F.

Habeas Corpuz (R-102)

1. Definition and Nature or Scope (S-1)
2. Requisites for Application (S-3)
3. Disallowance or Discharge of Writ (S-4)
4. Preliminary citation vs writ (S-6)
5. The return: when evidence; when plea (S-10, 12, 13)
Cases:
1. Ilusorio vs Bildner, 332 SCRA 169
2. Serapio vs Sandiganbayan- 396 SCRA 443
3. Lacson vs Perez, 357 SCRA 756
4. Sangca vs City Prosecutor of Cebu, 524 SCRA 610
5. Mangila vs. Pangilinan, 701 SCRA 355
6. Tujan-Militante vs Cada Deapera, July 28 2014
7. Datukan Malalang Salibo vs. the Warden 755 SCRA 296

1. ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO vs. ERLINDA I. BILDNER and SYLVIA K.

ILUSORIO, JOHN DOE and JANE DOE G.R. No. 139789, May 12, 2000

FACTS:
Erlinda Kalaw and Potenciano Ilusorio contracted matrimony and lived together for a
period of thirty (30) years. In 1972, they separated from bed and board for undisclosed
reasons.

On February 25, 1998, Erlinda filed with the Regional Trial Court, Antipolo City a
petition10 for guardianship over the person and property of Potenciano Ilusorio due to
the latter’s advanced age, frail health, poor eyesight and impaired judgment.

On May 31, 1998, after attending a corporate meeting in Baguio City, Potenciano
Ilusorio did not return to Antipolo City and instead lived at Cleveland Condominium,
Makati. On March 11, 1999, Erlinda filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for habeas
corpus to have the custody of lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio. She alleged that respondents
refused petitioner’s demands to see and visit her husband and prohibited Potenciano
from returning to Antipolo City.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a wife secure a writ of habeas corpus to compel her husband to live with
her in conjugal bliss

HELD:
The answer is no. Marital rights including coverture and living in conjugal dwelling may
not be enforced by the extra-ordinary writ of habeas corpus.

A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention, or by

which the rightful custody of a person is withheld from the one entitled thereto. It is
available where a person continues to be unlawfully denied of one or more of his
constitutional freedoms, where there is denial of due process, where the restraints are
not merely involuntary but are unnecessary, and where a deprivation of freedom
originally valid has later become arbitrary. It is devised as a speedy and effectual remedy
to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, as the best and only sufficient defense of
personal freedom.

To justify the grant of the petition, the restraint of liberty must be an illegal
and involuntary deprivation of freedom of action. The illegal restraint of
liberty must be actual and effective, not merely nominal or moral.

The evidence shows that there was no actual and effective detention or deprivation of
lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio’s liberty that would justify the issuance of the writ. The fact
that lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio is about 86 years of age, or under medication does not
necessarily render him mentally incapacitated. Soundness of mind does not hinge on
age or medical condition but on the capacity of the individual to discern his actions.

2. ATTY. EDWARD SERAPIO vs. SANDIGANBAYAN, et al. G.R. No. 148468,

January 28, 2003

FACTS:

Herein petitioner was charged with plunder together with former President Estrada and
Jinggoy Estrada before the Sandiganbayan. Before the arraignment, petitioner filed a
series of motions and/or petitions before the Sandiganbayan, among which are as
follows: (1) petition for bail; (2) motion to quash amended information; and (3) petition
for habeas corpus on the ground that the delay in proceeding with the bail hearing was
caused by the prosecution, thus, prosecution is deemed to have waive its right to
question the propriety of grant of bail.

Petitioner also assailed the decision of the Sandiganbayan in allowing the joint hearing
of petitioner’s petition for bail with that of President Estrada and Jinggoy’s petition for
bail.

ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not petitioner should first be arraigned before hearings of his petition for
bail may be conducted;
(2) Whether petitioner may file a motion to quash the amended Information during the
pendency of his petition for bail;
(3) Whether or not petition for bail of two defendants may be heard jointly;
(4) Whether or not petition for issuance of writ of habeas corpus may be availed of on
the ground of delay in the hearing of a petition for bail not as a matter of right.

HELD:
(1) The arraignment of an accused is not a prerequisite to the conduct of hearings on his
petition for bail. A person is allowed to petition for bail as soon as he is deprived of his
liberty by virtue of his arrest or voluntary surrender. An accused need not wait for his
arraignment before filing a petition for bail. To condition the grant of bail to an accused
on his arraignment would be to place him in a position where he has to choose between
(1) filing a motion to quash and thus delay his release on bail because until his motion to
quash can be resolved, his arraignment cannot be held, and (2) foregoing the filing of a
motion to quash so that he can be arraigned at once and thereafter be released on bail.
This would undermine his constitutional right not to be put on trial except upon a valid
complaint or Information sufficient to charge him with a crime and his right to bail.

(2) These two reliefs have objectives which are not necessarily antithetical to each other.
There is no inconsistency exists between an application of an accused for bail and his
filing of a motion to quash. Bail is the security given for the release of a person in the
custody of the law, furnished by him or a bondsman, to guarantee his appearance before
any court as required under the conditions set forth under the Rules of Court. Its
purpose is to obtain the provisional liberty of a person charged with an offense until his
conviction while at the same time securing his appearance at the trial. As stated earlier,
a person may apply for bail from the moment that he is deprived of his liberty by virtue
of his arrest or voluntary surrender.

On the other hand, a motion to quash an Information is the mode by which an accused
assails the validity of a criminal complaint or Information filed against him for
insufficiency on its face in point of law, or for defects which are apparent in the face of
the Information. An accused may file a motion to quash the Information, as a general
rule, before arraignment.

(3) There is no provision in the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure or the Rules of
Procedure of the Sandiganbayan governing the hearings of two or more petitions for bail
filed by different accused or that a petition for bail of an accused be heard
simultaneously with the trial of the case against the other accused. The matter is
addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court.

However, in the cases at bar, the joinder of the hearings of the petition for bail of
petitioner with the trial of the case against former President Joseph E. Estrada is an
entirely different matter as it will prejudice the petitioner. Because although all
defendants were charged with plunder, the alleged specific violation as to each one of
them is different. The petitioner is merely charged with conspired with the other co-
accused named in sub-paragraph (a) by "receiving or collecting, directly or indirectly, on
several instances, money x x x from illegal gambling, x x x in consideration of toleration
or protection of illegal gambling

Thus, with respect to petitioner, all that the prosecution needs to adduce to prove that
the evidence against him for the charge of plunder is strong are those related to the
alleged receipt or collection of money from illegal gambling as described in
subparagraph (a) of the amended Information. With the joinder of the hearing of
petitioner's petition for bail and the trial of the former President, the latter will have the
right to cross-examine intensively and extensively the witnesses for the prosecution in
opposition to the petition for bail of petitioner.
The joinder of the hearing of petitioner's bail petition with the trial of former President
Joseph E. Estrada will be prejudicial to petitioner as it will unduly delay the
determination of the issue of the right of petitioner to obtain provisional liberty and seek
relief from this Court if his petition is denied by the respondent court.

(4) The answer is in the negative. As a general rule, the writ of habeas corpus will not
issue where the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty in custody of an officer
under a process issued by the court which jurisdiction to do so. In exceptional
circumstances, habeas corpus may be granted by the courts even when the person
concerned is detained pursuant to a valid arrest or his voluntary surrender, for this writ
of liberty is recognized as "the fundamental instrument for safeguarding individual
freedom against arbitrary and lawless state action" due to "its ability to cut through
barriers of form and procedural mazes." Thus, in previous cases, we issued the writ
where the deprivation of liberty, while initially valid under the law, had later become
invalid, and even though the persons praying for its issuance were not completely
deprived of their liberty.

The Court finds no basis for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus in favor of
petitioner. The general rule that habeas corpus does not lie where the person alleged to
be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court
which had jurisdiction to issue the same applies, because petitioner is under detention
pursuant to the order of arrest issued by the Sandiganbayan on April 25, 2001 after the
filing by the Ombudsman of the amended information for plunder against petitioner
and his co-accused. Petitioner had in fact voluntarily surrendered himself to the
authorities on April 25, 2001 upon learning that a warrant for his arrest had been
issued.

A petition for habeas corpus is not the appropriate remedy for asserting
one's right to bail. It cannot be availed of where accused is entitled to bail
not as a matter of right but on the discretion of the court and the latter has
not abused such discretion in refusing to grant bail, or has not even
exercised said discretion. The proper recourse is to file an application for
bail with the court where the criminal case is pending and to allow hearings
thereon to proceed.

The ruling in Moncupa vs. Enrile that habeas corpus will lie where the deprivation of
liberty which was initially valid has become arbitrary in view of subsequent
developments finds no application in the present case because the hearing on
petitioner's application for bail has yet to commence. The delay in the hearing of
petitioner's petition for bail cannot be pinned solely on the Sandiganbayan or on the
prosecution for that matter. Petitioner himself is partly to be blamed with the series of
pleadings filed before the Sandiganbayan which totaled to 8 and 32 is those filed by
other defendants will be considered.
3. PANFILO LACSON, et al. vs. SECRETARY HERNANDO PEREZ, et al. G.R.
No. 147780, May 10, 2001

FACTS:
On May 1, 2001, President Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 38 declaring that
there was a state of rebellion in the National Capital Region. She likewise issued General
Order No. 1 directing the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National
Police to suppress the rebellion in the National Capital Region. Warrantless arrests of
several alleged leaders and promoters of the "rebellion" were thereafter effected.

Aggrieved by the warrantless arrests, and the declaration of a "state of rebellion," which
allegedly gave a semblance of legality to the arrests, a petition for prohibition,
injunction, mandamus, and habeas corpus (with an urgent application for the issuance
of temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction) filed by Panfilio
M. Lacson, Michael Ray B. Aquino, and Cezar O. Mancao. They alleged that they are
under imminent danger of being arrested.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petition for habeas corpus may be availed of against an imminent
danger from warrantless arrest.

HELD:
Petitioners' contention in G. R. No. 147780 (Lacson Petition), 147781 (DefensorSantiago
Petition), and 147799 (Lumbao Petition) that they are under imminent danger of being
arrested without warrant do not justify their resort to the extraordinary remedies of
mandamus and prohibition, since an individual subjected to warrantless arrest is not
without adequate remedies in the ordinary course of law. Such an individual may ask for
a preliminary investigation under Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, where he may adduce
evidence in his defense, or he may submit himself to inquest proceedings to determine
whether or not he should remain under custody and correspondingly be charged in
court. Further, a person subject of a warrantless arrest must be delivered to the proper
judicial authorities within the periods provided in Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code,
otherwise the arresting officer could be held liable for delay in the delivery of detained
persons. Should the detention be without legal ground, the person arrested can charge
the arresting officer with arbitrary detention. All this is without prejudice to his filing an
action for damages against the arresting officer under Article 32 of the Civil Code.
Verily, petitioners have a surfeit of other remedies which they can avail themselves of,
thereby making the prayer for prohibition and mandamus improper at this time The
application for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus is not proper since its purpose is
to relieve petitioners from unlawful restraint a matter which remains speculative up to
this very day.
4. ANISAH IMPAL SANGCA vs. THE CITY PROSECUTOR OF CEBU CITY
G.R. No. 175864, June 8, 2007

FACTS:
PDEA charged Lovely Impal Adam with violation of RA 9165. The inquest prosecutor
recommended the dismissal of the case but was disapproved by the City Prosecutor.
Consequently, an information charging Adam with violation of Section 5, Article 2 of
R.A. No. 9165 was filed before RTC.

On petition for review before the Department of Justice, Secretary Raul M. Gonzalez
found no probable cause to hold Adam liable for the offense charged The Justice
Secretary directed the City Prosecutor of Cebu City to withdraw the information. PDEA
filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied by the Justice Secretary on December
8, 2006.

On January 4, 2007, petitioner Anisah Impal Sangca filed the instant petition praying
for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus and the release of Lovely Impal Adam.

Finding that Adam could not be held liable for the crime charged, Judge Ingles issued an
Order on January 26, 2007 granting the Motion to Withdraw Information and ordering
the release of the accused, unless otherwise held for another valid ground.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petition for habeas corpus may be availed of in case of warrantless
arrests where there is pending motion to withdraw information before the trial court.

HELD:
Yes. A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention in
which any person is deprived of his liberty, or in which the rightful custody of any
person is withheld from the person entitled to it. Its essential object and purpose is to
inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint and to relieve a person from it if such
restraint is illegal. The singular function of a petition for habeas corpus is to protect and
secure the basic freedom of physical liberty.

5. ANITA MANGILA vs. JUDGE HERIBERTO M. PANGILINAN, et al G.R.

No. 160739, July 17, 2013

FACTS:
Petitioner Anita Mangila and four others were charged with seven criminal complaints
of syndicated estafa and violations of Republic Act No. 8042 (Migrant Workers and
Overseas Filipino Act of 1995) before the Municipal Trial Court

On the following day, June 17, 2003, Judge Heriberto M. Pangilinan, Presiding Judge of
the MTCC, conducted a preliminary investigation on the complaints. After examining
Miguel Aaron Palayon, one of the complainants, Judge Pangilinan issued a warrant for
the arrest of Mangila and her cohorts without bail. On the next day, the entire records of
the cases, including the warrant of arrest, were transmitted to the City Prosecutor of
Puerto Princesa City for further proceedings and appropriate action in accordance with
the prevailing rules. As a consequence, Mangila was arrested on June 18, 2003 and
detained at the headquarters on Taft Avenue, Manila of the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI).

Claiming that Judge Pangilinan did not have the authority to conduct the preliminary
investigation; that the preliminary investigation he conducted was not yet completed
when he issued the warrant of arrest; and that the issuance of the warrant of arrest was
without sufficient justification or without a prior finding of probable cause, Mangila
filed in the CA a petition for habeas corpus to obtain her release from detention. Her
petition averred that the remedy of habeas corpus was available to her because she could
no longer file a motion to quash or a motion to recall the warrant of arrest considering
that Judge Pangilinan had already forwarded the entire records of the case to the City
Prosecutor who had no authority to lift or recall the warrant.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a petition for habeas corpus may be availed of on the ground that an
accused in a criminal case when remedies such as motion to quash or motion to recall
warrant of arrest is no longer available.

HELD:
The answer is in the negative. Habeas corpus is not in the nature of a writ of error; nor
intended as substitute for the trial court’s function. It cannot take the place of appeal,
certiorari or writ of error. The writ cannot be used to investigate and consider questions
of error that might be raised relating to procedure or on the merits. The inquiry in a
habeas corpus proceeding is addressed to the question of whether the proceedings and
the assailed order are, for any reason, null and void. The writ is not ordinarily granted
where the law provides for other remedies in the regular course, and in the absence of
exceptional circumstances. Moreover, habeas corpus should not be granted in advance
of trial. The orderly course of trial must be pursued and the usual remedies exhausted
before resorting to the writ where exceptional circumstances are extant.

Hence, it cannot be issued where what is being questioned is the propriety of the
issuance of the warrant of arrest and other remedies to inquire into such issue is no
longer available. The function of habeas corpus, where the party who has appealed to its
aid is in custody under process, does not extend beyond an inquiry into the jurisdiction
of the court by which it was issued and the validity of the process upon its face. It is not
a writ of error.

There is no question that when the criminal complaints were lodged against Mangila
and her cohorts on June 16, 2003, Judge Pangilinan, as the Presiding Judge of the
MTCC, was empowered to conduct preliminary investigations involving "all crimes
cognizable by the proper court in their respective territorial jurisdictions." His authority
was expressly provided in Section 2, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure. It is relevant to point out at this juncture that the authority of the MTC and
MTCC judges to conduct preliminary investigations was removed only effective on
October 3, 2005 pursuant to A.M. No. 05-8-26-SC. With Mangila’s arrest and ensuing
detention being by virtue of the order lawfully issued by Judge Pangilinan, the writ of
habeas corpus was not an appropriate remedy to relieve her from the restraint on her
liberty. This is because the restraint, being lawful and pursuant to a court process, could
not be inquired into through habeas corpus.

6. Tujan-Militante vs Cada Deapera, July 28 2014

FACTS:
Respondent Raquel M. Cada-Deapera filed before the RTC-Caloocan a verified petition
for writ of habeas corpus, n the said petition, respondent demanded the immediate
issuance of the special writ, directing petitioner Ma. Hazelina Tujan-Militanteto produce
before the court respondent's biological daughter, minor Criselda M. Cada (Criselda),
and to return to her the custody over the child. Additionally, respondent indicated that
petitioner has three (3) known addresses where she can be served with summons and
other court processes,

The RTC-Caloocan issued a writ of habeas corpus, ordering petitioner to bring the child
to court. Despite diligent efforts and several attempts, however, the Sheriff was
unsuccessful impersonally serving petitioner copies of the habeas corpus petition and of
the writ. Instead, the Sheriff left copies of the court processes at petitioner's Caloocan
residence, as witnessed by respondent's counsel and barangay officials. Nevertheless,
petitioner failed to appear at the scheduled hearings before the RTC-Caloocan.

Meanwhile, petitioner filed a Petition for Guardianship over the person of Criselda
before the RTC, Branch 89 in Quezon City (RTC-Quezon City). Respondent filed a
Motion to Dismiss the petition for guardianship on the ground of litis pendentia, among
others. Thereafter, respondent filed a criminal case for kidnapping before the Office of
the City Prosecutor Quezon City against petitioner and her counsel.

The RTC-Quezon City granted respondent's motion and dismissed the guardianship
case due to the pendency of the habeas corpus petition before RTC-Caloocan.

Petitioner, by way of special appearance, moved for the quashal of the writ and prayed
before the RTC Caloocan for the dismissal of the habeas corpus petition, claiming,
among others, that she was not personally served with summons. Thus, as argued by
petitioner, jurisdiction over her and Criselda's person was not acquired by the RTC-
Caloocan.

Arguing that the RTC-Caloocan lacked jurisdiction over the case, petitioner relies on
Section 3of A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC and maintains that the habeas corpus petition should
have been filed before the family court that has jurisdiction over her place of residence
or that of the minor or wherever the minor may be found.[18] As to respondent, she
asserts, among others, that the applicable rule is not Section 3 but Section 20 of A.M.
No. 03-04-04-SC
ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC-Caloocan has jurisdiction over the habeas corpus petition

HELD:

The RTC-Caloocan has jurisdiction over the habeas corpus proceeding.

The Rules provide that a petition for a writ of habeas corpus involving custody of minors
shall be filed with the Family Court and the writ shall be enforceable within its Judicial
Region to which the Family Court belongs. Since Caloocan City and Quezon City both
belong to the same judicial region, the writ issued by the RTC-Caloocan can still be
implemented in Quezon City. Whether petitioner resides in the former or the latter is
immaterial in view of the above rule.

7. Datukan Malalang Salibo vs. the Warden 755 SCRA 296

FACTS:
Datukan Malang Salibo (Salibo) and other Filipinos were allegedly in Saudi Arabia for
the Hajj Pilgrimage. When he returned to the Philippines, he learned that police officers
of Datu Hofer Police Station in Maguindanao suspected him to be Butukan S. Malang.

Butukan S. Malang was one of the 197 accused of 57 counts of murder for allegedly
participating in the November 23, 2009 Maguindanao Massacre. He had a pending
warrant of arrest issued by the trial court in People of the Philippines v. Datu Andal
Ampatuan, Jr., et al.

Salibo presented himself before the police officers of Datu Hofer Police Station to clear
his name. There, he explained that he was not Butukan S. Malang and that he could not
have participated in the November 23, 2009 Maguindanao Massacre because he was in
Saudi Arabia at that time.

To support his allegations, Salibo presented to the police "pertinent portions of his
passport, boarding passes and other documents" tending to prove that a certain
Datukan Malang Salibo was in Saudi Arabia from November 7 to December 19, 2009.
[11]

The police officers initially assured Salibo that they would not arrest him because he was
not Butukan S. Malang.Afterwards, however, the police officers apprehended Salibo and
tore off page two of his passport that evidenced his departure for Saudi Arabia on
November 7, 2009. They then detained Salibo at the Datu Hofer Police Station for about
three (3) days.

The police officers transferred Salibo to the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group
in Cotabato City, where he was detained for another 10 days. While in Cotabato City, the
Criminal Investigation and Detention Group allegedly made him sign and affix his
thumbprint on documents.

Salibo was finally transferred to the Quezon City Jail Annex, Bureau of Jail Management
and Penology Building, Camp Bagong Diwa, Taguig City, where he is currently detained.

Salibo filed before the Court of Appeals the Urgent Petition for Habeas Corpus
questioning the legality of his detention and deprivation of his liberty. He maintained
that he is not the accused Butukan S. Malang.