Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Cap and
Trade
The Kyoto Protocol, Greenhouse Gas
(GHG) Emissions, Carbon Tax, Emission
Allowances, Acid Rain SO2 Program,
Ozone Transport Commission, NOX,
Carbon Markets, and Climate Change
Compiled by TheCapitol.Net
GOVERNMENT SERIES
Cap and
Trade
The Kyoto Protocol, Greenhouse Gas (GHG)
Emissions, Carbon Tax, Emission Allowances,
Acid Rain SO2 Program, Ozone Transport
Commission, NOX, Carbon Markets,
and Climate Change
Compiled by TheCapitol.Net
Authors: Jonathan L. Ramseur, Larry Parker, Peter Folger, Ross W. Gorte,
Renee Johnson, Kelsi Bracmort, James E. McCarthy, Donald J. Marples,
Sam Napolitano, David L. Sokol, Richard Newell, Robert Greenstein, Sonny
Popowsky, Steven L. Kline, Michael Carey, A. Denny Ellerma, Gilbert E. Metcalf,
Karen Palmer, Chad Stone, Ray Kopp, Ted Gayer, and Jonathan M. Banks
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v1
Chapter 1:
“Cap and Trade: Essentials,” U.S. Environmental Protection Agency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Chapter 2:
“Cap and Trade: Multi-State NOx Programs,”
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Chapter 3:
“Cap and Trade: Acid Rain Program Basics,”
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Chapter 4:
“Annual Energy Outlook 2010 Early Release Overview December 2009,”
Energy Information Administration, U.S. Department of Energy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Chapter 5:
“Annual Energy Outlook 2010 Reference Case,”
Energy Information Administration, U.S. Department of Energy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Chapter 6:
“The Role of Offsets in a Greenhouse Gas Emissions Cap-and-Trade
Program: Potential Benefits and Concerns,” by Jonathan L. Ramseur,
CRS Report for Congress RL34436, May 18, 2009 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Chapter 7:
“Potential Offset Supply in a Cap-and-Trade
Program,” by Jonathan L. Ramseur, CRS Report
for Congress RL34705, October 14, 2008 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
Chapter 8:
“Allowance Markets Assessment: A Closer Look at the Two Biggest
Price Changes in the Federal SO2 and NOX Allowance Markets,”
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, April 23, 2009 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
Chapter 9:
“Carbon Tax and Greenhouse Gas Control: Options and
Considerations for Congress,” by Jonathan L. Ramseur and
Larry Parker, CRS Report for Congress R40242, March 10, 2009 ................... 95
Chapter 11:
“Measuring and Monitoring Carbon in the Agricultural
and Forestry Sectors,” by Ross W. Gorte and Renee Johnson,
CRS Report for Congress RS22964, August 6, 2009 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
Chapter 12:
“Climate Change: The Role of the U.S. Agriculture
Sector and Congressional Action,” by Renee Johnson,
CRS Report for Congress RL33898, November 9, 2009 ............................. 183
Chapter 13:
“Forest Carbon Markets: Potential and Drawbacks,”
by Ross W. Gorte and Jonathan L. Ramseur,
CRS Report for Congress RL34560, July 3, 2008 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 219
Chapter 14:
“Methane Capture: Options for Greenhouse Gas Emission Reduction,”
by Kelsi Bracmort, Jonathan L. Ramseur, James E. McCarthy,
Peter Folger, and Donald J. Marples, CRS Report for
Congress R40813, September 17, 2009 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 239
Chapter 15:
“Cars and Climate: What Can EPA Do to Control Greenhouse
Gases from Mobile Sources?” by James E. McCarthy,
CRS Report for Congress R40506, December 9, 2009 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 263
Chapter 16:
“Aviation and Climate Change,” by James E. McCarthy,
CRS Report for Congress R40090, August 4, 2009 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 285
Chapter 17:
“Cap and Trade Programs for Air Emissions,” by Sam Napolitano, Clean Air
Markets Division, Office of Air and Radiation, U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency, Presentation for the Clean Air Conference, December 4, 2009 . . . . . . . . . . . 299
Chapter 18:
“Climate Change and the EU Emissions Trading
Scheme (ETS): Kyoto and Beyond,” by Larry Parker,
CRS Report for Congress RL34150, November 24, 2008 ........................... 321
Chapter 20:
Testimony of David L. Sokol, Chairman, MidAmerican Energy
Holdings Company Before the Subcommittee on Energy
and Environment, Committee on Energy and Commerce,
U.S. House of Representatives, June 9, 2009 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 383
Chapter 21:
Testimony of Dr. Richard Newell, Administrator, Energy Information
Administration, U.S. Department of Energy before the Committee
on Energy and Natural Resources, U.S. Senate, October 14, 2009 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 407
Chapter 22:
Testimony of Robert Greenstein, Executive Director, Center on Budget
and Policy Priorities, House Committee on Energy and Commerce,
Subcommittee on Energy and Environment, March 12, 2009 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 423
Chapter 23:
Testimony of Sonny Popowsky, Consumer Advocate of Pennsylvania
Before the House Committee on Energy and Commerce,
Subcommittee on Energy and Environment, March 12, 2009 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 439
Chapter 24:
Testimony of Steven L. Kline, Vice President, Corporate
Environmental and Federal Affairs, PG&E Corporation
Before the Subcommittee on Energy and Environment of the
House Energy and Commerce Committee, March 12, 2009 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 451
Chapter 25:
Testimony of Michael Carey, President, Ohio Coal Association
Before the Subcommittee on Energy and Environment of
the House Energy and Commerce Committee, March 12, 2009 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 461
Chapter 26:
Testimony of A. Denny Ellerman, Center for Energy and
Environmental Policy Research, Massachusetts Institute
of Technology, Before the Senate Committee on Energy
and Natural Resources, October 21, 2009 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 467
Chapter 28:
Testimony of Karen Palmer, Darius Gaskins Senior Fellow,
Resources for the Future, Before the Senate Committee
on Energy and Natural Resources, October 21, 2009 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 495
Chapter 29:
Testimony of Chad Stone, Chief Economist,
Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, Before the Senate
Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, October 21, 2009 .................. 505
Chapter 30:
Testimony of Ray Kopp, Senior Fellow and Director, Climate
Policy Program, Resources for the Future, Before the Senate
Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, December 2, 2009 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 519
Chapter 31:
Testimony of Ted Gayer, Brookings Institution,
Before the Senate Committee on Energy and
Natural Resources, December 2, 2009 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 525
Chapter 32:
Testimony of Jonathan M. Banks, Climate Policy Coordinator,
Clean Air Task Force, Before the Senate Committee on
Energy and Natural Resources, December 2, 2009 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 529
Chapter 33:
Resources from TheCapitol.Net . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 539
Chapter 34:
Other Resources ........................................................................... 541
Chapter 1:
“Cap and Trade: Essentials,” U.S. Environmental Protection Agency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Chapter 2:
“Cap and Trade: Multi-State NOx Programs,”
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Chapter 3:
“Cap and Trade: Acid Rain Program Basics,”
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Chapter 4:
“Annual Energy Outlook 2010 Early Release Overview December 2009,”
Energy Information Administration, U.S. Department of Energy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Chapter 5:
“Annual Energy Outlook 2010 Reference Case,”
Energy Information Administration, U.S. Department of Energy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Chapter 6:
“The Role of Offsets in a Greenhouse Gas Emissions Cap-and-Trade
Program: Potential Benefits and Concerns,” by Jonathan L. Ramseur,
CRS Report for Congress RL34436, May 18, 2009 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Introduction
Offsets: An Overview
Offset Types and Examples
Biological Sequestration
Renewable Energy Projects
Energy Efficiency
Non-CO2 Emissions Reduction
Potential Benefits of Offsets
Cost-Effectiveness
Potential Co-Benefits
Potential Benefits to Developing Nations
Other Potential Domestic Benefits
Potential Concerns
Integrity Concerns
Additionality
Measurement
Double-Counting
Chapter 7:
“Potential Offset Supply in a Cap-and-Trade
Program,” by Jonathan L. Ramseur, CRS Report
for Congress RL34705, October 14, 2008 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
Introduction
Factors Affecting Offset Supply
Mitigation Potential
Elements of Uncertainty
Estimates from Agriculture and Forestry Activities
Estimates from Other Activities
Policy Choices
Design of the Cap-and-Trade Program
Actions in Other Nations or U.S. States
Other Policy Influences
Economic Factors
Emission Allowance Price
Other Factors
Offset Use in a Cap-and-Trade Program
Figure 1. Illustration of Inputs and Variables That Affect Potential Offset Supply
Figure 2. Estimated Offset Use Under S. 2191 If International and
Domestic Offsets Limited to 15% of Allowance Submission
Figure 3. Estimated Offset Use Under S. 2191 If Domestic and International Offset Use Unlimited
Figure 4. Estimated Offset Use Under S. 2191 If Domestic Offset Use Unlimited
and International Offset Use Limited to 15%
Table 1. EPA and USDA Estimates of Mitigation Potential for Afforestation
and Soil Sequestration (in 2025)
Table 2. EPA Estimates of Mitigation Potential for Other Agriculture and Forestry Activities (in 2025)
Table 3. EPA Estimates of Mitigation Potential from Other Activities (in 2010)
Chapter 9:
“Carbon Tax and Greenhouse Gas Control: Options and
Considerations for Congress,” by Jonathan L. Ramseur and
Larry Parker, CRS Report for Congress R40242, March 10, 2009 ................... 95
Introduction
Cost or Quantity Control: An Overview
Economic Theory vs. Uncertainty
A Stark Choice or a Policy Continuum?
A Flexible Emissions Cap
A Flexible Carbon Tax
Limits of the Policy Continuum
Potential Advantages of a Carbon Tax
Economic Efficiency
Basis for the Argument
Underpinnings of the Argument
Modeled Efficiency Gains
Economic Efficiency Versus Precaution
Price Stability
Tax Revenue Applications
Potential Implementation Advantages
Transparency
Administrative Issues
Policy Modification
Potential Disadvantages
Uncertain Emissions
Political Feasibility
What’s in a Name?
Support from Industry?
Support from Environmental Groups?
Consideration of International Efforts and Cooperation
Coordination with Existing International Efforts
Maximizing Participation
International Implementation Concerns
Implementation of a Carbon Tax
Point of Taxation
Where to Impose a Carbon Tax?
CO2 Emissions or All GHG Emissions?
Which Emissions Sources to Control?
Level of Taxation
Chapter 10:
“The Carbon Cycle: Implications for Climate Change
and Congress,” by Peter Folger, CRS Report for
Congress RL34059, February 18, 2009 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
Introduction
Carbon Storage, Sources, and Sinks
Carbon Flux, or Exchange, with the Atmosphere
How Much Carbon Is Exchanged
How Fast Carbon Is Exchanged
Land Surface-Atmosphere Flux
Chapter 11:
“Measuring and Monitoring Carbon in the Agricultural
and Forestry Sectors,” by Ross W. Gorte and Renee Johnson,
CRS Report for Congress RS22964, August 6, 2009 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
Purpose of Measuring Forest and Agricultural Carbon
Decisions Needed in Setting Measurement Requirements
Scale and Baseline
Periodicity
Verification
Measurement Techniques
On-Site Measurement
Indirect Measurement with Off-Site Tools
Estimation Using Process Models or Inferences
Considerations for Congress
Appendix. Forestry and Agricultural Activities for Carbon Sequestration
and/or Emission Reduction
Chapter 12:
“Climate Change: The Role of the U.S. Agriculture
Sector and Congressional Action,” by Renee Johnson,
CRS Report for Congress RL33898, November 9, 2009 ............................. 183
Agricultural Emissions and Sinks
Source of National Estimates
Agricultural Emissions
Direct Emissions
Electricity-Related Emissions
Land Use and Forestry Emissions
Uncertainty Estimating Emissions
Potential for Additional Emission Reductions
Agricultural Carbon Sinks
Carbon Loss and Uptake
Agriculture-Based Sequestration
Other Land Use and Forestry Sequestration
Uncertainty Estimating Carbon Sinks
Potential for Additional Uptake
Enhancing Carbon Sinks
Chapter 13:
“Forest Carbon Markets: Potential and Drawbacks,”
by Ross W. Gorte and Jonathan L. Ramseur,
CRS Report for Congress RL34560, July 3, 2008 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 219
Forest Carbon Markets
Compliance Offset Markets
Kyoto Protocol
European Union’s Emission Trading Scheme
Regional Initiatives in the United States
Mandatory U.S. State Requirements
Proposals in the 110th Congress
Voluntary Offset Markets
Retail Offsets
Chicago Climate Exchange
Reporting and Registry Programs
1605(b) Reporting Program
California Registry
The Climate Registry
USDA Guidelines
Forestry Projects for Offsets
Afforestation and Reforestation
Long-Term Wood Products
Chapter 14:
“Methane Capture: Options for Greenhouse Gas Emission Reduction,”
by Kelsi Bracmort, Jonathan L. Ramseur, James E. McCarthy,
Peter Folger, and Donald J. Marples, CRS Report for
Congress R40813, September 17, 2009 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 239
Introduction
Policy Options for Addressing Methane Capture
Market-Based Emission Control Programs
Carbon Offsets
Emission Performance Standards
Maintain Existing Programs/Incentives
Legislative Proposals Concerning Methane Capture
Methane: A Primer
Global Warming Potential
Sources of Methane
Domestic
International
Methane Use and Storage
Opportunities and Challenges for Methane Capture
Agriculture
Landfill Gas
Oil and Natural Gas
Coalbed Methane
Concerns Applicable to All Sources
Federal Support for Methane Capture
Methane-to-Markets Partnership
Voluntary Methane Programs
Chapter 15:
“Cars and Climate: What Can EPA Do to Control Greenhouse
Gases from Mobile Sources?” by James E. McCarthy,
CRS Report for Congress R40506, December 9, 2009 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 263
Introduction
Option 1: Cap-and-Trade
Option 2: A Carbon (or GHG) Tax
Option 3: Regulation Under Existing Authority
The Entry Point: Massachusetts vs. EPA
The ANPR
The Obama Administration’s Approach
Going After Mobile Sources: Title II Authorities
New Motor Vehicles
Ships
Other Nonroad Engines
Aircraft
Fuels
Summary of Mobile Source and Fuel GHG Emissions
Figure 1. Motor Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emissions
Table 1. Petitions for Regulation of Greenhouse Gas Emissions Under the Clean Air Act
Table 2. Motor Vehicle GHG Emissions, 2007, by Source Category
Table 3. Nonroad Sector CO2 Emissions, 2007, by Source Category
Table 4. Categories of Sources Whose GHG Emissions Could Be
Regulated Under Title II of the Clean Air Act
Chapter 16:
“Aviation and Climate Change,” by James E. McCarthy,
CRS Report for Congress R40090, August 4, 2009 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 285
Introduction
Aircraft Emissions
Reducing Emissions: Non-Regulatory Factors
Fuel Cost
Air Traffic Control
Chapter 17:
“Cap and Trade Programs for Air Emissions,” by Sam Napolitano, Clean Air
Markets Division, Office of Air and Radiation, U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency, Presentation for the Clean Air Conference, December 4, 2009 . . . . . . . . . . . 299
Chapter 18:
“Climate Change and the EU Emissions Trading
Scheme (ETS): Kyoto and Beyond,” by Larry Parker,
CRS Report for Congress RL34150, November 24, 2008 ........................... 321
Overview
National Allocation Plans and the ETS
Need for Further Emissions Reductions
Need to Adjust ETS Allocations
Issues Arising in Phase 2 NAPs for the ETS
Supplementarity
Auction Policy
New Entrant Reserves
Closure Policy
Benchmarking
Allocation and Energy Policy
Looking to Phase III
Eliminating NAPs
Expanding Coverage
Auctions
Summary and Considerations for U.S. Cap-and-Trade Proposals
Emission Inventories and Target Setting
Coverage
Allocation Schemes
Flexibility and Price Volatility
Figure 1. ECX CFI Futures Contracts: Price and Volume
Figure 2. EU-15 Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Projections for the Kyoto Period: 2008–2012
Table 1. ETS Annual Allocations for Phase 2: 2008–2012
Table 2. JI/CDM Limits for Phase 2: 2008–2012
Table 3. Value of Annual Allocation for New NGCC Powerplant
Table 4. Annual ETS Cap Figures for Proposed Phase 3
Chapter 20:
Testimony of David L. Sokol, Chairman, MidAmerican Energy
Holdings Company Before the Subcommittee on Energy
and Environment, Committee on Energy and Commerce,
U.S. House of Representatives, June 9, 2009 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 383
Chapter 22:
Testimony of Robert Greenstein, Executive Director, Center on Budget
and Policy Priorities, House Committee on Energy and Commerce,
Subcommittee on Energy and Environment, March 12, 2009 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 423
Chapter 23:
Testimony of Sonny Popowsky, Consumer Advocate of Pennsylvania
Before the House Committee on Energy and Commerce,
Subcommittee on Energy and Environment, March 12, 2009 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 439
Chapter 24:
Testimony of Steven L. Kline, Vice President, Corporate
Environmental and Federal Affairs, PG&E Corporation
Before the Subcommittee on Energy and Environment of the
House Energy and Commerce Committee, March 12, 2009 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 451
Chapter 25:
Testimony of Michael Carey, President, Ohio Coal Association
Before the Subcommittee on Energy and Environment of
the House Energy and Commerce Committee, March 12, 2009 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 461
Chapter 26:
Testimony of A. Denny Ellerman, Center for Energy and
Environmental Policy Research, Massachusetts Institute
of Technology, Before the Senate Committee on Energy
and Natural Resources, October 21, 2009 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 467
Chapter 27:
Testimony of Gilbert E. Metcalf, Professor of Economics,
Tufts University, Before the Senate Committee on Energy
and Natural Resources, October 21, 2009 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 483
Chapter 28:
Testimony of Karen Palmer, Darius Gaskins Senior Fellow,
Resources for the Future, Before the Senate Committee
on Energy and Natural Resources, October 21, 2009 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 495
Chapter 29:
Testimony of Chad Stone, Chief Economist,
Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, Before the Senate
Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, October 21, 2009 .................. 505
Chapter 31:
Testimony of Ted Gayer, Brookings Institution,
Before the Senate Committee on Energy and
Natural Resources, December 2, 2009 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 525
Chapter 32:
Testimony of Jonathan M. Banks, Climate Policy Coordinator,
Clean Air Task Force, Before the Senate Committee on
Energy and Natural Resources, December 2, 2009 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 529
Chapter 33:
Resources from TheCapitol.Net . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 539
Capitol Learning Audio CoursesTM
Live Training
Chapter 34:
Other Resources ........................................................................... 541
Internet Resources
Think Tanks
Books
The Kyoto Protocol, set to expire in 2012, established binding reductions of greenhouse gas
(GHG) emissions for thirty-six countries. The United States was not a party to the treaty. Reducing
GHG emissions through cap-and-trade programs is generating widespread discussion, including
consideration by the U.S. Congress. Debate is ongoing as to cap and trade’s effectiveness, costs,
inequities, and questionable reductions in pollution, to name a few.
Cap and trade is a policy approach for controlling large amounts of emissions from a group of
sources. The approach sets an overall cap, or maximum amount of emissions per compliance
period, for all sources under the program. The cap is chosen in order to achieve a desired
environmental effect.
Authorizations to emit in the form of emission allowances are then allocated to affected sources,
and the total number of allowances cannot exceed the cap. Individual control requirements are
not specified for sources; instead, sources report all emissions and then surrender the equivalent
number of allowances at the end of the compliance period.
Allowance trading enables sources to design their own compliance strategy based on their
individual circumstances while still achieving the overall emissions reductions required by the cap.
A compliance option in a cap and trade program is an offset. An offset is a measurable reduction,
avoidance, or sequestration of GHG emissions from a source not covered by an emission reduction
program. If allowed, offset projects could generate "emission credits" which could be used by a
regulated entity to comply with its reduction requirement.
Examples of cap-and-trade programs in the United States include the Acid Rain SO2 Program
and the Ozone Transport Commission NOX SIP call, while in Europe the European Union Trading
System spreads across the bloc’s twenty-seven member nations.
25
Guiding Principles for
Without
Acid Rain
Program
Program Design
20
Three features critical to designing and implementing
Millions of Tons
1984
1988
1992
1996
2000
2004
2008
Energy Trends to 2035 the alternative cases prepared for AEO2010, EIA has
In preparing the Annual Energy Outlook 2010 (AEO- examined many proposed policies at the request of
2010), the Energy Information Administration (EIA) Congress in 2009, and reports describing the results
evaluated a wide range of trends and issues that could of those analyses are available on EIA’s web site.2
have major implications for U.S. energy markets.
Key updates in the AEO2010 reference case include:
This overview focuses primarily on one case, the
AEO2010 reference case, which is presented and com- •This year, for the first time, a projection period
pared with the updated Annual Energy Outlook 2009 that extends through 2035
(updated AEO2009) reference case released in April
20091 (see Table 1). Because of the uncertainties in- •Revised handling of corporate average fuel econ-
omy (CAFE) standards to reflect the standards
herent in any energy market projection, particularly
proposed jointly by the U.S. Environmental Pro-
in periods of high price volatility, rapid market trans-
tection Agency (EPA) and the U.S. Department of
formation, or active changes in legislation, the refer- Transportation’s National Highway Traffic
ence case results should not be viewed in isolation. Safety Administration (NHTSA) for light-duty ve-
Readers are encouraged to review the alternative hicles (LDVs) in model years 2012 through 2016
cases when the complete AEO2010 publication is re-
leased in order to gain perspective on how variations •Updated projections of investment costs for many
in key assumptions can lead to different outlooks for categories of capital-intensive energy projects
energy markets.
•Recognition of changes in environmental rules at
To provide a basis against which alternative cases and both the Federal and State levels
policies can be compared, the AEO2010 reference
case generally assumes that current laws and regula-
•Implementation of a new lower 48 onshore oil and
natural gas supply submodule that improves
tions affecting the energy sector remain unchanged EIA’s ability to address issues related to changes
throughout the projection (including the implication and improvements in technology, access to land
that laws which include sunset dates do, in fact, be- for exploration and production, and legislative
come ineffective at the time of those sunset dates). policies
EIA considers this practice to be a prudent approach
to addressing the impact of legislation and regula- •Updated characterization of natural gas shale
tions. Currently, there are many pieces of legislation plays, reflecting the continued evolution of “shale
and regulation that appear to have a high probability gas” resources and extraction technologies.
of being enacted in the not-too-distant future, and
some laws include sunset provisions that may be ex- Economic Growth
tended; however, it is difficult to discern the exact •Real gross domestic product (GDP) grows by 2.5
forms that the final provisions of pending legislation percent per year from 2008 to 2030 in the AEO-
or regulations will take, and sunset provisions may or 2010 reference case (similar to the GDP growth
may not be extended. Even in situations where exist- rate in the updated AEO2009 reference case) and
ing legislation contains provisions to allow revision of by 2.4 percent per year from 2008 to 2035. The
implementing regulations, those provisions are not Nation’s population, labor force, and productivity
exercised consistently. grow at annual rates of 0.9 percent, 0.6 percent,
and 2.0 percent, respectively, from 2008 to 2035.
As in past AEO editions, the complete AEO2010 will
include many additional cases. The standard set of •Beyond 2011, the economic assumptions under-
cases in the complete AEO will be expanded to include lying the AEO2010 reference case reflect trend
additional cases that reflect the impact of extending a projections that do not include short-term fluctu-
variety of current energy programs beyond their cur- ations. The near-term scenario for economic
rent expiration or the permanent retention of a broad growth is consistent with that in EIA’s September
set of current programs that are currently subject 2009 Short-Term Energy Outlook.
to sunset provisions, among others. In addition to
1 The AEO2009 reference case, originally released in December 2008, was updated to reflect the provisions of the American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA), enacted in mid-February 2009.
2 See “Responses to Congressional and Other Requests,” at www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/service_rpts.htm.
10 Norway
Natural gas
Canada
5
United Kingdom
Coal
0
1980 1990 2000 2008 2015 2025 2035 0 2,500 5,000 7,500 10,000 12,500
Table 1. Comparison of projections in the AEO2010 and Updated AEO2009 reference cases, 2008-2035
2020 2030 2035
Energy and economic factors 2008 AEO2010 AEO2009 AEO2010 AEO2009 AEO2010
Primary energy production (quadrillion Btu)
Petroleum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13.08 15.51 15.01 15.68 18.00 15.87
Dry natural gas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21.14 20.54 20.13 23.00 23.67 23.92
Coal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23.86 23.71 24.56 24.68 25.42 25.19
Nuclear power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.46 9.26 9.14 9.29 9.29 9.41
Hydropower . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.46 2.96 2.95 2.98 2.96 2.99
Biomass . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.97 5.63 6.19 7.93 8.58 9.27
Other renewable energy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.17 3.01 2.97 3.17 3.08 3.36
Other . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.10 0.89 0.93 0.92 1.01 0.81
Total. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74.23 81.51 81.88 87.63 92.02 90.83
Net imports (quadrillion Btu)
Petroleum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24.06 20.83 20.35 21.23 17.90 21.30
Natural gas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.04 2.66 1.92 1.91 0.42 1.53
Coal/other (- indicates export) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . -1.11 -0.37 0.11 0.08 0.47 0.53
Total. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25.99 23.11 22.37 23.22 18.78 23.36
Consumption (quadrillion Btu)
Liquid fuels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38.35 39.36 38.67 41.08 40.30 42.02
Natural gas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23.91 23.27 22.13 25.01 24.15 25.56
Coal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22.41 23.01 24.36 24.25 25.42 25.11
Nuclear power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.46 9.26 9.14 9.29 9.29 9.41
Hydropower . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.46 2.96 2.95 2.98 2.96 2.99
Biomass . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.10 3.93 4.28 5.19 5.60 5.83
Other renewable energy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.17 3.01 2.97 3.17 3.08 3.36
Net electricity imports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.24 0.20 0.18 0.20 0.16 0.22
Total. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100.09 105.00 104.67 111.18 110.96 114.51
Liquid fuels (million barrels per day)
Domestic crude oil production . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.96 6.13 5.79 6.20 7.14 6.27
Other domestic production . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.38 4.58 4.58 5.26 5.35 5.73
Net imports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.19 9.72 9.51 9.91 8.38 10.00
Consumption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19.53 20.56 20.05 21.48 20.92 22.06
Natural gas (trillion cubic feet)
Production . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20.62 20.04 19.65 22.44 23.09 23.34
Net imports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.95 2.57 1.85 1.84 0.38 1.46
Consumption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23.25 22.63 21.53 24.33 23.50 24.86
Coal (million short tons)
Production . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,172 1,183 1,223 1,260 1,272 1,285
Net imports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . -49 -15 7 2 22 20
Consumption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,122 1,183 1,240 1,276 1,305 1,319
Prices (2008 dollars)
Imported low-sulfur, light crude oil (dollars per barrel) . . . . 99.57 108.28 119.36 123.50 133.80 133.22
Imported crude oil (dollars per barrel) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92.61 98.14 117.02 111.49 127.09 121.37
Domestic natural gas at wellhead
(dollars per thousand cubic feet) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.07 6.03 6.94 7.31 8.19 8.06
Domestic coal at minemouth (dollars per short ton). . . . . . 31.26 30.01 27.99 27.43 28.48 28.10
Average electricity price (cents per kilowatthour). . . . . . . . 9.8 9.0 9.5 9.7 10.3 10.2
Economic indicators
Real gross domestic product (billion 2000 dollars). . . . . . . 11,652 15,416 15,398 19,883 19,875 22,362
GDP chain-type price index (2000=1.000) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.225 1.497 1.521 1.849 1.896 2.059
Real disposable personal income (billion 2000 dollars) . . . 8,753 11,967 11,903 16,069 16,014 18,168
Value of manufacturing shipments (billion 2000 dollars) . . 4,014 5,006 5,019 5,680 5,631 6,010
Primary energy intensity
(thousand Btu per 2000 dollar of GDP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.59 6.81 6.80 5.59 5.58 5.12
Energy-related carbon dioxide emissions
(million metric tons) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5,814 5,852 5,905 6,176 6,207 6,320
Notes: Quantities reported in quadrillion Btu are derived from historical volumes and assumed thermal conversion factors. Other production
includes liquid hydrogen, methanol, and some inputs to refineries. Net imports of petroleum include crude oil, petroleum products, unfinished oils,
alcohols, ethers, and blending components. Other net imports include coal coke and electricity. Coal consumption includes waste coal consumed
in the electric power and industrial sectors, which is not included in coal production.
Sources: AEO2010 National Energy Modeling System, run AEO2010R.D111809A; and AEO2009 National Energy Modeling System, run
STIMULUS.D041409A.
20 Shale gas
Coalbed methane
15
Non-associated onshore
10
Non-associated offshore
5
Associated with oil
Net imports
0
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035
Richard Newell, SAIS, December 14, 2009 Source: Annual Energy Outlook 2010 17
-2
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030
Richard Newell, SAIS, December 14, 2009 Source: Annual Energy Outlook 2010 18
Other Other
119 (12%) 2 (1%) Natural gas
116 (46%)
Natural gas
338 (33%)
* Includes pumped storage
Richard Newell, SAIS, December 14, 2009 Source: Annual Energy Outlook 2010 19
5,000
17.0
4,000 Renewable
9.1 20.8
Natural gas
21.4
3,000
Richard Newell, SAIS, December 14, 2009 Source: Annual Energy Outlook 2010 20
billion kilowatthours
600 History Projections
500
400
Biomass
300
200 Wind
0 Waste
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035
Richard Newell, SAIS, December 14, 2009 Source: Annual Energy Outlook 2010 21
5,814 6,320
million metric million metric
tons tons
8.7% growth
0.3% per year
Transportation
1,925 (33%) Transportation
2,115 (33%)
Richard Newell, SAIS, December 14, 2009 Source: Annual Energy Outlook 2010 22
Jonathan L. Ramseur
Analyst in Environmental Policy
Larry Parker
Specialist in Energy and Environmental Policy
Carbon Tax and Greenhouse Gas Control: Options and Considerations for Congress
Summary
Market-based mechanisms that limit greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions can be divided into two
types: quantity control (e.g., cap-and-trade) and price control (e.g., carbon tax or fee). To some
extent, a carbon tax and a cap-and-trade program would produce similar effects: Both are
estimated to increase the price of fossil fuels, which would ultimately be borne by consumers,
particularly households. Although there are multiple tools available to policymakers that could
control GHG emissions—including existing statutory authorities—this report focuses on a carbon
tax approach and how it compares to its more frequently discussed counterpart: cap-and-trade.
If policymakers had perfect information regarding the market, either a price (carbon tax) or
quantity control (cap-and-trade system) instrument could be designed to achieve the same
outcome. Because this market ideal does not exist, preference for a carbon tax or a cap-and-trade
program ultimately depends on which variable one wants to control—emissions or costs.
Although there are several design mechanisms that could blur the distinction, the gap between
price control and quantity control can never be completely overcome.
A carbon tax has several potential advantages. With a fixed price ceiling on emissions (or their
inputs—e.g., fossil fuels), a tax approach would not cause additional volatility in energy prices. A
set price would provide industry with better information to guide investment decisions: e.g.,
efficiency improvements, equipment upgrades. Economists often highlight a relative economic
efficiency advantage of a carbon tax, but this potential advantage rests on assumptions—about the
expected costs and benefits of climate change mitigation—that are uncertain and controversial.
Some contend that a carbon tax may provide implementation advantages: greater transparency,
reduced administrative burden, and relative ease of modification.
The primary disadvantage of a carbon tax is that it would yield uncertain emission control. Some
argue that the potential for irreversible climate change impacts necessitates the emissions
certainty that is only available with a quantity-based instrument (e.g., cap-and-trade). Although it
may present implementation challenges, policymakers could devise a tax program that allows
some short-term emission fluctuations, while progressing toward a long-term emission reduction
objective. Proponents argue that short-term emission fluctuations would be preferable to the price
volatility that might be expected with a cap-and-trade system.
Although a carbon tax could possibly face more political obstacles than a cap-and-trade program,
some of these obstacles may be based on misunderstandings of the differences between the two
approaches or on assumptions that the tax would be set too low to be effective. Carbon tax
proponents could possibly address these issues to some degree, but there remains considerable
political momentum for a cap-and-trade program.
Carbon Tax and Greenhouse Gas Control: Options and Considerations for Congress
Contents
Introduction ................................................................................................................................1
Cost or Quantity Control: An Overview.......................................................................................3
Economic Theory vs. Uncertainty .........................................................................................3
A Stark Choice or a Policy Continuum?.................................................................................5
A Flexible Emissions Cap ...............................................................................................5
A Flexible Carbon Tax ....................................................................................................6
Limits of the Policy Continuum.......................................................................................6
Potential Advantages of a Carbon Tax .........................................................................................7
Economic Efficiency.............................................................................................................7
Basis for the Argument....................................................................................................7
Underpinnings of the Argument..................................................................................... 10
Modeled Efficiency Gains ............................................................................................. 13
Economic Efficiency Versus Precaution......................................................................... 14
Price Stability ..................................................................................................................... 14
Tax Revenue Applications ................................................................................................... 15
Potential Implementation Advantages.................................................................................. 16
Transparency ................................................................................................................ 16
Administrative Issues .................................................................................................... 17
Policy Modification ...................................................................................................... 18
Potential Disadvantages ............................................................................................................ 18
Uncertain Emissions ........................................................................................................... 18
Political Feasibility ............................................................................................................. 19
What’s in a Name? ........................................................................................................ 20
Support from Industry? ................................................................................................. 21
Support from Environmental Groups? ........................................................................... 22
Consideration of International Efforts and Cooperation ....................................................... 22
Coordination with Existing International Efforts............................................................ 22
Maximizing Participation .............................................................................................. 23
International Implementation Concerns ......................................................................... 24
Implementation of a Carbon Tax ............................................................................................... 24
Point of Taxation................................................................................................................. 24
Where to Impose a Carbon Tax? ................................................................................... 25
CO2 Emissions or All GHG Emissions?......................................................................... 27
Which Emissions Sources to Control?........................................................................... 28
Level of Taxation ................................................................................................................ 32
Tax Based on Estimates of Costs and Benefits............................................................... 33
Tax Based on Meeting an Emissions Target ................................................................... 35
Tax Revenue Distribution.................................................................................................... 37
Estimates of Tax Revenues............................................................................................ 37
Uses of Tax Revenues ................................................................................................... 38
Policy Considerations of Different Revenue Applications .............................................. 40
Distributional Impacts................................................................................................... 41
Conclusions .............................................................................................................................. 44
Carbon Tax and Greenhouse Gas Control: Options and Considerations for Congress
Figures
Figure 1. Illustration of Price Versus Quantity .............................................................................4
Figure 2. Bridging the Gap between Price and Quantity Control ..................................................6
Figure 3. Illustrative Scenario with a Relatively Flat Marginal Benefits Curve.............................9
Figure 4. Illustrative Scenario with a Relatively Steep Marginal Benefits Curve ........................ 10
Figure 5. Illustrative Scenario with Marginal Costs and Marginal Benefits That Are
Higher Than Expected............................................................................................................ 13
Figure 6. “Phase 2” Emission Allowance Prices in the European Union’s Emission
Trading System ...................................................................................................................... 15
Figure 7. Illustration of Options for Points of Taxation within the Energy Production-to-
Consumption Chain ............................................................................................................... 25
Figure 8. Emission Allowance Price Estimates under S. 2191 .................................................... 36
Figure 9. Relative Differences in Efficiency Costs between Different Applications of Tax
(or Auction) Revenues and No-Cost Allowance Distribution in a Cap-and-Trade
Program................................................................................................................................. 41
Figure A-1. Illustration of Relationship between the Stock of CO2 in Atmosphere and
Annual CO2 Emissions........................................................................................................... 46
Tables
Table 1. CO2 Emissions Per Unit of Energy for Fossil Fuels ...................................................... 27
Table 2. Selected Sources of U.S. GHG Emissions and Potential Applications of a
Carbon Tax ............................................................................................................................ 31
Table 3. Estimates of Potential Tax Revenues from Carbon Tax Proposals from the 110th
Congress (in 2005 dollars)...................................................................................................... 38
Table 4. Distributional Effects of Carbon Tax with Different Applications of Carbon Tax
Revenues ............................................................................................................................... 42
Table A-1. Comparison of Estimated Carbon Tax-Related Price Impacts to Fossil Fuels
and Motor Gasoline from Selected Carbon Tax Rates ............................................................. 47
Appendixes
Appendix. Additional Information............................................................................................. 46
Contacts
Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 47
Carbon Tax and Greenhouse Gas Control: Options and Considerations for Congress
Introduction
A variety of efforts that seek to reduce greenhouse gas emissions (GHG)1 are currently under way
or being developed on the international, national, and sub-national level (e.g., individual state
actions or regional partnerships). One option (of many, see text box below—“Other Policy
Options for Addressing GHG Emissions”) for controlling GHG emissions is to apply a tax or fee
on GHG emissions or the inputs that create them. This type of approach is commonly called (and
referred to in this report as) a carbon tax,2 whether it would apply to CO2 emissions alone or to
multiple GHGs, including some that may have no molecular carbon.3 This report does not provide
a comprehensive comparison and analysis of the multiple policy tools available to Congress that
would address climate change. Instead, this report focuses on the policy considerations of using a
carbon tax to control GHG emissions.
Governments may impose taxes for a variety of purposes. The primary reason that governments
impose taxes is to raise revenue to fund various objectives or services: e.g., national defense,
public education, social security, etc. Generally, governments raise these revenue streams by
placing a tax on activities that are recognized as desirable (“economic goods”) such as income,
employment, and investment. While this tax placement ensures a relatively steady flow of
revenue (often the primary objective of the tax), economists generally describe such taxes as
distortionary, because the taxes discourage the “good” activity. For example, many economists
have argued that payroll and income taxes discourage employment and investment.4 If these taxes
were reduced, the incentives to increase labor and investment would be greater.
1
The major GHGs discussed include carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O), sulfur hexafluoride
(SF6), hydrofluorocarbons (HFC), and perfluorocarbons (PFC). Recent GHG reduction proposals have also included
nitrogen trifluoride (NF3).
2
As discussed in this report, terminology is a key issue. Some proponents of the “carbon tax” approach describe the
policy instrument as a user fee or user charge. There are multiple reasons that proponents may seek to change the
nomenclature. Perhaps the primary concern is the political stigma associated with the word “tax.” Regardless, the term
“carbon tax” is the one that is most commonly associated with the GHG control policy instrument discussed in this
report.
3
Non-carbon GHGs could still be subject to the tax based on their contribution to global warming in relation to CO2.
Global warming potential (GWP) is an index of how much a GHG may contribute to global warming over a period of
time, typically 100 years. GWPs are used to compare gases to carbon dioxide, which has a GWP of 1. For example,
methane’s GWP is 25, and is thus 25 times more potent a GHG than CO2. The GWPs listed in this report are from:
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change 2007: The Physical Science Basis (2007), p. 212.
4
See e.g., Gilbert Metcalf, A Green Employment Tax Swap: Using a Carbon Tax to Finance Payroll Tax Relief (2007);
Nathaniel Keohane and Sheila Olmstead, Markets and the Environment (2007), Island Press; Ian Parry “Fiscal
Interactions and the Case for Carbon Taxes over Grandfathered Carbon Permits,” in Climate Change Policy (Dieter
Helm, editor), Oxford University Press (2005).
5
Named after A. Cecil Pigou, author of a landmark economic work, Economics of Welfare (1920).
Carbon Tax and Greenhouse Gas Control: Options and Considerations for Congress
In economics parlance, the social cost not reflected in the market price is called an “externality.”
A pollution tax would internalize the external costs by making the party who profits from the
polluting activity include the external costs in the price of the good or service. Policymakers
could place a pollution tax on GHG emissions or the inputs that create them. By attaching a price
to GHG emissions, a carbon tax would stimulate GHG emission reduction. If the tax were placed
on emissions, entities directly subject to the tax, such as power plants, would have an incentive to
take actions—e.g., energy efficiency improvements or equipment upgrades—to lower tax
payments. If the tax were placed on emission inputs—e.g., fossil fuels—the price of carbon-
intensive energy sources, primarily coal, would increase relative to low-carbon fuels (Table A-1
of this report—located in the Appendix—includes estimates of price increases to fossil fuels and
motor gasoline based on different carbon tax rates). Energy consumers—e.g., power plants,
industry, households, etc.—would be encouraged to (1) switch to less carbon-intensive fuels; (2)
use less energy or use energy more efficiently; and (3) prefer products or services that are lower-
priced by virtue of incorporating less emission tax. Each of these activities would reduce GHG
emissions compared to a business-as-usual track.
These expected behavioral changes mirror the activities that are forecast for a potential cap-and-
trade program. Both a carbon tax and a cap-and-trade system would place a price on carbon. Both
a carbon tax and cap-and-trade system are intended (and expected) to increase the price of coal,
oil, and natural gas. Under either program, these price increases would ultimately be borne by
energy consumers, both businesses and households. These price increases are integral to a
market-based approach to GHG emission reduction, because they send more accurate information
to purchasers about the full cost of their choices.
This report begins with an overview of the fundamental choices involved between a cost (tax) and
a quantity (cap) control instrument. This includes a discussion of policy tools that could be
employed to bridge the gap between a carbon tax and a cap-and-trade program. Following this
overview, the report analyzes the potential advantages and disadvantages of a carbon tax. In many
cases, carbon tax attributes are compared with those of a cap-and-trade program. The next section
discusses implementation issues for a carbon tax, including where to apply the tax, at what level
to set the tax, and options for distributing tax revenues. The final section provides conclusions.
Carbon Tax and Greenhouse Gas Control: Options and Considerations for Congress
6
See also, CRS Report RL33799, Climate Change: Design Approaches for a Greenhouse Gas Reduction Program, by
Larry Parker; CRS Report RL34513, Climate Change: Current Issues and Policy Tools, by Jane A. Leggett.
7
See e.g., William Pizer, Prices vs. Quantities Revisited: The Case of Climate Change (1997), Resources for the Future
Discussion Paper 98-02.
8
The marginal cost curve indicates the cost of an additional unit (e.g., one ton of GHG emissions) of emission
abatement at different emission levels. A rising marginal cost curve (as depicted in Figure 1) signals that as each
incremental unit of GHG emission abatement is made, the cost of abatement (per unit) increases.
9
The marginal benefit curve indicates the benefit of an additional unit (e.g., one ton of GHG emissions) of emission
abatement at different emission levels. A declining benefit slope (as depicted in Figure 1) illustrates that with each
incremental unit of abatement, the per unit benefit decreases.
10
Abatement may include emission reductions, emissions avoided, and sequestration activities.
11
In other words, for abatement above this level, it would cost more than the value of the benefits received. Society
would be paying too much; money would be better spent for other purposes.
anaerobic digesters and methane projects; wind, solar, or other renewable energy use; and forest
restoration. Similar programs also have been initiated in Illinois (Illinois Conservation and
Climate Initiative), Indiana (Environmental Credit Corporation), and the Northwest (Upper
Columbia Resource Conservation and Development Council). Another, Terrapass, has among its
projects two large-scale dairy farms that use anaerobic digesters and methane capture for energy
production.69
These programs “aggregate” carbon credits across many farmers and landowners. These credits
may later be sold on the Chicago Climate Exchange.70 Farmer participation in such programs may
help offset farm costs to install emissions controls and/or practices that sequester carbon by
providing a means for them to earn and sell carbon credits.
Congressional Action
Source: Climate Analysis Indicators Tool (CAIT) Version 6.0 (Washington, DC: World Resources Institute, 2009).
25
20
15
GW
10
0
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Source: EPA
33
1400
Anthracite Coal
1200
Lignite Coal
1000
Million Short Tons
800
Sub bituminous Coal
600
400
Bituminous Coal
200
0
70
72
74
76
78
80
82
84
86
88
90
92
94
96
98
00
02
04
06
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
20
20
20
20
34
Source: Energy Information Administration/Annual Energy Review 2008
Allowance Distribution
• Considerations: Equity, incentives, certainty, efficiency, revenue
impacts, price effects, profitability
– Allowance allocation should balance the need for certainty and changing
circumstances
• Experience: Generally allocation does not change the environmental
outcome. (The emission caps and option for “banking” of allowances
over time drive the environmental performance). Allowance allocation
can substantially influence compliance expenses by individual firms
and the total distributional effects of a program.
• Approach: Many options, none are perfect
– Direct allocation to sources based on historical and/or current emissions,
energy use (input), or production (output, e.g. electric generation), with the
option of set-asides within the cap for certain sources and/or actions (new
sources, renewables, demand side efficiency)
– Auction
– Hybrid
– Auction phase-in following allocation
35
June 9, 2009
Holdings Company, which has $41 billion in energy assets in 20 states and around the world
serving 7 million end-use customers. Our two domestic utilities serve retail electric and natural
gas customers in ten states, and our generation capacity mix consists of about 22% renewables
(of which about half is wind), 48% coal, 24% natural gas, and the rest nuclear and other assets.
I want to be absolutely clear at the outset: Cap-and-trade is two concepts. The electricity
sector can meet the Waxman-Markey interim and ultimate caps of reducing greenhouse gas
emissions to 80% below 2005 levels by 2050, but the bill’s trading mechanism will impose a
huge and unacceptable double cost on customers: first to pay for emission allowances, which
will not reduce greenhouse gas emissions by one ounce, and then for the construction of new
low- and zero-carbon power plants and other actions that will actually do the job of reducing
these emissions. This bill will cost hundreds of billions of dollars, and we think it is wrong to
saddle customers with these unnecessary and duplicative costs that provide them with absolutely
no benefits. We should work instead on an alternative mechanism that empowers state regulators
to work with their utilities to comply with the emission caps but without the trading.
$3.6 Billion @ $25/Ton $9.3 Billion @ $25/Ton 7 Units = $5.3 Billion (09$)
130%
25,000,000
120%
Load Growth Mitigation
Renewables and Energy Efficiency 110%
ons)
% of Baseline
80%
WaxmanMarkey
15,000,000
70%
e ofBaselineEmissions
60%
CO2 Emissions(To
10,000,000 50%
Percentage
40%
30%
5,000,000
20%
10%
0 0%
2005
2008
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
2022
2023
2024
2025
2026
2027
2028
2029
2030
2031
2032
2033
2034
2035
2036
2037
2038
2039
2040
2041
2042
2043
2044
2045
2046
2047
2048
2049
2050
2051
397
Chapter 20: Testimony of David L. Sokol
398
PacifiCorp CO2 Emissions Projection
60,000,000
Cost of Compliance
p Load Growth Mitigation
g 110%
$0.1 Billion @ $25/Ton Renewables and Energy Efficiency
100%
Gas Unit CO2 Emissions
50,000,000
Transfer of Wealth Coal Unit CO2 Emissions
Allocated Allowances 90%
$23 5 Billion @ $25/Ton
$23.5
% of Baseline
WaxmanMarkey 80%
40,000,000
Goverment Series: Cap and Trade
70%
ns)
Combined Cycle Plants
Percentage
50%
CO2 EEmissions(Ton
40%
20,000,000
e ofBaselineEmissions
30%
10%
0 0%
2005
2008
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
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Chapter 22: Testimony of Robert Greenstein
Tel: 202-408-1080
Fax: 202-408-1056
center@cbpp.org
www.cbpp.org
Thank you for the opportunity to testify today. The main message of my testimony is that climate
change legislation can fight global warming effectively while protecting consumers if it is designed
appropriately. Here is the issue in a nutshell.
Fighting global warming requires policies that significantly restrict greenhouse gas emissions. The
most cost-effective ways to do that are to tax emissions directly or to put in place a “cap-and-trade”
system. Either one will significantly raise the price of fossil-fuel energy products — from home
energy and gasoline to food and other goods and services with significant energy inputs. Those
higher prices create incentives for energy efficiency and the development and increased use of clean
energy sources. But they will also put a squeeze on consumers’ budgets, and low- and moderate-
income consumers will feel the squeeze most acutely.
Fortunately, climate change policies can be designed in a way that preserves the incentives from
higher prices to change the way that we produce and consume energy, while also offsetting the
effect on consumer budgets of those higher prices. Well-designed climate policies will generate
substantial revenue that can be used to offset the impact of higher prices on the budgets of the most
vulnerable households, to cushion the impact substantially for many other households, and to meet
other legitimate needs such as expanded research on alternative energy sources.
To capture this revenue in a cap-and-trade system, it is essential that most or all of the allowances
or permits used to limit emissions be auctioned for public purposes rather than given away free to
emitters. Giving away, or “grandfathering,” allowances is sometimes portrayed as a way to keep
down costs for consumers, but that argument does not stand up to scrutiny. Rather, if allowances
are given away free to firms that are responsible for emissions, the firms and their shareholders will
reap unwarranted benefits. As CBO has explained, these firms would receive “windfall profits:”
they would be able to charge higher prices for their products due to the effects of the emissions cap
but would not have to pay for their emissions allowances. Ordinary consumers would get no help in
dealing with the strain that the higher prices put on their budgets. Greg Mankiw, former chair of the
Council of Economic Advisers for President George W. Bush, has written in a similar vein that
consumer prices will rise regardless of whether allowances are given free to emitters and that
grandfathering the allowances would constitute “corporate welfare.” There is little disagreement
among economists about this effect.
BEFORE THE
UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT
Testimony of
SONNY POPOWSKY
CONSUMER ADVOCATE
OF PENNSYLVANIA
Regarding
Washington, DC
March 12, 2009
109826
SUMMARY OF TESTIMONY
The National Association of State Utility Consumer Advocates (NASUCA) supports the
enactment of federal legislation to reduce greenhouse gases on an economy-wide basis. It is
NASUCA’s position, however, that any greenhouse gas emission reduction program for the
electric industry “should provide appropriate emission reductions while minimizing the cost to
consumers, and must not produce windfall gains for electric generators at the expense of electric
consumers.”
The primary focus of the Congressional debate has been on the development of a cap and
trade program for carbon dioxide emissions. This focus is understandable, given the great
success of the cap and trade program for sulfur dioxide emissions under the Clean Air Act of
1990. Congress must recognize, however, that the electric industry of 2009 is far different from
the electric industry of 1990, particularly in those states that have restructured, or deregulated,
the generation function of our electric utilities.
Under the 1990 Clean Air Act, allowances were initially allocated free of charge to utility
generators, and the benefits of those free allowances were effectively passed through to
customers through their cost-based rates in states across the Nation. The same result will not
occur today, particularly in “restructured” states where electric generation rates are no longer
based on the actual cost of service, but rather are based on unregulated wholesale market prices.
If allowances are given for free to carbon-emitting generators in deregulated markets, those
generators will nevertheless include the market value (or opportunity cost) of the allowances in
the prices that they bid into the market, and consumers will pay the market value of these
allowances in generation prices, even though they cost the generator nothing. Moreover, under
the “single market clearing price” method that is used to establish generation prices in
restructured markets, if the market clearing price reflects the cost (or market value) of an
emission allowance, this price will be paid to all generators that are operating in that hour,
including nuclear units that do not need to purchase allowances and do not incur any carbon
compliance costs. As a result of these factors, consumers could pay many billions of dollars in
increased generation prices with only modest reductions in actual carbon dioxide emissions.
To the extent that allowances are to be given at no cost to any segment of the utility
industry, those allowances must not be given to unregulated generators, but to regulated local
distribution companies, which should include state-regulated investor-owned utilities as well as
rural cooperatives, and municipal and other publicly owned companies. The benefits of those
free allowances must be flowed back to consumers through such means as customer rebates,
energy efficiency programs, and low-income energy assistance. A similar result can be
achieved if allowances are distributed to the states, as in the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative,
and the states then auction the allowances to generators with the proceeds of those auctions
utilized for the benefit of that state’s consumers. Alternatively, the allowances can be auctioned
directly to generators by the federal government, but it is important that proceeds from such an
Hearing on
Prepared for the U.S. Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources
October 21, 2009
Summary of Testimony
This testimony focuses on the effects of different methods of allocating carbon dioxide (CO2)
allowances on the price of electricity paid by consumers and the cost of a cap-and-trade program.
The traditional approach of allocating emissions allowances to electricity generators will result in
regional disparities in the electricity price effects of a climate policy, in part because of different
regulatory frameworks across states. In those states where prices are set by regulators, the price
of electricity will not reflect the value of emissions allowances that the utility obtained free of
charge. However, in regions with deregulated generation markets, the value of emissions
allowances used to produce electricity will be reflected in the electricity price even if they were
received for free. Two ways to reduce this disparity are to auction a greater share of allowances
or to allocate allowances to local distribution companies instead of to generators. As regulated
entities, local distribution companies are expected to pass the value of the free allocation on to
their customers, thus reducing the impact of a cap-and-trade policy on electricity consumers.
However, this approach is likely to result in higher allowance prices and thus could ultimately
leave households worse off than they would be if more allowances were auctioned. Greater
reliance on a cap-and-dividend approach, under which a portion of the value of emission
allowances is distributed to households on a per capita basis, could improve the delivery of
compensation to households and lower the overall cost of the policy.
Hearing on
From both scholarly and practical perspectives, I have studied the performance of emissions cap-
and-trade programs, including evaluation of the sulfur dioxide (SO2) emissions allowance trading
program created by the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments. I have conducted analysis and
modeling to support both state and regional efforts to design trading programs, including the
Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative in the Northeast and the California carbon dioxide (CO2)
cap-and-trade program under AB32. Currently I serve on the New York State RGGI Advisory
Committee, advising the New York State Energy Research and Development Authority on how
to use the RGGI allowance auction revenue, and on the New York State Independent System
Operator Environmental Advisory Council. Additionally, I serve on the EPA Science Advisory
Board’s Environmental Economics Advisory Council. Recently, with colleagues at RFF, I have
conducted economic analysis of mechanisms to contain the costs and the variability of costs of
implementing climate policy.
**************
Today I will focus on the effects of different methods of allocating CO2 allowances on the price
of electricity paid by consumers and the cost of a cap-and-trade program. The electricity sector is
responsible for 40 percent of U.S. CO2 emissions, but, according to the recent EIA analysis of
the Waxman Markey cap-and-trade bill, it will be responsible for over 80 percent of total
domestic CO2 emissions reductions from energy use during the early years of the program.
I want to highlight four main points about cap and trade and allowance allocation within the
electricity sector:
x The traditional approach of allocating emissions allowances to electricity generators will
result in regional disparities in the electricity price effects of a climate policy, in part
because of different regulatory frameworks across the states.
Purchased Offsets
2,000
1,800
EIA Waxman-
1,600 Markey
CATF Waxman-
1,400 Markey/Sectoral
1,200
1,000
MMTCO2e
800
600
400
200
Figure 6. From CATF modeling of sectoral policies and EIA modeling of HR 2454
What modeling does not show is the complexity (both political and technological) of
creating and enacting any climate policy, including a sectoral-based approach. For
sectoral, some of this complexity could be managed by passing multiple pieces of
legislation or sectoral titles. This would allow for fine-tuning of the program, and could
provide a more adaptable policy framework over the long haul. This would also narrow
the number of key stakeholders to a more manageable set of groups that need to come to
the table on each piece of the policy.
Currently many in the power and industrial sector have publicly stated that they do not
want a sectoral climate policy. What exactly drives this, we do not know with certainty.
It could be the fear of potentially being the only industry regulated. It may also be simply
that economy wide policy is the devil we know. It has been the subject of the legislative
process for the last 8 years. Industry and members of Congress have engaged and have
staked out positions and voiced their concerns. Of course, the launch pad for the last
eight years was actually a sectoral approach known as the Clean Smokestacks Act.
What you and your colleagues have to decide is whether the concerns expressed
regarding the current proposals in the Senate are best dealt with through further
refinement of the overall economy wide proposal, or in the end whether it will be
necessary to look to policy alternatives. Regardless of the answer to that question, the
imperative to take the first step forward on climate remains. I would be happy to answer
any questions you might have.
For more information and additional charts, please visit our website:
www.catf.us/advocacy/legal/
10
Live Training
<www.CapitolHillTraining.com>
Other Resources
Internet Resources
• U.S. EPA, Cap and Trade
<www.epa.gov/captrade/>
• Cap and Trade101
<www.epa.gov/captrade/captrade-101.html>
• Cap and Trade Markets
<www.epa.gov/capandtrade/allowance-trading.html>
• Carbon Trade Watch, “Carbon Trading – How it Works and Why It Fails”, November 24, 2009
<http://www.carbontradewatch.org/>
• Democracy Now!, “Cap & Trade: A Critical Look at Carbon Trading,” December 15, 2009
<http://www.democracynow.org/2009/12/15/cap_trade_a_critical_look_at>
• Carbon Trade Watch, Fact Sheet 1, “Cap and Trade” December 2009 (pdf)
<http://www.thecornerhouse.org.uk/pdf/document/fact1captrade.pdf>
• Carbon Trade Watch, Fact Sheet 2, “Carbon Offsets” December 2009 (pdf)
<http://www.thecornerhouse.org.uk/pdf/document/fact2offsets.pdf>
• “Carbon Trading: How it works and why it fails,” Dag Hammarskjold Foundation Occasional
Paper Series, no. 7 November 2009, Tamra Gilbertson and Oscar Reyes ISSN 1654-4250 (pdf)
<http://www.dhf.uu.se/pdffiler/cc7/cc7_web.pdf>
Think Tanks
• “Discounting and Climate Change Economics: Estimating the Cost of Cap and Trade,”
by David Kreutzer, Ph.D., The Heritage Foundation
<http://www.heritage.org/Research/EnergyandEnvironment/wm2705.cfm>
• “The “Kyoto II” Climate Change Treaty: Implications for American Sovereignty,”
by Steven Groves, The Heritage Foundation
<http://www.heritage.org/Research/EnergyandEnvironment/sr0072.cfm>
• “The EPA Tackles Greenhouse Gas,” by Ted Gayer, The Brookings Institution
<http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2009/1228_greenhouse_gas_gayer.aspx>
• “Offsets Chipping Away at the Cap,” by Ted Gayer, The Brookings Institution
<http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2009/0623_offsets_gayer.aspx>
• “When the Cap isn’t a Cap, the Trades Are a Charade,” by Kenneth P. Green,
American Enterprise Institute For Public Policy Research
<http://www.aei.org/article/100578>
Books
• “Carbon Markets An International Business Guide,” by Arnaud Brohé, Nick Eyre and
Nicholas Howarth with a Foreward by Nicholas Stern, (Earthscan 2009), ISBN: 9781844077274
• Leveling the Carbon Playing Field: International Competition and US Climate Policy
Design,” by Trevor Houser, Rob Bradley, Britt Childs, Jacob Werksman, and Robert Heilmayr,
(The Peter G. Peterson Institute for International Economics and the World Resources
Institute 2008), ISBN: 978-0-88132-420-4
• Carbon Finance: The Financial Implications of Climate Change, by Sonia Labatt and Rodney
R. White, (John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 2007), ISBN-13: 978-0-471-794677; ISBN-10: 0-471-79467-8
• International Trade and Climate Change: Economic, Legal, and Institutional Perspectives,
(Environment and Development Series) by The World Bank, (The International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank 2008), ISBN: 978-0-8213-7225-8
• Voluntary Carbon Markets: An International Business Guide to What They Are and How
They Work, (Environmental Markets Insight Series), second edition, by Ricardo Bayon,
Amanda Hawn, and Katherine Hamilton, editors, (Earthscan 2009), ISBN: 978-1-84407-561-4
• Carbon Tax and Cap-and-Trade Tools: Market-Based Approaches for Controlling Greenhouse
Gases (Climate Change and Its Causes, Effects and Prediction), Nelson E. Burney, editor,
(Nova Science Pub., Inc., January, 2010), ISBN-10: 1608761371 ISBN-13: 978-1608761371
• Unstoppable Global Warming: Every 1,500 Years, Updated and Expanded Edition,
by Fred Singer, ISBN 10: 0742551245
• A Primer on CO2 and Climate, 2nd Edition, by Howard C. Hayden, ISBN 10: 0971484562
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