeply ambivalent about punitive action against racists, as though punishment or other firm action
against them (or anyone else transgressing agreed social or legal norms) precluded ùnderstanding' or even help
through psychotherapy. It is indeed a strange kind of ànti-racism' that portrays active racists as the `victims', those
who are in need of `help'. But this is where Cohen's argument ends up. In their move from politics to the academy
postmodernists may have simply exchanged one grand narrative, historical

materialism, for another, psychoanalysis.62 For psychoanalysis is a grand narrative, par excellence. It is a theory
that seeks to account for the world and which recognises few limits on its explanatory potential. And the claimed
radicalism of psychoanalysis, in the hands of the postmodernists at least, is not a radicalism at all but a
prescription for a politics of quietism, fatalism and defeat. Those wanting to change the world, not just to interpret
and the world of `discourse', the
it, need to look elsewhere.
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at: scapegoating impact

Best data proves scapegoating is wrong --- if the aff doesnt solve, the
US will be more lenient towards other countries
Gollwitzer 4 --- University of Trier, Germany (Mario, Do Normative Transgressions Affect Punitive Judgments? An
Empirical Test of the Psychoanalytic Scapegoat Hypothesis, SagePub)//trepka
The psychoanalytic scapegoat hypothesis implies (a) that individuals who are guilty of
violating a law or norm tend to impose harsher punitive judgments on comparable wrongdoers
than nonguilty individuals and (b) that transgressors punitiveness should be amplified by the
subjectively perceived decision conflict. A new alternative hypothesis was derived from research
on blame avoidance and empathy: If individuals were really fundamentally concerned with avoiding self-ascriptions of
blame by applying defensive attributions (Shaver, 1970, 1985), then it follows that transgressors should impose more
lenient punishment on comparable offenders, especially under circumstances of similarity.
Although the blame-avoidance hypothesis directly contradicts the implications of the scapegoat
hypothesis, both effects might be present depending on situationspecific or person-specific factors. If these factors are not
DISCUSSION
controlled for, the paradoxical situation could occur that the two effects cancel each other out (Schmitt et al., 2003). Among the most
theoretically plausible of such person-specific factors is authoritarianism. This variable is expected to moderate the transgressionpunitiveness relation. In other words: The scapegoat effect is expected to occur among high authoritarians, whereas the leniency
The data presented here largely support the blameavoidance motivation account: Punitive judgment scores were higher among nontransgressors,
regarding both vignette transgressions in immoral temptation situations and actually committed
transgressions reported by participants. This effect was consistent across all six criminal case s in
effect should occur among low authoritarians.
both vignette and actual transgressions. Furthermore, compared with a baseline measure of punitive judgments, the present results
suggest that it is not a harshness bias on the side of the nontransgressors that causes this effect but rather, a mildness bias on the
side of the transgressors. Although this finding is a clear corroboration for the blame-avoidance hypothesis, one could argue (a) that
transgressors simply do not care about the norm they transgress and (b) that transgression
decision and punitiveness share a common cause, that is, the moral reprehensibility of the deed .
The first explanation implies that conflict scores do not differ between transgressors and
nontransgressors. This is, however, not the case, because conflict scores wereexcept for the moonlighter scenario
consistently higher among transgressors than among nontransgressors. The suggestion that transgressors mildness bias was simply
due to their recklessness can therefore be ruled out. The second explanation would result in the argument that the relation between
transgression decision and punitive judgments is spurious, because they can both be traced back to the same cause, that is, the
moral evaluation of the deed. The mediation effect of moral evaluation was not significant in the present analyses: The effect sizes of
transgression decisions on punitive judgments remained largely unaffected by entering moral evaluation scores as a covariate. This
finding contradicts the alternative hypothesis that moral evaluation was the common cause for transgression decisions as well as for
we tested whether the

subjectively experienced decision conflict in a dilemma situation affects punitive judgments
among transgressors. Although the size of this correlation was consistently positive in sign across the six scenarios, it
was not statistically deviant from 0. Thus, this particular finding cannot be used as an argument
for or against the scapegoat hypothesis. Taking authoritarianism as a possible moderator variable into account was a
punitive judgments. Besides investigating the main effect of transgression decision on punitiveness,
further attempt to demonstrate scapegoating effects in a subpopulation where they appear to be most likely to occur. The negative
sign of the three-way interaction regression coefficient shows that this was not the case. One might think of the possibility that this
three-way interaction did not emerge because authoritarianism and transgression decisions were confounded. This would be a
reasonable interpretation because authoritarianism implies conventionalism, which means refraining from committing something
unlawful because it is unlawful (Adorno et al., 1950). Therefore, it could be that individuals high in authoritarianism principally do not
give in to immoral temptations. Contrary to this speculation, however, transgression decisions in each of the six vignettes were
correlated only weakly with authoritarianism (.05 < r < .12, average r = .04). Thus, nontransgressors are not automatically high
the present study presents both weak and strong results. The major aim
was to test the psychoanalytic scapegoat hypothesis against an alternative hypothesis based on
a blame-avoidance motivation. Concerning the main effect of transgression on punitive judgments, the results
strongly support the blame-avoidance hypothesis. Concerning the effect of transgressors decision conflict on
punitive judgments, however, the results support neither the scapegoat nor the blame-avoidance motivation hypothesis. One
authoritarians. Taken together,
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could think of other empirical accesses to the effect of decision conflicts. For example, the subjective
quality of experienced decision conflicts in tempting situations might have trait-like qualities: Individuals might consistently differ in
the way they perceive and solve moral decision conflicts and in the amount of unease connected to these decision conflicts. These
interindividual differences could be assessed and tested as predictors for punitive judgments. Second, moral conflicts may be better
captured by assessing them on a more idiosyncratic level. Participants could be interviewed about temptation situations in which they
recall having experienced a strong decision conflict; subsequently, their punitive judgments could be assessed in an adaptively
constructed criminal case vignette that resembles this particular temptation. Finally, a possible conflict- punitiveness relation might
Because fear of an Idbreakthrough is considered the

crucial motor of scapegoating by Freud (1923/1990), trait anxiety appears to be a suitable
moderator variable. It is remarkable that a prominent theoretical account such as the psychoanalytic scapegoat
hypothesis, which is discussed among principal penological theories in standard textbooks on legal studies (e.g., Gppinger,
1997; Kaiser, 1996; Schwind, 2002), has never received the empirical attention that it might deserve.
The present study was a first attempt to test specifically derived implications of the scapegoat
hypothesis. It seems that although the process of scapegoating and its psychodynamic roots, as conceptualized in psychoanalytic
be moderated by other variables than authoritarianism.
writings, is not testable as such, its implications can be incorporated into contemporary accounts of punitiveness and retributive
justice. If these implications repeatedly fail to receive empirical backup,
reformulated, or
[khirn]
the scapegoat hypothesis should be at least
dismissed.
pg. 27

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Michigan Debate 2015-2016