South European Society and Politics

ISSN: 1360-8746 (Print) 1743-9612 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fses20

Attitudes of Greek Parliamentarians Towards

European and National Identity, Representation,
and Scope of Governance
Roula Nezi , Dimitri A. Sotiropoulos & Panayiota Toka
To cite this article: Roula Nezi , Dimitri A. Sotiropoulos & Panayiota Toka (2010) Attitudes
of Greek Parliamentarians Towards European and National Identity, Representation,
and Scope of Governance, South European Society and Politics, 15:1, 79-96, DOI:
10.1080/13608746.2010.496930
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13608746.2010.496930

Published online: 26 Jul 2010.

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South European Society and Politics

Vol. 15, No. 1, March 2010, pp. 7996

Attitudes of Greek Parliamentarians

Towards European and National
Identity, Representation, and
Scope of Governance
Roula Nezi, Dimitri A. Sotiropoulos & Panayiota Toka

This article analyses the attitudes of Greek political elites towards the European Union
(EU) and compares them with the views of public opinion. Data were collected in 2007
through personal interviews with 90 MPs and a public opinion survey (IntUne project).
The attitudes of MPs are discussed with regard to three dimensions of European
citizenship: identity, representation, and scope of governance. There are traditionalists,
formalists, and liberals among the MPs. Their trust in EU institutions and their
perceptions of EU policy areas and levels of policymaking are strongly influenced by
political ideology and party affiliation.
Keywords: Political elites; Identity; Representation; Scope of Governance; Greece; IntUne
Survey

In Greece the salience of European Union (EU) issues has oscillated between relative
indifference and feverish debates. On the one hand, there is little debate on issues that
have shaken the EU, such as Eastern Enlargement. On the other hand, when EU
decisions affect national finances (e.g. financial sanctions for violating EU legislation)
or the incomes of certain population strata (e.g. the EU-based subsidies that farmers
enjoy), heated debates follow.
In all these cases, Greek political elites have played a major role. In the late 1970s the
centre-right governing elite steered the country towards the European Community
(EC) and in the late 1990s the centre-left governing elite actively pursued the aim of
entry to the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). However, the opinions of Greek
elites on the EU have not been included in studies on Greece and the EU, which are
otherwise rich in analyses of the countrys European integration (Ioakimidis 1998;
2000; Mitsos & Mossialos 2000; Pagoulatos 2003; Dimitrakopoulos & Passas 2004;
Featherstone & Papadimitriou 2008). There is little research on post-authoritarian
ISSN 1360-8746 (print)/ISSN 1743-9612 (online) q 2010 Taylor & Francis
DOI: 10.1080/13608746.2010.496930

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R. Nezi et al.

Greek elites (Sotiropoulos & Bourikos 2002) and comparative studies of European
political elites have also been rare (Schmitt & Thomassen 1999; Katz & Wessels 1999;
Best & Cotta 2000).
The few studies of attitudes of Greek MPs have shown that, in contrast to MPs of
other countries, Greek MPs understand the European project mainly as a vehicle for
economic development (Esaiasson 1999, p. 157, table 8.1, p. 161, table 8.3). The Greek
public is very pro-European (e.g. Scheuer 1999, pp. 32 34; Norris 1999, p. 79) and
Greek MPs take pride in being European (Scheuer 1999, p. 37, table 2.2). However, the
MPs have a rather instrumentalist view of EU institutions (the EU as a milking cow).
Our research questions refer to the determinants of national and European identity
formation among Greek political elites, the extent to which elites believe EU
institutions to be representative, and whether they favour the deepening of European
integration through the adoption of additional EU common policies and the
assignment of policy-making to EU rather than national bodies. The determinants of
identity may be ascribed (e.g. being a Greek because one is born to Greek parents) or
achieved (e.g. becoming a Greek through mastering the Greek language). This
dichotomy, however, may not be fully satisfactory. Aspects of national identity actually
reflect patterns of national culture not fully represented by the distinction between
ascribed and achieved characteristics. Moreover, our data, drawing on field research in
Greece in 2007, show that the conceptual distinction between ethnic and civil
citizenship may not be adequate to capture the variation of attitudes towards
citizenship. A threefold typology may be more useful for our purposes.
First, in Greece there is traditionalism, emphasising the values of small
communities, the Greek Orthodox Church, and Greek nationalism. Second, there is
formalism, evident in the over-emphasis placed upon laws and formalities and the
legalism of Greek public life (Mouzelis 1978). There is a tendency to pay lip service to
formalities (e.g. fulfilling administrative requirements) without ensuring that the
purpose of the obeyed rule is indeed served. This attitude differs both from an
understanding of citizenship along ethnic criteria (e.g. having Greek parents) and
from civic criteria (e.g. respect for a countrys laws). What we have called formalism is
a set of attitudes located somewhere in between traditionalism and respect for law and
institutions. Third, there is liberalism, associated with the era of Enlightenment,
equality before the law and respect for the law and institutions.
In the remainder of this article, we will present our data and methods and briefly
discuss the stance of Greek parties towards the EU. Then we will discuss the responses
of MPs to questions on national and European identity and contrast their responses to
those of the sample of the Greek population included in the IntUne mass survey. (In
2007 the same questionnaire was administered to a public opinion sample of 1000
respondents.) We will analyse the MPs attachment to various levels of multi-level
governance with reference to the respondents political ideology and party affiliation.
We will discuss levels of trust of MPs in major EU institutions and the way MPs see
Greek interests being affected by the EU. Finally, we will turn to attitudes towards the

South European Society and Politics 81

deepening of European integration through the adoption of common policies and

towards the appropriate level of policy-making.

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Measuring European Identity

This research is part of the IntUne project and presents new data on Greece. Between
February and June 2007 we conducted a sample survey of Greek parliamentarians,
using the common questionnaire employed in the cross-national IntUne survey
of elites. The Greek parliament has 300 seats, and our sample consisted of 90 MPs,
selected through quota sampling. In the same time period, we also conducted 30
interviews with economic elites (business owners and managers). Owing to the
reluctance of many further members of economic elites to grant us interviews,
we encountered a quota-sampling problem. Among those eventually interviewed,
some left questions unanswered. For these reasons, our analysis does not include
economic elites.
Our sample of parliamentarians was representative in terms of gender (14 per cent
of MPs in parliament and in our sample were female) and age (74 per cent of the MPs
in parliament and in our sample were over 50 years old). In parliament, 33 per cent of
MPs were newly elected while this share was somewhat higher in our sample (40 per
cent). Our discussion refers to political elites in general (MPs and ministers), since
among the 90 parliamentarians interviewed, 32 had served at least once as minister or
junior minister.
In the Greek parliament elected in April 2004 (and dissolved in August 2007) there
were four parties, namely New Democracy (ND), the Panhellenic Socialist Movement
(PASOK), the Communist Party of Greece (KKE) and the Coalition of the Left (SYN).
Since Greeces transition to democracy (1974), ND has traditionally been a centre-right
party, while PASOK, which in past decades used to be a populist/socialist party, is
currently considered a centre-left party. The 2004 7 Greek parliament included 166
MPs of ND, 116 of PASOK, 12 of KKE and six of SYN. We obtained interviews with 43
parliamentarians of ND, 43 of PASOK, one of KKE and three of SYN. In our sample,
ND, which in 2004 had obtained the parliamentary majority (55 per cent of
parliamentary seats), and KKE are under-represented. We were officially refused
interviews by the latter party, which allowed only one of its MPs to grant us an
interview. In the top party organs of SYN, there is a majority consisting of former KKE
cadres, who oppose what they perceive to be a neo-liberal direction taken by the EU.
Even though there is also a more pro-EU minority faction within the same party, we
have not been granted enough interviews to explore intra-party variations of opinion.
Greek Parties and the EU
After almost 20 years as an associate member (since 1961), Greece gained accession to
the EC in 1981. However, at the time, Greeces membership in the EC did not enjoy
support from all political parties. It was fully supported by ND and opposed by

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R. Nezi et al.

PASOK and KKE. The small Eurocommunist party (KKE Interior) accepted the
prospect of Greeces EC membership with some reservations. Under Constantine
Karamanlis, the ND government (197481) perceived the countrys membership as
the end of a period of political isolation. Karamanlis understood Greeces EC
membership as an opportunity to stabilise the young Greek democracy and to
strengthen Greeces independence and bargaining power in relation to other countries.
He saw EC membership as a vehicle useful to accomplish the modernisation and
Westernisation of Greece. In contrast, PASOK, led by Andreas Papandreou, was
opposed to EC membership. PASOK claimed that the Mediterranean periphery, to
which Greece belonged, would become dependent on Western Europe and that the EC
would pose an obstacle to the countrys socialist transformation. After Greeces
accession to the EC (1981), the anti-EC PASOK came to power with a commitment to
renegotiate Greeces entry terms, but, upon realising the difficulties of this enterprise
and the financial benefits of membership, PASOK softened its line.
Gradually, in the late 1980s and the early 1990s, PASOK moved from an antiEuropean stance to a pro-European one (Verney 2004). This shift became evident in
1996 when Kostas Simitis, a social democrat, assumed the leadership of the party and
of the government. Under Simitis (1996 2004), Greece sought to achieve the so-called
convergence criteria in order to join the Eurozone, an aim that it finally fulfilled in
2001. Greece received generous funding, technical assistance in policy-making, and
diplomatic support in its relations with third countries.
Greeces integration into the EU gave rise to new types of political conflicts and
ideological cleavages. The old ideological conflict between right and left ran in parallel
to a new pattern of conflict between pro-European modernisers on the one hand and
traditionalists on the other, a conflict that cut cross political parties. The modernisers
wanted to accelerate domestic reforms through Europeanisation. Traditionalists
sought to contain the impact of the EU, which they understood as a force threatening
the countrys traditional cultural identity. They therefore resisted the countrys
adaptation to the logic and requirements of European integration (Diamandouros
1994; Ioakimidis 2000). Aspects of these parallel cleavages underlie patterns of
national and European identity to which we now turn.
Patterns of European and National Identity
The IntUne questionnaire included items that reflected ascribed and achieved aspects
of identity. The surveys respondents were asked to select those items which, in their
opinion, formed national and, separately, European identity. As Tables 1 and 2 show,
the ascribed aspects of identity included place of birth and nationality of the
respondents parents as well as religion, while the achieved aspects included sharing
the cultural traditions of Greece (and, in the case of European identity, European
traditions), feeling Greek (or European), mastering the language of the country (or
one European language), being a Greek citizen and respecting Greek (or, respectively,
European) laws and institutions.

South European Society and Politics 83

Table 1 Aspects of national identity: importance of different items for public opinion and
political elites (per cent of respondents)

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Very/somewhat important
To be a Christian
To share Greeces cultural
traditions
To be born in Greece
To have Greek parents
To feel Greek
To master the Greek language
To respect Greek laws and
institutions
To be a Greek citizen

Public
opinion

Political
elites

Left

Centreleft

Centreright

74.3
94.3

59.8
88.4

0
100

41.5
80.5

83.3
95.1

76.4
84.8
95.6
92.9
93.7

60.5
69.8
97.7
86.1
96.6

75
50
100
100
75

48.8
58.5
97.6
82.9
97.6

70.7
82.9
97.6
87.8
97.6

80.9

77.9

75

77.5

78.6

Note: In all the tables, the column headed left includes the one MP of the KKE and three MPs of the
SYN who were sampled in our survey; the centre-left concerns the sampled MPs of PASOK; and the
centre-right the sampled MPs of ND.

National Identity
Different aspects of Greek identity were reported as very or somewhat important by
more than 50 per cent of respondents. The vast majority of sampled MPs believe that
to feel Greek is the most important aspect of Greek identity. The vast majority of
respondents in the public opinion survey held the same belief. For our MPs, the
second most important aspect, with just one per cent difference from the first, was to
respect Greek laws and institutions. For the public opinion sample, the second most
important aspect was to share Greeces cultural traditions. Even though at both the
elite and mass levels, religion is the least important aspect of Greek national identity,
for the public opinion sample this was a much more salient aspect than for the elite
sample. This may be attributed to the fact that religion was not an important element
Table 2 Aspects of European identity: importance of different items for public opinion and
political elites (per cent of respondents)
Very/somewhat Important
To be a Christian
To share Europes cultural
traditions
To be born in Europe
To have European parents
To feel European
To master a European Language
To respect European laws and
institutions

Public
opinion

Political
elites

Left

Centreleft

Centreright

62.6
65.8

32.9
77.4

0
75

15
69.2

53.7
85.4

54.9
49.1
67.9
85.5
86.5

53.5
50.6
98.8
90.7
96.5

50
50
100
100
75

48.8
50
97.6
82.9
95.1

58.5
51.2
100
97.6
100

84

R. Nezi et al.

of identity for the MPs of PASOK and the left (left and centre-left MPs form the
majority of sampled MPs). By contrast, the vast majority of sampled MPs from ND
(83.3 per cent) reported that Christianity is an important aspect of Greek citizenship.
Centre-left and centre-right parliamentarians believed respecting laws and
institutions and feeling Greek to be the two most important determinants of national
identity. As for the left, its MPs selected above all the items of cultural traditions,
feeling Greek and mastering the language.

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European Identity
As Table 2 shows, for the public opinion sample, European identity was primarily
determined by mastering a European language and respecting European laws and
institutions. MPs also gave high marks to these two aspects, but for them, in order to
be a true European, the most important element is to feel European. The second
most important aspect was to respect European laws and institutions. In contrast with
national identity, MPs did not consider that the place of birth is a very important
criterion of European identity. Half of the MPs (51 per cent) said that having
European parents is an essential element of European citizenship, whereas almost 70
per cent of them believed that having Greek parents is a very important requisite for
being Greek. Mastering a European language and feeling European were the items
chosen by left MPs. By contrast, MPs belonging to the centre-left and centre-right
selected other items: respect for laws and institutions and feeling European.
It seems that MPs offered more or less similar answers to the questions about what
distinguishes Greek and European identity. Respecting laws and institutions and
feeling Greek and European were considered the most prominent aspects of national
and European identity, respectively. In the case of Greek national identity in particular,
other highly preferred aspects were the sharing of Greek cultural values and the
mastering of the Greek language.
Could the responses of Greek MPs be correlated with a set of implicit unobserved
variables contrasting a preference for ascribed characteristics to a preference for
achieved characteristics of identity? Table 3 shows the findings of factor analysis for
national identity and European identity. In both cases, we used the standard criterion
of retaining only those eigenvalues with scores greater than 1. Our analysis, with a
varimax rotation pattern matrix, produces three factors, shown in Table 3 for both
national and European identities. Factor loadings represent how the variables were
weighted for each factor.
Overall, the three factors explained 61.8 per cent of the total variance in national
identity. The first factor, which we have called traditionalism, explains most of the
variance and includes the belief that for someone to be Greek he or she has to be
Christian, to have Greek parents, to be born in Greece, to share Greeces cultural
traditions and to feel Greek. Two items show high loadings in this factor, i.e. to share
cultural traditions (0.77) and to have Greek parents (0.76). The second factor, which
we have labelled formalism, explains 19.71 per cent of the variance and includes two

South European Society and Politics 85

Table 3 The dimensions of national and European identity among MPs (factor analysis)
National
identity

European
identity

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Factor 1
Factor 2
Factor 3
Factor 1
Factor 2
Traditionalism Formalism Liberalism EU traditionalism EU liberalism
To be a Christian
To share Greeces/Europes
cultural traditions
To be born in Greece/Europe
To have Greek/European
parents
To feel Greek/European
To master Greek/European
language
To respect Greek/European
laws and institutions
To be a Greek citizen

0.61
0.77

0.21
0.12

0.36
2 0.03

0.56
0.39

0.34
0.43

0.55
0.76

0.34
0.21

0.14
2 0.01

0.82
0.80

0.09
0.12

0.62
0.06

2 0.27
0.83

2 0.28
0.01

0.18
0.69

0.76
20.10

2 0.01

2 0.03

0.91

2 0.02

0.88

0.17

0.75

2 0.06

Note: Factor analysis with varimax rotation pattern matrix.

items with high loadings, i.e. the ability to speak Greek (0.83) and to be a Greek citizen
(0.75). The third factor, which we have named liberalism, includes only one item,
namely that in order to be Greek one has to respect Greek laws and institutions. This
item scores very highly (0.91).
The first factor suggests that within our sample there was a considerable group of
MPs who thought about national identity in the most traditional manner. Their
opinions clustered around three ascribed characteristics, which were Christianity,
parents national origin, and place of birth, plus two achieved characteristics (to feel
Greek and to share the countrys traditions). All five items are familiar to Greeks
socialised in Greek schools, the Orthodox Church and the traditional family. These
socialisation agents have propagated ideas about Greek identity which have been
heavily nationalist (e.g. widely held opinions about the uniqueness and superiority
of Greeks).
The factor of formalism includes two formal criteria that, if fulfilled, constitute the
basis for including someone among the Greeks. The underlying assumption is that,
regardless of whether one feels Greek or shares Greek values or respects the countrys
laws, it would be sufficient to master the countrys language and to fulfil the legal
requirements for obtaining Greek citizenship in order to be considered a Greek. The
combined emergence of these two characteristics is not an odd phenomenon. As
hypothesised in the introduction of this article, it can be understood in the context of a
culture of formalism, located in-between old-fashioned traditional and modern liberal
perceptions of identity.
The final factor (liberalism) consists of respect for the laws and institutions of the
country. This factor is based on a principle of political liberalism according to which
laws and institutions require equal respect by all.

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86

R. Nezi et al.

Turning to the factor analysis of responses on European identity, two underlying

factors are revealed, which together account for almost 90 per cent of the observed
variance. Naturally, since there is no single European language, and supra-national
European citizenship is indirect (that is, it is not accompanied by formal requirements
to be fulfilled), a factor similar to formalism, discussed above with regard to Greek
nationality, has not emerged. Our analysis of European identity, then, does not contain
a factor similar to formalism, but contains factors reminiscent of the traditionalism
and liberalism discussed above: we will call them EU traditionalism and EU
liberalism (Table 3).
In detail, the first factor, EU traditionalism, is composed of five elements. In order
to be a real European, someone has to be born in Europe, have European parents, be a
Christian, master a European language, and be a European citizen. Two items show
high loadings in this factor, i.e. to be born in Europe (0.82) and to have European
parents (0.80). The second factor, EU liberalism, contains the aforementioned aspect
of respect for European laws and institutions with a high factor loading (0.88), while
feeling European is also loaded.
Feeling European is understood as a liberal stance because of the elective affinity
between liberalism and the West in Greek political culture. Already in the early years of
the Greek War of Independence (182130), the ideas of liberalism were spread in
Greece by intellectuals and merchants educated in Western Europe (Diamandouros
1994). In the nineteenth century, liberal political and market institutions were
imported from the West, while at the beginning of the twentieth century the liberal
party of Venizelos advocated state-building along West European lines. By contrast,
feeling Greek has always meant being faithful to a tradition that was pure and
uncontaminated by foreign (including liberal) ideas. Such tradition included
ahistorical ideas about the glory of ancient Hellenes, otherworldly beliefs in Christian
Orthodox dogma, and values akin to village life.
The traditionalist factor explains most of the variance in both models, i.e. 38.2 per
cent of the variance with regard to national and 33.1 per cent with regard to European
identity. MPs do not use different sets of criteria to distinguish the content of national
identity from that of European identity. Barring the factor of formalism, the things on
the basis of which MPs define national and European identity are more or less the
same. For traditionalists, having Greek parents matters for Greek identity. For the
same respondents, to be born in Europe and to have European parents matter a lot for
European identity. For liberals, respecting laws and institutions is of primary
importance for national and European identity.
However, we cannot conclude that for our MPs, the two identities were of equal
importance. In Greece, attachment to Europe is traditionally weak and people do not
easily identify with the EU. In 1977, for example, even though the pro-European ND
was in power, about one-third of the Greek electorate voted for PASOK and the KKE,
which were against the prospect of Greece joining the EC. It was only in the mid-1980s
that PASOK dropped its reservations about Greeces European prospects (Verney
1993). Today, Eurosceptic perceptions again came to the fore in the winter of 2009 10,

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South European Society and Politics 87

when part of the Greek press and the trade unions attributed Greeces grave fiscal
problems and the governments austerity measures to the EU.
As Table 4 shows, in a question on the strength of their attachment to their village,
region, country, and Europe, the majority in our public opinion sample was strongly
attached to the country and to their region and village. Only half of the respondents in
the public opinion survey declared a strong attachment to Europe. This trend was not
exactly replicated at the level of elites. The vast majority of sampled MPs claimed that
they were very or somewhat attached to Greece (98.9 per cent). A relatively lower
share of 80.7 per cent (but much higher than the corresponding share of the public
opinion sample) said the same about the EU (the question was not formed in an
either or fashion, so percentages do not add up to 100). The MPs attachment to their
village and region was also much higher than their attachment to the EU and this was
true regardless of party affiliation. It is not surprising that for MPs and the wider public,
European identity was supplementary to their national identity and that, compared
with national citizenship, European citizenship was a second-order citizenship.

Explaining Variance in Identity

With regard to identity, was there any variation of responses of MPs which can be
accounted for by ideological self-placement on the left right scale (010 where 0
means extreme left and 10 extreme right)? We observed that in our sample, the MPs of
the two largest parties (ND and PASOK, which have alternated in power since 1974)
did not necessarily abide by the official political ideology of their party. Thus, the
interpretation of emerging patterns in the context of the ideological profile of the
interviewed MPs is more useful than an interpretation on the basis of their party
membership or government versus opposition membership. In what follows, we will
attempt to explain variance on the basis of the left right self-placement of the MPs.
Owing to the small N of our sample, we limit ourselves to exploratory bivariate
associations.
The first factor loads on the more traditionalist elements of national identity and is
correlated with self-placement on the left right scale (Table 5). Traditionalist MPs,
namely those who considered that being Greek depends on having Greek parents,
Table 4 Attachment to different levels of community among public opinion and political
elites (per cent of respondents)
Political elites
Very/somewhat attached
Attachment
Attachment
Attachment
Attachment

to village
to region
to Greece
to Europe

Public opinion

All

Left

Centre-left

Centre-right

85.7
86.5
93.6
50

96.6
95.5
98.9
80.7

100
100
100
50

95.1
90.5
97.6
73.8

97.6
100
100
90.5

88

R. Nezi et al.

Table 5 Correlations between national and European identity factors and self-placement of
MPs on the left right scale
National identity

Left
Centre
Right

European identity

Traditionalism

Formalism

Liberalism

EU traditionalism

EU liberalism

20.35**
0.09
0.29*

20.01
20.03
0.00

20.21*
0.26*
0.01

20.20
0.03
0.19

20.19
0.11
0.17

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Note: 0 10 left right scale where 0 means left and 10 means right.
**Significant at the 0.01 level; *Significant at the 0.05 level.

being born in Greece, sharing the countrys traditions, being a Christian, and feeling
Greek, were most likely to place themselves closer to the right side of the scale. In
contrast, most of those who did not consider the aforementioned traditionalist aspects
important for national identity placed themselves closer to the left side of the scale.
Unsurprisingly, MPs who placed themselves on the right were more traditionalist as
far as national identity was concerned. The Greek right has always been associated with
Christianity and family values.
Switching to the factor of liberalism, we find that, among those parliamentarians
who considered that being Greek depends on respecting Greek laws and institutions,
most placed themselves closer to the centre of the scale, whereas few placed themselves
closer to the left. This is not surprising, given that a large proportion of the left
traditionally opposes laws and institutions that it regards as tools of the capitalist state.
In Greece, part of the communist left has integrated disrespect for laws and
institutions into its discourse. In this context, the association between the factor of
liberalism and left ideology is negative. Formalism is not correlated with selfplacement on the left right spectrum.
Turning to European identity (Table 5), we observe that our two factors (EU
traditionalism, EU liberalism) were not correlated with left right self-placement. This
may be explained by the fact that MPs do not closely identify with Europe. As we have
seen in Table 4, Europe was less important to them than their own country or region,
which means that they had not yet formed a strong European identity.
Representation
The problem of the EUs democratic deficit is well known. Lack of political
participation, transparency, and accountability are only a few aspects of the problem.
Another aspect is distrust of European institutions (European Parliament, European
Council, and European Commission). We hypothesised that MPs would show
different levels of trust in European institutions, depending on the political party to
which they belonged and their self-placement on the left right scale. One might
expect that MPs of the centre-left and the left would tend to show comparatively lower

South European Society and Politics 89

Table 6 Level of trust in European Institutions (mean scores): responses of the Greek
public opinion sample and 90 MPs
Public opinion

Political elites

Left

Centre-left

Centre-right

6.2

7.1

5.5

6.9

7.4

6.3

6.0

2.7

5.4

6.9

n.a.*

6.3

2.5

5.8

7.2

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Trust in the European

Parliament
Trust in the European
Commission
Trust in the European
Council

Note: Trust is measured on a 0 10 scale where 0 indicates no trust.

*The question was not included in the mass survey.

levels of trust to the extent that they understood EU organs as Western capitalist
institutions.
As Table 6 shows, the members of the mass sample trusted the European Commission
and the European Parliament almost equally. By contrast, as expected from their
familiarity with the legislative process, MPs trusted the European Parliament more than
the other EU institutions (as the higher score shows). MPs of the centre-right trusted
European institutions more than MPs of the left: the deputies of ND trusted the EU
institutions the most, whereas MPs of SYN as well as the only interviewed KKE deputy
trusted them the least. An explanation for this finding lies in the strong anti-Western
and anti-capitalist sentiments expressed at least up until the mid-1980s by Greek
communists and socialists alike. Such sentiments have probably surfaced in the form of
the mistrust towards EU institutions shown by MPs of PASOK, SYN, and KKE.
Even though left and centre-left Greek MPs are sceptical towards EU institutions,
they appreciated the benefits stemming from their countrys participation in the EU.
This is shown in Table 7 by the fact that the majority of MPs (56.2 per cent) opposed
the statement that Greeces interests are not taken into account by those making
decisions at the EU level. By contrast, the majority (two-thirds) of the public opinion
sample agreed with this statement. The masses may have a more instrumentalist
and ethnocentric view of EU than the parliamentary elite. Of course, there were
Table 7 The representation of Greeces interests: percentage distribution of responses of
Greek public opinion sample and 90 MPs (by political party family)
Greeces interests are not taken into
account by those making decisions at
the EU level
Strongly/somewhat agree
Neither agree or disagree
Somewhat/strongly disagree

Public
opinion

Political
elites

Left

Centreleft

Centreright

68.5
5.0
25.1

24.7
19.1
56.2

25
0
75

33.3
21.4
45.2

16.3
18.6
65.1

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R. Nezi et al.

differentiations among parties. For example, MPs of PASOK disagreed less with the
aforementioned statement than MPs of ND.
Despite the increased security in terms of foreign relations enjoyed by EU member
states and the generous provision of EU funds to the poorer states, in Greece
Euroscepticism has remained strong among left-wing voters and their representatives.
The criticism advanced by the Greek left against the EU and against any Greek
governments eager to actively participate in EU affairs is related to the EUs
democratic deficit and a perception, prevalent on the left, that the European project
primarily serves capitalist interests. Another argument of the left is that the EU does
not really protect Greeces foreign and defence interests and that it primarily serves the
interests of a closed club of old and powerful member states.
The results of bivariate correlations, associating trust in EU institutions with selfplacement on the left right scale of political ideology, suggest that there is a strong
correlation between MPs self-placement on the left and their distrust of both the
European Commission and the European Council. The coefficient of the correlation
between self-placement on the left and trusting the European Commission is 20.35 at
the 0.01 significance level. For the European Council the corresponding coefficient
is 2 0.31 at the 0.05 significance level. Among MPs, trust in the European
Commission was correlated with placing oneself on the right, with a coefficient scoring
0.22 at the 0.05 significance level. There are no other statistically significant
relationships to report.1 The left in Greece, as in other EU member states, has been
traditionally more Eurosceptic than other political forces and more critical towards the
executive branch of power in the EU. Since there was a very small share of MPs from
left parties in our sample, the observed association may be accounted for by the
presence of left-leaning deputies of PASOK. Although across Europe the left has
moved substantially toward a more pro-European stance over time (Gabel & Hix
2004), the legacy of populist Euroscepticism, dominant in this party in 1974 85, may
still negatively affect attitudes towards the Commission and the Council.
Scope of Governance
In the EUs multi-level governance system, there is a recurrent debate about the
appropriate level at which sectoral policies should be formulated. A similar debate
occurs on the issue of how deep European integration should become in the future.
Our research is relevant to both debates, as the IntUne questionnaire includes
questions on the respondents preferred level of decision-making with regard to several
policy areas (Table 8) and on how respondents project the role of EU in various policy
areas in ten years time (Table 9).
In various policy areas, competences are gradually transferred from national
authorities to supra-national ones as well as to sub-national levels of decision-making
(e.g. to regional authorities). This is a process usually referred to as the hollowing
out of the state. MPs were asked to indicate their preferred level of policy-making,
choosing one out of the following options: European, national, or regional level

South European Society and Politics 91

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Table 8 Preferred level for the formulation of EU policies: percentage distribution of

responses of Greek public opinion sample and 90 MPs (by political party family)

Immigration
National level
European level
Both levels
Environmental issues
National level
European level
Both levels
Fighting crime
National level
European level
Both levels
Health issues
National level
European level
Both levels
Taxation
National level
European level
Both levels

ND

PASOK

SYN

KKE

Public opinion

20.9
25.6
53.5

9.3
20.9
69.7

0
33.3
66.7

100

56.1
37.1
6.3

16.3
18.6
65.1

11.6
18.6
69.8

100

50.0
37.7
11.5

25.6
9.3
65.1

34.9
7.0
58.1

66.7
0
33.3

100

67.2
22.5
9.4

51.2
4.6
44.2

51.2
2.3
46.5

33.3
0
66.7

100

73.9
19.7
6.1

41.9
11.6
46.5

50
7.1
42.9

66.7
0
33.3

100

0
0
100

or a combination of these levels. Predictably enough, the underdevelopment of

regional administration in Greece and the fact that decentralisation has not progressed
at the regional level as it has in Italy and Spain made the regional option rather
irrelevant in the case of Greece (not shown in Table 8). The share of Greek MPs who
chose the region as the appropriate level for policy-making ranged, depending on the
policy in question, from zero (immigration) to 3.5 per cent (fight against crime).

Table 9 The evolution of the EU over the next ten years: percentage distribution of
responses of Greek public opinion and 90 MPs who are in favour of specific common
policies (by political party family)
Very/somewhat in favour

Public opinion

Political elites

Left

Centre-left

Centre-right

Common tax system

Social security system
Common foreign policy
Help for EU regions
in economic or social
difficulties

63.4
80.2
78.8
92.7

76.1
88.6
97.7
100

75
75
75
100

66.7
85.7
95.3
100

85.7
92.8
97.7
100

Note: Left includes the MP of the KKE and the sampled MPs of the SYN; centre-left: the sampled MPs
of PASOK, centre-right: the sampled MPs.
Source: IntUne 2007 Elite and Mass Surveys in Greece.

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R. Nezi et al.

As far as decision-making on immigration and environmental protection is

concerned, a minority of MPs from various parties (ranging between 18.6 and 33.3 per
cent, Table 8) preferred the European over the national level. On the other hand, the
only interviewed MP of KKE, a party that has been consistently anti-European,
invariably responded that all policies should be dealt with at the national level. The
MPs of SYN showed a more pro-European stance, claiming that the best level for
formulating three of the suggested policies would be a combination of both the
European and the national. MPs of both ND and PASOK also followed this option
(both levels) with regard to immigration and environmental policies and fighting
organised crime. However, with regard to public health, MPs of ND and PASOK
mostly preferred to reply at the national level instead of at both levels.
The noted preference to resort to the both levels option may be the result of
interviewee fatigue or a tendency on the part of MPs to avoid taking a position. MPs
may acknowledge that one day decision-making powers on some public policies might
be transferred from national to supra-national authorities. This prospect is probably
feared more by the general public, as shown by the responses in the last column
of Table 8. The majority of the public opinion sample preferred that all policies
be formulated at the national level. This tendency in our public opinion sample
was particularly strong in relation to health issues and the fight against organised
crime.
With regard to the projected reach of European integration in ten years time,
respondents were asked to say whether they were in favour of a common tax system, a
common social security system, a common foreign policy, and further help for EU
regions encountering economic and social difficulties. Greece has been one of the
largest recipients of EU regional funds, particularly since 1988. This was reflected in
the overwhelming support among respondents from both the Greek samples (MPs
and public opinion) for further regional aid (regardless of the political party affiliation
of the respondents). Many Greeks have been convinced that EU membership would
provide a shelter for their country in the midst of recurring tensions in southeastern
Europe. This stance was reflected in the high scores of approval for a common foreign
policy: almost all sampled MPs (97.7 per cent) agree with such a common policy
(Table 9). Respondents from the public opinion sample were also supportive of such a
policy (by 78.8 per cent).
Members of the public opinion sample were also strongly in favour of a common
social security policy, in hopes that the major inefficiencies and inequalities of the
Greek pension system could be taken care of by a common EU policy in this sector.
Also 63.4 per cent of the respondents of the same sample were in favour of a common
tax system. The chronic problems of the malfunctioning Greek tax system (corruption,
tax evasion and frequent amendments in legislation) have taken their toll on public
opinion about the Greek states capacity to tax the population. The sampled MPs were
even more enthusiastic about the prospect of a common tax system and social security
andabove alla common foreign policy. In sum, we found a positive, albeit
variable, pro-European stance among Greek MPs and public opinion as far as the

South European Society and Politics 93

formulation of common European policies was concerned. In that respect, our Greek
respondents sided with those who believe in a much larger scope of government for
the EU in the future.

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Conclusions
In this article, we have discussed how the Greek MPs sampled in 2007 understood the
notion of European and national identity, as well as how they reacted to issues
of representation and scope of governance. We have also contrasted the attitudes of
MPs with those of a sample of Greek public opinion, interviewed with the same
questionnaire, in early 2007. Overall, we found differences of limited intensity in the
way Greek MPs and public opinion understood the notion of European and national
identity.
In order to understand the elements underlying the achieved and ascribed items
that are associated by MPs with identity formation, we employed a factor analysis. The
results of our analysis suggested that there were two factors underlying the notion of
national and European identity. We called these factors traditionalism and
liberalism. The first factor, relevant to both identities, is composed of elements such
as religion, birthplace, and parents nationality, suggesting a traditionalist approach
towards identity. This factor encompasses both ascribed and achieved characteristics.
The second factor, relevant for both the national and European identity, is liberalism.
According to the latter factor, the most important aspect of national identity is respect
for laws and institutions.
There is also a third factor reflecting a formalist approach, stressing typically
verifiable requirements. This factor, which we have called formalism, emerges only in
relation to national identity. Adherents of formalism would claim that individuals
who were not born in Greece or did not have Greek parents could still be Greeks if they
mastered the Greek language and fulfilled the legal requirements for Greek citizenship.
Our analysis suggests that there are limits to the use of conceptual dichotomies
(ascribed/achieved traits of identity, ethnic/civic citizenship).
Greek MPs did not assign different characteristics to national and to European
identity, but defined them in similar terms. This does not mean that the two
identities were of equal importance for the Greek MPs. Ethnocentrism was prevalent
among members of national parliaments, and the Greek case was no exception.
In the eyes of the MPs we sampled, European identity was supplementary to the
national one.
We have examined the impact of the MPs ideological position on identity,
representation and scope of governance. Compared with MPs leaning towards the
centre and the left, MPs who placed themselves on the right side of the left right scale
conceived of identity in terms of traditional aspects, such as family and traditional
values (e.g. to have Greek parents). Those at the centre of the scale had a more liberal
understanding of national identity. As far as European identity was concerned, the
self-placement of MPs on the left right scale was not significant.

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R. Nezi et al.

We discussed representation in relation to the trust MPs showed in European

institutions in comparison with the corresponding trust expressed by our public
opinion sample. On the average, the sampled Greek MPs trusted the European
Parliament more than the Greek public. MPs and the public trusted the European
Commission almost equally.
We then analysed the scope of governance with reference to MPs preferences
concerning the appropriate level of formulation of public policies and the
deepening of European integration through the advancement of common EU
policies. In terms of the level of policy formulation, the respondents to our public
opinion survey were more ethnocentric than the sampled MPs. The vast majority of
respondents believed that policy decisions about immigration, the environment,
organised crime, and health should be taken at the national level. By contrast, the
majority of sampled MPs believed that decisions should be taken at both European
and national level.
The self-placement of MPs on the left right scale was shown to be a predictor of
attitudes. Generally speaking, compared with MPs who placed themselves on the right,
left-leaning MPs showed little trust in EU institutions and particularly in the European
Commission. MPs of the left did not welcome the prospect of EU becoming more
active in the formulation of organised crime or taxation policies.
To conclude, despite the relative autonomy of EU issues (e.g. enlargement,
democratic deficit, balance of power among EU institutions, mix of EU policies,
subsidiarity), political elites did not think about Europe on its own terms. Rather, their
views on Europe depended on political ideology and on party affiliation. Our research
in 2007 showed that in Greece centre-right politicians had pro-European attitudes and
that to a certain extent the same held for centre-left politicians. This article therefore
corroborates the conclusions of recent research (Conti 2008), according to which, in
contrast to the past, centre-left politicians have become more pro-European. However,
Greece still shows a distinctive profile, as the centre-right tends in general to be more
pro-European than the centre-left. Therefore, even though the scope for party
competition on the EU has narrowed remarkably over time, there are still signs of
some persistence of a left right divide in this country. This divide structures a pattern
that is different from the one observed for the other countries analysed by this special
issue, as well as from the broad cross-national pattern described in other works (Gabel
& Hix 2004; Hooghe et al. 2004) characterised by the greater Europhilia of the centreleft compared with the centre-right.

Acknowledgements
This research was funded by a grant from the IntUne project (Integrated and United: A Quest for
Citizenship in an Ever Closer Europe) financed by the Sixth Framework Programme of the EU,
Priority 7, Citizens and Governance in a Knowledge Based Society (CIT3-CT-2005-513421). The
authors acknowledge the advice of Professors Elias Nicolakopoulos, Maurizio Cotta, Nicolo` Conti,
and Luca Verzichelli, the help of Manina Kakepaki, and the criticisms of two anonymous referees.

South European Society and Politics 95

Note
[1] The coefficient of the correlations among left, centre, and right and the European Parliament
are 2 0.13, 0.11, and 0.05, respectively. The score of correlation between self-placement on the
centre and trust in the European Commission is 0.14; and between such self-placement and
trust in the European Council, 0.11. Finally, the correlation between self-placement on the
right and trust in the European Council scores 0.23. None of these is a statistically significant
correlation.

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Spyridoula Nezi is a Ph.D. candidate at the University of Athens. Her research

interests are in the field of political parties, party competition and political
methodology. She has participated in various European research projects in the area of
political behaviour.
Dimitri A. Sotiropoulos is Assistant Professor at the Department of Political Science
and Public Administration of the University of Athens and Alpha Bank Visiting Fellow
in South East European Studies at St. Antonys College, Oxford. His most recent
publications include: The State and Democracy in the New Southern Europe (Oxford
University Press 2006, co-edited with R. Gunther and P.N. Diamandouros).
Panayiota Toka is a Ph.D. candidate at the University of Athens. She has participated
in research projects of the University of Athens in the fields of political parties, elites
and local administration.