418 U.S.

930
94 S.Ct. 3220
41 L.Ed.2d 1169

VILLAGE BOOKS, INC., et al.

v.
Arthur MARSHALL, Jr., State's Attorney for Prince George's
County, Maryland.
No. 73-1060.

Supreme Court of the United States

July 25, 1974

On petition for writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeals of maryland.

The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied.
Mr. Justice DOUGLAS, being of the view that any state ban on obscenity
is prohibited by the First Amendment, made applicable to the States by
the Fourteenth (see Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 70-73, 93
S.Ct. 2628, 37 L.Ed.2d 446 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting)), would grant
certiorari and reverse the judgment below.
Mr. Justice BRENNAN, with whom Mr. Justice STEWART and Mr.
Justice MARSHALL join, dissenting.
Petitioners were enjoined by the Circuit Court for Prince George's County,
Maryland, from selling a group of allegedly obscene books, on the
authority of Art. 27, 418 and 418A, of the Annotated Code of
Maryland. Section 418A grants jurisdiction to the circuit courts to enjoin
the sale or distribution of any publication which is 'obscene' within the
meaning of 418. Section 418 provides in pertinent part as follows:
'Every person who knowingly sends or causes to be sent, . . . into this
State, or . . . distributes . . . any obscene material is guilty of a
misdemeanor.' As respondent concedes, the Maryland courts have defined
the term 'obscenity' in this section by adopting the test set forth in Roth v.
United States, 354 U.S. 476, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498. See
Wagonheim v. Maryland State Board of Censors, 255 Md. 297, 304-305,

258 A.2d 240 (1969). The Court of Appeals affirmed, and this Court
granted certiorari, vacated the judgment of the Court of Appeals, and
remanded the case for reconsideration in light of Miller v. California, 413
U.S. 15, 93 S.Ct. 2607, 37 L.Ed.2d 419 (1973). That court again affirmed
in an unreported opinion.
It is my view that 'at least in the absence of distribution to juveniles or
obtrusive exposure to unconsenting adults, the First and Fourteenth
Amendments prohibit the State and Federal Governments from attempting
wholly to suppress sexually oriented materials on the basis of their
allegedly 'obscene' contents.' Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49,
113, 93 S.Ct. 2628, 37 L.Ed.2d 446 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
It is clear that, tested by that constitutional standard, 418A, as it
incorporates the term 'obscene' in 418, is constitutionally overbroad and
therefore invalid on its face. For the reasons stated in my dissent in Miller
v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 47, 93 S.Ct. 2607, 37 L.Ed.2d 419 (1973). I
would therefore grant certiorari, and, since the judgment of the Maryland
Court of Appeals was rendered after Miller, reverse.'*
In that circumstance, I have no occasion to consider whether the other
questions presented merit plenary review. See Heller v. New York, 413
U.S. 483, 494, 495, 93 S.Ct. 2789, 37 L.Ed.2d 745 (1973) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).

Moreover, on the basis of the Court's own holding in Jenkins v. Georgia, 418
U.S. 153, 94 S.Ct. 2750, 41 L.Ed.2d 642 (1974), its denial of certiorari is
improper. As permitted by Supreme Court Rule 21(1), which provides that the
record in a case need not be certified to this Court, the petitioners did not certify
the allegedly obscene materials involved in this case. It is plain, therefore, that
the Court, which has not requested the certification of those materials, has
failed to discharge its admitted responsibility under Jenkins independently to
review those materials under the second and third parts of the Miller obscenity
test. Nor can it be assumed that the court below performed such a review, since
that responsibility was not made clear until Jenkins. Petitioners have thus never
been provided the independent judicial review to which the Court held them
entitled in Jenkins. At a minimum, the Court should vacate the judgment below
and remand for such a review.

Although four of us would grant and reverse, the Justices who join this opinion

do not insist that the case be decided on the merits.