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FRANCISCO CHAVEZ VS. PCGG ET AL., GR NO. 130716, DECEMBER 09, 1998
Facts:
Petitioner, instituted a case against public respondent to make public any negotiations and/or
agreements pertaining to the latter's task of recovering the Marcoses' ill-gotten wealth. The
respondents argued that the action was premature since he has not shown that he had asked
the respondents to disclose the negotiations and agreements before filing the case.
Issue:
Does the petitioner have the personality or legal standing to file the instant petition?
Held:
The instant petition is anchored on the right of the people to information and access to
government records, documents and papers- a right guaranteed under section 7, article III of the
Philippine Constitution. The petitioner a former solicitor general, is a Filipino citizen, and
because of the satisfaction of the two basic requisites laid down by decisional law to sustain
petitioner's standing i.e
(1) ENFORCEMENT OF A LEGAL RIGHT
(2) ESPOUSED BY A FILIPINO CITIZEN
ANSWER: No. While Congress is composed of representatives elected by the people, it does
not follow, except in a highly qualified sense, that in every exercise of its power of inquiry, the
people are exercising their right to information. The right of Congress or any of its Committees to
obtain information in aid of legislation cannot be equated with the peoples right to public
information. The distinction between such rights is laid down in Senate v. Ermita: There are clear
distinctions between the right of Congress to information which underlies the power of inquiry
and the right of people to information on matters of public concern. For one, the demand of a
citizen for the production of documents pursuant to his right to information does not have the
same obligatory force as a subpoena duces tecum issued by Congress. Neither does the right
to information grant a citizen the power to exact testimony from government officials. These
powers belong only to Congress, not to an individual citizen. (visit fellester.blogspot.com)
On March 6, 2008, President Arroyo issued Memorandum Circular No. 151, revoking E.O. 464.
Is there a recognized claim of executive privilege despite the revocation of E.O. 464?
ANSWER: Yes. The revocation of E.O. 464 does not in any way diminish our concept of
executive privilege. This is because this concept has Constitutional underpinnings.
In Senate v. Ermita, the executive privilege should be invoked by the President or through the
Executive Secretary by order of the President. Did Executive Secretary Ermita correctly invoke
the principle of executive privilege, by order of the President?
ANSWER: Yes. The Letter dated November 17, 2007 of Executive Secretary Ermita satisfies the
requirement. It serves as the formal claim of privilege. There, he expressly states that this
Office is constrained to invoke the settled doctrine of executive privilege as refined in Senate v.
Ermita, and has advised Secretary Neri accordingly. Obviously, he is referring to the Office of
the President. That is more than enough compliance.
May the Congress require the executive to state the reasons for the claim with particularity?
ANSWER: No. The Congress must not require the executive to state the reasons for the claim
with such particularity as to compel disclosure of the information which the privilege is meant to
protect. This is a matter of respect to a coordinate and co-equal department. (Senate v. Ermita)
ANSWER: No. There being a legitimate claim of executive privilege, the issuance of the
contempt Order suffers from constitutional infirmity. The respondent Committees did not comply
with the requirement laid down in Senate v. Ermita that the invitations should contain the
possible needed statute which prompted the need for the inquiry, along with the usual
indication of the subject of inquiry and the questions relative to and in furtherance thereof. The
SC also find merit in the argument of the OSG that respondent Committees violated Section 21
of Article VI of the Constitution, requiring that the inquiry be in accordance with the duly
published rules of procedure. The respondent Committees issuance of the contempt Order is
arbitrary and precipitate. It must be pointed out that respondent Committees did not first pass
upon the claim of executive privilege and inform petitioner of their ruling. Instead, they curtly
dismissed his explanation as unsatisfactory and simultaneously issued the Order citing him in
contempt and ordering his immediate arrest and detention. (Neri vs. Senate, G.R. No. 180643,
March 25, 2008)
mandamus, despite the lapse of the May 2010 elections, claiming that the source code
remained important and relevant "not only for compliance with the law, and the purpose thereof,
but especially in the backdrop of numerous admissions of errors and claims of fraud."
ISSUE:
W/N COMELEC could be compelled to release the source code to CenPEG- YES
HELD:
pertinent portion of Section 12 of R.A. 9369 is clear in that "once an AES technology is selected
for implementation, the Commission shall promptly make the source code of that technology
available and open to any interested political party or groups which may conduct their own
review thereof."- The COMELEC has offered no reason not to comply with this requirement of
the law. Indeed, its only excuse for not disclosing the source code was that it was not yet
available when CenPEG asked for it and, subsequently, that the review had to be done,
apparently for security reason, "under a controlled environment." The elections had passed and
that reason is already stale.