Professional Documents
Culture Documents
AP-R512-16
Publisher
John Dudgeon
Austroads Ltd.
Level 9, 287 Elizabeth Street
Sydney NSW 2000 Australia
Phone: +61 2 8265 3300
austroads@austroads.com.au
www.austroads.com.au
Project Managers
Simon Grieve and Greg McFarlane
Abstract
About Austroads
Keywords
Austroads 2016
This work is copyright. Apart from any use as permitted under
the Copyright Act 1968, no part may be reproduced by any
process without the prior written permission of Austroads.
ISBN 978-1-925451-04-7
Austroads Project No. FS1808
Austroads Publication No. AP-R512-16
Publication date April 2016
Pages 49
This report has been prepared for Austroads as part of its work to promote improved Australian and New Zealand transport outcomes by
providing expert technical input on road and road transport issues.
Individual road agencies will determine their response to this report following consideration of their legislative or administrative
arrangements, available funding, as well as local circumstances and priorities.
Austroads believes this publication to be correct at the time of printing and does not accept responsibility for any consequences arising from
the use of information herein. Readers should rely on their own skill and judgement to apply information to particular issues.
Summary
The Freight Movement in Emergency Situations study seeks to identify the methods utilised by jurisdictions
to move essential freight and keep general freight moving in emergent situations. Essential freight is defined
as goods or services without which significant further or compounding economic loss is suffered; general
freight includes important and normally repetitive freight flows.
Austroads desired to document member experiences in keeping freight moving and lessons learned from the
multiple cyclone, flood, fire and earthquake emergencies early in the decade. The Austroads brief intimated
any lessons would potentially benefit other road users, as well as improving the social, employment and
economic performance of emergency stressed communities.
The literature review highlighted a key factor in minimising community social, employment and economic
distress during and after emergencies, is ensuring essential and general freight movement, as well as
response heavy vehicle movements. This focus requires a high priority by road agencies working with other
Government agencies during the planning, preparation, response and recovery phases of emergencies.
Six multi-agency public and private sector workshops were held in Queensland, Western Australia, South
Australia, New South Wales and New Zealand during mid-2013, outside the period of most emergencies.
Victoria was affected by an emergency so its workshop was held in June 2014.
The projects continual challenge was to maintain a freight movement focus. Many workshop attendees,
understandably, focussed on their agency roles during the emergency. However, a freight movement focus is
of great importance in ensuring emergency economic resilient outcomes for communities. During an
emergency, governments and the media are focussed on saving lives and preserving property with the
assistance of emergency response freight movements.
The literature review, workshops and project analysis determined that another key focus of road agencies
should be facilitating essential and general freight movement to better maintain economic resilience.
Economic resilience should be incorporated into the highest level of emergency management objectives, as
it is in some jurisdictions already. The Road Freight Risk Conceptual Model, adapted from a Productivity
Commission report, may assist in this.
Workshop attendees generally exhibited an increasing awareness of the community importance of essential
and general freight movement, and the workshops enhanced this. Importantly, the multi-agency and road
freight sectoral workshop approach allowed two-way feedback. Road freight operators discussed agency
performance, including communication, during emergencies and road agencies gave information to the road
freight sector on government obligations, objectives and priorities, resources, issues and improvement
programs. This experience suggests that road freight industry feedback at workshops should be sought
periodically. Such would enable emergency and road agencies to obtain road freight operator feedback on
their performance, communication efforts and issues arising, and address selected matters. Road agencies
could benefit as the road freight industry can assist or harm agencies in its separate meetings with
government.
Australia is a big country with big differences in weather related emergencies and in the density and location
of resilient road freight routes. The need for timely, appropriate information increases significantly in
jurisdictions and areas with sparse road networks, where road freight operators use restricted access
vehicles (RAVs) or in emergencies affecting cross border networks.
Workplace Health and Safety legislation obliges road freight operators to have Continuity Plans (CPs) for
employee/driver security and safety. CPs force road freight operators to defer freight movements if Single
Point of Truth (SPoT) information is not provided within about four hours from an incident occurring. This
seemed not to be appreciated by many government attendees. To alleviate incident economic costs, it is
suggested that the appropriate State agencies consider triggering emergency processes for all incidents
such as crashes, likely to exceed a certain timeframe. The four hour suggestion should be confirmed
following agency and industry dialogue.
Cancellation of freight services is costly. It also mitigates against the emergency economic and community
resilience sought by governments. Road freight operators interrogate many sources of information before
cancelling services. Stranding of vehicles due to road closures causes a higher cost than trip deferrals, so
emergency road closure timings is an important issue for monitoring.
A SPoT jurisdictional communication source is needed by the road freight sector where this is not already
provided. The SPoT source could provide the likely duration of impacts, the available road freight route
detours and forecast the expected re-opening of weather affected road assets. It is acknowledged that these
can all change during an emergency.
In almost all jurisdictions, the road agency has non-emergency communication responsibility for freight (and
passenger) safe movement across road and transport assets, and the related content and systems. Road
users are familiar with their road agency communication role. Road agencies should continue being the
SPoT during emergencies, but with increased focus. The jurisdictional payback for timely SPoT information
for road freight operators should be a reduction in emergency personnel distracted from their primary task by
repeated information requests.
Importantly, emergency and Police agencies are responsible for community safety and emergency
management. Their role need not displace nor detract from road agency responsibilities for essential and
general freight movement (and road user) performance and communication outcomes over impaired assets.
However, it is crucial the relevant agencies focus on their respective accountabilities and work well together,
as seems to be generally occurring.
Every emergency is different and has diverse impacts. Multi-agency planning and preparation, before, during
and after emergencies, are processes that alleviate confusion and mitigate impacts. New Zealand found that
a focussed program of planning and preparation for foreseeable disaster impacts can result in more resilient
road network surviving to perform a role following disasters.
Funding repair clarity for roads damaged during emergencies is another factor affecting their closure and
reopening. Regular workshops would assist in clarifying and refining processes.
During emergencies, clarity in agency accountabilities and their delivery and relevant timely communication
greatly assists the freight transport industry. This is most effectively achieved through modern, common
multi-agency platform IT systems, where prepared traffic management plans (TMPs) for the emergency area
can be deployed and communicated, including for RAVs. It is crucial that government agencies all have
secure access to these platforms.
Jurisdictional road and transport agencies vary in their emergency road related performance,
communication, and use of common IT platforms with other emergency and Police agencies. Consideration
of the project documentation may assist these agencies in considering future actions. Suggestions for
improvement are contained primarily in Section 4.2 of this report.
Report suggestions may assist in a greater awareness and visibility of freight movement, and its
interdependence on the public sector infrastructure and road freight industry performances in collectively
contributing to industry and community economic resilience when disasters and emergencies are
experienced.
Contents
1.
Introduction ............................................................................................................................................ 1
1.1 Background ...................................................................................................................................... 1
1.1.1
1.1.2
1.1.3
1.1.4
2.
1.2.1
1.2.2
Project Definitions................................................................................................................ 3
1.2.3
1.2.4
2.1.2
2.1.3
2.1.4
2.2.2
2.2.3
2.2.4
Japan ................................................................................................................................. 13
2.3.2
2.3.3
2.3.4
2.5.2
2.6.2
2.6.3
2.6.4
2.6.5
3.
3.2.2
Roles ................................................................................................................................. 26
3.2.3
Pilot Workshops................................................................................................................. 26
3.3.2
3.3.3
4.1.2
4.1.3
5.
4.2.1
4.2.2
4.2.3
Planning ............................................................................................................................. 36
4.2.4
Preparation ........................................................................................................................ 37
4.2.5
Partnering .......................................................................................................................... 39
4.2.6
4.2.7
4.2.8
4.2.9
5.3.2
Tables
Table 2.1:
Table 2.2:
Figures
Figure 1.1:
Figure 2.1:
Figure 2.2:
Figure 2.3:
Figure 2.4:
Figure 2.5:
Figure 2.6:
Figure 2.7:
Figure 2.8:
Figure 2.9:
Figure 4.1:
Figure 4.2:
1. Introduction
1.1
Background
Road
Rail
Pipeline
Sea
Air
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
Tonnes (million)
Source: Australian Transport Facts (ATF) 2015 by the CTEE
1
The CTEE is owned by Adam Pekol Consulting Pty Ltd, trading as Pekol Traffic and Transport
On a jurisdictional basis, New South Wales accounted for 26% of the national road freight task (in terms of
tonnes), followed by Victoria with 23%, Queensland with 22% and Western Australia with 18%. The other
States and Territories contribute the remaining 11% of the national total.
Much of the freight task performed by rigid trucks occurs in urban areas. A much smaller proportion of the
freight task carried by articulated or multi-combination vehicles occurs in urban areas.
Rigid trucks travelled 9841 million kilometres in Australia in 2012/13. Of this, 68.2% occurred in urban areas
and nearly a third (31.8%) elsewhere. Even in rural or regional areas, most rigid truck trips are relatively
short distance, with many being operated to service the agricultural sector.
In contrast, the longer distance road freight task in Australia is borne mainly by articulated vehicles. Of the
7267 million kilometres travelled by articulated vehicles in Australia in 2012/13, over two thirds (70.6%) took
place in rural, regional or remote areas. For many of these trips, their exposure to flooding, landslips,
avalanche and fires, is a matter for planning and operational response.
Urban areas in Australasia occupy a small proportion of the landmass, so they may be less likely to
experience disasters than regional and remote areas. Due to the concentration of population and economic
activity in urban areas, they are greatly impacted by disasters when these do occur.
In some cases, these have proven to be successful and are being implemented as standard practice. An
example in Queensland includes stocking stores before the emergency with essential goods that will be
required immediately afterwards, to reduce the subsequent heavy vehicle demand on a damaged system.
But many general freight movements in the agricultural, transport, manufacturing, mining and retailing
sectors are generated continuously irrespective of disasters.
Non-essential freight movements on a fragmented, already damaged network have the potential to cause
significant further damage to newly vulnerable assets. On the other hand, restrictions on general freight
movement have the potential to harm businesses and employment not initially affected by the emergency.
This can also increase the longer run social and economic costs to the emergency affected community.
Emergencies have also highlighted the need to support freight routes that connect communities. While these
routes generally carry lower traffic, and as such often receive less funding allocations, it is in emergency
situations when their function often changes from lower-level freight route to that of a vital link for local
communities when the primary freight route has been damaged or cut.
1.2
Emergency Duration
During the course of the workshops, road freight operators also reported that any event that closed roads for
longer than four hours, for example crashes, initiated similar emergency processes on their businesses, as
did emergencies or natural disasters. While the scale of the impact may be smaller, the impact on the
business was similar.
Freight Types
Essential freight is defined as goods or services without which significant further or compounding economic
loss would be suffered. Examples include movement of:
Grain and additives to poultry farms and cattle feedlots, without which the livestock perishes;
Perishable annual agricultural commodities, such as transporting grapes to wineries;
Fuel, without which road freight cannot move; and
Coal for power generation for refineries, without which the ore will solidify leading to months of lost
production and rectifying effort.
General freight includes important and normally repetitive freight flows. Examples include food, fuel and
water for people, and inputs and production in the agriculture, manufacturing and mining sectors, some of
which may be able to be stored for a period.
It is noted that there is potential overlap of the project scope with emergency management. An example is
the transport of bottled water during emergency response if the local water supply operation has suffered
damage. Although bottled water is routinely supplied in stores, the demand in an emergency situation is
greatly increased. In this eventuality, the supply of bottled and other water for the local population would be a
matter for emergency response.
2. Literature Review
The aim of this Chapter is to document the literature review process and findings for the project. The
literature review was conducted in mid-2013. It is augmented with selected recent research.
2.1
government sector (USA, Japan, New Zealand) planning and management of non-emergency freight
movements during disasters in affected areas
road freight carrier companies of Japan company reports containing information of freight performance
and movements
lessons learnt by these countries, which may be able to be applied to the Before and Recovery stages for
Australias freight movements.
Where documentation was found, associated references were investigated.
2.2
Only the last four are described below; the full literature review is reported in WP1.
To give effect to this goal, the DHS NPG has developed Capabilities and Preliminary Targets for the
Recovery Mission Area. There are eight Capabilities and Economic Recovery is one of these. Its Capability
and Preliminary Targets are illustrated in Figure 2.1.
Figure 2.1: DHS NPG Recovery Mission Area Targets for Economic Recovery
The focus of this project would fall within actions to implement Preliminary Targets 1 and 2 of the DHS NPG.
The next sub-section documents literature illustrating approaches the USA is taking towards these.
This DHS NPG Goal was restated on page 166 of the (Disaster Resilience, 2012) report; and Authors emphasis.
The 2015 Australian Transport Facts 3 report states that in June 2013, Australias population was 23.1 million
people. In the 2012/13 financial year, the national domestic road freight task totalled 2923 million tonnes and
221 billion tonne-kilometres. This equates to 127 tonnes per person (or 72% of the national figure) and 9570
tonne-kilometres per person (or 35% of the national figure).
(When rail, sea and aviation are included, the freight task becomes 4085 million tonnes or 639 billion tonnekilometres. This equates to 177 tonnes and 27 660 tonne-kilometres per person. Much of this increase is due
to rail haulage of iron ore and coal, and the sea transport of bauxite. These three high tonnage, long distance
exports influence or skew the national freight statistics.)
The above figures assume that the total road freight task in Australia is domestic and that all the rail and
maritime freight tasks are international; neither assumption being correct. There will be some balancing
influences from these assumptions, but these are unlikely to be entirely congruent. But even this simplistic
approach indicates that Australia and the USA have similar freight tasks.
A key difference is the density of the Australian and USA National Freight Networks. Australias Key Road
Freight Routes were approved by the Transport and Infrastructure Council of Ministers on 7 November 2014,
which is shown in Figure 2.2.
Figure 2.2: Indicative Map of Australias Key Freight Routes
The comparative USA National Freight Network is shown on page 3 (NCFRP Report 16, 2012) and forms
Figure 2.3.
Visual inspection reveals significantly more opportunities for different road freight trip paths in the USA than
in Australia, should any road link or links be closed by a disaster.
Perhaps in the USA, there is less need to secure general road freight movement across disaster damaged
road links, as other roads can provide this function without too much deviation and cost. This may explain the
USA focus on the economics and community impacts of freight movement disruptions (DHS NPG, 2011).
This reports emphasis is on identifying economic issues and inhibitors and specifying economic recovery
performance in recovery plans.
Figure 2.3: USA National Highway Network for Conventional Trucks
A second relevant report was found on the Transportation Research Board website. The 2012 report was
entitled Disaster Resilience: A National Imperative. It was produced by a consortium of consultants and
academia for the National Academy of Sciences. This report focussed principally on the health impacts and
organisational collaboration and processes that could result in better resilience, with transportation viewed
principally as contributing to resilient outcomes. The report contains some interesting discussion about
secondary economic impacts on business. In a sub-section entitled Geographic Variation in Economic
Losses (p 75), there is discussion that the data gathering processes in the USA under-estimates the total
value of losses because indirect losses and business interruption are not included, for example. Such
indirect losses can be substantial. The report further noted that Indirect flow losses refer to the disruption in
the supply chain for other businesses as a result of the shutdown (a ripple effect caused by the
interconnectedness of many supply chains regionally and globally).
On page 166, it notes that one of the USA DHSs National Preparedness Goals is as stated in sub-section
2.2.1 above.
In summary, the focus of this report (as with most others perused) is on the planning and response to
disasters to ensure greater resilience, with the re-establishment of road freight flows being a mention rather
than even a secondary item or focus.
It is clear that re-establishing the affected economy during the recovery stages is becoming a more
prominent issue. For example, it was accorded secondary consideration, along with other matters in the DHS
NPG.
In an Appendix from page 100, only four of the 50 States had an economic recovery plan or section in 2008.
Freight Mobility
Following the SFSRP for the WSDOT, that jurisdiction announced incorporation of the concept into its next
iteration of the Highway System Plan. Its FREIGHT MOBILITY: Joint Report5 on Washington State Freight
Highway and Rail Projects, September 2008, stated on page 3 that:
The [next] Highway System Plan update will highlight recommendations for freight system
improvements across the State, and feature new statewide freight corridor classification criteria and a
freight data program to support project prioritisation. It will include a list of high-priority freight highway
system projects and operational improvements. The Department also leads the States freight data and
analytic program, and initiatives to improve freight system operational efficiencies, build a data
framework to monitor system performance, and develop resilient freight systems.6
Page 5 outlined initiatives for establishing Strategic Freight Corridors for road, rail and maritime, which are
discussed further below. The remaining 11 pages of the report are associated with proposed highway and
rail projects, as its title suggests.
the restoration or recovery of the States economy as it is affected, enabled, or disabled by the
performance of the freight system (SFSRP 2008, 10)
how quickly and efficiently the freight transport system can recover from a disruption (SFSRP 2008, 10)
The purpose of the SFDFN research was to:
Understand how disruptions of the States freight corridors change the way trucking companies and
various freight-dependent industries route goods
Plan to protect freight-dependent sectors that are at high risk from these disruptive events
Prioritise future transportation investments based on the risk of economic loss to the State.
The research developed a statewide multimodal freight model for Washington State. It is a GIS-based
portrayal of the States freight highway, arterial, rail, waterway and intermodal network.
Two case studies, potato growing and processing and diesel fuel distribution, were chosen to represent the
agriculture and all industry sectors. These showed that the potato growing and processing sector was heavily
dependent on one Interstate road corridor, while the diesel delivery system is highly resilient and is not
dependent on any one corridor.
This was a joint report between WSDOT and the Freight Mobility Strategic Investment Board.
Author emphasis.
QTMR has a Road Freight Map that was first produced in 2003, its third iteration is dated 2010.
The FGTS classifies roadways using five truck gross tonnage8 classifications, T-1 through T-5, as
follows:
T-1
T-2
T-3
T-4
T-5
at least 20,000 tons in 60 days and less than 100,000 tons per year
WSDOT is aware that gross tonnage data (for roads, rail and freight) is not sufficient to present a
comprehensive view of the States freight system. It does not provide information on the users of the
system, their economic importance, performance requirements, system needs and future trends.
The road freight classification categories were used for investment decision-making, as outlined in the
Business Directions document. No information was discovered on the WSDOT site that these categories
were used to prioritise system resilience or for local government land use planning. Clearly, there is scope
for them to be used also for that purpose.
Figure 2.4: Urban Road Freight Route in Washington State
The tonnage estimates for road links were derived for three classes of vehicles using permanent and temporary count sites, inferring
truck proportions where not available and using derived tonnages for three truck classes. The result seems robust and comparable,
sufficient for the purpose of the road freight classification system.
2.3
The literature relating to these two countries is reported in a single section. This is because most of the New
Zealand literature used by this project corresponds to the Christchurch earthquakes mega-disaster as does
the single source from Japan.
Japan and New Zealands mountainous terrain are subject to landslides, which may be caused by
earthquakes or heavy rain, and to avalanches following snowfalls. Landslides can close or partially close
freight roads, or lead to river flash flooding, when a temporary landslide dam is breached.
Mega Disasters
The two Christchurch earthquakes and especially the second, like the Great East Japan Earthquake, can be
considered to be a mega-disaster from at least two aspects. Firstly, their combined economic impact was
about NZ$8.86 billion (Poulter 2012 p4), nearly 100 times greater than any of the 10 other New Zealand
disasters in the same two years. Secondly, in the second earthquake half of all roads in Christchurch were
damaged, with 54 km of roads significantly damaged, 980 km needing repair along with 600 retaining walls
and 30 bridges and 50 000 road defects (Ladbroke 2012). When there is such damage, the focus of
agencies is towards disaster response and recovery rather than economic resilience, as was found in Japan
(Ochi 2012).
Stephen Sellwood, Chief Executive of the New Zealand Council for Infrastructure Development, provided an
insightful presentation incorporating economic recovery into the suite of planning by government and the
Canterbury Council, but raising issues about organisational roles, financing and debt repayment obligations
over many years. While the scale of the damage is unusual and tragic, the lessons about preparedness and
freight movement facilitation could be applied in all Australian jurisdictions.
This matter is discussed in more detail in subsequent chapters.
2.3.1 Japan
On 7 February 2012, the Great East Japan Earthquake (GEJE) struck, causing its corresponding tsunami,
and subsequent nuclear power generator disasters. 15 846 lives were lost and another 3317 people are
missing. Such a disaster can be considered to be a mega-disaster.
Just over a year later, Shigeo Ochi, Director for Earthquake, Volcanic and Large-scale Flood Disaster
Management, Disaster Management Bureau, Cabinet Office gave a presentation (Ochi 2012). While the
scale of such a disaster is virtually unimaginable in Australia (but not in New Zealand), some aspects are
worth reporting to inform jurisdictions, including:
The area of inundation far exceeded that indicated in municipal hazard planning maps:
The effects of inundation are far more significant, but not dissimilar to the effects of flooding in
Australia as shown in Figure 2.5 and Figure 2.6; and
Loss of the telecommunications network restricted emergency operational incoming information and
outgoing instructions, as it did in the Bundaberg flood of 2013.
The total cost of the GEJE was $220 billion (using an exchange rate of $1=\77.07Y) of which $25 billion
was due to agriculture, forestry and fisheries impacts.
Nearly 10 months afterwards, 99% of Nationally controlled roads, 97% of railways but only 68% of ports
had been reinstated:
Thankfully, the tunnel was found to be structurally sound, so that restricted travel was allowed in the
following seven days. In order to provide fuel supplies to Christchurch and surrounding regions, dangerous
goods and heavy vehicles were approved to use the tunnel at night between 1900 and 0630 during full
tunnel closure for other traffic.
The consequences of the closure of Evans Pass are remarkably similar to the landslip disruption and
closures of the seven Great Dividing Range crossings, including two NLTN highways in Queensland in
January 2011. However, the cause was different with the Australian road ranges being closed due to
damage from a rain depression. In Queensland, the two NLTN highway range crossings were reopened on a
one lane basis quickly, but reconstruction of these and the other passes took between many months to well
over a year.
So as with the USA, New Zealand has a focus on the importance of economic recovery following disasters.
The remainder of this section discusses its planning, preparation and response, with particular emphasis on
the Christchurch Earthquakes of September 2010 and February 2011.
Stratton 2012 stated that the seismic retrofit works undertaken prevented more critical damage, and repairs
to these bridges would only cost $6.3 million. This indicates that a focussed program of planning and
preparation for foreseeable disaster impacts can result in more resilient road network surviving to perform a
role following disasters, even those of a Christchurch earthquake scale.
Figure 2.8: Canterbury Bridge with Structural Retrofits to increase Resilience to Earthquakes
Infrastructure Network
Days
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For the Christchurch mega-disaster, traffic management was most quickly reinstated followed by airports
with 50% capability within seven days and 100% within four weeks. Roads were next with 50% reinstatement
within three weeks. While rail was slower to this level, it had 99% reinstatement within six months, while
roads took between one and two years to reach this level. Ports were slowest with 50% reinstatement taking
two months and 99% between one and two years, the same repair performance as for roads.
The experience from Japan (Ochi 2012) following the GEJE mega-disaster was different, but followed similar
trends. Nearly ten months afterwards, 99% of nationally controlled roads, 97% of railways, 68% of ports and
99% of the telecommunications network had been reinstated.
2.4
Australian Literature
Until 2014, very little comparable information was found in the Australian literature.
For example, the Standing Council on Transport and Infrastructure 2013, National Land Freight Strategy: A
place for freight, states that transport and logistics share of GDP (Australias gross domestic product) could
be as much as 14% and the transport sector directly employed over half a million people. So the economic
importance of freight and logistics is acknowledged.
However, in spite of the multiple disasters affecting most states between 2010 and 2012, nowhere in the
report is the issue of economic resilience preparation, and economic recovery and the movement of road
freight after disasters, mentioned as one of Australias six key issues.
2.5
On 28 April 2014 (after all but one workshop had been conducted), the then Treasurer of the Australian
Government requested the Productivity Commission to examine natural disaster funding arrangements. It
produced a two volume draft report in September 2014.
As a context for this project, this section quotes extensively from the Volume 1, Draft Report, Natural
Disaster Funding Arrangements, Productivity Commission, September 2014.
Natural disasters are an inherent part of the Australasian landscape. Since 2009 in Australia, natural
disasters have claimed more than 200 lives, destroyed 2670 houses and damaged a further 7680, and
affected the lives and livelihoods of hundreds of thousands of Australians.9
Over the past 40 years, storms have been the most frequent disasters causing insured property losses.
Floods have also been frequent and, when they occur, are typically the most expensive events. Bushfires are
less frequent, but account for most fatalities. Across the country, accumulated insurance losses have been
greatest in New South Wales (mostly hail and storms), followed by Queensland (mostly floods and cyclones).
Volume 1, Draft Natural Disaster Funding Arrangements, Productivity Commission, September 2014.
Table 2.2:
Source: Table 1, Volume 1, Draft Natural Disaster Funding Arrangements, Productivity Commission, September 2014
In approximate per capita terms, the Northern Territory and Queensland suffered the highest losses, followed
by Western Australia, New South Wales and Victoria.
The highest property losses occurred from hail and storm, and it is likely that the insurance loss size is highly
correlated with urban areas. Storms and hail generally do not affect large areas or have the same level of
impacts on the transport system or businesses as do cyclones, floods, some bushfires or major earthquakes.
Insurance losses from natural disasters exceeded $29 billion over the period 1970 to 2013 (in 2011 dollars),
or an average of $670 million each year. However, the bulk of these losses arose from a relatively small
number of events - indeed, only 10 per cent of natural disasters accounted for 80 per cent of recorded
insurance losses.
However, the costs of natural disasters go beyond insured losses. Disasters impose a range of economic,
social and environmental costs on governments, businesses, households and communities. These include:
direct market costs caused by the physical event, such as damage to private properties and public
infrastructure;
Governments can also do better in terms of policies that allow people to understand natural disaster risks
and have incentives to manage them effectively.
Information is critical to understanding and managing natural disaster risk. Information on hazards and
risk exposure has improved significantly in recent years, but there are opportunities to improve its
consistency, sharing and communication.
Project Context
The scope of this project places it within two of the Productivity Commission concepts, being:
Source: Box 1.2, Volume 1, Draft Natural Disaster Funding Arrangements, Productivity Commission, September 2014
In terms of jurisdictional road assets, exposure can be mitigated by the location of those assets to be, where
possible, away from areas affected by storm surges, flooding and landslips. Where altering the location is not
possible and ranges and rivers have to be crossed, the vulnerability of the road assets can be reduced by
appropriate planning, design, construction and maintenance.
Box 1.2 is directly applicable for terminals and warehouses associated with road freight operations for
essential and general freight movement.
In terms of road freight operations, timely information about likely impacts on the road assets during a
hazard, can reduce significantly, or eliminate, heavy vehicle and driver exposure.
2.6
Disaster Management literature did not have a focus on economic recovery 20 years ago, merely noting it
as a consequence in an Appendix (Auf der Heide, 1989);
Communities are unable to survive for extensive periods without road transport services. Some important
local supplies can be exhausted in as little as a day or two, and can become critical within a week to a
month (Hu, 2008);
The USA freight task is growing along with its population (NCFRP Report 16, 2012). It is not dissimilar to
Australias (ATF, 2015), but the density of its freight road network far exceeds that of Australias (NCFRP
Report 16, 2012 and NLFS, 2013);
The economic function of freight movement has long been understood, but not always appreciated
(FGTS, 2011 and NCFRP Report 16, 2012). It appears to be under-reported (Disaster Resilience 2012),
with States having to specify a freight route hierarchy:
WSDOT has a five level road freight hierarchy (also rail and maritime) and this information is used for
planning and investment (FGTS, 2011 and Business Directions, 2008); and
Recently, disaster resilience has become a national focus, and national preparedness goals include
economic recovery as a secondary item (DHS NPG, 2011) (albeit with an economic (Disaster Resilience,
2012), planning and performance measurement focus):
The FHWA has a web page specifically for Freight Disruptions: Impacts on Freight Movement from
Natural and Man-Made Events;
There does not appear to be the same focus at State level with only four of 50 States having recovery
plans in 2008 (SFSRP, 2008);
WSDOT has a strong freight movement/economic focus, but even it appears to not have integrated as
yet the resilience, economic recovery and freight movement emphases into its transportation business
and highway planning (all documents in section 3.4 refer), even though this is a focus of its freight
planning;
The (SFSRP, 2008) report recommended the State and public sector should adopt BCPs in the same
way that the private sector has;
In the second stage of this research, WSDOT developed (SFDFN, 2009) a statewide GIS multi-modal
freight model and used it to assess the resilience of an agricultural and industry sector supply chain;
and
It planned to release its Freight Mobility Plan and updated Highway System Plan by end 2013.
This USA literature provides a framework within which this project can potentially make a compelling
contribution.
Perhaps Australias sparse freight network and propensity for disaster damage can provide a focus for
cooperation between the private and public sectors in the early reinstatement of essential and general freight
movement on roads damaged by disasters.
In this context, the goal of this project to document actions taken by jurisdictions to support essential and
general freight movement in the recovery phase of disasters is consistent with, but seems to be in advance
of, efforts in the USA.
However, there are many more opportunities for different road freight trip paths in the USA than in most
Australian jurisdictions, should any road link or links be impacted by a disaster. Perhaps the USA has a
reduced need to secure general road freight movement across disaster damaged road links, as other roads
can provide the freight movement without too much deviation and cost.
The results of this project could be used by jurisdictions to prepare BCPs for important economic sectors, as
recommended by USA documentation.
Telecommunications are vital to the immediate response and their recovery through interim power and
network reinstitution can be relatively quick compared with other transport networks:
It may be that the initial telecommunications loss has less impact on economic recovery than the loss
of physical transport infrastructure.
making interim arrangements to re-establish critical fuel supply chains, which also drive economic
recovery; and
3.1
Describe and reinforce the project focus, being researching essential and general freight movements
during emergencies and the lessons learned. At the same time emphasising that the emergency
response and recovery task is not within the scope of this project;
Have jurisdictions describe how it seeks to manage the essential and general freight task, aside from their
normal focus on the emergency response task;
Have jurisdictions describe how they experience the private sectors freight function role during
emergencies and its desire for timely, accurate emergency information;
Have the road freight industry sector describe how it views governments management of the essential
and general freight task, as distinct from emergency response and recovery; and
Have all attendees suggest issues arising, and make suggestions for improvement by both sectors, with a
focus on what each could do better and what they need from the other party.
In order to achieve the workshop aims, it was crucial to have a mix of attendees from both jurisdictions and
the road freight industry from:
across government, including the State Road Agency and Transport Agency, the Police and Emergency
Services, and possibly Local Government; and
3.2
Preparation
Two senior people at a workshop allowed better facilitation, clarification, discussion and recording. While
one was facilitating the other could be assessing reactions and reporting.
3.2.2 Roles
The role of the PRG member was to organise the workshop, facilitate the participation of State and private
sector attendees and introduce the study team (if the local Freight Program Manager was unavailable). Many
also provided information about State processes, played an active role in discussions and reviewed project
documentation.
The Austroads Project Manager was responsible for liaising with the jurisdictional Freight Program Manager,
introducing the Project, describing its focus and expectations, presenting material on the Western Australian
situation, facilitating the workshop and clarifying matters arising.
The Consultant was responsible for developing the agenda and introductory material, liaising with the PRG
member on organisational details, conducting a workshop presentation, assisting workshop facilitation and
following up on workshop materials.
3.3
Conduct
The type of emergency did not really affect the planning for and management of essential and general
freight movements. In both Queensland and Western Australia, the importance of planning for freight
route options and communication about available routes was required, irrespective of whether the
emergency was a cyclone, flood or fire.
Attendance by the private sector and their willingness to be open about the problems experienced in
seeking information was a key issue for the State agencies understanding the impact of their actions,
including timely communication of these actions.
Once these two matters were understood, the other workshops focus on the disaster type was substantially
reduced. It was still discussed so that participants could draw a quick conclusion that the type of disaster was
not material, but the actions taken were. As well, this ameliorated the focus on any particular incident that
may or may not have been well managed.
Secondly, both the private and public participants were educated that a key part of the workshop was
listening to what others had been dealing with and trying to manage, while also presenting how the actions of
the others had affected what they were trying to do.
The Queensland and Western Australian workshops were also conducted as regular workshops.
3.4
Workshops
Brisbane:
30 May 2013
Perth:
1 August 2013
Adelaide
27 August 2013
Sydney
23 October 2013
3.5
Workshop Documentation
A standard approach was developed for documenting each workshop. This was:
3.6
In general, it was noticeable that those in the private sector were less aware of the:
Constraints on government officers in seeking to both manage the emergency and keep essential and
general freight moving. Such constraints could include:
Context
In order to provide a road freight and emergency risk conceptual framework to aid discussion, Figure 4.2 has
been adapted from the Figure 2.9 of the Productivity Commission 2014 report.
The hazard risk can be one of the types mentioned in sub-section 4.1.1 or earlier in this report. The hazard
type, intensity, duration and impact area determines its significance and zone of exposure.
If the exposure zone is remote from economic development, the risk to freight movement volumes will be
small; the converse applies where the exposure zone has economic sectors of significant number and/or
size. A hazards exposure can be reduced if:
Economic Sector
and Size
Exposure
FREIGHT
MOVEMENT
RISK
Vulnerability
Network Density
Vulnerable Asset
- Range Crossing
- Bridge
HAZARD
Type and Impact Area
Source: Adapted from Box 1.2, Volume 1, Draft Natural Disaster Funding Arrangements, Productivity Commission,
September 2014
The risk to freight moving on a road network depends on its vulnerability. Vulnerability is influenced by the
network density in the hazard impact zone, and also to the weakest transport element.
A high density of freight network, where freight routes are configured to carry freight vehicles, results in a low
risk to essential and general freight movement stoppages. In many jurisdictions, RAVs require a standard of
road that has low network densities.
Road (and rail) elements most at risk are range crossings, which are vulnerable to landslides, or bridges,
culverts and roads near water, which may be destroyed by floods or earthquakes. As well, seaside freight
roads can be closed by tsunamis.
In the long term, road vulnerability can be significantly improved by relocating or rebuilding, or by investment
in higher resilient road infrastructure.
Even without resilience investment, much can be done to mitigate impacts due to foreseeable events such
as cyclones, monsoonal flooding, and fires, before and after emergencies. This includes:
Government agencies preparing appropriate policy and plans that can be implemented. This can include,
for example, pre-stocking of retailers, and adequate stocks of fuel for road freight companies, emergency
response and airports; and
SRAs having prepared traffic management plans for route diversions for different types of light vehicles,
heavy vehicles and RAVs. This maintains a level of network connectivity, and current information needs
to be disseminated to road freight operators; and
Businesses implementing their post emergency BCPs, which facilitates their economic activity, their
employees pay and the community economic wellbeing.
Fortunately, volcanoes, earthquakes and tsunamis are not as frequent, nor as predictable, with the current
state of knowledge. This makes pre-stocking of supplies and equipment wasteful. Preparations for
interventions after the disaster can pay significant dividends in alleviating community distress and increasing
economic resilience.
4.2
Key Lessons
Analysis of the literature review, workshop outcomes and the road freight emergency risk framework of
Figure 4.2 was used to derive the following key project lessons. These are presented within similar headings
used to document the six workshops, acknowledging the geographical variation across Australia and New
Zealand.
In sub-section 1.1.2, essential freight is defined as goods and services without which significant further or
compounding economic loss would be suffered. Four examples were provided. General freight movements
include important and normally repetitive freight flows. Examples include inputs and production outputs in the
agriculture, manufacturing and mining sectors, some of which may be able to be stored for a period.
The roles and responsibilities of the partnering Emergency, Police and Road (or Transport) in managing
emergencies are generally embodied in their separate jurisdictional legislation.
The objectives, policy, processes and systems of the National, State and Territory Road agencies are the
most relevant for this projects aims. This is because the project aim is related to emergency management,
being the objective of keeping essential and general freight moving to achieve community economic
resilience.
Victorias emergency agency has a unit to deliver business and community resilience outcomes.
When major emergencies are triggered under the relevant legislation, jurisdictions generally adopt an
Incident Controller model operating from a jurisdictional control centre. Similar processes apply at a regional
or local level for less severe emergencies.
These control centres operate with clear objectives and under defined processes to deliver government
objectives, including minimising the risk of harm to people. Having an explicit economic resilience goal in
emergency management is important. Otherwise roads may be closed too early to avert any possibility of a
safety risk prior to cyclonic conditions or in the vicinity of fires, without considering the resulting potential to
detract from community economic resilience. This matter was discussed at more than one workshop.
With quality agency co-operation, planning and preparation, emergency managements principal focus of
saving lives and preserving property need not detract entirely from achieving an economic resilient outcome
for the movement of essential and general freight.
As outlined in sub-section 4.1.2 and discussed below, agency policy and processes during the emergency
management planning, preparation and response stages significantly affect the quality of life of communities
and their local economies once the immediate hazard is over.
Local Governments
It was indicated that there were cases when local governments could and were frustrating the use of their
roads in emergencies. This viewpoint is understandable when States make emergency decisions that lead to
a low quality seal being badly damaged.
However, as well as potentially suffering infrastructure damage, local communities can be a beneficiary
through maintaining community economies and jobs through the maintenance of essential and general
freight flows.
Planning and preparation is the key to making progress, together with a robust funding arrangement
between all Governments. A related matter is that many local roads in some jurisdictions are recognised as
having B Double access under jurisdictional and National Heavy Vehicle Regulator (NHVR)-endorsed access
arrangements.
The potential use of a gazettal mechanism for agreed use of local government roads in emergencies only
may be a practical way forward, as discussed in the NSW workshop.
The Road Freight Industry also plays a crucial role maintaining community resilience. The projects joint
workshops indicate that sharing between the jurisdictional emergency agencies and road freight industry
delivers new insights benefiting both sectors. Many approaches to emergency management programmes
may benefit significantly by involving road freight operators and their stakeholders to achieve jurisdictional
economic goals.
Relevant parties should be included in emergency management discussions and processes.
10
Western Australian State-Level Risk Assessment, State Emergency Management Commission of WA, December 2013.
11
Authors emphases.
12
The Queensland workshop noted the heatwave induced day time closure of the Great Northern Line between Townsville and Mt Isa.
This was suggested because their CPs, prepared to be congruent with legislation, require all road freight
operators to focus on the wellbeing of their staff and drivers. Road freight operators, under legislative
imperatives for workplace safety and fatigue management, must cancel freight movements to avoid any
potential for workplace harm. Consequently, long distance road freight movements are terminated if there is
not a viable, available route within a certain timeframe. This was mostly commonly stated as being four
hours, but there was one instance of six hours.
Therefore, crashes on major freight routes and highways are a high risk freight movement priority. The
economic cost of crashes is known to be significant.
It was appreciated that having to provide reliable information about potential road closures and re-openings
within less than four hours is a challenge. For many road crashes it takes time to detect, learn about, reach
and assess the severity of the incident. This is particularly so for a fatality, when evidence for possible
charges may have to be collected. Such road crashes can make incident decision-making, including
implementing Standard Operating Procedures and information dissemination within a four hour timeframe,
challenging and problematic.
Improved processes and co-operation will be required between State agencies in order to manage major
crashes on key freight routes, using emergency management processes. Information about crashes should
be incorporated into emergency management policy and processes, including the heavy vehicle
communication and advice channels.
Road agencies should confirm the accuracy of the four hour decision period for shutting down road freight
movements. They need to research with their heavy vehicle operators the circumstances (type of trip and
vehicle used, desired route, and the like) in which this may apply.
4.2.3 Planning
Planning for emergencies needs to encompass two matters.
From the context of this project, planning for essential and general freight movements deserves a high
priority, as the discussion below supports.
Integrating the Important Economic Area/Transport Links Concept into Emergency Planning
The second matter involves planning in a jurisdictional context of their Important Economic Areas and the
transport links connecting them.
The basis for this approach is that some regional communities and the transport links serving them are far
more critical to Australias economic importance than many others. The corollary is that these areas can
have more widespread and wide-ranging economic impacts on all Australias communities. Important
Economic Areas and their transport links should frame the priorities of government efforts in the freight
movement emergency planning outlined in sub-section 4.2.2.
To illustrate: The Queensland Agricultural Land Audit by the Queensland Department of Agriculture, Forestry
and Fisheries (QALA 2013) report identified the concept of Important Agricultural Areas. The major
highway/s (and potentially rail lines) servicing Important Agricultural Areas and equivalent areas for the other
economic sectors could be investigated for their resilience to their potential hazards. Figure 2.9 may provide
some strategic guidance for this.13
The relevance of this approach is supported in an Australian Transport Research Forum paper (Dudgeon
2015). He found significant differences in road freight commodity flows between a coastal highway (Bruce
Highway) serving more than 0.5 million people, and an east-west Queensland highway (Warrego Highway)
connecting the Surat Basin (thermal coal) Region and the Eastern Darling Downs Important Agricultural Area
to Brisbane and the Port of Brisbane.
Jurisdictions working with the Commonwealth Government could consider this suggestion and, if warranted,
progress it.
The November 2014 Transport and Infrastructure Council adoption of key road freight routes 14 and ports into
the NLTN provides an excellent starting point for considering key freight routes from an economic resilience
viewpoint. Jurisdictional freight models and data would be needed as well.
It is understood that Austroads is initiating a related research project.
While many in road agencies correctly view the key road freight routes and ports from a planning and
investment, or high productivity vehicle perspective, their utility in times of emergency is crucial. This is
because rail cannot replace the key road freight route function on short notice. 15
Any efforts to prioritise key freight route security during emergencies could leverage any national security
work that may have already considered this matter.
4.2.4 Preparation
Mega-disasters, such as the GEJE or the Christchurch earthquakes, have such significant impacts that a
National response is required.
Australia is such a large country that even major disasters have mainly regional impacts. When these
regions have economic production critical to the national economy, State and Federal planning is important.
Without local governments having direct access to taxpayer funding, it is important that State jurisdictions
manage emergencies in co-operation.
13
It is noted that the WA SEMC process may approach or encompass this suggested approach.
14
New Zealands Roads of National Significance are significant parts of its strategic freight network currently being focused on in order
to upgrade them to deliver a Level of Service that reflects their strategic function.
15
Related workshop discussion where an attendee had previously tried to do so, without recognising rollingstock and other limitations.
4.2.5 Partnering
It was noticeable that at all workshops the attending representatives of the Emergency Services, Police and
SRAs were well known to each other. This is a credit to the agencies, its management and to the people.
As well, these relationships are crucial in emergencies and important if any of the suggestions in this report
are to be considered, allocated accountability, planned and actioned by different jurisdictional agencies. This
includes the importance to governments of the economic resilience of disaster affected communities, and the
suggestions for potential improvements to facilitate this.
As well, the action of road freight operators to attend workshops at their own cost demonstrates their concern
about emergency related matters. It also shows their community spirit.
The great majority of road freight operators play an intra-state function. For interstate operators, or when
emergencies are cross border events, two or more jurisdictional information systems and the related media
channels must be accessed.
There is obvious potential to have a national information system, with its information content provided by
accountable jurisdictional processes. Such a system would require assessment.
It was suggested that the NHVR had potential to supply the information system, perhaps by adapting their
journey planner to incorporate advice road closures and re-openings, and on emergency detour routes for
RAVs. This needs to be included in considerations, and SRAs and the NHVR have mechanisms to consider
this matter.
The intention of the agencies to further develop real time multi-media SPoT information including interactive
RAV maps was noted. How a road freight requirement could be integrated with any need for an Australian
SPoT for other road users was also noted. In Western Australia, for example, there are 11 different mediums
or channels to communicate with road users, including TV, radio, emails, posts on websites, twitter and
others. It also operates a call centre and web service for heavy vehicles and RAVs.
With a renewed focus on emergency economic resilience, it is time for the jurisdictional road agency
emergency units to do likewise. This could occur as an adjunct to the jurisdictional Emergency Departments
meeting.
16
Known Floods in the Brisbane and Bremer River Basins, Bureau of Meteorology, sourced 20150405.
17
On the other hand, the widespread flooding across Queensland during December 2010 and January 2011 caused loss of life (38
dead and nine missing) and Statewide road closures. Some roads (and rail lines) were fully or partially closed for many months and
discussion of this was protracted at the Queensland workshop.
So while the density of networks may be a factor in maintaining essential and general freight movements,
when urban networks are extensively damaged by mega disasters the impacts may be even greater than
when disasters damage regional and remote road networks.
Scope
For this project, the freight movements required during the response and recovery stages of disasters was
out-of-scope.
Essential freight is defined as goods or services without which significant further or compounding economic
loss would be suffered. Examples include movement of:
Grain and additives to poultry farms and cattle feedlots, without which the livestock perishes;
Perishable annual agricultural commodities, such as transporting grapes to wineries;
Fuel, without which road freight cannot move; and
Coal for power generation for refineries, without which the ore will solidify leading to months of lost
production and rectifying effort.
General freight includes important and normally repetitive freight flows. Examples include food, fuel and
water for people, and inputs and production in the agriculture, manufacturing and mining sectors, some of
which may be able to be stored for a period.
5.2
The literature review confirmed the premise of this project. This is that contributing to the economic resilience
of disaster affected communities by facilitating essential and general freight movement is crucially important.
It is also gaining increasing international profile.
While economic resilience is increasingly recognised, keeping essential and general freight moving has a low
profile. One reason may be that the density of road freight networks is far higher internationally than in
Australia, as compared in Figure 2.2 and Figure 2.3. Australia also has a higher proportion of its sparse
network accessible by high productivity RAVs than many other countries.
It follows that for the relatively sparse networks of Australasia, keeping essential and general freight moving
offers significant economic benefits for disaster affected communities.
Potentially, an improved focus on this matter could make a worthwhile contribution to the economic,
employment and social resilience of disaster affected communities.
5.3
The workshops and the unpublished documentation by jurisdictional road agencies revealed that this
projects focus did not enjoy a high priority until the recent emergency events.
Understandably, SRAs have been concerned about further damage to already weakened roads, and the
Emergency and Police Departments were focussed on minimising the risk to lives, even if this meant road
closures affecting freight movement and commerce.
With the new understanding of the importance of emergency economic resilience, and the contribution made
to this by essential and general freight movement, change is needed.
5.4
Suggestions
Many suggestions to facilitate essential and general freight movement in emergency situations have been
made, particularly in Chapters 2 and 4, and Section 4.2 of this report. These may be considered by
Austroads members and other relevant parties.
These suggestions may assist in a greater awareness and visibility of freight movement, and its
interdependence on the public sector infrastructure and road freight industry performances in collectively
contributing to industry and community economic resilience when disasters and emergencies are
experienced.
Term or Meaning
Explanation
BCPs
CILTNZ
CPs
Continuity Plans
CTEE
DHS
EMTSO
FGTS
FHWA
FMSIB
GEJE
GIS
HVRA
MRWA
NCFRP
NHVR
NLTN
NPG
PBS
PRG
PTT
QTMR
RAV
SEMC
SFDFN
SFSRP
SPoT
SRA
TMP
USA
WEBEOC
WeLG
WP1
WP2
WREMO
Acronym or Term
Term or Meaning
WSDOT
Explanation
Natural disaster
Hazard
Exposure
Risk
Mitigation
Resilience
Response
Recovery
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(FMSIB) September 2008, FREIGHT MOBILITY: Joint Report on Washington State Freight Highway and
Rail Projects
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Goods Transportation System (FGTS) 2011 Update
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GIS-based Statewide Freight Data Flow Network (SFDFN), by the University of Washington and
Washington State University
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2013, Restoring Wellingtons transport links after a major earthquake, Initial Project Report