Dascal, Marcelo - Epistemology

EPISTEMOLOGY, CONTROVERSIES, AND PRAGMATICS
http://www.tau.ac.il/humanities/philos/dascal/papers/dascal3.htm
Marcelo Dascal
Epistemology, Controversies, and Pragmatics

In this paper, I wish to present and defend the thesis that the impasse at which the philosophy and history of
science find themselves in the last couple of decades is due, to a large extent, either to the complete neglect or
to a misguided treatment of t he role of scientific controversies in the evolution of science.
In order to do so, I will first provide a preliminary clarification of the impasse to which I refer (section 1).
Then, I will explain why I see the study of controversies as a fundamental step in solving it (section 2), I will
locate controversies within the set of empirical phenomena of the class of `polemical discourses' (section 3),
and I will single out the properties of controversies which explain their potential role for solving the impasse
(section 4). I will then show how the extant epistemologic al options are unable to handle controversies in a
satisfactory form, which explains their inability to solve the impasse (section 5). I will then formulate an
essential desideratum for the solution of the impasse (section 6), and will suggest how it can be satisfied
through the use of pragmatics both as an instrument and as a model (section 7).
What seemed to me, when I began writing, a relatively short and schematic article, has grown larger and
larger, despite my efforts to be concise. In spite of its size, there are some affirmations here which may seem
dogmatic because they are insufficient ly argued, as well as some suggestions that seem merely
programmatic. I take upon myself the responsibility for providing better justifications, as well as for
developing the program here sketched in a larger essay in preparation.
1. The impasse[1]
I take as a starting point the more or less universally admitted failure of logical positivism qua philosophy of
science. According to its critics, this philosophy has failed both at the normative and at the descriptive levels.
On the normative level, because its main notion, that of `justification' of a theory, which is essentially
inductivist and based on the notion of `confirmation', is untenable. According to Popper, the main critic of the
normative component of the positiv ist model, it is not possible to build an inductive logic which is capable
of satisfactorily formalizing the idea that it is possible to attribute to each theory a `degree of confirmation',
defined in terms of its conditional probability relative to the a vailable evidence. If one insists on using such a
notion, the result is that all theories will have, at best, the same degree of confirmation, namely zero. Hence,
this notion does not permit us to formulate a criterion for the acceptance or abandonment of a theory. The
alternative normative criterion proposed by Popper is based -- as is well-known -- on the refutability of
theories, rather than on their confirmability. Every scientific theory should be considered as a refutable
conjecture. Those theories that have survived `serious' or `severe' efforts of refutation are àccepted'. Popper's
criterion contains, therefore not only a principle for evaluating theories, but also a normative recommendation
for the scientists to act upon: they are advised, on th e one hand, to produce refutable conjectures and, on the
other, to try to refute conjectures (theirs or others'); furthermore, they should be ready to abandon a theory,
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however cherished, as soon as it is refuted.

On the descriptive level, the critique of positivism has consisted mainly in indicating that the `growth of
(scientific) knowledge' does not occur through progressive incrementation of the degree of confirmation of
the proposed theories, as the positivis t model suggests. Critics like Kuhn, from the vantage point of the
history of science, argue that, at best, such a conception of scientific progress applies to certain relatively
homogeneous periods of `normal science'. But such periods are abruptly inter rupted by `crises' which
engender radical ruptures in the evolution of a science, which in turn do not permit even the measurement of
the progress made from one period of normal science to another. The growth of knowledge, if sense can be
made of this phr ase, occurs not linearly or incrementally, but rather in zig-zag. Furthermore, it is
characterized by an ìncommensurability' between its different phases, which affects not only the theories
proposed in each phase, but also the methodological norms preva iling in each of them.
More radical critics, such as Feyerabend, argue that, even in `normal' periods, scientists are in fact
`methodological opportunists', who make use of all available methods in order to develop and promote their
theories, without swearing faithfulness to a ny one of them. In this way, not only is the positivistic norm
called into question, but also any normative methodology. The outcome of this type of critique is the denial of
the possibility of universal criteria of legitimization of scientific knowledge, i.e., of criteria based exclusively
on principles of rationality. Ultimately, what is at stake is the very project of formulating an èpistemology' in
the sense of a theory capable of justifying the valid modes of knowledge, rather than merely describing the
modes considered valid by this or that community, culture, or historical period.
The two faces of the onslaught on positivism -- the normative and the descriptive -- are intimately related.
The arguments of the descriptivist and normativist critics make this clear: the former point out the uselessness
of norms nobody follows as well as the historical and social variability of these norms; the latter, the
necessity of adopting norms that bear some descriptive adequacy, without falling into the relativism of pure
descriptivism, which would make it impossible to explain the rationality of scientific progress. Consequently,
in post-positivist philosophy of science, where "the descriptive and the normative are inextricably mixed"
(Kuhn 1970: 233), the positions no longer range themselves along the categories normative vs. descriptive,
but rather according to the way in which these two aspects are combined. When Lakatos (1970: 177)
describes his differences with Kuhn saying that "Kuhn's conceptual framework for dealing with continuity in
science is sociopsychological: mine is normative" (t hereby provoking vehement protests from Kuhn), no
doubt he exaggerates the polarization of the two positions for rhetorical purposes. After all, he himself
stresses, in the next sentence, the word àlso': "Where Kuhn sees `paradigms', I also see rational `research
programmes'" (ibid.). He also stresses the need to account for the interaction between the three Popperian
`worlds' (Lakatos 1970: 180), and in another text he emphasizes the need of explaining "how the
historiography of science should learn fro m the philosophy of science and vice-versa" (Lakatos 1981:
107).[2]
The problem then, is not to choose between normativism and descriptivism, but to find an adequate way of
combining them, in the light of the criticism they address to each other. The impasse in the philosophy and
history of science results from the fact that the proposed combinations have so far tended to subordinate one
of these components to the other, without really attempting to harmonize them.
The way proposed by Lakatos in his "methodology of scientific research programmes" tries to take into
account the diachronic dimension, especially the fact that in most cases theories withstand the ìnstant death'
their empirical refutation ought to brin g about (according to the position Lakatos dubs `naive
falsificationism'). His main concern is to justify rationally this fact. That is to say, to show how the frequent
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violation of what seems to be a fundamental norm of scientific activity can be underst ood in terms of a
broader and deeper notion of rationality. His solution consists in taking as units of rational assessment not
isolated theories but series of theories -- `research programmes' -- sharing a "core" of guiding principles and
theses. Histori city thus becomes essential for the application of the norm of rationality. Nevertheless, in
order to fulfill this function, it must be -- according to Lakatos -- an ìnternal' historicity, grounded in the
`rational reconstruction' of the series of theori es, whence èxternal', allegedly irrelevant factors are excluded
a priori. The normative eye of `philosophy' is responsible for determining the selection of what is relevant,
while the descriptive eye of history (or of sociology, psychology, etc.) has at best an auxiliary function. No
wonder, therefore, that for Lakatos the drama of science's evolution occurs not in real history, but rather in
World Three, where normativity reigns, and whose characters are not the knowing subjects but àrticulate
knowledg e', independent of them. [3] In my opinion, Lakatos never satisfies his own demand for elaborating
a theory of the growth of knowledge that is really able to integrate the three worlds.
Nor does descriptivism, in its known versions. The ambivalence between prescription and description
detected by Feyerabend (1970: 198) in Kuhn's work simply confirms that here too there is a concern for
combining the two components. And Kuhn (1970: 237) i s certainly right when he replies that his work tends
to be read both ways simultaneously. But his argument to this effect -- which he considers simple and
unobjectionable -- clearly reveals the priority he assigns to the descriptive and the consequent `w eak'
normativity he allows for:[4]
[a] Scientists act in certain ways.
[b] These ways of acting fulfill certain essential functions.
[c] There is no other way of acting that fulfills the same functions.
[d] Scientists wish to improve scientific knowledge.
Ergo:
[e] Scientists must act as they do.
No doubt there is in this argument a deontic premise [d] which formally permits, without committing the
so-called `naturalist fallacy', the drawing of the normative conclusion [e]. However, it is a `weak' normativity,
applicable only under condition [c]. But this condition is satisfied only within a `paradigm': scientists trained
within it are simply unable to discern other `scientific' ways of acting. But, according to Kuhn himself, a shift
of paradigm involves, among other things, a change in the ways o f acting that scientists deem conducive to
the "flourishing of their enterprise".[5] That is to say, with the change in paradigm other ways of acting
capable of fulfilling the essential `functions' of science necessarily arise. In other w ords, the phrase `must act
as they do' acquires different contents with each shift of paradigm, without there being any possibility of
justifying or criticizing this norm other than ìnternally'. The normative conclusion [e] is weak because, since
conditi on [c] is either trivially true (within a paradigm) or else false (transparadigmatically), we don't have
any criterion that really permits us to compare different ways of acting; thus, there is no way to attribute to
them a stronger normativity, that is, a normativity grounded in criteria which apply, although not universally,
at least beyond the limits of each period of normal science.[6]
The strict separation Kuhn makes between periods of normal science where a rigorous normativity reigns and
of extraordinary science where normativity is practically suspended and "anything goes" is symptomatic of
the difficulty this project faces in harm onizing the two components. More radical versions of descriptivism -be they historiographic, sociological, or psychological -- tend in turn to renounce completely the normative
component, resting content with offering descriptions or, at most, causal an alyses. In this way, they are led -paradoxically -- to a sort of positivism (in the sense this word is used in the philosophy of law): the only
criterion of validity of norms is their existence as such, and their acceptance and evolution can only be exp
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lained in terms of external processes or forces that act as causes but not as reasons. [7]
If extant theories have been unable to harmonize a normative rationality with the description of the facts of
scientific praxis, it is because they have not been able to bring them closer to each other. Both descriptivism
and normativism have accepted wi thout question the opposition and consequent separation between a
regulative or formal rationality and a descriptivity which, although often declaring itself reconstructive, aims
at capturing the facts so to speak in their raw state, i.e., prior to any no rmativity. This mutual alienation is
what prevents the finding of a point of contact between them. [8]
What is needed in order to overcome this impasse is to go beyond the opposition on which it depends. On the
one hand, one must bring rationality down from its regulative heights, making it constitutive of content,
sensitive to the context of its applicat ion, even if this is accompanied by the danger of its `contamination' by
contingency and the consequent abandonment of its universalist pretensions. On the other hand, it must be
acknowledged that scientific praxis, qua human activity guided by reasons, c annot be described in terms
entirely alien to the constitutive role of these reasons. In my opinion, what has to be demonstrated is the
possibility of this rapprochement between norm and description, between rationality and `reality'. I believe
that the p oint of convergence par excellence of this encounter is scientific controversy. Therefore, what has
to be done is to try to understand why scientific controversy is impossible according to the extant
epistemological theories, and to try to develop an argu ment demonstrating its possibility. Before doing so, I
must explain why the role controversies play is so crucial in my view and what my conception of a
controversy is.
2. Why Controversies?
THESIS A: Controversies are indispensable for the formation, evolution and evaluation of (scientific)
theories, because it is through them that `serious' criticism -- i.e., the kind that allows for engendering,
improving and controlling both th e `well-formedness' and the èmpirical content' of scientific theories -- is
performed.
One can immediately note in this thesis what it shares with Popperian normativism, namely the importance I
assign to criticism. I think this starting point is reasonable and I won't try to defend it here. Starting here,
what is essential is to try to unve il the conditions of possibility of criticism. As opposed to Popper, who
considers these conditions as belonging exclusively to the logical plane, for me it is indispensable to take into
account also those conditions that permit critical activity, exercis ed mainly in controversies. In the latter it is
not observations vs. conjectures, nor theories vs. theories, nor arguments vs. arguments, nor even research
programmes vs. research programmes that are in opposition, but rather scientists who perform experi ments
and observations, formulate theories and arguments, and persevere in their research programmes or abandon
them -- all of them vs. scientists who oppose them by performing the same kinds of activity. Concepts such as
`seriousness' (Popper) or `tenaci ty' (Lakatos), which are essential for criticism to fulfill its function according
to the normativists, apply first and foremost to the activities of scientists and only derivatively to their results.
These human activities take place in World Two, rather than in World Three. It is only by virtue of an
unjustified assumption, which creates an insurmountable gap between these two worlds, that one is led to
believe that all that which in critical activity does not lend itself to a direct `translation' into components of
World Three is (a) irrelevant for explaining the scientificity of science, (b) corresponds to ìrrational' or
`nonepistemic' factors, and therefore (c) has nothing to do with the explanation of the growth of scientific
knowledge. But none of these can be a priori affirmed. If criticism is so essential -- and I agree with Popper
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that it is -- it is necessary to study the set of its conditions of possibility as they manifest themselves in its
`natural place', i.e., scientific controversies, i n order to be able to decide which of these conditions are
relevant for explaining the `rationality' of science.[9]
Thesis B: The rigorous study of controversies is an indispensable means for providing an adequate
description of the history and praxis of science. For controversies are the natural `dialogical context' where
theories are elaborated and where thei r meaning progressively crystallizes. Furthermore, the study of
controversies will permit us to determine empirically, on the one hand the precise nature of those `crises' and
`ruptures' that allegedly introduce an element of irrationality in the evolutio n of science, and on the other,
wherein lies the `continuity' which allegedly is required as the background for conceptual `change' and
ìnnovation'.
In this thesis one can note what is shared with descriptivism, namely the importance I attribute to the careful
description of the historical process of scientific evolution, where controversies play a decisive role. As
opposed to Kuhn and other descripti vists, however, I stress the fact that not all `context' has the same weight.
The dialogical context of controversy is the `direct' context of constitution of the meaning of a theory and it is
relative to it that other aspects of context acquire their rel evance. Furthermore, I believe that the touchstone
for understanding the alleged differences between normal and extraordinary science consists precisely in
finding out whether there are fundamental differences between the controversies that occur in each of them.
This would enable us to say something significant about the existence and nature of phenomenona such as
incommensurability, radical changes in methodological norms, etc. [10]
In short: science manifests itself in its history as a sequence of controversies; these are, therefore, not
anomalies but the `natural state' of science; controversies are the locus where critical activity is exercised,
where the meaning of theories is d ialogically shaped, where changes and innovations arise, and where the
rationality or irrationality of the scientific enterprise manifests itself; for all these reasons, to ignore them in
the philosophy and history of science is a capital mistake which mu st be corrected.
3. The empirical phenomenon `polemical discourse'

But what are -- the impatient reader will justly ask -- scientific controversies? In the present section I will try
to give an answer, locating controversy properly so called, and in particular scientific controversy, within the
family of phenomena to which it belongs.
This family is, evidently, that of discursive dialogical polemical phenomenona. There is no controversy,
strictly speaking, without there being at least two persons who employ language to address each other, in a
confrontation of opinions, arguments, the ories, and so forth. In this respect, the definition of controversy
provided by Leibniz (VOR, p. 18) in one of his fragments on the subject -- "controversia est quaestio circa
quam opiniones contrariae habentur" [a controversy is a question over which con trary opinions are held] -- is
clearly insufficient (except perhaps for Popper), since it reduces controversy to its logico-semantical aspect. I
also propose to exclude from the extension of the term `controversy' (although not necessarily from the field
of polemical discourse) what is called by the German tradition `critical reception' -- for instance, Popper's
diatribes against Marx, Hegel, and Plato, in his The Open Society and its Enemies. Similarly, I would exclude
prefabricated `dialogues', such as the one between Leibniz and Locke in the New Essays.[11]
The reason for excluding these cases has to do with my insistence on viewing controversy as an activity, and
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-- more importantly -- an activity that always contains an element of imprevisibility. In controversy it is

essential to preserve the possible an d the actual use of the right to contest the opponent's views granted to
each of the disputants. For a live, real, and active (i.e., neither dead, nor imaginary, nor silent) opponent is
unpredictable in his/her reactions. Although we may anticipate to som e extent our opponent's reactions, and
even undertake to manoeuver her to react in a certain way, the controversy game is essentially a `strategical
game', that is a game where our capacity for predicting the adversary's move is limited.[12] This fact is
responsible to a great extent for the controversy's capacity to call attention to confusions and produce
clarifications, to force conceptual, methodological or theoretical changes, and thereby to lead to innovations.
Another reason for not including critical reception, prefabricated dialogue, and the like among controversies
is the fact that they are not really dialogical. To be sure, every text is, at least implicitly, addressed to some
audience and designed accord ingly (cf. Clark 1992: xviii). But in dialogue the audience is very explicitly
defined, the roles of speaker and hearer alternate with high frequency, and the `conversational demands' (cf.
Dascal 1977) shift progressively with each intervention by each pa rticipant. These properties of dialogue in
general, which do not apply only to oral debates but also to written controversy (cf. Dascal 1989a), permit us
to understand some of its aspects: the variable or ad hoc nature of the arguments used in it (dependi ng on the
opponent, the stage of the controversy, etc.), the dynamic rather than static character of the definition of the
`problem situation' in the course of the controversy, the thematic shifts it undergoes, etc.
Conceived of as a dialogical phenomenon, controversy thus primarily consists in those texts or utterances
directly addressed by each disputant to the other (or others), privately or publicly. In addition to this `primary
text', there is in general a vast `secondary text' which, at least partially, belongs to the controversy. It includes,
for instance, works by the disputants where the controversy is reflected directly or indirectly, as well as letters
to third parties where allusion is made to the contro versy. A broader circle of texts that are pertinent for the
controversy form its `co-text' which includes, for example, works by prior or contemporary authors quoted
and relied upon by both disputants. Finally, every dialogue unfolds within a nondiscursiv e `context', whose
various aspects and levels have always a more or less important role in the content and development of
controversies.[13]
All that was just said applies to the whole family of polemical dialogues. We must now try to specify
controversy's position within this microfamily which includes, among its many members, verbal quarrels
between couples, political debates, round tables in scientific congresses, critical reviews of books and replies
to them, medieval disputationes, etc. Several classifications, more or less ad hoc, have been proposed, which
I will not be able to discuss here.[14] I will offer a taxonomy which has proved useful in the course of my
work on controversies.[15]
Let us reserve the term `polemics' for denoting the set of discursive dialogical polemical phenomena, whose
general characteristics have been described above. Within this set, I propose to distinguish between three
ìdeal types', members of the subfamily to which controversies belong. I will call them `discussion', `dispute',
and `controversy'.
A discussion is a polemics whose object is a well-circumscribed topic or problem. As the discussion
develops, the contenders tend to acknowledge that the root of the problem is a mistake relating to some
important concept or procedure within a well-defin ed field (even though they disagree regarding the nature
of the mistake in question and about who commits it). Discussions allow for solutions, which consist in
correcting the mistake thanks to the application of procedures accepted in the field (e.g., pr oof, computation,
repetition of experiments, etc.).
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A dispute is a polemics which also seems to have as its object a well-defined divergence. But at no point do
the contenders accept its definition as grounded in some mistake. Rather, it is rooted in differences of attitude,
feelings, or preferences. Ther e are no mutually accepted procedures for deciding the dispute, that is, a
dispute has no single `solution'.[16] At most they can be dissolved. But in general the underlying divergences
tend to recur in disputes over other topics. Some c ontenders see in the position of their opponents symptoms
of an illness against which the only reasonable action to take is therapeutic.
A controversy is a polemics that occupies an intermediate position between discussion and dispute. It can
begin with a specific problem, but it spreads quickly to other problems and reveals profound divergences.
These involve both opposed attitudes and p references and disagreements about the extant methods for
problem solving. For this reason, the opposition is not perceived simply as a matter of mistakes, nor are there
accepted procedures for deciding them -- which causes the continuation of controversi es and sometimes their
recurrence. However, they do not reduce to mere unsolvable conflicts of preferences. The contenders pile up
arguments they believe increase the weight of their positions vis a vis the adversaries' objections, thereby
leading, if not to deciding the matter in question, at least to tilting the `balance of reason' in their favor.[17]
Controversies are neither `solved' nor `dissolved'; they are resolved. Their resolution may consist in the
acknowledgment (by the conten ders or by their community of reference) that enough weight has been
accumulated in favor of one of their positions, or in the emergence (thanks to the controversy) of modified
positions acceptable to the contenders, or simply in the mutual clarification of the nature of the differences at
stake.
In real polemics, elements of the three ideal types are usually mixed up. But in general, under analysis, it is
possible to identify the dominant type. Also in polemics between scientists, the three types are mixed and it is
not easy to separate them. A simplistic solution would be to employ the Popperian technique of demarcation.
Just as he distinguishes (within science) between ìdeological revolutions' and properly `scientific
revolutions' (Popper 1981), demarcation would consist of assimilating scien tific polemics with discussions,
while considering disputes as being merely and clearly ìdeological' (and therefore without interest for
science).[18] At the opposite pole, a Kuhnian would say that discussions are typically intra-paradi gmatic and
thus characteristic of periods of normal science, whereas in the periods of extraordinary science the polemics
are essentially disputes. Neither demarcation leaves room for controversies (which they tend to assimilate
either with discussions or with disputes), and therefore they are unable to recognize their essential
characteristics and fundamental role. This difficulty is not merely circumstantial but results from certain basic
assumptions, which will be discussed in section 5. Before that, I will go into some more detail in describing
some of the basic characteristics of controversies.[19]
4. Some essential characteristics of controversies

I. The first important property of controversies is that they do not remain confined to the initial questions that
spark them. They tend to spread rapidly, both in extension and in depth.
In one of the cycles of the Malthus vs. Ricardo controversy, for example, the initial problem is that of `corn
laws', which restrict the import of corn to England. However, this problem quickly recedes into the
background, and the correspondence between the two economists focuses on other topics, such as the
relations between profits and interest rates, between salaries and the true price of labor, between effective
demand and the consumption of luxuries, as well as on methodological issues, such as the distinction between
permanent laws and temporary tendencies, the nature of scientific language, the question of whether
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economic theory should be monocausal or multicausal, etc. [20] It is important to note that all these new
topics are introduced in the debate without explicit digression markers (cf. Dascal and Katriel 1979) -- which
shows that the problem shifts in question are perceived by the participants as directly relevant to the initial
topic, now "broadly conceived". That is to say, the thematic evolution of the controversy is ruled, at least
partially, by intrinsic conditions of semantic and pragmatic relevance (cf. Dascal 1977).
In the course of a controversy, the initial problem is often completely set aside -- so much so that the
controversy may come to an end with the adoption of one of the positions in conflict, even if it is unable to
solve the initial problem. In the contr oversy about continental drift, one of the initial problems that
Wegener's theory (about the early union of the continents and their subsequent separation) purported to solve
was to account for the observed similarities between life forms existing on cont inents that are presently
separated. The alternative theories, which deny continental drift, explain this phenomenon by means of ad
hoc hypotheses (e.g., the existence of early ìntercontinental bridges', whose later disappearance they are
unable to expla in). Sixty years after Wegener's theory was first proposed, the controversy ends with the
almost universal adoption of the drift theory (albeit in a substantially modified form). But the decisive
evidence that supports it comes from another discipline (pa leomagnetism), and the initial
paleobiogeographical problem, to which Wegener had attributed decisive importance, remains unsolved.[21]
II. The expansion of the problematics includes the questioning by the contenders of their adversaries' basic
factual, methodological, and conceptual presuppositions. Thus, in his effort to undermine Malthus's theory of
value, Ricardo simply denies a fact affirmed by Malthus: that "repeated experience" demonstrates that "the
money price of labour never falls till many workmen have been for some time out of work" (Ricardo to
Malthus, 21 July 1821; WC, IX: 25). The rejection of this alleged fact (rec all that at the time there was no
reliable statistical information), in its turn, exemplifies Ricardo's general methodological attitude, according
to which it is more important that a hypothesis be supported by "general reasoning" than that it conform to
the facts (ibid.). Analogously, in the above mentioned controversy about continental drift, Simpson attacks
his opponents for using incorrect data based on the mistaken identification of fossils, for underestimating the
capacity of dispersion of several o rganisms, for incorrectly summing up data from other research sources,
and for not considering the possibility of parallel or convergent evolution -- i.e., he questions factual,
methodological, and conceptual assumptions, respectively. Another example is the expansion and deepening
of the controversy between Geoffroy de Saint-Hilaire and Cuvier about the existence of a uniform `plan of
organization' underlying the anatomy of all animal species. As pointed out by Gil (1985), this apparently
well-defined an d `technical' problem leads to a brief but intense (and even dramatic) controversy, where "a
whole series of fundamental epistemological decisions was at stake" (Gil 1985: 358). Whereas Cuvier favors
multiplicity, diversity, and discontinuity, demands str ict fidelity to data, requires the use of a precise
language, and imposes severe constraints on the use of analogy, Saint-Hilaire adopts the opposite choices: he
seeks a unity underlying multiplicity, criticizes empiricism, does not worry about rigorous d efinitions, and
employs analogy rather freely.
It is worth noticing the remarkable similarity between the oppositions Cuvier vs. Saint-Hillaire and Malthus
vs. Ricardo (for the latter, see Cremaschi and Dascal 1996). While Malthus favored an anti-deductivist and
anti-apriorist methodology and sought an èxact' adherence to reality, Ricardo had no qualms in sacrificing
such an adherence in favor of the simplicity of universal and `rigorous' laws. In Granger's (1959: 103) terms,
one valued above all the spirit of exactness; the other, the spirit of rig or. Both, however, professed fidelity to
the `same' scientific paradigm, inspired by Newton -- which shows that even within a paradigm there is room
for radically different interpretations (see below, paragraph III). The remarkable coincidence between the
methodological oppositions underlying these two controversies suggests that, behind their conscious options,
scientists oppose each other also by virtue of different `casts of mind', i.e. different ways of conceiving the
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very aim of scientific activity, and that such differences have a lasting impact on their actual exercise of such
an activity.
III. A third important characteristic of controversies is their hermeneutical aspect. The question of the correct
interpretation of data, of language, of theories, of methods, and of the status quaestionis, arises again and
again throughout a cont roversy. At each stage the contenders accuse each other of misrepresenting their
theses, of using ambiguous language, of not responding to the objections and -- for that reason -- of not
addressing themselves to the `true problem' at stake (either at a gi ven stage or in the controversy as a whole).
There are endless examples of these kinds of claims in all types of controversy, and I will not illustrate them
here (for some examples, see Dascal 1990a).
An interesting question is the reason or function these (alleged or real) `misunderstandings' may have in the
controversy. I have ventured the hypothesis (cf. Dascal 1990a) that they are related to the fact that, when they
engage in a controversy, the co ntenders take upon themselves a double commitment: to defend their own
theories and to criticize those of the adversary. Now, a relatively easy (and current) way of fulfilling these
commitments is to invoke (qua defendant) and to use (qua opponent) `disto rtion': I evade my opponent's
criticism alleging that it does not really apply to my theory, but to the incorrect version s/he gave of it; I
attack more efficiently a `reconstruction' (usually simplistic and sometimes caricatural) I myself propose of
my o pponent's theory, rather than the theory ìtself', in all its complexity. Notice that this hypothesis is not
psychological nor `political', since I am not accusing the contenders of ill faith. I am suggesting that they
employ the `strategy of misunderstan ding' by force of the objective obligations they undertake once they
engage in a controversy.
IV. The dynamic character of the problematic, the ongoing questioning of the presuppositions, and the
`hermeneutic freedom' the contenders grant themselves leads to the fourth -- perhaps the most important -characteristic of scientific controver sies: their òpenness'. What I want to express by this term is this: (a)
when we begin a controversy, we do not know where its inherent dynamics will lead us; (b) controversies are
rarely confined to a single discipline and, within a discipline, to a well -defined topic; (c) they reveal the
existence of deep differences regarding the meaning of concepts, methods, and facts so far accepted without
dispute; (d) it is not possible to anticipate all the objections of the opponent; (e) they clear the way for th e
emergence of radical innovation -- one might even say that they invite the appearance of `non conventional'
ideas, methods, techniques, and interpretations.
V. A special aspect of the openness of controversies, which it is convenient to single out as their fifth
characteristic, has to do with their closure -- a topic that has been the focus of the volume compiled by
Engelhardt Jr. and Caplan (1987). I n this volume, Beauchamp (1987: 28-35) and McMullin (1987: 77-82)
propose two similar typologies of `closures'.[22] Leaving aside `natural death' (Beauchamp) and
àbandonment' (McMullin), one can clearly recognize in the two typologies t he types of closure I have
indicated as typical of discussions and disputes. `Resolution' (McMullin) and `sound argument closure'
(Beauchamp) are instances of what I have called the `solution' (of a discussion), whereas `closure'
(McMullin) and `procedura l closure' (Beauchamp) are typical of disputes, which cannot be terminated
without the intervention of some umpire endowed with the required authority, even if this authority at best
`dissolves' the opposition for practical purposes, without in fact resol ving the conflict of attitudes.
Curiously, what these two typologies lack are the intermediate types of termination, more open than the
algorithms that solve discussions, but not arbitrary as the means for dissolving disputes are. Beauchamp's
`negotiation' and `consensus' might exempli fy these intermediate means, in so far as their decision power is
contingent (hence provisional), depends upon the contenders themselves, and is acknowledged as such by
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them. No doubt these forms of `closing without closure' correspond to the typical open ness of controversies.
Nevertheless, they stress excessively the element of àgreement'. Controversies in fact can terminate without
agreement, without thereby becoming disputes. What is interesting is that even in such cases they are
perceived by the par ticipants and analysts alike as `productive'. That is, although they do not permit even a
tilting of the balance in favor of one of the positions in conflict, they make a cognitive or epistemic
contribution: they clarify the problem, they permit one to id entify conceptual or methodological divergencies
or difficulties, they reorient the research effort, or they simply produce ùnderstanding'. As a whole these
contributions are decisive for clearing the ground for radical innovation -- often achieved in te rms of an
alternative quite different from the positions held by the adversaries in the controversy itself.[23]
VI. The openness of controversies does not mean they are anarchical. Although they are not governed by
implicitly or explicitly codified rules, as discussions are, they do not fall in the ànything goes' extreme.
Although they are not decided by a `tribunal of Reason' (Kant) nor by an impartial `judge of controversies'
(as the one often dreamt of by Leibniz), they are not terminated by invectives, censorship, or fist fights.[24]
Although their thematic evolution and problem shift s may be influenced by external events (discoveries in
other disciplines, new technologies, pressing practical needs, etc.), they also obey relations of relevance
inherent to the contents of the theories in conflict. In short, scientific controversies man ifest some sort of
order or systematicity, which is sufficiently weak so as not to deprive them of their essential openness, and
yet sufficient for ensuring that their development is not entirely arbitrary. In this kind of order, I believe, a
special form of rationality is operative -- a rationality which it is up to the theory of controversies to
elucidate.
5. The impasse and controversies

I will now connect the impasse described in the first section with what has been said about controversies so
far. My hypothesis is that the impasse results from the fact that the main extant positions in the philosophy
and history of science are unable to acknowledge and explain the role of controversies in the formation,
evolution, and evaluation of scientific theories. That is, I will defend the following thesis:
THESIS C: Neither the known forms of normativism, nor the known forms of descriptivism permit the
existence of scientific controversies displaying their role and characteristics as described in sections 2-4.
In order to complete my argument, it would be necessary to defend also the following thesis:
THESIS C': So far, no alternatives to normativism and descriptivism, capable of accounting for the role and
characteristics of controversies, have been proposed.
Nevertheless, I will not defend C' here, except by way of some marginal comments on some of these
àlternatives', because (a) I do not pretend to be knowledgeable about the vast recent literature on the subject
and (b) it doesn't seem to me -- by the exam ples I know of -- that the authors who propose such alternatives
have recognized the basic difficulty I identify as the deep cause of the impasse (namely, the fact that the
importance of controversies has been overlooked), so that they have not even attem pted to overcome it.
My argumentation in support of C will consist in showing how the more or less `classical' descriptivist and
normativist positions exclude the possibility of the existence of controversies (in my sense of the term)
because they do not permit the re alization of one or more of their essential properties. This exclusion leads to
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a polarization that reduces the field of scientific polemics to only two types -- discussions and disputes -with their respective modes of treatment. I will also argue that one can find in Kant an anticipation of this
situation. In the next section I will argue that the solution of the impasse requires the demonstration of the
possibility of transcending such a polarization.
I. The predominantly descriptivist positions, in their many variants, stress the variety and variability of
factors that intervene in scientific polemics. For them, the distinction between èpistemic' and `non-epistemic'
factors is contingent: dif ferent disciplines or `communities of experts', at different historical moments, draw
such a distinction in different ways. Hence, in order to have epistemic value, critical activity must conform to
the way in which a certain community establishes this va lue. This means that, necessarily, only controversies
that are ìnternal' to the community can be said to have epistemic value. That is to say, the space of, say,
`legitimate' controversy is pre-determined by a set of contingently valid norms given for ea ch `debate
community'. To attempt to engage in a trans-communitary debate is like attempting to play two different
`language games' applying the same rules. The rules defining each èpistemic game' cannot explain such an
endeavor; in order to account for it -- when it occurs -- it is necessary to appeal to non epistemic factors. In
other words, trans-communitary polemics is either absurd and produces only equivocation, or else -- if it has
any value -- such a value can only be non-epistemic, unless, contr ary to descriptivism's fundamental
presupposition, one admits the existence of supra-communitary epistemic norms.
Therefore, the internal logic of descriptivism, forces us to conceive of controversies either as `well-behaved'
debates conforming to the intra-communitary norms that ensure their epistemic value, or else as conflicts
governed only by non-epistemic facto rs. In the former case, they are reduced to what I have called
discussions; in the latter, to disputes. No room is left for controversies properly speaking. For no room is left
for radical innovation -- the kind of innovation that, precisely because it is grounded on deep criticism which
includes the contestation and revision of the contingently given demarcations between èpistemic' and
`non-epistemic', cannot be included in either category.
II. Another descriptivist tendency, which prevents it from being able to account for controversies, is its
`contextualism'. In so far as it tends to explain rather than just describe the norms in force within a scientific
community, descriptivism does so in terms of external causes (social, political, historical, psychological, etc.).
This means that, ultimately, the true explanation of each of the aspects of scientific activity must be given in
terms of one or another type of preferred cause. In this way, any àutonomy' -- even relative -- is denied to
such phenomena as the thematic evolution of a controversy. These phenomena must result, ultimately, from
the influence of external events. The assumption of an internal logic, of a semantic or prag matic relevance, is
viewed as entirely spurious -- a mere illusion.
In its extreme versions, this tendency leads to the thesis that every `rational reconstruction' (which not only
Lakatos, but also Kuhn, takes to be necessary in the history of science) of such processes in terms of their
alleged internal constraints belo ngs to the order of `rationalization' (Freud), ìdeology' (Marx), or disguise of
what really happens in all discursive processes, namely a fight for power (Foucault). Accordingly, even
well-behaved polemics are nothing but moves in a dispute, for their tr ue purpose is to defend a given `truth
regime' against its rivals.
The main problem of such a contextualism lies in the difficulty to establish how contents and relations
between contents are determined by their alleged causes. One can of course intimate that Marx's hemorrhoids
were responsible for his theory of alienat ion (cf. Bartley III 1987: 430-431), but it is difficult to demonstrate
it, except by a vague analogy between the two kinds of phenomena. Likewise, generic Machiavellian
arguments invoking the cui bono principle only acquire explanatory power if the conne ction between the
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alleged interests of an agent and the event that favors them is independently established: the fact that a
defendant has a motive for the crime is nothing but a piece of accessory evidence for condemning him/her.
Nevertheless, contextual ism generally satisfies itself with these kinds of argument, and hardly manages to
establish concrete causal relations of the sort required to ground its claims. In my view, the relation between
context and content is not unidirectional, but rather bidire ctional. The context no doubt contributes to the
determination of content, but the latter also contributes to the determination of the relevant context, i.e. it
allows us to face with success the problem of selecting from the infinity of potentially perti nent contextual
factors. Such a bi-directional interaction between context and content is essentially open (rather than
pre-determined), and constitutes one of the essential conditions for understanding the recurrence of
interpretative or hermeneutic issu es in controversies.
III. If descriptivism is wrong in suppressing or minimizing the autonomy of the internal processes
responsible for the evolution of science, normativism is wrong in exaggerating it. Nevertheless, the result is -paradoxically -- the same: a sort of pre-determination or closure of the space of legitimate criticism, which
transforms into arbitrary, cognitively irrelevant, or ìdeological' any criticism that does not conform to the
limitations of such a space.
As I have already pointed out, in his effort to demonstrate the rationality of scientific revolutions, Popper
(1981) introduces a "sharp distinction" (p. 99) between "scientific" and "ideological" revolutions. The former
obey a logical criterion of progr ess: the new theory must be able to account for all the facts accounted for by
the theories it purports to replace. For this reason, such revolutions are `rational'. In the latter, although they
are often associated with the former, there is no rational c riterion of progress; they are simply "intellectual
fashions" resulting from processes of social acceptance, which are independent of the rational merits of the
theories in conflict (p. 100). According to Popper, although both are often enmeshed, one can and must
distinguish clearly between them: the Copernican revolution, for instance, was a scientific revolution because
it replaced earlier theories satisfying the logical criterion of progress; but it also had an ideological impact
due to the fact that i t questioned theological dogmas and radically changed the position of man in the
universe.
The Copernican example might suggest that, for Popper, the ìdeological' comprises only ethico-political and
`metaphysical' aspects, usually accepted as `non-epistemic'. But this is not the case. When he speaks about
the Einsteinian revolution, for examp le, he includes in its ideological aspects methodological attitudes ("the
myth that Einstein had reached his result by an essential use of epistemological and especially operationalist
methods" - p. 105), interpretations of the new theory ("the dominance of a subjectivist interpretation of
quantum mechanics" - p. 106) and interpretations of the extension of the conceptual changes it has introduced
(e.g., the radical modification of the concepts of space and time[25]). But not only is it not evident that
questions such as these are `non-epistemic' or ìdeological'; rather, they are precisely the kinds of questions
that occur all the time throughout controversies -- where methodologies, interpretations, and opposed
meanings are in constant confrontation. Postulating that these are merely ìdeological' questions, devoid of
cognitive or rational value because they do not obey a pre-determined and strict norm of rationality is simply
to limit a priori and arbitrarily their import. Furthermore , it is to assert -- like the descriptivists -- that there
are only two possible types of polemics: discussions or disputes.
Popper himself explicitly draws this consequence when he contrasts the "conservative" character of scientific
revolutions with the "open" character of ideological revolutions. The former are necessarily conservative, for
him, because they must preserve the success of the preceding theories. For this reason, "a scientific
revolution, however radical, cannot really break with tradition" (p. 106). The latter, on the contrary, are those
that can effectively break with tradition, because they are not constra ined by this kind of requirement. That is
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to say, in sharp contrast with his well-known `rhetoric of openness', which hails openness to criticism as the
hallmark of scientific thought, Popper in fact considerably restricts the scope of such an openness by
describing as non-scientific those forms of openness that do not obey his own criterion of scientificity.[26]
IV. In order to do justice to Popper, one should also analyze the èvolutionary' version of his epistemology,
developed by himself (1981, 1987) and his collaborators (cf. Radnitzky and Bartley III (eds.), Bartley III
1987, Campbell 1987). For thi s version contains mechanisms that might permit one to account for some of
the properties of controversies. For example, problem shifts could be explained as follows: the adoption of a
new theory resolves some problems but creates others, since, as the ap pearance of a new biological species,
it changes the environment, thus altering the `selective pressures' that impose adaptive needs on the
remaining organisms (cf. Popper 1981: 83 and passim). Likewise, one could attribute the phenomenon of
`clearing the ground' for the emergence and eventual flourishing of innovations to the fact that the pressure
exerted by criticism, qua mechanism of natural selection, eliminates theories that have been refuted, thus
permitting the appearance of new ones.
However, evolutionary epistemology, like the other versions of Popperian epistemology, is above all
concerned with fighting against anti-realist conceptions. Its main objective is to ensure the objectivity of
those theories that survive critical pressure , i.e. their veracity (or at least verisimilitude) vis-a-vis the real
world (World One). Evolutionary epistemology believes itself able to achieve this only by establishing a
relation of `direct' representativity between World Three and World One, where t he intervention of World
Two factors is minimized or altogether eliminated. This is Popper's well-known notion of "knowledge
without knowing subjects". According to this view, any intervention of World Two in the exercise of criticism
endangers the objec tivity of criticism and must therefore be considered as `not scientific'. Criticism is thus
purged from all its human activity aspects and confined to the logico-semantic relations of World Three.
Thereby, it acts as a purely passive selective filter, and loses entirely its dialogical character. In short, it has
nothing to do with its real manifestation in controversies.
Finally, one must raise in connection with evolutionary epistemology the inevitable tu quoque. Whereas in
the biological theory of evolution the natural selection mechanism has the status of an empirical conjecture,
being therefore refutable, it seems th at in Popperian epistemology (including its evolutionary version) there
is no possibility of refuting the `natural selection mechanism' of theories it posits. But if this is the case, don't
we face here a use of the Darwinian revolution that is as ìdeolo gical' as those Popper himself denounces
when speaking of the Einsteinian revolution?[27]
V. Popperian `demarcationism' belongs to the family of strategies that attempt to defend rationality by
insulating it or by purging it from èxtraneous' factors (cf. Dascal 1990b). The result of such a strategy is to
ensure rationality's autonomy and supposed normative value. But the price paid by sharply separating the
pure from the impure is the creation of a chasm between them, which it is impossible to bridge. The two
domains thus created are viewed as belonging to different, unharmonizable `w orlds'. This Popperian strategy
is reinforced by what may be called his `naive semantics' (possibly deliberately naive), which is the opposite
of the descriptivists' contextualism. In this view, contents are conceived as entirely autonomous and
independen t of their textual embodiment, along with its co-textual and contextual environment. Texts are
supposed to be transparent and capable of revealing -- as the Scriptures according to Luther -- their meaning
without the need of an interpretation process that would take into account co-text and context. There are no
problems of `translation' between different conceptual schemes, and the question of their eventual
incommensurability doesn't even arise.[28] The philosophy of science not only doe s not need a sophisticated
philosophy of language, but it must distance itself from such a thought as from the devil, because the
philosophy of language can lead it to relativistic heresies.[29] This stance excludes, of course, any cogni
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tively significant role for real controversy, where the dialogical context is essential for the determination of
the content of theories no less than their àutonomous' evolution.
VI. Lakatos's `sophisticated falsificationism', although it aspires to be `dialectical', ultimately is also victim of
an essential `monologism', perhaps resulting from the fact that he shares with Popper both the belief in the
priority of normativ ism and in naive semantics. It is worthwhile to pinpoint this often unnoticed monologism
of Lakatos's conception, because it implies the denial of the relevance of real dialogue -- hence, of
controversy -- to his methodology of scientific research program mes.
According to Lakatos (1970), a research programme (R.P.) consists in a set of `methodological rules' of two
types: the `positive' and the `negative' heuristics (p. 132). The latter's job is to protect the `hard core' of the
programme, dodging the objecti ons towards auxiliary hypotheses (some of them especially designed for that
purpose) or to other marginal components of the R.P.(p. 133). The former's concern is to develop the
programme according to its pre-established `research policy', through the succ essive articulation of the
various models or theories that form the series the R.P. consists in. This double heuristics is Lakatos's device
for accounting for the fact that, contrary to what is implied by Popper's theory, there is no ìnstant death' of a
programme (not even of a single theory) through its `refutation'. On the contrary, R.P.'s in their initial stages
should be protected from `destructive' criticism, so as to allow them to flourish (p. 179). The double
heuristics thus acts as an insulating mechanism, which creates around the R.P. a sterilized environment, free
from the toxic agents (e.g., experimental data contrary to the programme, antagonistic programmes, etc.)
which would kill it before it could mature.
The policy of favoring the proliferation of R.P.'s is, of course, a tolerant and `friendly' one, and I have no
objection to it. What seems to me objectionable, however, is the `preformism' inherent to this conception, and
expressed in the organic and eco logical metaphors it employs.[30] Such a preformism seems to me to be
what deprives Lakatos's theory of the possibility of accounting for the role of controversies in the evolution
of science. It manifests itself in several ways and at s everal levels:
(a) The historical-dynamic element of a R.P. materializes in the succession of theories of models that realize
it. But the ìdentity' of the R.P. -- which consists in its double heuristics -- is essentially fixed, behind the
`surface' changes in i ts èmbodiments'. Like the death and replacement of the cells of an organism, which are
controlled by its genetic code, so too each successive model within a R.P. "is bound to be replaced during the
further development of the programme" (p. 136). For this reason, the refutation of any of these models, just
as the death of any particular cell, is irrelevant. The positive heuristics not only predicts (many of) these
`refutations' in advance, but provides a strategy for "digesting" them (another organic meta phor) without
damage to the organism.
(b) Lakatos attributes to the creators of new R.P.'s planning and predictive capacities that are really
extraordinary. Not only do they anticipate refutations; they also anticipate the stages of development of the
successive models.[ 31]
(c) Experimental `refutations' -- whether anticipated or not -- are neither decisive nor essential for the
progress of the programme (i.e., for the development of new models in the series).[32]
(d) As a result, a theoretician can quietly develop his or her R.P. alone. A "solitary" Bohr can work in his
office, "far ahead of the experimenter: we have a period of relative autonomy of theoretical progress" (p.
152).
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As a whole, the result of this preformism and insulation is monologism, which prevents the acknowledgment
of the real and effective role of controversy, especially in its essentially dialogical capacity of deepening and
expanding criticism in non-anticip ated ways. Although Lakatos mentions the importance of "rival
programmes", his account simply lets them "emerge" (p. 154) without explaining how. In this, he does not
differ from Kuhn. He also leaves unexplained the rise and development of controversies b etween rival
programmes. In fact, for him criticism does not necessarily come from a rival programme, since it may be
entirely internal -- even ànticipated'. If we recall, finally, Lakatos's unequivocal assignment of the process of
the growth of scientif ic knowledge to the autonomous domain of World Three,[33] then we are led to agree
with those who have already noticed troubling similarities between Lakatos's and Hegel's `dialectics'.
VII. As indicated explicitly by the prefaces to the first and second editions of the Critique of Pure Reason,
Kant considers scandalous the fact that metaphysics, as opposed to physics and mathematics, has been
throughout its history a battlefield of endless disputes. The main objective of the Critique is to put an end to
such scandals, thus transforming metaphysics into a respectable science. As far as possible, metaphysics must
imitate physics and mathematics, which have been able to eradicate c ontroversies "by a single and sudden
revolution" (B xvi). For this purpose, it is necessary to understand in depth the source, the nature, and the
function of metaphysical controversies -- a task Kant seeks to perform in the section called "The antithetic of
pure reason". Even though his analysis is not intended to apply to scientific controversies (he refers to the
latter only indirectly), it deserves to be recalled here because it contributes -- in my opinion -- to clarifying
the `transcendental' struct ure of the impasse I have been trying to expound.
As always, Kant's technique consists in looking for the presuppositions or `conditions of possibility' of the
phenomenon under examination -- in the present case, metaphysical controversies. As a result, the
"Antithetic" begins with a distinction between `thetic' and àntithetic':
If thetic be the name for any body of dogmatic doctrines, antithetic may be taken as meaning, not dogmatic
assertions of the opposite, but the conflict of the doctrines of seemingly dogmatic knowledge (thesi cum
antithesi) in which no one assertion can e stablish superiority over another. The antithetic does not, therefore,
deal with one-sided assertions. It treats only of the conflict of the doctrines of reason with one another and the
causes of this conflict (A 420-421).
That is to say, the antithetic lifts itself to a level above that of the controversies themselves. Its primary aim is
not to lead to a decision in favor of one of the `dogmatic' theses vis-a-vis the other, but rather to understand
the structure of these c ontroversies and their deep causes: "The transcendental antithetic is an enquiry into
the antinomy of pure reason, its causes and outcome" (A 421). The definition of controversy implicit in this
shift to an upper level is completely independent of the his torical occurrence of discursive episodes where
the controversy becomes manifest. The conflicts discussed by the antithetic are quite different from those
conflicts Kant calls `sophistical'. For, they (a) do not refer to àrbitrary' issues, but rather to questions "which
human reason must necessarily encounter in its progress" (A 422), and (b) they do not involve a "mere
artificial illusion such as at once vanishes upon detection, but a natural and unavoidable illusion, which even
after it has ceased to b eguile still continues to delude though not to deceive us" (A 422, B 450).
As opposed to other conflicts which can be resolved quite easily, the antithetic deals with those pseudorational doctrines which can neither hope for confirmation in experience nor fear refutation by it. Each of
them is not only in itself free from co ntradiction, but finds conditions of its necessity in the very nature of
reason -- only that, unfortunately, the assertion of the opposite has, on its side, grounds that are just as valid
and necessary (B 449).
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The shift to a meta-level and the inevitability of the conflict are what makes Kant suppose that there is a
limited set of possible (metaphysical) controversies, that their causes are essentially the same, and that, once
they are understood, reason can i f not avoid them, at least understand its own limits. This assumption lets
Kant define the task of the dialectic of pure reason in terms of providing answers to a small number of
questions:
(1) In what propositions is pure reason unavoidable subject to an antinomy?
(2) On what causes does this antinomy depend?
(3) Whether and in what way, despite this contradiction, does a path to certainty still remain open?
In order to perform this task, Kant dismisses from the analysis of controversies all their circumstantial aspects
(how they arise, how they are terminated, what strategies the contenders employ, which positions they
defend, etc.), as well as any interest in "deciding in favour of one or the other side" (B 451). The attitude to
be adopted is that of an "impartial umpire" (B 451) -- in fact, of a `meta-umpire' -- whose interest is not to
decide the dispute, but to investigate "whether the object of controv ersy is not perhaps a deceptive
appearance which each vainly strives to grasp" (B 451). From this overseeing point of view, what is of
interest is not the decision of the dispute, but its `deep structure'. Kant calls this attitude the sceptical method,
to be sharply distinguished from scepticism. Whereas the latter seeks to undermine "the foundations of all
knowledge" (A 424), the former -- like Cartesian doubt -- "aims at certainty" (B 452). Regarding
controversies, this methods acts as a prudent legisla tor vis-a-vis the perplexities of judges who undertake to
apply the law. Such a legislator sees in these perplexities symptoms of difficulties inherent to the laws -which leads him to correct them in order to avoid further perplexities. In the same way, the antinomic
conflicts of reason act as symptoms that call attention to the need for determining more cautiously the
principles and limits of pure reason.[34]
This symptomatic character of controversies is both inevitable and essential for the Kantian enterprise. It is
inevitable because it derives from the existence of two types of unity or synthesis, both legitimate (within
their scopes), both expressing our aspiration for synthesis: the unity of the understanding and of reason. It is
essential because it is the only touchstone (Probstein) that permits us to discover the architecture of our
knowledge capacity and to determine what belongs de jure to each of its components -- which is the only way
of, if not avoiding these controversies, at least understanding their true nature.
This is why the theory of pure reason needs the `sceptical method' -- the only means to understand and
thereby overcome controversy. The other sciences do not need it: "In mathematics its employment would,
indeed, be absurd" (B 452), since this science h as methods of proof able to solve any dispute; similarly,
"experimental philosophy" also has a "final means of deciding [any] dispute", namely experience (A 425). It
is because they can avail themselves of means for resolving controversies that these scie nces have made
continuous progress, whereas metaphysics was stuck in a perpetual debate. A form of transforming it in a
science and ensuring its progress would be to endow it, as in mathematics and experimental sciences, with a
means of solving all its de bates. One might say that this was the aim of the dogmatic philosophers who have
looked for a method. But this approach presupposes that it is possible to solve metaphysical debates. Kant, as
we have seen, does not believe in such a possibility. The Kanti an way of freeing metaphysics from its
scandalous state of endless controversy is, rather, to acknowledge the insolubility of such controversies, and
to use this acknowledgment in order to draw secure conclusions about the nature of metaphysical knowledge
and its limits. Controversy, from this point of view, has a propedeutic value for metaphysics. On the other
hand, the `solution' of controversy -- as that of any other symptom -- requires a therapeutic intervention. The
required therapy is essentially pr eventive: the elaboration of a "discipline" for the polemical use of pure
reason, that permits the avoidance of those transgressions we inevitably tend to indulge in -- namely, to
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employ constitutively (i.e., so as to determine content) a faculty which ha s only a regulative function.
Kant, therefore, offers us a `transcendental' typology of controversies which, like those typologies implicit in
contemporary epistemology, admits only two possibilities: either they are conflicts that can be solved or not.
The former are those for which there are rigorous and accepted methods of decision, which terminate
disputes and permit progress. The latter, although inevitable, are nothing but symptoms of transgressions of
certain norms of rationality. To attempt to resolve them would be to fall in the trap. What has to be done in
these cases is simply to avoid the transgressions that bring about the controversies.
In both cases, controversy, for Kant, neither has nor can have a constitutive role in the progress of
knowledge.[35] Like the `selection pressure' resulting from Popperian critique, controversy does not create
content; at most it allows for a diagnosis and consequent elimination of èrrors'. For Kant, this essential
limitation of its role is indispensable for avoiding the return to the state of barbarism where conflicts reflect
either power struggles between "despotic empires" or "compl ete anarchy".[36] However, the price to be paid
for `civilizing controversy' is to castrate it in its innovative capacity, by submitting it to a supreme and
incontestable law.
6. Desideratum
If the prevailing theories are not only unable to account for scientific controversies in the sense I have
outlined, but also in fact purport to demonstrate that they cannot exist,[37] then it is not sufficient to point out
their exi stence in order to demonstrate their possibility. For the prevailing theories interpret what I would
point to as instantiating controversies as something different from controversies. For this reason it is
necessary, in addition to the criticism undertake n in the preceding section, to demonstrate positively the
possibility of controversy.
If the fundamental reason for the inability of current epistemological theories to account for controversies is
the reductive dichotomy in terms of which they conceptualize all polemics -- those which are rational because
they can be solved through more or less strict rules vs. those which are essentially aporetical, anarchic, and
outside the domain of reason -- what has to be demonstrated is the possibility of a tertium, i.e., of an
alternative that shows that between `hard' rationality (purely `calcula tive' or `logical') and arbitrariness there
is a possibility of a `soft' rationality, and that controversies belong to this sphere.[38] Furthermore, it is
necessary to develop a theory of this kind of rationality, a task which has been n eglected in the past. I
consider the elaboration of a `theory of controversies' an essential step in this direction.
If the reductive polarization of the set of polemics derives from a radical opposition between what is `closed'
(ruled by rigorous norms) and what is òpen' (where all norms are suspended), what has to be demonstrated is
the possibility of a dynamical an d dialectical interaction between openness and closure, which connects
(rather than disconnects) the components of relative stability (`closure') and instability (òpenness') in the
evolution of science.
In short, what has to be done is nothing less and nothing more than to resist the dilemma that depicts the
admission of the contingency of norms as the first step on a slippery slope leading inevitably to irrationality,
which leaves as the only possibili ty of salvation the tenacious defence of their necessary character. The
possibility of the existence of scientific controversies with the characteristics here described depends upon
the demonstration that this is a false dilemma.
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To satisfy this desideratum is, of course, an enormous task. In the last section of this paper, I will limit myself
to indicating that there is at least a model and a tool -- directly related to controversies -- which can contribute
to the elaboration of the epistemological conception capable of satisfying this desideratum.
7. Why pragmatics?
The model and instrument I propose is pragmatics -- the theory of language uses.
I. Its ability to serve as an appropriate instrument for the analysis of controversies is evident insofar as
controversies are, above all, particular types of language use. However, it is surprising to observe that rarely
have scientific controver sies been studied from a pragmatic point of view.[39] I believe this is due to the
extraordinary reluctance -- past and present -- to admit the fundamental role played by language in science
and in thought, as well as the essentially pra gmatic nature of this role.[40] This reluctance was already
apparent in the refusal -- by Descartes, Bacon, and others -- to attribute to language more than a purely
external role in thought and in the constitution of scientific knowledg e, a role of mere transmission or at
most of organization of a thought formulated in a way entirely independent of language. The same reluctance
manifests itself in Kant's deliberate silence about language in his main writings (cf. Dascal and Senderowicz
1992). I think the reason for this reluctance has been mainly the fear that, by admitting a more fundamental
role for language in thought and science, one would ipso facto contaminate them with the component of
arbitrariness or contingency typical of huma n languages. Such a fear persists in our century, when even those
who acknowledge the importance of language attempt to replace natural languages by formalized symbolic
systems, the only ones considered appropriate for the ends of science, or else conceiv e of natural languages
as if they were formal systems whose semantics is `transparent'.
There has been recently a significant change in this attitude, thanks to the growing emphasis on the
importance of the pragmatic aspects of language for science. Perhaps the beginning of this tendency can be
traced to Mary Hesse's book (1966) which ackno wledged the cognitive value, the irreducibility and the
indispensability of the use of metaphor in science, and was followed by many other researchers.
Granger is another philosopher who has recognized the importance of the analysis of the nonsemantical
elements of language in science, since his Essai d'une philosophie du style. For him, "the textual appearances
of science are no mere epiphenomena of sc ientific knowledge; they pertain to its very substance" (Granger
1985: 349), whence he concludes that the philosopher of science must be interested in "registering and
interpreting actual [linguistic] usage from the combined standpoints of syntax, semanti cs, and pragmatics",
and not merely in "eliciting the grammatical rules of a perfect -- or almost perfect, ideal Begriffschrift" (p.
351). Granger distinguishes four types of scientific discourse to which he associates different degrees of
`pragmaticity'. The discourses he calls `polemical' are, according to him, those that have the largest range of
pragmatic elements. He illustrates this with the example of the well-known letter of Pascal to Father Noel (29
October, 1647) about the problem of the existen ce of a vacuum. Pragmatic analysis allows Granger to
identify the underlying intentions in Pascal's letter, which are revealed by his use of irony, by the pessimism
he expresses about the value of controversies, and by other indications. According to Gran ger, Pascal's basic
intention is not to convince Noel about the mistakes in his arguments about the vacuum, for he doesn't
consider Noel intellectually worthy; what matters for him is to establish -- for an audience larger than Noel
alone -- a distinction between a methodology or argumentative practice he considers inadequate for science
(that of Noel) and the requisites of a methodologically valid argumentation (that of Pascal).[41]
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Both the identification of root metaphors that structure a text and of the basic intentions that orient it, are
essential in order to understand its àrgumentative direction', its conceptual presuppositions, and its essential
premises -- without which it is impossible to evaluate its communicative efficacy and the validity of its
argument. In addition to this `macro' level, pragmatic analysis is also an essential tool for handling the `micro'
level, namely the understanding and assessment of each passage in the text, especially the texts that comprise
a controversy. No speech act, in a polemical context can be interpreted only on the basis of its semantics and
syntax. For example, in light of the conversational demand established by the preceding utteran ce of the
opponent and with the help of other pragmatical indicators it is possible to know whether a response is to be
read as an acceptance, a refusal, or a hesitation, since a `no' can always mean in context a `perhaps' or even a
`yes'. The `logic' of controversies -- insofar as it exists -- can only be applied through a continuous process of
pragmatic interpretation.
In order to fulfill its instrumental function in the analysis of controversies, pragmatics must refine its
theoretical apparatus. First of all, it must account for the peculiar fact that polemical discourse is at once
cooperative and competitive. This ma y lead to the recognition of special forms of respecting and violating
the communicative norms of cooperativity and intelligibility. Furthermore, it must give us the means to
distinguish empirically between the different forms of polemical discourse which were distinguished above in
theoretical terms. I don't think it will be particularly difficult for pragmatic research to fulfill these and other
requisites.
II. I will now describe those aspects of pragmatics that, in my view, permit one to see in it model of a theory
capable of satisfying the desideratum formulated in the preceding section.
(a) The relationship semantics-pragmatics
Pragmatics does not replace semantics but rather cohabits with it. The pragmatic interpretation of, say, a
metaphorical expression, depends upon the existence and recognition of its literal meaning (see Dascal 1986).
Semantics accounts for the codificati ons of meanings in a system of rules. Pragmatics permits one to use the
system in a flexible way, occasionally violating the rules, without thereby sacrificing intelligibility. This
symbiotic relationship between pragmatics and semantics seems to me to be an excellent model for systems
(in the present case, language) where closeness and openness are combined without damage to the efficacy of
the system. In particular, it permits one to explain: (i) the possibility of conceptual change or evolution -even a radical one -- without ìncommensurability'; (ii) the difficulties of translating (underestimated by
Popper and stressed by Kuhn), as well as the possibility of achieving reasonable translations; (iii) the fact that
there can exist semantically closed 'conceptual schemes' without it preventing communication across such
schemes, thanks to pragmatic openness.[42]
(b) The nature of pragmatic rules
Pragmatics is ruled by norms which ensure the intelligibility of communicative acts, but such norms, in
contrast to semantic rules, are not algorithmic in nature but rather heuristic. They have the character of
presumptions, that is, their conclusions ar e accepted on condition that there be no stronger reasons for giving
them up (see Dascal 1983). They can be formalized by means of nonmonotonic or gradualist logics (see Pena
1991). This characteristic of its norms makes pragmatics a good model (and perha ps also a means of
explanation for nonrigid normativity -- that is, for `soft' reason -- which, in controversies, permits one to
justify not abandoning one's position vis-a-vis its apparent refutation by the opponent: what is important is
not the isolated logical value of the alleged refutation, but rather its relative weight vis-a-vis the presumption
that favors the position allegedly refuted. This, in turn, explains the often ferocious debate between
contenders in a controversy aimed at securing favorab le presumptions (which, in turn determine the onus
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probandi).
c) Reasons as causes
From an ontological point of view, pragmatic interpretation occupies a well-defined niche.[43] It deals with a
form of causal explanation, for it consists in attributing to a speaker, on the basis of his linguistic behavior
and other co ntextual information, a communicative intention that serves as a cause for that behavior.
However, both regarding the way in which a mental state can act as a cause and regarding the inference that
allows for such an attribution to an agent, pragmatic int erpretation differs from usual physical causality,
because it depends essentially on the fact that the speaker's communicative intention and his corresponding
linguistic behavior have a `content', whose recognition by the hearer is indispensable for the s uccess of
communication. Since it rests on this special type of causality, which operates at the level of conscious
mental states, communicative behavior cannot be reduced to explanation in terms of `deep' causes, upon
which the conscious subject has no c ontrol (see Dascal 1992c). Pragmatic interpretation, thereby, escapes the
kind of causal determinism underlying `contextualist' descriptivism, while at the same time it suggests a
model for harmonizing in a non reductionist way between World Two and World s One and Three.
(d) Non-arbitrary contingency
Pragmatic norms possess instrumental rationality since they can be seen as corollaries of the view of
communication as a cooperative process (Grice). We speak coherently and clearly, we say relevant things,
and so on, because we wish to be understood (an d thereby, eventually to have the others cooperate with our
aims). In this sense, pragmatic norms are not arbitrary. But they are contingent, because the very idea of
cooperation can be interpreted (and in fact is) in very different ways in different cult ures and historical
periods. They are also contingent because the very idea of instrumentality is interpretable in different ways in
different contexts. That is to say, we have here an example of the possibility of an example of a non-arbitrary,
contingen t and variable normative system, whose non-arbitrariness, however, need not be guaranteed by a
Universal Reason forever immune to change and criticism.
NOTES
1.My presentation here of the situation of philosophy of science is evidently schematic. I know that there
have been several efforts to escape the impasse here described, some of which are very valuable. don't
mention them here in order t o simplify the exposition of what I take to be the basic coordinates of the
`problem situation'. Besides its contribution to clarifying the problem, this procedure will allow me to show
the specificity of my proposal for its solution.
2.Lakatos begins this text with the following paraphrase of a famous Kantian dictum: "Philosophy of science
without history of science is empty; history of science without philosophy of science is blind". As pointed out
by Hacking (1981: 1 38n), Kant's dictum does not speak about blindness bur rather about `cyclopic' vision:
"Mere polyhistory is a cyclopean erudition that lacks one eye, the eye of philosophy". The distortion of this
quotation by Lakatos is quite significant, since, as I wil l show below, one major problem in his own way of
combining descriptivism with normativism consists in its `cylopean' or `monological' character, which results
-- in my opinion -- of the excessive subordination of the former to the latter.
3. "...the -- rationally reconstructed -- growth of science takes place essentially in the world of ideas, in
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Plato's and Popper's `third world', in the world of articulated knowledge which is independent of knowing
subjects" (Lakatos 197 0: 179-180).
4."[S]cientists behave in the following ways; those modes of behavior have ... the following essential
functions; in the absence of an alternate mode that would serve similar functions, scientists should behave
essentially as they do if th eir concern is to improve scientific knowledge" (Kuhn 1970: 237). 5.This is
another form in which, significantly, Kuhn expresses premise [d]. The weak normativity of Stich's (1994)
proposal for the implementation of the program Quine dubs `the naturalization of epistemology' suffers from
difficulties similar to those po inted out in the text as well as from others discussed in Dascal (1995b).
5.This is another form in which, significantly, Kuhn expresses premise [d]. The weak normativity of Stich's
(1994) proposal for the implementation of the program Quine dubs `the naturalization of epistemology'
suffers from difficulties sim ilar to those pointed out in the text as well as from others discussed in Dascal
(1995b).
6.All depends, in this argument, on the level of generalization of the descriptions `ways of acting' and
èssential functions'. If they are sufficiently general (but not vacuous) so as to apply to different paradigms,
they engender a stron ger normativity. But in this case they endanger the thesis of the incommensurability of
paradigms.
7.And this `positivism` is obviously easy prey to a tu quoque argument, which would point out that its
descriptions and causal analyses, being applied to different paradigms, communities, and historical periods,
must obey veracity norms wh ich are trans-paradigmatic.
8.This paragraph sounds to me excessively metaphysical and abstract. However, the allusion to Kantian
terminology will be vindicated below (see section 5, paragraph VII).
9.For other differences between my position and Popper's and his disciples see below, section 5 paragraphs
III-VI.
10.For other differences with descriptivism, see below, section 5, paragraphs I-II.
11.There was a real dialogue between Leibniz and Locke under the form of a correspondence mediated by
third parties such as Lady Masham.
12.For this reason one cannot in general predict all the possible objections to a thesis one defends (unless it is
a tautology), which blocks the possibility of using a shortcut which would consist in demonstrating the thesis,
thus immuni zing it against any future objection. Leibniz applied this kind of consideration against Bayle in
their debate about the mysteries of faith (see Dascal 1975).
13.On the relationship between text, co-text, and context, see Dascal and Weizman (1987). On the notions of
primary and secondary text as well as co-text, see Dascal (1990a).
14.See for instance Granger (1985), Gil (1985), and especially Bohler and Katsakoulis (1994).
15.I proposed this taxonomy for the first time in the framework of the research group "Leibniz the
Polemicist" at the Institute for Advanced Studies (Jerusalem), in December 1994. It should be considered as a
sort of collective product of the group's work. I take this opportunity to thank the group's members for the
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fruitful discussions and the Institute and its staff for the magnificent support.
16.Except, of course, the recourse to some instituted authority, such as a tribunal. But in these cases, the
conflict of opinions or attitudes is not decided but merely repressed, since, as pointed out by Leibniz, no one
has the power to force the other to forget or to attend -- both indispensable conditions for having the power to
make the other change her opinion (VOR, p. 19).
17.On the use of this fundamental metaphor, see Dascal (in press a).
18.In contrast to Frankel (1987) who distinguishes between ` scientific controversies which are `pure' and
those which have political, ethical, and practical implications, Popper considers ìdeological' also those
`scientific revolutions' where methodological or philosophical considerations predominate or even just
intervene. On this topic, see below, section 5, paragraph III.
19.As I have done above, McMullin (1987:88) too claims that a scientific controversy must be looked at as an
activity, "a complex human action in which social, political, and psychological factors play an important
part". But in contrast to what I propose, he omits the fact that it is primarily a dialogical activity. Furthermore,
he hastens to add in the same sentence a significant `but': "but in which epistemic factors are most likely to be
determinative". With this he remains essentiall y faithful to the normativist tendency, imposing a priori a
category distinction (which he deems obvious) between èpistemic' and `nonepistemic' factors. Mentioning
the Kuhn of The Essential Tension for whom `mature' sciences are ruled by èpistemic value s` such as
predictive capacity, coherence, and fecundity, McMullin (p. 83) insists that these norms, although they vary
from scientist to scientist and from community to community "are not just contingent social conventions",
because "they have been found to serve the basic end of science, which is problem solving". Evidently, this
(normative) definition of science simply consists in opting for normal science as the true expression of
scientific activity. With this option, the possibility of accounting -- in respectable epistemic terms -- for
controversies in periods of extraordinary science, as they are described by the Kuhn of The Structure of
Scientific Revolutions, is excluded. No wonder that in the typology of forms of closure of controversies
propos ed by McMullin (which I discuss in note 22) we find only the dichotomy discussion vs. dispute, with
no room left for what I call controversy.
20.For a detailed study of this controversy, see Cremaschi and Dascal (1996 and forthcoming) and Dascal and
Cremaschi (Forthcoming).
21.At least according to the paleobiologist George Gaylord Simpson, who throughout the controversy ranked
with the opponents of the drift theory. In 1971, Simpson writes: "I now believe that continental drift did occur
... but direct foss il evidence is still curiously scanty or equivocal. The Cenozoic evidence indicates that drift
had little or no zoogeographic effect in that era as regards most of the continents, including al for which the
evidence is considerable or reasonably adequate ... Now everything has to relate to plate tectonics ... but it is
rather amusing that currently there are four completely different plate tectonic èxplanations' of the early
distribution of marsupials, none of them based on a reasonable balance of eviden ce" (quoted in Frankel
1987: 231-232).
22.For easy reference, I reproduce here the summaries of these typologies, as given by the editors
(Engelhardt Jr. y Caplan 1987: 5-6). McMullin: "1. Resolution. A controversy is resolved when an agreement
is reached on the merits of the case in terms of what the participants take to be standard epistemic factors. 2.
Closure. A controversy reaches closure when it is terminated on the basis of nonepistemic factors, such as the
authority of the state, the pride, ambition, or laziness of a c ontroversialist; or the withdrawal of publication
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facilities.3. Abandonment. Controversies may terminate through participants losing interest". Beauchamp: "1.
Sound argument closure: occurs if, and only if, a correct position has been reached ... thereby rendering
opposition views incorrect. 2. Consensus closure: occurs if, and only if, a consensus has been reached ...
through a means other than sound argument closure or some form of procedure or negotiation, that some
position is best and that opposition views are incorrect. 3. Procedural closure: occurs if, and only if, a
controversy is terminated by formal, procedurally governed efforts to end the sustained discussion ... 4.
Natural death closure: occurs if, and only if, a controversy has come to an en d through a gradual natural
death, as by fading away because of waning interest. 5. Negotiation closure: occurs if, and only if, a
controversy is settled through an intentionally arranged and morally unobjectionable resolution acceptable to
the principals in the controversy".
23.In the case of the controversy about continental drift, Hess's theory of tectonic plates, which was finally
accepted by all the contenders, differs substantively from the original drift theory, even though it shares with
it the idea th at continents actually drift. The controversy prepared the ground for the tectonic plate theory not
only because it called attention to the possibility of continental drift, but also to the absence of any reasonable
hypothesis (including in the original d rift theory) about the mechanism responsible for such a drift. As
pointed out by Thagard (1992: 161), the possibility of conceiving of such a mechanism required a substantive
`conceptual change': the abandonment of the assumption (shared by all earlier th eories) that the earth's crust
is uniform, which lead to the admission that there is a basic difference between the material the continents are
made of and the material the ocean floor is made of.
24.In the rare occasions when `scientific tribunals' have been constituted in order to resolve scientific
controversies, there was no guarantee that the tribunal's decision would terminate the controversy. This is
clearly shown by the con tinuation of the controversy over spontaneous generation many years after the
decision of the French Academy (1862), which was favorable to Pasteur in his confrontation with Pouchet
(cf. McMullin 187: 89; Mendelsohn 1987: 105-113).
25.In Minkovski's words: "The views of space and time I wish to lay before you ... are radical. Henceforth
space by itself, and time by itself, are doomed to fade away into mere shadows, and only a kind of union of
the two will preserve a n independent reality". After quoting Minkovski, Popper adds: "This is an
intellectually thrilling statement. But it is clearly not science: it is ideology. It became part of the ideology of
the Einsteinian revolution" (Popper 1981: 104).
26.A similar restriction to openness, in the political sphere, can be found in his `principle of limited
tolerance', which I discuss in Dascal (1979, 1989b).
27.Evolutionary epistemology subtly moves from a literal to a metaphorical use of the notion of biological
evolution, a move that may be responsible for this ìdeologization'. Throughout history, the biological notion
of evolution (concei ved in different ways by different theories) has been an important formative metaphor in
philosophy. It deserves a study similar to those I have devoted to other root metaphors in philosophy (cf.
Dascal in press a and b).
28.Against what he calls "the myth of the framework", which he attributes to Kuhn, Popper (1970: 56) says:
"I do admit that at any moment we are prisoners caught in the framework of our theories; our expectations;
our past experiences; ou r language. But we are prisoners in a Pickwickian sense: if we try, we can break out
of our framework at any time. ... critical discussion and a comparison of the various frameworks is always
possible. It is just a ... dangerous dogma that the different f rameworks are like mutually untranslatable
languages .... even totally different languages are not untranslatable..."
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29.Kuhn (1970: 268), on the contrary, stresses the difficulty (not the impossibility) of translation ("Why is
translation, whether between theories or languages, so difficult?") and points out the importance of the
philosophy of language for the philosophy of science (p. 235): "... philosophers of science will need to follow
other contemporary philosophers in examining, to a previously unprecedented depth, the manner in which
language fits the world, asking how terms attach to nature, how those attachments are learned, and how they
are transmitted from one generation to another by the members of a language community".
30.For instance: " ... a research programme can challenge a considerable bulk of accepted scientific
knowledge: it is planted, as it were, in an inimical environment [subrayado por mi] which, step by step, it can
override and transform" ( Lakatos 1970: 140). Evidently, the condition for the programme to be able to
overcome this hostile environment is that it be granted a favorable environment, at least at its beginnings.
31."All this was planned right at the start" (p. 146); although "[not] all developments in [Bohr's] programme
were foreseen and planned when the positive heuristics was first sketched" (p. 153).
32."In most cases we need no refutations to tell us that the theory is in urgent need of replacement: the
positive heuristic of the programme drives us forward anyway" (p. 151).
33."... the -- rationally reconstructed -- growth of science takes place essentially in the world of ideas, in
Plato's and Popper's `third world', in the world of articulated knowledge which is independent of knowing
subjects" (pp. 179-18 0).
34.The juridical comparison reappears later on in the "The Discipline of Pure Reason in respect of its
Polemical Employment". For proposals to adopt in epistemology a `juridical model', see Romano (1989) and
Dascal (1990c).
35.Fernando Gil (1980), in a brilliant chapter on "Kant and controversy", attempts to interpret the Kantian
texts I have referred to here in terms of the "less Kantian" hypothesis that "controversies are constitutive and
not a mere prepar ation for the exercise of thought" (p. 154). Though I fully agree with this hypothesis -which is precisely the one I defend in the present paper -- and also with its `Leibnizian' formulation
("Controversy is an aspect of an intrinsically complex rationa lity, neither finite nor infinite, bur rather
`confused', more leibniziano" -- p. 164), I confess that I do not understand the tour de force through which
Gil believes to be able to reconcile it with Kant's text.
36.In the preface to the first edition, Kant describes this scandal by means of an extraordinarily powerful
metaphor. Metaphysics, he tells us, has oscillated between two poles: the "despotic empire" of the dogmatists
and the "complete an archy" of the sceptics. The former led to the latter because its "legislation still bore
traces of the ancient barbarism" (A ix), whereas the latter led to the return of the former because of the
primitive methods of "demolition" of the dogmatic fortresse s they employed. In order to overcome this
scandalous oscillation, Kant will, on the one hand, improve the `method of demolition' and, on the other,
build fortresses grounded on `civilized legislation' (i.e., `regulative principles'), absolutely universa l and
therefore withstanding any attempt of demolition.
37.I would include Davidson's (1974) argument against the existence of different "conceptual schemes" -and in fact against the very notion of "conceptual scheme" -- in the list of arguments which allegedly
demonstrate the impossibility of controversies where radically different positions face each other.
Unfortunately, I don't have here the necessary space for developing these interpretations of Davidson's paper.
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38.The distinction here proposed is similar, though not identical, to that proposed by Granger (1985: 350)
between `logic' and `reason': "... the discourse of scientists allows one to perceive and explicitate two avenues
to justification and proof. Roughly speaking, one might call the one `logic' and the other `reason'. The first
consists in calculating, insofar as abstract concepts and rules of deduction are strictly defined; the second
consists in strategic choices, processes of orienta tion, and evaluation. ... If we are to track the non-logical,
though rational ways the discoverer has followed, then we must closely study his language".
39.One should not confound a pragmatic with a rhetorical treatment [of controversies]. The latter has become
popular in many studies about the `rhetoric of science' (cf. Gross 1990, 1993; Pera 1991) and aroused intense
polemic, e.g., in e conomy (cf. McCloskey 1994a, 1994b; Mayer 1994; Maloney 1994). The essential
difference between pragmatics and rhetoric, in my opinion, lies in the fact that the latter is basically interested
in producing a certain effect in an audience -- the adoption o f a certain opinion. The means to achieve this
effect -- linguistic or otherwise -- are chosen exclusively as a function of their causal efficacy. From this point
of view, subliminal propaganda, hypnosis, and the use of language according to norms of vera city,
informativity, relevance and clarity (i.e., according to Grice's `maxims') are equally legitimate alternatives.
Pragmatics, on the other hand, is interested in the properly communicative processes, i.e., those in which the
capacity of speakers and hearers to transmit and recognize communicative intentions, are essentially
involved. In so far as these processes are of an essentially inferential nature, they involve a very specific kind
of causality -- the kind of causality that leads one to accept a n opinion or to adopt an interpretation of an
utterance by virtue of the `reasons' we have for that. Pragmatics, in my view, is the study of this very specific
type of causality or rationality. See section 7(c) below.
40.For a historical account of the problematic of the relationships between language, science, and thought,
see Dascal (1994, 1995). For the importance of the pragmatic perspective for the understanding of these
relationships, see Dasca l (1992).
41.The pragmatic analysis in terms of intentions proposed here by Granger seems to me to be in conflict with
his own notion of pragmatics, which -- like the one of Apel and Habermas -- tends towards
transcendentalization. Granger (1979, 1 985) makes use of the Kantian distinction between "constitutive" and
"regulative" principles. In addition to this, he distinguishes between "empirical" and "transcendental"
conditions. For him, the empirical constitutive conditions of the use of language are the subject matter of
psychology, sociology, and so on, and are of no interest to him. The transcendental constitutive conditions, on
the other hand, are "algebraic", i.e. purely syntactical and semantical. What is left for pragmatics, therefore,
are those conditions which are not constitutive but regulative and not empirical but transcendental. Granger
singles out two of them -- the "conditions de vise" (corresponding to illocutionary forces) and "conditions
d'anchrage", (responsible for the inserti on of personal experience in the use of language). But, if the
psychological aspects have been discarded from pragmatics, what is `subject' or ìndividual' whose
experiences serve to anchor the utterance?
42.Davidson does not admit talk of pragmatic norms. For him, what characterizes pragmatic interpretation is
its absolutely open, nonconventional, character (See Davidson 1978, 1985). Searle, on the other hand, takes
as a model for pragmat ic norms the strict constitutive rules he employs in his speech-act theory. For this
reason, he is led to the conclusion that there is no pragmatic structure in conversation -- a conclusion I
criticize in Dascal (1992b).
43.On this see above, note 39.
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EPISTEMOLOGY, CONTROVERSIES, AND PRAGMATICS

Epistemology, Controversies, and Pragmatics

EPISTEMOLOGY, CONTROVERSIES, AND PRAGMATICS

however cherished, as soon as it is refuted.

EPISTEMOLOGY, CONTROVERSIES, AND PRAGMATICS

EPISTEMOLOGY, CONTROVERSIES, AND PRAGMATICS

EPISTEMOLOGY, CONTROVERSIES, AND PRAGMATICS

3. The empirical phenomenon `polemical discourse'

EPISTEMOLOGY, CONTROVERSIES, AND PRAGMATICS

-- more importantly -- an activity that always contains an element of imprevisibility. In controversy it is

EPISTEMOLOGY, CONTROVERSIES, AND PRAGMATICS

4. Some essential characteristics of controversies

EPISTEMOLOGY, CONTROVERSIES, AND PRAGMATICS

EPISTEMOLOGY, CONTROVERSIES, AND PRAGMATICS

EPISTEMOLOGY, CONTROVERSIES, AND PRAGMATICS

5. The impasse and controversies

EPISTEMOLOGY, CONTROVERSIES, AND PRAGMATICS

EPISTEMOLOGY, CONTROVERSIES, AND PRAGMATICS

EPISTEMOLOGY, CONTROVERSIES, AND PRAGMATICS

EPISTEMOLOGY, CONTROVERSIES, AND PRAGMATICS

EPISTEMOLOGY, CONTROVERSIES, AND PRAGMATICS

EPISTEMOLOGY, CONTROVERSIES, AND PRAGMATICS

EPISTEMOLOGY, CONTROVERSIES, AND PRAGMATICS

EPISTEMOLOGY, CONTROVERSIES, AND PRAGMATICS

EPISTEMOLOGY, CONTROVERSIES, AND PRAGMATICS

EPISTEMOLOGY, CONTROVERSIES, AND PRAGMATICS

EPISTEMOLOGY, CONTROVERSIES, AND PRAGMATICS

EPISTEMOLOGY, CONTROVERSIES, AND PRAGMATICS

EPISTEMOLOGY, CONTROVERSIES, AND PRAGMATICS

EPISTEMOLOGY, CONTROVERSIES, AND PRAGMATICS

EPISTEMOLOGY, CONTROVERSIES, AND PRAGMATICS

EPISTEMOLOGY, CONTROVERSIES, AND PRAGMATICS

EPISTEMOLOGY, CONTROVERSIES, AND PRAGMATICS

EPISTEMOLOGY, CONTROVERSIES, AND PRAGMATICS

EPISTEMOLOGY, CONTROVERSIES, AND PRAGMATICS

EPISTEMOLOGY, CONTROVERSIES, AND PRAGMATICS

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