Professional Documents
Culture Documents
L-12986
Held: Reversed.
manager,
and
supervisor,
respectively.
Private
respondents are spouses and the parents of Zhieneth
Aguilar (ZHIENETH), a six year old child.
In the afternoon of 9 May 1983, CRISELDA and
ZHIENETH were at the 2nd floor of Syvel's Department
Store, Makati City. CRISELDA was signing her credit
card slip at the payment and verification counter when
she felt a sudden gust of wind and heard a loud thud.
She looked behind her. She then beheld her daughter
ZHIENETH on the floor, her young body pinned by the
bulk of the store's gift-wrapping counter/structure.
ZHIENETH was crying and screaming for help. Although
shocked, CRISELDA was quick to ask the assistance of
the people around in lifting the counter and retrieving
ZHIENETH from the floor.
As a result, ZHIENETH died fourteen (14) days
after the accident or on 22 May 1983, on the hospital
bed.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether the death of ZHIENETH
was accidental or attributable to negligence? and
(2) Whether ZHIENETH, a six year old child and
CRISELDA can be held liable for contributory
negligence?
HELD: Petitioners omission and failure to act on the
previous observation of an employee of the counters
unsafe structure belies the claim of the petitioners that
what had happened is an accident.
An accident pertains to an unforeseen event in
which no fault or negligence attaches to the defendant.
Negligence, on the other hand, is "the failure to
observe, for the protection of the interest of another
person, that degree of care, precaution and vigilance
which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such
other person suffers injury.
As to the second issue, In our jurisdiction, a
person under nine years of age is conclusively
presumed to have acted without discernment, and is,
on that account, exempt from criminal liability.
Further, CRISELDA too, should be absolved
from any contributory negligence. Initially, ZHIENETH
held on to CRISELDA's waist, later to the latter's hand.
CRISELDA momentarily released the child's hand from
her clutch when she signed her credit card slip. At this
precise moment, it was reasonable and usual for
CRISELDA to let go of her child. Further, at the time
ZHIENETH was pinned down by the counter, she was
just a foot away from her mother; and the giftwrapping counter was just four meters away from
CRISELDA. The time and distance were both significant.
ZHIENETH was near her mother and did not loiter as
petitioners would want to impress upon us. She even
admitted to the doctor who treated her at the hospital
that she did not do anything; the counter just fell on
her.
G.R. No. 101683 February 23, 1995
LBC AIR CARGO, INC. FERNANDO M. YU and JAIME
TANO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, Fourth Division,
SHERWIN MONTEROLA y OYON-OYON,
represented by PATROCENIA GRONDIANO y
MONTEROLA, and PATROCENIA GRONDIANO y
MONTEROLA, respondents.
Facts: The case arose from a vehicular collision which
occurred at about 11:30 in the morning of 15
November 1987. Rogelio Monterola, a licensed driver,
was traveling on board his Suzuki motorcycle towards
RULING:
The court ruled that it was the truck
driver's negligence in failing to exert ordinary care to
avoid the collision which was, in law, the proximate
cause of the collision. The court had the occasion to
apply the doctrine of the last clear chance which
expound that the negligence of a claimant does not
preclude a recovery for the negligence of defendant
where it appears that the latter, by exercising
reasonable care and prudence, might have avoided
injurious consequences to claimant notwithstanding his
negligence. The doctrine applies only in a situation
where the plaintiff was guilty of prior or antecedent
negligence but the defendant, who had the last fair
chance to avoid the impending harm and failed to do
so, is made liable for all the consequences of the
accident notwithstanding the prior negligence of the
plaintiff. The subsequent negligence of the defendant
in failing to exercise ordinary care to avoid injury to
plaintiff becomes the immediate or proximate cause of
the accident which intervenes between the accident
and the more remote negligence of the plaintiff, thus
making the defendant liable to the plaintiff. Generally,
the last clear chance doctrine is invoked for the
purpose of making a defendant liable to a plaintiff who
was guilty of prior or antecedent negligence, although
it may also be raised as a defense to defeat claim (sic)
for damages. The court herein also imposed liability on
the private respondents as employers of the truck
driver under Article 2180 of the Civil Code are directly
and primarily liable for the resulting damages. The
presumption that they are negligent flows from the
negligence of their employee. That presumption,
however, is only juris tantum, not juris et de jure. Their
only possible defense is that they exercised all the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the
damage.
E. MERRITT vs. GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE
ISLANDS
[G.R. No. 11154. March 21, 1916.]
Facts: The plaintiff, riding on a motorcycle, was going
toward the western part of Calle Padre Faura. Upon
crossing Taft Avenue and was ten feet from the
southwestern intersection of said streets, the General
Hospital ambulance, upon reaching said avenue,
instead of turning toward the south turned
unexpectedly and struck the plaintiff. The plaintiff was
taken to the General Hospital on the very same day as
he was so severely injured.
The trial court ordered the Government of the
Philippine Islands to pay damages.
The Attorney-General on behalf of the
defendant urges that the Government of the Philippine
Islands is not liable for the damages sustained by the
plaintiff as a result of the collision, even if it be true
that collision was due to the negligence of the
chauffeur.
Issue: Whether or not the Government of the
Philippine Islands may be held liable for the act done
by the chauffeur.
Held: The Government of the Philippine Islands is not
liable.
The substantive law touching the defendant's
liability for the negligent acts of its officers, agents,
and employees can be found in paragraph 5 of article
1903 of the civil Code, which reads:
RULING:
The applicable law governing the rights
and liabilities of the parties herein is Article 1723 of the
New Civil Code, which provides:
Art. 1723. The engineer or architect who drew
up the plans and specifications for a building is liable
for damages if within fifteen years from the completion
of the structure the same should collapse by reason of
a defect in those plans and specifications, or due to the
defects in the ground. The contractor is likewise
responsible for the damage if the edifice fags within
the same period on account of defects in the
construction or the use of materials of inferior quality
furnished by him, or due to any violation of the terms
of the contract. If the engineer or architect supervises
the construction, he shall be solidarily liable with the
contractor.
Acceptance of the building, after completion,
does not imply waiver of any of the causes of action by
reason of any defect mentioned in the preceding
paragraph.
The action must be brought within ten years
following the collapse of the building.
On the other hand, the general rule is that no
person shall be responsible for events which could not
be foreseen or which though foreseen, were inevitable
(Article 1174, New Civil Code).
An act of God has been defined as an accident,
due directly and exclusively to natural causes without
human intervention, which by no amount of foresight,
pains or care, reasonably to have been expected, could
have been prevented. There is no dispute that the
earthquake of August 2, 1968 is a fortuitous event or
an act of God.
To exempt the obligor from liability under
Article 1174 of the Civil Code, for a breach of an
obligation due to an "act of God," the following must
concur:
The cause of the breach of the obligation must be
independent of the will of the debtor;
The event must be either unforseeable or
unavoidable;
The event must be such as to render it
impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a
normal manner; and
The debtor must be free from any participation
in, or aggravation of the injury to the creditor.
Thus it has been held that when the negligence
of a person concurs with an act of God in producing a
loss, such person is not exempt from liability by
showing that the immediate cause of the damage was
the act of God. To be exempt from liability for loss
because of an act of God, he must be free from any
previous negligence or misconduct by which that loss
or damage may have been occasioned.
The negligence of the defendant and the thirdparty defendants petitioners was established beyond
dispute both in the lower court and in the Intermediate
Appellate Court. Defendant United Construction Co.,
Inc. was found to have made substantial deviations
from the plans and specifications. and to have failed to
observe the requisite workmanship in the construction
as well as to exercise the requisite degree of
supervision; while the third-party defendants were
found to have inadequacies or defects in the plans and
specifications prepared by them.
As correctly assessed by both courts, the
defects in the construction and in the plans and
specifications were the proximate causes that rendered
HELD: Yes
RATIO:
Generally, malicious prosecution refers
to unfounded criminal actions and has been expanded
to include unfounded civil suits just to vex and
humiliate the defendant despite the absence of a
cause of action or probable cause. The foundation of
an action for malicious prosecution is an original
proceeding, judicial in character. A disbarment
proceeding is, without doubt, judicial in character and
therefore may be basis for a subsequent action for
malicious prosecution.
An action for damages arising from malicious
prosecution is anchored on the provisions of Articles
21, 2217 and 2219 of the New Civil Code.
Malice is essential to the maintenance of an
action for malicious prosecution and not merely to the
recovery of exemplary damages. Malice and want of
probable cause must both exist in order to justify
action. The general rule is well settled that one cannot
be held liable in damages for maliciously instituting a
prosecution where he acted with probable cause. In
other words, a suit will lie only in cases where a legal
prosecution had been carried on without probable
cause.
Rakes vs. Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Co.
No. 1719, January 23, 1907
FACTS: The plaintiff, one of the laborers in the
employment of the defendant, was at work
transporting iron rails from a barge in the harbor to the
companys yard in Manila. Plaintiff claims that only
one car was used in this work. The defendant,
however, has proved that they were two immediately
following one another, upon which were piled
lengthwise seven rails, each weighing 560 pounds, so
that the ends of the rails projected beyond the cars
both in front and behind. The rails lay upon two
crosspieces secured to the cars, but without side
pieces or guards to prevent them from slipping off.
According to the plaintiff, the men were either
in the rear of the car or at its sides. The defendant, on
the other hand, contends that some of them were also
in front, hauling by a rope. At a certain spot at or near
the waters edge the track sagged, the tie broke, the
car either canted or upset, the rails slid off and caught
the plaintiff. As a result, the plaintiff broke his leg
which was afterwards amputated at about the knee.
The trial court found that the dislodging of the
crosspiece or piling under the stringer by the water of
the bay raised by a recent typhoon was the cause of
the sagging of the track and the breaking of the tie,
which was the immediate occasion of the accident. A
fellow-worker of the plaintiff testified that a day before
the accident, he called the attention of the foreman
and asked the latter to have it repaired. It has not
been proved that the company inspected the track
after the typhoon or had any proper system of
inspection. It is upon the failure of the defendant to
repair the weakened track, after notice of its condition,
that the trial court based its judgment.
ISSUE: Whether or not a criminal action is the proper
remedy for injuries through negligence.
Whether or not there was contributory
negligence on the part of the plaintiff which caused his
injury.
Whether or not the plaintiff may recover
damages if he is guilty of contributory negligence.
but they did not cut off from the plant the flow of
electricity along the lines. They could have done this
pending inspection of the wires. Likewise, they did not
take the necessary precaution to eliminate the source
of danger to the electric line, knowing that tall banana
plants were standing on elevated ground and which
were higher than the electric post. The Court also took
note of the negligence of Cipriano Baldomero. He being
an employee of the electric plant and aware of the live
cut wire, he did not take the necessary precaution to
prevent anybody from approaching the place.
witnessed that the dog bit Theness. After trial, the CFI
of Cebu sustained the defendants and dismissed the
complaint.
On appeal, the respondent court arrived at a
different conclusion ruling that the Vestils were in
possession of the house and the dog and so should be
responsible under Article 2183 of the Civil Code for the
injuries caused by the dog. It also held that the child
died as a result of the dog bites and not from causes
independent thereof a submitted by the appellees. The
respondent court ordered the Vestils to pay for
damages and for the death of Theness.
Issue: Are the Vestils liable for damages as possessor
of an animal causing damage to another under Article
2183 of the Civil Code?
Ruling:YES. The Vestils are liable for damages under
Article 2183 of the Civil Code.
The Court held that the evidence of the childs
hydrophobia (based on the medical report and
testimony under oath of Dr. Tautjo) is sufficient to
convince it that she died because she was bitten by the
dog even if the death certificate stated a different
cause of death.
The Court further held that the petitioners
contention that they could not be expected to exercise
remote control of the dog is not acceptable. In fact,
Article 2183 of the Civil Code holds the possessor liable
even if the animal should escape or be lost and so be
removed from his control. And it does not matter either
that, as the petitioners contend, the dog was tame and
was merely provoked by the child into biting her. The
law does not speak only of vicious animals but covers
even tame ones as long as they cause injury. As for the
alleged provocation, the petitioners forgot that
Theness was only three years old at the time she was
attacked and can hardly be faulted for whatever she
might have done to the animal.