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Silverio v.

Republic, 537 SCRA 373, (2007)FACTS:


On November 26, 2002, petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a petition for the
change of his first name and sex in his birthcertificate in the Regional Trial Court of Manila by
reason of sex alteration or sex reassignment. He alleged that he is a male transsexual. He
underwentsex reassignment surgery on January 27, 2001 in Bangkok, Thailand. From then on, he
lived as a female and was in fact engaged to be married. Hethen sought to have his name in his
birth certificate changed from Rommel Jacinto to Mely, and his sex from male to
female.On June 4, 2003, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of petitioner, stating that
the petition would be more in consonance with theprinciples of justice and equity.On August 18,
2003, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), thru OSG, filed a petition for certiorari in the
Court of Appeals (CA) allegingthat there is no law allowing the change of entries in the birth
certificate by reason of sex alteration.On February 23, 2006, CA rendered a decision in favor of
the Republic, ruled that the trial courts decision lacked legal basis. Petition wasmoved for
reconsideration but it was denied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the change of the petitioners first name and sex in his birth certificate are
allowed?
HELD:
Petition DENIED. Lack of Merit.
RATIO:
A Persons First Name Cannot Be Changed.
RA 9048 provides the grounds for which change of first name may be allowed:(1) The petitioner
finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous, tainted with dishonor or extremely difficult to
write or pronounce;(2) The new first name or nickname has been habitually and continuously
used by the petitioner and he has been publicly known by that first name ornickname in the
community; or(3) The change will avoid confusion.RA 9048 does not sanction a change of first
name on the ground of sex reassignment. Rather than avoiding confusion, changing petitioners
first namefor his declared purpose may only create grave complications in the civil registry and
the public interest.

No Law Allows The Change of Entry In The Birth Certificate As To Sex On the Ground of Sex
Reassignment.
Section 2(c) of RA 9048 defines what a "clerical or typographical error" is. Clerical or
typographical error" refers to a mistake committed inthe performance of clerical work in writing,
copying, transcribing or typing an entry in the civil register that is harmless and innocuous, such
as misspelledname or misspelled place of birth or the like, which is visible to the eyes or obvious
to the understanding, and can be corrected or changed only byreference to other existing record
or records: Provided, however, That no correction must involve the change of nationality, age,
status or sex of thepetitioner.Under RA 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the
change of sex is not a mere clerical or typographical error.On the other hand, Article 407 of the
Civil Code authorizes the entry in the civil registry of certain acts, and judicial decrees. These
acts,events and judicial decrees produce legal consequences that touch upon the legal capacity,
status and nationality of a person. Their effects areexpressly sanctioned by the laws. In contrast,
sex reassignment is not among those acts or events mentioned in Article 407. Neither is it
recognized noreven mentioned by any law, expressly or impliedly. Article 413 of the Civil Code
provides that All other matters pertaining to the registration of civil status shall be governed by
special laws. Butthere is no such special law in the Philippines governing sex reassignment and
its effects.While petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body and appearance through the
intervention of modern surgery, no law authorizes thechange of entry as to sex in the civil
registry for that reason.
Neither May Entries in the Birth Certificate As to First Name or Sex Be Changed on the Ground
of Equity.
The changes sought by petitioner will have serious and wide-ranging legal and public policy
consequences. To grant the changes sought bypetitioner will substantially reconfigure and greatly
alter the laws on marriage and family relations. It will allow the union of a man with another
man whohas undergone sex reassignment (a male-to-female post-operative transsexual). There
are various laws which apply particularly to women such as theprovisions of the Labor Code on
employment of women, certain felonies under the Revised Penal Code and the presumption of
survivorship in case ofcalamities under Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, among others. These
laws underscore the public policy in relation to women which could besubstantially affected if
petitioners petition were to be granted.It is true that Article 9 of the Civil Code mandates that

"[n]o judge or court shall decline to render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurityor
insufficiency of the law." However, it is not a license for courts to engage in judicial legislation.
The duty of the courts is to apply or interpret the law,not to make or amend it.It might be
theoretically possible for this Court to write a protocol on when a person may be recognized as
having successfully changed hissex. However, this Court has no authority to fashion a law on
that matter, or on anything else. The Court cannot enact a law where no law exists. It canonly
apply or interpret the written word of its co-equal branch of government, Congress

Republic vs. Cagandahan, GR No. 166676


FACTS: Jennifer Cagandahan filed before the Regional Trial Court Branch 33 of Siniloan,
Laguna a Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate of her name from Jennifer B.
Cagandahan to Jeff Cagandahan and her gender from female to male. It appearing that Jennifer
Cagandahan is suffering from Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia which is a rare medical condition
where afflicted persons possess both male and female characteristics. Jennifer Cagandahan grew
up with secondary male characteristics. To further her petition, Cagandahan presented in court
the medical certificate evidencing that she is suffering from Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia
which certificate is issued by Dr. Michael Sionzon of the Department of Psychiatry, University of
the Philippines-Philippine General Hospital, who, in addition, explained that Cagandahan
genetically is female but because her body secretes male hormones, her female organs did not
develop normally, thus has organs of both male and female. The lower court decided in her
favor but the Office of the Solicitor General appealed before the Supreme Court invoking that the
same was a violation of Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court because the said petition did not
implead the local civil registrar.
ISSUE: The issue in this case is the validity of the change of sex or gender and name of
respondent as ruled by the lower court.
HELD: The contention of the Office of the Solicitor General that the petition is fatally defective
because it failed to implead the local civil registrar as well as all persons who have or claim any
interest therein is not without merit. However, it must be stressed that private respondent
furnished the local civil registrar a copy of the petition, the order to publish on December 16,
2003 and all pleadings, orders or processes in the course of the proceedings. In which case, the
Supreme Court ruled that there is substantial compliance of the provisions of Rules 103 and 108
of the Rules of Court. Furthermore, the Supreme Court held that the determination of a persons
sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal issue which in this case should be dealt with
utmost care in view of the delicate facts present in this case.

In deciding the case, the Supreme Court brings forth the need to elaborate the term
intersexuality which is the condition or let us say a disorder that respondent is undergoing.
INTERSEXUALITY applies to human beings who cannot be classified as either male or female.
It is the state of a living thing of a gonochoristic species whose sex chromosomes, genitalia,
and/or secondary sex characteristics are determined to be neither exclusively male nor female. It
is said that an organism with intersex may have biological characteristics of both male and
female sexes. In view of the foregoing, the highest tribunal of the land consider the
compassionate calls for recognition of the various degrees of intersex as variations which should
not be subject to outright denial.
The current state of Philippine statutes apparently compels that a person be classified either as a
male or as a female, but this Court is not controlled by mere appearances when nature itself
fundamentally negates such rigid classification. That is, Philippine courts must render judgment
based on law and the evidence presented. In the instant case, there is no denying that evidence
points that respondent is male. In determining respondent to be a female, there is no basis for a
change in the birth certificate entry for gender. The Supreme Court held that where the person is
biologically or naturally intersex the determining factor in his gender classification would be
what the individual, like respondent, having reached the age of majority, with good reason thinks
of his/her sex. Sexual development in cases of intersex persons makes the gender classification at
birth inconclusive. It is at maturity that the gender of such persons, like respondent, is fixed. The
Court will not consider respondent as having erred in not choosing to undergo treatment in order
to become or remain as a female. Neither will the Court force respondent to undergo treatment
and to take medication in order to fit the mold of a female, as society commonly currently knows
this gender of the human species. Respondent is the one who has to live with his intersex
anatomy. To him belongs the human right to the pursuit of happiness and of health. Thus, to him
should belong the primordial choice of what courses of action to take along the path of his sexual
development and maturation. In the absence of evidence that respondent is an incompetent and
in the absence of evidence to show that classifying respondent as a male will harm other
members of society who are equally entitled to protection under the law, the Supreme Court
affirmed as valid and justified the respondents position and his personal judgment of being a
male.
Consti
G.R. No. 207264 : OCTOBER 22, 2013
REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and
JOSEPH SOCORRO B. TAN, Respondents.
PEREZ, J.:

FACTS:
This is a Motion for Reconsideration of the En Banc Resolution of June 25, 2013 which found no
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Commission on Elections and affirmed the March 27,
2013 Resolution of the COMELEC First Division.
Petitioner raised the issue in the petition which is: Whether or not Respondent COMELEC is
without jurisdiction over Petitioner who is duly proclaimed winner and who has already taken
her oath of office for the position of Member of the House of Representatives for the lone
congressional district of Marinduque. Petitioner is a duly proclaimed winner and having taken
her oath of office as member of the House of Representatives, all questions regarding her
qualifications are outside the jurisdiction of the COMELEC and are within the HRET exclusive
jurisdiction.
The averred proclamation is the critical pointer to the correctness of petitioner submission.The
crucial question is whether or not petitioner could be proclaimed on May 18, 2013. Differently
stated, was there basis for the proclamation of petitioner on May 18 , 2013.
The June 25, 2013 resolution held that before May 18, 2013, the COMELEC En Banc had
already finally disposed of the issue of petitioner lack of Filipino citizenship and residency via its
resolution dated May 14, 2013, cancelling petitioner certificate of candidacy. The proclamation
which petitioner secured on May 18, 2013 was without any basis. On June 10, 2013, petitioner
went to the Supreme Court questioning the COMELEC First Division ruling and the May 14,
2013 COMELEC En Banc decision, baseless proclamation on 18 May 2013 did not by that fact
of promulgation alone become valid and legal.
ISSUE: Whether or not Petitioner was denied of due process?
HELD: Petitioner was denied of due process.
POLITICAL LAW: administrative due process
Petitioner alleges that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it took cognizance of
"newly-discovered evidence" without the same having been testified on and offered and admitted
in evidence. She assails the admission of the blog article of Eli Obligacion as hearsay and the
photocopy of the Certification from the Bureau of Immigration. She likewise contends that there
was a violation of her right to due process of law because she was not given the opportunity to
question and present controverting evidence.
It must be emphasized that the COMELEC is not bound to strictly adhere to the technical rules
of procedure in the presentation of evidence. Under Section 2 of Rule I, the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure "shall be liberally construed in order to achieve just, expeditious and inexpensive
determination and disposition of every action and proceeding brought before the Commission."
In view of the fact that the proceedings in a petition to deny due course or to cancel certificate of
candidacy are summary in nature, then the "newly discovered evidence" was properly admitted
by respondent COMELEC.

Furthermore, there was no denial of due process in the case at bar as petitioner was given every
opportunity to argue her case before the COMELEC. From 10 October 2012 when Tan's petition
was filed up to 27 March 2013 when the First Division rendered its resolution, petitioner had a
period of five (5) months to adduce evidence. Unfortunately, she did not avail herself of the
opportunity given her.
In administrative proceedings, procedural due process only requires that the party be given the
opportunity or right to be heard. As held in the case of Sahali v. COMELEC: The petitioners
should be reminded that due process does not necessarily mean or require a hearing, but simply
an opportunity or right to be heard. One may be heard, not solely by verbal presentation but also,
and perhaps many times more creditably and predictable than oral argument, through pleadings.
In administrative proceedings moreover, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not
strictly applied; administrative process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict
judicial sense. Indeed, deprivation of due process cannot be successfully invoked where a party
was given the chance to be heard on his motion for reconsideration.
In moving for the cancellation of petitioner's COC, respondent submitted records of the Bureau
of Immigration showing that petitioner is a holder of a US passport, and that her status is that of
a "balikbayan." At this point, the burden of proof shifted to petitioner, imposing upon her the
duty to prove that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen and has not lost the same, or that she has
re-acquired such status in accordance with the provisions of R.A. No. 9225. Aside from the bare
allegation that she is a natural-born citizen, however, petitioner submitted no proof to support
such contention. Neither did she submit any proof as to the inapplicability of R.A. No. 9225 to
her.
The Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED.
Vinzons-Chato v. Comelec
Facts: Unico has already been proclaimed and taken h i s o a t h o f o f f i c e a s a
M e m b e r o f t h e H O R , h e n c e , Comelec ruled that it had already lost jurisdiction over
p e t i t i o n e r C h a t o s e l e c t i o n p r o t e s t a g a i n s t U n i c o regarding canvassing of returns
and alleged invalidity of Unicos proclamation. He then filed a special civil action for
certiorari in the SC.
I s s u e : W O N t h e c o u r t s h o u l d t a k e c o g n i z a n c e o f Chatos
election protest. If not, to who is this issue best addressed to? WON his civil action
for certiorari will prosper. Held: The court should not take cognizance of Chatos election
protest for it would amount to usurpation of the constitutionally mandated functions of the
HRET.Civil action for certiorari
will not prosper.Ratio: - In an electoral contest where the validity of the proclamation of a
winning candidate who has taken his oath of office and assumed his post as Congressman is
r a i s e d , t h a t i s s u e i s b e s t a d d r e s s e d t o t h e H R E T.

Reason: it avoids duplicity of proceedings and a clash of jurisdiction between constitutional


bodies with due regard to the peoples mandate.
- S p e c i a l c i v i l a c t i o n f o r Certiorari shall prosper if the following requisites concur:
oTribunal, board or officer exercising judicial orquasi-judicial functions
has acted without or ine x c e s s o f j u r i s d i c t i o n o r w i t h g r a v e a b u s e o f jurisdictio
n amounting to lack of jurisdiction
o
T h e r e i s n o a p p e a l o r a n y p l a i n , s p e e d y a n d adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law to annul or modify the proceeding.-In this case, COMELEC did not commit
rave abuse of discretion when it issued a resolution holding that ithad lost jurisdiction
upon Unicos proclamation. Itd e m o n s t r a t e d f e a l t y t o t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l f i
a t regarding HRET.

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