MARY ROSE P.

CAMBEL
4th Year Juris Doctor
Special Proceedings Review
LSPU-Santa Cruz, Laguna

RULE 73
In re: in the matter of the petition to approve the will of ruperta palaganas with prayer for the
appointment of special administrator, MANUEL MIGUEL PALAGANAS and BENJAMIN
GREGORIOPALAGANAS vs. ERNESTO PALAGANAS
G.R. No. 169144
Facts:
Ruperta C. Palaganas (Ruperta), a Filipino who became a naturalized United
States (U.S.) citizen, died single and childless. In the last will and testament
she executed in California, she designated her brother, Sergio C. Palaganas (Sergio),
as the executor of her will for she had left properties in the Philippines and in the U.S.
Respondent Ernesto C. Palaganas (Ernesto), another brother of Ruperta, filed w i t h
the a petition for the probate of Rupertas will and for his
a p p o i n t m e n t a s special administrator of her estate. However, petitioners Manuel
Miguel
Palaganas
(Manuel) and
Benjamin
Gregorio Palaganas (Benjamin), nephews of Ruperta,
opposed
the
petition on the ground that Rupertas will should not be probated in the Philippines but in
the U.S. where she executed it. T h e R T C i s s u e d a n o r d e r : ( a ) a d m i t t i n g t o
p r o b a t e R u p e r t a s l a s t w i l l ; ( b ) appointing respondent Ernesto as special
administrator at the request of Sergio, the U.S.-based executor designated in the
will; and (c) issuing the Letters of Special Administration to Ernesto. Manuel and
Benjamin appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), arguing that an unprobated will
executed by an American citizen in the U.S. cannot be probated for the first time in the
Philippines. The CA affirmed order of the RTC, holding that the RTC properly allowed
the probate of the will. The CA pointed out that Section 2, Rule 76 of the Rules of
courtd o e s n o t r e q u i r e p r i o r p r o b a t e a n d a l l o w a n c e o f t h e w i l l i n
t h e c o u n t r y o f i t s execution, before it can be probated in the Philippines. The
present
case
is different
from reprobate, which refers to a will already probated and allowed a
b r o a d . Reprobate is governed by different rules or procedures.
Issue:
Whether or not a will executed by a foreigner abroad may be
p r o b a t e d i n t h e Philippines although it has not been previously probated and
allowed in the country where it was executed.

Held:
Section 1, Rule 73 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that if
the decedent is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the RTC of the province
where he has an estate may take cognizance of the settlement of such
estate. Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 76 further state that the executor, devisee, or
legatee named in the will,or any other person interested in the estate, may, at
any time after the death of thetestator, petition the court having jurisdiction to
have the will allowed, whether thesame be in his possession or not, or is lost
or destroyed.Our rules require merely that the petition for the allowance of a
will mustshow, so far as known to the petitioner: (a) the jurisdictional facts;
(b)
the
names,
ages, and residences of the heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator or
decedent; (c) the probable value and character of the property of the estate;
(d) the name of the person for whom letters are prayed; and (e) if the will has
not been delivered to the court, the name of the person having custody of
it. Jurisdictional facts refer to the fact of death of the decedent, his residence
at the time of his death in the province where the probate court is sitting, or if
he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the estate he left in such
province. The rules do not require proof that the foreign will has already been
allowed and probated in the country of its execution. In insisting that
Rupertas will should have been first probated and allowed bythe court of
California, petitioners Manuel and Benjamin obviously have in mind
theprocedure for the reprobate of will before admitting it here. But, reprobate
or
reauthentication of a will already probated and allowed in a foreign country is
different from that probate where the will is presented for the first time before
acompetent court. Reprobate is specifically governed by Rule 77 of the Rules
of Court. Contrary to petitioners stance, since this latter rule applies only tor
eprobate of a will, it cannot be made to apply to the present case. In
reprobate,the local court acknowledges as binding the findings of the foreign
probate
courtprovided
its
jurisdiction
over
the
matter
can be
established.Besides, petitioners stand is fraught with impractically. If the
instituted heirsdo not have the means to go abroad for the probate of the will,
it is as good asdepriving them outright of their inheritance, since our law
requires that no will shallpass either real or personal property unless the will
has been proved and allowed bythe proper court.

RULE 74

UTULO v. VDA DE GARCIA (66 Phil 302)

Facts:
Juan Garcia Sanchez died intestate leaving his spouse Leona and 3 children
Juan, Patrocinio and Luz
During the pendency of the administration proceedings of the fathers estate,
Luz died w/o any legitimate descendants; her only forced heirs were her mother and
husband Pablo Utulo
The only property Luz left was her share in her fathers estate
Pablo Utulo commenced the judicial administration of Luzs estate; he asked
the court to be the administrator
Leona opposed saying that since the deceased left no indebtedness, there
was no occasion for judicial administration; and if there is, she had better right
Pablo claims that it was necessary for him to be named the administrator so
that he may have legal capacity to appear in the intestate proceedings of Juan
Pablo was named administrator; Leonas appeal was granted; thus the petition
Issue:
Whether there was a need for appointment of administrator
Held:
There was no need for appointment of administrator
As a general rule, when a person dies and fails to leave a will or he had left
one but failed to name an executor, the competent court should appoint a qualified
administrator
Exceptions: (1) when all the heirs are of lawful age and there are no debts due
from the estate of the deceased, the heirs may agree in writing to partition of the
property without instituting the judicial administration; (2) where the property left does
not exceed P6,000, summary partition may be had without instituting the judicial
administration and the appointment of an administrator
In these instances, the heirs are not bound to submit the property to judicial
administration or to apply for the appointment of an administrator in court it is costly,
superfluous, and unnecessary since the heirs own the property from the moment of
death of the decedent
Pablos appointment as administrator was not necessary in order that he may
have standing in the proceedings of Juans estate; he could appear by right of
representation

ERMAC v. MEDELO (64 SCRA 359)

Facts:

Spouses Ermac and Mariquit both died leaving a parcel of land as the only
property to be inherited by heirs
MEDELO: grandson filed petition for summary settlement of the estate.
ERMAC: moved for reconsideration of the order of settlement claiming the land
as belonging to him and his wife.
Issue:
W/N the approval of the project of partition was valid despite the claim of ERMAC
in a separate civil action?
Held:
The policy of the law is to terminate proceedings for the settlement of the estate
of the deceased persons with the least loss of time.
Small estates: summary procedure dispensing with appointment of administrator
Not proper to delay the summary settlement of a deceased person just because
an heir or a third person claims that certain properties do not belong to the estate;
properly ventilated in an independent action and probate court should proceed to the
distribution of the estate (subject to the results of suit).
Appropriate step: proper annotation of lis pendens.

RULE 75
FERNANDEZ v. DIMAGIBA (21 SCRA 428)
Facts:
1) Ismaela Dimagiba (respondent) submitted petition for probate of purported will
of Benedicta delos Reyes as the sole heir of deceased. Later, heirs Dionisio Fernandez,
et. al. (oppositors) filed opposition to the probate on grounds of forgery, vices of
consent, laches, and revocation of the will on deeds of sale.
2) CFI found will genuine and properly executed but deferred resolution on
estoppel and revocation grounds until intrinsic validity will be passed upon. Oppositors
insisted that estoppel and revocation issues be considered but CFI overruled claim until
opportune time. Later, CFI ruled that Benedictas will was unrevoked by deeds of sale.
3) CA admitted will to probate and upheld finality for lack of opportune appeal,
that it was appealable independently of issue of revocation, affirmed CFI.
Issues:

1) W/n decree of CFI allowing probate had become final for lack of appeal?
2) W/n order overruling estoppel had become final?
3) w/n Benedictas will had been impliedly revoked by her deeds of sale?
Held:
1) YES, CA correct, CFI decree allowing probate is final.
Finality of probate decree: A probate decree finally and definitively settles all questions
concerning capacity of the testator and proper execution and witnessing of his last will
and testament, irrespective of whether its provisions are valid and unenforceable or
otherwise. As such, the probate order is final and appealable, and it is so recognized by
express provisions of Sec. 1 of Rule 109 (see enumeration of 6 instances when appeal
may be taken in special proceedings)
2) YES, CA correct, order overruling estoppel final. Estoppel cannot be raised in
probate proceedings: The presentation and probate of a will are requirements of public
policy, being primarily designed to protect the testators expressed wishes , w/c are
entitled to respect as a consequence of the decedents ownership and right of
dispossession within legal limits. It would be a non sequitur to allow public policy to be
evaded on the pretext of estoppel. W/n the order overruling the allegation of estoppel is
still appealable or not, the defense is patently meritorious.
3) NO, revocation of will doubtful; CA correct, existence of any change from original
intent of testatrix Benedicta is rendered doubtful by the circumstance that subsequent
alienations made in favor of legatee Dimagiba and she paid no consideration
whatsoever, making it more doubtful that in conveying property to legatee, testatrix
Benedicta merely intended to comply in advance with her testament, rather than a
departure therefrom.
RULE 76
MERCADO v. SANTOS (66 SCRA 215)
Facts:
Mercado filed in CFI Pampanga a petition for probate of will of deceased wife
Ines Basa. Without any opposition and upon testimony of witness Gabino (attesting
witness), admitted to probate. THREE YEARS LATER, five invtervenors moved ex parte
to reopen the probate alleging lack of jurisdiction. DENIED because of ex parte. Second
filing of the motion to open the proceeding, again denied.
SIXTEEN MONTHS AFTER THE PROBATE OF THE WILL, intervenor Basa de
Leon filed with Justice of Peace of San Fernando, Pampanga a complaint against
Mercado for falsification or forgery of the will. Mercado was arrested. Complainant
withdrew complaint.

THREE MONTHS later, same intervenor charged Mercado for same offense in
Mexico, Pampanga. The complaint was dismissed after investigation, at the instance of
complainant due to his poor health.
NINE MONTHS later, same charge against same person. This time filed by fiscal
of Pampanga in Justice of Peace Court of Mexico. Case dismissed after investigation
because will was already probated. Provincial Fiscal moved in CFI Pampanga for
reinvestigation. CFI Granted.
FOURTH TIME, Mercado was arrested. Mercado filed a demurrer on ground of
probate. Overruled. Case proceeded to trial. He filed with CA an injunction. CA issued
injunction.
Issues:
1. Whether the probate of petitioners deceased wifes will is a bar to prosecution of
forgery.
YES.
2. Whether petitioner was denied constitutional right to speedy trial.
YES.
Held:
Several foreign decisions were cited. It can go either way. Others saying that can
be impugned on ground of fraud. Sec. 306 of Code of Civil Procedure said that in an
action or special proceeding, the judgment or order is conclusive upon the title of the
thing, the will or administration or condition or relation of the person provided that only
be a prima facie evidence of the death of the testator conclusive as to its DUE
EXECUTION (Sec. 625). Sec. 625 was taken almost bodily from Statutes of Vermont.
Conclusive as to its due execution against the whole world (in rem), reason why
publication is a prerequisite. Conclusive presumption that judgment or order of a court
when declared by this Code of Civil Procedure are conclusive. State v. Mc Glynn (U.S.
case). Although in said case the information was filed by the State to set aside the
probate on forgery, we do not see difference in principle. ONLY A SUBTLE
DISTINCTION between setting aside a probate decree and declaring probated will to be
forgery. You would still disturb the decree.
No fixed standard and conflict of authorities so the Court chose the most
consistent with statutory law. Here, forgery is discovered after probate and prosecution
before the prescription. Code provides an adequate remedy to any party adversely
affected by probate application for relief within reasonable time but no case
exceeding SIX MONTHS after court judgment.

RULE 77
LEON & GHEZZI v. MANUFACTURERS LIFE INSURANCE CO. (90 Phil. 459)
Facts:
Basil Gordon Butler, a resident of the Philippines, died in New York leaving a will
which was duly probate in the Surrogates Court of New York country on August 3. The
estate having been settled, the proceedings were closed. The will devised his estate
and personal effects to Mercedes de Leon (residing in the Philippines) but since
Mercedes is not of sound judgments and discretion in handling of money (she is a minor
at the time she became devisee), she will only be given a sum ofmoney sufficient for her
current needs. James Ross, the trustee, bought an annuity from Manufacturers Life
Insurance where a monthly payment of $57.60 will be given to Mercedes during her
lifetime. On September 4, 1948, Mercedes presented Butlers will for probate in the CFI
of Manila. Mercedes and the appointed administrator (Ghezzi) filed a motion for the
citation of the manager of Manufacturers Life Insurance, Manila Branch to render a
complete accounting of certain funds. (Basically Mercedes filed this petition for probate
so that she can get hold at once of the entire amount invested in the annuity.) The court
denied the motion.
Issues:
Whether or not the administratrix (Ghezzi) can administer the properties of Butler.
Held:
No. The general rule is that the administration extends only to the assets of a
decedent found within the state or country where it was granted. Hence, the funds in
question (annuity) are outside the jurisdiction of the probate court of Manila. Having
been invested in an annuity in Canada under a contract executed in that country,
Canada is the situs of the money. There is no showing or allegation that the funds have
been transferred or removed to the Manila branch. Even if the money were in the hands
of the Manila branch, yet it no longer forms part of Butlers estate and is beyond the
control of the court because it has passed completely in the hands of the company by
virtue of the contract of annuity.

RULE 78
GUERRERO v. TERAN (13 Phil 212)
Facts:
Guerrero, (as guardian of the minors Munoz) commenced an action against
Teran to recover the sum of P4,129.56 and costs. The amount represents the amount

due by the estate of Antonio Munoz, which Teran had been the administrator, to the
minors Munoz.
The lower court found from the evidence that the estate of Antonio Munoz owed
the plaintiff the sum of P3,447.46.
Issue:
Whether Teran is liable.
Held:
No Teran is not liable.
Teran was appointed as the administrator of the estate of Antonio Sanchez and
guardian of the minors Munoz only for the period September 17, 1901 to March 17,
1902. However, from March 18, 1902 to October 6, 1906, Teran was replaced by Maria
Munoz as the guardian of the minors Munoz.Therefore, Maria Munoz is responsible to
said minors for the administration of their interest in the estate of Antonio Sanchez from
the time of her acceptance of said appointment on March 18, 1902 up to the time of her
removal on October 6, 1906 based on the ground that she was not a resident of the
Philippines. If during this time she allowed other persons tohandle the property of her
wards and if any mismanagement or loss occurred thereby, the responsibility must fall
upon her. However, she may have a right of action against such persons for any loss
occasioned by their negligence or corruption.
Since the record did not disclose that any of the amounts claimed by the plaintiff
arose during the time while the said defendant was administering their interest therein,
only the sum of P188.39 (the amount acknowledged by defendant in the lower court as
his liability)
Side issue: Appointment of Resident Administrators or Guardians
There is nothing in the law which requires the courts to appoint residents only as
administrators or guardians. However, notwithstanding that there is no statutory
requirement, the courts should not consent to the appointment of persons as
administrators and guardians who are not personally subject to the jurisdiction of our
courts here.
NAVAS v. GARCIA (44 Phil. 711)
Facts:
Navas is the surviving spouse of Geronima Uy. He is contesting an order of the
Court of First Instance of Samar which appointed Jose Garcia as the administrator of

the estate of Geronima Uy. He maintains that he should be appointed as administrator

instead of Jose Garcia.
Issue:
Whether the lower court erred in not appointing him as administrator.
Held:
No, the lower court did not commit an error.
It is well settled that a probate court cannot arbitrarily disregard the preferential
rights of the surviving spouse to the administration of the estate of the deceased
spouse. But, if the person enjoying such preferential right is unsuitable, the court may
appoint another person. The determination of a persons suitability as administrator rest,
to a great extent, in the sound judgment of the court exercising the power of
appointment and such judgment will not be interfered with on appeal unless it appears
affirmatively that the court below was in error.
In the present case, it appeared on record that appellant had adverse interests in
the estate of such a character as to render him unsuitable as administrator.
Unsuitableness may consist in adverse interest of some kind or hostility to those
immediately interested in the estate.

RULE 79
DOLORES B. GUICO, ET AL., plaintiffs and appellants vs. PABLO G. BAUTISTA, ET.
AL., defendants and appellees.
Facts:

The petitioner in this case filed a case of partition despite the existence of debts
of the decedent.

Issue:
The petitioner urges that their action for partition and liquidation may be
maintained, notwithstanding that there are pending obligations of the estate, subject to
the taking of adequate measures either for the payment or the security of its creditors. Is
his contention correct?

Held:
No.
There is no question that the law allows the partition of the estate of a deceased
person by the heirs, extrajudicially or through an ordinary action for partition, without the
filing of a special proceeding and the appointment of an administrator for the purpose of
the settlement of said estate, but this they may do only "if the decedent left no debts and
the heirs and legatees are all of age or the minors are represented by their judicial
guardians". The reason is that where the deceased dies without pending obligations,
there is no necessity for the appointment of an administrator to administer the estate for
them and to deprive the real owners of their possession to which they are immediately
entitled.
The situation is different, however, where the deceased left pending obligations.
In such cases, such obligations must be first paid or compounded with the creditors
before the estate can be divided among the heirs; and unless they reach an amicable
settlement as to how such obligations should be settled, the estate would inevitably be
submitted to administration for the payment of such debts. As compared to ordinary
partition, the regular estate proceedings offer the advantage of requiring all creditors of
the deceased to disclose themselves and submit their respective claims within a
comparatively short period (12 months under Rule 87, unless claims are contingent),
otherwise, they are forever barred; while in ordinary judicial partitions the creditors'
claims are only extinguished by the expiration of the period of extinctive prescription. An
heir, therefore, may have an interest in making sure that the share allocated to him will
be freed from invisible claims, so that creditors may not later appear and initiate the very
estate proceedings sought to be avoided, and he may properly object to an action for
partition on this ground. Unless, therefore, all the heirs are agreeable to assuming
personal liability for all the decedent's obligations, those known as well as those
undisclosed, regular estate proceedings cannot be avoided.
Appellants claim that there is nothing that would prevent the trial court from
directing and ordering that the pending obligations of the estate be paid first, or that they
should constitute as liens on the respective shares to be received by the heirs. In other
words, appellants propose that the administration of the estate for the purpose of paying
off its debts be accomplished right in this partition suit, with either the Court performing
the duties of the administrator, or an administrator appointed to take care of such debts,
as prayed for in their complaint. Obviously, an ordinary action for partition cannot be
converted into a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of a deceased, without
compliance with the procedure outlined by Rules 79-90 of the Rules of Court, especially
the provisions on publication and notice to creditors.

RULE 80
JARODA v. CUSI JR. (28 SCRA 1008)

Facts:
An intestate proceeding was commenced by Antonio V. A. Tan (private respondent in
this case) for Carlos Abrilles estate.
One of the properties left by Abrille was his 19% share in the co-ownership known as
Juna Subdivision.
Tan was appointed special administrator by the court.
Tan filed an ex-parte petition for the withdrawal of the sums of P109,886.42 and
P72,644.66 from PNB, which sums were not listed in his petition for administration as
among the properties left by the deceased. He alleged that these sums were deposited
in the name of thedeceased but that they actually belong to, and were held in trust for,
the co-owners of the Juna Subdivision. The court granted the petition.
Later, Tan executed, together with the other co-owners of the Juna Subdivision, a
power of attorney appointing himself as attorney-in-fact to "sell (or) dispose upon terms
and conditions as he deems wise" the lots in the subdivision. Only after this was he
issued letters of administration.
Now as a regular administrator, Tan filed a petition with the respondent court, alleging
that the deceased was the manager of and a co-owner in the Juna Subdivision and that
he had been engaged in the business of selling the lots, and praying for the approval by
the court of the power of attorney executed by him, in behalf of the intestate estate, and
appointing and authorizing himself to sell the lots. The court granted the petition.
Petitioner Jaroda moved to nullify the two orders granted by the court: 1. Allowing the
withdrawals from PNB and 2. Approving the power of attorney.
Issue 1:
Whether or not the respondent judge acted in abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction by allowing the special administrator to withdraw the bank deposits
standing in the name of the decedent?
Held:
Yes.
In the first place, said withdrawal is foreign to the powers and duties of a
special administrator. (Check Sec 2, Rule 80 for powers and duties)
In the second place, the order was issued without notice to, and hearing of,
the heirs of the deceased.

 The withdrawal of the bank deposits may be viewed as a taking of possession

and charge of the credits of the estate, but actually, said withdrawal is a waiver by the
special administrator of a prima facie exclusive right of the intestate estate to the bank
deposits in favor of the co-owners of the Juna Subdivision, who were allegedly claiming
the same.
The bank deposits were in the name of the deceased; they, therefore, belong
prima facie to his estate after his death. And until the contrary is shown by proper
evidence at the proper stage, when money claims may be filed in the intestate
proceedings, the special administrator is without power to make the waiver or to hand
over part of the estate, or what appears to be a prima facie part of the estate, to other
persons on the ground that the estate is not the owner thereof.
If even to sell for valuable consideration property of the estate requires prior
written notice of the application to the heirs, legatees, or devisees under Rule 89 of the
Rules of Court, such notice is equally, if not more, indispensable for disposing
gratuitously of assets of the decedent in favor of strangers. Admittedly, no such notice
was given, and without it the court's authority is invalid and improper.
Issue 2:
Whether or not the respondent judge acted in abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction by approving the power of attorney executed by Tan appointing and
authorizing himself to sell the lots?
Held:
Yes, the order is void for want of notice and for approving an improper contract or
transaction.
Section 4 of Rule 89 of ROC requires "written notice to the heirs, devisees,
and legatees who are interested in the estate to be sold" and, admittedly, administrator
Tan did not furnish such notice.
It is well settled that an executrix holds the property of her testator's estate as
a trustee
It is equally well settled that an executrix will not be permitted to deal with
herself as an individual in any transaction concerning the trust property
Note that auto-contracts may be permissible but should not be made to apply
to administrators of a deceased estate. A contrary ruling would open the door to fraud
and maladministration, and once the harm is done, it might be too late to correct it.

 In approving the power of attorney, the court allowed Tan to be an agent or

attorney-in-fact for two principals: the court and the heirs of the deceased on the one
hand, and the majority co-owners of the subdivision on the other.
This dual agency of the respondent Tan rendered him incapable of
independent defense of the estate's interests against those of the majority co-owners. It
is highly undesirable, if not improper, that a court officer and administrator, in dealing
with property under his administration, should have to look to the wishes of strangers as
well as to those of the court that appointed him.
A judicial administrator should be at all times subject to the orders of the
appointing Tribunal and of no one else.
RULE 81
ROXAS v. PECSON (82 Phil 407)
Facts:
Upon Pablo Roxas death, Maria his sister and Pedro his brother (private
respondents in this case), filed a petition for the administration of Pablos estate in a
special intestate proceeding in Bulacan.
Maria was appointed special administratrix
However, a few days later, Natividad the widow (petitioner of this case) filed a
petition for the probate of Pablos alleged will and for her appointment as executrix of
his estate.
The intestate proceedings were dismissed upon agreement of the parties.
Maria and Pedro opposed probate of the will and objected to the appointment
of Natividad as special administratrix. However, since she qualified, the widow was
appointed to the position.
CFI refused to admit the will to probate on the ground that the attesting
witnesses did not sign their respective names in the presence of the testator. The case
is now pending on appeal.
Maria and Pedro Roxas renewed their petition for the appointment of Maria
Roxas as special administratrix or special co-administratrix
Respondent judge rendered his resolution appointing the petitioner Natividad
as special administratrix only of all the conjugal properties of the deceased, and Maria

as special administratrix of all capital or properties belonging exclusively to the

deceased.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent judge acted in excess of the court's jurisdiction in
appointing two special co-administratices of the estate of the deceased Pablo Roxas?
Held:
YES.
It is well settled that the statutory provisions as to the prior or preferred right of
certain persons to the appointment of administrator under section 1, Rule 81, as well as
the statutory provisions as to causes for removal of an executor or administrator under
section 653 of Act No. 190, now section 2, Rule 83, do not apply to the selection or
removal of special administrator.
As the law does not say who shall be appointed as special administrator and
the qualifications the appointee must have, the judge or court has discretion in the
selection of the person to be appointed, discretion which must be sound, that is, not
whimsical or contrary to reason, justice or equity.
There is absolutely no reason for appointing two separate administrators,
especially if the estate to be settled is that of a deceased husband as in the present
case, for according to articles 1422 and 1423 of the Civil Code, onlyafter the dowry and
paraphernalia of the wife and the debts, charges, and obligations of the conjugal
partnership have been paid, the capital or exclusive property of the husband may be
liquidated and paid in so far as the inventoried estate may reach.
If two separate administrators are appointed as done in the present case, in
every action which one of them may institute to recover properties or credit of the
deceased, the defendant may raise the question or set up the defense that the plaintiff
has no cause of action, because the property or credit in issue belongs to the class
which is being administered by the other administrator, which cannot be done if the
administrator of the entire estate is only one.
As under the law only one general administrator may be appointed to
administer, liquidate and distribute the estate of a deceased spouse, it clearly follows
that only one special administrator may be appointed to administer temporarily said
estate, because a special administrator is but a temporary administrator who is
appointed to act in lieu of the general administrator.
"When there is delay in granting letters testamentary or of administration
occasioned by an appeal from the allowance or disallowance of will, or from any other
cause, the court may appoint a special administrator to collect and take charge of the

estate of the deceased until the questions causing the delay are decided and executors
or administrators thereupon appointed," (sec. 1, Rule 81).
RULE 82
GONZALES v. AGUINALDO (190 SCRA 112)
Facts:
1. In the intestate proceedings of the deceased Ramona Gonzales, two of her
four children GONZALES and OLBES were appointed as co-administratrices.
2. Later on, while GONZALES was in the US to accompany her husband who
was receiving medical treatment there, OLBES filed a motion to remove GONZALES as
co-administratrix on the ground that she is incapable or unsuitable to discharge the trust
and had committed acts and omissions detrimental to the interest of the estate and the
heirs.
3. An order was issued requiring GONZALES and other parties to file their
opposition. The other child of the deceased, Fabis, was the only one who opposed the
removal of GONZALES.
4. Thereafter, the letters of administrator granted to GONZALES was cancelled. It
was held that although it would be in the best interest of the estate to have the two
children as administrators, since GONZALES was presently absent and left OLBES to
manage the estate, there should be now only one administrator of the estate.
5. The motion for reconsideration of her removal was subsequently denied.
Issue:
Whether the order cancelling the letters of administration granted to GONZALES
should be nullified on the ground of grave abuse of discretion, as her removal was not
shown to be anchored on any of the grounds provided in Section 2, Rule 82 of the
Rules of Court.
Held:
Yes, there was grave abuse of discretion. GONZALES reinstated.
1. In the appointment of the administrator, the principal consideration reckoned
with is the interest of the estate. The underlying assumption behind this rule is that
those who will reap the benefit of a wise, speedy, economical administration of the
estate, or, on the other hand, suffer the consequences of waste, improvidence or

mismanagement, have the highest interest and most influential motive to administer the
estate correctly.
2. Administrators have such an interest in the execution of their trust as entitle
them to protection from removalwithout just cause. Hence, section 2 of Rule 92 provides
the legal and specific causes authorizing the removal of an administrator. Thus, a court
must have some fact legally before it, in order to justify a removal.
3. IN this case, the removal was not based on any of the causes specified in
OLBES motion. Neither was there a determination of the validity of the charges brought
against GONZALES. On the other hand, the removal was based on the fact that
conflicts and misunderstandings existed between GONZALES and OLBES and that the
former had been absent from the country for a little less than a year.
4. Contrary to the bare allegations of failure to manage and incompetence, it was
shown that despite being in the US, GONZALES continued to perform her duties
(sending a letter of authorization to OLBES to receive interests accruing from Land
Bank). Also, temporary absence in the state does not disqualify one to be an
administrator of the estate.
5. Reliance by the lower court on the fact that 2 of the 4 heirs do not wish to
reinstate GONZALES is misplaced. Removal of an administrator does not lie on the
whims, caprices and dictates of the heirs or beneficiaries of the estate, or on the belief
of the court that it would result in orderly and efficient administration.
DELA CRUZ v. CAMON (16 SCRA 886)
Facts:
- Estate of Thomas Fallon and Anne Fallon Murphy was owner of two-fourths
(2/4) share pro-indiviso of Hacienda Rosario in Negros Occidental.
- The whole hacienda was held in lease by Emilio Camon long before the present
intestate proceedings were commenced
- the administrator of the estate moved the court for an order to direct Emilio
Camon to pay the estate's two-fourths share of the rentals on Hacienda Rosario for the
crop years 1948-1949 through 1960-1961, viz: on the sugar land, P62,065.00; and on
the rice land, P2,100.00.
- Emilio Camon challenged the probate court's jurisdiction over his person.
- The court ruled that the demand for rentals cannot be made "by mere motion by
the administrator but by independent action."

- Dela Cruz the administrator appealed

Issue:
Whether the demand for rentals against Camon may be decided upon by the
Probate Court?
Held:
No. It must be decided in a separate action.
The jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental over the
subject matter herein is beyond debate. However, acting as a probate court, said court
is primarily concerned with the administration, liquidation and distribution of the estate.
With the foregoing as parting point, let us look at the administrator's claim for
rentals allegedly due. The amount demanded is not, by any means, liquidated.
Conceivably, the lessee may interpose defenses. Compromise, payment, statute of
limitations, lack of cause of action and the like, may be urged to defeat the
administrator's case and should be threshed out in a full trial on the merits.
Also, Paula vs. Escay, et al., teaches us that: "When the demand is in favor of
the administrator and the party against whom it is enforced is a third party, not under the
court's jurisdiction, the demand cannot be by mere motion by the administrator, but by
an independent action against the third person."6 The line drawn in the Escay case
gives us a correct perspective in the present. The demand is for money due allegedly
for rentals. Camon is a third person. Hence, the administrator may not pull him against
his will, by motion, into the administration proceedings. We are fortified in our view by
the more recent pronouncement of this court7 that even "matters affecting property
under judicial administration" may not be taken cognizance of by the court in the course
of intestate proceedings, if the "interests of third persons are prejudiced"
RULE 83
HEIRS OF GREGOIRE v. BAKER (51 Phil 75)
Facts:
- One J.H. Ankrom died; respondent Administrator included in the estate a tract of
land worth P60,000
- Petitioners Heirs of Gregoire filed a claim against the estate of Ankrom for about
P70,000, which was allowed

- Later on the respondent administrator discovers that Ankrom had executed a

mortgage on the property here in question in favor of the Philippine Trust Company to
secure that company from liability on a note in the amount of P20,000.00, of the same
date, upon which it had made itself contingently liable; Two days after this mortgage had
been executed Ankrom appears to have made an assignment of all his interest in the
mortgaged property to one J. G. Jung, of Cincinnati, Ohio, for a purported consideration
of the sum of P1 and other good and valuable considerations.
- In view of these conveyances by his intestate, the administrator presented an
amended inventory, omitting therefrom the tract of 930 hectares with its improvements
thereon, the same being the land covered by the transfers above mentioned.
- The courts initially ordered the inclusion of the land considering that without it
the estate would be insolvent, but later on reversed
- Petitioners appeal, claiming that the assignment to Jung by Ankrom of the
equity of redemption of the latter in the tract of land above mentioned was affected in
fraud of creditors, and that it was the duty of the administrator to retain the possession
of this tract of land and thereby place upon Jung, or persons claiming under him, the
burden of instituting any action that may be necessary to maintain the rights of the
transferee under said assignment.
Issue:
w/n the contentions of the petitioners are correct; what is the remedy of the
creditors?
Held:
Yes.
- The precise remedy open to the appellants in the predicament above described
is clearly pointed pout in section 713 of our Code of Civil Procedure, which reads as
follows: When there is a deficiency of assets in the hands of an executor or
administrator to pay debts and expenses, and when the deceased person made in his
life-time such fraudulent conveyance of such real or personal estate or of a right or
interest therein, as is stated in the preceding section, any creditor of the estate may, by
license of the court, if the executor or administrator hasnot commenced such action,
commence and prosecute to final judgment, in the name of the executor or
administrator, an action for the recovery of the same and may recover for the benefit of
the creditors, such real or personal estate, or interest therein so conveyed. But such
action shall not be commenced until the creditor files in court a bond with sufficient
surety, to be approved by the judge, conditioned to indemnify the executor or
administrator against the costs of such action. Such creditor shall have a lien upon the

judgment by him so recovered for the costs incurred and such other expenses as the
court deems equitable.
- The remedy of the appellants is, therefore, to indemnify the administrator
against costs and, by leave of court, to institute an action in the name of the
administrator to set aside the assignment or other conveyance believed to have been
made in fraud of creditors.
RULE 84
PHIL. TRUST CO. v. LUZON SURETY (2 SCRA 122)
Facts:
PICARD was appointed as administrator of the Intestate Estate of James Burt;
filed an administrators bond with LUZON SURETY as his suretysubsequently
dismissed and replaced by Philippine Trust Co.
Court issued an order for PICARD to account for an amount with the PNB as part
of the inventory of the estate of Burt. PICARD was found guilty of estafa for having
disbursed funds of the estate without authority.
Court ordered LUZON SURETY to show cause why the administrators bond
should not be confiscated.
Issue:
W/n the probate court can order the confiscation of the administrators bond?
Held:
Yes. The probate court may have the bond executed in the same probate
proceeding.
A probate court is possessed with all-embracing power not only in requiring but
also in fixing the amount and executing or forfeiting the administrators bond; execution
or forfeiture of the bond- necessary part and incident of the administration proceedings
Surety is bound upon the terms of the bond of the principal, as Picard failed to
faithfully execute the orders and decrees of court, the obligations remains in full force
and effect; surety- not entitled to notice in the settlement of the accounts of the executor
or administrator, privy to the proceedings against his principal.
RULE 85

LACSON v. REYES (182 SCRA 729)

Facts:
Ephraim Serquina petitioned the court for the probate of the last will and
testament of Carmelita Farlin, in his capacity as counsel for the heirs and as executor
under the will. He then filed a motion for attorneys fees against the heirs, alleging that
the heirs have agreed to pay, as and for his legal services rendered the sum of
P68,000.00. The heirs denied the claim and alleged that the sum agreed upon was only
P7,000.00 which was already paid. Lower court granted the motion.
Issue:
Whether or not Serquina is entitled to attorneys fees.
Held:
No. First, no docket fee was paid, hence, the court did not acquire jurisdiction.
Second, The Rules of Court provides that an administrator or executor may be allowed
fees for the necessary expenses he has incurred as such, but he may not recover
attorneys fees from the estate. His compensation is fixed by the rule but such
compensation is in the nature of executors or administrators commissions, and never
as attorneys fees. Where the administrator is himself the counsel for the heirs, it the
latter who must pay therefore. Court ruled attorneys fees in the amount of P15,000.00
can be recovered from the heirs and not from the estate of Carmelita Farlin.
RULE 86
MANUEL BARREDO vs COURT OF APPEALS,
GR No. L-17863
Facts:
On 23 and 30 August and 6 September 1945, a notice to creditors requiring them
their claims with the clerk of court previously fixed within 6 months reckoned from the
date of its first publication and expiring February 23, 1946, was published by the
administrator of the intestate estate of Charles McDonough.
On 22 October 1947, the heirs of Fausto Barredo filed their belated claim to
collect the face value of a promissory note for P20,000.00 plus interest and attorneys
fees against the said estate. The promissory note was secured by a mortgage in favor
of FaustoBarredo over the leasehold rights of Mc D nough The original lease, the
extension of its term, and the mortgage were all annotated at the back of the certificate
of title of the land. A deed of extrajudicial partition of the secured credit was also made
by the heirs and was annotated at the back of the aforesaid title.

The claim was opposed by the administrator. The lower court allowed it after
hearing, but was reversed by the Court of Appeals.
In the case at bar, petitioner contends that the one month period referred to in
Section 2 of Rule 87 of Rules of Court is to be counted from and after the expiration of
the 6 month period fixed in the published notice to claims. The respondent administrator
argues that the one-month period for filing late claims should be counted from the
expiration of the regular 6-month period.
Issue:
WON the tardy claim will be allowed.
Held:
No. The claim was filed outside of the period previously fixed with an insufficient
cause. A tardy claim may be allowed, at the discretion of the court, upon showing of
cause for failure to present said claim on time.
The one-month period specified in this section is the time granted claimants, and
the same is to begin from the order authorizing the filing of the claims. It does not mean
that the extension of one month starts from the expiration of the original period fixed by
the court for the presentation of claims. (Paulin vs. Aquino, L-11267, March 20, 1958)
However, the probate courts discretion in allowing a claim after the regular
period for filing claims but before entry of an order of distribution presupposes not only
claim for apparent merit but also that cause existed to justify the tardiness in filing the
claim. Here, petitioners alleged as excuse for their tardiness the recent recovery of the
papers of the late Fausto Barredo from the possession of his lawyer who is now
deceased. This ground insufficient, due to the availability, and knowledge by the
petitioners, of the annotation at the back of the certificate of title of the mortgage
embodying the instant claim, (as well as the payment of P20,000.00 made by the
Japanese military authorities.)
The order of the trial court allowing the late claim without justification, because
under Section 2, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court, said court has no authority to admit a
belated claim for no cause or for an insufficient cause.
MELGAR v. BUENVIAJE (179 SCRA 196)
Facts:
A passenger bus owned by the Felicidad Balla and driven by Domingo Casin
swerved to the left lane and collided head-on with a Ford Fiera (a service jeep) owned
by Mateo Lim Relucio and driven by Ruben Lim Relucio coming from the opposite
direction. The bus swerved further to the left this time colliding head-on with another
passenger bus owned by Benjamin Flores and driven by Fabian Prades. Felicidad Balla

and Domingo Casin died on the spot. Drivers Ruben Lim Relucio and Fabian Prades
also died.
The spouses Oscar Prades and Victoria Prades, the only surviving forced
heirs of Fabian Prades, filed a complaint against the children of deceased Felicidad
Balla for damages. The spouses Prades alleged that Casin drove in a reckless and
imprudent manner which was the sole, direct and proximate cause of the incident which
resulted to the death of Fabian Prades, and that the estate of deceased Felicidad Balla
should be held liable for damages, since Felicidad Balla allowed her driver Casin to
drive recklessly and not observing the required diligence in the selection and
supervision of her employee, despite her presence in the passenger bus.
Felicidad's children moved for the dismissal of the case on the ground that the
complaint states no cause of action against them, arguing that it is entirely incorrect to
hold the children liable for the alleged negligence of their deceased mother. They said
what was proper was to sue the estate of said deceased person inasmuch as the last
portion of Section 21 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court means that the creditor should
institute the proper intestate proceedings wherein which he may be able to interpose his
claim. The court denied the motion to dismiss. Important note: there were no intestate
proceedings to settle Felicidad's estate.
Felicidad's children filed a MR. The spouses Prades filed their comment and
motion to admit amended complaint together with an amended complaint, amending the
title of the case naming as defendants the Estate of the late Felicidad Balla as
represented by the children named in the original complaint. The court issued an order
denying the MR and admitting the amended complaint. Felicidad's children then filed a
petition for certiorari assailing the denial of the MTD.
Held:
SC dismissed the petition for certiorari and upheld the assailed order.
Under Section 5 Rule 86 of the Rules of Court, actions that are abated by death
are:
(1) All claims for money against the decedent, arising from contract, express or
implied, whether the same be due, not due or contingent;
(2) All claims for funeral expenses and expenses for the last sickness of the
decedent; and
(3) Judgments for money against the decedent (Aguas v. Llemos, 5 SCRA 959
[1962]).
It is evident that the case at bar is not among those enumerated. Actions for
damages caused by the tortious conduct of the defendant survive the death of the latter.

The action can therefore be properly brought under Section 1, Rule 87 of the
Rules of Court, against an executor or administrator. The rule provides:
Section 1. Actions which may and which may not be brought against executor or
administrator. No action upon a claim for the recovery of money or debt or interest
thereon shall be commenced against the executor or administrator; but actions to
recover real or personal property, or an interest therein, from the state, or to enforce a
lien thereon, and actions to recover damages for an injury to person or property, real or
personal, may be commenced against him.
The point of controversy is however on the fact that no estate proceedings exist
for the reason that her children had not filed any proceedings for the settlement of her
estate, claiming that Felicidad Balla left no properties.

RULE 87
WARNER BARNES v. LUZON SURETY (95 Phil 924)
Facts:
-Plaintiff, Warner, Barnes & Co., filed a complaint in the CFI against defendant,
Luzon Surety, for the recovery of P6000, plus costs and P1500 for attorneys fees. The
basis for the complaint was a bond in the sum of P6000 filed by Agueda Gonzaga as
administratrix of the Interstate Estate of Aguedo Gonzaga in Special Proceedings No.
452of the CFI of Negros Occidental.
-The complaint alleges that plaintiff had a duly approved claim against the estate
of P6,485.02; that administratrix violated theconditions of her bond (i.e. failed to file
inventory, failed to pay approved claim of plaintiff, failed to render a true and just
account of her administration); and that defendant, as surety failed to pay plaintiff
notwithstanding the latters demand.
-CFI rendered a summary judgment sentencing the defendant to pay plaintiff
P6000, P900attys fees + costs.
Issue:
[1] W/N the lower court has jurisdiction to pass upon the liability of defendant
under the bond in question.
[2] W/N plaintiff should first file a claim against the estate of the deceased
administratrix, in conformity with section 6 of Rule 87 of the Rules of Court.

Held:
[1] Defendant contends that the lower court had no jurisdiction to pass upon its
liability under the bond in question, because it is only the probate court that can hold a
surety accountable for any breach by the administratrix of her duty.
-Court held that although the probate court has jurisdiction over the forfeiture or
enforcement of an administrators bond, the same matter may be litigated in an ordinary
civil action brought before the Court of First Instance.
-Though nominally payable to the Republic of the Philippines, the bond is
expressly for the benefit of the heirs, legatees and creditors of the Estate of the
deceased Aguedo Gonzaga. There is no valid reason why a creditor may not directly in
his name enforce said bond in so far as he is concerned.
[2] Defendant alleged that plaintiff should have first filed a claim against the
Estate of the deceased administratrix Agueda Gonzaga in conformity with Sec.6 of Rule
87 providing that where the obligation of the decedent is joint and several with another
debtor, the claim shall be filed against the decedent as if he were the only debtor,
without prejudice to the right of the state to recover contribution from the other debtor.
-Apart from the fact that this defense was not pleaded either in a motion to
dismiss or in the answer and was therefore waived, it appears that even as the present
complaint was filed, there were no proceedings for the administration of her estate.
Where there are no proceedings for the administration of the estate of the deceased
administrator, the creditor may enforce his bond against the surety which bound itself
jointly and severally in the case where the bond was filed.

RULE 88
AGUAS v. LILEMOS (5 SCRA 959)
Facts:
Francisco Salinas and spouses Felix and Maria Aguas filed a complaint for
recovery of damages from Hermogenes Llemos averring that Hermogenes served them
by registered mail with a copy of a petition for a writ of possession, with notice that the
same would be submitted to the said court of Samar on February 23, 1960 at 8: 00
a.m.; that in view of the copy and notice served, plaintiffs proceeded to the court from
their residence in Manilaaccompanied by their lawyers, only to discover that no such
petition had been filed; and that defendant Llemos maliciously failed to appear in court,
so that plaintiffs' expenditure and trouble turned out to be in vain, causing them mental
anguish and undue embarrassment.
Before defendant can answer the complaint, he died. The plaintiffs amended their
compliant to include the heirs of the deceased. The heirs filed a motion to dismiss which

was granted by the court on the ground that the legal representative, and not the heirs,
should have been made the party defendant; and that anyway the action being for
recovery of money, testate or intestate proceedings should be initiated and the claim
filed therein.
Issue:
Whether the lower court erred in dismissing the complaint?
Held:
NO
Rule 87 provides for actions that are abated by death are: (1) claims for funeral
expenses and those for the last sickness of the decedent; (2) judgments for money; and
(3) "all claims for money against the decedent, arising from contract express or implied".
None of these includes that of the plaintiffs-appellants. It is not enough that the claim
against the deceased party be for money, but it must arise from "contract express or
implied" which according to Leung Ben vs. O'Brien includes all purely personal
obligations other than those which have their source in delict or tort.
Rule 88 on the other hand enumerates actions that survive against a decedent's
executors or administrators, and they are: (1) actions to recover real and personal
property from the estate; (2) actions to enforce a lien thereon; and (3) actions to recover
damages for an injury to person or property. The present suit is one for damages under
the last class.

RULE 89
PAREDES v. MOYA

Facts:
Petitioner Severino Paredes sued his employer, August Kuntze, for collection of
separation and overtime pay in the CFI-Manila. Paredes prevailed, and Kuntze
appealed to the CA. Kuntze died pending appeal and was substituted by the
administratrix of his estate. The CA dismissed the appeal for the administratrixs failure
to file the printed record on appeal, and the record of the case was remanded. Paredes
filed a motion for execution, so the provincial Sheriff of Rizal levied on the properties of
August Kuntze. Paredes was the highest bidder at the auction sale conducted by the
Sheriff. In spite of a Motion to Quash the Writ of Execution filed by the Administratrix still
pending resolution, Paredes sold the property to co-petitioner Victorio Ignacio.

Respondent Court (Judge Moya) set aside the Writ of Execution and the Sheriff's Sale
and Public Auction of the property without prejudice to the filing of the judgment as a
claim in the proceedings for settlement of the estate of the deceased.

Issue:
W/N the CFI correctly set aside the Writ of Execution and the Sheriffs Sale and
Public Auction.

Held:
YES. In the case of a money claim where the defendant dies while appeal is
pending, the appeal should not be dismissed; it should continue, but the deceased
defendant should be substituted by his legal representativeexecutor or administrator
of the estate. If the lower court is affirmed, the plaintiff must go to the probate court for
an order directing the executor or administrator to satisfy the judgment. The CFI that
originally rendered the judgment has no power to order its execution and levy on the
properties of the deceased because the same are already in custodia legis in the
probate court where administration proceedings for the settlement of the estate of the
deceased defendant are already pending (see Section 21, Rule 3)
If the defendant dies after final judgment has been rendered by the CFI, as in the
case at bar, the action survives. The appeal should proceed with the deceased
defendant being substituted by his legal representative. This would prevent a useless
repetition of presenting anew before the probate court the evidence already presented
in the CFI on the validity of the claim. Consequently, contrary to respondents' claim, the
judgment against the deceased Kuntze became final and executory; it was not arrested
by his death.
It was error on the part of the plaintiff Paredes, now one of the petitioners, to
have the money judgment in his favor executed against the properties of the deceased
Kuntze.
The proper remedy of Paredes should have been to file his claim in the
administration proceedings of the estate of the deceased defendant Kuntze because all
claims for money against the decedent, arising from contract, express or implied,
whether the same be due, not due, or contingent, all claims for funeral expenses and
expenses for the last sickness of the decedent, and judgment for money against the
decedent, must be filed within the time limited in the notice to the creditors.

The respondent court correctly nullified the order of execution pursuant to the
judgment, which became final and executory, and the corresponding levy on execution
and the public auction sale.
The judgment for money against the deceased stands in the same footing as all
claims for money against the decedent, arising from contract, express or implied,
whether the same be due, not due, or contingent, all claims for funeral expenses and
expenses for the last sickness of the decedent, (1st sentence, Sec. 5, Rule 86 of the
Rules of Court), Rule 86 of the Rules of Court), although the validity of the money claim
covered by a judgment against the decedent which has already become final and
executory can no longer be litigated in the court where administration proceedings for
the settlement of the properties of the deceased are still pending, unlike the other
money claims whose validity may yet be challenged by the executor or administrator.
The writ of execution was not the proper procedure for the payment of debts and
expenses of the administration. The proper procedure is for the court to order the
administratrix to make the payment; and if there is no sufficient cash on hand, to order
the sale of the properties and out of the proceeds to pay the debts and expenses of the
administration.
The ordinary procedure by which to settle claims of indebtedness against the
estate of a deceased person, as an inheritance tax, is for the claimant to present a claim
before the probate court so that said court may order the administrator to pay the
amount thereof.
To such effect is the decision of this Court in Aldamiz vs. Judge of the Court of
First Instance of Mindoro, G.R. No. L-2360, Dec. 29, 1949, thus: . . . a writ of execution
is not the proper procedure allowed by the Rules of Court for the payment of debts and
expenses of administration. The proper procedure is for the court to order the sale of
personal estate or the sale or mortgage of real property of the deceased and all debts or
expenses of administration should be paid out of the proceeds of the sale or mortgage.
The order for the sale or mortgage should be issued upon motion of the administrator
and with the written notice to all the heirs, legatees and devisees residing in the
Philippines, according to Rule 89, section 3, and Rule 90, section 2. And when sale or
mortgage of real estate is to be made, the regulations contained in Rule 90, section 7,
should be complied with. Execution may issue only where the devisees, legatees or
heirs have entered into possession of their respective portions in the estate prior to
settlement and payment of the debts and expenses of administration and it is later
ascertained that there are such debts and expenses to be paid, in which case "the court
having jurisdiction of the estate may, by order for that purpose, after hearing, settle the
amount of their several liabilities, and order how much and in what manner each person

shall contribute, and may issue execution if circumstances require" (Rule 39, section 6;
see also Rule 74, section 4;). And this is not the instant case.
The same rule must be applied in connection with money judgments against the
deceased that have already become final, such as the money judgment in favor of
Paredes. No writ of execution should issue against the properties of the deceased. The
claim for satisfaction of the money judgment should be presented in the probate court
for payment by the administrator.
The legal basis for such a procedure is the fact that in the testate or intestate
proceedings to settle the estate of a deceased person, the properties belonging to the
estate are under the jurisdiction of the court and such jurisdiction continues until said
properties have been distributed among the heirs entitled thereto. During the pendency
of the proceedings all the estate is in custodia legis and the proper procedure is not to
allow the sheriff, in the case of court judgment, to seize the properties but to ask the
court for an order to require the administrator to pay the amount due from the estate
and required to be paid. In this jurisdiction, a void judgment or order is in legal effect no
judgment or order. By it no rights are divested. From it no rights can be obtained. Being
worthless, it neither binds nor bars anyone. All acts performed under it and all claims
flowing from it are void.

RULE 90
DE JESUS VS. DAZA
Facts:
Justina S. Vda de Manglapus purchased from Sixto de Jesus and Natalia
Alfonga, co-heirs of the petitioners, the rights, interest, and participation of the said Sixto
and Natalia in the testate estate of Gavino de Jesus, particularly, the two parcels of
land. These parcels of land were assigned to Sixto and Natalia as their shares in the
same testate estate based on the project of partition duly approved by the probate
court. The sale was also approved by the probate court.
After learning of the aforesaid sale, petitioners instituted an action in the CFI of
Batangas for legal redemption against respondent Vda. de Manglapus. While the latter
case is pending appeal, Vda. de Manglapus in the estate of the deceased Gavino de
Jesus asked the CFI of Batangas to order the provincial sheriff of said province to take
immediate possession of the parcels of land in controversy, which was in the
possession of the petitioners, and to deliver them to her afterwards. The petition was
granted and delivery was subsequently made by the sheriff.

Issue:
W/N the respondent judge, presiding the probate court, had jurisdiction to order
the delivery of the possession of the aforesaid parcels of land to respondent Vda. de
Manglapus within the same estate proceeding and not in an independent ordinary
action.
Held:
YES (this case is based on the old rules of court). From the admitted fact that the
probate court had already approved the project of partition without any reservation as to
payment of debts, funeral charges, expenses of administration, allowances to the
widow, or inheritance tax, it would appear that the estate was ready for distribution,
pursuant to Rule 91, section 1 (now Rule 90 section 1). Neither party has made any
representation to the contrary in this case.
The very fact that petitioners lodged an action for legal redemption with the Court of
First Instance of Batangas by commencing a civil case carries with it an implied but
necessary admission on the part of said petitioners that the sale to respondent Vda. de
Manglapus of the shares of Sixto and Natalia was valid. The sale was duly approved by
the probate court. By the effects of that sale and its approval by the probate court the
purchaser stepped into the shoes of the sellers for the purposes of the distribution of the
estate, and Rule 91, section 1 (now Rule 90 section 1), confers upon such purchaser,
among other rights, the right to demand and recover the share purchased by her not
only from the executor or administrator, but also from any other person having the same
in his possession.
It is evident that the probate court, having the custody and control of the entire
estate, is the most logical authority to effectuate this provision within the same estate
proceeding, said proceeding being the most convenient one in which this power and
function of the court can be exercised and performed without the necessity of requiring
the parties to undergo the inconvenience, delay and expense of having to commence
and litigate an entirely different action. There can be no question that if the executor or
administrator has the possession of the share to be delivered the probate court would
have jurisdiction within the same estate proceeding to order him to deliver that
possession to the person entitled thereto, and we see no reason, legal or equitable, for
denying the same power to the probate court to be exercised within the same estate
proceeding if the share to be delivered happens to be in the possession of "any other
person," especially when "such other person" is one of the heirs themselves who are
already under the jurisdiction of the probate court in the same estate proceeding.

This case is also assigned under Rule 90 Section 1-3. There is no discussion relevant
to Rule 89 section 8-9.

RULE 91
(Section 1)
THE MUNICIPAL COUNCIL OF SAN PEDRO, LAGUNA, ET AL., VS. COLEGIO DE
SAN JOSE, INC., ET AL.
Facts:
This is an appeal from the order of the Court which denied the petition for
escheat filed by the said petitioners, with the costs against the latter.
This case was commenced in the said by a petition filed by the petitioners in
behalf of the municipality of San Pedro, Province of Laguna, wherein they claim the
Hacienda de San Pedro Tunasa by the right of escheat.
Issue:
W/N COLEGIO DE SAN JOSE, INC., ET AL. may be parties to the case?
Yes.
W/N the land is proper subject of escheat?
No.
Held:
The sworn petition which gave rise to the proceeding is based upon the
provisions of section 750 and 751 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the English text of
which reads:
SEC. 750. Procedure when person dies intestate without heirs. When a
person dies intestate, seized of real or personal property in the Philippines Islands,
leaving no heir or person by law entitled to the same, the president and municipal
council of the municipality where the deceased last resided, if he was an inhabitant of
these Islands, or of the municipality in which he had estate, if he resided out of the

Islands, may, on behalf of the municipality, the file a petition with the Court of First
Instance of the province for an inquisition in the premises
SEC. 751. Decree of the court in such case. If, at the time appointed for the
that purpose, the court that the person died intestate, seized of real or personal property
in the Islands, leaving no heirs or person entitled to the same and no sufficient cause is
shown to the contrary, the court shall order and decree that the estate of the deceased
in these Islands, after the payment of just debts and charges, shall escheat
Escheat, under sections 750 and 751, is a proceeding whereby the real and
personal property of a deceased person become the property of the State upon his
death without leaving any will or legal heirs. It is not an ordinary action contemplated by
section 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, but a special proceeding in accordance with
the said section. The proceeding, as provided by section 750, should be commenced by
petition and not by complaint.
In a special proceeding for escheat under section 750 and 751 the petitioner is
not the sole and exclusive interested party. Any person alleging to have a direct right or
interest in the property sought to be escheated is likewise and interest and necessary
party and may appear and oppose the petition for escheat. In the present case the
Colegio de San Jose, Inc., and Carlos Young appeared alleging to have a material
interest in the Hacienda de San Pedro Tunasan; and the former because it claims to be
the exclusive owner of the hacienda, and the latter because he claim to be the lessee
thereof under a contract legality entered with the former.
According to the allegations of the petition, the petitioners base their right to the
escheat upon the fact that the temporal properties of the Father of the Society of Jesus,
among them, the Hacienda de San Pedro Tunasan, were confiscated by order of the
King of Spain and passed from then on to the Crown of Spain. If the hacienda de San
Pedro Tunasan,, which is the only property sought to be escheated and adjudicated to
the municipality of San Pedro, has already passed to the ownership of the
Commonwealth of the Philippines, it is evident that the petitioners cannot claim that the
same be escheated to the said municipality, because it is no longer the case of real
property owned by a deceased person who has not left any heirs or person who may
legality claim it, these being the conditions required by section 750 and without which a
petition for escheat should not lie from the moment the hacienda was confiscated by the
Kingdom of Spain, the same ceased to be the property of the children of Esteban
Rodriguez de Figueroa, the Colegio de San Jose or the Jesuit Father, and became the
property of the Commonwealth of the Philippines by virtue of the transfer under the
Treaty of Paris, alleged in the petition.

RULE 92

GONZALES v. AGUINALDO (190 SCRA 112)

Facts:
1. In the intestate proceedings of the deceased Ramona Gonzales, two of her
four children GONZALES and OLBES were appointed as co-administratrices.
2. Later on, while GONZALES was in the US to accompany her husband who
was receiving medical treatment there, OLBES filed a motion to remove GONZALES as
co-administratrix on the ground that she is incapable or unsuitable to discharge the trust
and had committed acts and omissions detrimental to the interest of the estate and the
heirs.
3. An order was issued requiring GONZALES and other parties to file their
opposition. The other child of the deceased, Fabis, was the only one who opposed the
removal of GONZALES.
4. Thereafter, the letters of administrator granted to GONZALES was cancelled. It
was held that although it would be in the best interest of the estate to have the two
children as administrators, since GONZALES was presently absent and left OLBES to
manage the estate, there should be now only one administrator of the estate.
5. The motion for reconsideration of her removal was subsequently denied.
Issue:
Whether the order cancelling the letters of administration granted to GONZALES
should be nullified on the ground of grave abuse of discretion, as her removal was not
shown to be anchored on any of the grounds provided in Section 2, Rule 82 of the
Rules of Court
Held:
Yes, there was grave abuse of discretion. GONZALES reinstated.
1. In the appointment of the administrator, the principal consideration reckoned
with is the interest of the estate. The underlying assumption behind this rule is that
those who will reap the benefit of a wise, speedy, economical administration of the
estate, or, on the other hand, suffer the consequences of waste, improvidence or
mismanagement, have the highest interest and most influential motive to administer the
estate correctly.
2. Administrators have such an interest in the execution of their trust as entitle
them to protection from removal

without just cause. Hence, section 2 of Rule 92 provides the legal and specific causes
authorizing the removal of an administrator. Thus, a court must have some fact legally
before it, in order to justify a removal.
3. IN this case, the removal was not based on any of the causes specified in
OLBES motion. Neither was there a determination of the validity of the charges brought
against GONZALES. On the other hand, the removal was based on the fact that
conflicts and misunderstandings existed between GONZALES and OLBES and that the
former had been absent from the country for a little less than a year.
4. Contrary to the bare allegations of failure to manage and incompetence, it was
shown that despite being in the US, GONZALES continued to perform her duties
(sending a letter of authorization to OLBES to receive interests accruing from Land
Bank). Also, temporary absence in the state does not disqualify one to be an
administrator of the estate.
5. Reliance by the lower court on the fact that 2 of the 4 heirs do not wish to
reinstate GONZALES is misplaced. Removal of an administrator does not lie on the
whims, caprices and dictates of the heirs or beneficiaries of the estate, nor on the belief
of the court that it would result in orderly and efficient administration.
RULE 93
UY AND JARDELEZA V. COURT OF APPEALS
Facts:
Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza suffered a stroke which left him comatose. His son
Teodoro upon learning that a real estate property of his parents was about to be sold,
filed a petition in court claiming that there was a need for the appointment of a guardian
to administer his fathers properties due to his present physical and mental incapacity. A
few days later, Gilda, the spouse of Ernesto filed a petition regarding the declaration of
incapacity of Ernesto, assumption of sole powers of administration of conjugal
properties and authorization to sell the same. According to her, medical treatment and
hospitalization expenses were piling up, thus requiring the need to urgently sell real
estate property. The lower court granted Gildas petition, declaring Ernesto
incapacitated and authorized her to assume the role of administrator of the conjugal
properties and sell real properties. Pending the motion for reconsideration filed by
Teodoro, Gilda was able to sell a parcel of land belonging to the conjugal properties to
her daughter Glenda. The lower court subsequently approved the deed of absolute sale.
However, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision.
Issue:

Whether or not Gilda Jardeleza as the wife of Ernesto Jardeleza, who suffered a
stroke that rendered him comatose, may assume sole powers of administration of the
conjugal property under Article 124 of the Family Code and dispose of a parcel of land
with the approval of the court in a summary proceeding.
Held:
Article 124 of the Family Code does not apply in the case at bar. When the nonconsenting spouse is incapacitated or incompetent to give consent, the proper remedy
is a judicial guardianship proceeding under Rule 93 of the Rules of Court. The spouse
who desires to sell real property as an administrator of the conjugal property must
observe the procedure provided for in Rule 95 of the Rules of Court, not the summary
judicial proceedings under the Family Code.
The trial court did not comply with the procedure under the Revised Rules of
Court. A notice of the petition was not served to the incapacitated spouse. Neither was
he required to show cause why the petition should be granted. Absent an opportunity to
be heard, the decision rendered by the trial court is void for lack of due process.

RULE 94
PAVIA vs. DE LA ROSA
Facts:
The deceased Pablo Linart e Iturralde named as executor Francisco Granada eI
turralde. In said will Carmen Linart y Pavia was made the only universal heir. Owing to
the death of the testator, Jose de la Rosa was substituted as executor and took
possession of the property of the estate. Rafaela Pavia, in her own behalf and as
guardian of Carmen, executed a power of attorney I behalf of Jose de la Rosa. Jose de
la Rosa accepted the power of attorney and proceeded to administer the estate in a
careless manner resulting in loss and damage to Carmen. Later Jose de la Rosa died
leaving as his only heirs Babiana and Salud de la Rosa. Babiana and Salud received
and accepted from the estate of Jose the inheritance without benefit of inventory and
received and divided among themselves, as such heirs, all of the estate. Babiana and
Salud were then sued by Carmen through Rafaela to recover the losses sustained by
Carmen due to Joses mismanagement of the estate.

Issue:
Whether or not the filing of the suit against Babiana and Salud was proper?

Held:
No. In accordance with the provisions of the aforesaid Act No. 190, it is
understood that testate or intestate succession is always accepted with the benefit of
inventory, and the heirs, even after taking possession of the estate of the deceased, do
not make themselves responsible for the debts of the deceased with their own property,
but solely with that property coming from the testate or intestate succession of the
deceased.
The Code of Civil Procedure now in force makes necessary the opening of a
testate or intestate succession immediately after the death of the person whose estate
is to be administered, the appointment of an executor or administrator, the taking of an
inventory of the estate, and the appointment of two or more commissioners for the
appraisal of the properties of the estate and deciding as to the claims against such
estate.
The extrajudicial division of an estate among heirs of legal age without the
intervention of the courts will take effect only in accordance with the terms and
conditions provided in sections 596 and 597 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Pursuant to the provisions contained in Part II of this code the only entity that can
lawfully represent a testate or intestate succession of a deceased person is the
executor or administrator appointed by the court, charged to care for, maintain, and
administer the estate of the deceased.
The heir legally succeeds the deceased from whom he derives his right and title,
but only after the liquidation of the estate, the payment of the debts of same, and the
adjudication of the residue of the estate of the deceased, and in the meantime the only
person in charge by law to attend to all claims against the estate of the deceased debtor
is the executor or administrator appointed by a competent court.
From the above it appears evident that whatever may be the right of action on
the part of Rafaela Pavia and the minor, Carmen Linart, the latter represented by the
former as guardian, as to the obligations assumed by Jose, now deceased, it must be
prosecuted against the executor or administrator of the estate of said deceased Jose,
whose executor or administrator is at this time the only representative of the estate or
intestate succession of said deceased.

RULE 95

UY AND JARDELEZA V. COURT OF APPEALS

Facts:
Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza suffered a stroke which left him comatose. His son
Teodoro upon learning that a real estate property of his parents was about to be sold,
filed a petition in court claiming that there was a need for the appointment of a guardian
to administer his fathers properties due to his present physical and mental incapacity. A
few days later, Gilda, the spouse of Ernesto filed a petition regarding the declaration of
incapacity of Ernesto, assumption of sole powers of administration of conjugal
properties and authorization to sell the same. According to her, medical treatment and
hospitalization expenses were piling up, thus requiring the need to urgently sell real
estate property. The lower court granted Gildas petition, declaring Ernesto
incapacitated and authorized her to assume the role of administrator of the conjugal
properties and sell real properties. Pending the motion for reconsideration filed by
Teodoro, Gilda was able to sell a parcel of land belonging to the conjugal properties to
her daughter Glenda. The lower court subsequently approved the deed of absolute sale.
However, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision.
Issue:
Whether or not Gilda Jardeleza as the wife of Ernesto Jardeleza, who suffered a
stroke that rendered him comatose, may assume sole powers of administration of the
conjugal property under Article 124 of the Family Code and dispose of a parcel of land
with the approval of the court in a summary proceeding.
Held:
Article 124 of the Family Code does not apply in the case at bar. When the nonconsenting spouse is incapacitated or incompetent to give consent, the proper remedy
is a judicial guardianship proceeding under Rule 93 of the Rules of Court. The spouse
who desires to sell real property as an administrator of the conjugal property must
observe the procedure provided for in Rule 95 of the Rules of Court, not the summary
judicial proceedings under the Family Code.
The trial court did not comply with the procedure under the Revised Rules of
Court. A notice of the petition was not served to the incapacitated spouse. Neither was
he required to show cause why the petition should be granted. Absent an opportunity to
be heard, the decision rendered by the trial court is void for lack of due process.

RULE 96
NELSON CABALES and RITO CABALES vs. COURT OF APPEALS, JESUSFELIANO and
ANUNCIANO FELIANO
G.R. No. 162421
Facts:
Sometime in 1964, Rurfino Cabales died leaving behind a parcel of
land in Southern Leyte to his wife, Saturnina and six children, namely, Bonifacio,
Francisco, Alberto, Albino, Lenora, and Rito. On 1971, the brothers and coowners Bonifacio, Alberto and Albino sold the property to Dr. Corrompido with
a right to repurchase within eight (8) years. On 1972, prior to the redemption
of the property, Alberto died leaving behind his wife and son, Nelson, herein
petitioner.Sometime later and within the redemption period, the said brothers and
theirmother, in lieu of Alberto, tendered their payment to Dr.Corrompido.
Subsequently,Saturnina, and her four children, Bonifacio, Albino, Francisco
and Leonora sold thesaid land to Spouses Feliano. It was provided in the deed of
sale that the shares of N e l s o n a n d R i t o , b e i n g m i n o r a t t h e t i m e o f t h e
s a l e , w i l l b e h e l d i n t r u s t b y t h e vendee and will paid upon them reaching the
age
of
21.
In 1986, Rito received the sum of 1,143 pesos from the
S p o u s e s F e l i a n o representing his share from the proceeds of the sale of the
property. It was only in1988, that Nelson learned of the sale from his uncle, Rito. He
signified his intentionto redeem the property in 1993 but it was only in 1995 that he filed
a complaint for redemption against the Spouses Feliano. The respondent Spouses
averred that the petitioners are estopped from denying the sale since: (1) Rito already
received hisshare; and (2) Nelson, failed to tender the total amount of the redemption
price. The Regional Trial Court ruled in favour of Spouses Feliano on the ground that
Nelson was no longer entitled to the property since, his right was subrogated
by Saturnina upon the death of his father, Alberto. It also alleged that Rito had no more
right to redeem since Saturnina, being his legal guardian at the time of the sale was
properly vested with the right to alienate the same. The Court of Appeals modified the
decision of the trial court stating that the sale made by Saturnina in behalf of Rito and
Nelson were unenforceable.
Issue:
Whether or not the sale made by a legal guardian (Saturnina) in
b e h a l f o f t h e minors were binding upon them.
Held:

With regard to the share of Rito, the contract of sale was

v a l i d . U n d e r Section 1, Rule 96 A guardian shall have the care and custody of the
person of his ward, and the management of his estate, or the management of the estate
only. x xx Indeed, the legal guardian only has the plenary power of
administration of the minors property. It does not include the power of
alienation
which
needs
judiciala u t h o r i t y. T h u s , w h e n S a t u r n i n a , a s l e g a l g u a r d i a n o f p e t i t i o n e
r R i t o , s o l d t h e latters pro indiviso share in subject land, she did not have the legal
authority to doso. Accordingly, the contract as to the share of Rito was
unenforceable. However, w h e n h e r e c e i v e d t h e p r o c e e d s o f t h e s a l e , h e
e f f e c t i v e l y r a t i f i e d i t . T h i s a c t o f ratification rendered the sale valid and binding
as to him. With respect to petitioner Nelson, the contract of sale was void. He
was a minor at the time of the sale. Saturnina or any and all the other co-owners were
not his legal guardians; rather it was his mother who if duly authorized by the
courts, could validly sell his share in the property. Consequently, petitioner Nelson
retained ownership over their undivided share in the said property. However, Nelson can
no longer redeem the property since the thirty day redemption period has expired and
thus he remains as co-owner of the property with the Spouses Feliano.

RULE 97
FRANCISCO V. COURT OF APPEALS
Facts:
Feliciano Francisco was the duly appointed guardian of the incompetent
Estefania San Pedro. Pelagio, a first cousin of Estefania petitioned the court for the
removal of Feliciano as the guardian and his appointment instead. Pelagio claimed that
Feliciano failed to submit an inventory of the estate and render an accounting. The court
ordered the retirement of Feliciano as guardian due to his old age and required him to
nominate a replacement. The court thereafter granted the execution pending appeal of
its decision and appointed Pelagio as the new guardian despite the fact that he was five
years older than the previous guardian. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of
the lower court.

Issue:
Whether or not the lower court committed grave abuse of discretion by ordering
the removal of Feliciano as guardian due to his advanced age.

Held:
The lower court correctly ordered the retirement of Feliciano as guardian. A
guardianship proceeding is instituted for the benefit and welfare of the ward. In the
selection of a guardian, the court may consider the financial situation, the physical
condition, the morals, character and conduct, and the present and past history of a
prospective appointee as well as the probability of his being able to exercise the powers
and duties of guardian for the full period during which guardianship will be necessary.
Feliciano, at the age of 72 cannot fulfil the responsibilities of a guardian anymore, as
evidenced by his delay in accounting and inventory of the wards property. To sustain
petitioner as guardian would be detrimental to the ward. While age alone is not a
controlling criterion in determining a persons fitness or qualification to be appointed or
be retained as guardian, it may be a factor for consideration.

RULE 98
OCCEA v. MARQUEZ
Facts:
Petitioners, Atty. Jesus Occea and Atty. Samuel Occea, are the lawyers for the
estate executrix, Mrs. Necitas Ogan Occea, and they had been representing the said
executrix since 1963, defending the estate against claims and protecting the interests of
the estate.
In order to expedite the settlement of William Ogan's estate, the seven instituted
heirs decided to enter into compromise with the claimants, as a result of which the total
amount of P220,000.00 in cash was awarded to the claimants, including co-executor
Atty. Isabelo V. Binamira, his lawyers and his wife. A partial distribution made to the
heirs in the total amount of P 450,000.00.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Partial Payment of Attorneys' Fees, asking the court
to approve payment to them of P 30,000.00, as part payment of their fees for their
services as counsel for the executrix since 1963, and to authorize the executrix to
withdraw the amount from the deposits of the estate and pay petitioners.
Three of the heirs moved to defer consideration of the motion until after the total
amounts for the executrix's fees and the attorney's fees of her counsel shall have been
agreed upon by all the heirs. Later, five of the seven instituted heirs filed with the court
a Manifestation stating that they had no objection to the release of P30,000.00 to
petitioners as partial payment of attorney's fees and recommending approval of
petitioners' motion.

Respondent Judge issued an order fixing the total fees of petitioners for the
period March, 1963 to December, 1965 at P 20,000.00. Petitioners moved to reconsider
that order. Respondent issued an order not only denying petitioners' Motion for
Reconsideration but also modifying the original order by fixing petitioners' fees for the
entire testate proceedings at P 20,000.00.
Petitioners contend that respondent Judge acted with grave abuse in fixing the
entire attorney's fees to which they are entitled as counsel for the executrix, and in fixing
the said fees in the amount of P 20,000.00.
In his Answer to the petition, respondent Judge alleged that (a) petitioners' proper
remedy is appeal and not a special civil action, considering that there is already a final
order on the motion for payment of fees; (b) petitioner Atty. Samuel Occea is the
husband of executrix Necitas Ogan Occea, hence, Samuel Occea's pecuniary
interest now goes against the pecuniary interest of the four heirs he is representing in
the special proceeding; (c) there are miscellaneous payments appearing in the
compromise agreement and in the executrix's accounting which cover expenses
incurred by petitioners for the estate; and (e) it is the duty of respondent Judge not to be
very liberal to the attorney representing the executrix, who is at the same time the wife
of said counsel and is herself an heir to a sizable portion of the estate, for respondent
Judge's duty is to see to it that the estate is administered "frugally," "as economically as
possible," and to avoid "that a considerable portion of the estate is absorbed in the
process of such division," in order that there may be a worthy residue for the heirs.
Issue:
W/N Judge Marquez acted with grave abuse when he fixed the attorney's fees
solely on the basis of the records of the case, without allowing petitioners to adduce
evidence to prove what is the proper amount of attorney's fees to which they are entitled
for their entire legal services to the estate.

Held:
YES. The rule is that when a lawyer has rendered legal services to the executor
or administrator to assist him in the execution of his trust, his attorney's fees may be
allowed as expenses of administration. The estate is, however, not directly liable for his
fees, the liability for payment resting primarily on the executor or administrator. If the
administrator had paid the fees, he would be entitled to reimbursement from the estate.
There is no question that the probate court acts as a trustee of the estate, and as such
trustee it should jealously guard the estate under administration and see to it that it is

wisely and economically administered and not dissipated. This rule, however, does not
authorize the court, in the discharge of its function as trustee of the estate, to act in a
whimsical and capricious manner or to fix the amount of fees which a lawyer is entitled
to without according to the latter opportunity to prove the legitimate value of his
services. Opportunity of a party to be heard is admittedly the essence of procedural due
process.
In fixing petitioners' attorney's fees solely on the basis of the records of the case,
without allowing petitioners to adduce evidence to prove what is the proper amount of
attorney's fees to which they are entitled for their entire legal services to the estate,
respondent Judge committed a grave abuse of discretion correctable by certiorari.
The court a quo is directed to hold a hearing to determine how much the total
attorney's fees petitioners are entitled to.

RULE 99
SANTOS V. ARANZANSO, 116 SCRA 1
Facts:
This is a petition to challenge the legality of the decree of adoption in favor of
Paulina Santos and Aurora Santos on the grounds that the application for adoption was
not signed by both adopting parents and by natural parents; and the judgment was
procured through and by means of fraud.

Issue:
1) Whether the validity if the adoption could be assailed collaterally in intestate
proceedings?
2) Whether the CFI has jurisdiction over the petition?
Held:
1) No. The validity of the adoption cannot be assailed collaterally in an intestate
proceedings.
2) No. Exclusive original jurisdiction over adoption and annulment of adoption
cases lies with the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court (JDRC) and not the
Court of First Instance.
RULE 100

REYES VS. SOTERO, GR NO. 167405

Facts:

Respondent Chichioco filed a petition for the issuance of letters of administration

and settlement of estate of the late Elena Lising claiming that she was the niece and
heir of Lising who died intestate. Respondent claims that real and personal properties
were allegedly in the possession of petitioner Ana Joyce S. Reyes, a grandniece of the
deceased.
Petitioner Reyes filed an Opposition to the petition, claiming that she was an adopted
child of Lising and the latters husband and asserting that the petition be dismissed
since she was the only heir of Lising who passed away without leaving any debts.
Subsequently, petitioner filed a Supplement to the Opposition attaching thereto the
certification of her adoption from the local civil registrars office that the adoption decree
was registered therein and also a copy of a Judicial Form and a certification issued by
the clerk of court that the decree was on file in the General Docket of the RTC-Tarlac.
Respondents filed a Comment to the opposition stating that reasonable doubts have
been cast on Petitioners claim that she was legally adopted due allegedly to certain
badges of fraud.
The appellate court refused to dismiss the proceeding because it was incumbent upon
the petitioner to prove before the trial court that she was indeed adopted by the Delos
Santos spouse since, imputations of irregularities permeating the adoption decree
render its authenticity under a cloud of doubt.
Issue:

WON petitioner had to prove the validity of her adoption due to imputations of
irregularities.

Held:

No. Petitioner need not prove her legal adoption by any evidence other than
those which she had already presented before the trial court.
An adoption decree is a public document required by law to be entered into public
records, the official repository of which, as well as all other judicial pronouncements
affecting the status of individuals, is the local civil registrars office as well as the court
which rendered the judgment.
Documents consisting of entries in public records made in the performance of a duty by
a public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. As such, the
certifications issued by the local civil registrar and the clerk of court regarding details of
petitioners adoption which are entered in the records kept under their official custody,
are prima facie evidence of the facts contained therein. These certifications suffice as
proof of the fact of petitioners adoption by the Delos Santos spouses until contradicted
or overcome by sufficient evidence. Mere imputations of irregularities will not cast a
cloud of doubt on the adoption decree since the certifications and its contents are
presumed valid until proof to the contrary is offered.

RULE 101
CHIN AH FOO AND YEE SHEE VS. CONCEPCION AND LEE VOO

Facts:

A Judge of the Court of first Instance acquitted a man charged with murder on
the plea of insanity, and has ordered the confinement of the insane person in an
asylum, subsequently permitting the same to leave the asylum without the
acquiescence of the Director of Health.
Article 8, paragraph 1, of the Penal Code discloses that the permission of the court who
orders the confinement of one accused of a grave felony in an insane asylum is a
prerequisite for obtaining release from the institution by the Director of Health.
Section 1048 of the Administrative Code grants the Director of Health authority to say
when a patient may be discharged from an insane asylum.

Article 8 of the Penal Code has not been impliedly repealed by section 1048 of the
Administrative Code.
Issue:

WON a judge who ordered the confinement of an insane person in an asylum

may permit the same to leave the asylum without the opinion of the Director of Health.

Held:

No. Article 8 of the Penal Code and section 1048 of the Administrative Code can
be construed so that both can stand together in such a way that the powers of the
courts and of the Director of Health are complimentary to each other.
The Director of Health is without power to release, without proper judicial authority, any
person confined by order of the court in an asylum pursuant to the provisions of Article 8
of the Penal Code. Conversely, any person confined by order of the court in an asylum
in accordance with article 8 of the Penal Code cannot be discharged from custody until
the views of the Director of Health have been ascertained as to whether or not the
person is temporarily of permanently cured or may be released without danger.

RULE 102
TIJING VS. CA, 354 SCRA 17; GR NO. 125901

Facts:
Petitioners filed a petition for habeas corpus in order to recover their son from
respondent and presented witnesses to substantiate their petition. Respondent claimed
on the other hand that she is the natural mother of the child.

The trial court held in favor of the petitioners and granted the petition for habeas
corpus. On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the decision rendered by the trial
court. The appellate court expressed its doubts on the propriety of the habeas corpus.

Issue:

WON habeas corpus is the proper remedy to regain custody of a minor.

Held:

Yes. The writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or
detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody
of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto. The writ of habeas corpus is
the proper legal remedy to enable parents to regain the custody of a minor child even if
the latter be in the custody of a third person of his own free will.

IN RE: AZUCENA L. GARCIA, 339 SCRA 292, GR 141443, AUGUST 30, 2000

Facts:

Petitioner is convicted by final judgment of the crime of falsification of public

document. In the case at bar, petitioner is out on bail and is seeking for a relief via a
petition for habeas corpus questioning the validity of the judgment rendered. Petitioner
contends that were proceedings were attended by violations of the constitutional rights
of the accused; the judgment of conviction is void thereby warranting relief by the
extraordinary legal remedy of habeas corpus.
The OSG, on the other hand states that the writ of habeas corpus is a remedy available
to a person who is illegally imprisoned or restrained by his liberty. Consequently, a
person discharged or out on bail, like petitioner, is not entitled to the writ.
Issue:

WON a person convicted by final judgment and/or out on bail is entitled to the
writ of habeas corpus.

Held:

No. The high prerogative writ of habeas corpus was devised and exists as a
speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint. Its object is to
inquire into the legality of ones detention, and if found illegal, to order release of the
detainee.
It is a well-settled rule that the writ will not issue where the person in whose behalf the
writ is sought is out on bail, or is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a
court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and that the court
or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render judgment, or make the order.

RULE 103
REPUBLIC VS. HERNANDEZ, GR NO. 117209, FEBRUARY 9, 1996_DIGESTED

Facts:

The RTC granted the petition for adoption of Kevin Earl Bartolome Moran and
simultaneously granted the prayer therein for the change of the first name of said
adoptee to Aaron Joseph, to complement the surname Munson y Andrade which he
acquired consequent to his adoption.
Petitioner opposed the inclusion of the relief for change of name in the same petition for
adoption objecting to the joinder of the petition for adoption and the petitions for the
change of name in a single proceeding, arguing that these petition should be conducted
and pursued as two separate proceedings.
Petitioner argues that a petition for adoption and a petition for change of name are two
special proceedings which, in substance and purpose, are different from and are not
related to each other, being respectively governed by distinct sets of law and rules.

Petitioner further contends that what the law allows is the change of the surname of the
adoptee, as a matter of right, to conform with that of the adopter and as a natural
consequence of the adoption thus granted. If what is sought is the change of the
registered given or proper name, and since this would involve a substantial change of
ones legal name, a petition for change of name under Rule 103 should accordingly be
instituted, with the substantive and adjective requisites therefor being conformably
satisfied.
Private respondents, on the contrary, admittedly filed the petition for adoption with a
prayer for change of name predicated upon Section 5, Rule 2 which allows permissive
joinder of causes of action in order to avoid multiplicity of suits and in line with the policy
of discouraging protracted and vexatious litigations. It is argued that there is no
prohibition in the Rules against the joinder of adoption and change of name being
pleaded as two separate but related causes of action in a single petition.
Issue:

WON respondent judge erred in granting prayer for the change of the given or
proper name if the adoptee in a petition for adoption.
Held:
No.
Par (1), Art. 189 of the Family Code provides one of the legal effect of adoption:
(1) For civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be a legitimate child of the
adopters and both shall acquire the reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the
relationship of parent and child, including the right of the adopted to use the surname of
the adopters;
The law allows the adoptee, as a matter of right and obligation, to bear the surname of
the adopter, upon issuance of the decree of adoption. It is the change of the
adoptees surname to follow that of the adopter which is the natural and necessary
consequence of a grant of adoption and must specifically be contained in the order of
the court, in fact, even if not prayed for by petitioner.
However, the given or proper name, also known as the first or Christian name, of the
adoptee must remain as it was originally registered in the civil register. The creation of
an adoptive relationship does not confer upon the adopter a license to change the
adoptees registered Christian or first name. The automatic change thereof, premised
solely upon the adoption thus granted, is beyond the purview of a decree of adoption.
Neither is it a mere incident in nor an adjunct of an adoption proceeding, such that a
prayer therefor furtively inserted in a petition for adoption, as in this case, cannot
properly be granted.

The official name of a person whose birth is registered in the civil register is the name
appearing therein. If a change in ones name is desired, this can only be done by filing
and strictly complying with the substantive and procedural requirements for a special
proceeding for change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, wherein the
sufficiency of the reasons or grounds therefor can be threshed out and accordingly
determined.
A petition for change of name being a proceeding in rem, strict compliance with all the
requirements therefor is indispensable in order to vest the court with jurisdiction for its
adjudication. It is an independent and discrete special proceeding, in and by itself,
governed by its own set of rules. Afortiori, it cannot be granted by means of any other
proceeding. To consider it as a mere incident or an offshoot of another special
proceeding would be to denigrate its role and significance as the appropriate remedy
available under our remedial law system.

RULE 104
PONCE VS ENCARNACION (1953)

Facts:
This is a petition for a writ of certiorari to annul an order of the respondent court
granting Potenciano Gapol authority, pursuant to section 26, Act No. 1459, otherwise
known as the Corporation Law, to call a meeting of the stockholders of the Dagunoy
Enterprises, Inc. and to preside at such meeting by giving proper notice to the
stockholders, as required by law or by laws of the corporation, until after the majority of
the stockholders present and qualified to vote shall have chosen one of them to act as
presiding officer of the meeting; another order denying a motion of the petitioners to
have the previous order set aside; and a third order denying a motion to the same effect
as the one previously filed. Daguhoy Enterprises, Inc., was duly registered at a meeting
duly called, the voluntary dissolution of the corporation and the appointment of
Potenciano Gapol as receiver were agreed upon. The respondent Potenciano Gapol,
who is the largest stockholder, charged his mind and filed a complaint to compel the
petitioners to render an accounting of the funds and assets of the corporation, to
reimburse it, jointly and severally because the contended that Domingo Ponce, the
president of the company, used the company funds for his own benefit. The petitioner
filed an action with the TC and prayed for an order directing him to a call a meeting of
the stockholders of the corporation and to preside at such meeting in accordance with
section 26 of the Corporation law. TC granted their petition.
Issue:

WON under the corporation code, the TC can validly call for a stockholders
meeting? / Are the officers deprived of due process in the action of the TC?
Held:
Yes. On the showing of good cause therefor, the court may authorize a
stockholder to call a meeting and to preside threat until the majority stockholders
representing a majority stockholders representing a majority of the stock present and
permitted to be voted shall have chosen one among them to preside it. And this showing
of good cause therefor exists when the court is apprised of the fact that the by-laws of
the corporation require the calling of a general meeting of the stockholders to elect the
board of directors but call for such meeting has not been done.
With persistency petitioners claim that they have been deprived of their right without due
process of law. They had no right to continue as directors of the corporation unless
reflected by the stockholders in a meeting called for that purpose every even year. They
had no right to a hold-over brought about by the failure to perform the duty incumbent
upon one of them. If they felt that they were sure to be reelected, why did they fail,
neglect, or refuse to call the meeting to elect the members of the board? Or, why did
they not seek their reelection at the meeting called to elect the directors pursuant to the
order of the respondent court.

RULE 105
CARIDAD CRUZ VDA. DE SY-QUIA
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and JOSE PEDRO REYNALDO SY-QUIA
Facts:
This case is about the necessity of taking the testimony of Doctor Ernesto
Medina Cue on the serological tests which he took in 1961 regarding the blood types of
Jose Sy-Quia, Pedro Sy-Quia and Remedios Borres.
The Court of Appeals in its decision of March 31, 1982 ordered that Doctor Cue
should testify before the trial court in Pasig, Rizal. His testimony should be admitted in
lieu of his deposition.
Pedro M. Sy-Quia died in living a holographic will, wherein he divided equally
one-half of his net estate among his widow and five children. His widow Caridad Cruz
filed Special Proceeding for the probate of his will. The will was probated in May 10,
1968.

More than three years later, Jose Pedro Reynaldo Sy-Quia filed a motion in the
probate proceeding wherein he alleged that he was an acknowledged natural child of
the testator. He prayed in his motion that being the testator's voluntarily acknowledged
natural child, his pretention nullified Pedro M. Sy-Quia's will and, therefore, his estate
should be settled under the rules of intestacy.
The widow opposed the motion on the ground that Jose was asking
for compulsory recognition which could not be entertained under article 285 of the Civil
Code. This incident was duly heard by the trial court.
Jose Sy-Quia presented Leopoldo Sy-Quia, Pedro's brother, who testified that
Jose was Pedro's acknowledged natural child. He also offered in evidence his school
records at De la Salle College containing the signatures of P.M. Sy-Quia, particularly
Exhibit Y dated July 1, 1954, which was an authorization addressed to Brother Jerome
signed by Pedro M. Sy-Quia.
On the other hand, Caridad Cruz Vda. de Sy-Quia filed a motion for the taking of
the deposition of Doctor Cue, Clinical Laboratory, Pasay City. The motion was granted
by the lower court. The deposition was taken over the opposition of Jose Sy-Quia's
counsel. He objected to its presentation in court as evidence since Doctor Cue could
have testified in court.
Doctor Cue's deposition purportedly proved that taking into account the blood
groups and types of Jose Sy-Quia, Pedro M. Sy-Quia and Remedios Borres, which, as
already noted, he examined in 1961, Jose could not have been the son of Pedro and
Remedios.
The lower court found that there is no indubitable writing showing that Jose was
an acknowledged natural child of Pedro M. Sy-Quia, that his action for compulsory
recognition should have been brought during Pedro's lifetime and that the result of the
blood tests explains why Pedro omitted Jose in his will.
Jose appealed to the Court of Appeals which in its aforementioned 1982 decision
held that Jose's theory was that he was already a voluntarily acknowledged natural child
under article 278 of the Civil Code.
However, the Appellate Court ruled that the deposition of Doctor Cue was
inadmissible evidence. It remanded the case to the trial court and directed it to
subpoena Doctor Cue to testify on the subject of his deposition and to be crossexamined by Jose Sy-Quia's counsel.
Mrs. Sy-Quia appealed to this Court.
Issue:

WON Jose was a voluntarily recognized natural child should be decided under
article 278 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
Held:
Article 2260 of that Code provides that "the voluntary recognition of a natural
child shall take place according to this Code, even if the child was born before the
effectivity of this body of laws" or before August 30, 1950. Hence, article 278 may be
given retroactive effect (p. 169, Report of Code Commission; 7 Padilla, Civil Code,
1975, p. 709).
Voluntary recognition "in any authentic writing" under article 278 means any
genuine or indubitable writing sufficient for compulsory recognition under article 135 of
the Spanish Civil Code (De Jesus vs. Syquia, 58 Phil. 866; 1 Tolentino, Civil Code,
1974, p. 585, 586).
The status of a person as a voluntarily acknowledged natural child "could be
established by the ordinary means of evidence without any limitations as to time"
(Larena vs. Hubio 43 Phil. 1017, 1019). "An action based on voluntary acknowledgment
may be brought after the death of the father" (Javelona vs. Monteclaro, 74 Phil. 393,
400; Guaria vs. Guaria-Casas 109 Phil. 1111). Hence, Jose's motion in the testate
proceeding to claim his alleged hereditary share is proper.
The Appellate Court's decision is set aside. It is directed to receive the testimony
of Doctor Cue within thirty days from notice of the finality of this resolution and
thereafter to render a new decision as may be warranted under the facts and the law of
the case.

RULE 106
DE MESA V. ACERO
G.R. No. 185064, [January 16, 2012]
Facts:
Araceli De Mesa is married to Ernesto De Mesa.They purchased a parcel of land
located in Meycauayan, Bulacan. A house was contracted in the said property, which
became their family home. A year after, Arceli contracted a loan in the amount of

P100,000 from Claudio Acero, which was secured by a mortgage on the said parcel of
land and house. Araceli issued a check for the payment of the loan. When Acero
presented the check to the bank it was dishonored because the checking account was
already closed. Acero demanded payment. However, Spouses De Mesa still failed to
pay. Acero filed a complaint for violation of B.P. 22 in the RTC. The RTC acquitted the
Spouses but ordered them to pay Acero P100,000 plus legal interest. A writ of
execution was issued to levy on the said property.
The house and lot was sold in the public auction and Acero was the highest
bidder. Acero leased the property to Juanito Oliva, who defaulted payment for several
years. Oliva contends that the Acero spouses are not the owners of the property.
The MTC rendered a Decision, giving due course to Spouses Aceros complaint
and ordering the Spouses De Mesa and Oliva to vacate the subject property. Spouses
De Mesa contend that they are the rightful owners of the property. The MTC also stated
that from the time a Torrens title over the subject property was issued in Claudios name
up to the time the complaint for ejectment was filed, the petitioners never assailed the
validity of the levy made by the Sheriff, the regularity of the public sale that was
conducted thereafter and the legitimacy of Aceros Torrens title that was resultantly
issued.
Spouses De Mesa filed an action to nullify the TCT issued to Acero. Spouses De
Mesa contend that the subject property is a family home, which is exempt from
execution under the Family Code and, thus, could not have been validly levied upon for
purposes of satisfying the writ of execution. RTC dismissed the complaint. CA affirmed
RTCs decision.
Issue:
Whether or not the subject property, as a family home, may be subject to
execution in this case.
Held:
YES, the subject property is family home but is subject to execution. In general,
the family home is exempt from execution. However, the person claiming this privilege
must assert it at the time it was levied or within a reasonable time thereafter.

Ratio:
For the family home to be exempt from execution, distinction must be made as to
what law applies based on when it was constituted and what requirements must be
complied with by the judgment debtor or his successors claiming such privilege.
The foregoing rules on constitution of family homes,
of exemption from execution, could be summarized as follows:

for

purposes

First, family residences constructed before the effectivity of the Family Code or
before August 3, 1988 must be constituted as a family home either judicially or
extrajudicially in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code in order to be exempt
from execution;
Second, family residences constructed after the effectivity of the Family Code on
August 3, 1988 are automatically deemed to be family homes and thus exempt from
execution from the time it was constituted and lasts as long as any of its beneficiaries
actually resides therein;
Third, family residences which were not judicially or extrajudicially constituted as
a family home prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, but were existing thereafter, are
considered as family homes by operation of law and are prospectively entitled to the
benefits accorded to a family home under the Family Code.
Here, the subject property became a family residence sometime in January 1987
when Spouses De Mesa got married. There was no showing, however, that the same
was judicially or extrajudicially constituted as a family home in accordance with the
provisions of the Civil Code. Still, when the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988,
the subject property became a family home by operation of law and was thus
prospectively exempt from execution. The petitioners were thus correct in asserting that
the subject property was a family home.
Despite the fact that the subject property is a family home and, thus, should have
been exempt from execution, Spouses De Mesa should have asserted the subject
property being a family home and its being exempted from execution at the time it was
levied or within a reasonable time thereafter. They are stopped from claiming
the exemption of the property from execution.

RULE 107
REPUBLIC V. GRANADA
G.R. No. 187512, [June 13, 2012]
Facts:
Cyrus and Yolanda Granada, both employees of Sumida Electric Company, got
married in 1993.
Sometime in May 1994, when Sumida Electric Philippines closed down, Cyrus
went to Taiwan to seek employment. Yolanda claimed that from that time, she did not
receive any communication from her husband, notwithstanding efforts to locate him. Her
brother testified that he had asked the relatives of Cyrus regarding the latters
whereabouts, to no avail.
After nine (9) years of waiting, Yolanda filed a Petition to have Cyrus declared
presumptively dead with the RTC Lipa City. On 7 February 2005, the RTC rendered a
Decision declaring Cyrus as presumptively dead.
On 10 March 2005, petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the
OSG, filed a Motion for Reconsideration of this Decision. Petitioner argued that Yolanda
had failed to exert earnest efforts to locate Cyrus and thus failed to prove her wellfounded belief that he was already dead. The motion was denied. The OSG then
elevated the case on appeal to the Court of Appeals. Yolanda filed a Motion to Dismiss
on the ground that the CA had no jurisdiction over the appeal. She argued that her
Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death, based on Article 41 of the Family Code,
was a summary judicial proceeding, in which the judgment is immediately final and
executory and, thus, not appealable.
The appellate court granted Yolandas Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction. Citing Republic v. Bermudez-Lorino, the CA ruled that a petition for
declaration of presumptive death under Rule 41 of the Family Code is a summary
proceeding. Thus, judgment thereon is immediately final and executory upon notice to
the parties.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration, which was denied. Hence, the present
petition under Rule 45.
Issues:
1. Whether the order of the RTC in a summary proceeding for the declaration of
presumptive death is immediately final and executory upon notice to the parties and,
hence, is not subject to ordinary appeal.
2. Whether the CA erred in affirming the RTCs grant of the petition for declaration of
presumptive death based on evidence that respondent had presented.
Held:
Yes, the declaration of presumptive death is final and immediately executory.
Even if the RTC erred in granting the petition, such order can no longer be assailed.
Ratio:
1. A petition for declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse for the purpose of
contracting a subsequent marriage under Article 41 of the Family Code is a summary
proceeding as provided for under the Family Code. Taken together, Articles 41, 238,
247 and 253 of the Family Code provide that since a petition for declaration of
presumptive death is a summary proceeding, the judgment of the court therein shall be
immediately final and executory.
By express provision of law, the judgment of the court in a summary proceeding
shall be immediately final and executory. As a matter of course, it follows that no appeal
can be had of the trial courts judgment in a summary proceeding for the declaration of
presumptive death of an absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code. It goes
without saying, however, that an aggrieved party may file a petition for certiorari to
question abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Such petition should be
filed in the Court of Appeals in accordance with the Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts. To
be sure, even if the Courts original jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is concurrent
with the RTCs and the Court of Appeals in certain cases, such concurrence does not
sanction an unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. From the decision of the
Court of Appeals, the losing party may then file a petition for review on certiorari under

Rule 45 of the Rules of Court with the Supreme Court. This is because the errors which
the court may commit in the exercise of jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment which
are the proper subject of an appeal.
In sum, under Article 41 of the Family Code, the losing party in a summary
proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death may file a petition for certiorari with
the CA on the ground that, in rendering judgment thereon, the trial court committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. From the decision of the CA,
the aggrieved party may elevate the matter to this Court via a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
2. Petitioner also assails the RTCs grant of the Petition for Declaration of Presumptive
Death of the absent spouse of respondent on the ground that she had not adduced the
evidence required to establish a well-founded belief that her absent spouse was already
dead, as expressly required by Article 41 of the Family Code.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding
paragraph, the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this
Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the
effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.
The spouse present is, thus, burdened to prove that his spouse has been absent
and that he has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse is already dead before
the present spouse may contract a subsequent marriage. The law does not define what
is meant by a well-grounded belief is a state of the mind or condition prompting the
doing of an overt act. It may be proved by direct evidence or circumstantial evidence
which may tend, even in a slight degree, to elucidate the inquiry or assist to a
determination probably founded in truth. Any fact or circumstance relating to the
character, habits, conditions, attachments, prosperity and objects of life which usually
control the conduct of men, and are the motives of their actions, was, so far as it tends
to explain or characterize their disappearance or throw light on their intentions,
competence evidence on the ultimate question of his death.
The belief of the present spouse must be the result of proper and honest to
goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain the whereabouts of the absent spouse and
whether the absent spouse is still alive or is already dead. Whether or not the spouse
present acted on a well-founded belief of death of the absent spouse depends upon the

inquiries to be drawn from a great many circumstances occurring before and after the
disappearance of the absent spouse and the nature and extent of the inquiries made by
present spouse. (Footnotes omitted, underscoring supplied.)
Applying the foregoing standards to the present case, petitioner points out that
respondent Yolanda did not initiate a diligent search to locate her absent husband.
While her brother Diosdado Cadacio testified to having inquired about the whereabouts
of Cyrus from the latters relatives, these relatives were not presented to corroborate
Diosdados testimony. In short, respondent was allegedly not diligent in her search for
her husband. Petitioner argues that if she were, she would have sought information
from the Taiwanese Consular Office or assistance from other government agencies in
Taiwan or the Philippines. She could have also utilized mass media for this end, but she
did not. Worse, she failed to explain these omissions.
The Republics arguments are well-taken. Nevertheless, we are constrained to
deny the Petition.
The RTC ruling on the issue of whether respondent was able to prove her wellfounded belief that her absent spouse was already dead prior to her filing of the
Petition to declare him presumptively dead is already final and can no longer be
modified or reversed. Indeed, nothing is more settled in law than that when a judgment
becomes final and executory, it becomes immutable and unalterable. The same may no
longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is
perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law.
RULE 108
BRAZA V CIVIL REGISTRAR
G.R. No. 181174 | December 4, 2009
Facts:
Petitioner Ma. Cristinas husband, Pablo died on April 15, 2002 in a vehicular
accident in Indonesia. During the wake following the repatriation of his remains to the
Philippines, respondent Lucille Titular began introducing her co-respondent minor
Patrick Alvin Titular Braza (Patrick) as her and Pablo's son. Petitioner thereupon made
inquiries with the Local Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental. On the
annotation of Patricks birth certificate reflects Patrick as having been acknowledged by
Pablo (or Pablito) as son on January 13, 1997, that he was legitimated by virtue of

subsequent marriage of parents on April 22,1998 at Manila, and that he shall be known
as Patrick Titular Braza. Ma. Cristina likewise obtained a copy of a marriage contract
showing that Pablo and Lucille were married on April 22, 1998, drawing her and her copetitioners (her three legitimate children with Pablo) to file on December 23, 2005
before the Regional Trial Court of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental a petition to
correct the entries in the birth record of Patrick in the Local Civil Register. Contending
that Patrick could not have been legitimated by the supposed marriage between Lucille
and Pablo, said marriage being bigamous on account of the valid and subsisting
marriage between Ma. Cristina and Pablo, petitioners prayed for (1) the correction of the
entries in Patrick's birth record with respect to his legitimation, the name of the father
and his acknowledgment, and the use of the last name "Braza"; 2) a directive to Leon,
Cecilia and Lucille, all surnamed Titular, as guardians of the minor Patrick, to submit
Parick to DNA testing to determine his paternity and filiation; and 3) the declaration of
nullity of the legitimation of Patrick as stated in his birth certificate and, for this purpose,
the declaration of the marriage of Lucille an Pablo as bigamous. TC dismissed
the petition, holding that in a special proceeding for correction of entry, the court, which
is not acting as a family court under the Family Code, has no jurisdiction over an action
to annul the marriage of Lucille and Pablo, impugn the legitimacy of Patrick, and order
Patrick to be subjected to a DNA test, hence, the controversy should be ventilated in an
ordinary adversarial action.MR was denied.
Hence, this petition for review.
Issue:
WON the court a quo may pass upon the validity of marriage and questions on
legitimacy even in an action to correct entries in the civil registrar. (WON substantial
errors, such as those sought to be corrected in the present case, can be the subject of a
petition under Rule 108)
Held:
NO. In a special proceeding for correction of entry under Rule 108 (Cancellation
or Correction of Entries in the Original Registry), the trial court has no jurisdiction to
nullify marriages and rule on legitimacy and filiation.
Ratio:
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court vis a vis Article 412 of the Civil Code charts the
procedure by which an entry in the civil registry may be cancelled or corrected. The
proceeding contemplated therein may generally be used only to correct clerical,
spelling, typographical and other innocuous errors in the civil registry. A clerical error is
one which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding; an error made by a

clerk or a transcriber; a mistake in copying or writing, or a harmless change such as a

correction of name that is clearly misspelled or of a misstatement of the occupation of
the parent. Substantial or contentious alterations may be allowed only in adversarial
proceedings, in which all interested parties are impleaded and due process is properly
observed. The petitioners cause of action is actually to seek the declaration of
Pablo and Lucilles marriage as void for being bigamous and impugn Patricks
legitimacy, which causes of action are governed not by Rule 108 but by A.M. No. 02-1110-SC which took effect on March 15, 2003, and Art. 171 of the Family Code,
respectively, hence, the petition should be filed in a Family Court as expressly provided
in said Code. It is well to emphasize that, doctrinally, validity of marriages as well as
legitimacy and filiation can be questioned only in a direct action seasonably filed by the
proper party, and not through collateral attack such as the petition filed before the court
a quo.
Petition Denied.

RULE 109
DEL ROSARIO v. DEL ROSARIO (67 Phil 652)
Facts:
RAMON del Rosario (husband) died in 1895 and FLORENCIA Arcega (wife) in
1933. RAMON died intestate and FLORENCIA administered the conjugal properties.
FLORENCIA acquired other properties using the fruits of the conjugal ones. After
RAMON died, his intestate was not commenced and the conjugal properties were not
liquidated until FLORENCIA died, after which the latter's testamentary proceedings were
initiated and are now in progress. The heirs of both spouses brought this action to
recover their share not only in the conjugal properties left by RAMON but also in those
acquired by FLORENCIA with the products of said properties. A demurrer (by other
heirs) was interposed to the complaint on the ground that there is another action
pending between the same parties and for the same cause of action; that there is a
defect of party plaintiffs and party defendants, and that the complaint does not allege
facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The (probate) court sustained this
demurrer and dismissed the case. From this resolution an appeal was taken.
Issue:
Whether granting the demurrer was proper.
Ruling:
Yes. The appealed judgment is affirmed.

Whatever law might be applicable the intestate of RAMON del Rosario not
having been commenced upon his death in 1895 until his widow FLORENCIA Arcega
also died in 1933, and the testamentary proceedings of FLORENCIA Arcega having
been subsequently initiated, wherein, among other things, the liquidation of her conjugal
properties with the deceased RAMON del Rosario should be made the pendency of
these testamentary proceedings of the deceased wife excludes any other proceeding
aimed at the same purpose (Zaide vs. Concepcion and Quintana, 32 Phil., 403). At any
rate, the plaintiffs have a right to intervene in these proceedings as parties interested in
the liquidation and partition of the conjugal properties of the deceased spouses.