Criminal Law Review Case Digests Crimes Against Persons

CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS
TICKLER: PARRICIDE
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. PO3 ARMANDO DALAG y CUSTODIO,
appellant.
G.R. No. 129895. April 30, 2003
FACTS: Armando Dalag, a member of the PNP, was lawfully married to Leah Dalag. They had
three children, Francis, Princess Joy and Ezra John. The marriage of Armando and Leah was far
from idyllic. Their coverture was marred by violent quarrels, with Leah always at the losing end.
Each time the couple had a quarrel, she sustained contusions, bruises and lumps on different
parts of her body.
On the night of August 15, 1996, the children heard their parents quarreling. Leah was
admonishing Armando not to drink liquor. The kids sensed that some object was being banged on
the wall. Thereafter, they heard their mother cry. Francis and Princess Joy rushed outside and
were horrified when from a distance of three meters, they saw Armando pushing and kicking
Leah on the left side of her body. Leah fell to the ground as Armando continued to beat her up,
punching her on the different parts of the body. The kids pleaded to their father to stop
maltreating their mother. He grabbed Leahs hair and banged her head on the wall. Leahs
forehead directly hit the wall. In the process, Armando stepped on a nail. Even as she was being
assaulted by her husband, she told him Toy, Toy, I will find some medicine for your wound. Leah
then fled to the house of their neighbor, Tia Feli. Armando ran after Leah and pushed her to the
house of Felisa. Armando herded Leah back to the house. Princess Joy she saw her mother being
pushed by her father. Leah fell to the ground and lost consciousness. Armando placed the head of
Leah on a stone and ordered Princess Joy to get some water. She did. She poured water on the
face of her mother but the latter did not move. Armando then tried to revive Leah by applying
mouth-to-mouth resuscitation to no avail. Leah was brought to the hospital the following day but
never regained her consciousness until she died on August 22.
Dr. Jesse Rey T. Cruel, the medico-legal officer, testified that Leah suffered severe beatings and
traumatic physical violence resulting in intracranial hemorrhage which caused her death.
CRIME CHARGED: PARRICIDE

RTC: GUILTY AS CHARGED
SC: Affirmed. The crime of parricide is defined by Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code thus:
ART. 246. Parricide. Any person who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or
illegitimate, or any of his ascendants, or descendants, or his spouse, shall be guilty of parricide
and shall be punished by the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death. (Restored by Sec. 5, RA No.
7659.)
The prosecution is mandated to prove the following essential elements:

(1) a person is killed;
(2) the deceased is killed by the accused; and
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PROSECUTOR VICTORIA C. GARCIA
(3) the deceased is the father, mother or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or a legitimate
other ascendant or other descendant, or the legitimate spouse of the accused.
The prescribed penalty for the crime is reclusion perpetua to death. The key element in parricide
is the relationship of the offender with the victim. In the case of parricide of a spouse, the best
proof of the relationship between the accused and the deceased would be the marriage certificate.
In this case, the prosecution proved all the essential elements of parricide.
Tickler: Murder, Felipe Lagera 65 y/o, Ranil Tagpis 1 y/o
People v Rosendo Rebucan
Facts: On January 23, 2003, the accused-appellant was charged with the crime of double murder
in an Information, the accusatory portion of which reads:
That on or about the 6th day of November, 2002, in the Municipality of Carigara, Province of
Leyte, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
with deliberate intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation and abuse of superior
strength, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and wound
FELIPE LAGERA Y OBERO, 65 years old and RANIL TAGPIS Y LAGERA, 1 year old, with
the use of a long bolo (sundang) which the accused had provided himself for the purpose,
thereby inflicting upon Felipe Lagera Hypovolemic shock, massive blood loss and multiple
hacking wounds upon Ranil Tagpis: Hypovolemic shock, massive blood loss and hacking
wound, head[,] which wounds caused the death of Felipe Lagera y Obera and Ranil Tagpis y
Lagera, immediately thereafter.
The prosecution presented as witnesses: (1) Dr. Ma. Bella V. Profetana, Municipal Health Officer
of Carigara, Leyte; (2) Carmela Tagpis, the 5-year-old granddaughter of the victim Felipe Lagera
and sister of the victim Ranil Tagpis, Jr.; (3) Adoracion Lagera, the wife of Felipe Lagera; and
(4) Alma Tagpis, the daughter of Felipe Lagera and mother of Ranil Tagpis, Jr.
Carmela stated that at the time of the incident, she was playing with a toy camera inside the
house and she was situated beside a chicken cage, near a bench. Felipe was also there near the
bench and he was carrying Ranil in his right arm. When asked whether the accused-appellant
came inside the house in a sudden manner, Carmela answered in the affirmative. She insisted that
Ranil was indeed carried by Felipe when the accused-appellant entered the house. She said that
no fight or altercation occurred between Felipe and the accused-appellant. After Felipe was
hacked, he immediately ran outside of the house. Carmela and Jericho then ran to the back of the
house.
For the defense: The accused-appellant testified that he arrived in Carigara, Leyte from Manila
on August 15, 2002. He went to the house of his elder brother, Hilario, to look for his children.
There, he learned that his wife went to Manila and his brother was taking care of his two children
and his stepson, Raymond. On November 2, 2002, he saw Raymond at the place of his friend,
Bernie Donaldo. He asked Raymond why the latter's mother went to Manila and he was told that,
while he was still in Manila, Felipe and Timboy Lagera went to their house and tried to place
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themselves on top of his wife. He then said that he harbored ill feelings towards the said men but
he was able to control the same for the sake of his children. On November 6, 2002, at about 2:00
p.m., he went to the house of barangay chairperson Arminal to place a call to his wife who was in
Manila. He was carrying a bolo at that time since he was using the same to cut cassava stems in
his farm. When he talked to his wife, she confirmed that she was sexually molested by Felipe and
Timboy. Thereafter, as the accused-appellant proceeded to go home, it rained heavily so he first
sought shelter at the place of his friend, Enok. The latter was drinking gin and he was offered a
drink. After staying there and drinking for half an hour, the accused-appellant decided to go
home. Afterwards, he remembered that he had to buy kerosene so he went to the store of Felipe
Lagera.
The accused-appellant further testified that when he reached the house of Felipe, the latter was
feeding chickens. When Felipe asked him what was his business in going there, he confronted
Felipe about the alleged sexual abuse of his wife. Felipe allegedly claimed that the accused-
appellant had a bad purpose for being there and that the latter wanted to start a fight. Accused-
appellant denied the accusation and responded that Felipe should not get angry, as it was he
(Felipe) who committed a wrong against him and his wife. Felipe allegedly got mad and hurled
the cover of a chicken cage at him, but he was able to parry it with his hand. The accused-
appellant then drew his long bolo and hacked Felipe on the left side of the abdomen, as the latter
was already turning and about to run to the house. He also went inside the house since Felipe
might get hold of a weapon. When they were both inside and he was about to deliver a second
hacking blow, Felipe held up and used the child Ranil as a shield. As the second hacking blow
was delivered suddenly, he was not able to withdraw the same anymore such that the blow
landed on Ranil. When he saw that he hit the child, he got angry and delivered a third hacking
blow on Felipe, which landed on the right side of the latter's neck. Thereafter, Felipe ran outside.
He followed Felipe and hacked him again, which blow hit the victim's upper left arm. At that
time, Felipe was already on the yard of his house and was about to run towards the road. He then
left and surrendered to the barangay chairperson.
RTC: Double Murder
Evident premeditation: [In view of] the vivid portrayal of Raymond on how [the wife of the
accused] was sexually abused by the father and son Lagera, the accused hatched a decision to
avenge his wife's sexual molestation. Days had passed, but this decision to kill Felipe did not
wither, instead it became stronger, that on the 6th of November 2002, he armed himself with a
sharp long bolo known as "sundang" and went to Brgy. Canlampay, Carigara, Leyte where the
victim live[d]. Fueled by hatred and the spirit of London gin after consuming one bottle with his
compadre "Enok", he decided to execute his evil deeds by going to the house of Felipe Lagera, in
the guise of buying kerosene and once inside the house hacked and wounded the victim, Felipe
Lagera who was then holding in his arm his grandson, one and half years 1 old, Ramil Tagpis,
Jr.
Treachery: There is credence to the testimony of the minor eyewitness Carmela Tagpis that the
victim, Felipe was holding in his arms her younger brother, Ramil Tagpis, Jr. inside his house,
when the accused entered, and without any warning or provocation coming from the victim, the
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accused immediately delivered several hacking blows on the victim giving no regard to the
innocent child in the arms of Lagera. With this precarious situation, the victim who was unarmed
has no opportunity to put up his defense against the unlawful aggression of the accused, moreso,
to retaliate. Moreover, what defense could an innocent 1 1/2 years old Ramil Tagpis, Jr. put up
against the armed and superior strength of the accused, but to leave his fate to God.
CA: 2 counts of murder
The Court of Appeals promulgated the assailed decision on August 21, 2007, modifying the
judgment of the RTC. The appellate court adopted the position of the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) that the felonious acts of the accused-appellant resulted in two separate crimes of
murder as the evidence of the prosecution failed to prove the existence of a complex crime of
double murder. The Court of Appeals subscribed to the findings of the RTC that the killing of
Felipe Lagera was attended by the aggravating circumstances of treachery and evident
premeditation.
Issue: Whether accused is guilty of Murder?
Held: Yes. 2 Counts of murder. Reclusion Perpetua for each count.
SC: Basic is the rule that in order to affirm the conviction of an accused person, the prosecution
must establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean
such a degree of proof as, excluding possibility of error, produces absolute certainty. Only moral
certainty is required, or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind.
Ultimately, what the law simply requires is that any proof against the accused must survive the
test of reason for it is only when the conscience is satisfied that the perpetrator of the crime is the
person on trial should there be a judgment of conviction. A finding of guilt must rest on the
strength of the prosecution's own evidence, not on the weakness or even absence of evidence for
the defense.
In the instant case, the evidence of the prosecution established the fact that the killings of Felipe
and Ranil were attended by treachery, thus qualifying the same to murder.
According to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, any person who shall kill
another shall be guilty of murder if the same was committed with the attendant circumstance of
treachery, among other things, and that the situation does not fall within the provisions of Article
246. There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person,
employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially
to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party
might make. The essence of treachery is a deliberate and sudden attack, offering an unarmed and
unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or to escape. There is treachery even if the attack is
frontal if it is sudden and unexpected, with the victims having no opportunity to repel it or
defend themselves, for what is decisive in treachery is that the execution of the attack made it
impossible for the victims to defend themselves or to retaliate.
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No evident premeditation: In the case at bar, the evidence of the prosecution failed to establish
any of the elements of evident premeditation since the testimonies they presented pertained to the
period of the actual commission of the crime and the events that occurred thereafter. The
prosecution failed to adduce any evidence that tended to establish the exact moment when the
accused-appellant devised a plan to kill Felipe, that the latter clung to his determination to carry
out the plan and that a sufficient time had lapsed before he carried out his plan.
Likewise, the trial court erred in appreciating the aggravating circumstances of abuse of superior
strength, dwelling, minority and intoxication. When the circumstance of abuse of superior
strength concurs with treachery, the former is absorbed in the latter. On the other hand, dwelling,
minority and intoxication cannot be appreciated as aggravating circumstances in the instant case
considering that the same were not alleged and/or specified in the information that was filed on
January 23, 2003.
No mitigating circumstance of immediate vindication of grave offense.
In the case at bar, the accused-appellant points to the alleged attempt of Felipe and Timboy
Lagera on the virtue of his wife as the grave offense for which he sought immediate vindication.
He testified that he learned of the same from his stepson, Raymond, on November 2, 2002. Four
days thereafter, on November 6, 2002, the accused-appellant carried out the attack that led to the
deaths of Felipe and Ranil. To our mind, a period of four days was sufficient enough a time
within which the accused-appellant could have regained his composure and self-control. Thus,
the said mitigating circumstance cannot be credited in favor of the accused-appellant.
Mitigating Circumstance of Voluntary Surrender present: After the incident, the accused
Rosendo Rebucan immediately went to the house of Brgy. Chairman, Renerio Arcenal at sitio
Palali, Brgy. Canlampay, Carigara, Leyte, to surrender, because he killed Felipe Lagera and
Ramil Tagpis, Jr. The Brgy. Chairman instructed his Brgy. Human Rights Action Officer, Ricky
Irlandez and his Chief Tanod, Pedro Oledan to bring Rosendo to the Police Authorities of
Carigara, Leyte. This fact of voluntary surrender was corroborated by Police Officer Arnulfo
Alberca, who presented to Court the police blotter, under entry No. 5885, dated November 6,
2002, of the PNP, Carigara, Leyte.
TICKLER: banana cue store; sidecar of motorcycle; less serious PI pero naging slight PI nalang
and murder
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. CECILIA LAGMAN

G.R. No. 197807; A p r i l 1 6 , 2 0 1 2
On February 24, 2002, at about 1:30 p.m, prosecution witness Donna Maniego was in
front of her banana cue store on Lakandula Street, Tondo, Manila. She was seated alongside her
mother, Violeta Sicor, inside the sidecar of a motorcycle. Without warning, the accused
approached her and punched her face several times. The accused turned on Sicor, grabbed her
and stabbed her in the middle of her buttocks with a small knife. Maniego got out of the sidecar
and ran to the barangay hall for help. Upon finding that the barangay chairman was not around,
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Maniego went to check on her common-law spouse, Jondel Santiago, at the house of Santiagos
mother. On her way there, she saw the accused stab Santiago four (4) times from a distance of
five (5) to six (6) meters. The distance between where Maniego was punched and
where Santiago was stabbed was about nine (9) meters. Maniego then saw the accused flee the
scene of the crime carrying a knife and heading towards Juan Luna Street. Seeing
that Santiago was mortally hurt, Maniego rushed Santiago to Gat Andres Bonifacio Hospital but
he later expired. While Maniego was at the hospital, she saw the accused, who was being treated
after an angry crowd mauled her. Maniego informed the policeman who was escorting the
accused that it was the latter who had stabbed and killed Santiago.
Sicor corroborated Maniegos testimony. PO3 Alateit testified that on the day of the incident, it
was reported to him that a stabbing incident had taken place. He headed towards an area where a
crowd was causing a commotion. He then saw a woman who looked like a lesbian running
towards him. Her head was bloodied. He handcuffed the injured woman after he was informed
that she had stabbed someone. At the time of her arrest, a sharp object fell from the womans
waist. He confiscated the item and brought the woman to the police station and to Gat Andres
Bonifacio Hospital. He identified the woman as the accused.
Other witnesses presented were SPO2 Bertolido, the police investigator in the case against the
accused and PO3 Samson, who testified that on the date of the incident, he was assigned at the
Western Police District Crime Laboratory Division and presented before the court the sharp
object used in stabbing the victim and the Request for Laboratory Examination
Defense of the accused is denial. She claimed that on the date of the stabbing incident, she
confronted Maniego and asked her if it was true that she had been spreading the rumor that the
accused was insane. Maniego answered in the affirmative. Angered, the accused slapped
Maniego and left, leaving Santiago, Sicor, and Maniego in pursuit. Santiago then hit her with a
lead pipe. Since she needed medical treatment after the attack, she was brought to Gat
Andres Bonifacio Medical Hospital by her mother and a barangay kagawad. At the police
station, the accused denied killing Santiago. She averred that nothing was found on her body
when she was frisked. She said that the knife recovered by PO3 Alateit was not hers and that
there were other people in the area where it was found. She added that she had an argument only
with Maniego, not with Sicor or Santiago.
Dr. Mario Lato testified that on February 24, 2002, he treated the accused, who had a laceration
on the head which was possibly caused by a hard object such as a pipe.
Charge: Murder of Jondel Mari Davantes Santiago and Less Serious Physical Injuries upon
Violeta Sicor.
RTC: Guilty
CA: Affirmed
SC: Guilty of murder and slight physical injuries (less serious physical injuries not
established)
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ISSUES:
1. WON accused is guilty of murder
2. WON accused is guilty of less serious physical injuries
HELD:
1. Yes. The elements of murder that the prosecution must establish are (1) that a person was
killed; (2) that the accused killed him or her; (3) that the killing was attended by any of
the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC);
and (4) that the killing is not parricide or infanticide.
The prosecution was able to clearly establish that Santiago was killed and that it was
accused-appellant who killed him as there was an eyewitness to the crime. Santiagos killing
was attended by the qualifying circumstance of treachery as testified to by the prosecution
eyewitness, Maniego. Paragraph 16, Art. 14 of the RPC defines treachery as the direct
employment of means, methods, or forms in the execution of the crime against persons which
tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to the offender arising from
the defense which the offended party might make. Maniegos testimony proved the presence
of treachery in this case. Witness saw accused stab the victim who was lighting a cigarette.
He was stabbed once in the chest, twice on the back, and another one at the neck.
In order for treachery to be properly appreciated, two elements must be present: (1) at the
time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself; and (2) the accused
consciously and deliberately adopted the particular means, methods, or forms of attack
employed by him. The essence of treachery is that the attack is deliberate and without
warning, done in a swift and unexpected way, affording the hapless, unarmed and
unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape. These elements were present when
accused-appellant stabbed Santiago.
Finally, the killing of Santiago was neither parricide nor homicide.
1. No. The elements of less serious physical injuries were not established
Art. 265 of the RPC provides, Any person who shall inflict upon another physical injuries
not described [as serious physical injuries] but which shall incapacitate the offended party for
labor for ten (10) days or more, or shall require medical attendance for the same period, shall
be guilty of less serious physical injuries and shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor.
Nothing in the records, however, supports the finding that Sicor was incapacitated for
labor for ten (10) days or more or that she required medical attention for the same
period. After the wound on her buttocks was treated, Sicor was released two hours after she
was admitted to the hospital.She later returned to the hospital for the removal of the suture on
her wound, according to the RTC, after a certain period of time.The Medico-Legal Report on
Sicor (Exhibit H) does not indicate how many days of medical treatment her injury would
need. Sicor, however, testified that she lost two (2) days of work on account of the injury she
sustained. The prosecution was, therefore, unable to establish that the injury sustained by
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Sicor falls under less serious physical injuries absent the requirement that her injury required
medical attention for 10 days or incapacitated her for the same period.
The Court can, thus, only convict accused-appellant of slight physical injuries. Under
par. 1, Art. 266 of the RPC, the penalty for slight physical injuries isarresto menor when the
offender has inflicted physical injuries which shall incapacitate the offended party for labor
from one to nine days, or shall require medical attendance during the same period. There
being no modifying circumstances to be appreciated, and in accordance with par. 1 of Art. 64,
accused-appellant should be meted a penalty of imprisonment of arresto menor in its medium
period, which has a duration of eleven (11) to twenty (20) days under Art. 76 of the RPC
In accordance with the rules cited above, We modify the award of damages. In line with
prevailing jurisprudence,[37] the award of civil indemnity ex delicto of PhP 50,000 in favor of the
heirs of Santiago is in order. Moral damages of PhP 50,000 and PhP 30,000 in exemplary
damages, with an interest of six percent (6%) per annum, are also proper.[38]
MURDER: Accused-appellant is ordered to indemnify the heirs of the late Jondel Mari
Davantes Santiago the sum of PhP 50,000 as civil indemnity, PhP 50,000 as moral damages, PhP
30,000 as exemplary damages, and interest on all damages at the rate of six percent (6%) per
annum from the finality of judgment until fully paid.
SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES: twenty (20) days of arresto menor.
INSERT WACOY & QUIBAC VS PEOPLE
People v. Pareja
GR No. 188979
September 5, 2012
Brion, J.
Accused: Christopher Pareja

Victim: AAA (13 y.o.) sister of the common law spouse of accused.
FACTS:
At around 3:30 am of June 16, 2003, AAA was sleeping beside her 2 year old nephew, BBB,
when Pareja hugged her and kissed her nape and neck. AAA cried, but Pareja covered her and
BBB with a blanket. Pareja removed AAAs clothes and he also took off his pants and underwear.
The accused went on top of AAA and held her hands, AAA resisted, but accused parted her legs
using his own legs, and tried to insert his provate part into hers. Accused stopped when AAAs
cry got louder. AAA kicked the accuseds upper thigh as the latter was about to stand up.
Accused put his clothes on and threatened to kill AAA is she disclosed the incident to anyone.
At aound 6:00 am of the same day, AAA proceeded to the house of her older sister, DDD and
narrated to her what had happened. Afterwards, AAA and her two siblings went to the
Mandaluyong Police station to report the incident.
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CRIME CHARGED: Rape

RTC: Guilty as charged.
CA: affirmed RTC. (the slight penetration of the labia by the male organ is sufficient to
constitute rape)
Defense: The prosecution failed to prove even the slightest penetration of his penis into the
victims vagina.
ISSUE: Whether or not Pareja is guilty of rape.
RULING: The prosecution failed to prove Parejas guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
consummated rape. He is liable only of ATTEMPTED RAPE.
1. Carnal knowledge was not proven with moral certainty. Rape is consummated by having
carnal knowledge of a woman with the use of force, threat, or intimidation, or when she is
deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or when she is under 12 years of age or is
demented. Carnal knowledge is defined as the act of a man having sexual intercourse or sexual
bodily connection with a woman. It must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. From the
testimony of AAA, the SC found it clear that Parejas penis did not penetrate but merely touched
AAAs private part. In fact, AAA confirmed on cross-examination that Pareja did not succeed in
inserting his penis into her vagina.
Did the touching of the penis of the victims private part amount to carnal knowledge?
In People v. Campuhan, the SC laid down the parameters of genital contact in rape cases:
a. Touching when applied to rape cases does not simply mean mere epidermal contact,
stroking or grazing of organs, a slight brush or a scrape of the penis on the external layer
of the victims vagina or the mons pubis.
b. there must be sufficient and convincing proof that the penis indeed touched the labias
or slid into the female organ and not merely stroked the external surface thereof for an
accused to be convicted of consummated rape.
c. touching the labia majoria or the labia minora of the pudendum constitutes
consummated rape without any showing of such penetration, it can only be attempted
rape or ats of lasciviousness.
2. Article 6 of the RPC states that there is attempt when the offender commences the commission
of the rime directly by overt act but does not perform all the acts of execution by reason of some
cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance. In People v. Publico, the SC ruled
that when the touching of the vagina by the penis is coupled with the intent to penetrate,
attempted rape is committed; otherwise, the crime committed is merely acts of lasciviousness. In
the case at bar, the totality of the appellants acts demonstrated the unmistakable objective to
insert his penis into the victims private pats.
3. In rape cases, the prosecution bears the primary duty to present its case with clarity and
persuasion, to the end that conviction becomes the only logic and inevitable conclusion.
TICKLER: Five or ten pesos, lunch money
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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RODRIGO GUTIEREZ y ROBLES ALIAS ROD

AND JOHN LENNON
G.R. No. 208007 April 2, 2014
FACTS:
AAA, who was then 10 years old and a Grade 2 student at Camp 7 Elementary School in Baguio
City, went home from school to have lunch. On the way home, she met Rodrigo (accused) at his
house. He brought her to his room and laid her down on the bed. He then raised her skirt,
removed her panties, pulled down his pants, and then inserted his penis into her vagina. Rodrigo
stayed on top of her for a long time, and when he withdrew his penis, white liquid came out. He
then gave her five pesos before she went back to school.
AAA went back to school. Her adviser, Agustina Chapap asked her where she came from
because she was tardy. AAA initially did not answer, but she then admitted she came from
Uncle Rod and that she went there to ask for money. The adviser, together with another
teacher, Rona Ambaken, brought AAA to the principals office. AAA was brought to the comfort
room where Ambaken inspected her panties. The principal was able to confirm that AAA was
touched since AAAs private organ was swelling. Her underwear is also wet. Another teacher
went to the barangay hall and the police station to report the incident.
An information was filed, charging Rodrigo with statutory rape. On trial, AAA disclosed that
Rodrigo had done the same thing to her about 10 times on separate occasions. In his defense,
Rodrigo denied the accusations and stated that he was already at work by 1:30PM. He said that
he has a relationship with AAAs sister and that a similar complaint was filed against him, but it
was settled at the barangay level.
RTC: Guilty of statutory rape.

CA: Affirmed the conviction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Rodrigo Gutierez is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of statutory rape.
HELD:
YES. Rape under Art. 266-A is committed: 1. By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a
woman under any of the following circumstances:
a. Through force, threat, or intimidation;
b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;
c. By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and
d. When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though
none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.
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PROSECUTOR VICTORIA C. GARCIA 0
Statutory rape is committed when (1) the offended party is under 12 years of age and (2) the
accused has carnal knowledge of her, regardless of whether there was force, threat or
intimidation; whether the victim was deprived of reason or consciousness; or whether it was
done through fraud or grave abuse of authority. It is enough that the age of the victim is proven
and that there was sexual intercourse. What the law punishes in statutory rape is carnal
knowledge of a woman below twelve (12) years old. Thus, force, intimidation and physical
evidence of injury are not relevant considerations; the only subject of inquiry is the age of the
woman and whether carnal knowledge took place. The law presumes that the victim does not and
cannot have a will of her own on account of her tender years; the child's consent is immaterial
because of her presumed incapacity to discern good from evil.
AAA was able to narrate in a clear and categorical manner the ordeal that was done to her. As a
child-victim who has taken significant risks in coming to court, her testimony deserves full
weight and credence. AAA's ordeal was supported by the testimonies of her teachers whose
concern for her led to the discovery of the crime. The medical certificate presented in court,
together with the testimonies of the physicians, is consistent with the finding that she was
sexually abused. Beyond reasonable doubt, Rodrigo Gutierez raped AAA, a minor who was only
10 years of age.
Rodrigo asserted that AAA's failure to cry out for help shows reasonable doubt.1wphi1 He
noted that her house was just near his house where the incident happened. In any case, whether
she cried for help is immaterial in a charge of statutory rape since "[t]he law presumes that such a
victim, on account of her tender age, does not and cannot have a will of her own."
It is settled that the award of civil indemnity is mandatory upon a finding that rape was
committed, along with the award of moral and exemplary damages. Due to the utter heinousness
of the crime involved in this case, damages must be increased to P100,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P100,000.00 as moral damages, and P100,000.00 as exemplary damages.
SC: Affirmed the conviction.
People vs. Joel Crisostomo

G.R. No. 196435, January 29, 2014
Tickler: Stautory Rape; Sexual Assault Rape; Cigarette burns
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Facts:
"AAA" testified that at noon time of April 8, 1999, she was playing with her playmates
whereupon she wandered by the house of accused which was just below their house. While
"AAA" was at the house of accused, she claimed that her genitals and buttocks were burned with
a lighted cigarette by the said accused. "AAA" testified further that her clothes were taken off by
the same accused who also took his clothes off after which he allegedly placed himself on top of
her, inserted his penis and proceeded to have illicit carnal knowledge of the then six (6) year old
girl.
"BBB," father of "AAA," presented in court his daughters birth certificate which stated that she
was born on April 4, 1993. On the other hand, Dr. Reyes the Medico-Legal Officer who
examined "AAA" testified that the victim indeed had two (2) third degree burns in the perianal
region , possibly, caused by a lighted cigarette stick being forced on the victims skin. Moreover,
Dr. Reyes confirmed that there was a loss of virginity on the part of the victim and that the same
could have been done 24 hours from the time of his examination which was also on April 8,
1999.
On the other hand, accused presented his brother-in-law Rogelio Oletin who testified that he was
tending the store located at the house of accused when the latter supposedly arrived from work at
10:00 [a.m.] of April 8, 1999 and slept until 5:00 [p.m.] of the same day. According to Rogelio
that is the usual routine of accused as the latter worked in the night shift schedule as vulcanizer
in the vulcanizing shop owned by the victims father. Accused added that he knew of no reason
why the family of the private complainant would pin the crime against him.
In an effort to explain the burn marks on the delicate parts of "AAAs" body, the defense
presented a supposed playmate of "AAA" in the person of Mary Pabuayan. According to Mary,
she was then 7 years old when she and two other playmates together with "AAA" and Joel "Liit"
the son of accused were burning worms near a santol tree in their neighborhood on a Good
Friday in the year 1999. This Joel "Liit" supposedly lighted a straw which inadvertently burned
the anal portion of "AAAs" body. Marys exact words were to the effect that "napatakan ang
puwit ni "AAA"."
CRIME CHARGED: 2 Counts of Sexual Assault Rape and 1 count of Statutory Rape
RTC's RULING : guilty of three counts of rape
CA's RULING: Affirmed RTC's ruling but modified the penalties imposed
Issue: Whether or not rape was committed.
Held:
The RTC, as affirmed by the CA, correctly found appellant guilty of two counts of rape by
sexual assault and one count of rape by sexual intercourse. Article 266-A of the Revised Penal
Code (RPC) provides:
ART. 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. - Rape is committed
1. By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:
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a. Through force, threat or intimidation;

b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious;
c. By means of fraudulent machinations or grave abuse of authority;
d. When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none
of the circumstances mentioned above should be present;
2. By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, shall
commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another persons mouth or anal orifice,
or any instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person.
When the offended party is under 12 years of age, the crime committed is "termed statutory rape
as it departs from the usual modes of committing rape. What the law punishes is carnal
knowledge of a woman below 12 years of age. Thus, the only subject of inquiry is the age of the
woman and whether carnal knowledge took place. The law presumes that the victim does not and
cannot have a will of her own on account of her tender years."24 In this case, the prosecution
satisfactorily established all the elements of statutory rape. "AAA" testified that on April 8, 1999,
appellant took off her clothes and made her lie down. Appellant also removed his clothes, placed
himself on top of "AAA," inserted his penis into her vagina, and proceeded to have carnal
knowledge of her. At the time of the rape, "AAA" was only six years of age. Her birth certificate
showed that she was born on April 4, 1993. "AAAs" testimony was corroborated by Dr.
Emmanuel Reyes who found "AAA" to have fresh and bleeding hymenal lacerations.
Likewise, the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt appellants guilt for two counts of
rape by sexual assault. Records show that appellant inserted a lit cigarette stick into "AAAs"
genital orifice causing her labia majora to suffer a 3rd degree burn. Appellant likewise inserted a
lit cigarette stick into "AAAs" anal orifice causing 3rd degree burns in her perianal region. .
"The gravamen of the crime of rape by sexual assault is the insertion of the penis into another
persons mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into another persons genital or anal
orifice."
Note:
1. It seems that every insertion constitutes one count of sexual assault rape.
2. Pursuant to Article 266-B of the RPC, the penalty for statutory rape is death when the victim
is a child below seven years old. There is no dispute that at the time the rape was committed on
April 8, 1999, "AAA" was only six years old, having been born on April 4, 1993. However,
pursuant to Republic Act No. 9346, the penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be imposed on the
appellant but without eligibility for parole. The CA thus correctly imposed the said penalty on
appellant.
On the other hand, rape by sexual assault committed against a child below seven years old is
punishable by reclusion temporal. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, and there being no
other aggravating or mitigating circumstance, the proper imposable penalty shall be prision
mayor as minimum, to reclusion temporal, as maximum. The CA thus correctly imposed the
penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day ofprision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years
and four (4) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum, for each count of sexual assault.
3. I think cruelty could be appreciated since the accused burned the the anal orifice of AAA but it
was not stated in the information (in case itanong)
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TICKLER: 67-year old Rape Victim
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. AURELIO JASTIVA
G.R. No. 199268, February 12, 2014
De-Castro
On August 3, 2004, then [67]-year old AAA was drying corn in their small barn ("kamalig") in a
farmland located at [Sitio XXX], Zamboanga del Norte, when her husband[,] BBB[,] left her
alone. BBB spent that night in their permanent residence at [Sitio WWW] because their daughter
has (sic) no companion.
At about 11:00 x x x in the evening, AAA was fast asleep when a certain man she later identified
as accused-appellant Aurelio Jastiva covered her mouth, threatened her with a knife and told her
not to scream because he will have sexual intercourse with her. AAA grabbed accused-
appellants hand and felt the blade of the knife he held. Thereafter, accused-appellant removed
AAAs underwear. However, he cannot proceed with his lewd design because his penis was not
yet erected (sic), accused-appellant therefore toyed with AAAs sexual organ by licking it.
Accused-appellant then made his way up and tried to suck AAAs tongue. The latter evaded her
assaulters sexual advances by closing her lips tightly and in the process wounded the same
through her teeth. Once done, accused-appellant held his penis and inserted it to (sic) AAAs
vagina. After fulfilling his sexual desire and before AAA could stand up, accused-appellant
tapped AAAs shoulder and said "Salamat" (Thank [y]ou).
AAA stood up and opened the door to let accused-appellant out. When the latter passed through
(sic) AAA, it was then that the (sic) AAA clearly recognized, through the illumination of the
moon, that it was their (sic) neighbor accused-appellant who abused her. Engulfed with fear,
AAA immediately closed the door because she thought that accused-appellant might go (sic)
back and kill her. AAA later learned that accused-appellant destroyed a particular rack in their
kitchen to enter the small barn. AAA was no longer able to sleep after the incident.
At about 5:00 x x x in the morning of the next day, AAA relayed her ordeal to her neighbor
Corazon Mokot and her husband BBB. The latter immediately told her that they will bring the
matter to the attention of the authorities.
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On August 5, 2004, they [AAA and BBB] went to the Barangay Hall of Barangay [YYY] to
report the incident. Barangay Kagawad Celedonio Paul Payla, Jr., the officer-on-duty wrote a
barangay blotter about the incident. On the same day, AAA was medically examined by Dr.
Domiciano Talaboc, the Municipal Health Officer of the Municipality of [ZZZ]. The Medical
Certificate dated August 5, 2004 revealed that AAAs labia majora and labia minora on both sides
showed signs of irritation and are reddish in color, in addition to a partial separation of tissues
noted between the labium. AAAs vaginal opening also showed signs of irritation and are (sic)
reddish in color. The same also stated that AAA sustained multiple scratches at both her upper
and lower lips.
Crime charged: Rape penalized under Article 266-A in relation to Article 266-B of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended
According to the defense, appellant Jastiva, 49 years old at the time of the incident, could not
have committed the crime because on the date and time thereof, he was at home sleeping.
RTC: Guilty of the crime of Rape penalized under Article 266-A in relation to Article 266-B of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended. Accordingly, he is hereby sentenced to serve the
determinate penalty of reclusion perpetua. In view of his conviction and without need of further
proof, he is also ordered to pay complainant [AAA] the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS
(P50,000.00) as civil indemnity and FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as moral
damages. Being a detention prisoner, Aurelio Jastiva is entitled to the full benefit of his
preventive detention.
CA: Affirmed
SC: Affirmed
Issue: The principal issue in this case, therefore, is whether or not the prosecution was able to
prove the guilt of appellant Jastiva beyond reasonable doubt on the basis of the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses and the documentary evidence presented.
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Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code defines the crime of rape, viz:
ART. 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. Rape is committed
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:
a) Through force, threat or intimidation[.]
From the above-quoted provision of law, the elements of rape (under paragraph 1, subparagraph
a) are as follows: (1) that the offender is a man; (2) that the offender had carnal knowledge of a
woman; and (3) that such act is accomplished by using force, (threat) or intimidation.
The RTC and the Court of Appeals were one in finding that appellant Jastiva had carnal
knowledge of AAA against the latters will through force and intimidation. Despite his vigorous
protestations, this Court agrees in the finding that the crime of rape committed by appellant
Jastiva against AAA was proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt on the basis of the
following:
a) AAAs credible, positive and categorical testimony relative to the circumstances

surrounding her rape;
b) AAAs positive identification of appellant Jastiva as the one who raped her;
c) The physical evidence consistent with AAAs assertion that she was raped; and
d) The absence of ill motive on the part of AAA in filing the complaint against appellant
Jastiva.
Consequently, this appeal is denied, and the conviction of appellant Jastiva is affirmed.
Firstly, in this case, appellant Jastiva insistently makes an issue out of AAAs failure to shout for
help or struggle against him, which for him does nothing but erode her credibility. This Court,
however, does not agree. It does not follow that because AAA failed to shout for help or struggle
against her attacker means that she could not have been raped. The force, violence, or
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intimidation in rape is a relative term, depending not only on the age, size, and strength of the
parties but also on their relationship with each other. And physical resistance need not be
established in rape when intimidation is exercised upon the victim and the latter submits herself
against her will to the rapists advances because of fear for her life and personal safety. Record
disclose that in this case, AAA was already 67 years of age when she was raped in the dark by
appellant Jastiva who was armed with a knife. Justifiably, a woman of such advanced age could
only recoil in fear and succumb into submission. In any case, with such shocking and horrifying
experience, it would not be reasonable to impose upon AAA any standard form of reaction. Time
and again, this Court has recognized that different people react differently to a given situation
involving a startling occurrence. The workings of the human mind placed under emotional stress
are unpredictable, and people react differently - some may shout, others may faint, and still
others may be shocked into insensibility even if there may be a few who may openly welcome
the intrusion.
More to the point, physical resistance is not the sole test to determine whether a woman
involuntarily succumbed to the lust of an accused. Some may offer strong resistance while others
may be too intimidated to offer any resistance at all, just like what happened in this case. Thus,
the law does not impose a burden on the rape victim to prove resistance. What needs only to be
proved by the prosecution is the use of force or intimidation by the accused in having sexual
intercourse with the victim which it did in the case at bar.
The preceding paragraphs altogether, the testimony of AAA was shown to be credible, natural,
convincing and consistent with human nature; and the fact that AAA is already of advanced age
lends more credence to her protestations of rape and inspires the thought that this case was filed
for the genuine reason of seeking justice.
Secondly, the circumstances after the commission of the rape testified to by AAA sufficed to
establish the ability of the latter to identify appellant Jastiva as the perpetrator of the crime.
Appellant Jastivas assertions that the cover of darkness and lack of lighting inside the "kamalig"
where the crime took place, utterly diminished AAAs ability to identify him or anyone for that
matter, is downright specious. AAA never claimed to have seen her attacker inside the "kamalig."
What AAA testified to was the fact that she saw appellant Jastiva when he walked past her by the
open door of the "kamalig" and his face was finally illuminated by the moonlight.
From the above, the RTC correctly held that "the Court is not disposed to doubt the evidenced
ability of the complainant to identify her rapist especially because her familiarity of the latter
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could easily be strengthened by the fact that the accused is her neighbor living some 100 meters
away from the crime scene."
Thirdly, contrary to appellant Jastivas claim that the "absence of rape is x x x bolstered by the
medical findings,"54the Medical Certificate issued by Dr. Domiciano P. Talaboc, Municipal
Health Officer of the town where the crime of rape was committed, stating his medico-legal
findings of his examination of AAA made on August 5, 2004 showing:
Findings: 1) Patient is ambulatory, conscious, coherent and oriented as to time,

day and place.
2) Multiple scratches noted at both upper and lower lips, towards the inner folds.
xxxx
5) On internal examination, both labia majora and labia minora on both sides
showed signs of irritation, reddish in color, and partial separation of tissues
between labia majora and labia minora on both sides was noted with more
separation on the right side.55
is consistent with AAAs assertion that appellant Jastiva succeeded in having sexual intercourse
with her.
And, fourthly, worth noting is the fact that appellant Jastiva did not allege, much less show, that
AAA was prompted by improper or malicious motives to impute upon him such a serious charge.
This being so, the categorical and positive identification of appellant Jastiva prevails over the
latters plain alibi and bare denial.
Moreover, such prevarication was devoid of any persuasion due to its being easily and
conveniently resorted to, and due to denial being generally weaker than and not prevailing over
the positive assertions of an eyewitness. It has been held that for the defense of alibi to prosper,
the accused must prove the following: (i) that he was present at another place at the time of the
perpetration of the crime; and (ii) that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of
the crime during its commission. Physical impossibility involves the distance and the facility of
access between the crime scene and the location of the accused when the crime was committed;
the accused must demonstrate that he was so far away and could not have been physically
present at the crime scene and its immediate vicinity when the crime was committed.56
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Here, appellant Jastiva utterly failed to satisfy the above-quoted requirements. From the
testimonies of the witnesses, it was shown that the distance between AAAs farmhouse and
appellant Jastivas house was only 150 meters, more or less.57 Certainly, 150 meters is not too far
as to preclude the presence of appellant Jastiva at the farmhouse of AAA. That he presented
witnesses to attest to his presence at his own home around the time the rape was said to have
been committed did not help him one bit. If truth be told, the testimonies of his wife and
daughter were more deleterious to his defense because they contradicted each others account on
material points relative to the circumstances of that fateful night.
Appellant Jastiva further tries to interject reasonable doubt by pointing out that AAAs claim that
he indulged in sexual foreplay prior to having sexual intercourse with her is unbelievable and
contrary to the normal conduct of a rapist, i.e., that "[n]ormally, a rapist, who is pressed for time
so as not to be caught in flagrante, would not leisurely engage in sexual intercourse with his
victim, as what actually happened in this case." He reasons that he could not have engaged in
sexual foreplay because he could not have known that AAA would be all alone in the farmhouse
on the night in question.
Case law, however, shows numerous instances of rape committed under indirect and audacious
circumstances. The lust of a lecherous man respects neither time nor place. Neither the
crampness of the room, nor the presence of people therein, nor the high risk of being caught, has
been held sufficient and effective obstacle to deter the commission of rape.
All told, this Court is convinced beyond reasonable doubt that appellant Jastiva committed the
crime of rape by having carnal knowledge of AAA using force and intimidation. Under Article
266-B of the Revised Penal Code, the proper penalty to be imposed is:
Art. 266-B. Penalties. Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be punished
by reclusion perpetua.
Whenever the rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the
penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
But the imposition of death penalty has been prohibited by Republic Act No. 9346, entitled "An
Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines;" thus, the RTC, as affirmed
by the Court of Appeals, properly imposed upon appellant Jastiva the penalty of reclusion
perpetua.
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Relative to the award of damages, the RTC correctly awarded P50,000.00 as civil indemnity
and P50,000.00 as moral damages. Civil indemnity is in the nature of actual and compensatory
damages, and is obligatory upon conviction of rape. As to moral damages, it is automatically
awarded to rape victims without the necessity of proof, for it is assumed that they suffered moral
injuries entitling them to such award. Similarly, the Court of Appeals fittingly imposed interest
on all damages awarded to AAA, the private offended party, at the legal rate of six percent (6%)
per annum from the date of the finality of this Court's decision in conformity with present
jurisprudence.
This Court notes, however, that both the RTC and Court of Appeals overlooked the award of
exemplary damages. Being corrective in nature, exemplary damages can be awarded even in the
absence of an aggravating circumstance if the circumstances of the case show the highly
reprehensible or outrageous conduct of the offender.68 Thus, this Court deems it necessary to
modify the civil liability of appellant Jastiva to include exemplary damages for the vindication of
the sense of indignity and humiliation suffered by AAA, a woman of advanced age, and to set a
public example, to serve as deterrent to those who abuse the elderly, and to protect the latter from
sexual assaults.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated August 31, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-
H.C. No. 00754-MIN is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Appellant Aurelio Jastiva is found
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of simple rape and is sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua, and ordered to pay AAA the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages. Appellant
Aurelio Jastiva is further ordered to pay legal interest on all damages awarded in this case at the
rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of finality of this decision until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
People vs. Ricky Joel Arguta and Wilson SIWIT Cahipe

GR No. 213216
Tickler: RAPE; QUALIFIED RAPE; OLD RAPE PROVISION; From the beach to the
Kubo; not once but twice.
Facts:
8PM of December 5, 1996, AAA was supposed to fetch her sister in school, but after
failing to find her, AAA decided to go back home. On the way home, she was intercepted by the
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two accused and threatened her with a bladed weapon, dragged her to a cottage at a nearby beach
resort, bounding her hands and feet. JOEL mounted her first, then SIWIT. After the rape, SIWIT
returned and dragged AAA to a store owned by a Lino Ostero and raped her one more time and
then brought her back to the cottage. The next day, AAA was found crying at the cottage.
Defense: JOEL Denial and that he was watching TV at Osteros house.
SIWIT Denial and that he was manning the store of Ostero.
Medical Findings: Dr. Eilleen Colaba on AAA, stating, inter alia, that: (a) AAA's genitalia was
grossly normal, which means no abnormality; (b) AAA has complete healed hymenal lacerations
at the 5 o'clock and 7 o'clock positions and a partially healed hymenal laceration at the 12 o'clock
position; and (c) AAA's genitalia is negative for the presence of spermatozoa.
Charge: SIWIT CAHIPE Two Counts of Rape; JOEL Arguta One Count of Rape
RTC: GUILTY to only one charge of Rape for both; the second time that SIWIT allegedly
raped AAA was dismissed due to insufficiency of evidence. NOTE: RTC ruled that it was
unusual for AAA to not attempt to escape or shout for help when she was being transported
after the first rape.
Alibi and denial failed because it was not physically impossible for them to be present at
the locus criminalis and the positive assertions of AAA.
CA: AFFIRM (NOTE: Both the RTC and the CA convicted them under Art. 266-A, finding
that the carnal knowledge with AAA was attained through force, threat, or intimidation.)
SC: Affirmed BUT MODIFIED
RAPE TO QUALIFIED RAPE
The case falls under the old rape provision of the RPC Article 355 because it was committed
before the amendment.
Art. 335. When and how rape is committed. - Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of
a woman under any of the following circumstances:
1. By using force or intimidation;
2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.
The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more
persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
Under this provision, the elements of Rape are: (a) the offender had carnal knowledge of the
victim; and (b) said carnal knowledge was accomplished through the use of force or
intimidation; or the victim was deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or when the
victim was under twelve (12) years of age or demented. The provision also states that if the act
is committed either with the use of a deadly weapon or by two (2) or more persons, the
crime will be Qualified Rape, necessitating the imposition of a higher penalty. In People v.
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Lamberte, the Court clarified the legal effect of the presence of both circumstances, as
follows:
The presence of either circumstance - "use of a deadly weapon" or "by two or more persons" -
qualifies the crime. If one is present, the remaining circumstance, if also attendant, is not a
generic aggravating circumstance.
In this case, records reveal that accused-appellants threatened AAA with a bladed instrument
and tied her up before having carnal knowledge of her without her consent. Jurisprudence
holds that force or intimidation, as an element of Rape, need not be irresistible; as long as the
assailant's objective is accomplished, any question of whether the force employed was
irresistible or not becomes irrelevant. Intimidation must be viewed from the lens of the
victim's perception and judgment and it is enough that the victim fears that something will
happen to her should she resist her assailant's advances. In this regard, case law provides that
the act of holding a bladed instrument, by itself, is strongly suggestive of force or, at least,
intimidation, and threatening the victim with the same is sufficient to bring her into submission.
In view of the foregoing, the Court finds no reason to deviate from the findings of fact made by
the courts a quo that accused-appellants are guilty as charged, i.e., of raping AAA with the use of
a deadly weapon, as the same are supported by the records.
Nevertheless, considering that the crime was committed by two (2) persons, the accused-
appellants herein, with the use of a bladed weapon, it is only appropriate to increase their
conviction from Simple Rape to Qualified Rape. Anent the proper penalty to be imposed,
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 934629 provides that "[p]ersons convicted of offenses punished
with reclusion perpetua, or whose sentences will be reduced to reclusion perpetua, by reason of
this Act, shall not be eligible for parole under Act No. 4103, otherwise known as the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended." Pursuant thereto, accused-appellants should be
sentenced with the penalty of reclusion perpetua, without eligibility for parole.
Emperador, Alquizola Lodging House

People and AAA vs CA
G.R. No. 183652, February 25, 2015
FACTS:
On March 25, 2004, AAA, together with Christian Lim, Joefhel Oporto, and Raymund
Carampatana, ate dinner at the house of one Mark Gemeno at Purok, Bulahan, Maranding. After
eating, Lim invited them to go to Alsons Palace. In the bedroom, they saw Montesco with
Batoctoy, Roda, dela Cruz, Rudinas, Diego, and Angelo. They had a drinking spree. At first,
AAA refused to drink because she had never tried hard liquor before. During the session, they
shared their problems with each other. When it was AAAs turn, she became emotional and
started crying. It was then that she took her first shot. She consumed more or less 5 glasses of
Emperador Brandy and felt dizzy so she laid her head down on Oportos lap. Oporto then started
kissing her head. This angered her so she told them to stop. Then, Roda also kissed her. AAA
was already sleepy, but they still forced her to take another shot. She heard Lim say, "Hubuga na,
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hubuga na," (You make her drunk, you make her drunk). And heard another say, "You drink it,
you drink it." She leaned on Oportos lap again, then she fell asleep. They woke her up and Lim
gave her the Emperador Brandy bottle to drink the remaining liquor inside. She tried to refuse
but they insisted, so she drank directly from the bottle. Again, she fell asleep.
The next thing she knew, Roda and Batoctoy were carrying her down the stairs, and then she was
asleep again. When she regained consciousness, she saw that she was already at the Alquizola
Lodging House. She would thereafter fall back asleep and wake up again. And during one of the
times that she was conscious, she saw Oporto on top of her, kissing her on different parts of her
body, and having intercourse with her. She started crying. She tried to resist when she felt pain in
her genitals. She also saw Carampatana and Moises Alquizola inside the room, watching as
Oporto abused her. At one point, AAA woke up while Carampatana was inserting his penis into
her private organ. She cried and told him to stop. Alquizola then joined and started to kiss her.
For the last time, she fell unconscious.
When she woke up, it was already 7:00a.m. of the next day. Her body felt heavy and exhausted.
She found herself with her shirt on but without her lower garments. The upper half of her body
was on top of the bed but her feet were on the floor. There were also red stains on her shirt.
When she told them that she was raped, her mother started hitting her. They reported the incident
to the police and subsequently undergone a medical examination. Dr. Acusta found an old
hymenal laceration at 5 oclock position and hyperemia or redness at the posterior fornices. The
vaginal smear likewise revealed the presence of sperm.
On the other hand, accused denied that they raped AAA. According the defense witnesses, after
drinking, Batoctoy offered to bring AAA home. But she refused and instead instructed them to
take her to the Alquizola Lodging House because she has a big problem. AAA, Lim, and
Carampatana rode a motorcycle to the lodging house. When they arrived, AAA approached
Alquizola and told him, "Kuya, I want to sleep here for the meantime." Alquizola then opened
Room No. 4 where AAA, Oporto, and Carampatana stayed. There were two beds inside, a single
bed and a double-sized bed. AAA lay down on the single bed and looked at Carampatana. The
latter approached her and they kissed. He then removed her shirt and AAA voluntarily raised her
hands to give way. Carampatana likewise removed her brassiere. All the while, Oporto was at the
foot of the bed. Thereafter, Oporto also removed her pants. AAA even lifted her buttocks to make
it easier for him to pull her underwear down. Oporto then went to AAA and kissed her on the
lips. Carampatana, on the other hand, placed himself in between AAAs legs and had intercourse
with her. When he finished, he put on his shorts and went back to Alsons Palace to get some
sleep. When he left, Oporto and AAA were still kissing. Alquizola then entered the room. When
AAA saw him, she said, "Come Kuya, embrace me because I have a problem." Alquizola thus
started kissing AAAs breasts. Oporto stood up and opened his pants. AAA held his penis and
performed fellatio on him. Then Oporto and Alquizola changed positions. Oporto proceeded to
have sexual intercourse with AAA. During that time, AAA was moaning and calling his name.
Afterwards, Oporto went outside and slept with Alquizola on the carpet. Oporto then had
intercourse with AAA two more times. At 3:00 a.m., he went back to Alsons Palace to sleep. At
around 6:00 a.m., Oporto and Carampatana went back to the lodging house. They tried to wake
AAA up, but she did not move so they just left and went home.
4F (2016-2017) 2
CRIME CHARGED: RAPE against Carampatana, Oporto, Alquizola, Lim, dela Cruz, Rudinas,
Roda, Batoctoy, and Villame (They voluntarily surrendered)
RTC: GUILTY: Carampatana (RP), Oporto (minor, 6 yrs & 1 day to 12 yrs), Alquiloza
(accomplice, 6yrs & 1day to 12yrs & 1 day)
ACQUITTED: dela Cruz, Rudinas, Roda, Batoctoy and Villame
CA: ACQUITTED: Carampatana, Oporto, Alquiloza
SC: GUILTY: Conspiracy (4 counts of rape): Carampatana (RP in each case), Oporto (minor,
6yrs & 1 day to 12yrs & 1 day in each case), Alquiloza (RP in each case). Voluntary Surrender
appreciated.
The elements of rape are: (1) the offender had carnal knowledge of the victim; and (2) such act
was accomplished through force or intimidation; or when the victim is deprived of reason or
otherwise unconscious; or when the victim is under twelve years of age. Here, the accused
intentionally made AAA consume hard liquor more than she could handle. They still forced her
to drink even when she was already obviously inebriated. They never denied having sexual
intercourse with AAA, but the latter was clearly deprived of reason or unconscious at the time
the private respondents ravished her.
The CA, readily concluded that she agreed to the sexual act simply because she did not shout or
offer any physical resistance, disregarding her testimony that she was rendered weak and dizzy
by intoxication, thereby facilitating the commission of the crime. The appellate court never
provided any reason why AAAs testimony should deserve scant or no weight at all, or why it
cannot be accorded any credence. In reviewing rape cases, the lone testimony of the victim is and
should be, by itself, sufficient to warrant a judgment of conviction if found to be credible. Also,
it has been established that when a woman declares that she has been raped, she says in effect all
that is necessary to mean that she has been raped, and where her testimony passes the test of
credibility, the accused can be convicted on that basis alone. The trial court correctly ruled that if
AAA was not truthful to her accusation, she would not have opened herself to the rough and
tumble of a public trial. AAA was certainly not enjoying the prying eyes of those who were
listening as she narrated her harrowing experience. AAA positively identified the private
respondents as the ones who violated her. She tried to resist, but because of the presence of
alcohol, her assaulters still prevailed.
The defense of consensual copulation was belatedly invoked and seemed to have been a last
ditch effort to avoid culpability. The accused never mentioned about the same at the pre-trial
stage. The trial court only came to know about it when it was their turn to take the witness stand,
catching the court by surprise. Generally, the burden of proof is upon the prosecution to establish
each and every element of the crime and that it is the accused who is responsible for its
commission. Having admitted to carnal knowledge of the complainant, the burden now shifts to
the accused to prove his defense by substantial evidence. the accused themselves admitted to
4F (2016-2017) 2
having carnal knowledge of AAA but unfortunately failed to discharge the burden required of
them.
The CA continued, belaboring on the fact that the examining physician found old hymenal
laceration on AAAs private organ. The lack of a fresh hymenal laceration, which is expected to
be present when the alleged sexual encounter is involuntary, could mean that AAA actually
consented to the fornication. No woman, especially one of tender age, would concoct a story of
defloration, allow an examination of her private parts, and be subjected to public trial and
humiliation if her claim were not true. And even if she were indeed highly promiscuous at such a
young age, the same could still not prove that no rape was actually committed. The victims
moral character in rape is immaterial where, as in this case, it is shown that the victim was
deprived of reason or was rendered unconscious through intoxication to enable the private
respondents to have sex with her. Moreover, the essence of rape is the carnal knowledge of a
woman against her consent. A freshly broken hymen is not one of its essential elements. Neither
does AAAs mothers act of hitting her after learning about the rape prove anything. It is a truism
that "the workings of the human mind when placed under emotional stress are unpredictable, and
the people react differently." It is a settled rule that when there is no showing that private
complainant was impelled by improper motive in making the accusation against the accused, her
complaint is entitled to full faith and credence.
Lastly, the trial court pronounced that Alquizola was not part of the conspiracy because his
participation in the crime was uncertain. The Court, however, finds that the RTC erred in ruling
that Alquizolas liability is not of a conspirator, but that of a mere accomplice. To establish
conspiracy, it is not essential that there be proof as to previous agreement to commit a crime, it
being sufficient that the malefactors shall have acted in concert pursuant to the same objective.
Conspiracy is proved if there is convincing evidence to sustain a finding that the malefactors
committed an offense in furtherance of a common objective pursued in concert. Proof of
conspiracy need not even rest on direct evidence, as the same may be inferred from the collective
conduct of the parties before, during or after the commission of the crime indicating a common
understanding among them with respect to the commission of the offense.
As the caretaker of the Alquizola Lodging House, he provided a room so the rape could be
accomplished with ease and furtiveness. He was likewise inside the room, intently watching,
while Oporto and Carampatana sexually abused AAA. He did not do anything to stop the bestial
acts of his companions. He even admitted to kissing AAAs lips, breasts, and other parts of her
body. Indubitably, there was conspiracy among Carampatana, Oporto, and Alquizola to sexually
abuse AAA. Hence, the act of any one was the act of all, and each of them, Alquizola including,
is equally guilty of the crime of rape. While it is true that the RTC found Alquizola guilty as
mere accomplice, when he appealed from the decision of the trial court, he waived the
constitutional safeguard against double jeopardy and threw the whole case open to the review of
the appellate court, which is then called upon to render such judgment as law and justice dictate,
whether favorable or unfavorable to the accused-appellant.
4F (2016-2017) 2
Carampatana, Oporto, and Alquizola can then be held liable for more than one crime of rape, or a
total of four (4) counts in all, with conspiracy extant among the three of them during the
commission of each of the four violations.
PEOPLE VS LAOG TICKLER: LEAD PIPE, RICE PADDIES, SPECIAL COMPLEX

CRIME OF RAPE WITH HOMICIDE
FACTS: Appellant Conrado Laog y Ramin was charged with murder before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC). He was likewise charged before the same court with the crime of rape of AAA. The
two cases were thereafter tried jointly because they arose from the same incident. AAA testified
that at around six oclock in the evening of June 6, 2000, she and her friend, Jennifer Patawaran-
Rosal, were walking along the rice paddies on their way to apply for work at a canteen near the
National Highway in Sampaloc, San Rafael, Bulacan. Suddenly, appellant, who was holding an
ice pick and a lead pipe, waylaid them and forcibly brought them to a grassy area at the back of a
concrete wall. Without warning, appellant struck AAA in the head with the lead pipe causing her
to feel dizzy and to fall down. When Jennifer saw this, she cried out for help but appellant also
hit her on the head with the lead pipe, knocking her down. Appellant stabbed Jennifer several
times with the ice pick and thereafter covered her body with thick grass. Appellant then turned to
AAA. He hit AAA in the head several times more with the lead pipe and stabbed her on the face.
While AAA was in such defenseless position, appellant pulled down her jogging pants, removed
her panty, and pulled up her blouse and bra. He then went on top of her, sucked her breasts and
inserted his penis into her vagina. After raping AAA, appellant also covered her with grass. At
that point, AAA passed out. When AAA regained consciousness, it was nighttime and raining
hard. She crawled until she reached her uncles farm at daybreak on June 8, 2000. When she saw
him, she waved at him for help. Her uncle, BBB, and a certain Nano then brought her to Carpa
Hospital in Baliuag, Bulacan where she stayed for more than three weeks. She later learned that
Jennifer had died. Appellant, on the other hand, denied the charges against him. Appellant
testified that he was at home cooking dinner around the time the crimes were committed. With
him were his children and his nephew. At around seven oclock, he was arrested by the police
officers of San Rafael, Bulacan. He learned that his wife had reported him to the police after he
went wild that same night and struck with a lead pipe a man whom he saw talking to his wife
inside their house. When he was already incarcerated, he learned that he was being charged with
murder and rape.
CC: MURDER AND RAPE RTC: GUILTY OF MURDER AND RAPE (Separate crimes) CA:
AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION (it added P25,000 actual damages, and reduced the
exemplary damages to P25,000) SC: GUILTY OF SPECIAL COMPLEX CRIME OF RAPE
WITH HOMICIDE Appellant principally attacks the credibility of prosecution witness AAA.
Here, both the trial and appellate courts gave credence and full probative weight to the testimony
of AAA, the lone eyewitness to Jennifers killing and was herself brutally attacked by appellant
who also raped her. Appellant had not shown any sufficiently weighty reasons for us to disturb
the trial courts evaluation of the prosecution eyewitness credibility. Appellant merely interposed
the defense of denial and alibi. He claimed that at the time of the incident, he was at his house
with his children and nephew cooking dinner. His defense, however, cannot prevail over the
4F (2016-2017) 2
straightforward and credible testimony of AAA who positively identified him as the perpetrator
of the murder and rape. Time and again, we have held that positive identification of the accused,
when categorical and consistent and without any showing of ill motive on the part of the
eyewitness testifying, should prevail over the alibi and denial of the appellant whose testimony is
not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence.
As to the fact that the physician who examined AAA at the hospital did not testify during the
trial, we find this not fatal to the prosecutions case. It must be underscored that the foremost
consideration in the prosecution of rape is the victims testimony and not the findings of the
medico-legal officer. In fact, a medical examination of the victim is not indispensable in a
prosecution for rape; the victims testimony alone, if credible, is sufficient to convict. Thus we
have ruled that a medical examination of the victim, as well as the medical certificate, is merely
corroborative in character and is not an indispensable element for conviction in rape. What is
important is that the testimony of private complainant about the incident is clear, unequivocal
and credible, as what we find in this case.
While we concur with the trial courts conclusion that appellant indeed was the one who raped
AAA and killed Jennifer, we find that appellant should not have been convicted of the separate
crimes of murder and rape. An appeal in a criminal case opens the entire case for review on any
question, including one not raised by the parties. The facts alleged and proven clearly show that
the crime committed by appellant is rape with homicide, a special complex crime provided under
Article 266-B, paragraph 5 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No.
8353. Where the law provides a single penalty for two or more component offenses, the resulting
crime is called a special complex crime. Some of the special complex crimes under the Revised
Penal Code are (1) robbery with homicide, (2) robbery with rape, (3) kidnapping with serious
physical injuries, (4) kidnapping with murder or homicide, and (5) rape with homicide. In a
special complex crime, the prosecution must necessarily prove each of the component offenses
with the same precision that would be necessary if they were made the subject of separate
complaints.
A special complex crime, or more properly, a composite crime, has its own definition and special
penalty in the Revised Penal Code, as amended. Justice Regalado, in his Separate Opinion in the
case of People v. Barros, explained that composite crimes are neither of the same legal basis as
nor subject to the rules on complex crimes in Article 48 [of the Revised Penal Code], since they
do not consist of a single act giving rise to two or more grave or less grave felonies [compound
crimes] nor do they involve an offense being a necessary means to commit another [complex
crime proper]. However, just like the regular complex crimes and the present case of aggravated
illegal possession of firearms, only a single penalty is imposed for each of such composite crimes
although composed of two or more offenses.
Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, provides only a single penalty for the
composite acts of rape and the killing committed by reason or on the occasion of the rape:
"When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, homicide is committed, the penalty shall be
death"
4F (2016-2017) 2
Considering that the prosecution in this case was able to prove both the rape of AAA and the
killing of Jennifer both perpetrated by appellant, he is liable for rape with homicide under the
above provision. There is no doubt that appellant killed Jennifer to prevent her from aiding AAA
or calling for help once she is able to run away, and also to silence her completely so she may not
witness the rape of AAA, the original intent of appellant. His carnal desire having been satiated,
appellant purposely covered AAAs body with grass, as he did earlier with Jennifers body, so that
it may not be easily noticed or seen by passersby. Appellant indeed thought that the savage blows
he had inflicted on AAA were enough to cause her death as with Jennifer. But AAA survived and
appellants barbaric deeds were soon enough discovered.
The facts established showed that the constitutive elements of rape with homicide were
consummated, and it is immaterial that the person killed in this case is someone other than the
woman victim of the rape. An analogy may be drawn from our rulings in cases of robbery with
homicide, where the component acts of homicide, physical injuries and other offenses have been
committed by reason or on the occasion of robbery.
In the special complex crime of rape with homicide, the term homicide is to be understood in its
generic sense, and includes murder and slight physical injuries committed by reason or on
occasion of the rape. Hence, even if any or all of the circumstances (treachery, abuse of superior
strength and evident premeditation) alleged in the information have been duly established by the
prosecution, the same would not qualify the killing to murder and the crime committed by
appellant is still rape with homicide. As in the case of robbery with homicide, the aggravating
circumstance of treachery is to be considered as a generic aggravating circumstance only.
Abuse of superior strength in this case is merely a generic aggravating circumstance to be

considered in the imposition of the penalty. The penalty provided in Article 266-B of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended, is death. However, in view of the passage of R.A. No. 9346, the Court
is mandated to impose on the appellant the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for
parole.
The aggravating/qualifying circumstances of abuse of superior strength and use of deadly

weapon have greater relevance insofar as the civil aspect of this case is concerned. While the trial
court and CA were correct in holding that both the victim of the killing (Jennifer) and the rape
victim (AAA) are entitled to the award of exemplary damages, the basis for such award needs
further clarification.
In view of the presence of abuse of superior strength in the killing of Jennifer, her heirs are
entitled to exemplary damages pursuant to Article 2230. With respect to the rape committed
against AAA, Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, provides that a man who
shall have carnal knowledge of a woman through force, threat or intimidation under Article 266-
A (a), whenever such rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more
persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death. Since the use of a deadly weapon raises
the penalty for the rape, this circumstance would justify the award of exemplary damages to the
offended party (AAA) also in accordance with Article 2230.
4F (2016-2017) 2
Article 266-B likewise provides for the imposition of death penalty if the crime of rape is
committed with any of the aggravating/qualifying circumstances enumerated therein. Among
these circumstances is minority of the victim and her relationship to the offender:
1) When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant,
stepparent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the
common law spouse of the parent of the victim.
AAAs relationship to appellant, who is his uncle by affinity, was not alleged in the information
but admitted by appellant when he testified in court. The failure of the prosecution to allege in
the information AAAs relationship to appellant will not bar the consideration of the said
circumstance in the determination of his civil liability. In any case, even without the attendance
of aggravating circumstances, exemplary damages may still be awarded where the circumstances
of the case show the highly reprehensible or outrageous conduct of the offender. In this case, the
brutal manner by which appellant carried out his lustful design against his niece-in-law who
never had an inkling that her own uncle would do any harm to her and her friend, justified the
award of exemplary damages. In cases of murder and homicide, the award of moral damages is
mandatory, without need of allegation and proof other than the death of the victim. Accused-
appellant is hereby ordered to pay the heirs of Jennifer Patawaran-Rosal P75,000 as civil
indemnity ex delicto, P50,000 as moral damages, P25,000 as actual damages and P30,000 as
exemplary damages. He is further ordered to pay to the victim AAA the sums of P50,000 as civil
indemnity ex delicto, P50,000 as moral damages and P30,000 as exemplary damages.
People vs Villaflores aka Batman

Tickler: alyas BATMAN, protruding elbow of dead child inside a sack, nahulaan ng
manghuhula yung location ng biktima
Crime Charged: Composite Crime/Special Complex Crime of Rape with Homicide
RTC: Guilty of Composite Crime/Special Complex Crime of Rape with Homicide
CA: Affirmed RTC
SC: Affirmed
Facts: Victim Marita, 4 years and 8 months of age, was just playing in their backyard in Bagong
Silang, Caloocan in the morning of July 2, 1999. When her mother noticed her missing, she
called her husband to look for her but the search has gone futile until midnight. They sought the
assistance of the police the following day. In her desperation, the mother consulted a clairvoyant
(manghuhula) who said that Marita is just 5 houses away from them. True enough, they found
Maritas lifeless body covered with a blue and yellow sack inside a comfort room of an
abandoned house just 5 structures away from the victims house. Maritas face was black and
blue and bloody. She had been tortured and strangled with a nylon rope.
Witnesses Aldrin Bautista and Jovy Solidum pointed to Villaflores as the culprit. Villaflores was
arrested and charged with rape with homicide.
According to these two witnesses, they saw Villaflores, known as Batman, leading Marita by
hand the day she went missing. Also that day, the three of them sniffe shabu in Batmans house.
4F (2016-2017) 2
Although the witnesses did not see Marita inside the house, JOVY PRESUMED THAT
BATMAN WAS HIDING HER AT THE BACK OF HIS HOUSE.
In the afternoon, Jovy heard cries of a child coming from the house of Batman.
In the evening, Jovy saw Batman carrying a yellow sack which appeared heavy towards a vacant
house.
Batmans wife told the police that he saw her husband placing some sacks under their house the
night Marita went missing. She also saw a protruding elbow from the sack which Batman
dismissed as Wala yun, wala yun. When she re-checked the sack, she saw a dead girl inside.
Medico-legal report: asphyxia by strangulation (sinakal sa pamamagitan ng tali) and rape
Alibi of Batman: Batman claimed he was at the market place that day to get some plywood for
his aunt and that the two witnesses had ill feeling against him because he would not allow them
to sniff shabu in his house on some occasions.
*a defense witness, Sherwin Borcillo, pointed that it was Jovy who carried the sack with a dead
girl inside.
RTC: convicted Batman of rape with homicide. Circumstantial evidence shows guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. Penalty is death with 75K indemnity, 30k moral damages, and 20k exemplary
damages.
CA: affirmed RTC.
SC: Affirms conviction but penalty is reclusion perpetua.
The felony of rape with homicide is a composite crime. A composite crime, also known as a
special complex crime, is composed of two or more crimes that the law treats as a single
indivisible and unique offense for being the product of a single criminal impulse. It is a specific
crime with a specific penalty provided by law, and differs from a compound or complex crime
under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code.
There are distinctions between a composite crime, on the one hand, and a complex or compound
crime under Article 48, on the other hand. In a composite crime, the composition of the offenses
is fixed by law; in a complex or compound crime, the combination of the offenses is not
specified but generalized, that is, grave and/or less grave, or one offense being the necessary
means to commit the other. For a composite crime, the penalty for the specified combination of
crimes is specific; for a complex or compound crime, the penalty is that corresponding to the
most serious offense, to be imposed in the maximum period. A light felony that accompanies a
composite crime is absorbed; a light felony that accompanies the commission of a complex or
compound crime may be the subject of a separate information.
4F (2016-2017) 3
Republic Act No. 8353 (Anti-Rape Law of 1997) pertinently provides:

Article 266-A. Rape; When and How Committed. Rape is committed
1) By a man who have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none
of the circumstance mentioned above be present.
xxx
Article 266-B. Penalties. Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be punished
xxx
When the rape is attempted and a homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion thereof,
the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, homicide is committed, the penalty shall be
death.
Xxx
The law on rape quoted herein thus defines and sets forth the composite crimes of attempted rape
with homicide and rape with homicide. In both composite crimes, the homicide is committed by
reason or on the occasion of rape. As can be noted, each of said composite crimes is punished
with a single penalty, the former with reclusion perpetua to death, and the latter with death.
The phrases by reason of the rape and on the occasion of the rape are crucial in determining
whether the crime is a composite crime or a complex or compound crime. The phrase by reason
of the rape obviously conveys the notion that the killing is due to the rape, the offense the
offender originally designed to commit. The victim of the rape is also the victim of the killing.
The indivisibility of the homicide and the rape (attempted or consummated) is clear and admits
of no doubt. In contrast, the import of the phrase on the occasion of the rape may not be as easy
to determine. To understand what homicide may be covered by the phrase on the occasion of the
rape, a resort to the meaning the framers of the law intended to convey thereby is helpful. Indeed,
during the floor deliberations of the Senate on Republic Act No. 8353, the legislative intent on
the import of the phrase on the occasion of the rape to refer to a killing that occurs immediately
before or after, or during the commission itself of the attempted or consummated rape, where the
victim of the homicide may be a person other than the rape victim herself for as long as the
killing is linked to the rape, became evident.
With enough circumstantial evidence, the prosecution was able to prove the following:
(a) that Villaflores had carnal knowledge of Marita;
(b) that he consummated the carnal knowledge without the consent of Marita; and
(c) that he killed Marita by reason of the rape
4F (2016-2017) 3
Rape is always committed when the accused has carnal knowledge of a female under 12 years of
age. The crime is commonly called statutory rape, because a female of that age is deemed
incapable of giving consent to the carnal knowledge.
(Bonus facts lang) The 10 circumstantial evidence were:

1. Aldrin Bautista and Jovie Solidum saw Villaflores holding Marita by the hand (akay-akay) at
around 10:00 am on July 2, 1999,leading the child through the alley going towards the direction
of his house about 6 houses away from the victims house.
2. Marita went missing after that and remained missing until the discovery of her lifeless body
on the following day.
3. Solidum passed by Villaflores house at about 3:00 pm of July 2, 1999 and heard the crying and
moaning (umuungol) of a child coming from inside.
4. At about 7:00 pm of July 2, 1999 Solidum saw Villaflores coming from his house carrying a
yellow sack that appeared to be heavy and going towards the abandoned house where the childs
lifeless body was later found.
5. Manito, the father of Marita, identified the yellow sack as the same yellow sack that covered
the head of his daughter (nakapalupot sa ulo) at the time he discovered her body; Manito also
mentioned that a blue sack covered her body.
6. A hidden pathway existed between the abandoned house where Maritas body was found and
Villaflores house, because his house had a rear exit that enabled access to the abandoned house
without having to pass any other houses. This indicated Villaflores familiarity and access to the
abandoned house.
7. Several pieces of evidence recovered from the abandoned house, like the white rope around
the victims neck and the yellow sack, were traced to Villaflores. The white rope was the same
rope tied to the door of his house,[36] and the yellow sack was a wallcovering for his toilet.
8. The medico-legal findings showed that Marita had died from asphyxiation by strangulation,
which cause of death was consistent with the ligature marks on her neck and the multiple injuries
including abrasions, hematomas, contusions and punctured wounds.
9. Marita sustained multiple deep fresh hymenal lacerations, and had fresh blood from her
genitalia. The vaginal and periurethral smears taken from her body tested positive for
spermatozoa.
10.The body of Marita was already in the second stage of flaccidity at the time of the autopsy of
her cadaver at 8 pm of July 3, 1999. The medico-legal findings indicated that such stage of
flaccidity confirmed that she had been dead for more than 24 hours, or at the latest by 9 pm of
July 2, 1999.
4F (2016-2017) 3
G.R. No. 211027, June 29, 2015
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JOSE BRONIOLA
TICKLER: Taiwan Fish / Bolo with Blood
FACTS:
PROSECUTION: Around 5:30 in the afternoon, Alfredo Abag was on his way home bringing
some Taiwan fish to sell when he met the appellant at a shortcut road passable only to people and
animals. He noticed that appellant had scratches on his face and his hand was holding a bolo with
blood on it. Appelant asked for the price of the fish but didnt buy it and left. He also seems
restless and uneasy. Then, AAAs father reported to the authorities that his daughter was missing.
Next morning, he went with Abag and other barangay officials to search for AAA. They found
her dead lying on a grassy area near a farm hut owned by Jhonefer Q. Darantinao. AAAs body
bore several hack wounds, blood oozed from her mouth, her one hand and one finger were cut
off. He knows appellant because they are neighbors. Their families had a rift because appellants
father was killed by his son-in-law, Lito Miguel.
DEFENSE: n the morning of February 28, 2000, appellant was plowing his farm located adjacent
to their house. After having lunch, he worked in the fishpond just beside their house until 3:00
oclock in the afternoon. Thereafter, he stayed inside their house together with his mother, wife
and children. Appellant claimed he does not know Abag, AAA or BBB
CRIME CHARGED: RAPE with HOMICIDE
RTC: RAPE with HOMICIDE
CA: RAPE with HOMICIDE
ISSUE: Whether or not appellant was guilty of rape with homicide
HELD: Appellant was charged and convicted of rape with homicide. The felony of rape with
homicide is a special complex crime that is, two or more crimes that the law treats as a single
indivisible and unique offense for being the product of a single criminal impulse. In rape with
homicide, the following elements must concur: (1) the appellant had carnal knowledge of a
woman; (2) carnal knowledge of a woman was achieved by means of force, threat or
intimidation; and (3) by reason or on occasion of such carnal knowledge by means of force,
threat or intimidation, the appellant killed a woman.
In this case, nobody witnessed the actual rape and killing of AAA. Appellant, however, may still
be proven as the culprit despite the absence of eyewitnesses. Direct evidence is not a
condition sine qua non to prove the guilt of an accused beyond reasonable doubt. For in the
absence of direct evidence, the prosecution may resort to adducing circumstantial evidence to
discharge its burden.
It is settled that in the special complex crime of rape with homicide, both the rape and the
homicide must be established beyond reasonable doubt. In this regard, we have held that the
4F (2016-2017) 3
crime of rape is difficult to prove because it is generally unwitnessed and very often only the
victim is left to testify for herself. It becomes even more difficult when the complex crime of
rape with homicide is committed because the victim could no longer testify. Thus, in crimes of
rape with homicide, as here, resort to circumstantial evidence is usually unavoidable.
Circumstantial evidence consists of proof of collateral facts and circumstances from which the
existence of the main fact may be inferred according to reason and common experience.
The following circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution as sufficient for the
conviction of appellant: First, witness Abag met the appellant on a shortcut road near the place
where AAAs dead body was found, at about the same time (5:30 p.m.) AAA went missing as she
failed to return home that day, February 28, 2000; Second, appellant had scratches on his face
and he was holding a lagaraw a type of bolo used in the rural areas, which was stained with
blood, and he was restless and uneasy; Third, in the morning of the following day, February 29,
2000, AAAs lifeless body was found with several hack wounds inflicted on her face, neck and
extremities, one hand and one finger were totally severed; Fourth, the post-mortem examination
conducted by Dr. Edu confirmed that AAA died from loss of blood due to multiple hack wounds,
her underwear was blood-stained, she had hymenal lacerations and a whitish discharge was
found in her vagina; Fifth, appellant had the motive to commit the crime against AAA
considering that it was BBBs son-in-law, Lito Miguel, who killed appellants father; and Sixth,
appellant was evasive when being questioned on his knowledge of the identity of his fathers
killer and the latters relationship to the family of AAA, and the amicable settlement executed by
his mother in behalf of appellants family.
As regards the penalty imposed, R.A. No. 8353 provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
ART. 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. Rape is committed
circumstances:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
a) Through force, threat or intimidation;
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none
of the circumstances mentioned above be present.
xxxx
ART. 266-B. Penalties. Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be punished
xxxx
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, homicide is committed, the penalty shall be
4F (2016-2017) 3
death.
x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
On the other hand, Section 2 of R.A. No. 9346 or An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death
Penalty in the Philippines provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
SEC. 2. In lieu of the death penalty, the following shall be imposed:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
(a) the penalty of reclusion perpetua, when the law violated makes use of the nomenclature of
the penalties of the Revised Penal Code; or
(b) the penalty of life imprisonment, when the law violated does not make use of the
nomenclature of the penalties of the Revised Penal Code.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Furthermore, Section 3 of R.A. No. 9346 provides, [p]ersons convicted of offenses punished
with reclusion perpetua, or whose sentences will be reduced to reclusion perpetua, by reason of
this Act, shall not be eligible for parole under Act No. 4103, otherwise known as the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended.
The CA thus correctly modified the RTC judgment by declaring that the penalty of reclusion
perpetua is without the possibility of parole, in accordance with the law.
People vs. Jojie Suansing

TICKLER: RAPE, MENTAL RETARDATION, CARNAL KNOWLEDGE
FACTS:
Jojie Suansing was accused of raping AAA who was suffering from mental retardation.
Sometime before April 8, 2001, GGG, the sister of the accused, requested FFF, the friend of
the
victim, to get from Suansings boarding house an electric fan and a transformer. FFF, her
brother
and AAA went to the boarding house. After giving the requested items, Suansing ordered
FFF and her brother to leave AAA behind.
GGG, upon learning that AAA was still with the accused, requested FFF to fetch AAA.
Upon
arriving at the boarding house, she noticed that the door was closed. She called out to AAA
who
opened the door and came out fixing her short pants. FFF then asked AAA if anything
happened. AAA replied that after FFF and her brother left the boarding house, appellant
pulled her inside the room, removed her shoes and panty, told her to lie down on the floor, and
inserted his penis into her vagina without her consent. AAA requested FFF not to tell anyone
that she was raped by appellant.
4F (2016-2017) 3
On August 3, 2001, EEE learned about the rape and confronted AAA. EEE then reported
the
incident to police authorities. The genital examination of AAA on August 6, 2001 revealed
old hymenal lacerations. Her psychiatric evaluation also disclosed that she was suffering from
mild
retardation with the mental age of a 9 to 12-year old child. Although with impaired adaptive
skills, the RTC found AAA qualified to testify.
Appellant denied raping AAA and claimed that the relatives of AAA filed the instant case
against him because his sister, GGG, no longer gives them financial support.
The RTC found convincing evidence that Suansing was aware that AAA is a mental retardate;
that appellant raped AAA; that AAA or FFF was not ill-motivated to falsely accuse
appellant of such crime; and, that proof of force or intimidation was unnecessary as a mental
retardate is not capable of giving consent to a sexual act. However, the RTC also ruled that since
AAAs mental
retardation was not specifically alleged in the Amended Information, it cannot be considered as a
qualifying circumstance that would warrant the imposition of the death penalty. He was
sentenced
with reclusion perpetua.
The CA affirmed the findings of the RTC with respect to the assessment of the testimony of
AAA. It also affirmed the RTCs ruling not to consider the mental retardation of AAA as a
qualifying circumstance that would result in the imposition of the death penalty since it was not
specifically alleged in the Amended Information. However, the CA modified the awards for civil
indemnity and moral damages to conform to prevailing jurisprudence.
Suansing appealed for his exoneration.
CC: RAPE
RTC GUILTY
CA: GUILTY
ISSUE:
W/N the RTC and the CA gravely erred in convicting Suansing despite the failure of the
prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt
HELD:
The SC affirmed the decision of the CA with modifications with regard to:
(1) The appreciation of the fact of the appellants knowledge of AAAs mental
retardation was alleged in the Information; and (2) The damages awarded.
For the charge of rape to prosper, the prosecution
must prove that:
(1) The offender had carnal knowledge of a woman,
(2) through force or intimidation, or when she was deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious, or when she was under 12 years of age or was demented.
4F (2016-2017) 3
From these requisites, it can thus be deduced that rape is committed the moment the offender has
sexual intercourse with a person suffering from mental retardation.
Carnal knowledge of a woman who is a mental retardate is rape. A mental condition of

retardation
deprives the complainant of that natural instinct to resist a bestial assault on her chastity and
womanhood. For this reason, sexual intercourse with one who is intellectually weak to the extent
that she is incapable of giving consent to the carnal act already constitutes rape, without
requiring proof that the accused used force and intimidation in committing the act.
Only the facts of sexual congress between the accused and the victim and the latters mental
retardation need to be proved.
The SC held that the evidence presented by the prosecution established beyond reasonable
doubt the sexual congress between appellant and AAA and the latters mental retardation.
AAA positively identified appellant as her rapist.
She also described the manner by which the appellant perpetuated the crime.
In addition, according to the SC:
(1) It is highly improbable that a mentally retarded victim would fabricate the rape
charge against the appellant, given her limited intellect.
(2) Mental retardation of AAA does not diminish the credibility and reliability of her
testimony. AAA was able to make known her perception, communicate her ordeal, in
spite of some difficulty, and identify appellant as her rapist.
(3) The absence of fresh lacerations does not negate sexual intercourse. What is
required for a consummated crime of rape is the mere touching of the labia by the
penis AAA testified that appellants penis entered her vagina.
(4) Knowledge of the offender of the mental disability of the victim during the
commission of the crime of rape qualifies and makes it punishable by death. However,
such knowledge by the rapist should be alleged in the Information since a crime can
only be qualified by circumstances pleaded in the indictment. Appellants knowledge of the
mental
disability of AAA at the time of the commission of the crime of rape was properly alleged in
the Amended Information.
(5) The enactment of RA 9346 prohibited the imposition of the death penalty. In lieu
thereof, the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole.
(6) The amounts of civil indemnity and moral damages awarded to "AAA" are increased
to P75,000.00 each. Appellant is also ordered to pay "AAA'' exemplary damages in the amount
of
P25,000.00.
4F (2016-2017) 3
Tickler: Biologically 19 years old with a mental capacity of a 7-yr. old child, Retardate
PEOPLE v. CATAYTAY
G.R. No. 196315, October 22, 2014
FACTS:
BBB (AAAs mother) testified that she knew accused-appellant Cataytay as her neighbor in
their compound in Mandaluyong City. Accused-appellant was a shoe repairman who had a shop
six houses away from BBBs house. On September 7, 2003, at around 6:30 p.m., BBB left AAA
in their house to look for BBBs youngest daughter. Thirty minutes later, when she reached the
bridge near Block 37, her neighbor, Lito, told her that there was a problem, and brought her to
the barangay outpost. AAA and the accused-appellant were already at the outpost. Lito told the
persons at the outpost that she was the mother of the victim. When BBB saw AAA, the latter told
her, Mommy, ni-rape po ako. BBB asked her who raped her. AAA responded by pointing to
accused-appellant. During the interviews made by the barangay officials, AAA narrated how she
was raped by accused-appellant, which ended when a certain Mimi knocked at the door. When
accused-appellant answered the knock, Mimi told the former that she will shout if he does not
leave the house. AAA went out of the house and sought help from their neighbors. One of their
neighbors, Amelita Morante, called the barangay officials at the outpost.
BBB identified a Psychological Evaluation Report from the DSWD dated May 25, 1999, which
was conducted in connection with another rape case. The report stated that AAA had the mental
capacity of an eight-year-old child. BBB also identified AAAs birth certificate which showed
that she was biologically 19 years old at the time of the incident. On cross-examination, BBB
confirmed that AAA was the victim in a rape case in 1999 against a certain Norberto Lerit. BBB
admitted that she did not personally witness the alleged rape committed by Cataytay.
When AAA appeared as the second witness for the prosecution, the prosecution manifested that
by merely looking at her, it was apparent that she was mentally retardate.10 AAA, who was
crying while being asked questions, testified that she was raped by accused-appellant by
inserting his penis into her, despite her protestations. After the deed, she was given money by
accused-appellant. She knew the accused-appellant before the incident as a shoe repairman.
DSWD Social Worker Arlene Gampal testified that she referred AAA to the National Center
for Mental Health (NCMH) for psychological examination. She also conducted a Social Case
Study upon AAA in relation to the incident of sexual abuse at the hands of the accused. NCMH
Psychologist Susan Sabado was presented as a prosecution witness, but her testimony was
dispensed with when the defense agreed to a stipulation regarding her expertise and that the tests
conducted on AAA affirmed that the latter had a mental capacity of a seven-year-old child.
For the defense, accused-appellant testified that on September 7, 2003, at around 7:00 p.m., he
was in his house together with his brother, feeding his four-year-old daughter. He then went out
and proceeded to a videoke bar, which was around 20 meters from his house. He stayed at the
videoke bar for less than 15 minutes, as barangay officers suddenly arrived and arrested him.
Upon asking why he was being arrested, the officers told him that he was the suspect in the rape
of AAA. He was brought to the Barangay Hall, where he denied the accusations against him. He
estimated that the house of BBB was more or less 50 meters away from his house, and that it
4F (2016-2017) 3
would take more or less a one minute walk from the videoke bar to the house of AAA. Accused-
appellant admitted that by merely looking at AAA, he could tell that she has a mental disability.
Alicia Panaguitol (Alicia), a neighbor of AAA and accused-appellant, testified that she lives two
meters away from AAAs house and 60 meters away from that of accused-appellant. She was
inside her house at around 7:00 p.m. of September 7, 2003, during which time she heard AAA
shouting that she was raped. She asked AAA who raped her. AAA replied Pilay, apparently
referring to their neighbor who was called Jun Pilay. Alicia saw Jun Pilay run from AAAs house
towards a dark area.
CHARGE: RAPE
RTC: GUILTY OF RAPE (Art. 266-A par. 1 in relation to Art. 266-B par. 10, RPC)
CA: AFFIRMED
SC: AFFIRMED
ISSUE: Whether Cataytay is liable under Art. 266-A(b) or Art. 266-A(d) of the RPC.
HELD:
Cataytay is liable under therefore criminally liable for rape under paragraph 1(b) of Article 266-
A of the Revised Penal Code. To recall, the Information charged accused-appellant of
committing the following act: by means of force and intimidation, did, then and there willfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously have carnal knowledge [of AAA], 19 years of age but with a mental
age of a 5 year old, hence, a retardate, or demented, which is known to accused at the time of the
commission of the offense, against her will and consent and to her damage and prejudice. The
Information, as worded, can conceivably comprehend rape under either paragraph 1(b) or 1(d) of
Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, which provides:
Article 266-A. Rape; When and How Committed. Rape is committed

circumstances:
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority;
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though
none of the circumstances mentioned above be present. (Emphasis supplied)
In People v. Caoile, we differentiated the terms deprived of reason and demented, as follows:
The term demented refers to a person who has dementia, which is a condition of deteriorated
mentality, characterized by marked decline from the individual's former intellectual level and
often by emotional apathy, madness, or insanity. On the other hand, the phrase deprived of
reason under paragraph 1 (b) has been interpreted to include those suffering from mental
abnormality, deficiency, or retardation. Thus, AAA, who was clinically diagnosed to be a
mental retardate, can be properly classified as a person who is deprived of reason, and not
one who is demented. In the case at bar, AAA was clinically diagnosed to have mental
retardation with the mental capacity of a seven-year old child. The prosecution and the defense
agreed to stipulate on the conclusion of the psychologist that the mental age of the victim whose
4F (2016-2017) 3
chronological age at the time of the commission of the offense is nineteen (19) years old x x x is
that of a seven (7) year old child. Accused-appellant is therefore criminally liable for rape under
paragraph 1(b) of Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code. The appropriate penalty is provided
for by Article 266-B, which relevantly provides: The death penalty shall also be imposed if the
crime of rape is committed with any of the following aggravating/qualifying circumstances: 10.
When the offender knew of the mental disability, emotional disorder and/or physical handicap of
the offended party at the time of the commission of the crime. Since the accused-appellants
knowledge of AAAs mental retardation was alleged in the Information and admitted by the
former during the trial, the above special qualifying circumstance is applicable, and the penalty
of death should have been imposed. With the passage, however, of Republic Act No. 9346
prohibiting the imposition of the death penalty, the penalty of reclusion perpetua shall instead be
imposed. The RTC sentenced accused-appellant to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of twenty
years and one day to forty years of reclusion perpetua. The Court of Appeals correctly modified
the penalty to be simply reclusion perpetua. Since reclusion perpetua is an indivisible penalty, the
Indeterminate Sentence Law cannot be applied.
TICKLER: RAPE, SPECIAL NEEDS CHILD

People vs. Nerio, Jr.
G.R. No. 200940, July 22, 2015
FACTS:
AAA, a child with special needs, was born on April 15, 1990 and was adopted by Kathlene and
Rick. In the afternoon of February 26, 2003, Kathlene was working in the school canteen of
Aplaya Elementary School when she noticed that AAA, who was enrolled at the same school,
was missing. Thinking that AAA just went to her cousins house near school, Kathlene did not
worry until after school hours when AAA was still nowhere to be found. She then went to look
for her child, and when she was unsuccessful, she went to the police to have the incident placed
in the blotter. Rick likewise looked for AAA, and he was told that his daughter was seen
boarding a minibus with a group of people who just had a picnic at the beach. Together with their
neighbor, Rosaliah, Rick and Kathlene proceeded to Matanao, Davao del Sur, after learning that
the minibus was Matabao-bound. With the assistance of the police, they were able to find the
owner of the minibus who told them that he indeed saw AAA inside his bus. The charterer of the
minibus, Arthur Lucero, informed them that AAA went to the house of the Nerios in Blocon,
Magsaysay, Davao del Sur. When Lucero knocked, it was the mother of the accused-appellant,
Violeta, who opened the door. When Kathlene asked about her daughter, Violeta told her that
AAA was sleeping upstairs. But when Kathlene started climbing the stairs, Violeta immediately
corrected herself and said that AAA was, in fact, sleeping on the ground floor. Still, Kathlene
proceeded and upon seeing a room with the door left ajar, she went inside. To her dismay, she
saw her daughter scantily clad sleeping beside a half-naked Nerio, with her head resting on the
latters shoulder. They took AAA and proceeded to the Matanao Police Station to report the
incident before finally returning home to Digos. On February 28, Dr. Arthur Navidad examined
AAA and found a hymenal laceration at eleven (11) oclock position, which appeared fresh and
could not have occurred more than three (3) days from the date he examined AAA.
4F (2016-2017) 4
Crime Charged:
RTC: Rape
CA: Affirmed
ISSUE:
Whether or not there can be a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt in the crime of rape
where the victim, who is mentally disabled, was not presented in court during trial to substantiate
the accusation in the criminal information
HELD:
Petition is devoid of merit. It is settled that carnal knowledge of a woman who is a mental
retardate is rape as she is in the same class as a woman deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious. The term deprived of reason has been construed to encompass those who are
suffering from mental abnormality, deficiency or retardation. Carnal knowledge of a woman
above twelve (12) years of age but with the mental age of a child below twelve (12) years, even
if she agrees to the same, is rape because a mental retardate cannot give a valid and intelligent
consent to such act. Contrary to the defense, the prosecution was able to establish that AAA is
indeed a special child. In fact, Nerio himself said in his direct testimony that he and his family
had known from the start that AAA is a special child. At the time of the incident, AAA was
already in her sixth year as a Grade 1 pupil. According to Kathlene, she first noticed that her
adopted child was mentally challenged when the latter was merely six (6) years old. Dr. Navidad
observed that when he was about to conduct the physical examination, AAA, a thirteen year old,
acted more like a small child. The prosecution also submitted the Psychological Assessment
Report showing that AAA has Mild to Moderate Mental Retardation. Lastly, the lower court
observed that while in court and seated next to Kathlene, AAA would bury her head on the lap of
her mother and would make unnecessary and imperceptible sounds.
It is true that in rape cases, the testimony of the victim is essential. However, when the victim is
a small child or, as in this case, someone who acts like one, and thus cannot effectively testify as
to the details of the offense, and there are no other eyewitnesses, resort to circumstantial
evidence becomes inevitable. Here, AAA was not presented to testify in court because she was
declared unfit to fully discharge the functions of a credible witness. The psychologist who
examined her found that her answers reveal a low intellectual sphere, poor insight, and lack of
real capacity to deal with matters rationally. She could hardly even understand simple
instructions. The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, who were not shown to have any
malicious motive to fabricate a story, positively identified Nerio as the person seen alone with
AAA in bed in the evening of February 26, 2003. AAA, who was only in a sando and panties,
had her head on the shoulder of Nerio, who was naked and only had a blanket covering the lower
portion of his body. Although Nerio denied this because he allegedly slept downstairs, while
AAA slept with his mother and sisters upstairs, his testimony is inconsistent with that of his
mother, who testified that AAA and Nerio actually slept in one (1) room, but she lay between the
two. Further, Dr. Navidad found a fresh hymenal laceration on AAAs genitals. He explained it
could not have been inflicted more than three (3) days from the date he examined AAA. There
was likewise no showing that AAA met with another man during that three-day-period. Hence,
the courts below did not err when they held that these pertinent circumstanced proven during the
4F (2016-2017) 4
trial form an unbroken chain of events leading to the conclusion that Nerio had carnal knowledge
of AAA without her consent.
4F (2016-2017) 4
G.R. No. 199740. March 24, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JERRY OBOGNE
Tickler: Sugar cane / Simple Rape
Facts:
"AAA" recalled that while she was playing, [appellant] saw her and asked her to go with him
because he would give her a sugar cane. [Appellant] brought "AAA" to his house and while
inside, he removed her panty, and then inserted his penis into her vagina and he got the knife
and then he took a sugar cane and then he gave it to her and then she went home.
Appellant Jerry Obogne was charged with the crime of rape m an Information that reads as
follows:
That on or about the 29th day of July 2002, in the afternoon, in barangay Ogbong, municipality
of Viga, province of Catanduanes, Philippines, within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the
said accused by means of force and intimidation, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously x x x
succeeded in having carnal knowledge of "AAA", a 12-year old mentally retarded person, to the
damage and prejudice of the said "AAA".
Defense: Appellant argues that the testimony of "AAA" deserves no credence because she was
incapable of intelligently making known her perception to others by reason of her mental
disability. Also presented his alibi that he was at barangay Ananong at the time of the rape
incident.
CRIME CHARGED: Simple Rape
RTC: Guilty of SIMPLE RAPE

The trial court did not consider "AAAs" mental retardation as a qualifying circumstance
considering that the Information failed to allege that appellant knew of "AAAs" mental
disability.
CA: Affirmed RTC's Ruling
Issue: WON the accused is guilty of simple rape or qualified rape.
Held: The accused is guilty of SIMPLE RAPE.
The trial court and the Court of Appeals correctly found appellant guilty of simple rape and
properly imposed upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua pursuant to Article 266-B, par. 1 of
the Revised Penal Code. The trial court correctly ruled that "AAAs" mental disability could not
be considered as a qualifying circumstance because the Information failed to allege that appellant
knew of such mental condition at the time of the commission of the crime.
As held in People v. Limio:
4F (2016-2017) 4
By itself, the fact that the offended party in a rape case is a mental retardate does not call for the
imposition of the death penalty, unless knowledge by the offender of such mental disability is
specifically alleged and adequately proved by the prosecution.
For the Anti-Rape Law of 1997, now embodied in Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC) expressly provides that the death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is
committed with the qualifying circumstance of (10) when the offender knew of the mental
disability, emotional disorder and/or physical handicap of the offended party at the time of the
commission of the crime. Said knowledge x x x qualifies rape as a heinous offense. Absent said
circumstance, which must be proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt, the conviction
of appellant for qualified rape under Art. 266-B (10), RPC, could not be sustained, although the
offender may be held liable for simple rape and sentenced to reclusion perpetua.
xxxx
[T]he mere fact that the rape victim is a mental retardate does not automatically merit the
imposition of the death penalty. Under Article 266-B (10) of the Revised Penal Code, knowledge
by the offender of the mental disability, emotional disorder, or physical handicap at the time of
the commission of the rape is the qualifying circumstance that sanctions the imposition of the
death penalty. As such this circumstance must be formally alleged in the information and duly
proved by the prosecution.
Rule 110 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure requires both qualifying and aggravating
circumstances to be alleged with specificity in the information. x x x But in the absence of a
specific or particular allegation in the information that the appellant knew of her mental
disability or retardation, as well as lack of adequate proof that appellant knew of this fact, Article
266-B (10), RPC, could not be properly applied x x x
Hence, the appellant can only be convicted of simple rape, as defined under Article 266-A of the
[Revised] Penal Code, for which the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua.
Tickler: Letter
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, v. MICHAEL JOSON Y ROGANDO

G.R. No. 206393, January 21, 2015
PEREZ, J
Facts:
AAA lives with appellant and his common-law partner. AAA testified that at around 1:00 in the
morning of 14 May 2009, and while appellants wife was away, AAA was awakened by appellant
undressing her. AAA tried to struggle but appellant was tightly holding her arms. After
undressing her, appellant kissed and mounted her. Appellant was able to insert his penis into her
vagina. AAA felt pain in her genitalia. Thereafter, appellant went back to sleep leaving AAA
4F (2016-2017) 4
crying. At about 6:00 or 7:00 in the morning, appellant left AAA with a letter apologizing for
what happened and begging her not to tell on his wife. The letter
reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Ne!
Sorry Ne. Patawarin mo ko. Dala lang ng kalasingan kaya ko nagawa ang ganung bagay. Sana
po wala ng ibang makaalam nito lalu na si Ate Cindy mo. Ayokong masira na naman ang
pamilya ko at mga buhay natin. Paki tapon muna to pag tapos mong basahin.5cralawlawlibrary
At around 5:00 in the afternoon of that same date, AAA related to appellants wife the rape
incident.6And on 1 June 2009, AAA, accompanied by her father, reported the incident to the
police and she executed a sworn statement detailing the rape Also submitted as part of the
prosecutions evidence is the birth certificate of AAA to prove that she was still a minor at the
time the rape was committed on 14 May 2009.
Version of the Defense:
Appellant admitted that AAA is his sister but he proffered the defense of alibi and claimed that
he was staying in Alfonso, Cavite on 14 May 2009 and only went back to his house in
Dasmarias on 26 May 2009. Appellant vehemently denied the accusation against him and
speculated that AAA resented him because he was strict with his sister. Appellant also denied
writing the apology letter and presented his specimen handwriting in court.8cra
TR
RTC Ruling: Guilty of RAPE (Reclusion Perpetua)
CA Rulling: Affirmed
Issue: WON appellant is guilty of RAPE?
Held:
Yes. AAAs testimony has established all the elements of rape required under Article 266-A of
the Revised Penal Code. First, appellant had carnal knowledge of the victim. AAA positively
identified her own brother as the assailant. She was likewise unwavering in her narration that
appellant inserted his penis into her vagina. Second, appellant employed threat, force and
intimidation to satisfy his lust. The Supreme Court has, time and again, ruled that the force or
violence that is required in rape cases is relative; when applied, it need not be overpowering or
irresistible. That it enables the offender to consummate his purpose is enough. The parties
relative age, size and strength should be taken into account in evaluating the existence of the
element of force in the crime of rape. The degree of force which may not suffice when the victim
is an adult may be more than enough if employed against a person of tender age. In the case at
bench, the accused-appellant employed that amount of force sufficient to consummate the rape. It
must be stressed that, at the time of the incident, AAA was only 14 years old. Considering the
tender years of the offended party as compared to the accused-appellant who was in the prime of
his life, the act of the accused-appellant in pinning the arms of AAA to avoid any form of
4F (2016-2017) 4
resistance from her suffices. Force or intimidation is not limited to physical force. As long as it is
present and brings the desired result, all consideration of whether it was more or less irresistible
is beside the point.
WHEREFORE, the Court of Appeals' decision dated 31 August 2012 finding appellant Michael
Joson yRogando guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape and sentencing him to reclusion
perpetua isAFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The civil indemnity awarded is increased to
P100,000.00; moral damages to P100,000.00; and the exemplary damages to P100,000.00. The
award of damages shall earn interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality of the
judgment until fully paid.
PEOPLE VS CANDELLADA
GR NO. 189293
Topic:Rape
Tickler: AAA, impregnated by her father
FACTS: AAA was the second of three daughters of accused Vicente Candellada and his deceased
first wife. AAA lived with accused-appellant and the latters second wife, while AAAs two
sisters lived with accused-appellants mother. While they were still living in Davao, accused-
appellant impregnated AAA. When AAA was already five months pregnant, accused-appellant
brought her with him to Lanao del Norte. Cadellada approached a certain Gemina and asked
permission if he could stay at Geminas old house with his wife, introducing AAA to Gemina as
his wife. Gemina and her husband agreed. While they were staying at Geminas old house,
accused-appellant had intercourse with AAA many times, but AAA could only remember eight
specific dates, i.e., on May 30, 2004; June 2, 2004; June 12, 2004; July 10, 2004; August 13,
2004; November 5, 2004; December 15, 2004; and December 25, 2004. When asked to explain
what "intercourse" meant, AAA stated that Candellada inserted his penis into her vagina. AAA
further testified that she consistently resisted Candelladas bestial acts but he threatened to stab
her with a knife. Lastly, AAA narrated that she delivered a baby boy with Geminas help on
September 24, 2004, but the baby died four days later. On December 28, 2004, accused-appellant
again made amorous advances on AAA. AAA refused so accused-appellant became violently
angry. He mauled AAA and hit her head with a piece of wood, which rendered her
unconscious. Gemina, who saw what happened, asked help from the Barangay Captain. The
Barangay Captain and civilian volunteers arrested the accused-appellant. Thus he was not able to
consummate his attempt to have intercourse with AAA.
AAA was physically examined. However, she did not initially mention being raped by accused-
appellant to Dr. Magtagad. It was only later in the investigation that AAA claimed she had been
raped by accused Candellada at least 8 times.
Defense/s of accused:
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They had misunderstandings because he would admonish AAA for always roaming about
at night. Also, he denied impregnating AAA, claiming it was the latters classmate who
impregnated her. He called AAA a liar. He denied raping AAA eight times between May 30,
2004 to December 25, 2004. He also asserted that he could not have made an attempt to rape
AAA on December 28, 2004 as he was already in jail by that time. Accused-appellant claimed
that he was already arrested on December 23, 2004, a Tuesday, after he struck AAA.
Charge: 8 counts of consummated rape, 1 count of attempted rape.
RTC: No enough evidence to prove Candelladas culpability for the charge of attempted rape on
December 28, 2004. The overt acts committed by accused-appellant resulted only in AAAs
physical injuries that took five to seven days to heal and slight physical injuries and were not
necessarily included in the charge of attempted rape. As for the charge of eight counts of
consummated rape, he was found guilty and imposed the penalty of death in each of the 8 counts.
CA: Affirmed the conviction of accused for 8 counts of consummated rape.
Issue: Did the RTC err in convicting the Vicente Candellada despite the failure of the prosecution
to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, as the accused insists?
HELD: No.
Qualified rape is defined and punished under the following provisions of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended:
ART. 266-A. Rape; When and How Committed. Rape is committed
circumstances:
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority;
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though
none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.
xxxx
ART. 266-B. Penalties. x x x.
xxxx
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The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the
following aggravating/qualifying circumstances:
1) When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant,
stepparent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the
common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.
For a conviction of qualified rape, the prosecution must allege and prove the ordinary elements
of (1) sexual congress, (2) with a woman, (3) by force and without consent; and in order to
warrant the imposition of the death penalty, the additional elements that (4) the victim is under
eighteen years of age at the time of the rape, and (5) the offender is a parent (whether legitimate,
illegitimate or adopted) of the victim.
In a prosecution for rape, the accused may be convicted solely on the basis of the testimony of
the victim that is credible, convincing, and consistent with human nature and the normal course
of things, as in this case. In resolving rape cases, primordial consideration is given to the
credibility of the victims testimony. The settled rule is that the trial court's conclusions on the
credibility of witnesses in rape cases are generally accorded great weight and respect, and at
times, even finality. What is important is that AAA had categorically testified that on eight
specific dates, her father, accused-appellant, armed with a knife, successfully had sexual
intercourse with her by inserting his penis into her vagina.
It is noteworthy to mention that even if accused-appellant did not use a knife or made threats to
AAA, accused-appellant would still be guilty of raping AAA, for in rape committed by a close
kin, such as the victim's father, stepfather, uncle, or the common-law spouse of her mother, it is
not necessary that actual force or intimidation be employed; moral influence or ascendancy takes
the place of violence or intimidation.
With the guilt of accused-appellant for the eight rapes already established beyond reasonable
doubt, the Court of Appeals was correct in imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua, without
eligibility of parole, instead of death, for each count of rape, pursuant to Republic Act No. 9346.
As for the damages, the Court affirms the award to AAA of P75,000.00 civil indemnity
and P75,000.00 moral damages for each count of rape. However, in line with jurisprudence, the
Court increases the amount of exemplary damages awarded to AAA from P25,000.00
to P30,000.00 for each count of rape; and imposes an interest of 6% per annum on the aggregate
amount of damages awarded from finality of this judgment until full payment thereof.
TICKLER: Common law husband vs stepfather; Bolo on the waist

People vs Cial
FACTS:
Marciano Cial was charged with the crime of rape. In the information, it was alleged that Cial
4F (2016-2017) 4
had carnal knowledge of AAA, a minor, 13 years old, against her will. The commission of the
rape was attended by the qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship, Cial being the
common-law husband of AAA's mother.
Sometime in December 2002, Cial called AAA and told her to go to the bedroom inside their
house. Once inside, Cial took off AAA's shorts and panty and spread her legs. He pulled his
pants down to his thighs and inserted his penis into the AAA's vagina. AAA did not try to
struggle because Cial had a bolo on his waist. Thereafter, Cial threatened to kill AAA and her
family if she reported the incident to anyone. At that time, AAA's maternal grandmother was in
the house but was unaware that AAA was being ravished. Unable to endure the torment, AAA
confided her ordeal to her mother but the latter did not believe her. AAA ran away from home
and went to her maternal uncles house. There, she disclosed the incident to her mothers
siblings.
Cial denied the allegations claiming that AAA's aunt fabricated the charge because Cial called
her a thief.
CRIME CHARGED: Qualified rape (qualified by minority and relationship)

RTC: Guilty of qualified rape
CA: Affirmed the RTC
HELD:
Not guilty of qualified rape. The prosecution failed to present AAA's Certificate of Live Birth.
AAA also testified that she does not know her age and birthday. Hence, the prosecution failed to
prove minority.
Moreover, the prosecution failed to establish AAA's relationship with Cial. Although the
information alleged Cial is the common law husband of AAA's mother, AAA referred to him as
her stepfather. The terms common-law husband and step-father have different legal
connotations. For Cial to be a step-father to AAA, he must be legally married to AAAs mother.
Since the qualifying circumstances of minority and relationsip are not present, Cial should only
be guilty of simple rape.
TICKLER: Rape, Curfew, 5-minute break
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MANOLITO LUCENA Y VELASQUEZ
G.R. No. 190632, February 26, 2014
FACTS:
Appellant Lucena is a Barangay Tanod Volunteer. On the night of the incident, they arrested the
victim AAA (then 17 years old) for violation of city ordinance imposing curfew on minors. 2
brgy. Tanods, including the appellant, brought AAA to the vicinity of the barangay hall. The
other tanod went inside the brgy. Hall and when he returned, Lucena told him that he will just be
the one to bring AAA back to her house. However, instead of escorting AAA back to her house,
appellant brought her to Kabuboy Bridge in Paranaque. While on their way, the appellant
threatened AAA that he would kill her once she resists or jumps off the tricycle. Upon arrival, the
appellant ordered AAA to alight from the tricycle.
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Upon arrival, the appellant ordered AAA to alight from the tricycle. They went to a grassy area.
He subsequently pointed a gun at AAA and commanded her to lie down and to take off her
clothes. The appellant later put the gun down on the ground and inserted his penis into AAAs
vagina despite the latters plea not to rape her. Satisfied, the appellant stopped. But after about 5
minutes, appellant, once again, inserted his penis into AAAs vagina. Thereafter, he stopped. On
the 3rd time, appellant inserted again his penis into AAAs vagina. Fulfilling his bestial desire, the
appellant stopped and finally ordered AAA to dress up. Appellant even threatened AAA that he
would kill her should she tell anyone about what happened between them.
The next day, AAA lodged her complaint against Lucena. An information for rape was filed
against Lucena.
CHARGE: 3 counts of Rape under Art. 266a par. 1(a) in relation to Art. 266B of the RPC
RTC: GUILTY of 3 counts of Rape under Art. 266a par. 1(a) in relation to Art. 266B of the
RPC
CA: AFFIRMED RTC
In this appeal, appellant contends that: (1) the prosecution failed to prove that force or
intimidation attended the commission of rape. AAA opted to remain passive throughout her
ordeal despite the fact that during the 3 episodes of their sexual intercourse he was unarmed and
she, thus, had all the opportunity to escape, which she never did; and (2) he cannot be convicted
of 3 counts of rape since the intervening period of 5 minutes between each penetration does not
necessarily prove that he decided to commit three separate acts of rape. He maintains that what is
of prime importance is that he was motivated by a single criminal intent.
ISSUE: Whether or not appellant is guilty of 3 counts of rape through force or intimidation.
RULING: YES. The force and violence required in rape cases is relative and need not be
overpowering or irresistible when applied. For rape to exist, it is not necessary that the force or
intimidation be so great or be of such character as could not be resisted it is only necessary that
the force or intimidation be sufficient to consummate the purpose which the appellant had in
mind. Further, it should be viewed from the perception and judgment of the victim at the time of
the commission of the crime. What is vital is that the force or intimidation be of such degree as
to cow the unprotected and vulnerable victim into submission. Force is sufficient if it produces
fear in the victim, such as when the latter is threatened with death.
In this case, appellant was armed with a gun and the same was pointed at AAA while she was
ordered to lie down and to take off her clothes, to which she acceded because of fear for her life
and personal safety. The appellant then put the gun down on the ground and successfully inserted
his penis into AAAs vagina, not only once but thrice. This happened despite AAAs plea not to
rape her. And, after satisfying his lust, the appellant threatened AAA that he would kill her
should she tell anyone about the incident. This same threat of killing AAA was first made by the
appellant while the former was still inside the tricycle on their way to Kabuboy Bridge. It cannot
be denied, therefore, that force and intimidation were employed by the appellant upon AAA in
order to achieve his depraved desires.
While it is true that the appellant had already put the gun down on the ground the moment he
inserted his penis into AAAs vagina and was actually unarmed on those 3 episodes of sexual
intercourse, the same does not necessarily take away the fear of being killed that had already
been instilled in the mind of AAA. Emphasis must be given to the fact that the gun was still
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within appellants reach, therefore, he could still make good of his threat on AAA at anytime the
latter would show any resistance to his evil desires
Further, We agree with the trial court that appellant should be convicted of 3 counts of rape. It
appears from the facts that the appellant thrice succeeded in inserting his penis into the private
part of AAA. The 3 penetrations occurred one after the other at an interval of 5 minutes wherein
the appellant would rest after satiating his lust upon his victim and, after he has regained his
strength, he would again rape AAA. Hence, it can be clearly inferred from the foregoing that
when the appellant decided to commit those separate and distinct acts of sexual assault upon
AAA, he was not motivated by a single impulse, but rather by several criminal intent.
INSERT PEOPLE VS JUMAWAN
INSERT RECALDE VS PEOPLE
TICKLER: Lecherous father G.R. No. 197712; April 20, 2015
NONITO IMBO vs PEOPLE
FACTS:
An information for the crime of Acts of Lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC in relation
to Section 5, Article III of Republic Act (R.A) No. 7610 was charged against Petitioner.
AAA, who was then 11 y/o testified that sometime between the periods of 14 October 2003 to 25
January 2004, while their entire household was asleep and had retired for the night, she was
awakened by petitioner, her own father, licking her vagina and mashing her breasts. At the time,
AAA was sleeping at the second level of their residence with her younger sister, BBB. AAA
immediately and repeatedly shouted for her mother, CCC, who was sleeping outside the room,
but to no avail. AAA continued to shout for her mother prompting petitioner to leave and run out
of the room. AAA cried herself to sleep, and on the very next day told her mother of what her
father, petitioner, had done to her.
Petitioner denied the charge, claiming that his wife, CCC, AAAs mother, merely fabricated such
a story. Petitioner countered that he and his wife, CCC, had fought on the night of 6 August
2003, which impelled CCC to create the convoluted charge of petitioner sexually abusing his
own daughter. Ultimately, petitioner claimed that on the night in question, within the period from
14 October 2003 to 25 January 2004, no crime occurred, his days ending as did his workday
which were from 8:30 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.
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RTC: Convicted
CA: Affirm
SC: Affirm
Under Article 336 of the RPC, the elements of the crime of Acts of Lasciviousness are:
(1) That the offender commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness;
(2) That it is done under any of the following circumstances:
a. By using force or intimidation; or
b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or
c. By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and
d. When the offended party is under 12 years of age.
(3) That the offended party is another person of either sex.
Notably, the parties already stipulated on AAAs minority, that she was, at the time of the assault,
under 12 years of age. The only issue in this case then concerns the first element which is
whether or not petitioner committed acts of lasciviousness or lewdness against his own daughter,
AAA. The details of the testimony on the act establish, even dramatize, the gross incest during
the night in question. The offended daughter narrated that her lecherous father licked her vagina
and mashed her breasts.
On more than one occasion, we have held that the lone testimony of the offended party, if
credible, is sufficient to establish the guilt of the accused. The fact that no other member of their
household corroborated the testimony of AAA is not definitive of the commission of the crime.
By its very nature, sexual abuse, in this case, acts of lasciviousness by the petitioner against his
own daughter, is generally done out of sight of people and is only attested to by the victim and
the perpetrator. On the other hand, the inconsistencies pointed out by petitioner do not discount
at all the possibility of him sexually abusing his own daughter on the night in question. As
already pointed out in the past: Lust is no respecter of time and place.
To concoct a story of incestuous molestation by ones own father or to agree to the mothers
alleged manipulations to accuse the father of sexual abuse, is unnatural and against human
nature. If at all, CCCs supposed influence on her daughter, AAA, to falsely accuse her own
father, petitioner, of Acts of Lasciviousness, should have also extended to her influence over her
other children to corroborate the testimony of AAA and further solidify the charge against
petitioner.
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We also affirm both lower courts ruling on the application of Section 5, Article III of R.A. No.
7610 for the imposable penalty on petitioner.
The elements of sexual abuse under Section 5, Article III of R.A. No. 7610 are:
1. The accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct;
2. The said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual
abuse; and
3. The child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age
Contrary to the contention of petitioner that the penalty in Section 5, Article III of R.A. No. 7610
is inapplicable since there was no allegation relating thereto in the Information, we find that the
elements and act of sexual abuse under R.A. No. 7610 were sufficiently alleged in the
Information and duly proven during trial.
The Information specifically stated that:
(1) At the time of the incident, AAA was a minor;
(2) Petitioner committed a lascivious act against AAA by kissing her private parts and mashing
her breasts; and
(3) Corollary to paragraph 2, petitioner subjected AAA to sexual abuse, debasing, degrading or
demeaning the offended partys intrinsic worth and dignity as a human being.
That petitioner committed Acts of Lasciviousness against AAA is bolstered by Section 32,
Article XIII of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 7610 which defines
lascivious conduct as follows:
(T)he intentional touching, either directly or through clothing, of the genitalia, anus, groin,
breast, inner thigh, or buttocks, or the introduction of any object into the genitalia, anus or mouth
of any person, whether of the same or opposite sex, with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass,
degrade or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person, bestiality, masturbation, lascivious
exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of a person.
It needs to be restated, too, that the mere act of committing lascivious conduct with a child who
is exploited in prostitution or subjected to sexual abuse constitutes the offense. It is a malum
prohibitum, an evil that is proscribe and was duly alleged in the Information against petitioner.
Above all, it is quite clear by specific provision of Section 5 Article III of R.A. No. 7610 that
when the victim is under 12 years of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted under the RPC, but
the penalty is that which is provided in R.A. No. 7610. Petitioners submission that he cannot be
4F (2016-2017) 5
penalized under R.A. No. 7610 because the Information failed to indicate its applicability, is,
therefore, without merit.
As regards the imposable penalty, the lower courts imposed the penalty on petitioner of fourteen
(14) years, eight (8) months of reclusion temporalas minimum to seventeen (17) years, four (4)
months of reclusion temporal as maximum.
We find need to modify the penalty imposed by the lower court as it failed to properly apply
Republic Act No. 4103, the Indeterminate Sentence Law. We need also to discuss how the correct
penalty is reached given that the trial court, except for the dispositive portion of the decision,
which was simply affirmed by the appellate court, did not specifically mention the applicability
of R.A. No. 7610 in the determination of the imposable penalty on petitioner. Section 5(b),
Article III of R.A. No. 7610 provides the imposable penalty for Acts of Lasciviousness when the
victim is under twelve (12) years of age, albeit the offense is prosecuted under Article 336 of the
RPC, is reclusion temporalin its medium period.
The range of the imposable penalty on petitioner of reclusion temporalin its medium period is
fourteen (14) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months.
The Indeterminate Sentence Law is applicable to prison sentence both for an offense punished by
the RPC and an offense punished "by any other law."
In Criminal Case, where AAA was still below 12 years old at the time of the commission of the
acts of lasciviousness, the imposable penalty is reclusion temporal in its medium period in
accordance with Section 5(b), Article III of Republic Act No. 7610. This provision specifically
states "[t]hat the penalty for lascivious conduct when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age
shall be reclusion temporal in its medium period." Considering the presence of the aggravating
circumstance of relationship, as explained, the penalty shall be imposed in its maximum period.
TICKLER: RA 7610, acts of lasciviousness at hospital

GARINGARAO vs PEOPLE
G.R. No. 192760, July 20, 2011
FACTS:
AAA was brought to the Virgen Milagrosa Medical Center by her father BBB and mother CCC
due to fever and abdominal pain. Dr. George Morante (Dr. Morante), the attending physician,
recommended that AAA be confined at the hospital for further observation. BBB left the
hospital to go to Lingayen, Pangasinan to process his daughters Medicare papers. CCC also left
the hospital that same morning to attend to their store at Urbiztondo, Pangasinan, leaving AAA
alone in her room. When BBB returned to the hospital, AAA told him that she wanted to go
home. Dr. Morante advised against it but due to AAAs insistence, he allowed AAA to be
discharged from the hospital with instructions that she should continue her medications. When
AAA and her parents arrived at their house, AAA cried and told her parents that Garingarao
sexually abused her. They all went back to the hospital and reported the incident to Dr. Morante.
4F (2016-2017) 5
They inquired from the nurses' station and learned that Garingarao was the nurse on duty on that
day. The City Prosecutor filed an Information against Garingarao for acts of lasciviousness in
relation to RA 7610, as follows:
That on or about the 29th day of October 2003, at Virgen Milagrosa University Hospital, San
Carlos City, Pangasinan, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, with lewd designs, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously touched the
breast of AAA, 16 years of age, touched her genitalia, and inserted his finger into her vagina, to
the damage and prejudice of said AAA who suffered psychological and emotional disturbance,
anxiety, sleeplessness and humiliation.
During the trial, AAA testified that on 29 October 2003, between 7:00 a.m. and 8:00 a.m.,
Garingarao, who was wearing a white uniform, entered her room and asked if she already took
her medicines and if she was still experiencing pains. AAA replied that her stomach was no
longer painful. Garingarao then lifted AAAs bra and touched her left breast. Embarrassed, AAA
asked Garingarao what he was doing. Garingarao replied that he was just examining her.
Garingarao then left the room and returned 15 to 30 minutes later with a stethoscope. Garingarao
told AAA that he would examine her again. Garingarao lifted AAAs shirt, pressed the
stethoscope to her stomach and touched her two nipples. Garingarao then lifted AAAs pajama
and underwear and pressed the lower part of her abdomen. Garingarao then slid his finger inside
AAAs private part. AAA instinctively crossed her legs and again asked Garingarao what he was
doing. She asked him to stop and informed him she had her monthly period. Garingarao ignored
AAA and continued to insert his finger inside her private part. Garingarao only stopped when he
saw that AAA really had her monthly period. He went inside the bathroom of the private room,
washed his hands, applied alcohol and left. When BBB arrived at the hospital, AAA insisted on
going home. She only narrated the incident to her parents when they got home and they went
back to the hospital to report the incident to Dr. Morante. Garingarao denied that he inserted his
finger into AAAs private part and that he fondled her breasts. Garingarao alleged that the filing
of the case was motivated by the argument he had with BBB when BBB accused them of not
administering the medicines properly and on time.
Trial Court: found Garingarao GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of acts of
lasciviousness in relation to Republic Act 7610
CA: ruled that while Garingarao was charged for acts of lasciviousness in relation to RA 7610,
he should be convicted under RA 7610 because AAA was 16 years old when the crime was
committed. The Court of Appeals ruled that under Section 5(b) of RA 7610, the offender shall be
charged with rape or lascivious conduct under the Revised Penal Code (RPC) only if the victim
is below 12 years old; otherwise, the provisions of RA 7610 shall prevail.
Garingarao filed a motion for reconsideration. The Court of Appeals denied the motion. Hence,
the petition before this Court.
ISSUE: Whether Garingarao should have been convicted only of acts of lasciviousness and
not of violation of RA 7610.
4F (2016-2017) 5
HELD:
NO. Garingarao alleges that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court's decision
finding him guilty of acts of lasciviousness in relation to RA 7610. Garingarao insists that it was
physically impossible for him to commit the acts charged against him because there were many
patients and hospital employees around. He alleges that AAAs room was well lighted and that he
had an assistant when the incident allegedly occurred. Garingarao further alleges that, assuming
the charges were correct, there was only one incident when he allegedly touched AAA and as
such, he should have been convicted only of acts of lasciviousness and not of violation of RA
7610.
Section 5, Article III of RA 7610 provides:
Section 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. - Children, whether male or female, who
for money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult,
syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be
children exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse.
The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed
upon the following:
(a) x x x
(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child exploited
in prostitution or subject to other sexual abuse; Provided, That when the victim is under twelve
(12) years of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted under Article 335, paragraph 3 for rape and
Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the Revised Penal Code, for rape or lascivious
conduct, as the case may be; Provided, That the penalty for lascivious conduct when the victim is
under twelve (12) years of age shall be reclusion temporal in its medium period, x x x
(c) x x x
The elements of sexual abuse under Section 5, Article III of RA 7610 are the following:
1. The accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct;
2. The said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual
abuse; and
3. The child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.
Under Section 32, Article XIII of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA 7610,
lascivious conduct is defined as follows:
[T]he intentional touching, either directly or through clothing, of the genitalia, anus, groin,
breast, inner thigh, or buttocks, or the introduction of any object into the genitalia, anus or
mouth, of any person, whether of the same or opposite sex, with the intent to abuse, humiliate,
harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person, bestiality, masturbation,
lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of a person.
In this case, the prosecution established that Garingarao touched AAAs breasts and inserted his
finger into her private part for his sexual gratification. Garingarao used his influence as a nurse
by pretending that his actions were part of the physical examination he was doing. Garingarao
4F (2016-2017) 5
persisted on what he was doing despite AAAs objections. AAA twice asked Garingarao what he
was doing and he answered that he was just examining her.
The Court has ruled that a child is deemed subject to other sexual abuse when the child is the
victim of lascivious conduct under the coercion or influence of any adult. In lascivious conduct
under the coercion or influence of any adult, there must be some form of compulsion equivalent
to intimidation which subdues the free exercise of the offended party's free will. In this case,
Garingarao coerced AAA into submitting to his lascivious acts by pretending that he was
examining her.
Garingarao insists that, assuming that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were
true, he should not be convicted of violation of RA 7610 because the incident happened only
once. Garingarao alleges that the single incident would not suffice to hold him liable under
RA 7610.
Garingarao's argument has no legal basis. The Court has already ruled that it is
inconsequential that sexual abuse under RA 7610 occurred only once. Section 3(b) of RA
7610 provides that the abuse may be habitual or not. Hence, the fact that the offense
occurred only once is enough to hold Garingarao liable for acts of lasciviousness under RA
7610.
TICKLER: SPEED; WAKE; FISH PORT
PEOPLE v. DULAY
G.R. No. 193854, September 24, 2012
AAA was 12 years old when the whole incident happened. AAA's sister introduced the appellant
to AAA as someone who is nice. Thereafter, appellant convinced AAA to accompany her at a
wake at GI San Dionisio, Paraaque City. Before going to the said wake, they went to a casino
and to Sto. nio to look for appellant's boyfriend, but he was not there. When they went to
Bulungan Fish Port to ask for some fish, they saw appellant's boyfriend. Afterwards, AAA,
appellant and the latter's boyfriend proceeded to the Kubuhan located at the back of the
Bulungan Fish Port. When they reached the Kubuhan, appellant suddenly pulled AAA inside a
room where a man known by the name Speed was waiting. AAA saw Speed give money to
appellant and heard Speed tell appellant to look for a younger girl. Thereafter, Speed
wielded a knife and tied AAA's hands to the papag and raped her. AAA asked for appellant's help
when she saw the latter peeping into the room while she was being raped, but appellant did not
do so. After the rape, Speed and appellant told AAA not to tell anyone what had happened or
else they would get back at her.
AAA went to San Pedro, Laguna after the incident and told her sister what happened and the
latter informed their mother about it. AAA, her sister and mother, filed a complaint at Barangay
San Dionisio. Thereafter, the barangay officials of San Dionisio referred the complaint to the
police station.
4F (2016-2017) 5
Defense : Appellant met AAA a few days before June 2005 when the latter was introduced to her
by her cousin Eglay Akmad during the wake of a relative of AAA at Palanyag. The cousin of
appellant was AAA's neighbor at Palanyag. Around 1 o'clock in the morning of July 3, 2005,
appellant averred that she was at La Huerta, at the Bulungan Fish Port in Paraaque City with her
cousin Eglay and stayed there for about thirty (30) minutes. They then proceeded to the house of
appellant's cousin in Palanyag. In the said house, appellant saw Speed and two (2) other male
persons. She also saw AAA who was engaged in a conversation with Speed and his two (2)
companions. She asked AAA what she was doing there and the latter said that it was none of her
business (wala kang pakialam sa akin). Because of the response of AAA, appellant left the
house and went home to General Trias, Cavite.
CHARGE: Rape under Article 266-A, No. 1 (a) of the RPC, as amended by R.A. 8353 in relation
to Section 5 (b) of R.A. 7610
RTC: GUILTY OF RAPE AS CO-PRINCIPAL BY INDISPENSABLE COOPERATION
CA: AFFIRMED
Ratio (RTC & CA) : cooperation of the accused-appellant consisted in performing an act which
is different from the act of execution of the crime committed by the rapist. Accused-appellant
cooperated in the perpetration of the crime of rape committed by Speed by acts without which
the crime would not have been consummated, since she prepared the way for the perpetration
thereof, convinced the victim to go with her under the guise of looking for her boyfriend and
upon arrival at the kubuhan, she pulled the victim inside a room where Speed was waiting,
delivered the victim to him, and then after receiving some amount of money from Speed she
settled in another room together with her boyfriend so that Speed might freely consummate the
rape with violence and intimidation, as he did.
ISSUE: WON the appellant is guilty of Rape by indispensable cooperation.
HELD: No. To be a principal by indispensable cooperation, one must participate in the criminal
resolution, a conspiracy or unity in criminal purpose and cooperation in the commission of the
offense by performing another act without which it would not have been accomplished. Nothing
in the evidence presented by the prosecution does it show that the acts committed by appellant
are indispensable in the commission of the crime of rape. The events narrated by the CA, from
the time appellant convinced AAA to go with her until appellant received money from the man
who allegedly raped AAA, are not indispensable in the crime of rape. Anyone could have
accompanied AAA and offered the latter's services in exchange for money and AAA could still
have been raped. Even AAA could have offered her own services in exhange for monetary
consideration and still end up being raped. Thus, this disproves the indispensable aspect of the
appellant in the crime of rape. It must be remembered that in the Information, as well as in the
testimony of AAA, she was delivered and offered for a fee by appellant, thereafter, she was raped
by Speed.
The appellant is guilty of violation of Sec 5(a) of RA 7610.
4F (2016-2017) 5
Sec. 5 : Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. Children, whether male or female, who for
money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult,
syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be
children exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse.
(a) Those who engage in or promote, facilitate or induce child prostitution which include, but are
not limited to, the following:
(1) Acting as a procurer of a child prostitute;
(2) Inducing a person to be a client of a child prostitute by means of written or oral

advertisements or other similar means;
(3) Taking advantage of influence or relationship to procure a child as a prostitute;
(4) Threatening or using violence towards a child to engage him as a prostitute; or
(5) Giving monetary consideration goods or other pecuniary benefit to a child with intent to
engage such child in prostitution.
The elements of paragraph (a) are:
the accused engages in, promotes, facilitates or induces child prostitution;
the act is done through, but not limited to, the following means:
acting as a procurer of a child prostitute;
inducing a person to be a client of a child prostitute by means of written or oral advertisements or

other similar means;
taking advantage of influence or relationship to procure a child as a prostitute;
threatening or using violence towards a child to engage him as a prostitute; or
giving monetary consideration, goods or other pecuniary benefit to a child with intent to engage
such child in prostitution;
the child is exploited or intended to be exploited in prostitution and
the child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.
Paragraph (a) essentially punishes acts pertaining to or connected with child prostitution. It
contemplates sexual abuse of a child exploited in prostitution. In other words, under paragraph
(a), the child is abused primarily for profit.
4F (2016-2017) 5
the appellant acting as a procurer of a child and inducing the latter into prostitution. It must be
remembered that the character of the crime is not determined by the caption or preamble of the
information nor from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, they
may be conclusions of law, but by the recital of the ultimate facts and circumstances in the
complaint or information. The sufficiency of an information is not negated by an incomplete or
defective designation of the crime in the caption or other parts of the information but by the
narration of facts and circumstances which adequately depicts a crime and sufficiently apprises
the accused of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
To dispute the allegation and the evidence presented by the prosecution, appellant merely
interposes the defense of denial. It is well settled that denial is essentially the weakest form of
defense and it can never overcome an affirmative testimony, particularly when it comes from the
mouth of a credible witness.
GEORGE BONGALON vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 169533 March 20, 2013
TICKLER: Santo Nino procession; Anti-Child Abuse Law
DOCTRINE:
Not every instance of the laying of hands on a child constitutes the crime of child abuse
under Section 10 (a) of Republic Act No. 7610. Only when the laying of hands is shown beyond
reasonable doubt to be intended by the accused to debase, degrade or demean the intrinsic worth
and dignity of the child as a human being should it be punished as child abuse. Otherwise, it is
punished under the Revised Penal Code.
FACTS:
Prosecutors Office of Legazpi City charged the petitioner in the RTC in Legazpi City
with child abuse, an act in violation of Section 10(a) of RA 7610.
The Prosecution showed that on May 11, 2002, Jayson Dela Cruz (Jayson) and Roldan,
his older brother, both minors, joined the evening procession for the Santo Nio at Oro Site in
Legazpi City; that when the procession passed in front of the petitioners house, the latters
daughter Mary Ann Rose, also a minor, threw stones at Jayson and called him "sissy"; that the
petitioner confronted Jayson and Roldan and called them names like "strangers" and "animals";
that the petitioner struck Jayson at the back with his hand, and slapped Jayson on the face; that
the petitioner then went to the brothers house and challenged Rolando dela Cruz, their father, to
a fight, but Rolando did not come out of the house to take on the petitioner; that Rolando later
brought Jayson to the Legazpi City Police Station and reported the incident; that Jayson also
underwent medical treatment at the Bicol Regional Training and Teaching Hospital; that the
doctors who examined Jayson issued two medical certificates attesting that Jayson suffered the
following contusions, to wit: (1) contusion .5 x 2.5 scapular area, left; and (2) +1x1 cm.
contusion left zygomatic area and contusion .5 x 2.33 cm. scapular area, left.
4F (2016-2017) 6
On his part, the petitioner denied having physically abused or maltreated Jayson. He
explained that he only talked with Jayson and Roldan after Mary Ann Rose and Cherrylyn, his
minor daughters, had told him about Jayson and Roldans throwing stones at them and about
Jaysons burning Cherrylyns hair. He denied shouting invectives at and challenging Rolando to a
fight, insisting that he only told Rolando to restrain his sons from harming his daughters.
To corroborate the petitioners testimony, Mary Ann Rose testified that her father did not
hit or slap but only confronted Jayson, asking why Jayson had called her daughters "Kimi" and
why he had burned Cherrlyns hair. Mary Ann Rose denied throwing stones at Jayson and calling
him a "sissy." She insisted that it was instead Jayson who had pelted her with stones during the
procession. She described the petitioner as a loving and protective father.
RTC: Guilty of Child Abuse
CA: Affirmed conviction but modified penalty
SC: Not liable for child abuse; liable for SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES, penalty mitigated by
passion or obfuscation
ISSUE:
Whether or not George Bongalon is guilty of child abuse in violation of Sec.10(a) of RA
7610?
RULING:
The law under which the petitioner was charged, tried and found guilty of violating is
Section 10 (a), Article VI of Republic Act No. 7610, which relevantly states:
Section 10. Other Acts of Neglect, Abuse, Cruelty or Exploitation and other Conditions
Prejudicial to the Childs Development.
(a) Any person who shall commit any other acts of child abuse, cruelty or exploitation or be
responsible for other conditions prejudicial to the childs development including those covered
by Article 59 of Presidential Decree No. 603, as amended, but not covered by the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period.
xxxx
Child abuse, the crime charged, is defined by Section 3 (b) of Republic Act No. 7610, as follows:
Section 3. Definition of terms.
xxxx
4F (2016-2017) 6
(b) "Child Abuse" refers to the maltreatment, whether habitual or not, of the child which includes
any of the following:
(1) Psychological and physical abuse, neglect, cruelty, sexual abuse and emotional
maltreatment;
(2) Any act by deeds or words which debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth
and dignity of a child as a human being;
(3) Unreasonable deprivation of his basic needs for survival, such as food and shelter; or
(4) Failure to immediately give medical treatment to an injured child resulting in serious
impairment of his growth and development or in his permanent incapacity or death.
Although we affirm the factual findings of fact by the RTC and the CA to the effect that
the petitioner struck Jayson at the back with his hand and slapped Jayson on the face, we
disagree with their holding that his acts constituted child abuse within the purview of the above-
quoted provisions. The records did not establish beyond reasonable doubt that his laying of hands
on Jayson had been intended to debase the "intrinsic worth and dignity" of Jayson as a human
being, or that he had thereby intended to humiliate or embarrass Jayson. The records showed the
laying of hands on Jayson to have been done at the spur of the moment and in anger, indicative
of his being then overwhelmed by his fatherly concern for the personal safety of his own minor
daughters who had just suffered harm at the hands of Jayson and Roldan. With the loss of his
self-control, he lacked that specific intent to debase, degrade or demean the intrinsic worth and
dignity of a child as a human being that was so essential in the crime of child abuse.
It is not trite to remind that under the well-recognized doctrine of pro reo every doubt is
resolved in favor of the petitioner as the accused. Thus, the Court should consider all possible
circumstances in his favor.
What crime, then, did the petitioner commit?
Considering that Jaysons physical injury required five to seven days of medical
attention, the petitioner was liable for slight physical injuries under Article 266 (1) of the Revised
Penal Code, to wit:
Article 266. Slight physical injuries and maltreatment. The crime of slight physical
injuries shall be punished:
1. By arresto menor when the offender has inflicted physical injuries which shall
incapacitate the offended party for labor from one to nine days, or shall require medical
attendance during the same period.
xxxx
4F (2016-2017) 6
The penalty for slight physical injuries is arresto menor, which ranges from one day to 30
days of imprisonment. In imposing the correct penalty, however, we have to consider the
mitigating circumstance of passion or obfuscation under Article 13 (6) of the RPC, because the
petitioner lost his reason and self-control, thereby diminishing the exercise of his will
power. Passion or obfuscation may lawfully arise from causes existing only in the honest belief
of the accused. It is relevant to mention, too, that in passion or obfuscation, the offender suffers a
diminution of intelligence and intent. With his having acted under the belief that Jayson and
Roldan had thrown stones at his two minor daughters, and that Jayson had burned Cherrlyns
hair, the petitioner was entitled to the mitigating circumstance of passion. Arresto menor is
prescribed in its minimum period (i.e., one day to 10 days) in the absence of any aggravating
circumstance that offset the mitigating circumstance of passion. Accordingly, with the
Indeterminate Sentence Law being inapplicable due to the penalty imposed not exceeding one
year, the petitioner shall suffer a straight penalty of 10 days of arresto menor.
RA 7610
TICKLER: School Teacher
Rosaldes vs People
FACTS:
On February 13, 1996, seven year old Michael Ryan Gonzales, then a Grade 1 pupil at Pughanan
Elementary School located in the Municipality of Lambunao, Iloilo, was hurriedly entering his
classroom when he accidentally bumped the knee of his teacher, petitioner Felina Rosaldes, who
was then asleep on a bamboo sofa). Roused from sleep, petitioner asked Michael Ryan to
apologize to her. When Michael did not obey but instead proceeded to his seat,, petitioner went
to Michael and pinched him on his thigh. Then, she held him up by his armpits and pushed him
to the floor. As he fell, Michael Ryan's body hit a desk. As a result, he lost consciousness.
Petitioner proceeded to pick Michael Ryan up by his ears and repeatedly slammed him down on
the floor. Michael Ryan cried.
After the incident, petitioner proceeded to teach her class. During lunch break, Michael Ryan,
accompanied by two of his classmates, Louella Loredo and Jonalyn Gonzales, went home crying
and told his mother about the incident (TSN, March 14, 1997, p. 7). His mother and his Aunt
Evangeline Gonzales reported the incident to their Barangay Captain, Gonzalo Larroza who
advised them to have Michael Ryan examined by a doctor. Michael Ryan's aunt and Barangay
Councilman Ernesto Ligante brought him to the Dr. Ricardo Y. Ladrido Hospital where he was
examined by Dr. Teresita Castigador. They, likewise, reported the incident to the Police Station.
The medical certificate issued by Dr. Teresita Castigador reads that there is discoloration of the
skin caused by the extravasation of blood beneath it. She opined that the petechiae and
tenderness of the ears of the victim could have been caused by pinching. As to the lumbar pain
and tenderness at the third and fourth level of the vertebrae (wound no. 2), the doctor testified
that during her examination of the victim the latter felt pain when she put pressure on the said
area. She stated that this could be caused by pressure or contact with a hard object. Wound No. 3
is located on the victim's left inner thigh. According to her this could not have been caused by
4F (2016-2017) 6
ordinary pinching with pressure. Wound No. 4 is located on the upper part of the left thigh. Dr.
Castigador testified that she noticed that the boy was limping as he walked
CRIME CHARGED:
The Provincial Prosecutor of Iloilo, upon approval and Directive of the Deputy OMBUDSMAN
for the Visayas accuses FELINA ROSALDES of the crime of VIOLATION OF CHILD ABUSE
LAW (Section 10 (a) of R..A. 7610).
RTC RULING:
Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of Section 10 (a), Article VI of R.A. 7610, the
Court sentences her to an indeterminate prison term ranging from four (4) years, two (2) months
and one (1) day of prision correctional, as minimum, to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor, as maximum, and to pay the costs.
No pronouncement as to civil liability, the same not having been proved.
CA:
AFFIRMED the conviction but MODIFIED THE TERM OF SENTENCE. Accused-appellant is
sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of
prision correctional, as the minimum of it, to ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
the maximum thereof.
ISSUE:
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in convicting the petitioner by holding that the acts of the
petitioner constitute child abuse penalized under Section 10 (a) of Republic Act No. 7610.
Petitioner contends that she did not deliberately inflict the physical injuries suffered by
Michael Ryan to maltreat or malign him in a manner that would debase, demean or
degrade his dignity. She characterizes her maltreatment as an act of discipline that she as
a schoolteacher could reasonably do towards the development of the child. She insists
that her act further came under the doctrine of in loco parentis.
RULING:
The contention of the petitioner is utterly bereft of merit.
Although the petitioner, as a schoolteacher, could duly discipline Michael Ryan as her pupil, her
infliction of the physical injuries on him was unnecessary, violent and excessive. The boy even
fainted from the violence suffered at her hands. She could not justifiably claim that she acted
only for the sake of disciplining him. Her physical maltreatment of him was precisely prohibited
by no less than the Family Code, which has expressly banned the infliction of corporal
punishment by a school administrator, teacher or individual engaged in child care exercising
special parental authority (i.e., in loco parentis), viz: Article 233. The person exercising
substitute parental authority shall have the same authority over the person of the child as the
parents. In no case shall the school administrator, teacher or individual engaged in child care
exercising special parental authority inflict corporal punishment upon the child, (n)
4F (2016-2017) 6
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 7610 defines child abuse thusly:

xxxx
(b) "Child abuse" refers to the maltreatment, whether habitual or not, of the child which
includes any of the following:
(1) Psychological and physical abuse, neglect, cruelty, sexual abuse and emotional
maltreatment;
(2) Any act by deeds or words which debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth and
dignity of a child as a human being;
(3) Unreasonable deprivation of his basic needs for survival, such as food and shelter; or
(4) Failure to immediately give medical treatment to an injured child resulting in serious
impairment of his growth and development or in his permanent incapacity or death.
xxxx
In the crime charged against the petitioner, therefore, the maltreatment may consist of an act
by deeds or by words that debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of
a child as a human being. The act need not be habitual. The CA concluded that the petitioner
"went overboard in disciplining Michael Ryan, a helpless and weak 7-year old boy, when she
pinched hard Michael Ryan on the left thigh and when she held him in the armpits and threw him
on the floor[; and as] the boy fell down, his body hit the desk causing him to lose consciousness
[but instead] of feeling a sense of remorse, the accused-appellant further held the boy up by his
ears and pushed him down on the floor." On her part, the trial judge said that the physical pain
experienced by the victim had been aggravated by an emotional trauma that caused him to stop
going to school altogether out of fear of the petitioner, compelling his parents to transfer him to
another school where he had to adjust again. Such established circumstances proved beyond
reasonable doubt that the petitioner was guilty of child abuse by deeds that degraded and
demeaned the intrinsic worth and dignity of Michael Ryan as a human being.
It was also shown that Michael Ryan's physical maltreatment by the petitioner was neither her
first or only maltreatment of a child. Prosecution witness Louella Loredo revealed on cross
examination that she had also experienced the petitioner's cruelty. The petitioner was also
convicted by the RTC in Iloilo City (Branch 39) in Criminal Case No. 348921 for maltreatment
of another child named Dariel Legayada. Such previous incidents manifested that the petitioner
had "a propensity for violence," as the trial judge stated in her decision of June 26, 2003.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision of the CA, subject to the MODIFICATIONS
that: (a) the petitioner shall suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years, nine (9) months
and eleven (11) days of prision correccional, as minimum, to seven (7) years, four (4) months
and one (1) day of prision mayor, as the maximum; (b) the petitioner shall pay to Michael Ryan
Gonzales P20,000.00 as moral damages, P20,000.00 as exemplary damages, and P20,000.00 as
temperate damages, plus interest at the rate of 6% per annum on each item of the civil liability
reckoned from the finality of this decision until full payment; and (c) the petitioner shall pay the
costs of suit.
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TICKLER: Anti-Violence Against Women & their Children Act, Support

Norma DEL SOCORRO, for and in behalf of her minor child Roderigo Norjo Van Wilsem,
VS.
Ernst Johan Brinkman VAN WILSEM
G.R. No. 193707, December 10, 2014
Peralta, J.
FACTS:
Petitioner Norma A. Del Socorro and respondent Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem
contracted marriage in Holland. They were blessed with a son named Roderigo Norjo Van
Wilsem, who at the time of the filing of the instant petition was sixteen (16) years of age.
Unfortunately, their marriage bond ended by virtue of a Divorce Decree issued by the
appropriate Court of Holland. At that time, their son was only eighteen (18) months old.
Thereafter, petitioner and her son came home to the Philippines. According to petitioner,
respondent made a promise to provide monthly support to their son. However, since the arrival of
petitioner and her son in the Philippines, respondent never gave support to the son, Roderigo.
Not long thereafter, respondent came to the Philippines and remarried in Pinamungahan, Cebu,
and since then, have been residing thereat. To date, all the parties, including their son, Roderigo,
are presently living in Cebu City. Petitioner, through her counsel, sent a letter demanding for
support from respondent. However, respondent refused to receive the letter. Because of the
foregoing circumstances, petitioner filed a complaint affidavit with the Provincial Prosecutor of
Cebu City against respondent for violation of Section 5, paragraph E(2) of R.A. No. 9262 (Anti-
Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004) for the latters unjust refusal to
support his minor child with petitioner.
RTC: DISMISSED the case.
ISSUE:
Can a foreign national be held criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262 for his unjustified
failure to support his minor child?
HELD:
YES. Since the respondent is a citizen of Holland or the Netherlands, we agree with the
RTC-Cebu that he is subject to the laws of his country, not to Philippine law, as to whether he is
obliged to give support to his child, as well as the consequences of his failure to do so. In
international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or case has the
burden of proving the foreign law. In the present case, respondent hastily concludes that being a
national of the Netherlands, he is governed by such laws on the matter of provision of and
capacity to support. While respondent pleaded the laws of the Netherlands in advancing his
position that he is not obliged to support his son, he never proved the same. When the foreign
law, judgment or contract is contrary to a sound and established public policy of the forum, the
said foreign law, judgment or order shall not be applied.
SECTION 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children.- The crime of
violence against women and their children is committed through any of the following acts:
4F (2016-2017) 6
xxxx
(e) Attempting to compel or compelling the woman or her child to engage in conduct
which the woman or her child has the right to desist from or desist from conduct which the
woman or her child has the right to engage in, or attempting to restrict or restricting the woman's
or her child's freedom of movement or conduct by force or threat of force, physical or other harm
or threat of physical or other harm, or intimidation directed against the woman or child. This
shall include, but not limited to, the following acts committed with the purpose or effect of
controlling or restricting the woman's or her child's movement or conduct:
xxxx
(2) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her children of financial support
legally due her or her family, or deliberately providing the woman's children insufficient
financial support;
xxxx
(i) Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the woman or
her child, including, but not limited to, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and denial of
financial support or custody of minor children of access to the woman's child/children.
Under the aforesaid special law, the deprivation or denial of financial support to the child
is considered anact of violence against women and children. In addition, considering that
respondent is currently living in the Philippines, we find strength in petitioners claim that the
Territoriality Principle in criminal law, in relation to Article 14 of the New Civil Code, applies to
the instant case, which provides that: "[p]enal laws and those of public security and safety shall
be obligatory upon all who live and sojourn in Philippine territory, subject to the principle of
public international law and to treaty stipulations." On this score, it is indisputable that the
alleged continuing acts of respondent in refusing to support his child with petitioner is committed
here in the Philippines as all of the parties herein are residents of the Province of Cebu City. As
such, our courts have territorial jurisdiction over the offense charged against respondent. It is
likewise irrefutable that jurisdiction over the respondent was acquired upon his arrest. The act of
denying support to a child under Section 5(e)(2) and (i) of R.A. No. 9262 is a continuing offense,
which started in 1995 but is still ongoing at present. Accordingly, the crime charged in the instant
case has clearly not prescribed.
SUPREME COURT: REVERSED and SET ASIDE the decision of the RTC and
REMANDED the case to the trial court.
DINAMLING vs.PEOPLE
4F (2016-2017) 6
Tickler: whore house, pulled down pants and panty in public, Incomplete abortion,
FACTS: Ricky Dinamling, a police officer and a married man is the accused in a 2 criminal
cases for violation of RA No. 9262 with special qualifying aggravating circumstance of the
victim being pregnant at the time of the abuse. The Victim on the other hand, is AAA, to whom
Dinamling had an illicit relationship for five years and to whom he begot two common children,
aged 4 and 2 at the time of the abuse.
On the night of March 14, 2007, while the illicit relationship was still on-going, Dinamling, and
a friend went to the boarding house of AAA drunk. While AAA was putting the two children to
bed Dinamling started to evict AAA and the children, ordering AAA to pack her things in a trash
bag and a carton box for ducklings. His reason for the eviction was that she was allegedly using
the place as a "whore house" wherein she "brought (her) partners." AAA initially did not want to
leave but she left when Dinamling threw a baby's feeding bottle outside the house, causing it to
break. She then went to the house of BBB and requested the latter to fetch her children. When
BBB and another friend went for the children, Dinamling already had left with the older child
and only the baby was left. The baby was brought by the friends back to AAA. In the past, there
were similar incidents that happened between Dinamling and AAA. Dinamling would hit AAA's
head, pull her hair and kick her. Even the mere sound of petitioners motorcycle makes AAA fear
the impending abuse.
Six days later, or on March 20, 2007, at around 9:00 p.m., AAA was at the house of CCC when
Dinamling arrived. He shouted and counted down for AAA to come out. When she came out,
Dinamling punched her at the left ear, which subsequently bled. When AAA asked him why he
kept on following her when she already had left him, Dinamling shouted her family name and
told her she was "good-for-nothing." AAA left for the barangay captain's house, but Dinamling
caught up with her and kicked her until she fell to the ground. On the road, Dinamling pulled
down AAA's pants and panty and shouted at her while people looked on. Dinamling then threw
the pants and panty back at AAA and shouted her family name. Dinamling, then intoxicated, left
on a motorcycle. AAA stayed at her friend's home until she felt some back pain in the next
morning. She found out she was bleeding and about to miscarry so she was immediately brought
to the hospital. There, she was told by Dr. Baguilat that she was 19 weeks pregnant and had an
incomplete abortion. She was hospitalized for four days. Dinamling visited her but showed no
remorse over his acts.
Charge: Two (2) criminal Informations in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for violation of
4F (2016-2017) 6
Section 5(i), in relation to Section 6(f) of RA No. 9262 with the offense being
attended by the special qualifying aggravating circumstance of the victim being

pregnant at the time. It was docketed as Crim. Case No. 1701 and 1702.
RTC: Guilty to both charges.
CA: Criminal Case No. 1701 - guilt affirmed;
Criminal Case No. 1702 guilt affirmed with the modification on the penalty, by
applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
Dinamlings Denial and alibi, claiming that he was on duty at the town's police station at the time
defenses: that the offenses were committed.
That the testimony of Dr. Diaz (As Dr. Baguilat was not able to testify) allegedly frees
him from responsibility for the incomplete abortion of AAA's unborn child. Dr. Diaz
testified that the medical certificate indicated that AAA was pregnant, but that her
incomplete abortion might or might not have been caused by her "mauling."
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not Dinamling is guilty of violation of Section 5(i) of RA No. 9262;
(2) Is defense of denial and alibi sufficient in this case;
(2) Whether the uncertainty as to whether the mauling of AAA caused her abortion, exculpates
him from the crime.
HELD: (1) Yes. The above testimonies suffice to establish the elements of the crime as defined
in Section 5(i) of RA No. 9262 and as alleged in the two Informations filed against petitioner.
The provision of the law states:
4F (2016-2017) 6
Section 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children.- The crime of violence against
women and their children is committed through any of the following acts:
(i) Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the woman or her
child, including, but not limited to, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and denial of financial
support or custody of minor children or access to the woman's child/children.
From the aforequoted Section 5(i), in relation to other sections of RA No. 9262, the elements of
the crime are derived as follows:
(1) The offended party is a woman and/or her child or children;
(2) The woman is either the wife or former wife of the offender, or is a woman with
whom the offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or is a woman with whom
such offender has a common child. As for the woman's child or children, they may be
legitimate or illegitimate, or living within or without the family abode;
(3) The offender causes on the woman and/or child mental or emotional anguish; and
(4) The anguish is caused through acts of public ridicule or humiliation, repeated verbal
and emotional abuse, denial of financial support or custody of minor children or access to
the children or similar such acts or omissions.
As for the first case, Criminal Case No. 1701, filed against petitioner Dinamling, the elements
have been proven and duly established. It is undisputed that:
1. AAA, as the victim, is a woman
2. who was then in a five-year ongoing relationship with petitioner Dinamling. At that
time, AAA and Dinamling had two common children.
3. AAA was often in fear of petitioner due to the latter's physical and verbal abuse. In
the evening of March 14, 2007, an incident occurred in which she and her children
were actually evicted by Dinamling from a boarding house.
4. Dinamling, in the presence of his own friend and the children, accused AAA of using
the boarding house as a "whore-house" and alleged that AAA brought sexual partners
in that place. Dinamling further humiliated AAA by telling her to pack her clothes in
a trash bag and in a carton box used to pack ducklings. He then threw a baby bottle
4F (2016-2017) 7
outside and broke it. This forced AAA to hastily leave even without her children.
Dinamling also left and took with him the elder child and left the baby behind. AAA
had to ask for her friends to fetch the children but the latter found only the baby.
According to AAA and her mother DDD, that incident was not an isolated one, as
similar incidents had happened previously.
As for the second case, Criminal Case No. 1702, the crime's elements were likewise proven. In
addition to the first two elements of the victim being a woman and in a relationship with the
offender, the prosecution was able to prove another incident of mental or emotional anguish
through public ridicule or humiliation when it showed Dinamling acting in the following
manner:
Element 3 and 4
a) by calling and counting down on AAA for the latter to come out of the house where
she was staying;
b) by punching AAA at the left ear upon seeing her;
c) by shouting AAA's family name and calling her "good-for-nothing;"
d) by saying that AAA could sue him but he would just pay her;
e) by kicking AAA to the ground and then pulling off her pants and underwear (panty)
and calling her worthless;
f) by throwing the pants and panty back at AAA while shouting AAA's family name as he
left.
All such acts were committed while in full view and hearing of the public, highlighting
the public ridicule and humiliation done on AAA and causing her mental and emotional
pain. AAA's suffering is so much that even the sound of petitioner's motorcycle would
put fear in her.
It bears emphasis that Section 5(i) penalizes some forms of psychological violence that are
inflicted on victims who are women and children. Taccording to Sec. 3 of R.A. 9262,
"Psychological violence" refers to acts or omissions causing or likely to cause mental or
emotional suffering of the victim such as but not limited to intimidation, harassment, stalking,
damage to property, public ridicule or humiliation, repeated verbal abuse and mental infidelity.
4F (2016-2017) 7
Psychological violence is an element of violation of Section 5(i) just like the mental or emotional
anguish caused on the victim. Psychological violence is the means employed by the perpetrator,
while mental or emotional anguish is the effect caused to or the damage sustained by the
offended party. To establish psychological violence as an element of the crime, it is necessary to
show proof of commission of any of the acts enumerated in Section 5(i) or similar such acts. And
to establish mental or emotional anguish, it is necessary to present the testimony of the victim as
such experiences are personal to this party. All of this was complied with in the case at bar.
(2) NO. In the face of the strong and credible testimony of AAA, petitioner Dinamling relies on a
defense of denial and alibi. Nothing in Dinamling's defense overcomes the clear, straightforward,
unequivocal and positive declarations of AAA.
(3) NO. Petitioner barks up the wrong tree because the fact of AAA's physical injuries from the
mauling, including her abortion, do not constitute an element of the crime with which he is
charged. The testimony of Dr. Diaz or any physician as to the fact or existence of such physical
injuries is not indispensable to petitioner's conviction or acquittal.
In fact, neither the physical injuries suffered by the victim nor the actual physical violence done
by the perpetrator are necessary to prove the essential elements of the crime as defined in Section
5(i) of RA 9262. The only exception is, as in the case at bar, when the physical violence done by
the accused is alleged to have caused the mental and emotional suffering; in which case, such
acts of physical violence must be proven. There was no such allegation in the information in the
case at bar. Thus, proof of physical injuries is not needed for conviction. Likewise, proof of the
absence thereof or lack of proof of such injuries would not lead to an acquittal. Physical violence
or physical injuries, in isolation, are not elements of this particular crime.
In the case at bar, petitioner Dinamling's acts of publicly punching, kicking and stripping AAA of
her pants and underwear, although obvious acts of physical violence, are also instances of
psychological violence since it was alleged and proven that they resulted in AAA's public
ridicule and humiliation and mental or emotional distress.
As to the alleged miscarriage or incomplete abortion, the allegedly exculpatory testimony of Dr.
Diaz, or even the complete disregard of any evidence surrounding such fact does not lead to
petitioner Dinamling's acquittal. Like the physical injuries that was discussed above, the fact of
AAA's miscarriage or incomplete abortion is not among the crime's elements. In fact, it is not
abortion but the mere fact of pregnancy of the victim at the time of commission which is an
4F (2016-2017) 7
aggravating circumstance, not an element, of the offense as provided in Section 6 of RA 9262.

The
imprisonment of prision mayor shall be imposed in the maximum period with
fine of 100,000-300,000
undergo mandatory psychological counseling or psychiatric treatment and shall report

compliance to the court.
For this crime, pregnancy or the presence of the woman's child are aggravating circumstances
which increase the imposable penalty, thus, they must be alleged and proven with competent
evidence for the penalty to be properly imposed. In this case, the pregnancy is proven by AAA's
unrebutted testimony as well as by the medical certificate that she presented in the course of such
testimony to show that she was indeed hospitalized and suffered an "incomplete abortion
secondary to the mauling." Hence, guilt affirmed, with modification to penalties imposed.
4F (2016-2017) 7
PEOPLE VS. BAYABOS

TICKLER: school authorities as accomplices; PMMA
FACTS: Fernando C. Balidoy, Jr. (BALIDOY) was admitted as a probationary midshipman at

the PMMA. In order to reach active status, all new entrants were required to successfully
complete the mandatory Indoctrination and Orientation Period, which was set from 2 May to 1
June 2001. Balidoy died on 3 May 2001.anroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) probed the death of BALIDOY. After months of
investigation, it forwarded its findings to the provincial prosecutor of Zambales for the
preliminary investigation and possible criminal prosecution of those involved in the orientation
and indoctrination of the PMMA Class of 2005. Subsequently, the Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor of Zambales issued a Resolution finding probable cause to charge the following as
principals to the crime of hazing: Aldwin Alvarez (ALVAREZ), Leotharius C. Montez
(MONTEZ), Rudence G. Reyes (REYES), and Jed Nicholas S. Simpas (SIMPAS) collectively,
ALVAREZ ET AL. A criminal case against ALVAREZ ET AL. was then filed with the Regional
Trial Court of Iba, Zambales (RTCZambales).
The Assistant Provincial Prosecutor also endorsed to the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military the
finding of probable cause to charge the following school authorities as accomplices to hazing:
Rear Admiral (RADM) Virginio R. Aris (ARIS), Lieutenant Senior Grade (LTSG.) Dominador
D. Bayabos (BAYABOS), Lieutenant Junior Grade (LTJG.) Gerry P. Doctor (DOCTOR), LTJG.
Manny Ferrer (FERRER), LTJG. Kruzaldo Mabborang (MABBORANG), LTJG. Ronald G.
Magsino (MAGSINO), Ensign (ENS.) Dennis Velasco (VELASCO), and ENS. Dominador
Operio (OPERIO) collectively, RESPONDENTS. The Ombudsman Investigator agreed with
the findings of the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor. The matter was thus ordered re-docketed for
the purpose of conducting the proper administrative proceedings against respondents for grave
misconduct and abuse of authority. The Office of the Special Prosecutor eventually filed with the
Sandiganbayan a criminal case charging respondents as accomplices to the crime of hazing.
Meanwhile, the RTCZambales issued an Order dismissing the Information against the principal
accused, Alvarez et al.12 The Order was later entered in the Book of Entries of Judgment.
Bayabos, Ferrer, Magsino, Doctor, and Operio (collectively, Bayabos et al.) filed a Motion to
Quash the Information. They argued that the Information did not contain all the essential
elements of the offense. They also pointed out that there was no allegation that the purported act
had been made a prerequisite for admission to the PMMA, especially considering that the victim
had already been accepted in the academy. Moreover, they stressed that there was no averment in
the Information that the PMMA was a fraternity, a sorority, or an organization. Also underscored
was the absence in the Information of any assertion that the alleged hazing was not part of the
physical, mental, and psychological testing and training procedure and practices to determine
and enhance the physical, mental and psychological fitness of prospective regular members.
Furthermore, they emphasized that there was no allegation that they were given prior written
notice of the hazing and that they had permitted the activity.
4F (2016-2017) 7
As a final point, BAYABOS ET AL. argued that the case against the principal accused had
already been dismissed with finality by the RTC. There being no more principals with whom
they could have cooperated in the execution of the offense, they asserted that the case against
them must be dismissed.
The Special Prosecutor opposed the motion of BAYABOS ET AL. He insisted that the
Information alleged the material facts that would sufficiently establish the presence of the
essential ingredients of the crime of accomplice to hazing. He also stressed that there was
nothing in the law requiring that the principals must be prosecuted first before a case could be
filed against the accomplices. The Comment/Opposition of the Special Prosecutor was, however,
silent on the issue of whether the Information contained an allegation that the supposed hazing
had been made a prerequisite for admission to the PMMA, and whether the academy was
considered an organization within the meaning of the Anti-Hazing Law.
Six days before BAYABOS ET AL. were set to be arraigned, the Sandiganbayan issued the
assailed Resolution (SB Resolution I) quashing the Information and dismissing the criminal case
against them. According to the court, the fact that the charge against the principal accused
ALVAREZ ET AL. was dismissed with finality favorably carried with it the indictment against
those charged as accomplices, whose criminal responsibility was subordinate to that of the
former. It stressed that before there can be an accomplice, there must be a principal by direct
participation, the latter being the originator of the criminal design. In this case, as there were no
principal perpetrators to speak of, necessarily, there was no one else with whom they could have
cooperated in the execution of the crime of hazing. In view of the dismissal of the case against
the principals, the court ruled that the Information charging BAYABOS ET AL. as accomplices
could no longer stand on its own.
In any event, the Sandiganbayan found that the Information charged no offense, and that the
allegations therein were mere conclusions of law. It also stressed that there was no averment that
the alleged hazing was not part of the physical, mental and psychological testing and training
procedure and practices to determine and enhance the physical, mental and psychological fitness
of prospective regular members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the
Philippine National Police (PNP), pursuant to Section 1 of the law. It must be noted, though, that
the Sandiganbayan did not make any categorical determination that the PMMA was considered
an organization within the meaning of the Anti-Hazing Law.
Six months after the Sandiganbayan issued its Resolution dismissing the criminal case against
BAYABOS ET AL., the accused VELASCO surrendered and then filed his own Motion to
Quash,17 adopting the grounds raised by that court. His arraignment was set on 14 August 2006.
However, on 3 August 2006, the Sandiganbayan issued another Resolution (SB Resolution II)
dismissing the case against him. According to the court, since VELASCO was similarly situated
as BAYABOS ET AL., the Information against him must likewise be quashed in light of the
reasoning laid out in SB Resolution I. In the same Resolution, the Sandiganbayan ex proprio
motu dismissed the case against Aris and Mabborang (collectively, VELASCO ET AL.),
explaining that they, too, had been charged under the same Information for the same offense. It is
unclear from the records whether the accused Aris and Mabborang surrendered or were arrested,
4F (2016-2017) 7
or whether the Order of Arrest was recalled prior to the dismissal of the case.
Aggrieved, the Office of the Ombudsman, through the Special Prosecutor, filed with this Court
on 13 March 2006 a Petition assailing SB Resolution I and, on 16 October 2006, another Petition
challenging SB Resolution II.
ISSUES:
4. Whether the prosecution of respondents for the crime of accomplice to hazing can proceed in
spite of the dismissal with finality of the case against the principal accused
5. Whether the Information filed against respondents contains all the material averments for the
prosecution of the crime of accomplice to hazing under the Anti-Hazing Law
HELD:
I. With regard to the first issue, we agree with petitioner that the Sandiganbayan erred when it
dismissed outright the case against respondents, on the sole ground that the case against the
purported principals had already been dismissed. It is a settled rule that the case against those
charged as accomplices is not ipso facto dismissed in the absence of trial of the purported
principals; the dismissal of the case against the latter; or even the latters acquittal, especially
when the occurrence of the crime has in fact been established.
In People v. Rafael,23 the Supreme Court En Banc reasoned thus: The corresponding
responsibilities of the principal, accomplice, and accessory are distinct from each other. As long
as the commission of the offense can be duly established in evidence, the determination of the
liability of the accomplice or accessory can proceed independently of that of the principal.
Accordingly, so long as the commission of the crime can be duly proven, the trial of those
charged as accomplices to determine their criminal liability can proceed independently of that of
the alleged principal.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
We note in the present case that Bayabos et al. merely presented the Order of Entry of Judgment
dismissing the case against ALVAREZ ET AL. Nowhere is it mentioned in the order that the case
was dismissed against the alleged principals, because no crime had been committed. In fact, it
does not cite the trial courts reason for dismissing the case. Hence, the Sandiganbayan
committed an error when it simply relied on the Order of Entry of Judgment without so much as
scrutinizing the reason for the dismissal of the case against the purported principals.
Nonetheless, as will be discussed below, we affirm the quashal of the Information against
respondents.
Section 14, Article III of the Constitution, recognizes the right of the accused to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation against them. As a manifestation of this constitutional
right, the Rules of Court requires that the information charging persons with an offense be
sufficient. One of the key components of a SUFFICIENT INFORMATION is the statement
of the acts or omissions constituting the offense charged, subject of the complaint. The
information must also be crafted in a language ordinary and concise enough to enable persons of
common understanding to know the offense being charged against them. This approach is
4F (2016-2017) 7
intended to allow them to suitably prepare for their defense, as they are presumed to have no
independent knowledge of the facts constituting the offense they have purportedly committed.
The information need not be in the same kind of language used in the law relied
upon.hanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
At any time before entering a plea, an accused may assail the information filed with the court
based on the grounds enumerated in Section 3, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, one of which is
the claim that the facts charged do not constitute an offense. In assessing whether an information
must be quashed on that ground, the basic test is to determine if the facts averred would establish
the presence of the essential elements of the crime as defined in the law. The information is
examined without consideration of the truth or veracity of the claims therein, as these are more
properly proven or controverted during the trial. In the appraisal of the information, matters
aliunde are not taken into account.
We quote the pertinent provision of the Anti-Hazing Law as

follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Section 1. Hazing, as used in this Act, is an initiation rite or practice as a prerequisite for
admission into membership in a fraternity, sorority or organization by placing the recruit,
neophyte or applicant in some embarrassing or humiliating situations such as forcing him to
do menial, silly, foolish and other similar tasks or activities or otherwise subjecting him to
physical or psychological suffering or injury.
The term organization shall include any club or the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
Philippine National Police, Philippine Military Academy, or officer and cadet corp of the
Citizen's Military Training and Citizen's Army Training. The physical, mental and
psychological testing and training procedure and practices to determine and enhance the
physical, mental and psychological fitness of prospective regular members of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police as approved by the Secretary of National
Defense and the National Police Commission duly recommended by the Chief of Staff, Armed
Forces of the Philippines and the Director General of the Philippine National Police shall not be
considered as hazing for the purposes of this Act.
Sec. 4. x x x x.
The school authorities including faculty members who consent to the hazing or who have
actual knowledge thereof, but failed to take any action to prevent the same from occurring
shall be punished as accomplices for the acts of hazing committed by the perpetrators.
(Emphasis supplied)
The crime of hazing is thus committed when the following essential elements are established: (1)
a person is placed in some embarrassing or humiliating situation or subjected to physical or
psychological suffering or injury; and (2) these acts were employed as a prerequisite for the
persons admission or entry into an organization. In the crime of hazing, the crucial ingredient
distinguishing it from the crimes against persons defined under Title Eight of the Revised Penal
Code is the infliction by a person of physical or psychological suffering on another in furtherance
4F (2016-2017) 7
of the latters admission or entry into an organization.
In the case of school authorities and faculty members who have had no direct participation in the
act, they may nonetheless be charged as accomplices if it is shown that (1) hazing, as established
by the above elements, occurred; (2) the accused are school authorities or faculty members; and
(3) they consented to or failed to take preventive action against hazing in spite actual knowledge
thereof.
First, we reject the contention of respondents that PMMA should not be considered an
organization. Under the Anti-Hazing Law, the breadth of the term organization includes but is
not limited to groups, teams, fraternities, sororities, citizen army training corps, educational
institutions, clubs, societies, cooperatives, companies, partnerships, corporations, the PNP, and
the AFP.31 Attached to the Department of Transportation and Communications, 32 the PMMA is a
government-owned educational institution33 established for the primary purpose of producing
efficient and well-trained merchant marine officers.34 Clearly, it is included in the term
organization within the meaning of the law.
We also disagree with the Sandiganbayan ruling that the quashal of the Information was
warranted for failure to allege that the purported acts were not covered by the exemption relating
to the duly recommended and approved testing and training procedure and practices for
prospective regular members of the AFP and the PNP. This exemption is an affirmative defense
in, not an essential element of, the crime of accomplice to hazing. It is an assertion that must be
properly claimed by the accused, not by the prosecution. The reason for this rule is that the
accused carry the burden of proof in establishing by clear and convincing evidence that they
have satisfied the requirements thereof.35 Thus, the prosecutions failure to point out in the
Information that the exception is inapplicable would not justify the quashal of that Information.
Nevertheless, we find albeit for a different reason that the Motion to Quash must be granted,
as the Information does not include all the material facts constituting the crime of accomplice to
hazing. The Information charging respondents reads as follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The undersigned Assistant Special Prosecutor, Office of the Special Prosecutor, hereby accuses
[RADM] Virginio R. Aris, [LTSG.] Dominador D. BAYABOS, [LTJG.] Manny G. Ferrer,
[LTJG.] Ronald G. Magsino, [LTJG.] Kruzaldo G. Mabborang, [LTJG.] Gerry P. Doctor, [ENS.]
Dominador B. Operio, Jr., and [ENS.] Dennis S. Velasco, as accomplices for Violation of R.A.
8049 (Anti-Hazing Law), committed as follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
That during the period from the 2 nd of May 2001 up to the 3 rd of May 2001, inside the campus of
the Philippine Merchant Marine Academy (PMMA), in the Municipality of San Narciso,
Province of Zambales, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court accused
RADM Virginio R. Aris, President of PMMA with [Salary Grade (SG) 29]; LTSG. Dominador
D. BAYABOS, Commandant of the Cadets; (LTJG.) Manny G. Ferrer, 1 st Batallion Officer;
LTJG. Ronald G. Magsino, Security Officer; LTJG. Kruzaldo G. Mabborang, 2 nd Battalion
Officer; LTJG. Gerry P. Doctor, Batl. Mast.; ENS. Dominador B. Operio, Jr., 1 st Battalion
Company Officer; and ENS. Dennis S. Velasco, Mess Officer, all public officers, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another, committing the offense in relation to office and
4F (2016-2017) 7
while in the performance of their duties as such public officers being the school authorities
and/or faculty members did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally, consent or have
actual knowledge of the hazing perpetrated by the principal accused, all First Class Midshipmen,
against probationary midshipman FERNANDO BALIDOy, JR. during the schools
Indoctrination and Orientation; and, fail to take any action to prevent the occurrence of the
hazing and the infliction of psychological and physical injuries against said FERNANDO
BALIDOy, JR. thereby causing the instantaneous death of the latter, to the damage and prejudice
of the heirs of said FERNANDO BALIDOy, JR.
As can be gleaned from the above, the indictment merely states that psychological pain and
physical injuries were inflicted on the victim. There is no allegation that the purported acts were
employed as a prerequisite for admission or entry into the organization. Failure to aver this
crucial ingredient would prevent the successful prosecution of the criminal responsibility of the
accused, either as principal or as accomplice, for the crime of hazing. Plain reference to a
technical term37 in this case, hazing is insufficient and incomplete, as it is but a
characterization of the acts allegedly committed and thus a mere conclusion of law. Section 6,
Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, expressly states that the information must include, inter alia,
both the designation of the offense given by the statute and the acts or omissions complained
of as constituting the offense. The Special Prosecutors belated argument 38 in his Petition before
this Court that the successful completion of the indoctrination and orientation program was used
as a prerequisite for continued admission to the academy i.e., attainment of active midshipman
status does not cure this defect in the Information. Thus, the Information must be quashed, as
the ultimate facts it presents do not constitute the crime of accomplice to hazing.
Finally, we reject the Special Prosecutors claim that the Sandiganbayan should just have ordered
the filing of another information or the correction of the defect by amendment, instead of
dismissing the case outright.39 Indeed, Section 4, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, provides that if
a motion to quash is based on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, the
court shall give the prosecution a chance to correct the defect by amendment. However, the
provision also states that if the prosecution fails to make the amendment, the motion shall be
granted. Here, we point out that the Special Prosecutor insisted in his Comment on the Motion to
Quash that there was no defect in the Information. Neither has he filed a new information after
the motion was sustained, pursuant to Section 5, Rule 117. Thus, the Sandiganbayan was correct
in ordering the quashal of the Information and the eventual dismissal of the case.
This does not mean, however, that the Special Prosecutor is now precluded from filing another
information. Section 6, Rule 117, specifically states that an order sustaining a motion to quash
would not bar another prosecution. That is, of course, unless respondents are able to prove that
the criminal action or liability has been extinguished, or that double jeopardy has already
attached.
Given the foregoing, the Court no longer sees the necessity to pass upon the other issues raised
by petitioner
4F (2016-2017) 7

Criminal Law Review Case Digests Crimes Against Persons

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CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS

CRIME CHARGED: PARRICIDE

The prosecution is mandated to prove the following essential elements:

Tickler: Murder, Felipe Lagera 65 y/o, Ranil Tagpis 1 y/o

People v Rosendo Rebucan

RTC: Double Murder

CA: 2 counts of murder

Issue: Whether accused is guilty of Murder?

Held: Yes. 2 Counts of murder. Reclusion Perpetua for each count.

No mitigating circumstance of immediate vindication of grave offense.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. CECILIA LAGMAN

Finally, the killing of Santiago was neither parricide nor homicide.

INSERT WACOY & QUIBAC VS PEOPLE

Accused: Christopher Pareja

CRIME CHARGED: Rape

ISSUE: Whether or not Pareja is guilty of rape.

TICKLER: Five or ten pesos, lunch money

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RODRIGO GUTIEREZ y ROBLES ALIAS ROD

RTC: Guilty of statutory rape.

a. Through force, threat, or intimidation;

b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;

c. By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and

SC: Affirmed the conviction.

People vs. Joel Crisostomo

Issue: Whether or not rape was committed.

a. Through force, threat or intimidation;

TICKLER: 67-year old Rape Victim

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. AURELIO JASTIVA

G.R. No. 199268, February 12, 2014

ART. 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. Rape is committed

a) Through force, threat or intimidation[.]

a) AAAs credible, positive and categorical testimony relative to the circumstances

Findings: 1) Patient is ambulatory, conscious, coherent and oriented as to time,

People vs. Ricky Joel Arguta and Wilson SIWIT Cahipe

1. By using force or intimidation;

2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and

3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.

The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.

Emperador, Alquizola Lodging House

CA: ACQUITTED: Carampatana, Oporto, Alquiloza

PEOPLE VS LAOG TICKLER: LEAD PIPE, RICE PADDIES, SPECIAL COMPLEX

Abuse of superior strength in this case is merely a generic aggravating circumstance to be

The aggravating/qualifying circumstances of abuse of superior strength and use of deadly

People vs Villaflores aka Batman

Medico-legal report: asphyxia by strangulation (sinakal sa pamamagitan ng tali) and rape

CA: affirmed RTC.

SC: Affirms conviction but penalty is reclusion perpetua.

Republic Act No. 8353 (Anti-Rape Law of 1997) pertinently provides:

(Bonus facts lang) The 10 circumstantial evidence were:

G.R. No. 211027, June 29, 2015

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JOSE BRONIOLA

TICKLER: Taiwan Fish / Bolo with Blood

ISSUE: Whether or not appellant was guilty of rape with homicide

ART. 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. Rape is committed

b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;

c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and

SEC. 2. In lieu of the death penalty, the following shall be imposed:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

People vs. Jojie Suansing

Carnal knowledge of a woman who is a mental retardate is rape. A mental condition of

Article 266-A. Rape; When and How Committed. Rape is committed

TICKLER: RAPE, SPECIAL NEEDS CHILD

G.R. No. 199740. March 24, 2014

CRIME CHARGED: Simple Rape

RTC: Guilty of SIMPLE RAPE