Restrictions on Hand Carriage of Liquids,

Aerosols and Gels Challenges Faced

Abstract
There are many security threats to civil aviation operations and one of them that came to the
fore was in August 2006 when terrorists hatched an alleged plot to destroy several airliners
while flying across the Atlantic Ocean using liquid explosives. That incident drew many
immediate responses and reactions towards minimizing and trying to prevent the occurrence
of such attacks. However, the immediate measures imposed resulted in many operational,
security and facilitation problems for airlines, airports, security screeners, passengers, and
airport retailers. To address these concerns, a number of States and the International Civil
Aviation Organization (ICAO) developed a set of security guidelines to provide all
stakeholders with a way to keep up security whilst at the same time facilitate the needs of
passengers and airports. Although these guidelines can only serve as interim solutions, they
are nonetheless, useful compared to a situation where stakeholders only rely on unilateral
measures to try to address the complexity of issues and procedures, which can be chaotic.
The adoption of these guidelines as a common approach by a number of States was an
encouraging sign. It showed that States could harmonies approaches, measures and
procedures for global security issues if they had the will to do so. This should be encouraged
and the guidelines recommended by ICAO to allow the hand carriage of liquids, aerosols and
gels (LAGs) should be further promoted for adoption by all States until a more permanent,
practical and cost-effective solution can be found. Meanwhile, some States have embarked on
developing possible technological solutions and liquid explosive scanning systems with the
aim of attaining that lasting solution. While this is indeed useful, all stakeholders will have to
overcome some challenges to the deployment of both the hardware and the software, plus
addressing the human factors, for such technological solutions to be feasible.

1.INTRODUCTION
In August 2006, British security authorities uncovered an alleged plot by a group of terrorists
to destroy civil aircraft over the Atlantic Ocean flying between the UK and US using liquid
explosives. This alleged plot was not the first time where terrorists had thought of using
liquid explosives to destroy civil aircraft in flight1. In 1994, terrorists linked to the
mastermind of the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Centre in New York City, Ramsey
Yusouf, ignited a nitroglycerin bomb on board a Philippines Airlines flight from Manila to
Tokyo (Narita Airport) via Cebu, in which one person was killed.
However, the August 2006 incident led to the swift imposition of restrictions on hand carried
liquid items on air travelers in some States. In November 2006, the European Union (EU)
introduced a ban on hand carriage of LAGs on passengers making transfer connections from
non European Union (EU) airports through EU airports. The restrictions were for Liquids,
Aerosols and Gels (LAGs) items of more than 100 millimeters (ml) such as duty free liquor,

perfumes and even drinking water that were purchased from the non-EU airport where the
passengers flight had originated from. At the EU airports, passengers with hand carried
LAGs items of more than 100ml making transfer connections would have to dispose of the
LAGs items at the security checkpoint before boarding their onward flight. In the case of the
EU, its restrictions on LAGs, which were passed under law, would not apply to passengers
originating from one EU airport with hand carried LAGs items purchased from that airport,
when making transfer connections at another EU airport. This was because the 27 EU
member States adopted a common set of security measures that was commonly accepted and
recognized amongst the EU member States. The measures for LAGs items of above 100ml
sold at retail shops in EU airports were primarily centered on such items being sealed for
hand carriage in a security tamper-evident bag (STEB).
Aside from the EU, many States followed suit to impose restrictions on the hand carriage of
LAGs items above 100ml on passengers making transfer connections at their airports. One
State even went further to impose a ban on passengers carrying LAGs items of more than
100ml when arriving into its airports, regardless of whether the passenger was making an
onward transfer connection.
The common arrangement that was adopted by many States was for personal LAGs items
which the passengers would need during their flight. Such items would include toiletries and
medication which could be carried onboard the flight so long as each item was kept in
containers no more than 100ml and all such containers can fit into a one-litre resealable
transparent plastic bag.

THE SITUATION
The result of these restrictions imposed at many airports around the world was an array of
mass confusion, conflicting procedures and massive wastage arising from the confiscation
and mandatory disposal of LAGs items of more than 100ml at airport security screening
points. This created an environmentally unfriendly situation at many airports where large
quantities of confiscated liquids, including liquor and cosmetics, had to be discarded daily.
In the initial months following the August 2006 incident in the UK, and with airports
imposing LAGs restrictions in an ad-hoc and non-uniformed manner, many passengers were
gripped with confusion. They were unsure whether they could carry LAGs of above 100ml
onboard their flights. In many cases, such items of above 100ml were permitted for carriage
on the flight at the airport of origin. However, there was no assurance that the same item
could be hand carried at the airport where the passenger was making a transfer or transit
connection. In some airports, the retail outlets selling LAGs items of more than 100ml, such
as duty free liquor and cosmetics, would seal the items in a STEB. The passenger could then
carry this item as sealed in the STEB to board the flight and make transfer connections if the
transfer airport permitted and accepted the STEB as a form of security measure to
authenticate that the LAGs item being hand carried by the passenger was harmless and had
not been tampered with. The state of confusion was indeed significant. In many airports,
transfer passengers could not comprehend nor could they accept that their LAGs items
purchased from the retail shops at the airport of origin had to be discarded at the transfer
airport, in some cases even though the LAGs item had been sealed in a STEB. The situation
was made worse when the same item being discarded could be bought at the airport where the
passenger was making the transfer connection.
Airport security screeners also found themselves in a quagmire. Aside from their primary
duty of screening passengers to ensure that they do not carry weapons and explosives onto

the aircraft, the screeners now had to pay close attention to check on whether passengers were
carrying their LAGs items for personal use onboard the flight in one-litre transparent plastic
bags. They also had to sieve out LAGs items of more than 100ml for disposal (in many
airports) or to assess whether they are allowed through the airport security screening point,
according to the airports security restrictions. These added stress on to many airport security
screeners.
Airport retailers faced challenges especially when selling LAGs items above 100ml. On one
hand, they would want to carry on selling such items as usual. But they also did not want to
have the passengers buying these items, only to have these items confiscated at the airport
security screening points as a result of the varying LAGs restrictions and rules imposed by
different countries. Retailers had to make a conscious effort to provide the passengers with as
accurate advice as possible, whether they could hand carry the LAGs item through the airport
where the passengers would be making their transfer connections. Some retailers also had to
ascertain whether the LAGs items needed to be sealed in STEBs before selling them to the
passengers. All these also added to the level of uncertainty and confusion faced by passengers
and the airport community.
Needless to say, the airlines were equally inconvenienced. Some States imposed onto the
airlines the responsibility of ensuring that passengers did not flout the LAGs restrictions. For
instance, some States made it incumbent on the airlines to sieve out LAGs items not sealed in
STEBs prior to boarding of the passengers at the preceding airports. In many cases, the
airlines also had to advise passengers to note the restrictions imposed at various airports so
that passengers would make a considered decision before purchasing LAGs of above 100ml
through the airlines inflight sales

2. PROBLEM DOMAIN
ADDRESSING THE ISSUE GLOBALLY
Given the chaotic situation, many regulators, retailers and other organizations such as retail
associations, explored various avenues to try to find common and workable solutions to
minimize the inconvenience faced by all stakeholders and passengers. However, there was
ultimately the need for a universal and global solution, where a set of harmonized measures
could be adopted at all airports so that passengers could continue to carry LAGs items, both
for personal use on the flight and for LAGs items purchased at airport shops, without having
these items confiscated midway through their journey.
Many States and stakeholders raised the issue to the attention of ICAO and sought for ICAO
to develop a set of universal and harmonized measures that could be applied across all
airports. In December 2006, ICAO issued a letter to all States recommending a set of
measures for the carriage of LAGs items for personal use by passengers while on the flight.
Following that, ICAO also held at least two meetings involving aviation security experts to
further refine and develop the guidelines on the security measures to facilitate the carriage of
LAGs items by air travelers. The efforts by ICAO resulted in the development of further
guidelines including specifications for security tamper evident bags for use by airport
retailers for the sale of LAGs of more than 100ml, such as liquor and cosmetics. Through two
more State Letters, ICAO further provided these guidance, as well as recommended
measures, for airport retailers selling LAGs items to enhance the security of the supply chain.
These efforts by ICAO were much welcomed and gave regulators, airport operators, security
agencies and retailers a set of common and universal guidelines to follow. The aim was to

ensure that the relevant security concerns were addressed, yet with minimal inconvenience to
passengers and security screening personnel.
These guidelines resulted in some positive developments and agreements between States in
allowing transfer passengers to hand carry LAGs items, especially those above 100ml sealed
in STEBs, when making transfer connections at each others airports. With the issuance of
these guidelines, many regulators, airport operators and retailers started approving or
adopting the use of STEBs for the security of hand carried LAGs of more than 100ml sold at
airport shops by air travellers4. For instance, to date, the European Commission has entered
into an arrangement to mutually allow such LAGs items of above 100ml to be hand carried
by passengers originating from Singapore and Croatia who are making transfer connections
through EU airports. These are clear and encouraging signs that harmonization of measures
and practices on the carriage of LAGs items can be achieved amongst States through
universal guidelines developed and promulgated by ICAO.
However, despite the development of the ICAO guidelines, there are still a number of airports
that have yet to implement measures on the carriage of LAGs items. For instance, in some
airports, retailers do not use STEBs for the carriage of LAGs items of above 100ml. These
would result in the passengers being unable to hand carry the said item when making transfer
connections at a foreign airport, with the item likely to be discarded or confiscated. Some
States also continue to impose a unilateral ban on LAGs items above 100ml that are hand
carried into their airports by passengers on arrival, regardless of whether or not the
passengers would be making onward transfer connections to another destination. Yet in some
airports, the regulators require that the airport retailers deliver the LAGs items of more than
100ml to the passengers at the boarding gate for the passengers to carry onto the flight, i.e.
the passengers are not allowed to hand carry the LAGs items by themselves from the point of
sale at the airport shop to the aircraft. The airport shops would thus have to engage additional
resources to deliver the LAGs items to the passengers at the boarding gate.
Then there are also different practices in different airports regarding the carriage of LAGs
that adds to the ambiguity faced by passengers. For instance, some airports do not allow
passengers to carry empty liquid containers into the aircraft cabin, while some other airports
do. In some airports, the passengers are asked to taste the liquids that they are carrying to
verify its authenticity, while in others they are not required to do so. All these show that there
is still room for improvement across States to work towards a globally uniform and
harmonized approach towards managing the security restrictions and facilitation of the
carriage of LAGs by air travelers.

3. SOLUTION DOMAIN
IS TECHNOLOGY THE SOLUTION?
Since the events of August 2006, a number of States and security technology companies have
been exploring and looking at developing liquid explosive scanners that could hopefully
provide a practical solution at all airports. To date, a number of liquid explosive scanners
have already been developed in Japan, China, US and Russia, just to name a few. But these
scanners have not been deployed across airports on a wide scale. The US Transportation
Security Administration (TSA) is also conducting some trials at selected US airports to test
new prototype liquid explosive scanners that are being designed for use in a live airport
environment5. Other similar tests are being planned or being carried out in Europe. In August

2009, the President of the ICAO Council, Mr. Roberto Kobeh Gonzalez, said that ICAO was
also in the process of evaluating the effectiveness and practical application of such scanners
in detecting LAGs that could be used as explosives to threaten civil aviation operations. He
added, on an optimistic note, that the new measures using such new liquid explosive scanners
at airports could possibly be introduced as early as 20106.

4. SYSTEM DOMAIN
There is no doubt that technology will provide a superior method to help security screeners at
airports across the world detect liquid explosives to weed out such threats. The use of
technology has proven to be useful as seen in the development and deployment of explosive
detection x-ray systems in many airports today to screen hold luggage for explosive items. If
the same could be done to screen liquids, where the scanners are able to detect liquid
explosives swiftly and accurately, hence enhancing both security and facilitation, it would
certainly raise the level of security and efficiency at all airports. Passengers would also not
have to suffer the inconveniences that they had faced, and in some airports, continue to face,
and to have their LAGs items confiscated and discarded even if the items were not liquid
explosives but bonafide LAGs items purchased from airport shops.

5. APPLICATION DOMAIN
CHALLENGES
There will, however, be some challenges which all stakeholders are likely to face in the quest
towards developing and employing new security screening technology to screen for liquid
explosives at airports. These include:

Accuracy and Speed of Detection

Given the high volume of passengers and demands for fast throughput, and to meet airport
minimum connecting times to ensure efficiency and on-time departures, the liquid explosive
scanners would have to be able to scan and detect such materials swiftly and accurately.
Otherwise, such scanners would add on to the security processing times at airport security
screening points, and may bring about more inconveniences. False alarm rates of such
detection equipment should also be kept to a very low level so as to avoid security screening
personnel having to resolve many false alarms through secondary checks.

Availability of Scanning Equipment

It would not be possible for all airports around the world to implement such liquid explosives
scanning equipment quickly, when an ideal system has been developed for use at airports.
There will be issues which ICAO would need to resolve, such as detection and system
standards, so that airports would be able to at least apply and adopt a baseline standard when
employing such equipment (the airports could, of course, employ equipment that go beyond
the baseline level if they wish). It will certainly take time for equipment manufacturers to
produce the expected high numbers of scanning equipment to meet the demands of many
airports worldwide. There will also be the issue of whether States and airports have the
financial means to procure and deploy such scanning equipment quickly and in large
numbers.

Man-Machine Interface
Procuring and installing liquid explosive scanning equipment at airports would be just a first
step. The next critical step is to ensure that airport security screeners using the scanners are
properly trained to operate them accurately. The scanners would also need to be well
maintained for maximum effectiveness. These will take time to be achieved effectively.

The Interim
Assuming that an ideal liquid explosive scanner will be successfully developed for use in a
high human volume airport environment that also meets the demands of speed and accuracy,
regulators, airport security screeners, passengers and stakeholders will have to manage an
interim period straddling across the current measures (i.e. use of STEBs for LAGS above
100ml) and the use of new scanning equipment. This interim period could well be in the form
of the originating airport using new scanning technology, but the transfer airport has not yet
employed similar scanning technology. This would suggest that in the interim period,
regulators, security screeners, passengers and airport retailers would still have to implement
the current measures, whilst phasing in the use of new liquid explosive scanners. This can
possibly lead to some degree of confusion again and it would have to be carefully managed
and well coordinated at the operational level.

6. FEASIBILITY STUDY
Complete detail study of how and why Restrictions on Hand Carriage of
Liquids, Aerosols and Gels was put and was taken so seriously.
The 2006 transatlantic aircraft plot was a terrorist plot to detonate liquid explosives carried on
board seven airliners travelling from the United Kingdom to the United States and Canada.
The plot was discovered and foiled by British police before it could be carried out and, as a
result, unprecedented security measures were immediately put in place.

The restrictions were gradually relaxed in the following weeks, but passengers were still not
allowed to carry containers with more than 100ml of liquids onto commercial aircraft as of
2016.
Of the approximately 24 suspects who were arrested in and around London on the night of 9
August 2006, eleven were charged with terrorism offences on 21 August, two on 25 August
(subsequently discharged on 1 November), and a further three on 30 August. Eight men
(Ahmed Abdullah Ali, Assad Sarwar, Tanvir Hussain, Oliver Savant, Arafat Khan, Waheed
Zaman, Umar Islam, Mohammed Gulzar) were charged in connection with the plot. The trial
began in April 2008 and ended in September. The jury failed to reach a verdict on charges of
conspiracy to kill by blowing up aircraft, but the court did find three guilty of conspiracy to
murder. In September 2009, a second trial (of the eight men excluding Gulzar but with the
addition of Donald Stewart-Whyte) found Ali, Sarwar, and Hussain guilty of the plot.
In July 2010, Ibrahim Savant, Arafat Khan and Waheed Zaman were found guilty at
Woolwich Crown Court and sentenced to life in prison for conspiracy to murder. They must
serve a minimum of 20 years in prison before being eligible for release.

Surveillance
In Pakistan, a British man from Birmingham named Rashid Rauf is believed to have put
plotters in touch with al-Qaeda's leadership. When Ahmed Ali, who was under police
surveillance, returned from Pakistan in June 2006, investigators covertly opened his baggage.
Inside they found a powdered soft drinkTangand a large number of batteries, which
raised suspicions; in the following weeks the police mounted the UK's largest surveillance
operation, calling on an additional 220 officers from other forces.
Assad Sarwar (from High Wycombe) was seen buying items that did not appear to fit with his
daily needs, and which may have had a potentially deadly context. On one occasion
surveillance officers watched him dispose of empty hydrogen peroxide bottles at a recycling
center. Sarwar and Ali were seen meeting in an east London park. When MI5 covertly entered
a flat being used by Ali, they found what appeared to be a bomb factory. They placed a
camera and microphone; on 3 August Ali and Tanvir Husain were seen constructing devices
out of drink bottles. Surveillance officers watched Ali spend two hours in an Internet cafe
researching flight timetables.

Arrests
On 9 August 2006, British police arrested 24 suspects. The arrests were made in London,
Birmingham, and High Wycombe, Buckinghamshire, in an overnight operation. Two of the
arrests were made in the Birmingham area, where firearms officers were not involved, and
five were made in High Wycombe. The key suspects were British-born Muslims, some of
Pakistani descent.[7][8][9] Three of the suspects were recent converts to Islam.
Nineteen of the suspects had their finances frozen. Seventeen of the suspects were later
charged with conspiracy to murder and commit acts of terrorism or failing to disclose
information about acts of terrorism. Eight of the suspects were released without charge.
Another seven suspects were arrested in Pakistan on charges related to the alleged plot.
Police said they had been observing this plot for months, and that the "investigation reached a
critical point last night (9 August 2006) when the decision was made to take urgent action in
order to disrupt what we believe was being planned." An undercover British agent had

infiltrated the group, according to American government sources. According to Franco

Frattini, the European Commissioner for Justice, Freedom & Security, "the plotters received a
very short message to 'Go now. However, it was not clear when the attacks were supposed
to have been launched, and the New York Times has since reported that the plans were at an
earlier stage than was initially stated.
British authorities carried out a total of 69 searches of residences, businesses, vehicles and
open spaces, which netted bomb-making equipment and chemicals such as hydrogen
peroxide, Deputy Assistant Commissioner Peter Clarke said on 21 August 2006. "As well as
the bomb-making equipment, we have found more than 400 computers, 200 mobile
telephones and 8,000 items of removable storage media such as memory sticks, CDs and
DVDs," he said. "So far, from the computers alone, we have removed some 6,000 gigabytes
of data." It will take "many months" for investigators to analyze all of the data, he said. Police
said they found a list of flights on a memory stick belonging to Mr. Ali following his arrest.
The memory stick allegedly listed scheduled flights from three carriers American Airlines,
United Airlines and Air Canada.

Disagreement over when to make the arrests

NBC News reported disagreement between the United States and the United Kingdom over
when to make the arrests. According to NBC News, a senior British official contended that an
attack was not imminent, noting that the suspects had not yet purchased airline tickets and
some did not even have passports; he urged that the investigation continue to collect more
evidence. The report noted that this official's statement was contrary to statements by other
British officials previously reported in the press.
The same source also told NBC News that the United States had threatened to use
extraordinary rendition upon suspected ringleader Rashid Rauf in Pakistan, or to pressure the
Pakistan government to arrest him, if he were not immediately taken into custody. A United
States official acknowledged this disagreement over the timing of arrests and that a British
official believed that an attack was not imminent. However, Frances Townsend, Assistant to
the President for Homeland Security, denied the report of a dispute: "There was no
disagreement between US and UK officials."
In Ron Suskind's The Way of the World (2008), Dick Cheney is reported to have "ordered"
the arrest of Rauf in Pakistan in August 2006, apparently with a view to providing "good
news" ahead of the US 2006 mid-term elections.

The alleged plot

Responsibility.
Paul Beaver, a British terrorism expert, said that it appeared possible that the militant Islamic
organization al-Qaeda was behind the plot, which was to take place only weeks after the
group threatened to attack British aviation. United States Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) Secretary Chertoff stated the plot, which was "getting close to the execution phase",
was "suggestive of an al-Qaeda plot".

Liquid explosives
The plotters planned to use peroxide-based liquid explosives.[9] US authorities named two
peroxides that could be used: acetone peroxide (TATP) and hexamethylene triperoxide
diamine (HMTD). These "are sensitive to heat, shock, and friction, can be initiated simply
with fire or electrical charge, and can also be used to produce improvised detonators."
Metropolitan Police sources confirmed that the plot involved TATP. According to the New
York Times, the plotters wanted to use HMTD.
During the trial of the conspirators the prosecution stated that each alleged bomber would
board a plane with the "necessary ingredients and equipment". They would then construct the
devices mid-flight and detonate them. The alleged bombs would include 500 ml plastic
bottles of the Oasis and Lucozade soft drinks. A sugary drink powder, Tang, would be mixed
with hydrogen peroxide to colour the liquid to resemble a normal soft drink. Hydrogen
peroxide is widely available for use as hair bleach and along with the other ingredients can
become explosive if mixed to a specific strength. The mixture would be injected into a bottle
with the help of a syringe. The bottle's cap would not have been removed and the hole would
have been resealed, thereby allowing the device to resemble a normal drink bottle when
screened by airport security. The use of liquid explosives with dissolved powder is similar to
the composition used in the 21 July 2005 London bombings, using hydrogen peroxide and
chapatti flour, activated by a detonator.
A second substance, a type of high explosive, would be hidden within an AA battery casing;
this small explosive charge detonate the main bomb. The charge would be detonated by
linking the bottle of explosives to a light bulb and a disposable camera. The charge from the
camera's flash unit would be enough to trigger the explosion.
On 28 August 2006 the New York Times reported that seven martyrdom tapes made by six
suspects were recovered. This was confirmed by prosecution during the subsequent trial.

Airports planned to be affected

United Kingdom.

London Heathrow Airport, London, England

Targeted flights

United States

San Francisco International Airport, San Francisco, California

O'Hare International Airport, Chicago, Illinois
Dulles International Airport, Washington, D.C.

 John F. Kennedy International Airport, New York City, New York

Canada.
Pierre Elliott Trudeau International Airport, Montreal, Canada
Lester B. Pearson International Airport, Toronto, Canada

Flights targeted
The court reviewing the case heard from prosecutors that the suspects did not restrict
themselves to the following flights; the prosecutors said that the suspects talked about
including 18 suicide bombers and that they examined Denver, Boston, and Miami as
destinations to target possibly along with the other flights.

United Airlines Flight 931 to San Francisco departing at 14:15 on a Boeing 777

Air Canada Flight 849 to Toronto-Pearson departing at 15:00 on an Airbus

A330[24]

Air Canada Flight 865 to Montreal-Trudeau departing at 15:15 on an Airbus

A330[24]

United Airlines Flight 959 to Chicago-O'Hare departing at 15:40 on a Boeing

777

United Airlines Flight 925 to Washington-Dulles departing at 16:20 on a Boeing

777

American Airlines Flight 131 to New York-JFK departing at 16:35 on a Boeing

777
American Airlines Flight 91 to Chicago-O'Hare departing at 16:50 on a Boeing 777

Pakistan's role.
Initial reactions praised Pakistan's assistance in stopping the plot before its execution.
However, later press reports have questioned Pakistan's claimed commitment to the War on
Terrorism.
Other press reports that the alleged bombers were funded by "charities" intended to help
victims of the 2005 Kashmir earthquake. The FBI and Scotland Yard investigated links to
militants and the flow of money to the conspirators. Pakistan and international press also
reported that Rashid Rauf, the key player in the plot, had links with the Jaish-e-Mohammed, a
Kashmir militant group banned by several countries. Media reports state that he has close
family ties to Maulana Masood Azhar, one of the most wanted criminals in India.
In Pakistan, law enforcement authorities continued to interrogate Rashid Rauf, a Briton of
Pakistani descent, over his alleged key role in the plot. Pakistani Interior Minister Aftab Khan
Sherpao said British police were conducting inquiries in Pakistan but were not involved in
questioning Rauf. The UK Foreign Office sought Rauf's extradition from Pakistan, and it was
reported that Pakistan plans to accept the request. However, in mid-December 2006, terrorism
charges against Rauf were dropped by a Pakistani judge, who ruled there was a lack of
evidence. Rauf's case was transferred from a terrorism court to a regular court where he faced
lesser charges including forgery. The charges were later dropped, and Rauf was reported
killed in a US drone attack in Pakistan in November 2008.

Political reaction.
Prior to the arrests, the plot was discussed at a high level of government; Prime Minister
Tony Blair knew about it for months, and alerted President George W. Bush to the
investigation on Sunday 6 August 2006.
On 9 August, hours before the arrests, Home Secretary John Reid gave a major speech to
Demos (a British think-tank) hinting at a new round of anti-terror legislation and claiming
that the country was facing "probably the most sustained period of severe threat since the end
of the second world war. The following day Reid broke the news along with Douglas
Alexander, the Transport Secretary.

Public announcement
On 10 August 2006 the Deputy Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, Paul Stephenson,
said that the plot, aimed to destroy as many as ten aircraft in mid-flight from the United
Kingdom to the United States, using explosives brought on board in the suspects' hand
luggage, was disrupted.(9)News media reported that planned targets included American
Airlines, British Airways, Continental Airlines, and United Airlines flights from London
Heathrow and London Gatwick airports to Chicago, Illinois; Los Angeles; Miami; Orlando,
Florida; Boston; Newark, New Jersey; New York City; San Francisco; Cleveland, Ohio and
Washington, D.C.Air Canada flights were also included, with destinations being Montreal
and Toronto. BBC security correspondent Gordon Corera said the plot involved a series of
simultaneous attacks, targeting three planes each time. Reports vary regarding the number of
planes involved, ranging from three to twelve. In a press release, the United States Secretary
of Homeland Security, Michael Chertoff, said "multiple commercial aircraft" were targeted.
Some reports say the attacks were planned for 16 August, but police said no evidence
specifying the date had been found. British officials later stated that the estimate of ten
aircraft was "speculative and exaggerated."
In the United States, the announcement was made during a joint press conference by the
Secretary of Homeland Security Michael Chertoff, the Attorney General Alberto Gonzales,
the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration Kip Hawley and the Director
of the FBI Robert Mueller. Chertoff refused to be drawn on questions about the design of the
devices or whether any bombs had actually been built.
On the same day, President George W. Bush commented upon arrival in Wisconsin: "The
recent arrests that our fellow citizens are now learning about are a stark reminder that this
nation is at war with Islamic fascists who will use any means to destroy those of us who love
freedom, to hurt our nation."

Responses

On 12 August, British Muslim groups sent an open letter to the Prime Minister, stating that
"current British government policy risks putting civilians at increased risk both in the UK and
abroad. Many such groups and even certain sectors of UK government have suggested that
(among other factors) the foreign policy position of the United Kingdom in places such as
Palestine, Lebanon, Afghanistan and Iraq is to a large extent responsible for the increasing
radicalization of young Muslims in the UK, thus promoting the possibility of actions like the
7 July 2005 London bombings. The letter also states "Attacking civilians is never justified",
and encourages the UK to reassess its foreign policy in order to maintain the safety of

individuals both in the UK and abroad. In interviews with the BBC, John Reid described the
letter as "a dreadful misjudgment", and former Conservative leader Michael Howard
described it as "a form of blackmail".
Prime Minister Tony Blair was on holiday during these events, but decided not to return to
the UK. Blair had been notified of the raid prior to its occurrence, and kept in constant
contact with officials. He briefed President George W. Bush about the raid overnight.[
Britain's Deputy Prime Minister, John Prescott, nominally running the UK government
during Tony Blair's holiday, paid tribute to the way the UK reacted to what he called an
"extraordinary past 36 hours in the efforts to protect this country". He expressed his
"deepest appreciation" to the "real dedication" shown by security services, police, transport
staff and aviation companies and praised Home Secretary Dr John Reid and Transport
Secretary Douglas Alexander. Prescott added that the British public had acted "calmly,
sensitively and with great patience."

Scepticism in response to the arrests

Several commentators expressed scepticism over the allegations.Many mentioned the Forest
Gate raid, the shooting of Jean Charles de Menezes and the Iraq War, all based on
intelligence that turned out to be wrong, as reasons for their doubts. Muslim sections of the
British population were also reportedly skeptical that the plot was carried out by other
Muslims.
Former UK ambassador to Uzbekistan Craig Murray was skeptical of the account of the plot.
He based his criticism on the facts that "None of the alleged terrorists had made a bomb.
None had bought a plane ticket. Many did not have passports." He also suggested that
suspected ringleader Rashid Rauf invented the plot under torture in Pakistan.
The Register ran a story on the practicalities of producing TATP on board an aeroplane from
constituent liquids and concluded that, while theoretically possible, the chances of success
would be extremely low. Later, following additional details revealed at the trial The Register
wrote that the plot and bombing method chosen was viable.
Lieutenant-Colonel Nigel Wylde, a former senior British Army Intelligence Officer with
decades of anti-terror and explosives experience, declared the plot to be "fiction", an
invention of the UK security services in order to justify wide-ranging new security measures
that threaten to permanently curtail civil liberties. He said the explosives in question could
not possibly have been produced on the plane.

Security reaction
London Heathrow Airport
In the immediate aftermath of the first arrests, passenger rules were amended for flights
between the United States and the United Kingdom to make all liquids (apart from baby
milk) forbidden, including beverages, hair gels, toothpaste, lipstick, sunscreen, and hand
lotions, due to the suspicion that liquids were planned to be used in the attacks. Since
passengers may purchase beverages after passing regular airport checkpoints, gate

checkpoints were also implemented at many American airports, such as Boston's Logan
International Airport.

United Kingdom
Following the raids, the terror alert level was raised by the Joint Terrorist Analysis Centre
from 'severe' to 'critical', signaling an attack was believed to be imminent, although this was
only done after the raid. On 14 August 2006 the threat level was reduced from 'Critical' to
'Severe'.
In the immediate aftermath of the raids, no hand luggage was allowed except for a very few
essentials such as travel documents and wallets. Hand baggage was reintroduced at some
smaller airports on 14 August, but was not permitted at Heathrow and Gatwick Airports until
15 August. The size of baggage was restricted to 45 cm 35 cm 16 cm, but this was
increased to 56 cm 45 cm 25 cm as of 22 September 2006.
Despite having made it clear in August that the unprecedented security measures were "here
to stay", at the end of September, upon pressure from the industry representatives and
professional musicians, the British government relaxed the restrictions on size to the aviation
industry standard (56 cm 45 cm 25 cm) and allowed musical instruments as carry-on
luggage. On 6 November 2006 the restrictions were relaxed once again to allow limited
amounts of liquids in the cabin.
In November 2007 Transport Secretary Ruth Kelly announced that from 8 January 2008
British airports will be able to allow more than one item of hand luggage on board. This was
following criticism in October by the shadow transport secretary Theresa Villiers, who said
that because of the restrictive rules, Heathrow was "rapidly becoming a national
embarrassment". Chief executive of British Airways Willie Walsh was also critical, saying
that they are "damaging the UK's reputation around the world from a business perspective.
However, the implementation of this new rule is subject to the discretion of the individual
airports, and at some airports, differs depending on the airline travelled with.

United States.
Following the operation, United States Homeland Security banned all liquids and gels except
baby formula and prescription medications in the name of the ticket holder in carry-on
luggage on all flights. The DHS level in the United States was raised to 'severe' (red) for all
flights from the UK. The terror level for all other domestic or non-British international flights
to the United States was raised to High (orange).
As of 13 August 2006, airline passengers in the United States could take up to 3.4 US fl oz
(101 ml) of non-prescription medicine, glucose gel for diabetics, solid lipstick, and baby food
aboard flights. The TSA also began demanding that passengers remove their shoes so they
may be X-rayed before boarding.

Eventually, it became that passengers are allowed only a certain amount of liquid aboard an
aircraft in carry-on luggage. The restrictions do not apply to checked luggage. Liquids that
measure 100 ml (3.5 imp fl oz; 3.4 US fl oz) or less are allowed, including aerosols. Another
stipulation applies to the total size of each container (no larger than 3 oz), regardless of the
total volume of the liquid. TSA standards require all non-medical liquids of appropriate
volume be confined to a quart-sized plastic bag, with only one such bag allowed per
passenger. Any non-medical (also called exemptible) liquids that do not fit in the bag are not
permitted. This means that if the plastic bag is full, any excess liquids cannot be taken in
carry-on. TSA officers are required to inform passengers of their options for excess liquids or
liquids over the quantity limit. These are:
Return to the air carrier ticketing counter and place a luggage item with the liquids into
checked luggage.
Return the liquid(s) to the passenger's vehicle, if able.
If a non-traveling companion is available, the liquids may be turned over to them, provided
they are not entering the secured areas of the airport.
Surrender the liquid(s) to the TSA for disposal. (Note: if a companion is accompanying the
passenger to the boarding gate, the companion is not able to leave his or her liquids with the
TSA for retrieval by the non-ticketed companion)

Effect
Overall, an estimated 400,000 passengers were affected because of the alerts. It has been
estimated that the first day of delays cost the airlines over 175 million.
As many as 20,000 bags are believed to have been misplaced at Heathrow.

Flight cancellations on 10 August.

All international inbound flights to London Heathrow Airport were cancelled on the day of
the arrests, most notably the Thursday short-haul flights of British Airways. Some of the last
international inbound flights to arrive, had landed at 7am and were immediately told to
reclaim their baggage. Some flights to and from London Gatwick Airport were also
suspended, although US Airways flights continued flying normally from Gatwick according
to the airline's helpline. Passengers (connecting flights and non-connecting flights) in London
Heathrow were asked to collect their luggage and wait until further notice. Later on that
evening, some flights had resumed. Shorter flights as far as Dublin, Ireland were resumed
around 6pm. However, passengers boarding the plane were told they may only carry their
boarding pass and passport. All of their belongings were to be stowed into carry-on luggage
and checked in with the rest of their luggage.

Service resumption

Tents on the car park in front of terminal 4. Heathrow, 14 August. They were erected to give

people a place to stay while waiting for their flight to depart

A few hours after the beginning of the confusion, aircraft began to fly out of London
Heathrow, although not at the usual level of more than one per minute. The situation
remained chaotic with huge queues of passengers waiting to check-in and get through the
strengthened security procedures, and reports of some aircraft leaving Heathrow airport with
only transit passengers aboard.
On Sunday 13 August, 30% of flights out of Heathrow were cancelled to reduce pressure on
the screeners. By 15 August flight cancellations had fallen to 47 flights at Heathrow, and 8
Ryan air flights from Stansted. It was reported by BA that 10,000 items of baggage belonging
to their passengers had gone missing. It was anticipated that cancellations would reduce on
16 August, with 90% of flights expected to depart as scheduled.

Controversy over the alert

On 12 August a public argument broke out between BAA, the operator of Heathrow and other
airports, and British Airways, with Willie Walsh, BA's Chief Executive, accusing BAA of not
being able to cope with the increased security and baggage checks. Ryanair also called on the
British government to employ police and military reservists to speed up the full body
searches which were now mandated.
Three days later on 12 August 2006 the owner and operator of London Heathrow, BAA
ordered airlines using the airport to make a 30 per cent reduction in departing passenger
flights (something BA was already having to do as many passengers missed flights due to the
extra time it took to clear security), to help reduce delays and cancellations.[83]
On 18 August Ryanair's CEO, Michael O'Leary delivered an ultimatum to the British
government demanding the resumption of normal hand baggage dimensions and hand
screening one passenger in four instead of one in two within one week, otherwise Ryanair
would sue the Government for compensation under section 93 of the Transport Act 2000. The
government responded that the actions were taken under the Aviation Security Act 1982, and
no compensation was payable.
Several pilots have complained about the "ridiculous" luggage restrictions that was thought
up by "utter morons".Carolyn Evans, head of flight safety at the British Airline Pilots
Association, said that "the procedures put in place are not sustainable long term, and unless
the passengers are treated more reasonably we will not have an industry left".
The British government was criticized for scare mongering for its response to the alert and
for using it to drive through unpopular reforms.

Economic effects.
The Times commented the day after the arrests, that the economic effects were minor and that
the FTSE 100 index showed only "mild signs of strain", suggesting that terror was already
priced into assets, that the market impact will be contained, and that "what is lost on the
swings may be gained on the roundabouts". It observed that the real commercial risk is that
"people's behavior is altered... change may come so subtly and subconsciously that it is hard
to see, let alone measure people may stop travelling for example, not because they are
scared of being blown up, but because they are tired of complying with necessary security
measures."

Estimates have also been made of the cost to airlines of their disrupted business. British
Airways had to cancel 1280 flights, at a cost of 40 million. Ryanair had to cancel 500 flights
and sued the UK government for the 3.3 million the cancellations cost them. EasyJet had to
cancel 469 flights, at a cost of about 4 million. BAA says the alert cost them 13 million.
Air passengers also switched to other means of travel, including ferries operating from Dover
to Calais, and Eurostar.
BA considered making a claim for compensation against BAA, which operates Heathrow, for
its failure to provide adequate security services and shortages of personnel during the crisis.
In November 2006, BA claimed the increased security measures since August had cost it
100 million. On 13 August 2006, Michael O'Leary, the chief executive of Ryanair, claimed
that the chaos at airports meant that the terrorists were achieving their aims. On 25 August
2006, O'Leary announced plans to sue the British Government over the disruption to his
business.

Trial
Following the August 2006 arrests, The New York Times blocked IP addresses in Britain
from accessing a story titled "Details Emerge in British Terror Case." If a user in Britain tried
to access the article, he or she was met with a disclaimer: "On advice of legal counsel, this
article is unavailable to readers of nytimes.com in Britain. This arises from the requirement in
British law that prohibits publication of prejudicial information about the defendants prior to
trial." Using software technology designed for targeted advertising, The New York Times was
able to comply with laws stricter than those in the United States.
Eventually, only eight men (Ahmed Abdullah Ali, Assad Sarwar, Tanvir Hussain, Ibrahim
Savant, Arafat Khan, Waheed Zaman, Umar Islam, Mohammed Gulzar) were charged in
connection with the plot. The trial began in April 2008, and the prosecution began with the
exhibition of suicide videos and the allegation that the suspects had bought chemicals.[101]
In their defense, the seven men, who had recorded videos denouncing Western foreign policy,
said they had only planned to cause a political spectacle and not to kill anyone. Ahmed Ali
told the court that he intended to make the political statement by letting off a small device at
Heathrow and scaring people, and that the plot did not involve attacking planes.All the
accused, except for Mohammad Gulzar, admitted plotting to cause a public nuisance. Ali,
Sarwar and Hussein also pleaded guilty to conspiracy to cause explosions.
On 8 November 2008 after more than 50 hours of deliberations, the jury did not find any of
the defendants guilty of conspiring to target aircraft. The jury found Ali, Sarwar and Hussein
guilty of conspiracy to murder charges but was unable to reach verdicts on charges relating to
the alleged plot to blow up aircraft.

Conviction and sentencing.

On 7 September 2009, a second jury at Woolwich Crown Court found Ahmed Abdulla Ali,
Assad Sarwar and Tanvir Hussain guilty of "conspiracy to murder involving liquid bombs"
and therefore that the target of the conspiracy were airline passengers. The plot was said at
court to have been discovered by MI5 using covert listening devices in a flat in east London.
The jurors were unable to reach verdicts on those charges against Ibrahim Savant, Arafat
Khan, Waheed Zaman or Unmar Islam. Umar Islam was however convicted on a separate
charge of conspiracy to murder. Mohammad Gulzar was acquitted on all counts. Sarwar, 29,

must serve at least 36 years, while Tanvir Hussain, 28, was jailed for at least 32 years at
Woolwich Crown Court.
In July 2010, Ibrahim Savant, Arafat Khan and Waheed Zaman were found guilty at
Woolwich Crown Court and sentenced to life in prison for conspiracy to murder. They must
serve a minimum of 20 years in prison before being eligible for release.

International Civil Aviation Organization

REQUEST FOR DEVELOPMENT OF DETAILED GUIDANCE MATERIAL ON
RESTRICTIONS ON LIQUIDS, AEROSOLS AND GELS FOR CARRIAGE
ONBOARD AIRCRAFT

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This paper acknowledges the good work by ICAO in expeditiously developing guidelines for
the implementation of restrictions on liquids, aerosols and gels onboard aircraft. It describes
Singapores experience and challenges faced in the implementation of the LAGs restrictions.
Realizing the need for better international harmonization of these measures, the paper seeks
to draw the attention of the Assembly to the urgent need for ICAO to develop detailed
guidance material in order to further assist States in the implementation of security controls
for screening liquids, aerosols and gels as soon as practicable.
Action: The Assembly is invited to:
a) note the accomplishments of the ICAO Council, Secretariat, AVSEC Panel and the
Secretariat Study Group for their expeditious efforts in responding to this new threat; and
b)request ICAO to develop detailed guidance material in order to further assist States in the
implementation of security controls pertaining to the carriage of liquids, aerosols and gels
onboard aircraft as soon as practicable.

Strategic Objectives:

This working paper will further Strategic Objective B by enhancing

global aviation security.

Financial
implications:

Not Applicable.

References:

AS 8/11-06/100 dated 1 December 2006 AS 8/11-07/26 dated 30

March 2007 AS 8/11-07/53 dated 6 July 2007 A36-WP55

1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 The alleged terrorist plot in the UK in August 2006 highlighted a new threat of liquid
explosives on board aircraft. Since then, the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)
had issued three State Letters that provided useful guidance on the implementation of liquids,
aerosols and gels (LAGs) restrictions. These included guidelines on the technical
specifications of the Security Tamper-Evident Bag (STEBs), supply chain security for LAGs
and STEBs, and the validation processes for mutual acceptance by Contracting States.
1.2 Nonetheless, the experience at airports has shown that while some airports have put in
place various measures and procedures concerning the hand carriage of liquids, aerosols and
gels by air travelers, other airports and regulators are still working out how they could
institute practical measures to keep up security while at the same time minimize confusion,
inconvenience, financial loss and improve airport facilitation for air travelers. In some
airports, transfer passengers continue to abandon their LAGs items, especially those
purchased at airport retail outlets, which is wasteful and environmentally unfriendly.
Therefore, the development of detailed guidance materials on LAGs security controls is
necessary to assist Contracting States to move towards harmonized implementation, thereby
increasing the level of security while maintaining good facilitation for air travelers on a
global basis.
2. SINGAPORES EXPERIENCE
2.1 Singapore implemented the security measures for LAGs on 8 May 2007. To ensure
smooth implementation of LAGs control measures, a public communication campaign was
launched one month prior to the implementation date. The media and travel trade were
engaged for this purpose. The Civil Aviation Authority of Singapore also worked actively
with airlines and ground handling agents to inform passengers of the new restrictions.
Similarly, overseas airports were notified of Singapores implementation to minimize
inconvenience to passengers. Singapore also embarked on an extensive training programmer
for security, retail, and frontline customer service and check-in staff. At the airport, multilingual signs were placed at strategic locations to inform the travelling public of the new
measures. Re-packing counters and disposal bins were also placed at various areas to
facilitate passengers. During the initial implementation phase, additional customer service
staff were deployed to help with queries and distribute re-sealable plastic bags to passengers.
2.2 Not withstanding these initiatives, a number of travelers at Singapore Changi Airport,
especially transfer passengers, have had to discard their LAGs purchases as these purchases
were not packed in proper STEBs. Due to the differing treatment by States for certain LAGs
items at other airports of origin, travelers also encountered problems during security
screening at Singapore Changi Airport.
3. REQUEST FOR DETAILED GUIDANCE MATERIAL
3.1 The restrictions on the hand carriage of LAGs are likely to continue until new detection
technology for liquid explosives that can be deployed effectively in an airport environment is
available. This could take a considerable amount of time. Hence, it would be useful for many
States if ICAO could quickly develop and promulgate detailed guidance material to guide

States in the effective and comprehensive implementation of restrictions on LAGs. Taking

into account that the amendment to the seventh edition of the Security Manual for
Safeguarding Civil Aviation Against Acts of Unlawful Interference (Doc 8973) is in progress,
it would be worthwhile to develop and include the detailed guidance material in this
amendment to this document. Examples of detailed guidance that would be helpful to States
would be instructions, documentation and guidance for the training of screeners and travel
retail staff on the identification and the handling and storage of LAGs and STEBs items.
Detailed guidance for check-in and other frontline staff on the screening of passengers,
handling of various scenarios and situations, implementation of supply chain security
measures, and development of checklists for the validation of security regimes, could be of
assistance to the implementing States on how the measures could be effectively and
efficiently planned and applied.
3.2 States that are moving towards implementation or enhancement of the LAGs restrictions
will benefit most from these detailed guidance materials as they will have a clearer step- bystep understanding of the measures needed to put in place for LAGs restrictions. With this,
States can meet the expected security standards for LAGs implementation, thereby aiding the
validation process for the mutual acceptance between States of each others security regime.
This will also help ICAO and its Contracting States to progress towards a harmonized
approach for the security of LAGs carried by air travelers.
4. CONCLUSION
4.1 ICAO has been prompt and decisive in leading the drive to respond to this security threat.
The AVSEC Panel was convened shortly after the alleged plot and was effective in
galvanizing support from States to respond to this threat. Efforts put in by the Study Group
on the Carriage and Screening of Liquids Gels and Aerosols and the Council had enabled the
rapid issuance by ICAO of the State Letters for States implementation. Singapore would like
to suggest that ICAO carry on with the momentum to reconvene the Secretariat Study Group
on the Carriage and Screening of Liquids, Gels and Aerosols to develop this set of detailed
guidance material for LAGs as soon as practicable.

Air Liquids, aerosols and gels

Following the terrorist attempts to blow up several aircraft during flight using homemade
explosives at London-Heathrow Airport in 2006, the European Commission adopted
additional rules on aviation security to address this newly-identified threat.

New rules restrict passengers on carrying liquids, aerosols and gels (LAGs) past screening
points, whether on their persons or in their hand luggage, with the following exemptions:
liquids in individual containers with capacity no greater than 100 milliliters packed in one
transparent one-liter re-sealable plastic bag .
liquids which are to be used during the trip for medical purposes or special dietary
requirements, including baby food;
EU duty free liquids which have been obtained at EU airports or on board of an aircraft of
an EU carrier on condition that they are packed in packed in security tamper-evident bag
(STEB), inside which proof of purchase at airside at that airport on that day is displayed, as
recommended by ICAO
Duty-free liquids purchased at certain airports in Croatia, Malaysia, Singapore or at
international airports in Canada or the U.S on condition that they are packed in a STEB inside
which satisfactory proof of purchase at airside at that airport within the preceding 36 hours is
displayed.
This ban was envisaged as a temporary restriction to be lifted when suitable technology to
screen liquids for explosives became readily available.
Following successful operational trials and in close cooperation with the international
partners, the Commission developed a road map leading to a stepped approach for replacing
the restriction on the carriage of LAGs with technological screening. On 19 March 2013 the
Commission adopted the necessary legal changes to implement the first step of this phased
approach. Phase 1 will enter into force on 31 January 2014 at the latest and will make it
mandatory for airports to screen with special liquid explosive detection equipment at least
LAGs in STEBs (security tamper evident bags) purchased at airports and any liquid medicine
or special dietary needs. The operational impact of this first phase will be closely monitored
and evaluated and if successful will lead to a further legislative amendment preparing the
second phase. Any further legal obligations will be subject to agreement of Member State
regulatory committee on aviation security and scrutiny by the European Parliament and
Council.

AVIATION SECURITY
These rules allow airport retailing after security checks to be business as usual with no new
restrictions, except for travelers transferring at another EU airport.

Aviation Security: An ever evolving agenda

ETRC has closely monitored the changes in aviation security and has worked proactively
with stakeholders and EU policy-makers to develop appropriate actions in response to the
threats, particularly in relation to Liquids, Aerosols and Gels (LAGs) into which category
many products sold in duty-free and travel retail stores fall.
ETRC supports legislation, measures and procedures that will increase the efficient screening

of passengers, and enhance the passenger experience and will support activities by airport
operators and equipment manufactures that work towards this objective.
The duty-free and travel retail channel is one of the most secure supply chains, with long
established requirements for a secure environment. However, in recent years, increased
regulation and/or restrictions have been introduced in response to the insecure global
environment (terrorism).

LAGs and STEBs

Following the exposure of a terrorist plot to blow up US bound aircraft uncovered in August
2006 which led to a ban on all liquids being carried on board aircraft, ETRC worked with the
European Commission to develop a system whereby passengers travelling within the EU and
transferring at EU airports, plus Switzerland and Norway, could carry through security
products purchased from duty free and travel retail stores if sealed in Security Tamper
Evident Bags (STEBs). This was subsequently extended to passengers flying into the EU and
transferring to another flight from Singapore, Croatia, Kuala Lumpa International Airport, as
well as from all US and Canadian international airports.
In 2011, the European Union postponed implementation of part of Regulation (EC) No
272/2009 which called for the lifting of restrictions for transfer passengers carrying LAGs, in
response to concerns by some EU Member States and airport operators that the equipment
then available did not screen transfer passengers efficiently and speedily enough. Ultimately,
that Regulation was meant to lift all restrictions for passengers carrying LAGs by the 29 April
2013 deadline, whether from landside to airside, such as personal toiletries, or products
purchased from duty-free and travel retail stores.
In July 2012 however, the European Commission announced its recommendation for a
postponement of the April 2013 deadline for the lifting of present restrictions on the carriage
of LAGs on board aircraft. This followed the results of a study and trials undertaken in 12 EU
airports that established that technology available was not yet fit for purpose to allow for a
smooth implementation of the Regulation.
A revised proposal to amend existing legislation was brought forward by the European
Commission in autumn 2012 and was accompanied by a roadmap setting out a timeline for a
phased lifting of all restrictions on LAGs to be replaced by a regime based on new screening
technologies for liquid explosives. This was adopted by EU Member States in March 2013.

LAGs Screening Regime since January 31, 2014.

On 31 January 2014, new rules regarding the carriage of LAGs in hand luggage entered into
force in the European Union (28 Member States of the EU) and the European Economic Area
(EEA, comprised of Switzerland, Iceland and Norway), the United States, Canada, and
Australia.
Passengers transferring at European (EU and EEA), and Canadian airports are allowed to
carry duty free LAGs bought at an airport or onboard an aircraft anywhere in the world,
provided they are sealed in an ICAO approved STEB (Security Tamper-Evident Bag)
together with proof of purchase (receipt inside the STEB). LAGs over 100ml will have to be

successfully screened with enhanced screening technology at the transfer airport security
check point. Duty free LAGs in containers of 100 ml or less do not need to be screened but
should be carried separately in STEBs.
The situation for the USA is different: only passengers going to the US and transferring
onwards from a direct flight from the EU/Canada/Australia, or having transferred through the
EU/Canada/Australia will be allowed to carry duty-free LAGs in a STEB once successfully
screened at the US transfer airport security check point. For passengers coming from or
transferring in other countries, rules dont change.
ETRC has produced Recommendations and Guidelines that set out the changes that will
come into effect on 31 January 2014 and the resultant steps retailers need to take to facilitate
passengers transferring at an EU (plus Switzerland, Norway and Iceland), Canadian,
American or Australian airport. The document is available for download in the Member
section.

The way forward

The European Commission is currently considering a new Strategy to work towards the full
lifting of restrictions on LAGs when operationally feasible.
The Commission has requested a study based on operational trials on optimizing LAGs
screening at passenger security checkpoints, which results should be available in the second
half of 2016.
Over the last years, ETRC has worked closely with EU regulators and all stakeholders
involved, and will continue doing so to ensure the implementation of the new security regime
is as smooth and trouble free as possible for airports, retailers and crucially passengers,
while enhancing aviation security standards.

7. EXPECTED OUTCOME
FINAL CONCLUSION
It has been Few years since the LAGs issue took center stage. But arguably, ICAO and a
number of States and stakeholders have made significant and commendable progress in
developing a set of universal guidelines on the security measures, including supply chain
security measures for airport retailers, to facilitate the hand carriage of LAGs items by air
passengers. The existence of these ICAO guidelines, and the ability by a number of regulators
to work together to recognize each others LAGs measures in order to allow passengers
transferring through each others airports to hand carry LAGs of above 100ml, show that it is
possible for States and ICAO to harmonies these measures and security procedures globally.
In the interim, this is probably the best option and it will require regulators to adopt the will
to want to implement the ICAO guidelines and mutually recognize similar guidelines and
measures that had been taken by other States. For States and airports that have yet to level up
with the ICAO guidelines, it would be useful if they do so expeditiously. This is in the
absence of a readily available, affordable and easily deployable new liquid explosives
scanning equipment that can be quickly introduced at all airports to meet the needs and
demands of our ever growing airport environment. Nonetheless, the quest to develop and

adopt new technological solutions should continue, especially if it will offer all stakeholders a
better and more efficient way of facilitating the hand carriage of LAGs items between and
across airports, whilst also enhancing the level of aviation security around the world.