G.R. No.

128096 January 20, 1999

PANFILO M. LACSON, petitioner,vs.THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE
SANDIGANBAYAN, OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, THE
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, MYRNA ABALORA, NENITA ALAP-AP, IMELDA
PANCHO MONTERO, and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
ROMEO M. ACOP AND FRANCISCO G. ZUBIA, JR., petitioner-intervenors.
MARTINEZ, J.:

and intervenors. The recommendation was approved by the Ombudsman except

for the withdrawal of the charges against Chief Supt. Ricardo de Leon.

These bills were consolidated and later approved into law as R.A. No. 8249 13 by
the President of the Philippines on February 5, 1997.

Thus, on November 2, 1995, petitioner Panfilo Lacson was among those charged
as principal in eleven (11) information for murder 2 before the Sandiganbayan's
Second Division, while intervenors Romeo Acop and Francisco Zubia, Jr. were
among those charged in the same informations as accessories after-in-the-fact.

Subsequently, on March 5, 1997, the Sandiganbayan promulgated a Resolution 14

denying the motion for reconsideration of the Special Prosecutor, ruling that it
"stands pat in its resolution dated May 8, 1996."

On the same day 15 the Sandiganbayan issued and ADDENDUM to its March 5,
Upon motion by all the accused in the 11 information, 3 the Sandiganbayan allowed 1997 Resolution, the pertinent portion of which reads:
them to file a motion for reconsideration of the Ombudsman's action. 4
After conducting a reinvestigation, the Ombudsman filed on March 1, 1996 eleven
(11) amended informations 5 before the Sandiganbayan, wherein petitioner was
charged only as an accessory, together with Romeo Acop and Francisco Zubia, Jr.
and other. One of the accused 6 was dropped from the case.

The constitutionality of Sections 4 and 7 of Republic Act No. 8249 an act which
further defines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is being challenged in this
petition for prohibition and mandamus. Petitioner Panfilo Lacson, joined by
petitioners-intervenors Romeo Acop and Francisco Zubia, Jr., also seeks to
prevent the Sandiganbayan from proceedings with the trial of Criminal Cases Nos.
23047-23057 (for multiple murder) against them on the ground of lack of
On March 5-6, 1996, all the accused filed separate motions questioning the
jurisdiction.
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, asserting that under the amended informations,
the cases fall within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court pursuant to Section
2 (paragraphs a and c) of Republic Act No. 7975. 7 They contend that the said law
The antecedents of this case, as gathered from the parties' pleadings and
limited the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to cases where one or more of the
documentary proofs, are as follows:
"principal accused" are government officials with Salary Grade (SG) 27 or higher,
or PNP officials with the rank of Chief Superintendent (Brigadier General) or higher.
In the early morning of May 18, 1995, eleven (11) persons believed to be members The highest ranking principal accused in the amended informations has the rank of
of the Kuratong Baleleng gang, reportedly an organized crime syndicate which had only a Chief Inspector, and none has the equivalent of at least SG 27.
been involved in a spate of bank robberies in Metro Manila, where slain along
Commonwealth Avenue in Quezon City by elements of the Anti-Bank Robbery and
8
Intelligence Task Group (ABRITG) headed by Chieff Superintendent Jewel Canson Thereafter, in a Resolution dated May 8, 1996 (promulgated on May 9, 1996),
penned
by
Justice
Demetriou,
with Justices Lagman and de Leon concurring, and
of the Philippine National Police (PNP). The ABRITG was composed of police
9
officers from the Traffic Management Command (TMC) led by petitioner-intervenor Justices Balajadia and Garchitorena dissenting, the Sandiganbayan admitted the
amended
information
and
ordered
the
cases
transferred
to the Quezon City
Senior Superintendent Francisco Zubia, Jr.; Presidential Anti-Crime Commission
Regional
Trial
Court
which
has
original
and
exclusive
jurisdiction
under R.A. 7975,
Task Force Habagat (PACC-TFH) headed by petitioner Chief Superintendent
as none of the principal accused has the rank of Chief Superintendent or higher.
Panfilo M. Lacson; Central Police District Command (CPDC) led by Chief
Superintendent Ricardo de Leon; and the Criminal Investigation Command (CIC)
headed by petitioner-intervenor Chief Superintendent Romeo Acop.
Acting on a media expose of SPO2 Eduardo delos Reyes, a member of the CIC,
that what actually transpired at dawn of May 18, 1995 was a summary execution
(or a rub out) and not a shoot-out between the Kuratong Baleleng gang members
and the ABRITG, Ombudsman Aniano Desierto formed a panel of investigators
headed by the Deputy Ombudsman for Military Affairs, Bienvenido Blancaflor, to
investigate the incident. This panel later absolved from any criminal liability all the
PNP officers and personal allegedly involved in May 18, 1995 incident, with a
finding that the said incident was a legitimate police operation. 1
However, a review board led by Overall Deputy Ombudsman Francisco Villa
modified modified the Blancaflor panel's finding and recommended the indictment
for multiple murder against twenty-six (26) respondents, including herein petitioner

On May 17, 1996, the Office of the Special Prosecutor moved for a
reconsideration, insisting that the cases should remain with the Sandiganbayan.
This was opposed by petitioner and some of the accused.
While these motions for reconsideration were pending resolution, and even before
the issue of jurisdiction cropped up with the filing of the amended informations on
March 1, 1996, House Bill No. 2299 10 and No. 1094 11 (sponsored by
Representatives Edcel C. Lagman and Lagman and Neptali M. Gonzales II,
respectively), as well as Senate Bill No. 844 12 (sponsored by Senator Neptali
Gonzales), were introduced in Congress, defining expanding the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. Specifically, the said bills sought, among others, to amend the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan by deleting the word "principal" from the phrase
"principal accused" in Section 2 (paragraphs a and c) of R.A. No. 7975.

After Justice Lagman wrote the Resolution and Justice Demetriou concurred in it,
but before Justice de Leon. Jr. rendered his concurring and dissenting opinion, the
legislature enacted Republic Act 8249 and the President of the Philippines
approved it on February 5, 1997. Considering the pertinent provisions of the new
law, Justices Lagman and Demetriou are now in favor of granting, as they are now
granting, the Special Prosecutor's motion for reconsideration. Justice de Leon has
already done so in his concurring and dissenting opinion.
xxx xxx xxx
Considering that three of the accused in each of these cases are PNP Chief
Superintendents: namely, Jewel T. Canson, Romeo M. Acop and Panfilo M.
Lacson, and that trial has not yet begun in all these cases in fact, no order of
arrest has been issued this court has competence to take cognizance of these
cases.
To recapitulate, the net result of all the foregoing is that by the vote of 3 of 2, the
court admitted the Amended Informations in these cases by the unanimous vote of
4 with 1 neither concurring not dissenting, retained jurisdiction to try and decide the
cases 16 (Empahasis supplied)
Petitioner now questions the constitutionality of Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249,
including Section 7 thereof which provides that the said law "shall apply to all
cases pending in any court over which trial has not begun as to the approval
hereof." Petitioner argues that:
a) The questioned provisions of the statute were introduced by the authors thereof
in bad faith as it was made to precisely suit the situation in which petitioner's cases
were in at the Sandiganbayan by restoring jurisdiction thereof to it, thereby
violating his right to procedural due process and the equal protection clause of the
Constitution. Further, from the way the Sandiganbayan has foot-dragged for nine
(9) months the resolution of a pending incident involving the transfer of the cases
to the Regional Trial Court, the passage of the law may have been timed to
overtake such resolution to render the issue therein moot, and frustrate the
exercise of petitioner's vested rights under the old Sandiganbayan law (RA 7975)
b) Retroactive application of the law is plan from the fact that it was again made to
suit the peculiar circumstances in which petitioner's cases were under, namely, that

the trial had not yet commenced, as provided in Section 7, to make certain that
those cases will no longer be remanded to the Quezon City Regional Trial Court,
as the Sandiganbayan alone should try them, thus making it an ex post facto
legislation and a denial of the right of petitioner as an accused in Criminal Case
Nos. 23047-23057 to procedural due process.
c) The title of the law is misleading in that it contains the aforesaid "innocuous"
provisions in Sections 4 and 7 which actually expands rather than defines the old
Sandiganbayan law (RA 7975), thereby violating the one-title one-subject
requirement for the passage of statutes under Section 26 (1), Article VI of the
Constitution. 17
For their part, the intervenors, in their petition-in-intervention, add that "while
Republic Act No. 8249 innocuously appears to have merely expanded the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the introduction of Section 4 and 7 in said
statute impressed upon it the character of a class legislation and an ex-post facto
statute intended to apply specifically to the accused in the Kuratong Baleleng case
pending before the Sandiganbayan. 18 They further argued that if their case is tried
before the Sandiganbayan their right to procedural due process would be violated
as they could no longer avail of the two-tiered appeal to the Sandiganbayan, which
they acquired under R.A. 7975, before recourse to the Supreme Court.
Both the Office of the Ombudsman and the Solicitor-General filed separate
pleadings in support of the constitutionality of the challenged provisions of the law
in question and praying that both the petition and the petition-in-intervention be
dismissed.

Sec. 5. The Batasang Pambansa shall create a special

court, to be known as Sandiganbayan, which shall have
jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases involving graft
and corrupt practices and such other offenses committed
by public officers and employees including those in
government-owned or controlled corporations, in relation
to their office as may be determined by law.
The said special court is retained in the new (1987) Constitution under the
following provisions in Article XI, Section 4:
Sec. 4. The present anti-graft court known as the Sandiganbayan shall continue to
function and exercise its jurisdiction as now or hereafter may be provided by law.

(d) Philippine Army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher
rank;
(e) Officers of the Philippines National Police while occupying the position of
provincial director and those holding the rank of senior superintendent or higher.
(f) City of provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors
in the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees or managers of government-owned or
controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations;
(2) Members of Congress or officials thereof classified as-Grade "27" and up under
the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;

Pursuant to the constitutional mandate, Presidential Decree No. 1486 21 created the
Sandiganbayan. Thereafter, the following laws on the Sandiganbayan, in
(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;
chronological order, were enacted: P.D. No. 1606, 22 Section 20 of Batas
23
24
25
26
Pambansa Blg. 123, P.D. No. 1860, P.D. No. 1861, R.A. No. 7975, and R.A.
(4) Chairman and members of the Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to
No. 8249. 27 Under the latest amendments introduced by Section 4 of R.A. No.
the provisions of the Constitution;
8249, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the following cases:
Sec 4. Section 4 of the same decree [P.D. No. 1606, as amended] is hereby further (5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade "27" or higher under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
amended to read as follows:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction in all cases involving:

This Court then issued a Resolution 19 requiring the parties to file simultaneously
within a nonextendible period of ten (10) days from notice thereof additional
memoranda on the question of whether the subject amended informations filed a
Criminal Case Nos. 23047-23057 sufficiently allege the commission by the
accused therein of the crime charged within the meaning Section 4 b of Republic
Act No. 8249, so as to bring the said cases within the exclusive original jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan.

b. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes

committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in Subsection a of this
section in relation to their office.

a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and connection with Executive Orders
Nos. 1,2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.
Titile VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused
are officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a
permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense: In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to
salary Grade "27" or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act 6758, or military
and PNP officers mentioned above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director
vested in the proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial
and
higher,
otherwise
classified
as
Grade
"27"
and
higher,
of
the
Compensation
The parties, except for the Solicitor General who is representing the People of the
court, and municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to their
and
Position
Classification
Act
of
1989
(Republic
Act
No.
6758),
specifically
Philippines, filed the required supplemental memorandum within the nonextendible
jurisdictions as privided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.
including:
reglementary period.
The established rule is that every law has in its favor the presumption of
constitutionality, and to justify its nullification there must be a clear and unequivocal
breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative one. 20 The burden of
proving the invalidity of the law lies with those who challenge it. That burden, we
regret to say, was not convincingly discharged in the present case.
The creation of the Sandiganbayn was mandated in Section 5, Article XIII of the
1973 Constitution, which provides:

The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final

(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang
panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other provincial judgments, resolutions or orders of regional trial courts whether in the exercise of
their own original jurisdiction or of their appellate jurisdiction as herein provided.
department heads;
(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city
treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads;
(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;

The Sandiganbayan shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions of the
issuance of the writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus,
injunctions, and other ancillary writs and processes in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction and over petitions of similar nature, including quo warranto, arising or
that may arise in cases filed or which may be filed under Executive Order Nos. 1,
2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986: Provided, That the jurisdiction over these petitions
shall not be exclusive of the Supreme Court.
The procedure prescribed in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as well as the
implementing rules that the Supreme Court has promulgated and may hereafter
promulgate, relative to appeals/petitions for review to the Court of Appeals, shall
apply to appeals and petitions for review filed with the Sandiganbayan. In all cases
elevated to the Sandiganbayan and from the Sandiganbayan to the Supreme
Court, the Office of the Ombudsman, through its special prosecutor, shall represent
the People of the Philippines, except in cases filed pursuant to Executive Order
Nos. 1, 2, 14, and 4-A, issued in 1986.
In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or
accessories with the public officers or employee, including those employed in
government-owned or controlled corporations, they shall be tried jointly with said
public officers and employees in the proper courts which shall exercise exclusive
jurisdiction over them.

(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director
and higher, otherwise classified as Grade "27" and higher, of the Compensation
and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically
including:
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang
panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineer, and other provincial
department heads;

court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and municipal circuit trial court,
as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129.
The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction on appelas from
the final judgment, resolutions or orders of regular court where all the accused are
occupying positions lower than grade "27," or not otherwise covered by the
preceding enumeration.

(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city

treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads;
(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;
(d) Philippine Army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher
rank;

xxx xxx xxx

In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or
accessories with the public officers or employees, including those employed in
government-owned or controlled corporations, they shall be tried jointly with said
public officers and employees in the proper courts which shall have exclusive
jurisdiction over them.
xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied)

(e) PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank;

(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and
prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;

Sec. 7 of R.A. No. 7975 reads:

Sec. 7. Upon the effectivity of this Act, all criminal cases in which trial has not
begun in the Sandiganbayan shall be referred to the proper courts.
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or
controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations;
Under paragraphs a and c, Section 4 of R.A. 8249, the word "principal" before the
Sec. 7 of R.A. No. 8249 states:
(2) Members of Congress or officials thereof classified as Grade "27" and up under word "accused" appearing in the above-quoted Section 2 (paragraphs a and c) of
R.A. 7975, was deleted. It is due to this deletion of the word "principal" that the
Sec. 7. Transitory provision This act shall apply to all cases pending in any court the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;
parties herein are at loggerheads over the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
over which trial has not begun as of the approval hereof. (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner and intervenors, relying on R.A. 7975, argue that the Regional Trial
(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution; Court, not the Sandiganbayan, has jurisdiction over the subject criminal cases
The Sandiganbayan law prior to R.A. 8249 was R.A. 7975. Section 2 of R.A. 7975
since none of the principal accused under the amended information has the rank of
provides:
(4) Chairman and members of the Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to Superintendent 28 or higher. On the other hand, the Office of the Ombudsman,
the provisions of the Constitution;
through the Special Prosecutor who is tasked to represent the People before the
Sec. 2. Section 4 of the same decree [Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended)
Supreme Court except in certain cases, 29 contends that the Sandiganbayan has
is hereby further amended to read as follows:
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade "27" or higher under the jurisdiction pursuant to R.A. 8249.
xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied)

Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.

Sec 4. Jurisdiction The Sandiganbayan shall exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:

A perusal of the aforequoted Section 4 of R.A. 8249 reveals that to fall under the
exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the following requisites must
b. Other offenses or felonies committed by the public officials and employees
concur: (1) the offense committed is a violation of (a) R.A. 3019, as amended (the
mentioned in Subsection a of this section in relation to their office.
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), (b) R.A. 1379 (the law on ill-gotten wealth),
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended,
II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code (the law on
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices c. Civil and criminal cases files pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order (c) Chapter
bribery), 30 (d) Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14, and 14-A, issued in 1986
Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2,
Nos. 1, 2, 14, and 4-A.
(sequestration cases), 31 or (e) other offenses or felonies whether simple or
Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or
complexed with other crimes; (2) the offender comitting the offenses in items (a),
more of the pricipal accused are afficials occupying the
In cases where none of the principal accused are occupying positions
(b), (c) and (e) is a public official or employee 32 holding any of the positions
following positions in the government, whether in a
corresponding
to
salary
Grade
"27"
or
higher,
as
presribed
in
the
said
Republic
Act
enumerated in paragraph a of Section 4; and (3) the offense committed is in
permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the
6758, or PNP officers occupying the rank of superintendent or higher, or their
relation to the office.
commission of the offense:
equivalent, exclusive jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper regional trial

Considering that herein petitioner and intervenors are being charged with murder
which is a felony punishable under Title VIII of the Revised Penal Code, the
governing on the jurisdictional offense is not paragraph a but paragraph b, Section
4 of R.A. 8249. This paragraph b pertains to "other offenses or felonies whether
simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public officials and
employees mentioned in subsection a of (Section 4, R.A. 8249) in relation to their
office. "The phrase" other offenses or felonies" is too broad as to include the crime
of murder, provided it was committed in relation to the accused's officials functions.
Thus, under said paragraph b, what determines the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction is
the official position or rank of the offender that is, whether he is one of those
public officers or employees enumerated in paragraph a of Section 4. The offenses
mentioned in pargraphs a, b and c of the same Section 4 do not make any
reference to the criminal participation of the accused public officer as to whether he
is charged as a principal, accomplice or accessory. In enacting R.A. 8249, the
Congress simply restored the original provisions of P.D. 1606 which does not
mention the criminal participation of the public officer as a requisite to determine
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

substantial distinction that makes real differences. 36 In the first instance, evidence
against them were not yet presented, whereas in the latter the parties had already
submitted their respective proofs, examined witnesses and presented documents.
Since it is within the power of Congress to define the jurisdiction of courts subject
to the constitutional limitations, 37 it can be reasonably anticipated that an alteration
of that jurisdiction would necessarily affect pending cases, which is why it has to
privide for a remedy in the form of a transitory provision. Thus, petitioner and
intervenors cannot now claim that Sections 4 and 7 placed them under a different
category from those similarly situated as them. Precisely, paragraph a of Section 4
provides that it shall apply to "all case involving" certain public officials and, under
the transitory provision in Section 7, to "all cases pending in any court." Contrary to
petitioner and intervenors' argument, the law is not particularly directed only to the
Kuratong Baleleng cases. The transitory provision does not only cover cases which
are in the Sandiganbayan but also in "any court." It just happened that Kuratong
Baleleng cases are one of those affected by the law. Moreover, those cases where
trial had already begun are not affected by the transitory provision under Section 7
of the new law (R.A. 8249).

Petitioner and entervenors' posture that Section 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 violate their
right to equal protection of the law 33 because its enactment was particularly
directed only to the Kuratong Baleleng cases in the Sandiganbayan, is a
contention too shallow to deserve merit. No concrete evidence and convincing
argument were presented to warrant a declaration of an act of the entire Congress
and signed into law by the highest officer of the co-equal executive department as
unconstitutional. Every classification made by law is presumed reasonable. Thus,
the party who challenges the law must present proof of arbitrariness. 34

In their futile attempt to have said sections nullified, heavy reliance is premised on
what is perceived as bad faith on the part of a Senator and two Justices of the
Sandiganbaya 38 for their participation in the passage of the said provisions. In
particular, it is stressed that the Senator had expressed strong sentiments against
those officials involved in the Kuratong Baleleng cases during the hearings
conducted on the matter by the committee headed by the Senator. Petitioner
further contends that the legislature is biased against him as he claims to have
been selected from among the 67 million other Filipinos as the object of the
deletion of the word "principal" in paragraph a, Section 4 of P.D. 1606, as
amended, and of the transitory provision of R.A. 8249. 39 R.A 8249, while still a bill,
was acted, deliberated, considered by 23 other Senators and by about 250
Representatives, and was separately approved by the Senate and House of
Representatives and, finally, by the President of the Philippines.

It is an established precept in constitutional law that the guaranty of the equal

protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable
classification. The classification is reasonable and not arbitrary when there is
concurrence of four elements, namely:
(1) it must rest on substantial distinction;
(2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law;
(3) must not be limited to existing conditions only, and
(4) must apply equaly to all members of the same class, 35

(a) which makes an act done criminal before the passing of the law and which was
innocent when committed, and punishes such action; or
(b) which aggravates a crime or makes it greater than when it was committed; or
(c) which changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law
annexed to the crime when it was committed.
(d) which alters the legal rules of evidence and recieves less or different testimony
that the law required at the time of the commission of the offense on order to
convict the defendant. 43
(e) Every law which, in relation to the offense or its consequences, alters the
situation of a person to his disadvantage. 44
This Court added two more to the list, namely:
(f) that which assumes to regulate civil rights and remedies only but in effect
imposes a penalty or deprivation of a right which when done was lawful;
(g) deprives a person accussed of crime of some lawful protection to which he has
become entitled, such as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a
proclamation of a amnesty. 45

Ex post facto law, generally, prohibits retrospectivity of penal laws. 46 R.A. 8249 is
not penal law. It is a substantive law on jurisdiction which is not penal in character.
Penal laws are those acts of the Legislature which prohibit certain acts and
establish penalties for their violations; 47 or those that define crimes, treat of their
nature, and provide dor their punishment. 48 R.A 7975, which amended P.D. 1606
as regards the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction, its mode of appeal and other
procedural matters, has been declared by the Court as not a penal law, but clearly
On the perceived bias that the Sandiganbayan Justices allegedly had against
a procedural statute, i.e. one which prescribes rules of procedure by which courts
petitioner during the committe hearings, the same would not constitute sufficient
justification to nullify an otherwise valid law. Their presence and participation in the applying laws of all kinds can properly administer justice. 49 Not being a penal law,
legislative hearings was deemed necessary by Congress since the matter before the retroactive application of R.A. 8249 cannot be challenged as unconstitutional.
the committee involves the graft court of which one is the head of the
Sandiganbayan and the other a member thereof. The Congress, in its plenary
Petitioner's and entervenors' contention that their right to a two-tiered appeal which
legislative powers, is particularly empowered by the Constitution to invite persons they acquired under R.A. 7975 has been diluted by the enactment of R.A. 8249, is
to appear before it whenever it decides to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. 40 incorrect. The same contention has already been rejected by the court several

Petitioner and entervenors further further argued that the retroactive application of
all of which are present in this case.
R.A. 8249 to the Kuratong Baleleng cases constitutes an ex post facto law 41 for
they are deprived of their right to procedural due process as they can no longer
The challengers of Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 failed to rebut the presumption of avail of the two-tiered appeal which they had allegedly acquired under R.A. 7975.
constitutionality and reasonables of the questioned provisions. The classification
between those pending cases involving the concerned public officials whose trial
Again, this contention is erroneous. There is nothing ex post facto in R.A. 8249. In
has not yet commence and whose cases could have been affected by the
42
amendments of the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction under R.A. 8249, as against those Calder v. Bull, an ex post facto law is one
cases where trial had already started as of the approval of the law, rests on

times 50 considering that the right to appeal is not a natural right but statutory in
nature that can be regulated by law. The mode of procedure provided for in the
statutory right of appeal is not included in the prohibition against ex post facto laws.
51
R.A. 8249 pertains only to matters of procedure, and being merely an
amendatory statute it does not partake the nature of an ex post facto law. It does
not mete out a penalty and, therefore, does not come within the prohibition. 52
Moreover, the law did not alter the rules of evidence or the mode of trial. 53 It has
been ruled that adjective statutes may be made applicable to actions pending and
unresolved at the time of their passage. 54

In any case; R.A. 8249 has preserved the accused's right to appeal to the
Supreme Court to review questions of law. 55 On the removal of the intermediate
review of facts, the Supreme Court still has the power of review to determine if he
presumption of innocence has been convincing overcome. 56

The remaining question to be resolved then is whether the offense of multiple

murder was committed in relation to the office of the accussed PNP officers.

of specific factual averments to show the intimate relation/connection between the

offense charged and the discharge of official function of the offenders.

There being no unconstitutional infirmity in both the subject amendatory provision

of Section 4 and the retroactive procedural application of the law as provided in
Section 7 of R.A. No. 8249, we shall now determine whether under the allegations
in the Informations, it is the Sandiganbayan or Regional Trial Court which has
jurisdictions over the multiple murder case against herein petitioner and
entervenors.

specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, they being
conclusions of law, but by the actual recital of facts in the complaint or information. That on or about May 18, 1995 in Mariano Marcos Avenue, Quezon City
68
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of his Honorable Court, the accused CHIEF
INSP. MICHAEL RAY AQUINO, CHIEF INSP. ERWIN T. VILLACORTE, SENIOR
INSP. JOSELITO T. ESQUIVEL, INSP. RICARDO G. DANDAN, SPO4 VICENTE
The noble object or written accusations cannot be overemphasized. This was
ARNADO, SPO4 ROBERTO F. LANGCAUON, SPO2 VIRGILIO V. PARAGAS,
explained in U.S. v. Karelsen: 69
SPO2 ROLANDO R. JIMENEZ, SPO1 WILFREDO C. CUARTERO, SPO1
ROBERTO O. AGBALOG, and SPO1 OSMUNDO B. CARINO, all taking
The object of this written accusations was First; To furnish the accused with
advantage of their public and official positions as officers and members of the
such a descretion of the charge against him as will enable him to make his defense Philippine National Police and committing the acts herein alleged in relation to their
and second to avail himself of his conviction or acquittal for protection against a
public office, conspiring with intent to kill and using firearms with treachery evident
further prosecution for the same cause and third, to inform the court of the facts
premeditation and taking advantage of their superior strenghts did then and there
alleged so that it may decide whether they are sufficient in law to support a
willfully unlawfully and feloniously shoot JOEL AMORA, thereby inflicting upon the
conviction if one should be had. In order that the requirement may be satisfied,
latter mortal wounds which caused his instantaneous death to the damage and
facts must be stated, not conclusions of law. Every crime is made up of certain
prejudice of the heirs of the said victim.
acts and intent these must be set forth in the complaint with reasonable particularly
of time, place, names (plaintiff and defendant) and circumstances. In short, the
That accused CHIEF SUPT. JEWEL F. CANSON, CHIEF SUPT. ROMOE M.
complaint must contain a specific allegation of every fact and circumstance
ACOP, CHIEF SUPT. PANFILO M. LACSON, SENIOR SUPT. FRANCISCO G.
necessary to constitute the crime charged. (Emphasis supplied)
ZUBIAM JR., SUPT. ALMARIO A. HILARIO, CHIEF INSP. CESAR O. MANCAO II,
CHIEF INSP. GIL L. MENESES, SENIOR INSP. GLENN DUMLAO, SENIOR INSP.
It is essential, therefore, that the accused be informed of the facts that are imputed ROLANDO ANDUYAN, INSP. CEASAR TANNAGAN, SPO3 WILLY NUAS, SPO3
to him as "he is presumed to have no indefendent knowledge of the facts that
CICERO S. BACOLOD, PO2 ALEJANDRO G. LIWANAG committing the acts in
constitute the offense." 70
relation to office as officers and members of the Philippine National Police are
charged herein as accessories after-the-fact for concealing the crime herein above
Applying these legal principles and doctrines to the present case, we find the
alleged by among others falsely representing that there where no arrest made
amended informations for murder against herein petitioner and intervenors wanting during the read conducted by the accused herein at Superville Subdivision,
Paranaque, Metro Manila on or about the early dawn of May 18, 1995.

In People vs. Montejo, 64 we held that an offense is said to have been committed in In the present case, one of the eleven (11) amended informations 71 for murder
relation to the office if it (the offense) is "intimately connected" with the office of the reads:
Another point. The challenged law does not violate the one-title-one-subject
offender and perpetrated while he was in the performance of his official functions. 65
provision of the Constitution. Much emphasis is placed on the wording in the title of This intimate relation between the offense charged and the discharge of official
AMENDED INFORMATIONS
the law that it "defines" the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction when what it allegedly does duties "must be alleged in the informations." 66
is to "expand" its jurisdiction. The expantion in the jurisdiction of the
The undersigned Special Prosecution Officer III. Office of the Ombudsman hereby
Sandiganbayan, if it can be considered as such, does not have to be expressly
As to how the offense charged be stated in the informations, Section 9, Rule 110 of accuses CHIEF INSP. MICHAEL RAY AQUINO, CHIEF INSP. ERWIN T.
stated in the title of the law because such is the necessary consequence of the
the Revised Rules of Court mandates:
VILLACORTE, SENIOR INSP. JOSELITO T. ESQUIVEL, INSP. RICARDO G.
amendments. The requirement that every bill must only have one subject
DANDAN, SPO4 VICENTE P. ARNADO, SPO4 ROBERTO F. LANGCAUON,
57
expressed in the title is satisfied if the title is comprehensive enough, as in this
Sec.
9
Couse
of
accusation

The
acts
or
omissions
complied
of
as
constituting
SPO2 VIRGILIO V. PARAGAS, SPO2 ROLANDO R. JIMENEZ, SPO1 WILFREDO
case, to include subjects related to the general purpose which the statute seeks to
achieve. 58 Such rule is liberally interpreted and should be given a practical rather the offense must be stated in ordinary and concise language without repetition not C. CUARTERO, SPO1 ROBERTO O. AGBALOG, SPO1 OSMUNDO B. CARINO,
necessarily in the terms of the statute defining the offense, but in such from as is
CHIEF SUPT. JEWEL F. CANSON, CHIEF SUPT. ROMEO M. ACOP, CHIEF
than a technical construction. There is here sufficient compliance with such
sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is
SUPT. PANFILO M. LACSON, SENIOR SUPT. FRANCISCO G. ZUBIA JR., SUPT.
requirement, since the title of R.A. 8249 expresses the general subject (involving
intended to be charged, and enable the court to pronounce proper judgment.
ALMARIO A. HILARIO, CHIEF INSP. CESAR O. MANCAO III, CHIEF INSP. GIL L.
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and the amendment of P.D. 1606, as
(Emphasis
supplied)
MENESES, SENIOR INSP. GLENN DUMLAO, SENIOR INSP. ROLANDO
59
amended) and all the provisions of the law are germane to that general subject.
ANDUYAN, INSP. CEASAR TANNAGAN, SPO3 WILLY NUAS, SPO3 CICERO S.
The Congress, in employing the word "define" in the title of the law, acted within its
BACOLOD, SPO2 NORBERTO LASAGA, PO2 LEONARDO GLORIA, and PO2
power since Section 2, Article VIII of the Constitution itself empowers the legislative As early as 1954 we pronounced that "the factor that characterizes the charge is
ALEJANDRO G. LIWANAG of the crime of Murder as defined and penalize under
67
60
the actual recital of the facts." The real nature of the criminal charge is
body to "define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of various courts.
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code committed as follows
determined not from the caption or preamble of the informations nor from the

The jurisdiction of a court is defined by the Constitution or statute. The elements of

that definition must appear in the complaint or information so as to ascertain which
court has jurisdiction over a case. Hence the elementary rule that the jurisdiction of
a court is determined by the allegations in the complaint or informations, 61 and not
by the evidence presented by the parties at the trial. 62
As stated earlier, the multiple murder charge against petitioner and intervenors falls
under Section 4 [paragraph b] of R.A. 8249. Section 4 requires that the offense
charged must be committed by the offender in relation to his office in order for the
Sandiganbayan to have jurisdiction over it. 63 This jurisdictional requirement is in
accordance with Section 5, Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution which mandated
that the Sandiganbayan shall have jurisdiction over criminal cases committed by
the public officers and employees, including those in goverment-owned or
controlled corporations, "in relation to their office as may be determined by law."
This constitutional mandate was reiterated in the new (1987) Constitution when it
declared in Section 4 thereof that the Sandiganbayan shall continue to function
and exercise its jurisdiction as now or hereafter may be provided by law.

CONTRARY LAW.

policemen appointed and provided by him with pistols and higher power guns and
then established a camp . . . at Tipo-tipo which is under his command . . .
While the above-quoted information states that the above-named principal accused supervision and control where his co-defendants were stationed entertained
committed the crime of murder "in relation to thier public office, there is, however, criminal complaints and conducted the corresponding investigations as well as
assumed the authority to arrest and detain person without due process of law and
no specific allegation of facts that the shooting of the victim by the said principal
without bringing them to the proper court, and that in line with this set-up
accused was intimately related to the discharge of their official duties as police
officers. Likewise, the amended information does not indicate that the said accused established by said Mayor of Basilan City as such, and acting upon his orders his
arrested and investigated the victim and then killed the latter while in their custody. co-defendants arrested and maltreated Awalin Tebag who denied in consequence
thereof.
Even the allegations concerning the criminal participation of herein petitioner and
intevenors as among the accessories after-the-facts, the amended information is
vague on this. It is alleged therein that the said accessories concelead "the crime
herein-above alleged by, among others, falsely representing that there were no
arrests made during the raid conducted by the accused herein at Superville
Subdivision, Paranaque Metro Manila, on or about the early dawn of May 18,
1995." The sudden mention of the "arrests made during the raid conducted by the
accused" surprises the reader. There is no indication in the amended information
that the victim was one of those arrested by the accused during the "raid." Worse,
the raid and arrests were allegedly conducted "at Superville Subdivision,
Paranaque, Metro Manila" but, as alleged in the immediately preceding paragraph
of the amended information, the shooting of the victim by the principal accused
occurred in Mariano Marcos Avenue, Quezon City." How the raid, arrests and
shooting happened in the two places far away from each other is puzzling. Again,
while there is the allegation in the amended information that the said accessories
committed the offense "in relation to office as officers and members of the (PNP),"
we, however, do not see the intimate connection between the offense charged and
the accused's official functions, which, as earlier discussed, is an essential element
in determining the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

we held that the offense charged was committed in relation to the office of the
accused because it was perpetreated while they were in the performance, though
improper or irregular of their official functions and would not have been committed
had they not held their office, besides, the accused had no personal motive in
committing the crime thus, there was an intimate connection between the offense
and the office of the accused.

It is an elementary rule that jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the

complaint or information and not by the result of evidence after trial.
In (People vs) Montejo (108 Phil 613 (1960), where the
amended information alleged

DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Resolution dated
September 29, 1999 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Borongan, Eastern
Samar, Branch 2, which upheld the reinstatement of the criminal case for rape
against petitioner Pablo Condrada, and its Resolution dated January 14, 2000
which denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.

Petitioner was charged with rape in Criminal Case No. 10770 presently pending
before the RTC of Borongan, Eastern Samar, Branch 2. When he was arraigned
Unlike in Montejo the informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 15562 and 15563 in the on February 26, 1999, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge against him.
court below do not indicate that the accused arrested and investigated the victims
and then killed the latter in the course of the investigation. The informations merely On March 31, 1999, the date set by the trial court for the initial hearing, the
prosecution moved that the same be postponed due to the absence of the
allege that the accused for the purpose of extracting or extortin the sum of
P353,000.00 abducted, kidnapped and detained the two victims, and failing in their complainant and her witnesses. The hearing was reset on April 29, 1999.
common purpose they shot; and killed the said victims. For the purpose of
determining jurisdiction, it is these allegations that shall control, and not the
On April 29, 1999, the prosecution again moved to postpone the hearing due to the
evidence presented by the prosecution at the trial.
absence of the complainant and her witnesses. Petitioner objected to the motion

In the aforecited case of People vs. Montejo, it is noteworthy that the phrase
committed in relation to public office "does not appear in the information, which
only signifies that the said phrase is not what determines the jurisdiction of the
The stringent requirement that the charge be set forth with such particularly as will Sandiganbayan. What is controlling is the specific factual allegations in the
reasonably indicate the exact offense which the accused is alleged to have
information that would indicate the close intimacy between the discharge of the
committed in relation to his office was, sad to say, not satisfied. We believe that the accused's official duties and the commission of the offense charged, in order to
mere allegation in the amended information that the offense was committed by the qualify the crime as having been committed in relation to public office.
accused public officer in relation to his office is not sufficient. That phrase is merely
a conclusion between of law, not a factual avernment that would show the close
Consequently, for failure to show in the amended informations that the charge of
intimacy between the offense charged and the discharge of the accused's official
murder was intimately connected with the discharge of official functions of the
duties.
accused PNP officers, the offense charged in the subject criminal cases is plain
In People vs. Magallanes, 72 where the jurisdiction between the Regional Trial
Court and the Sandiganbayan was at issue, we ruled:

PABLO CONDRADA, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND HON.

ARNULFO C. BUGTAS, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Borongan,
Eastern Samar, Branch 2, respondents.

on the ground that his right to speedy trial was being violated by such
postponements. The trial court granted the prosecutions motion and reset the
hearing on May 31, 1999. It also directed that the subpoenae to the complainant
and her witnesses be coursed through the National Bureau of Investigation which
handled the investigation of the case.
During the hearing on May 31, 1999, the prosecution requested for another
postponement. Petitioner moved for at least a temporary dismissal of the case.
The prosecution manifested that it would not object to a temporary dismissal.
Thus, on the same date, the trial court issued an order temporarily dismissing the
case.

murder and, therefore, within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial On June 22, 1999, the prosecution filed a Motion for Reinstatement and/or Revival
Court, 73 not the Sandiganbayan.
of Criminal Case No. 10770. Appended to said motion was the affidavit of private
complainant that the subpoenae sent to her for the trial of the case did not reach
her because in the meantime she had transferred her residence.
WHEREFORE, the constitutionality of Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 is hereby
sustained. The Addendum to the March 5, 1997 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan
is REVERSED. The Sandiganbayan is hereby directed to transfer Criminal Cases The trial court set the hearing on the motion for reinstatement on June 25, 1999.
Nos. 23047 to 23057 (for multiple murder) to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
Petitioner opposed the motion contending that the revival or reinstatement of the
City which has exclusive original jurisdiction over the said cases.1wphi1.nt
case will place him in double jeopardy. On September 29, 1999, the Court issued
SO ORDERED.

Leroy S. Brown City Mayor of Basilan City, as such, has organized groups of police
patrol and civilian commandoes consisting of regular policeman and . . . special
[G.R. No. 141646. February 28, 2003]

a resolution reinstating the said case and reiterating the issuance of a warrant of
arrest for petitioner.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of said resolution insisting that the
reinstatement of the case will place him in double jeopardy.

same was subject to reinstatement within thirty days from the date of the
temporary dismissal. The trial court explained:

On January 14, 2000, the court issued a resolution denying the motion for
reconsideration of petitioner. Consequently, Criminal Case No. 10770 is still
pending before the trial court.

The defense, however, moved for, at least a temporary dismissal of the case, to
which the government prosecutor acceded provided the same is temporary. Thus,
as prayed for by the defense, the court on May 31, 1999 issued an order
dismissing the case temporarily subject to its reinstatement and/or revival within a
period of thirty (30) days; otherwise, if the case is not revived within the aforesaid
period, the case would be considered dismissed permanently.

Aggrieved, petitioner filed the instant petition on February 1, 2000. He claims that
Criminal Case No. 10770 cannot be revived because the dismissal of the case on
May 31, 1999 is permanent in character, having been made in consideration of his
right to speedy trial.
Therefore, it cannot be gainsaid that the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 10770 on
May 31, 1999 was provisional or temporary, without prejudice to the revival thereof
within thirty days from the date of dismissal. Thus, the Court finds that the
The Solicitor General, on the other hand, contends that the case was dismissed
reinstatement thereof on June 25, 1999 did not place petitioner in double jeopardy.
not because petitioners right to speedy trial has been violated by the
postponements of the trial on several instances, but because petitioner through
counsel moved that the case be dismissed at least even temporarily to which the
public prosecutor interposed no objection. The Solicitor General points out that the
prosecution moved for the postponement of the trial several times in good faith and
for valid reasons. He likewise argues that the revival of the case does not place
the petitioner twice in jeopardy for the same offense because the dismissal of the
case on May 31, 1999 was made at petitioners instance.

The proscription against double jeopardy presupposes that an accused has been
previously charged with an offense, and the case against him is terminated either
by his acquittal or conviction, or dismissed in any other manner without his
consent. As a general rule, the following requisites must be present for double
jeopardy to attach: (1) a valid indictment, (2) before a court of competent
jurisdiction, (3) the arraignment of the accused, (4) a valid plea entered by him,
and (5) the acquittal or conviction of the accused, or the dismissal or termination of
The issues for resolution are (1) Whether or not the dismissal of Criminal Case No. the case against him without his express consent. However, there are two
10770 by the trial court in its Order of June 25, 1999 is permanent in character so exceptions to the foregoing rule, and double jeopardy may attach even if the
dismissal of the case was with the consent of the accused: first, when there is
as to operate as an acquittal of the petitioner for the crime charged; and (2)
Whether or not the reinstatement of Criminal Case No. 10770 places the petitioner insufficiency of evidence to support the charge against him; and second, where
there has been an unreasonable delay in the proceedings, in violation of the
in double jeopardy.
accuseds right to speedy trial.
There is no merit in the petition.
A permanent dismissal of a criminal case may refer to the termination of the case
on the merits, resulting in either the conviction or acquittal of the accused; to the
dismissal of the case due to the prosecutions failure to prosecute; or to the
dismissal thereof on the ground of unreasonable delay in the proceedings, in
violation of the accuseds right to speedy disposition or trial of the case against
him. In contrast, a provisional dismissal of a criminal case is a dismissal without
prejudice to the reinstatement thereof before the order of dismissal becomes final
or to the subsequent filing of a new information for the offense within the periods
allowed under the Revised Penal Code or the Revised Rules of Court.

Petitioner is not in danger of being twice put in jeopardy with the reinstatement of
Criminal Case No. 10770 because as earlier stated, said case was provisionally
dismissed by the trial court upon his motion. Thus, the requirement that the
dismissal of the case must be without the consent of the accused is not present in
this case. Neither does the case fall under any of the aforecited exceptions. The
prosecution had not yet presented evidence at the time the case was dismissed on
May 31, 1999. Moreover, as previously explained, said dismissal was temporary in
nature, as the case was subject to reinstatement within thirty days from the date of
dismissal. Hence, the Court finds no error on the part of the trial court in allowing
the reinstatement of Criminal Case No. 10770.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

In the present case, it is clear from the records that the dismissal ordered by the
trial court on May 31, 1999 was a temporary dismissal of the case, and not a
permanent dismissal on the ground that the right of the accused to speedy trial had SO ORDERED.
been violated by the delay in the prosecution of the said case. The trial court
apparently denied petitioners motion to have Criminal Case No. 10770 dismissed
[G.R. No. 180299, January 31, 2008]
on the ground of his right to speedy trial when despite said motion made in open
LYNDON D. BOISER, Petitioner,vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, [1]
court on April 29, 1999, it ordered the resetting of the hearing of the case on May
Respondent.
31, 1999. In subsequently granting petitioners request for the dismissal of
Criminal Case No. 10770 on May 31, 1999, the trial court expressly stated that the

RESOLUTION
NACHURA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari[2] assailing the Decision of the
Court of Appeals (CA), dated June 5, 2007 in CA-G.R. CEB-SP. No. 02368.[3]
The main issue in this case is whether the CA committed reversible error in
affirming the decision of the RTC which denied petitioners omnibus motion to
quash the informations filed against him.
Based on the findings of the CA, the pertinent facts of the case are as follows:
On June 4, 2004, three (3) Informations were filed against petitioner, charging him
with acts of lasciviousness, other acts of child abuse, and rape[4] of minor AAA
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 1, Tagbilaran, Bohol.
On June 11, 2004, petitioner filed a Motion praying that a hearing be conducted to
determine the existence of probable cause and to hold in abeyance the issuance of
a warrant of arrest against him. On June 16, 2004, private respondent filed an
Opposition thereto.
On June, 18, 2004, the family court issued three (3) separate Orders in the three
(3) criminal cases, directing the prosecution to submit additional evidence on the
cases along with the transcript of proceedings during the preliminary investigation.
On June 20, 2004, the prosecutor filed a Manifestation saying that the prosecution
had no additional evidence to present and that due to the non-availability of a
stenographer who could take down notes during the preliminary investigation on
April 28, 2004 and May 7, 2004, he personally took down notes, and submitted
certified photocopies of the same to the court. On July 2, 2004, the family court
directed the City Prosecution Office in Tagbilaran City to complete the preliminary
investigation in a regular manner with duly recorded proceedings attended by a
stenographer. On August 4, 2004, a Reinvestigation Report was submitted by the
prosecutor maintaining the existence of probable cause in the three cases.
On August 9, 2004, petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion for Determination of
Probable Cause. On September 10, 2004, the family court issued three (3)
separate Orders finding probable cause against petitioner in the three (3) cases,
issued a warrant of arrest against him and fixed the corresponding bail for each
case. On November 19 and 24, 2004, petitioner filed Motions to Inhibit the judge of
Branch 1 from hearing the 3 cases. The judge acceded. Thereafter, the cases were
raffled to Branch 2 of the same court. On March 1, 2005, petitioner again filed a
Motion to Inhibit the judge of Branch 2. The same was granted and the case was
raffled to Branch 4 of the same court. Then again, petitioner filed a Motion to Inhibit
the Judge of Branch 4. The three (3) cases were then raffled to Branch 49 of the
said court.
On August 19, 2005, petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion to Quash the three (3)
Informations to which private respondent filed an Opposition. On June 30, 2006,
Branch 49 issued a Joint Order denying the aforesaid motion. A Motion for
Reconsideration was filed by petitioner citing absence of probable cause and lack
of jurisdiction over his person as grounds in support of his motion. However, upon
the request of private respondents parents, the Judge of Branch 49 inhibited
himself from hearing the three (3) cases. Finally, the cases were raffled to Branch 3
of the RTC of Tagbilaran City, Bohol, presided over by Judge Venancio J. Amila
(Judge Amila).

On November 6, 2006, the lower court issued an Omnibus Order denying

petitioners omnibus motion for reconsideration to quash the informations. On
November 22, 2006, petitioner filed anew an Urgent Omnibus Motion to Quash. On
November 30, 2006, the RTC issued an Order denying the second omnibus motion
to quash, and set the arraignment on December 15, 2006. A day before the
arraignment, petitioner filed a Second Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration of the
order denying his motion to quash.
On December 15, 2006, petitioner reminded Judge Amila of his second omnibus
motion for reconsideration. Judge Amila, in open court, denied for lack of merit the
second omnibus motion for reconsideration. Upon arraignment, petitioner refused
to enter a plea for the 3 cases. Accordingly, a plea of not guilty was entered for
petitioner for each of the 3 criminal cases.

to delay the proceedings, a reprehensible tactic that impedes the orderly

administration of justice. If he is truly innocent, petitioner should bravely go to trial
and prove his defense. After all, the purpose of a preliminary investigation is
merely to determine whether a crime has been committed and whether there is
probable cause to believe that the person accused of the crime is probably guilty
thereof and should be held for trial. A finding of probable cause needs only to rest
on evidence showing that more likely than not a crime has been committed and
was committed by the suspect. Probable cause need not be based on clear and
convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing guilt beyond
reasonable doubt, and definitely, not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of
guilt.[12]

One (1) brick of dried marijuana leaves

weighing 721 grams

Six disposable lighter

One (1) roll Aluminum Foil

Several empty plastics (tea bag)

As to the allegation of petitioner that the RTC has not acquired jurisdiction over his
person, this issue has been rendered moot and academic with petitioners
Cash money amounting to P12,536.00 in
On January 2, 2007, petitioner filed a Petition for certiorari[5] before the CA claiming arraignment in the 3 cases and his taking part in the proceedings therein.
that the family court acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the orders
denying his omnibus motions to quash the informations.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
different denominations believed to be proceeds
Costs against the petitioner.
On June 5, 2007, the CA rendered a Decision[6] affirming the Orders of the RTC. In
of the contraband.
denying the petition, the CA ratiocinated that it cannot reverse the RTC orders
SO ORDERED.
because: (1) an order denying a motion to quash is interlocutory and not
[G.R. No. 139615. May 28, 2004]
appealable; and (2) the petitioner failed to positively prove grave abuse of
without first securing the necessary permit/license to possess the same.
discretion on the part of the RTC judge in the issuance of the assailed orders. The
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. AMADEO TIRA and CONNIE
fallo of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED. The assailed TIRA, appellants.
CONTRARY to SEC. 8 in relation to Sec. 20 of RA 6425, as amended.
orders of the respondent judge are hereby AFFIRMED.
Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.[7]
A motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioner which the CA denied in a
Resolution[8] dated September 19, 2007.
On November 16, 2007, petitioner filed the instant case raising the following
arguments:
The Honorable Court of Appeals has decided [a] question of substance, not
theretofore determined by the Supreme Court, or has decided it in a way not in
accord with law or with the applicable decisions of the Supreme Court:
That the Honorable Court of Appeals has so far departed from the accepted and
usual course of judicial proceedings, or so far sanctioned such departure by the
lower court.[9]
We resolve to deny the petition.
A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is not the proper remedy against an order
denying a motion to quash. The accused should instead go to trial, without
prejudice on his part to present the special defenses he had invoked in his motion
and, if after trial on the merits, an adverse decision is rendered, to appeal
therefrom in the manner authorized by law.[10] Based on the findings of the
investigating prosecutor and of the trial judge, probable cause exists to indict
petitioner for the 3 offenses. Absent any showing of arbitrariness on the part of the
investigating prosecutor or any other officer authorized by law to conduct
preliminary investigation, courts as a rule must defer to said officers finding
and determination of probable cause, since the determination of the existence of
probable cause is the function of the prosecutor.[11]
It is obvious to this Court that petitioners insistent filing of numerous motions
to inhibit the judge hearing the 3 criminal cases and of motions to quash is a ploy

DECISION

The Case for the Prosecution

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

In the evening of February 24, 1998, SPO3 Asidelio Manibog received a verbal
instruction from the Chief of Police Superintendent Wilson R. Victorio to conduct
This is an appeal of the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pangasinan, Branch surveillance operations on the house of Amadeo Tira and Connie Tira at Perez
Extension Street because of reported rampant drug activities in the said area.
46, finding appellants Amadeo Tira and Connie Tira guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of violating Section 16, in relation to Section 20, Article III of Republic Act No. Manibog formed a team composed of SPO1 Renato Cresencia, PO3 Reynaldo
Javonilla, Jr. and PO3 Efren Abad de Vera to conduct the ordered surveillance.
6425, known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by Rep. Act No.
7659, sentencing each of them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and
ordering each of them to pay a fine of P1,000.000.
At around 8:00 p.m., the group, clad in civilian clothes, arrived at Perez Extension
Street. As they stationed themselves in the periphery of a store, they observed
that more than twenty persons had gone in and out of the Tira residence. They
confronted one of them, and asked what was going on inside the house. The
person revealed that Amadeo Tira sold shabu, and that he was a regular
The appellants Amadeo Tira and Connie Tira were charged in an Information which
customer. The group went closer to the house and started planning their next
reads:
move. They wanted to pose as buyers, but hesitated, for fear of being identified as
PNP members. Instead, they stayed there up to 12:00 midnight and continued
That on or about March 9, 1998, in the Municipality of Urdaneta, province of
observing the place. Convinced that illegal activities were going on in the house,
Pangasinan and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
the policemen returned to the station and reported to P/Supt. Wilson R. Victorio.
accused, conspiring together, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously After hearing their report, P/Supt. Victorio instructed his men to make an affidavit of
have in their possession, control and custody the following:
surveillance preliminary to an application for a search warrant.
The Indictment

Three (3) (sic) sachets of shabu

-

Six (6) pieces opened sachets of shabu residue

On March 6, 1998, SPO3 Asidelio Manibog, PO3 Efren Abad de Vera, SPO1
Renato Cresencia and PO2 Reynaldo Soliven Javonilla, Jr. executed an Affidavit of
Surveillance, alleging, inter alia, that they were members of the Drug Enforcement
Unit of Urdaneta, Pangasinan, and that in the evening of February 24, 1998, they
confirmed reports of illegal drug-related activities in the house of the spouses

Amadeo and Connie Tira. On March 6, 1998 Police Chief Inspector Danilo
Bumatay Datu filed an Application for a Search Warrant in the Municipal Trial Court
of Urdaneta, Pangasinan, attaching thereto the affidavit of surveillance executed by
his men and a sketch of the place to be searched.

1 pc.

Satisfied with the testimonies of SPO3 Manibog, PO3 de Vera, SPO1 Cresencia
and PO2 Javonilla, Jr., Judge Aurora A. Gayapa issued a search warrant
commanding the applicants to make an immediate search of the Tira residence at
anytime of the day or night, particularly the first room on the right side, and the two
rooms located at Perez south, and forthwith seize and take possession of the
following items:
1.

-P1,000.00 bill
4 pcs.

500.00 bill

52 pcs.

100.00 bill

36 pcs.

50.00 bill

100 pcs.

20.00 bill

53 pcs.

10.00 bill

1 pc.

5.00 bill

Poor Mans Cocaine known as Shabu;

2.

Drug-Usage Paraphernalia; and

3.

Weighing scale.

1 pc.

P/Sr. Inspector Ludivico Bravo, and as head of the team, with SPO3 Cariaga, PO3
Concepcion, Cario, Galima, Villaroya, Andaya, SPO1 Mario Tajon, SPO1 Asterio
Dismaya, SPO1 Renato Cresencia, and PO3 Reynaldo Javonillo were directed to
implement the search warrant. They responded and brought Barangay Kagawad
Mario Conwi to witness the search. At 2:35 p.m. on March 9, 1998, the team
proceeded to the Tira residence. The men found Ernesto Tira, the father of
Amadeo, at the porch of the house. They introduced themselves and told Ernesto
that they had a warrant authorizing them to search the premises. Ernesto led them
inside. The policemen found the newly awakened Amadeo inside the first room of
the house. With Barangay Kagawad Conwi and Amadeo Tira, the policemen
proceeded to search the first room to the right (an inner room) and found the
following under the bed where Amadeo slept:
1.

9 pcs. suspected methamphetamine hydrochloride

placed in heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets

2.

roll aluminum foil

3.

several empty plastic transparent

4.

used and unused aluminum foil

5.

disposable lighters

6.

1 sachet of shabu confiscated from Nelson Tira

The policemen listed the foregoing items they found in the house. Amadeos
picture was taken while he was signing the said certification. Ernesto (Amadeos
father), also witnessed the certification.

A1 to A3, B1 to B6, E POSITIVE to the test for methamphetamine

hydrochloride (shabu), a regulated drug.
C and D1 to D4 POSITIVE to the test for marijuana, a prohibited drug.
CONCLUSION:
Specimens A1 to A3, B1 to B6 and E contain methamphetamine hydrochloride
(Shabu) and specimens C and D1 to D24 contain marijuana.
A criminal complaint was filed by P/Supt. Wilson R. Victorio against Amadeo Tira
and Connie Tira on March 10, 1998 for violation of Rep. Act No. 6425, as
amended. After finding probable cause, Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Rufino A.
Moreno filed an Information against the Tira Spouses for illegal possession of
shabu and marijuana, in violation of Section 8, in relation to Section 20 of Rep. Act
No. 6425. A warrant of arrest was issued against Connie Tira on May 13, 1998.
However, when the policemen tried to serve the said warrant, she could not be
found in the given address. She was arrested only on October 6, 1998.

A joint affidavit of arrest was, thereafter, executed by SPO3 Asidelio Manibog,

SPO1 Mario C. Tajon, SPO1 Asterio T. Dismaya, SPO1 Renato M. Cresencia and
PO3 Reynaldo S. Javonilla, Jr. for the apprehension of Amadeo Tira and Nelson
Tira who were brought to the police station for custodial investigation. The articles During the trial, the court conducted an ocular inspection of the Tira residence.
seized were turned over to the PNP Crime Laboratory, Urdaneta Sub-Office, for
examination. In turn, a laboratory examination request was made to the Chief of
The Case for Accused Amadeo Tira
the Philippine National Police Service-1, Sub-Office, Urdaneta, Pangasinan for the
following:
Amadeo Tira denied the charge. He testified that he was a furniture delivery boy
who owned a one-storey bungalow house with two bedrooms and one masters
a.
Three (3) sachets of suspected methamphetamine
bedroom. There was also another room which was divided into an outer and inner
hydrochloride approximately 0.5 grams;
room; the latter room had no windows or ventilation. The house stood twenty
meters away from Perez Extension Street in Urdaneta, Pangasinan, and could be
b.
Six (6) opened sachets of suspected
reached only by foot. He leased the room located at the western portion to his
methamphetamine hydrochloride (SHABU)
nephew Chris Tira and the latters live-in-partner Gemma Lim for four hundred
residue;
pesos a month. Chris and Gemma were engaged in the buying and selling of
bananas. He denied that there were young men coming in and out of his house.
c.

They also found cash money amounting to P12,536 inside a shoulder bag placed
on top of the television, in the following denominations:

1.00 coin

On March 17, 1998, the PNP Crime Laboratory Group in Physical Science Report
No. DT-057-98 reported that the test conducted by Police Superintendent/Chemist
Theresa Ann Bugayong-Cid, yielded positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride
(shabu) and marijuana. The report contained the following findings:

d.

Twenty-four (4) pieces of dried marijuana leaves

sachet; and
One (1) heat-sealed plastic sachet of suspected
methamphetamine hydrochloride confiscated from
the possession of Nelson Tira.

On March 10, 1998, P/Supt. Wilson R. Victorio executed a Compliance/Return of

Search Warrant.

In the afternoon of March 6, 1998, he was in his house sleeping when the
policemen barged into his house. He heard a commotion and went out of the room
to see what it was all about, and saw police officers Cresencia, Javonilla and
Bergonia, searching the room of his nephew, Chris Tira. He told them to stop
searching so that he could contact his father, Ernesto, who in turn, would call the
barangay captain. The policemen continued with their search. He was then pulled
inside the room and the policemen showed him the items they allegedly found.
Barangay Kagawad Mario Conwi testified that on March 9, 1998, while he was at
Calle Perez, Urdaneta, Pangasinan, Capt. Ludivico Bravo asked to be

accompanied to the Tira residence. Capt. Bravo was with at least ten other
policemen. As they parked the car at Calle Perez, the policemen saw a man
running towards the direction of the ricefields. Kagawad Conwi and some of the
policemen chased the man, who turned out to be Nelson Tira. One of the
policemen pointed to a sachet of shabu which fell to the ground near Nelson. The
policemen arrested him and proceeded to the house of Amadeo Tira to serve the
warrant. When they reached the house, the other policemen were waiting. He saw
Amadeo and Connie Tira sitting by the door of the house in the sala. Thereafter,
he and the policemen started the search. They searched the first room located at
the right side (if facing south), and found marijuana, shabu, money and some
paraphernalia. An inventory of the items seized was made afterwards, which was
signed by Capt. Bravo and Ernesto Tira.

that Amadeo, as owner of the house, had control over the room as well as the
things found therein and that the inner room was a secret and practical place to
keep marijuana, shabu and related paraphernalia.

escort within fifteen (15) days upon receipt of this Order.

house to watch certain programs. In the afternoon of March 9, 1998, she was at
the Tira residence watching Mirasol, while Connie was in the kitchen nursing her
baby. Suddenly, about five or ten persons ran inside the house and handcuffed
Amadeo Tira.

Amadeo appealed the decision.

The Ruling of the Trial Court

The trial court found Connie Tira guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal
possession of 807.3 grams of marijuana and 1.001 gram of shabu. The dispositive
portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, JUDGMENT is hereby rendered CONVICTING beyond reasonable

doubt accused CONNIE TIRA for Illegal Possession of Marijuana weighing 807.3
grams and shabu weighing 1.001 gram penalized under Article III, Section 16 and
After her arrest, Connie filed a motion to quash search warrant, alleging that the
20, of Republic Act 6425, known as [the] Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as
police officers who applied for the said warrant did not have any personal
amended by Republic Act 7659, the Court sentences Connie Tira to suffer the
knowledge of the reported illegal activities. She contended that the same was
issued in violation of Section 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, as the judge issued penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and a fine of P1,000,000.00.
the search warrant without conducting searching questions and answers, and
Alfonso Gallardo, Amadeos neighbor, testified that he was the one who
The amount of P12,536.00 is hereby forfeited in favor of the government which
constructed the Tira residence and that the house initially had two rooms. The first without attaching the records of the proceedings. Moreover, the search warrant
issued
was
in
the
nature
of
a
general
warrant,
to
justify
the
fishing
expedition
forms part of the fine; the marijuana weighing 807.3 grams and shabu weighing
room was rented out, while the second room was occupied by the Spouses
1.001 gram are hereby forfeited in favor of the government; the disposable lighter
Amadeo and Connie Tira. Subsequently, a divider was placed inside the first room. conducted on the premises.
and the aluminum foil are, likewise, forfeited in favor of the government.
He also testified that his house was only three (3) meters away from that of the
On October 26, 1998, the presiding judge ordered Judge Aurora A. Gayapa to
Tiras, and that only a toilet separated their houses. He denied that there were
forward the stenographic notes of the applicant and the witnesses. Connie was
The Warden, Bureau of Jail Management and Penology (BJMP) is hereby ordered
many people going in and out of the Tira residence.
arraigned on November 9, 1998, pending the resolution of the motion. She
to transmit the person of Connie Tira to the National Bilibid Prisons with proper
pleaded
not
guilty
to
the
charge
of
illegal
possession
of
shabu
and
marijuana.
The
escort within fifteen (15) days upon receipt of his Order.
The Ruling of the Trial Court
trial court thereafter issued an Order on November 11, 1998, denying the motion to
quash. It did not give credence to the allegations of Connie Tira, and found that
The trial court did not believe that Connie Tira had no knowledge, control and
The trial court rendered judgment on September 24, 1998, finding Amadeo Tira
Judge Gayapa issued the search warrant after conducting searching questions,
possession of the shabu and marijuana found in the first or inner room of their
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal possession of 807.3 grams of marijuana and in consideration of the affidavit of witness Enrique Milad.
house. It stressed that Connie and Amadeo Tira jointly controlled and possessed
and 1.001 gram of shabu. The decretal portion of its decision is herein quoted:
the shabu and marijuana that the policemen found therein. It ratiocinated that it
Connie testified that she was engaged in the business of buying and selling of
was unusual for a wife not to know the existence of prohibited drugs in the conjugal
WHEREFORE, JUDGMENT is hereby rendered CONVICTING beyond reasonable fruits, while her husband was employed at the Glasshouse Trading. One of the
abode. Thus, as husband and wife, the accused conspired and confederated with
doubt accused AMADEO TIRA for Illegal Possession of Marijuana weighing 807.3 rooms in their house was occupied by their three boarders, two male persons and each other in keeping custody of the said prohibited articles. The court also held
grams and shabu weighing 1.001 gram penalized under Article III, Sections 16 and one female.
that Connie Tiras flight from their house after the search was an indication of her
20, of Republic Act 6425, known as [the] Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as
guilt. Connie, likewise, appealed the decision.
amended by Republic Act 7659. The Court sentences Amadeo Tira to suffer the
In
the
afternoon
of
March
9,
1998,
she
and
her
husband
Amadeo
were
in
their
penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and a fine of P1,000,000.00.
house, while their boarders were in their respective rooms. At 2:30 p.m., she was The Present Appeal
in the kitchen taking care of her one-year-old child. She had other three children,
The amount of P12,536.00 is hereby forfeited in favor of the government which
aged eight, four, and three, respectively, who were watching television. Her
In their brief, the appellants Amadeo and Connie Tira assigned the following errors
forms part of the fine; the marijuana weighing 807.3 grams and shabu weighing
husband Amadeo was sleeping in one of the rooms. Suddenly, five policemen
committed by the trial court:
1.001 gram are hereby forfeited in favor of the government; the disposable lighter barged into their house and searched all the rooms. The policemen found and
and the aluminum foil are likewise forfeited in favor of the government.
seized articles in the room occupied by one of their boarders. They arrested
I
Amadeo, and her brother-in-law, Nelson Tira, and brought them to the police
The Branch Clerk of Court of this Court is hereby ordered to prepare the mittimus. station. The boarders, however, were not arrested.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANTS
The Warden, Bureau of Jail Management and Penology (BJMP) is hereby ordered Joy Fernandez, a neighbor of the Tiras, lived approximately ten meters away from DESPITE FAILURE ON THE PART OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE THEIR
GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
to transmit the person of Amadeo Tira to the National Bilibid Prison with proper
the latter. Since they had no television, she frequently went to her neighbors

The trial court upheld the validity of Search Warrant No. 3 issued by Judge Aurora
Gayapa. It found Amadeos defense, that the room where the items were seized
was rented out to the couple Cris Tira and Gemma Lim, unsubstantiated. It held

The Case Against Connie Tira

II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE SEARCH WAS
ILLEGALLY MADE.

III
ASSUMING THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT AMADEO TIRA IS GUILTY AS
CHARGED, THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THERE WAS A
CONSPIRACY BETWEEN HIM AND HIS WIFE CONNIE TIRA.
The Court shall resolve the assigned errors simultaneously as they are
interrelated.
The appellants contend that the search conducted by the policemen in the room
occupied by Chris and Gemma Lim, where the articles and substances were found
by the policemen, was made in their absence. Thus, the search was made in
violation of Section 7, Rule 126 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, which
provides:
SEC. 7. Search of house, room, or premise, to be made in presence of two
witnesses. No search of house, room, or any other premise shall be made except
in the presence of the lawful occupant thereof or any member of his family or in the
absence of the latter, in the presence of two witnesses of sufficient age and
discretion residing in the same locality.
The appellants posit that the articles and substances found by the policemen in
their house are inadmissible in evidence, being the fruits of a poisonous tree.
Hence, they contend, they should have been acquitted of the crime charged. The
appellants further assert that the prosecution failed to prove that they owned the
prohibited drugs, and that the same were in their possession and control when
found by the policemen. They insist that it cannot be presumed that they were in
control and possession of the said substances/articles simply because they owned
the house where the same were found, considering that the room was occupied by
Chris Tira and his live-in partner, Gemma Lim.
The appellant Connie Tira avers that she never fled from their house after the
policemen had conducted the search. Neither was she arrested by the policemen
when they arrested her husband.
The appeals have no merit.
Contrary to the appellants claim, appellant Amadeo Tira was present when the
policemen searched the inner room of the house. The articles and substances
were found under the bed on which the appellant Amadeo Tira slept. The
policemen did not find the said articles and substances in any other room in the
house:
Q So when you reached the house of Amadeo Tira at the Tiras compound, you
saw the father and you told him you are implementing the Search Warrant and
your group was allowed to enter and you are allowed to search in the presence of
Amadeo Tira?
A Yes, Sir.

PROS. DUMLAO
Q In the course of your search, what did you find?
WITNESS:
A We found out suspected marijuana leaves, Sir.
Q Where, in what particular place did you find?
A Under the bed inside the room of Amadeo Tira, Sir
Q What else did you find aside from marijuana leaves?
A We also find suspected sachet of shabu, Sir.
Q What else?
A Lighter, Sir.
COURT:
Q If that shabu will be shown to you, could you identify the same?
WITNESS:
A Yes, Sir.
Q About the marijuana leaves, if shown to you could you identify the same?
A Yes, Sir.
PROS. DUMLAO:
Q What else did you find out aside from the marijuana leaves, shabu and lighter?

A I have here the list, Sir.

One (1) brick of marijuana
24 pcs. tea bag of marijuana
9 pcs. sachets of suspected shabu
6 disposable lighters
1 roll of aluminum foil
several empty plastic; several used
and unused aluminum foil
one (1) sachet of shabu confiscated from Nelson Tira; and
P12,536.00 cash in different denominations proceeds of the contrand (sic).
COURT:
Q Where did you find the money?

A Near the marijuana at the bag, Sir.

Q About the money, could you still identify if shown to you?
A Yes, Sir.
Q When you found shabu, lighter, marijuana, and money, what did you do?
A We marked them, Sir.
Q All of the items?
A Only the marijuana, Sir.
Q What mark did you place?
A My signature, Sir.

PROS. TOMBOC:

Q And when you were allowed to enter the house, did you notice who was
present?
A I noticed the presence of Connie Tira, Sir.
Q When you said Connie Tira, is she the same Connie Tira the accused in this
case?
A Yes, Sir, she was taking care of the baby.
Q Who else?
A We also noticed the presence of Amadeo Tira, Sir.
Q What was he doing there?
A He was newly awake, Sir.
Q Upon entering the house, what did you do?
A We entered and searched the first room, Sir.
Q What did you find out?
A Shabu and Marijuana and paraphernalia, Sir.

Q Are you one of those who entered the house?

A Yes, Sir.
Q Can you mention to the Honorable Court those items that you searched in the
house of Connie Tira and Amadeo Tira?
A As per in (sic) our records, we found three (3) sachets containing suspected
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride Shabu residue; one (1) brick of suspected dried
marijuana leaves weighing more or less 750 grams; twenty-four (24) tea bags
containing dried marijuana leaves; six (6) disposable lighter; one (1) roll aluminum
foil; several empty plastics (tea bag); several used and unused aluminum foil; and
cash money amounting to P12,536.00 in different denominations believe[d] to be
proceeds of the contraband, Sir.
Q You said you recovered one (1) brick of marijuana leaves, showing to you a
(sic) one (1) brick suspected to be marijuana leaves, is this the one you are
referring to?
A Yes, Sir, this is the one.
Appellant Amadeo Tira was not the only witness to the search; Kagawad Mario
Conwi and Ernesto Tira, Amadeos father, were also present. Ernesto Tira even led
the policemen inside the house. This is evidenced not only by the testimony of
Kagawad Conwi, but also by the certification signed by the appellant himself, along
with Kagawad Conwi and Ernesto Tira.
The trial court rejected the testimony of appellant Amadeo Tira that the inner room
searched by the policemen was occupied by Chris Tira and his girlfriend Gemma
Lim with the following encompassing disquisition:
The defense contention that a couple from Baguio City first occupied the first
room, the Court is not persuaded because they did not present said businessmen
from Baguio City who were engaged in vegetable business. Secondly, the same
room was rented by Chris Tira and Gemma Lim. Chris Tira and Gemma Lim,
engaged in banana business, were not presented in Court. If it were true that
Chris Tira and Gemma Lim were the supposed lessees of the room, they should
have been apprehended by the searching party on March 9, 1998, at about 2:30
p.m. There was no proof showing that Chris Tira and Gemma Lim ever occupied
the room, like personal belongings of Chris Tira and Gemma Lim. The defense did
not even show proof showing that Chris Tira reside in the first room, like clothings,
toothbrush, soap, shoes and other accessories which make them the residents or
occupants of the room. There were no kitchen plates, spoons, powder, or soap
evidencing that the said room was occupied by Chris Tira and Gemma Lim.
Amadeo Tira contended that Chris Tira and Gemma Lim are engaged in banana
business. There are no banana stored in the room at the time of the search and
both of them were out of the room at the time of the search. And why did not
Amadeo Tira supply the police officers of the personal identities and address
where they could find Chris Tira and Gemma Lim at the time of the search. If they
were banana dealers, they must be selling their banana in the market and they
could have pointed them in the market.
We are in full accord with the trial court. It bears stressing that the trial court
conducted an ocular inspection of the house of the appellants, and thus, had first
hand knowledge of the layout of the house. Besides, the testimony of the
appellant Amadeo Tira, that the inner room was occupied by Chris Tira and
Gemma Lim who were not there when the search was conducted, is belied by the

testimony of the appellant Connie Tira that the room was occupied by two male
and one female boarders who were in the room when the policemen searched it.
Thus:
Q You said that while taking care of your baby, several policemen barged [sic]
your house?

A Yes, Sir.
Q And they proceeded to your room where your husband was sleeping at that
time?
A Yes, Sir.
Q And it is in that room where your husband was sleeping and where those
articles were taken?
A No, Sir.
Q Where are (sic) those things came (sic) from?
A At the room where my boarders occupied, Sir.
Q So, at that time where were those boarders?
A They were inside their room, Sir.
Q How many of them?
A Two (2) male persons and one woman, Sir.
Q And do you know their whereabout[s], Madam Witness?
A No more, Sir.
Q When did they leave, Madam Witness?
A At that time, they left the house, Sir.
Q They were not investigated by the police?
A No, Sir.

Thus, conviction need not be predicated upon exclusive possession, and a

showing of non-exclusive possession would not exonerate the accused. Such fact
of possession may be proved by direct or circumstantial evidence and any
reasonable inference drawn therefrom. However, the prosecution must prove that
the accused had knowledge of the existence and presence of the drug in the place
under his control and dominion and the character of the drug. Since knowledge by
the accused of the existence and character of the drugs in the place where he
exercises dominion and control is an internal act, the same may be presumed from
the fact that the dangerous drug is in the house or place over which the accused
has control or dominion, or within such premises in the absence of any satisfactory
explanation.
In this case, the prohibited and regulated drugs were found under the bed in the
inner room of the house of the appellants where they also resided. The appellants
had actual and exclusive possession and control and dominion over the house,
including the room where the drugs were found by the policemen. The appellant
Connie Tira cannot escape criminal liability for the crime charged simply and
merely on her barefaced testimony that she was a plain housewife, had no
involvement in the criminal actuations of her husband, and had no knowledge of
the existence of the drugs in the inner room of the house. She had full access to
the room, including the space under the bed. She failed to adduce any credible
evidence that she was prohibited by her husband, the appellant Amadeo Tira, from
entering the room, cleaning it, or even sleeping on the bed. We agree with the
findings and disquisition of the trial court, viz:

We agree with the finding of the trial court that the only occupants of the house
when the policemen conducted their search were the appellants and their young
children, and that the appellants had no boarders therein.

The Court is not persuaded that Connie Tira has no knowledge, control and
possession of the shabu and marijuana (Exhibits M, N, O and P) found in
their room. Connie Tira and Amadeo Tira jointly control and possess the shabu
(Exhibits M and N) and marijuana (Exhibits O and P) found in the room of
their house. It is unusual for a wife not to know the existence in their conjugal
Before the accused may be convicted of violating Section 8 of Republic Act No.
abode, the questioned shabu and marijuana. The husband and wife (Amadeo and
6425, as amended by Rep. Act No. 7659, the prosecution is burdened to prove
Connie) conspired and confederated with each other the keeping and custody of
beyond reasonable doubt the essential elements of the crime, viz: (1) the actual
possession of an item or object which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such said prohibited articles. Both of them are deemed in possession of said articles in
violation of R.A. 6425, Section 8, in relation to Section 20.
possession is not authorized by law; and, (3) the accused freely or consciously
possessed the said drug.
The Crimes Committed by the Appellants
The essential elements of the crime of possession of regulated drugs are the
following: (a) the accused is found in possession of a regulated drug; (b) the
person is not authorized by law or by duly constituted authorities; and, (c) the
accused has knowledge that the said drug is a regulated drug. This crime is mala
prohibita, and, as such, criminal intent is not an essential element. However, the
prosecution must prove that the accused had the intent to possess (animus
posidendi) the drugs. Possession, under the law, includes not only actual
possession, but also constructive possession. Actual possession exists when the
drug is in the immediate physical possession or control of the accused. On the
other hand, constructive possession exists when the drug is under the dominion
and control of the accused or when he has the right to exercise dominion and
control over the place where it is found. Exclusive possession or control is not
necessary. The accused cannot avoid conviction if his right to exercise control and
dominion over the place where the contraband is located, is shared with another.

The trial court convicted the appellants of violating Section 16, in relation to
Section 20, of Rep. Act No. 6425, as amended. The Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) asserts that the appellants should be convicted of violating Section 8 of
Rep. Act No. 6425, as amended. We do not agree with the trial court and the
OSG. We find and so hold that the appellants are guilty of two separate crimes:
(a) possession of regulated drugs under Section 16, in relation to Section 20, of
Rep. Act No. 6425, as amended, for their possession of methamphetamine
hydrochloride, a regulated drug; and, (b) violation of Section 8, in relation to
Section 20 of the law, for their possession of marijuana, a prohibited drug.
Although only one Information was filed against the appellants, nevertheless, they
could be tried and convicted for the crimes alleged therein and proved by the
prosecution. In this case, the appellants were charged for violation of possession
of marijuana and shabu in one Information which reads:

That on or about March 9, 1998, in the Municipality of Urdaneta, province of

Pangasinan, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring together, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
have in their possession, control and custody the following:
-

Three (3) pieces (sic) sachets of shabu

-

Six (6) pieces opened sachets of shabu residue

One (1) brick of dried marijuana leaves weighing 721 grams

-

Twenty-four (24) tea bags of dried marijuana leaves

weighing 86.3 grams

Six [6] disposable lighter

One (1) roll Aluminum foil

Several empty plastics (tea bag)

-

Cash money amounting to P12,536.00 in different

denominations believed to be proceeds of the
contraband.

without first securing the necessary permit/license to posses[s] the same.

CONTRARY TO SEC. 8, in relation to Sec. 20 of R.A. 6425, as amended.
The Information is defective because it charges two crimes. The appellants should
have filed a motion to quash the Information under Section 3, Rule 117 of the
Revised Rules of Court before their arraignment. They failed to do so. Hence,
under Rule 120, Section 3 of the said rule, the appellants may be convicted of the
crimes charged. The said Rule provides:
SEC. 3. Judgment for two or more offenses. - When two or more offenses are
charged in a single complaint or information but the accused fails to object to it
before trial, the court may convict him of as many offenses as are charged and
proved, and impose on him the penalty for each offense, setting out separately the
findings of fact and law in each offense.
The Proper Penalties On the Appellants
The crime of violation of Section 8, Article II of Rep. Act No. 6425, as amended, for
illegal possession of 807.3 grams of marijuana, a prohibited drug, is punishable by
reclusion perpetua to death. Considering that there are no qualifying
circumstances, the appellants are sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion

perpetua, conformably to Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code and are ordered to
pay a fine of P500,000.00.
Under Section 16, Article III of Rep. Act No. 6425, as amended, the imposable
penalty of possession of a regulated drug, less than 200 grams, in this case,
shabu, is prision correccional to reclusion perpetua. Based on the quantity of the
regulated drug subject of the offense, the imposable penalty shall be as follows:
QUANTITY
Less than one (1) gram to 49.25 grams
49.26 grams to 98.50 grams
98.51 grams to 147.75 grams
temporal
147.76 grams to 199 grams

IMPOSABLE PENALTY
prision correccional
prision mayor
reclusion

DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

which induced the Bermundos to deliver to the accused their (sic) amount of
P68,700.00 which amount accused applied and used for her own benefit to the
damage and prejudice of Junimar and Rosalie Bermundo.

This resolves the petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) promulgated on October 28, 2003, and the
CA Resolution dated February 23, 2004, denying petitioners motion for
reconsideration; together with the letter of petitioner dated January 18, 2005 which
was treated by the Court as a petition for habeas corpus alleging that the Decision
dated July 2, 1997 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las Pias City, Branch 275,
imposed upon petitioner an erroneous and excessive penalty.

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is rendered finding

accused GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as charged which is punished under
Article 315, par. 2 (a), and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, accused
MARY HELEN ESTRADA is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison
term of TWELVE (12) YEARS of prision mayor maximum as minimum to TWENTYFOUR (24) YEARS as maximum; to pay back the sum of P68,700.00 to Junimar
Bermundo and Rosalie Bermundo; and to pay the costs. 2

The present case has its origin in a criminal case filed against petitioner. An
Information charging petitioner with estafa was filed with the RTC of Las Pias City.
In view of the fact that petitioner jumped bail, the RTC issued an Order dated May
14, 1997, considering petitioner to have waived her right to present evidence.
Thus, the RTC rendered judgment based only on prosecution evidence and made
the following conclusions:

In a petition for certiorari and/or mandamus filed with the CA, petitioner assailed
the decision of the RTC, alleging the same to be null and void for having been
rendered in violation of petitioners constitutional rights.

Junimar Bermundo applied for employment in Japan with the accused. Accused
collected money from Junimar and his wife in the total amount of P68,700.00.

On October 24, 1994, Asst. Provincial Prosecutor Danilo Uy filed an Information for
estafa against petitioner Mary Helen B. Estrada docketed as Criminal Case No. 946230

The proceedings that transpired in the trial court are accurately set forth in the
Decision of the CA dated October 28, 2003, as follows:

reclusion perpetua

Considering that the regulated drug found in the possession of the appellants is
only 1.001 grams, the imposable penalty for the crime is prision correccional.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the appellants are sentenced to suffer
an indeterminate penalty of from four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor
in its medium period as minimum, to three (3) years of prision correccional in its
medium period as maximum, for violation of Section 16 of Rep. Act No. 6425, as
amended.

These payments were all evidenced by various receipts bearing different dates.

Junimar and his wife were able to pay the accused by using the money they
obtained from a loan with the Luzon Development Bank using their parcel of land
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, appellants Amadeo and Connie Tira are
found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 8, Article II of Rep. Act located at Pangao, Lipa City as collateral (Exh. "L").
No. 6425, as amended, and are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua, and ORDERED to pay a fine of P1,000,000.00. The said
After making the necessary payments, the accused told Junimar to proceed to the
appellants are, likewise, found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of violating
Japanese Embassy to claim the plane tickets in December 1993, but when they
Section 16, Article III of Rep. Act No. 6425, as amended, and are sentenced to
went to the Japanese Embassy, they were told that nothing was filed with their
suffer an indeterminate penalty of from Four (4) Months and One (1) Day of arresto office. Junimar then informed the accused what happened and the latter
mayor in its medium period as minimum, to Three (3) years of prision correccional, accompanied him the second time to the Japanese Embassy. It was only at that
in its medium period, as maximum.
time that accused filed the necessary documents. Accused told them that if they
would use the name of her daughter, the processing of their papers would be faster
because her daughter performs outside the country.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 162371. August 25, 2005
MARY HELEN ESTRADA, Petitioners,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and HON. BONIFACIO SANZ MACEDA,
Respondent.

On January 23, 1995, petitioner signed an undertaking that in case of her failure to
appear during the trial despite due notice, her absence would constitute as an
express waiver of her right to be present during trial and promulgation of judgment
and the lower court would then proceed with the hearing in absentia.
During the hearing on May 30, 1996, Atty. Ma. Nenette Quicho, counsel for
petitioner, failed to appear. On motion of the private prosecutor, the lower court
directed Atty. Ma. Nenette Quicho to explain in writing within ten (10) days from
notice why she should not be cited for contempt.
After the presentation of evidence for the prosecution on March 31, 1997, the lower
court scheduled the reception of evidence for the petitioner on May 14, 1997.
Counsel for petitioner failed to explain her absence in the previous hearing. She
was found guilty of contempt of court and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of
one (1) day imprisonment.

However, in the early part of 1994, the Japanese Embassy wrote a letter to
Junimar requiring them to submit documents but the accused failed to produce
these documents. Junimar then decided to abandon his plan of going to Japan and On May 14, 1997, in view of the fact that petitioner jumped bail, the lower court
just get the money from the accused. Accused, however, failed to return the money considered her to have waived the presentation of her evidence and declared the
despite receipt of a demand letter the witness made (Exh. "I" & "J", tsn, Sept. 5,
case submitted for decision.
1995, pp. 2-9).
On June 13, 1997, a Notice of Appearance with Motion for Presentation of
Under the established facts, accused indeed deceived Junimar Bermundo and
Evidence for the Defense was filed by Atty. Herenio E. Martinez, as collaborating
Rosalie Bermundo by means of false pretenses and fraudulent misrepresentations counsel for petitioner. He argued among others, that the fact that despite trial in

absentia and accuseds (petitioner) failure to surrender, still petitioner could present
her evidence in support of her defense because there were other witnesses who
would testify for her. Hence, she prayed that the scheduled date for promulgation
of decision (June 18, 1997) be cancelled and she be allowed to present her
evidence.
However, the subject decision was promulgated on July 2, 1997, convicting
petitioner of the crime charged.

discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when he denied petitioners

motion for reconsideration of the decision and/or motion for new trial; neither
petitioner nor her counsel has officially received a copy of the RTC decision,
hence, the same has not yet become final and executory at the time petitioner filed
her motion for reconsideration and/or new trial; the RTC judge acted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when he denied due
course to petitioners appeal because petitioner filed her notice of appeal well
within the fifteen-day period within which to appeal, thus, it was the mandatory duty
of the RTC judge to approve the notice of appeal.

The Decision was entered in the Docket Book on September 3, 1997.

On October 28, 2003, the CA promulgated its decision denying the petition for
certiorari. The CA held that there was no grave abuse of discretion committed by
On December 1, 1999, petitioner moved for reconsideration and/or new trial stating the RTC judge as his actions were anchored on Section 14 (2), Article III of the
that her constitutional rights to be heard and to counsel were violated for the
1987 Constitution which states that "after arraignment, trial may proceed
following reasons:
notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly
notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable," and on Section 1(c), Rule 115 of
(1) counsel for petitioner was not served a copy of the Order dated March 31, 1997 the Rules of Court which provides that "[t]he absence of the accused without
citing her for contempt of court;
justifiable cause at the trial of which he had notice shall be considered a waiver of
his right to be present thereat." The CA further held that "[t]he deprivation of her
right to present evidence in her defense shall be deemed to include the non(2) counsel for petitioner was not served any copy of the Order dated May 14,
1997 declaring petitioner to have waived her right to present evidence and set the admission of the testimonies of the other witnesses other than the petitioner
herself. This must be so because the deprivation of her opportunity to present
date of promulgation of decision on June 18, 1994 (sic) at 2:00 p.m.;
evidence due to unreasonable absences on the scheduled hearings is primarily
intended to safeguard the orderly administration of justice." Thus, the CA
(3) the order dated July 18, 1997 denying the motion for reception of petitioners
concluded that the trial courts action was well within its jurisdiction.
evidence was not furnished counsel for petitioner and it came after the judgment of
conviction; and
The CA did not dwell on the propriety of the penalty imposed on petitioner although
petitioner raised it as one of the issues in the petition. In her motion for
(4) the penalty imposed was beyond that allowed by law.
reconsideration of the CA Decision, petitioner called the CAs attention to this fact,
and also pointed out that although petitioner, by failing to appear at several trial
On March 6, 2000 the motion for reconsideration was denied for lack of merit.
dates, may be deemed to have waived her right to be present during the
proceedings, such waiver does not include a waiver of her right to present
On April 5, 2000 petitioner filed her notice of appeal but was denied due course in evidence. On February 23, 2004, the CA issued a resolution denying the motion for
reconsideration for lack of merit.
an Order dated April 5, 2000.3

imposed on her. Thus, in said administrative case, the Court issued a Resolution
dated March 9, 2005, resolving to treat petitioners letter as a petition for habeas
corpus and ordered the Office of the Solicitor General to comment on said letterpetition. Thereafter, the Office of the Solicitor General filed its Comment where it
was manifested that there is a pending petition for review on certiorari with the
Court which turned out to be the herein petition under consideration, involving the
issue of the penalty imposed on petitioner.
Thus, in a Resolution dated July 5, 2005, the Court resolved to consolidate the
letter/petition for habeas corpus with the instant petition for review on certiorari.
Petitioner alleges that the CA erred in deciding the case in a way not in accord with
law or jurisprudence and departed from the usual course of judicial proceedings. In
support of said allegations, petitioner reiterated her arguments that the trial court
denied her the constitutional right to be heard and to be assisted by counsel by
failing to furnish her counsel copies of the order setting the date for reception of
defense evidence on May 14, 1997, and the order considering petitioner to have
waived her right to present evidence in her defense; that the decision of the trial
court was null and void for imposing a penalty not authorized by law; that inasmuch
as the decision was null and void, the trial court acted with grave abuse of
discretion in denying petitioners motion for reconsideration and/or new trial on the
ground that the assailed decision had become final; and that the CA utterly failed to
resolve petitioners submission that the trial courts decision was null and void by
virtue of the excessive penalty imposed.
At the outset, the undisputed fact that petitioner jumped bail while trial was pending
should be emphasized. In fact, it appears that from the beginning, the address she
furnished the trial court was incorrect. The trial courts process server, Nap
Manguserra, made a note on the subpoena he was trying to serve on petitioner,
that "per ocular inspection made, said address is a vacant lot subject person is
unknown to her neighbors.6 From such fact alone, petitioners arguments
regarding the validity of the proceedings and promulgation of judgment in absentia
for being in violation of her constitutional right to due process are doomed to fail.

The holding of trial in absentia is authorized under Section 14 (2), Article III of the
1987 Constitution which provides that "after arraignment, trial may proceed
notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly
Previously, however, petitioner had filed an administrative case (A.M. OCA IPI No. notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable." In fact, in People vs. Tabag,7 the
00-1002-RTJ) against Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda of the RTC of Las Pias City, Court even admonished the trial court for failing to proceed with the trial of some
Branch 275 for gross ignorance of the law. In a Resolution dated August 13, 2001, accused who escaped from preventive detention, to wit:
the Court dismissed said administrative complaint but issued a stern reminder to
Petitioners appeal was denied due course by the trial court in its Order dated April respondent judge to be more cautious in computing the appropriate penalty in the Finally, the trial court also erred in not proceeding with the case against Laureo
5, 2000 for having been filed beyond the reglementary period.5 She then filed the future to avoid injustice.
Awod and Artemio Awod after their successful escape on 19 October 1989 while in
aforementioned petition for certiorari and/or mandamus with the CA, alleging that:
preventive detention. They had already been arraigned. Therefore, pursuant to
the RTC judge violated petitioners constitutional right to due process by depriving In connection with said administrative case, petitioner, who is presently detained at the last sentence of paragraph (2), Section 14, Article III of the Constitution,
petitioner of the right to be assisted by counsel during the proceedings and failing the Correctional Institution for Women, sent a letter dated January 18, 2005,
trial against them should continue and upon its termination, judgment
to notify petitioner of the scheduled presentation of defense evidence; the RTC
wherein she emphasized that although the Courts Resolution of August 13, 2001 should be rendered against them notwithstanding their absence unless, of
judge imposed upon petitioner a penalty which was not authorized under the law
issued such stern warning to respondent judge, the same resolution did not give
course, both accused have died and the fact of such death is sufficiently
for which petitioner had been charged; the RTC judge acted with grave abuse of
any relief for the injustice she is now suffering due to the erroneous penalty
established. Conformably with our decision in People v. Salas, their escape
It also appears from the records that on September 13, 1999, petitioner was
arrested and detained at the Las Pias Police Station.4 This was a little over two
years after the judgment of conviction against her had been entered in the criminal
docket book on September 3, 1997, and prior to the filing of a motion for
reconsideration and/or new trial with the trial court on December 1, 1999.

Hence, petitioner filed the present petition for review on certiorari.

should have been considered a waiver of their right to be present at their

trial, and the inability of the court to notify them of the subsequent hearings
did not prevent it from continuing with their trial. They were to be deemed to
have received notice. The same fact of their escape made their failure to appear
unjustified because they have, by escaping, placed themselves beyond the pale
and protection of the law. This being so, then pursuant to Gimenez v. Nazareno,
the trial against the fugitives, just like those of the others, should have been
brought to its ultimate conclusion. Thereafter, the trial court had the duty to rule
on the evidence presented by the prosecution against all the accused and to
render its judgment accordingly. It should not wait for the fugitives reappearance or re-arrest. They were deemed to have waived their right to
present evidence on their own behalf and to confront and cross-examine the
witnesses who testified against them.

upon the veracity of the CAs factual findings and conclusion is not the function of
the Supreme Court for the Court is not a trier of facts."
With the finding that petitioner and her counsel were duly notified of the hearing
dates for reception of defense evidence and the decision of the trial court, in
addition to the undisputed fact that petitioner jumped bail when trial of her case
was pending, petitioners argument that the RTC Decision was null and void for
having been rendered in violation of petitioners constitutional right to due process,
i.e., the right to be heard and be assisted by counsel, must also fail.
Due process is satisfied when the parties are afforded a fair and reasonable
opportunity to explain their respective sides of the controversy.13

shall be served upon the accused or counsel. If the judgment is for conviction and
the accuseds failure to appear was without justifiable cause, the court shall further
order the arrest of the accused, who may appeal within fifteen (15) days from
notice of the decision to him or his counsel. (Italics supplied)
Clearly, promulgation of judgment in absentia is allowed under the Rules. Hence, in
Pascua vs. Court of Appeals,14 it was held that such promulgation is valid provided
the following essential elements are present: (a) that the judgment be recorded in
the criminal docket; and (b) that a copy thereof be served upon the accused or
counsel. The factual circumstances in said case are analogous to the case at bar.

In Pascua, the promulgation of judgment in said case was set on May 5, 1998.
When the case was first called on that date, petitioner was not present although
her counsel of record was in court. The case was set for second call. After the
In
the
present
case,
petitioner
was
afforded
such
opportunity.
The
trial
court
set
a
It is obvious that the trial court forgot our rulings in Salas and Nazareno. We thus
lapse of two hours, the accused still had not appeared, thus, the dispositive portion
hearing on May 14, 1997 for reception of defense evidence, notice of which was
take this opportunity to admonish trial judges to abandon any cavalier stance
of the decision was read in open court. Afterwards, counsel for the accused
duly sent to the addresses on record of petitioner and her counsel, respectively.
against accused who escaped after arraignment, thereby allowing the latter to
received a copy of the decision, and upon motion of the prosecution, the trial court
When
they
failed
to
appear
at
the
May
14,
1997
hearing,
they
later
alleged
that
make a mockery of our laws and the judicial process. Judges must always keep in
they were not notified of said setting. Petitioners counsel never notified the court of ordered the issuance of a warrant of arrest and forfeiture of accuseds cash bond.
mind Salas and Nazareno and apply without hesitation the principles therein laid
No motion for reconsideration or notice of appeal was filed by the accused within
any change in her address, while petitioner gave a wrong address from the very
down, otherwise they would court disciplinary action.8 (Emphasis supplied)
beginning, eventually jumped bail and evaded court processes. Clearly, therefore, 15 days from May 5, 1998. On June 8, 1998, accused, without discharging her
counsel of record, filed through another lawyer a notice of change of address,
petitioner and her counsel were given all the opportunities to be heard. They
From the foregoing pronouncement, it is quite clear that all of petitioners
cannot now complain of alleged violation of petitioners right to due process when it together with an omnibus motion to lift warrant of arrest and confiscation of bail
protestations that she was denied due process because neither she nor her
bond, and also to set anew the promulgation of the decision, alleging that the
was by their own fault that they lost the opportunity to present evidence.
counsel received notices of the trial courts orders are all to naught, as by the mere
accused failed to appear at the scheduled promulgation because notices for said
fact that she jumped bail and could no longer be found, petitioner is considered to
schedule were sent to her former address, hence she was not able to receive any
have waived her right to be present at the trial, and she and her counsel were to be The Court likewise upholds the validity of the promulgation in absentia of the RTC notice. Said motion was denied by the trial court. The matter was brought to this
judgment and the RTCs Order dated April 5, 2000, denying due course to
deemed to have received notice.
Court where the accused argued that there was no valid promulgation because
petitioners notice of appeal for being filed beyond the reglementary period. Section she was not properly notified of the date thereof. The Court held thus:
6, Rule 120 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, the Rule applicable in this
Moreover, in the earlier case of People vs. Magpalao9, the Court already ruled that: case since promulgation was held before the effectivity of The Revised Rules of
Let us examine the validity of the May 5, 1998 promulgation which took place in
Criminal Procedure, provides:
the case at bar. The dispositive portion of the decision convicting petitioner was
. . . once an accused escapes from prison or confinement or jumps bail or flees to
read in open court, after which the public prosecutor, the defense counsel Atty.
a foreign country, he loses his standing in court and unless he surrenders or
Section 6. Promulgation of judgment --The judgment is promulgated by reading the Marcelino Arias, and private complainant Lucita Lopez, acknowledged receipt of
submits to the jurisdiction of the court he is deemed to have waived any right to
same in the presence of the accused and any judge of the court in which it was
their respective copies of the decision by affixing their signatures at the back of the
seek relief from the court.10
rendered. However, if the conviction is for a light offense, the judgment may be
original of the decision on file with the record of the case. Atty. Arias failed to file a
pronounced in the presence of his counsel or representative. When the judge is
notice of appeal within fifteen days from receipt of the decision. Is it proper to rule
Nevertheless, in this case, records reveal that the trial court sent out notices to
absent or outside of the province or city, the judgment may be promulgated by the that the period within which to file an appeal has lapsed?
petitioner and her counsel. In a Resolution dated September 30, 2002, the CA
clerk of court.
required the Office of the Solicitor General to submit proof of service on petitioner
In Florendo v. Court of Appeals (239 SCRA 325 [1994]), the facts are parallel to
and her counsel of the RTCs Order dated March 31, 1997 setting the date for
If the accused is confined or detained in another province or city, the judgment may those of the instant case. We held
reception of evidence on May 14, 1997; the Order dated May 14, 1997 considering be promulgated by the executive judge of the Regional Trial Court having
petitioner to have waived her right to present evidence in her defense in view of the jurisdiction over the place of confinement or detention upon request of the court
fact that she has jumped bail; and the RTC Decision dated July 2, 1997. On
In the case at bench, a copy of the judgment was served to the counsel of
that rendered the judgment. The court promulgating the judgment shall have
December 20, 2002, the Office of the Solicitor General, submitted such proof of
petitioner on June 15, 1992; therefore, he had only up to June 30, 1992 within
authority to accept the notice of appeal and to approve the bail bond pending
service. Thus, in its Decision promulgated on October 28, 2003, the CA made the appeal.
which to appeal. The notice of appeal filed on July 6, 1992 was clearly out of time.
factual finding that petitioner and her counsel were indeed duly served with copies
of the assailed RTC orders and decision at the addresses they submitted to the
The proper clerk of court shall give notice to the accused personally or through his It is presumed that official duties are regularly performed and that the proceedings
trial court. Factual findings of the CA are conclusive on the parties and not
bondsman or warden and counsel, requiring him to be present at the promulgation are made of record. This serves as a substantial compliance with the procedural
reviewable by this Court.11 As held in Morandarte vs. Court of Appeals,12 "inquiry
of the decision. In case the accused fails to appear thereat the promulgation shall requirement of the recording of the judgment in the criminal docket of the court. At
consist in the recording of the judgment in the criminal docket and a copy thereof

any rate, petitioner does not question non-compliance of the requirement of the
recording of the judgment in the criminal docket.
(At p. 329.)
Petitioner's first argument is devoid of merit. In the first place, her non-receipt of
the notice of promulgation was due to her own failure to immediately file a notice of
change of address with the trial court, which she clearly admitted. Besides,
promulgation could be properly done even in her absence, subject to the service of
a copy of the decision upon her or her counsel and the recording of the judgment
in the criminal docket.

From the foregoing, petitioner is deemed notified of the decision upon its recording
in the criminal docket on September 3, 1997 and she only had fifteen (15) days
therefrom within which to file an appeal. Evidently, the notice of appeal filed only on
April 5, 2000 was filed out of time.
However, the Court cannot close its eyes to the fact that the penalty imposed by
the trial court on petitioner was indeed erroneous. The dispositive portion of the
RTCs Decision reads thus:

In Rigor vs. The Superintendent, New Bilibid Prison,16 this Court found it to be in
the interest of justice to correct the penalty imposed by the trial court so as to
conform to the penalty prescribed by law despite the fact that the judgment had
already become final and executory for therein petitioners failure to take an
appeal. Therein, the Court expounded thus:

However, the Court noted a palpable error in the Joint Decision of the trial court
that must be rectified in order to avoid its repetition. The trial court erroneously
included an additional one day on the maximum period of arresto mayor imposed
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is rendered finding on petitioner, which is incorrect, as it is outside the range of said penalty.
accused GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as charged which is punished under
Article 315, par. 2 (a), and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, accused

MARY
HELEN
ESTRADA
is
hereby
sentenced
to
suffer
an
indeterminate
prison
In the present case, therefore, since the records bear out the fact that copies of the
decision were sent by registered mail to the given addresses of petitioner and her term of TWELVE (12) YEARS of prision mayor maximum as minimum to TWENTY- In line with the ruling of the Court in People vs. Barro, Sr., to wit:
FOUR (24) YEARS as maximum; to pay back the sum of P68,700.00 to Junimar
counsel, Atty. Herenio Martinez, and there is no question that the judgment was
Bermundo and Rosalie Bermundo; and to pay the costs.
indeed recorded in the criminal docket of the court, the promulgation was valid.
"However, where the penalty imposed on the co-accused who did not appeal was a
The significance of recording the decision in the criminal docket of the court was
nullity because it was never authorized by law, that penalty imposed on the
explained in Pascua, thus:
Art. 315 of the Revised Penal Code provides that the penalty of prision
accused who did not appeal can be corrected to make it conform to the penalty
correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period shall be prescribed by law, the reason being that, said penalty can never become final and
What is the significance of the recording of the judgment with the criminal docket of imposed if the amount of the fraud is over P12,000.00 but not over P22,000.00; if executory and it is within the duty and inherent power of the Court to have it
the amount of fraud exceeds P22,000.00, the penalty provided for shall be
the court? By analogy, let us apply the principles of civil law on registration.
conformable with law."
imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional P10,000.00,
but the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years.
Simply stated, registration is made for the purpose of notification (Paras, Civil
the error of the trial court in the present case can be corrected to make it conform
Code of the Philippines, Vol. II, 1989 ed., p. 653, citing Bautista vs. Dy Bun Chin,
to the penalty prescribed by law as it is within the Courts duty and inherent power.
Thus, in this case, since the amount of fraud, which is P68,700.00, exceeds
49 O.G. 179 [1952]).
Thus, the correction to be made by this Court is meant only for the penalty
P22,000.00, the penalty should be imposed in the maximum period. The range of imposed against petitioner to be in accordance with law and nothing else. 17
the penalty provided for by law is composed of only two periods, thus, to get the
Its purpose is to give notice thereof to all persons.
maximum period of the imposable penalty, the total number of years included in the
Thus, pursuant to the foregoing ruling, the Court likewise sees it befitting in this
two periods should be divided into three. A computation produces the following
case to modify the penalty imposed on petitioner. It must be noted, though, that in
Applying the above-mentioned principles to the instant case, we are prompted to
results: the minimum period is 4 years, 2 months and 1 day to 5 years, 5 months
the afore-quoted case, the Court also pointed out that the petition for habeas
further examine the provisions on promulgation in absentia.
and 10 days; the medium period is 5 years, 5 months and 11 days to 6 years, 8
his
months and 20 days; and the maximum period is 6 years, 8 months and 21 days to corpus cannot be granted if the accused has only served the minimum of
sentence because he must serve his sentence up to its maximum term.18
15
8
years.
As held in Florendo vs. Court of Appeals (supra), the rules allow promulgation of
judgment in absentia to obviate the situation where juridical process could be
subverted by the accused jumping bail. But the Rules also provide measures to
The amount defrauded being in excess of P22,000.00, the penalty imposed should WHEREFORE, the letter/petition for habeas corpus is DENIED. The petition for
review on certiorari is PARTLY GRANTED insofar only as the penalty is concerned.
make promulgation in absentia a formal and solemn act so that the absent
be the maximum period or 6 years, 8 months, and 21 days to 8 years of prision
In the interest of justice, the sentence of petitioner in Criminal Case No. 94-6230 is
accused, wherever he may be, can be notified of the judgment rendered against
mayor. However, Art. 315 also provides that an additional one year shall be
MODIFIED as follows: Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law and there being
him. As discussed earlier, the sentence imposed by the trial court cannot be served imposed for each additional P10,000.00 amount of the fraud. Since the total
no mitigating or aggravating circumstance, petitioner is sentenced to suffer an
in the absence of the accused. Hence, all means of notification must be done to let amount of the fraud in this case is P68,700.00 (P68,700.00 P22,000.00 =
the absent accused know of the judgment of the court. And the means provided by P46,700.00), an additional four (4) years of penalty should be imposed. Thus, the indeterminate prison term of two (2) years of prision correccional as MINIMUM to
the Rules are: (1) the act of giving notice to all persons or the act of recording or
correct imposable maximum penalty is anywhere between 10 years, 8 months and eleven (11) years of prision mayor as MAXIMUM.
registering the judgment in the criminal docket (which Section 6 incidentally
21 days and 12 years of prision mayor in its maximum period.
mentions first showing its importance); and (2) the act of serving a copy thereof
SO ORDERED.
upon the accused (at his last known address) or his counsel. In a scenario where Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum penalty that should have
the whereabouts of the accused are unknown (as when he is at large), the
January 24, 2003
been imposed by the RTC should be within the range of the penalty next lower to G.R. Nos. 143468-71
recording satisfies the requirement of notifying the accused of the decision
that prescribed by Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code for the crime committed.
wherever he may be.
Thus, in this case, the minimum penalty should be anywhere between 6 months, THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
and 1 day of prision correccional in its minimum period and 4 years and 2 months vs.
of prision correccional in its medium period.
FREDDIE LIZADA @ FREDIE LIZADA, accused-appellant.

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

This is an automatic review of the Decision1 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 54, finding accused-appellant Freddie Lizada guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of four (4) counts of qualified rape and meting on him the death penalty for
each count.
I. The Charges
Accused-appellant2 was charged with four (4) counts of qualified rape under four
separate Informations. The accusatory portion of each of the four Informations
reads:
"That sometime in August 1998 in the City of Manila, Philippines, the
said accused, with lewd designs, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously, by means of force, violence and intimidation upon the
person of one ANALIA ORILLOSA y AGOO, by then and there
embracing her, kissing and touching her private parts, thereafter
removing her skirt and panty, placing himself on top of her and trying
to insert his penis into her vagina and succeeded in having carnal
knowledge with the said ANALIA ORILLOSA y AGOO, against her will
and consent.
Contrary to law.
xxx

xxx

xxx

knowledge with the said ANALIA ORILLOSA Y AGOO, against her will pain in her sex organ. Satiated, accused-appellant dismounted but threatened to
and consent.
kill her if she divulged to anyone what he did to her. Accused-appellant then
returned to his room. The incident lasted less than one hour. Petrified by the
threats on her life, Analia kept to herself what happened to her.7
Contrary to law.
xxx

xxx

xxx

That on or about September 15, 1998, in the City of Manila,

Philippines, the said accused, with lewd designs, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, by means of force, violence and
intimidation upon the person of one ANALIA ORILLOSA Y AGOO, by
then and there embracing her, kissing and touching her private parts,
thereafter removing her skirt and panty, placing himself on top of her
and trying to insert his penis into her vagina and succeeded in having
carnal knowledge with the said ANALIA ORILLOSA Y AGOO, against
her will and consent.

Sometime in August 1997, accused-appellant entered again the room of Analia,

placed himself on top of her and held her legs and arms. He then inserted his
finger into her sex organ ("fininger niya ako"). Satiated, accused-appellant left the
room. During the period from 1996 to 1998, accused-appellant sexually abused
private complainant two times a week.

On November 5, 1998, at about 3:00 p.m., Analia was in the sala of their house
studying her assignments. Accused-appellant was also in the sala. Rossel tended
the video shop while his mother was away. Analia went into her room and lay down
in bed. She did not lock the door of the room because her brother might enter any
time. She wanted to sleep but found it difficult to do so. Accused-appellant went to
his room next to the room of Analia. He, however, entered the room of Analia. He
was wearing a pair of short pants and was naked from waist up. Analia did not
Contrary to law."3
mind accused-appellant entering her room because she knew that her brother,
Rossel was around. However, accused-appellant sat on the side of her bed, placed
The four (4) Informations were docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 99-171390, 99himself on top of her, held her hands and legs and fondled her breasts. She
171391, 99-171392 and 99-171393, respectively.
struggled to extricate herself. Accused-appellant removed her panty and touched
her sex organ. Accused-appellant inserted his finger into her vagina, extricated it
Accused-appellant was arraigned on April 15, 1999, assisted by counsel de parte and then inserted his penis into her vagina. Accused-appellant ejaculated. Analia
felt pain in her sex organ. Momentarily, Rossel passed by the room of Analia after
and entered a plea of not guilty to each of the charges.4 A joint trial then ensued.
drinking water from the refrigerator, and peeped through the door. He saw
accused-appellant on top of Analia. Accused-appellant saw Rossel and
II. Evidence of the Prosecution5
dismounted. Accused-appellant berated Rossel and ordered him to go to his room
and sleep. Rossel did. Accused-appellant then left the room. Analia likewise left the
Ricardo Orillosa and his wife, Rose Orillosa, natives of San Isidro, Bohol, had three room, went out of the house and stayed outside for one hour. Rose arrived home
(3) children, namely: Analia, who was born on December 18, 1985;6 Jepsy, who
at 6:00 p.m. However, Analia did not divulge to her mother what accused-appellant
was 11 years old, and Rossel, who was nine years old. However, the couple
had just done to her.
decided to part ways and live separately. Rose left Bohol and settled in Manila with
her young children. She worked as a waitress to make both ends meet.
On November 9, 1998, at about 3:00 p.m., Rose left the house. Accused-appellant

That on or about November 5, 1998, in the City of Manila, Philippines,

the said accused, with lewd designs, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, by means of force, violence and intimidation
upon the person of one ANALIA ORILLOSA Y AGOO, by then and
there embracing her, kissing and touching her private parts, thereafter
removing her skirt and panty, placing himself on top of her and trying
to insert his penis into her vagina and succeeded in having carnal
knowledge with the said ANALIA ORILLOSA Y AGOO, against her will In 1994, Rose met accused-appellant. They decided to live together as husband
and wife at No. 1252 Jose Abad Santos Street, Moriones, Tondo, Manila. In 1996,
and consent.
Rose resigned from her job as a waitress. She secured a loan, bought a truck and
used it for her business.
Contrary to law.

was in the sala of the house watching television. Analia tended the video shop.
However, accused-appellant told Analia to go to the sala. She refused, as nobody
would tend the video shop. This infuriated accused-appellant who threatened to
slap and kick her.

Analia ignored the invectives and threats of accused-appellant and stayed in the
video shop. When Rose returned, a heated argument ensued between accusedxxx
xxx
xxx
appellant and Analia. Rose sided with her paramour and hit Analia. This prompted
Analia to shout. "Ayoko na, ayoko na." Shortly thereafter, Rose and Analia left the
That on or about October 22, 1998, in the City of Manila, Philippines,
house on board the motorcycle driven by her mother in going to Don Bosco Street,
the said accused, with lewd designs, did then and there willfully,
Moriones, Tondo, Manila, to retrieve some tapes which had not yet been returned.
unlawfully and feloniously, by means of force, violence and intimidation Sometime in 1996, Analia was in her room when accused-appellant entered. He
When Rose inquired from her daughter what she meant by her statement, "ayoko
upon the person of one ANALIA ORILLOSA Y AGOO, by then and
laid on top of her, removed her T-shirt and underwear. He then inserted his finger in na, ayoko na," she told her mother that accused-appellant had been touching the
there embracing her, kissing and touching her private parts, thereafter her vagina. He removed his finger and inserted his penis in her vagina.
sensitive parts of her body and that he had been on top of her. Rose was shocked
removing her skirt and panty, placing himself on top of her and trying Momentarily, she felt a sticky substance coming out from his penis. She also felt
and incensed. The two proceeded to Kagawad Danilo Santos to have accusedto insert his penis into her vagina and succeeded in having carnal
appellant placed under arrest. On November 10, 1998, the two proceeded to the
In the meantime, Rose secured a loan anew and used the proceeds thereof to put
up a video shop in her house. She sold Avon products from house to house to
augment her income. Whenever she was out of their house, Rossel and Analia
took turns in tending the video shop and attending to customers.

Western Police District where Analia gave her Affidavit-Complaint to PO1 Carmelita
Nocum in the presence of SPO2 Fe H. Avindante. She related to the police
investigator that accused-appellant had touched her breasts and arms in August,
1998, September 15, 1998, October 22, 1998 and on November 5, 1998, at 3:00
p.m. Analia then submitted herself to genitalia examination by Dr. Armie Umil, a
medico-legal officer of the NBI. The medico-legal officer interviewed Analia, told
him that she was raped in May, 1997 at 3:00 p.m. and November 5, 1998 at 3:00
p.m.8
Dr. Umil prepared and signed a report on "Living Case No. MO-98-1265" which
contained her findings during her examination on Analia, thus:
"xxx

xxx

xxx

Fairly nourished, conscious, coherent, cooperative, ambulatory

subject. Breasts, developed, hemispherical, firm. , brown, 3.0 cms.
in diameter. Nipples brown, protruding, 0.7 cms. in diameter.
No extragenital physical injuries noted.

was then a utility worker with the Navotas Branch of the Philippine Banking
Corporation. Rose, on the other hand, was a waitress at the Golden Bird beer
house at Rizal Avenue, Manila.
Accused-appellant denied having raped Analia. He claimed that he loved the
children of Rose as if they were his own children. He took care of them, as in fact
he cooked and prepared their food before they arrived home from school. At times,
he ironed their school uniforms and bathed them, except Analia who was already
big. Analia was hard-headed because she disobeyed him whenever he ordered her
to do some errands. Because of Analia's misbehavior, accused-appellant and Rose
oftentimes quarreled. Rose even demanded that accused-appellant leave their
house. Another irritant in his and Rose's lives were the frequent visits of the
relatives of her husband.
Sometime in 1997, accused-appellant was retrenched from his employment and
received a separation pay of P9,000.00 which he used to put up the VHS Rental
and Karaoke from which he earned a monthly income of P25,000.00. While living
together, accused-appellant and Rose acquired two colored television sets, two
VHS Hi-fi recorders, one VHS player, one washing machine, one scooter motor,
two VHS rewinders, one sala set, one compact disc player and many other
properties.

GENITAL EXAMINATION:
Pubic hair, fully grown, moderate. Labia majora and minora,
coaptated. Fourchette, tense. Vetibular mucosa, pinkish. Hymen, tall,
thick, intact. Hymenal orifice measures, 1.5 cms. in diameter. Vaginal
walls, tight. Rugosities, prominent.

Accused-appellant ventured that Rose coached her children Analia and Rossel to
testify against him and used them to fabricate charges against him because Rose
wanted to manage their business and take control of all the properties they
acquired during their coverture. Also, Rose was so exasperated because he had
no job.

CONCLUSIONS:

IV. The Verdict

1). No evident sign of extragenital physical injuries noted on the body

of the subject at the time of examination.

On May 29, 2000, the trial court rendered judgment against accused-appellant
finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of four (4) counts of rape, defined and
penalized in the seventh paragraph, no. 1, Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code,
and meted on him the death penalty for each count. The dispositive portion of the
2). Hymen, intact and its orifice small (1.5 cms. in diameter) as to
preclude complete penetration by an average-sized adult Filipino male decision reads:
organ in full erection without producing any genital injury."9
"From all the evidence submitted by the prosecution, the Court
concludes that the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
Subsequently, Analia told her mother that "mabuti na lang iyong
crime charged against him in these four (4) cases, convicts him
panghihipo lang ang sinabi ko." When Rose inquired from her
thereof, and sentences him to DEATH PENALTY in each and every
daughter what she meant by her statement, Analia revealed to her
case as provided for in the seventh paragraph, no. 1, Article 335 of the
mother that accused-appellant had sexually abused her. On December
Revised Penal Code.
15, 1998, Analia executed a "Dagdag na Salaysay ng Paghahabla"
and charged accused-appellant with rape.10
SO ORDERED."11
III. The Defenses and Evidence of Accused-Appellant
V. Assigned Errors of the Trial Court
Accused-appellant testified in his defense. He declared that after a month of
courtship, he and Rose agreed in 1994 to live together as husband and wife. He

Accused-appellant assailed the decision of the court a quo and averred in his brief
that:
"THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT MAKING A FINDING
OF FACT IN ITS DECISION AND SUCH FAILURE IS A REVERSIBLE
ERROR."12
xxx

xxx

xxx

"THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSEDAPPELLANT OF FOUR (4) COUNTS OF RAPE DESPITE FAILURE
OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.13
VI. Findings of the Court
On the first assignment of error, accused-appellant contends that the decision of
the trial court is null and void as it failed to comply with the requirements of Section
14, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution and Section 1, Rule 36 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, as amended. He avers that the court a quo made no findings of
facts in its decision. The trial court merely summarized the testimonies of the
witnesses of the prosecution and those of accused-appellant and his witnesses,
and forthwith set forth the decretal portion of said decision. The trial court even
failed to state in said decision the factual and legal basis for the imposition of the
supreme penalty of death on him. The Solicitor General, on the other hand, argues
that there should be no mechanical reliance on the constitutional provision. Trial
courts may well-nigh synthesize and simplify their decisions considering that courts
are harassed by crowded dockets and time constraints. Even if the trial court did
not elucidate the grounds as the legal basis for the penalties imposed,
nevertheless the decision is valid. In any event, the Solicitor General contends that
despite the infirmity of the decision, there is no need to remand the case to the trial
court for compliance with the constitutional requirement as the Court may resolve
the case on its merits to avoid delay in the final disposition of the case and afford
accused-appellant his right to a speedy trial.
The contention of accused-appellant is well-taken. Article VIII, paragraph 14 of the
1987 Constitution provides that "no decision shall be rendered by any court without
expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based."
This requirement is reiterated and implemented by Rule 120, Section 2 of the 1985
Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, which reads:
"SEC. 2. Form and contents of judgment. The judgment must be
written in the official language, personally and directly prepared by the
judge and signed by him and shall contain clearly and distinctly a
statement of the facts proved or admitted by the accused and the law
upon which the judgment is based.

If it is of conviction, the judgment shall state (a) the legal qualification

of the offense constituted by the acts committed by the accused, and
the aggravating or mitigating circumstances attending the commission
thereof, if there are any; (b) the participation of the accused in the
commission of the offense, whether as principal, accomplice, or
accessory after the fact; (c) the penalty imposed upon the accused;
and (d) the civil liability or damages caused by the wrongful act to be
recovered from the accused by the offended party, if there is any,
unless the enforcement of the civil liability by a separate action has
been reserved or waived."14

portion of its decision that it did so based on the evidence of the prosecution. The
trial court swallowed hook, line and sinker the evidence of the prosecution. It failed
to explain in its decision why it believed and gave probative weight to the evidence
of the prosecution. Reading the decision of the trial court, one is apt to conclude
that the trial court ignored the evidence of accused-appellant. The trial court did not
even bother specifying the factual and legal bases for its imposition of the supreme
penalty of death on accused-appellant for each count of rape. The trial court
merely cited seventh paragraph, no. 1, Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code. The
decision of the trial court is a good example of what a decision, envisaged in the
Constitution and the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, should not be.

The purpose of the provision is to inform the parties and the person reading the
decision on how it was reached by the court after consideration of the evidence of
the parties and the relevant facts, of the opinion it has formed on the issues, and of
the applicable laws. The parties must be assured from a reading of the decision of
the trial court that they were accorded their rights to be heard by an impartial and
responsible judge.15 More substantial reasons for the requirement are:

The Court would normally remand the case to the trial court because of the
infirmity of the decision of the trial court, for compliance with the constitutional
provision. However, to avert further delay in the disposition of the cases, the Court
decided to resolve the cases on their merits considering that all the records as well
as the evidence adduced during the trial had been elevated to the Court.18 The
parties filed their respective briefs articulating their respective stances on the
factual and legal issues.

"For one thing, the losing party must be given an opportunity to

analyze the decision so that, if permitted, he may elevate what he may
consider its errors for review by a higher tribunal. For another, the
decision if well-presented and reasoned, may convince the losing
party of its merits and persuade it to accept the verdict in good grace
instead of prolonging the litigation with a useless appeal. A third
reason is that decisions with a full exposition of the facts and the law
on which they are based, especially those coming from the Supreme
Court, will constitute a valuable body of case law that can serve as
useful references and even as precedents in the resolution of future
controversies."16
The trial court is mandated to set out in its decision the facts which had been
proved and its conclusions culled therefrom, as well as its resolution on the issues
and the factual and legal basis for its resolution.17 Trial courts should not merely
reproduce the respective testimonies of witnesses of both parties and come out
with its decretal conclusion.

In reviewing rape cases, this Court is guided by the following principles: (1) to
accuse a man of rape is easy but to disprove it is difficult though the accused may
be innocent; (2) considering the nature of things, and only two persons are usually
involved in the crime of rape, the testimony of the complainant should be
scrutinized with great caution; (3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or
fall on its own merits and not be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the
evidence of the defense.19 By the very nature of the crime of rape, conviction or
acquittal depends almost entirely on the credibility of the complainant's testimony
because of the fact that usually only the participants can testify as to its
occurrence. However, if the accused raises a sufficient doubt as to any material
element of the crime, and the prosecution is unable to overcome it with its
evidence, the prosecution has failed to discharge its burden of proving the guilt of
the accused beyond cavil of doubt and hence, the accused is entitled to an
acquittal.
Anent the second assignment of error, we will resolve the same for convenience,
as follows:

In this case, the trial court failed to comply with the requirements under the
Constitution and the Rules on Criminal Procedure. It merely summarized the
Re: CRIMINAL CASES NOS. 99-171392 and 99-171393 (covering the
testimonies of the witnesses of the prosecution and of accused-appellant on direct
crime of rape committed on or about October 22, 1998 and on or
and cross examinations and merely made referral to the documentary evidence of
about September 15, 1998)
the parties then concluded that, on the basis of the evidence of the prosecution,
accused-appellant is guilty of four (4) counts of rape and sentenced him to death, Accused-appellant avers that the prosecution failed to adduce the requisite
on each count.
quantum of evidence that he raped the private complainant precisely on
September 15, 1998 and October 22, 1998. Moreover, the medical findings of Dr.
The trial court even failed to specifically state the facts proven by the prosecution Armie Umil show that the hymen of the private complainant was intact and its
based on their evidence, the issues raised by the parties and its resolution of the
orifice so small as to preclude complete penetration by an average size adult
factual and legal issues, as well as the legal and factual bases for convicting
Filipino male organ in full erection without producing any genital injury. The
accused-appellant of each of the crimes charged. The trial court rendered
physical evidence belies private complainant's claim of having been deflowered by
judgment against accused-appellant with the court declaration in the decretal
accused-appellant on four different occasions. The Office of the Solicitor General,

for its part, contends that the prosecution through the private complainant proved
the guilt of accused-appellant for the crime charged on both counts.
The contention of accused-appellant does not persuade the Court. The private
complainant testified that since 1996, when she was only eleven years old, until
1998, for two times a week, accused-appellant used to place himself on top of her
and despite her tenacious resistance, touched her arms, legs and sex organ and
inserted his finger and penis into her vagina. In the process, he ejaculated.
Accused-appellant threatened to kill her if she divulged to anyone what he did to
her.20 Although private complainant did not testify that she was raped on
September 15, 1998 and October 22, 1998, nevertheless accused-appellant may
be convicted for two counts of rape, in light of the testimony of private complainant.
It bears stressing that under the two Informations, the rape incidents are alleged to
have been committed "on or about September 15, 1998" and "on or about October
22, 1998." The words "on or about" envisage a period, months or even two or four
years before September 15, 1998 or October 22, 1998. The prosecution may prove
that the crime charged was committed on or about September 15, 1998 and on or
about October 22, 1998.
In People vs. Gianan,21 this Court affirmed the conviction of accused-appellant of
five (5) counts of rape, four of which were committed in December 1992 (two
counts) and one each in March and April, 1993 and in November, 1995 and one
count of acts of lasciviousness committed in December 1992, on a criminal
complaint for multiple rape, viz:
"That sometime in November 1995, and some occasions prior and/or
subsequent thereto, in the Municipality of Dasmarias, Province of
Cavite, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, with lewd designs, taking advantage of his superior
strength over the person of his own twelve (12) year old daughter, and
by means of force, violence and intimidation, did, then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, have repeated carnal knowledge of
Myra M. Gianan, against her will and consent, to her damage and
prejudice."22
On the contention of accused-appellant in said case that his conviction for rape in
December 1992 was so remote from the date (November 1995) alleged in the
Information, so that the latter could no longer be considered as being "as near to
the actual date at which the offense was committed" as provided under Section 11,
Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, this Court held:
"Accused-appellant nevertheless argues that his conviction for rape in
December 1992 is so remote from the date (November 1995) alleged
in the information, so that the latter could no longer be considered as
being "as near to the actual date at which the offense was committed"
as provided under Rule 110, 11.

This contention is also untenable. In People v. Garcia, this Court

upheld a conviction for ten counts of rape based on an information
which alleged that the accused committed multiple rape "from
November 1990 up to July 21, 1994," a time difference of almost four
years which is longer than that involved in the case at bar. In any case,
as earlier stated, accused-appellant's failure to raise a timely objection
based on this ground constitutes a waiver of his right to object."23

We agree with accused-appellant that he is guilty only of two counts of simple

rape, instead of qualified rape. The evidence on record shows that accusedappellant is the common-law husband of Rose, the mother of private complainant.
The private complainant, as of October 1998, was still 13 years old, and under
Article 335 as amended by Republic Act 7659, the minority of the private
complainant, concurring with the fact that accused-appellant is the common-law
husband of the victim's mother, is a special qualifying circumstance warranting the
imposition of the death penalty.28 However, said circumstance was not alleged in
Moreover, when the private complainant testified on how accused-appellant defiled the Informations as required by Section 8, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure which was given retroactive effect by this Court because it is
her two times a week from 1996 until 1998, accused-appellant raised nary a
29
whimper of protest. Accused-appellant even rigorously cross-examined the private favorable to the accused. Hence, even if the prosecution proved the special
qualifying
circumstance
of
minority of private complainant and relationship, the
complainant on her testimony on direct examination. The presentation by the
accused-appellant
being
the
common-law husband of her mother, accusedprosecution, without objection on the part of accused-appellant, of evidence of
appellant
is
guilty
only
of
simple
rape. Under the given law, the penalty for simple
rape committed two times a week from 1996 until 1998 (which includes September
rape is reclusion perpetua. Conformably with current jurisprudence, accused15, 1998 and October 22, 1998) to prove the charges lodged against him
appellant is liable to private complainant for civil indemnity in the amount of
constituted a waiver by accused-appellant of his right to object to any perceived
infirmity in, and in the amendment of, the aforesaid Informations to conform to the P50,000.00 and moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 for each count of
rape, or a total of P200,000.00.
evidence adduced by the prosecution.
The barefaced fact that private complainant remained a virgin up to 1998 does not
preclude her having been repeatedly sexually abused by accused-appellant. The
private complainant being of tender age, it is possible that the penetration of the
male organ went only as deep as her labia. Whether or not the hymen of private
complainant was still intact has no substantial bearing on accused-appellant's
commission of the crime.24 Even, the slightest penetration of the labia by the male
organ or the mere entry of the penis into the aperture constitutes consummated
rape. It is sufficient that there be entrance of the male organ within the labia of the
pudendum.25 In People vs. Baculi, cited in People vs. Gabayron,26 we held that
there could be a finding of rape even if despite repeated intercourse over a period
of four years, the complainant still retained an intact hymen without injury. In these
cases, the private complainant testified that the penis of accused-appellant gained
entry into her vagina:
"Fiscal Carisma
(continuing)
After your underwear was removed by the accused, what
happened next?
Witness:
He laid himself on top of me, sir.
Q
What did he do while he was on top of you?
A
He inserted his finger (Finenger nya ako, ipinatong nya yong
ano nya)
Q
Can you please describe more specifically what is this and I
quote "Pinatong nya yong ano nya" and where did he place it?
A
His organ, sir.
Q
Where did he place his organ?
A
In my organ, sir. (sa ari ko po.)
Q
At this very juncture madam witness, what did you feel?
A
I felt pain, sir, and I also felt that there was a sticky substance
that was coming out, sir."27 (Emphasis supplied)

Re: Criminal Cases Nos. 99-171390 and 99-171391 (covering the

crime committed on or about August 1998 and November 5, 1998)
Accused-appellant avers that (a) the Information in Criminal Case No. 99-171390
is defective because the date of the offense "on or about August 1998" alleged
therein is too indefinite, in violation of Rule 110, Section 11 of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure which reads:
"Sec. 11. Date of commission of the offense. It is not necessary to
state in the complaint or information the precise date the offense was
committed except when it is a material ingredient of the offense. The
offense may be alleged to have been committed on a date as near as
possible to the actual date of its commission. (11a)"30

amended. Significantly, accused-appellant did not even bother to file a

motion for a bill of particulars under Rule 116, Section 9 of the Revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure before he was arraigned. Indeed,
accused-appellant was duly arraigned under the Information and
entered a plea of not guilty to the charge without any plaint on the
sufficiency of the Information. Accused-appellant even adduced his
evidence after the prosecution had rested its case. It was only on
appeal to this Court that accused-appellant questioned for the first
time the sufficiency of the Information filed against him. It is now too
late in the day for him to do so. Moreover, in People vs. Salalima,31 this
Court held that:
"Failure to specify the exact dates or time when the rapes occurred
does not ipso facto make the information defective on its face. The
reason is obvious. The precise date or time when the victim was raped
is not an element of the offense. The gravamen of the crime is the fact
of carnal knowledge under any of the circumstances enumerated
under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code. As long as it is alleged
that the offense was committed at any time as near to the actual date
when the offense was committed an information is sufficient. In
previous cases, we ruled that allegations that rapes were committed
"before and until October 15, 1994," "sometime in the year 1991 and
the days thereafter," "sometime in November 1995 and some
occasions prior and/or subsequent thereto" and "on or about and
sometime in the year 1988" constitute sufficient compliance with
Section 11, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.
In this case, although the indictments did not state with particularity the
dates when the sexual assaults took place, we believe that the
allegations therein that the acts were committed "sometime during the
month of March 1996 or thereabout," "sometime during the month of
April 1996 or thereabout," "sometime during the month of May 1996 or
thereabout" substantially apprised appellant of the crimes he was
charged with since all the elements of rape were stated in the
informations. As such, appellant cannot complain that he was deprived
of the right to be informed of the nature of the cases filed against him.
Accordingly, appellant's assertion that he was deprived of the
opportunity to prepare for his defense has no leg to stand on."

Accused-appellant further asserts that the prosecution failed to prove that he raped
private complainant in August 1998. Hence, he argues, he should be acquitted of
said charge. The Office of the Solicitor General, for its part, argued that the date
"on or about August 1998" is sufficiently definite. After all, the date of the
commission of the crime of rape is not an essential element of the crime. The
prosecution adduced conclusive proof that accused-appellant raped private
The prosecution proved through the testimony of private complainant that accusedcomplainant on or about August 1998, as gleaned from her testimony during the
appellant raped her two times a week in 1998. As in Criminal Cases Nos. 99trial.
171392 and 99-171393, accused-appellant is guilty only of simple rape.
The Court does not agree with accused-appellant. It bears stressing
that the precise date of the commission of the crime of rape is not an
essential element of the crime. Failure to specify the exact date when
the rape was committed does not render the Information defective.
The reason for this is that the gravamen of the crime of rape is carnal
knowledge of the private complainant under any of the circumstances
enumerated under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as

As to the crime of rape subject of Criminal Case No. 99-171391, accused-appellant

avers that he is not criminally liable of rape. We agree with accused-appellant. The
collective testimony of private complainant and her younger brother Rossel was
that on November 5, 1998, accused-appellant who was wearing a pair of short
pants but naked from waist up, entered the bedroom of private complainant, went
on top of her, held her hands, removed her panty, mashed her breasts and touched
her sex organ. However, accused-appellant saw Rossel peeping through the door

and dismounted. He berated Rossel for peeping and ordered him to go back to his
room and to sleep. Accused-appellant then left the room of the private
complainant. The testimony of private complainant on direct examination reads:
"Fiscal Carisma:
Q
In between 1996 and August 1997?
A
Yes, sir, sometimes two (2) times a week.
Q
In November of 1998, do you recall of any unusual experience
that happened to you again?
A
Yes, sir.
Q
What was this unusual experience of yours?
A
He laid himself on top of me, sir.
Q
You said "he" whom are you referring to?
A
Freedie Lizada Jakosalem, sir.
Q
The same person you pointed to earlier?
A
Yes, sir.
Q
You said he placed himself on top of you in November, 1998,
what did he do while he was on top of you?
A
He's smashing my breast and he was also touching my arms
and my legs, sir.
Q
What else if any madam witness?
A
He was also touching my sex organ, sir.
Q
What else, if any?
Atty. Estorco:
May we take note of the same objection your honor, the
prosecution
Court:
Same ruling. Let the complainant continue considering
that she is crying and still young.
Witness:
None else, sir.
Fiscal Carisma:
With what part of his body did he touch your sex organ?
Atty. Estorco:
Your Honor, that is
Court:
May answer.
Fiscal Carisma:
I will re-propound the question, your honor.
You said that he touched your sex organ, will you tell the
court with what part of his body, did he touch your sex
organ?
Witness:
With his hands, sir.
Q
What about after November 1998 was this the last incident,
this unusual thing that you experienced from the hands of the accused
was this that last time, the one you narrated in November 1998?
A
Yes, sir."32
On cross-examination, the private complainant testified, thus:
"Atty. Balaba:
Q
Who was that somebody who entered the room?
A
My stepfather Freedie Lizada, sir.
Q
He was fully dressed at that time, during the time, is that
correct?
A
Yes, sir, he was dressed then, sir.
Q
And he had his pants on, is that correct?

A
He was wearing a short pants, sir.
Court:
Q
Was it a T-shirt that he had, at that time or a polo shirt?
So we will be finished by 11:15, proceed.
A
He was not wearing any shirt then, sir, he was naked.
Atty. Balaba:
Q
When you realized that somebody was entering the room were
You cannot also remember which leg was held by Freedie
you not afraid?
Lizada?
A
No, sir, I was not afraid.
A
I cannot recall, sir.
Q
What happened when you realized that somebody entered the
Q
When this happened, did you not shout for help?
A
I did not ask for help, I was motioning to resist him, so that he
room, and the one who entered was your stepfather, Freedie Lizada?
A
I did not mind him entering the room because I know that my
would go out, sir. I was struggling to free myself from him, sir.
Q
And you were not able to extricate yourself from him?
brother was around but suddenly I felt that somebody was holding me.
A
I was not able to extricate myself, sir.
Q
He was holding you, where were you when he held you?
Q
You were struggling with one arm of Lizada holding your arm,
A
I was in the bed, sir, lying down.
Q
You were lying down?
and the other hand was holding your leg, is that what you are trying to
A
Yes, sir.
tell us?
Q
What part of the body did the accused Freedie Lizada touched
A
No, sir, it's not like that.
you?
Q
Could you tell us, what happened, you did not shout for help
A
My two arms, my legs and my breast, sir.
and you were trying to extricate yourself, what happened?
Q
Do you mean to tell us that he was holding your two arms and
A
He suddenly went out of the room, sir.
at the same time your legs, is that what you are trying to tell us?
Q
Now, he went
A
He held me first in my arms and then my legs, sir.
Court:
Q
He held you first by your arms, is that what you are trying to tell
You did not shout during that time?
A
No, your honor."33
us?
Rossel, the nine-year old brother of the private complainant corroborated in part
Fiscal Carisma:
Already answered your honor, he held the arms and then his sister's testimony. He testified on direct examination, thus:
"Fiscal Carisma: (continuing)
the legs.
Q
Now, on November 2, 1998 do you recall where you were at
Court:
Already answered.
about 3:00 o'clock?
Atty. Balaba:
A
I was outside our house, sir.
Q
Your honor, I am just trying to
Q
Where was your house again, Mr. witness, at that time? Where
Court:
was your house at that date, time and place? At that date and time?
Proceed.
A
1252 Jose Abad Santos, Tondo, Manila, sir.
Atty. Balaba:
Court:
Q
He held your arms with his two hands?
Q
The same address?
A
Only with one hand, sir.
A.
Yes, sir.
Q
Which hand were you touched?
Fiscal Carisma:
A
I do not know which hand, sir.
Q
On that date, time and place, do your recall where your sister
Q
Which arm of yours was held by Freedie Lizada?
Anna Lea Orillosa was?
A
I could not recall, sir.
A
Yes, sir.
Q
Which side of your body was Freedie Lizada at that time?
Q
Where was she?
A
I cannot recall, sir.
A
She was sleeping, sir.
Q
What was the position of Freedie Lizada when he held your
Q
Now, on that date, time and place you said you were outside
arms?
your house, did you stay the whole afternoon outside your house?
A
He was sitting on our bed, sir.
A
No, sir.
Q
Which side of your bed was Freedie Lizada sitting on?
Q
Where did you go next?
A
I do not know, sir. I cannot recall.
A
Inside, sir.
Atty. Balaba:
Q
For what purpose did you get inside your house?
Can we take a recess your honor?
A
Because I was thirsty, sir.
Court:
Q
So you went to the fridge to get some water?
How long will it take you to finish your cross?
A
Yes, sir.
Atty. Balaba:
Q
And what happened as you went inside your house to get
We will confront the witness with so many things your
some water?
honor.
A
I saw my stepfather removing the panty of my sister and he
Court:
touched her and then he laid on top of her, sir.
Yes, that's why I am asking you how long will it take you to
Q
Do you see your stepfather inside the courtroom now?
finish your cross?
A
Yes, sir.
Atty. Balaba:
Q
Will you point to him?
About another hour, sir.

A
He is the one, sir.
Court Interpreter:
Witness pointing to a male person who when asked
answers to the name Freedie Lizada.
Fiscal Carisma:
Q
This thing that your father was that your stepfather did to
your elder sister, did you see this before or after you went to the fridge
to get some water?
A
I already got water then, sir.
Q
What did you do as you saw this thing being done by your
stepfather to your elder sister?
A
I was just looking at them when he saw me, sir.
Q
Who, you saw who? You are referring to the accused Freedie
Lizada?
A
Yes, sir.
Q
So, what did you do as you were seen by your stepfather?
A
He scolded me, he shouted at me, he told me something and
after that he went to the other room and slept, sir."34
Rossel testified on cross-examination, thus:
"Q
So you got thirsty, is that correct, and went inside the house?
A
Yes, sir.
Q
And you took a glass of water from the refrigerator?
A
Yes, sir.
Q
And it was at this time that you saw the accused Freedie
Lizada touching your sister?
A
Yes, sir.
Q
Where was this refrigerator located?
A
In front of the room where my sister sleeps, sir.
Q
So the door of your sister's room was open?
A
Yes, sir.
Q
And okay, you said your sister was sleeping. What was the
position of your sister when you said the accused removed her panty?
A
She was lying straight, but she was resisting, sir.
Q
Were you noticed by your sister at that time?
A
No, sir.
Q
And your sister did not call for help at that time?
A
No, sir.
Q
And all this time you saw the accused doing this, from the
refrigerator where you were taking a glass of water?
A
Yes, sir.
Q
Did you not say something to the accused?
A
No, sir, I was just looking.
Q
So your sister was lying down when the accused removed her
panty, is that what you are trying to tell us?
A
Yes, sir.
Q
And where was the and the accused saw you when he was
removing the panty of your sister?
A
Not yet, sir, but after a while he looked at the refrigerator
because he might be thirsty.
Q
So you said the accused was touching your sister. What
part of her body was touched by the accused?
A
Here, sir.
Court Interpreter:
Witness pointing at the lower portion of the body.
Atty. Balaba:
Q
You saw with what hand was the accused touching your sister?

A
Yes, sir.
Q
What hand was he touching your sister?
A
This hand, sir.
Court Interpreter:
Witness raising his right hand.
Atty. Balaba:
Q
And which part of your sister's body was the accused touching
with his right hand? Your sister's body was the accused touching with
his right hand?
A
Her right leg, sir.
Q
How about his left hand, what was the accused doing with his
left hand?
A
Removing her panty, sir.
Q
Removing her?
A
Panty, sir.
Q
Which hand of your sister was being removed with the left
hand of the accused?
Court:
Which?
Atty. Balaba:
Which hand, which hand?
Fiscal Carisma:
The question is vague, your honor.
Atty. Balaba:
Because he said that removing the hand
Fiscal Carisma:
He said removing the panty.
Atty. Balaba:
Is that panty? I'm sorry.
Q
So, the accused was touching with his right hand the left thigh
of your sister
Fiscal Carisma:
The right thigh.
Atty. Balaba:
Q
Rather the right thigh of your sister and with his left hand
removing the panty, is that what you are telling to tell us?
A
Yes, sir.
Q
And your sister all the time was trying to was struggling to
get free, is that not correct?
A
Yes, sir, she was resisting. (witness demonstrating)
Q
She was struggling was the accused able to remove the
panty?
A
Yes, sir.
Q
And all the time you were there looking with the glass of water
in your hand?
A
Yes, sir."35
In light of the evidence of the prosecution, there was no introduction of the penis of
accused-appellant into the aperture or within the pudendum of the vagina of private
complainant. Hence, accused-appellant is not criminally liable for consummated
rape.36
The issue that now comes to fore is whether or not accused-appellant is guilty of
consummated acts of lasciviousness defined in Article 336 of the Revised Penal
Code or attempted rape under Article 335 of the said Code, as amended in relation
to the last paragraph of Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code. In light of the
evidence on record, we believe that accused-appellant is guilty of attempted rape
and not of acts of lasciviousness.

Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code reads:

"Art. 336. Acts of Lasciviousness. Any person who shall commit any
act of lasciviousness upon other persons of either sex, under any of
the circumstances mentioned in the preceding article, shall be
punished by prision correccional."37
For an accused to be convicted of acts of lasciviousness, the prosecution is
burdened to prove the confluence of the following essential elements:
"1. That the offender commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness.
2. That it is done under any of the following circumstances:
a. By using force or intimidation; or
b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or
otherwise unconscious; or
c. When the offended party is under 12 years of age."38
"Lewd" is defined as obscene, lustful, indecent, lecherous. It signifies that form of
immorality which has relation to moral impurity; or that which is carried on a wanton
manner.39
The last paragraph of Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code reads:
"There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of
a felony directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of
execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause
or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance."
The essential elements of an attempted felony are as follows:
"1. The offender commences the commission of the felony directly by
overt acts;
2. He does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce
the felony;
3. The offender's act be not stopped by his own spontaneous
desistance;
4. The non-performance of all acts of execution was due to cause or
accident other than his spontaneous desistance."40
The first requisite of an attempted felony consists of two elements, namely:
"(1) That there be external acts;
(2) Such external acts have direct connection with the crime intended
to be committed."41
An overt or external act is defined as some physical activity or deed, indicating the
intention to commit a particular crime, more than a mere planning or preparation,
which if carried out to its complete termination following its natural course, without
being frustrated by external obstacles nor by the spontaneous desistance of the
perpetrator, will logically and necessarily ripen into a concrete offense. 42 The raison
d'etre for the law requiring a direct overt act is that, in a majority of cases, the

conduct of the accused consisting merely of acts of preparation has never ceased
to be equivocal; and this is necessarily so, irrespective of his declared intent. It is
that quality of being equivocal that must be lacking before the act becomes one
which may be said to be a commencement of the commission of the crime, or an
overt act or before any fragment of the crime itself has been committed, and this is
so for the reason that so long as the equivocal quality remains, no one can say
with certainty what the intent of the accused is.43 It is necessary that the overt act
should have been the ultimate step towards the consummation of the design. It is
sufficient if it was the "first or some subsequent step in a direct movement towards
the commission of the offense after the preparations are made."44 The act done
need not constitute the last proximate one for completion. It is necessary, however,
that the attempt must have a causal relation to the intended crime.45 In the words of
Viada, the overt acts must have an immediate and necessary relation to the
offense.46
Acts constitutive of an attempt to commit a felony should be distinguished from
preparatory acts which consist of devising means or measures necessary for
accomplishment of a desired object or end.47 One perpetrating preparatory acts is
not guilty of an attempt to commit a felony. However, if the preparatory acts
constitute a consummated felony under the law, the malefactor is guilty of such
consummated offense.48 The Supreme Court of Spain, in its decision of March 21,
1892, declared that for overt acts to constitute an attempted offense, it is
necessary that their objective be known and established or such that acts be of
such nature that they themselves should obviously disclose the criminal objective
necessarily intended, said objective and finality to serve as ground for designation
of the offense.49

delito por actos exteriores, se detiene, por un sentimiento libre y espontaneo, en el appellant is also liable to private complainant for moral damages in the amount of
borde del abismo, salvo esta. Es un llamamiento al remordimiento, a la conciencia, P25,000.00.
una gracia un perdon que concede la Ley al arrepentimiento voluntario."55
As aptly elaborated on by Wharton:
"First, the character of an attempt is lost when its execution is voluntarily
abandoned. There is no conceivable overt act to which the abandoned purpose
could be attached. Secondly, the policy of the law requires that the offender, so
long as he is capable of arresting an evil plan, should be encouraged to do so, by
saving him harmless in case of such retreat before it is possible for any evil
consequences to ensue. Neither society, nor any private person, has been injured
by his act. There is no damage, therefore, to redress. To punish him after retreat
and abandonment would be to destroy the motive for retreat and abandonment."56

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 54, is SET ASIDE. Another judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. In Criminal Case No. 99-171390, accused-appellant is hereby found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of simple rape under Article 335 of the Revised Penal
Code as amended and is hereby meted the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Accused-appellant is also hereby ordered to pay private complainant Analia
Orillosa the amounts of P50,000.00 by way of civil indemnity and P50,000.00 by
way of moral damages;

2. In Criminal Case No. 99-171391, accused-appellant is hereby found guilty of

attempted rape under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended in
It must be borne in mind, however, that the spontaneous desistance of a
relation to Article 6 of the said Code and is hereby meted an indeterminate penalty
malefactor exempts him from criminal liability for the intended crime but it does not of from six years of prision correccional in its maximum period, as minimum to ten
exempt him from the crime committed by him before his desistance.57
years of prision mayor in its medium period, as maximum. Accused-appellant is
hereby ordered to pay private complainant Analia Orillosa the amount of
P25,000.00 by way of moral damages; and,
In light of the facts established by the prosecution, we believe that accused-

appellant intended to have carnal knowledge of private complainant. The overt acts
of accused-appellant proven by the prosecution were not mere preparatory acts.
By the series of his overt acts, accused-appellant had commenced the execution of
rape which, if not for his spontaneous desistance, will ripen into the crime of rape.
Although accused-appellant desisted from performing all the acts of execution
however his desistance was not spontaneous as he was impelled to do so only
because of the sudden and unexpected arrival of Rossel. Hence, accusedThere is persuasive authority that in offenses not consummated as the material
58
damage is wanting, the nature of the action intended (accion fin) cannot exactly be appellant is guilty only of attempted rape. In a case of similar factual backdrop as
this case, we held:
ascertained but the same must be inferred from the nature of the acts executed
(accion medio).50 Hence, it is necessary that the acts of the accused must be such
"Applying the foregoing jurisprudence and taking into account Article 6
that, by their nature, by the facts to which they are related, by circumstances of the
of the Revised Penal Code, the appellant can only be convicted of
persons performing the same, and b the things connected therewith, that they are
attempted rape. He commenced the commission of rape by removing
aimed at the consummation of the offense. This Court emphasized in People vs.
his clothes, undressing and kissing his victim and lying on top of her.
Lamahang51 that:
However, he failed to perform all the acts of execution which should
produce the crime of rape by reason of a cause other than his own
"The relation existing between the facts submitted for appreciation and
spontaneous desistance, i.e., by the timely arrival of the victim's
the offense which said facts are supposed to produce must be direct;
brother. Thus, his penis merely touched Mary Joy's private organ.
the intention must be ascertained from the facts and therefore it is
Accordingly, as the crime committed by the appellant is attempted
necessary, in order to avoid regrettable instances of injustice, that the
rape, the penalty to be imposed on him should be an indeterminate
mind be able to cause a particular injury."52
prison term of six (6) years of prision correccional as minimum to
twelve (12) years of prision mayor as maximum."
If the malefactor does not perform all the acts of execution by reason of his
53
spontaneous desistance, he is not guilty of an attempted felony. The law does not
The penalty for attempted rape is prision mayor which is two degrees lower than
punish him for his attempt to commit a felony.54 The rationale of the law, as
reclusion perpetua.59 Accused-appellant should be meted an indeterminate penalty
explained by Viada:
the minimum of which should be taken from prision correccional which has a range
of from six months and one day to six years and the maximum of which shall be
"La Ley, en efecto, no hiere sino a pesar suyo; prefiere impedir el crimen que
taken from the medium period of prision mayor which has a range of from eight
castigarlo. Si el autor de la tentativa, despues de haber comenzado a ejecutar el
years and one day to ten years, without any modifying circumstance. Accused-

3. In Criminal Cases Nos. 99-171392 and 99-171393, accused-appellant is hereby

found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of simple rape, defined in
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended and is hereby meted the
penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count. Accused-appellant is hereby ordered
to pay to private complainant Analia Orillosa the amount of P50,000.00 by way of
civil indemnity and the amount of P50,000.00 by way of moral damages for each
count, or a total amount of P200,000.00.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-57555 August 28, 1984
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
TERESA JALANDONI, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Teodoro Padilla as private prosecutor for Bank of the Philippine Islands.
Rodolfo U. Jimenez for accused-appelant.
RESOLUTION
ABAD SANTOS, J.:

This refers to the MOTION TO MODIFY JUDGMENT (as to appellant's civil liability)
filed by the Bank of the Philippine Islands, the private complainant.
In Criminal Case No. CCC-VI-2866 of the defunct Circuit Criminal Court of Manila,
Teresa Jalandoni was accused of estafa. The information alleged that she issued
several checks drawn against the Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation in favor
of the Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI); that the checks were dishonored for
lack of funds, a fact which was known by the accused; and that as a result thereof
the BPI suffered damage in the amount of P1,391,780.00.

Accused-appellant admits that per information for estafa,

complainant suffered by her transactions a damage of
P1,391,780.00 which represents P100,000.00 less than
complainant's computation. To shorten the proceedings,
as manifested in the oral arguments of 17 October 1983,
complainant is willing to accept P1,391,780.00 as
accused-appellant's civil liability to private complainant
plus interest at the legal rate of 12% per annum from the
time of demand for payment until full payment (Rollo, p.
168.)

(a) accused-appellant issued nine (9) RCBC personal

checks;
(b) the sum total of the face value of said nine (9) checks
is P2,150,000.00;
(c) of said nine (9) checks, one (1) was honored, namely,
RCBC check No. 2424530 in the amount of 200,000.00,
when the checks went through clearing;
(d) the checks drawn by accused-appellant against said
personal checks aggregated P2,041,780.00;
(e) said checks were drawn in favor of third parties, not
the accused-appellant; and
(f) out of the P2,150,000.00 worth of the nine (9) checks
involved, the damaged suffered is only P1,391,780.00.
(emphasis supplied.) (pp. 56.)

The trial court rendered the following judgment against the accused:

The appellant opposed the Motion on the following grounds: (a) People vs. de
Castillo is not in point because it was decided under the old Rules of Court; and (b)
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused guilty beyond the amount of civil liability, if any, is unsettled and requires necessarily the
reasonable doubt of the crime of estafa defined under
introduction of proof.
Jalandoni's claim that "[t]he amount of the civil liability, if any, is unsettled and
Article 315, 2(a), and hereby sentences her to a penalty of
requires necessarily the introduction of proof (Rollo, p. 161) is utterly devoid of
reclusion perpetua; to indemnify the bank of the Philippine
merit. As shown above the appellant has formally admitted that BPI suffered
Islands, Cervantes Branch, in the sum of P1,600,000.00 At this stage, the Motion was before the Second Division of this Court which
rendered
the
decision
acquitting
the
appellant
on
reasonable
doubt.
And
because
damage in the amount of P1,391,780.00. For her now to assert that the civil
representing the balance of the amount which she
the Motion called for the application of a novel doctrine, the case was prudently
liability, if any, is unsettled is an insult to the dignity of this Court. We cannot allow a
swindled from the said bank; and to pay the costs.
referred to the Court En Banc on February 28, 1984.
party to state a fact only to disown it afterwards because of convenience.
(Expediente, p. 603.)

Jalandoni appealed to this Court which in turn pronounced:

WHEREFORE, the guilt of the appellant not having been
demonstrated beyond reasonable doubt, the appealed
judgment is hereby set aside and another one is entered
acquitting her of the charge. No costs. (People vs.
Jalandoni G.R. No. 57555, May 30, 1983, 122 SCRA 588,
600.)
Subsequently, BPI filed the aforesaid Motion to Modify Judgment. BPI invoked a
Court of Appeals decision (People vs. De Castillo, 48 O.G. 4890) where the court
acquitted the appellant who was accused of malversation of public funds on the
ground of reasonable doubt but nonetheless ordered her to pay the amount of her
civil liability. Accordingly, BPI prayed that in the interest of justice and to avoid
multiplicity of suits, a second paragraph be added to Our judgment, to wit:
As to appellant's civil liability, considering that the civil
action was instituted at the commencement of the criminal
action, judgment is hereby rendered ordering appellant to
pay the Bank of the Philippine Islands, Cervantes branch,
the amount of P1,491,780.00 with interests at the legal
rate from the filing of the action until paid. (Rollo, p. 139.)

On May 31, 1984, the Court En Banc promulgated its decision in the case of
Padilla, et al. vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. L-39999) where it held "that the
respondent Court of Appeals did not err in awarding damages despite a judgment
of acquittal." The reason therefor has been stated thus:
There appear to be no sound reasons to require a
separate civil action to still be filed considering that the
facts to be proved in the civil case have already been
established in the criminal proceedings where the
accused was acquitted. Due process has been accorded
the accused. He was, in fact, exonerated of the criminal
charge. The constitutional presumption of innocence
called for more vigilant efforts on the part of prosecuting
attorneys and defense counsel, a keener awareness by all
witnesses of the serious implications of perjury, and a
more studied consideration by the judge of the entire
records and of applicable statutes and precedents. To
require a separate civil action simply because the
accused was acquitted would mean needless clogging of
court dockets and unnecessary duplication of litigation
with all its attendant loss of time, effort, and money on the
part of all concerned.
In the instant case, the appellant made the following ad missions in her brief:

In its Sur-Rejoinder, BPI reduced the amount claimed to P1,391,780.00 for the
following reason:

The following facts are admitted in the information

aforequoted:

WHEREFORE, the Motion is hereby granted; the judgment of this Court is modified
in that the appellant is ordered to pay the Bank of the Philippine Islands the
amount of P1,391,780.00 with interest at the legal rate of 12% per annum from the
filing of the action until paid.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nos. L-47994-97 September 24, 1986
LIDELIA MAXIMO, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE JUDGE NICOLAS GEROCHI, JR., Judge of the Circuit Criminal
Court, 12th Judicial District, Bacolod City and CONCHITA PANGHILASON,
respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This is a petition for certiorari and mandamus filed by the petitioner Lidelia Maximo
to compel the public respondent Judge Nicolas Gerochi, Jr. to include in his
judgment of acquittal in Criminal Case Nos. CCC-XII-1067, 1073, 1074 and 1129,
the civil liability which the private respondent Conchita Panghilason admitted in
court.
On June 28, 1976, the City Fiscal of Bacolod filed with the Circuit Criminal Court,
12th Judicial District, Bacolod City, four (4) informations for estafa against

respondent Conchita Panghilason. The informations alleged that Panghilason

willfully issued four (4) checks amounting to P35,586.00 drawn against the
Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank in favor of the petitioner; that the
checks were dishonored for lack of funds or that her account with said bank had
been closed and that she refused to make the necessary deposit within three (3)
days from receipt of notice to redeem the said checks.
The petitioner intervened in the case through her private prosecutor on July 10,
1976.
On December 5, 1977, the respondent judge rendered the following judgment:
Verily, for all said, the Court strongly believes that in the case at bar, the
prosecution, to say the least, failed to establish the guilt of accused beyond a
reasonable doubt. That, herein, it appears that if accused had any obligation, it is
simply civil in nature that could be properly ventilated within the context of civil law.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, and considering that the prosecution
failed to establish the guilt of accused Conchita Panghilason beyond a reasonable
doubt, the Court finds accused Conchita Panghilason NOT GUILTY of all the
above-entitled four (4) criminal information, and ACQUITS her therefrom, with
costs de oficio.
The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration praying "that the portion of the
decision regarding the civil liability of the accused be reconsidered and thereafter
the accused who had admitted her civil liability be ordered to pay the sum of
P33,586.00 plus 12% interest from the filing of the information. "

The rationale behind the rule is stated in the Padilla case as follows:
There appears to be no sound reasons to require a
separate civil action to still be filed considering that the
facts to be proved in the civil case have already been
established in the criminal proceedings where the
accused was acquitted. Due process has been accorded
the accused. He was, in fact, exonerated of the criminal
charge. The constitutional presumption of innocence
called for more vigilant efforts on the part of prosecuting
attorneys and defense counsel, a keener awareness by all
witnesses of the serious implications of perjury, and a
more studied consideration by the judge of the entire
records and of applicable statutes and precedents. To
require a separate civil action simply because the
accused was acquitted would mean needless clogging of
court dockets and unnecessary duplication of litigation
with all its attendant less of time, effort, and money on the
part of all concerned.
The aforementioned case further declared that:
A separate civil action may be warranted where additional facts have to be
established or more evidence must be adduced or where the criminal case has
been fully terminated and a separate complaint would be just as efficacious or
even more expedient than a timely remand to the trial court where the criminal
action was decided for further hearings on the civil aspects of the case. The
offended party may, of course, choose to file a separate action. These do not exist
in this case. Considering moreover the delays suffered by the case in the trial,
appellate, and review stages, it would be unjust to the complainants in this case to
require at this time a separate civil action to be filed.

This motion was denied by the court in an order dated February 20, 1978. The
order stated that the award of civil liability "would not have been a problem if the
accused was convicted, for then, this recovery of civil liability is deemed included in
the offense proved, but the question is not indubitable because the accused was
The evidence taken in this case is summarized by the lower court as follows:
acquitted in all the four (4) informations she was charged of."

reason of "account closed." Exhibit "A" the check; Exhibit "A-l," the signature of the
accused; Exhibit "B," the return slip; and Exhibit "B-l," remark "account closed;" all
for Crim. Case No. CCC-XII-1073;
That on February 6, 1976, accused again bought rice from her in the amount of P
ll,500.00, and in payment of which was made in check dated the same day
February 6,1976, PCIB Check No. 161479, which she accepted after the accused
assured her that the same was likewise supported by sufficient funds, hence, again
on February 6, 1976, accused was able to secure rice from her in the amount of
P11,500.00; that the said check when deposit (sic) by Mr. Oh to whom she
indorsed it, it was similarly dishonored for reason of "account closed." Exhibit "A,"
the check; Exhibit "A-l," the signature of the accused; Exhibit "B," the return slip;
and Exhibit "B-I," reason for return, "account closed;" all for Crim. Case No. CCCXII-1074;
Again on February 7, 1976, accused purchased rice from her in the amount of
P5,300.00 and with the same assurance given her as the previous checks, she
accepted a check which when deposited by Mr. Oh to whom she indorsed the
same, the same was dishonored for reason of "account closed." Exhibit "A" PCIB
Check No. 161490; Exhibit "A-1," signature of accused; Exhibit "B," return ship;
and Exhibit "B-l," reason of return, "closed account." All for Crim. Case No. CCCXII-1067;
That all these sale transactions of rice occurred at the Capitol Shopping Center,
Bacolod City, and that all these checks were signed in the presence of complainant
Mrs. Maximo; that accused, despite repeated demands failed to settle the matter
with her hence she was compelled to bring the matter to the Court, and, in the
process, retain the services of counsel to which she covenanted to pay as
attorney's fee for P3,000.00; that the actual total damage incurred by Mrs. Maximo
as a result of the dishonor of the checks in question summed up to P35,500.00;
that out of these four transactions, accused merely made partial payment of
P500.00 on December 17, 1975, as shown by Exhibit "l ".

Defense evidence, on the other hand, tends to show that accused came to know
complaining witness sometime in 1973; that it was her late husband who used to
have transactions with the latter who allowed her husband to purchase rice on
credit; that she took over the business of buying and selling rice when her husband
got sick; that likewise Mrs. Maximo allowed her to purchase rice on a 15- day credit
basis; that she was allowed to issue postdated checks dated 15 days after the
actual purchase; that consequently, she purchased rice from Mrs. Maximo weekly;
that after she got the rice, she would issue a check for the previous purchases she
made, as evidenced by the checks she had issued to Mrs. Maximo, Exhibit "2" up
to Exhibit "21," although all these checks did not represent all the transactions she
That on February 1, 1976, accused again purchased rice from her in the amount of had with her amounted approximately to P 480,000.00; that all the checks in
The prevailing rule as enunciated by this Court en banc in the case of Padilla v.
P 7,000.00, and in payment for which accused issued a check dated the same day, question involved in the above-entitled criminal cases were all issued on January
Court of Appeals (129 SCRA 558) is that the Court may acquit an accused on
February 1, 1976, which she accepted after the accused assured her that it was
reasonable doubt and still order payment of civil damages already proved in the
15 and 21, 1975, and not on the dates they appeared therein; that the check dated
same case without need for a separate civil action. This ruling was reiterated in the supported by sufficient funds hence accused again was able to secure the rice in January 31, 1976, covered in Crim. Case No. CCC-XII-1129 involved a transaction
case of People v. Jalandoni (131 SCRA 454) where the accused formally admitted the amount of P 7,000.00; that she (accused) issued PCIB Check No. 165511,
that transpired on January 15, 1975, and the check was issued on January 21,
Exhibit "A" in CCC-XII-1073; that when the check was deposited by a certain
the amount of civil damages.
1975, and actually postdated January 31, 1975; that the check dated February 1,
Enrique Oh to whom she indorsed the check, the same was also dishonored for
1976, in the amount of P7,000.00 was in payment of a rice transaction that took
Prosecution evidence tends to show that on January 31, 1976, accused purchased
The petitioner, therefore, came to this Court with the present petition.
rice from Mrs. Maximo and paid her the amount of P11,775.00 in a form of a check
which she accepted after the accused assured her that the check was covered by
The lower court is wrong.
sufficient funds which check when presented encashment to the bank was
dishonored for reason of "account closed." Exhibit "A", PCIB Check No. 161478;
If an accused is acquitted, it does not necessarily follow that no civil liability arising Exhibit "A-1", signature of accused; Exhibit "B", the return slip: Exhibit "B-l," remark
"account closed;" all for Crim. Case No. CCC-XII-1129;
from the acts complained of may be awarded in the same judgment.

place on January 15, 1975, and actually postdated February 1, 1975; that the
check dated February 6, 1976, was also in payment of a rice transaction that
occurred on January 21, 1975, and postdated February 6, 1975; that the check
dated February 7, 1976, in the amount of P5,000.00 involved a transaction that
actually transpired on January 21, 1975, and a check was issued in payment for it
on January 31, 1975, and also postdated February 7, 1975; that at the time she
was not able to make the necessary deposits because her husband was then
hospitalized and she pleaded to Mrs. Maximo not to encash the checks, and the
latter consented thereto as Mrs. Maximo know that her husband was really sick,
and in fact, he later died on December 3, 1976; that consequently Mrs. Maximo
brought the matter to the PC at the PC Headquarters at Bacolod City, and they
agreed before the PC that she would pay in installment, and on December 17,
1975, she deposited the amount of P500.00 with her, Exhibit "l," that later, Mrs.
Maximo tried to collect thru the Silay Police, and again later thru the PC, and she
offered to pay up to Pl,000.00 but Mrs. Maximo refused unless she would pay
P5,000.00 which she went to the PC again in the accompany (sic) of her eight-year

old girl but Mrs. Maximo was not there, and then Sgt. Villanueva asked her to initial The foregoing argument is erroneous in view of the Padilla v. Court of Appeals and
all the questioned checks to be dated 1976; that first she refused but later on she People v. Jalandoni rulings earlier cited which are applicable to the facts of this
consented after the assurance of Sgt. Villanueva that no case will be filed against case.
her.
The private respondent never denied her debts or obligations to the petitioner. Her
defense was directed only towards proving the fact that the checks were issued in
payment of a pre-existing obligation, not that the obligation is non-existent or paid
in full. We further note that the private respondent failed to submit her answer to
this petition despite several notices from this Court. She has waived her defenses
to the petition. In his answer, the trial judge justified his refusal to award civil
liability with a statement that the civil liability did not arise from any criminal act but
only from a civil contract connected to the crime. He stated in his denial of the
motion for reconsideration that the action for civil liability must be filed in a "civil
court."

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted. The order of the lower court denying
the motion for reconsideration is set aside. The private respondent Conchita
Panghilason is ordered to pay the petitioner the sum of P33,586.00 with 12%
interest from July 10, 1976 until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.