Terror, Terrorism, Terrorists

Author(s): Charles Tilly

Reviewed work(s):
Source: Sociological Theory, Vol. 22, No. 1, Theories of Terrorism: A Symposium (Mar., 2004),
pp. 5-13
Published by: American Sociological Association
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Terrorists*
Terror,Terrorism,
CHARLES TILLY

ColumbiaUniversity
The termsterror,
and terrorist
do notidentify
and distinct
terrorism,
causallycoherent
butstrategies
social phenomena
thatrecuracrossa widevariety
of actorsandpolitical
Social scientists
whoreifythetermsconfusethemselves
andrender
a disservice
situations.
to publicdiscussion.The U.S. government's
own catalogsof terrorist
eventsactually
bothclaims.
support

TERROR, TERRORISM, TERRORISTS

Some vivid termsserve political and normativeends admirablydespite hindering
descriptionand explanationof the social phenomenaat which theypoint. Those
double-edgedtermsinclude riot,injustice,and civil society,all of thempolitically
powerfulbut analyticallyelusive(Moore 1979; Vermuntand Steensma1991; Cohen
and Arato 1992; Brass 1996;Herzog 1998;Plotz 2000; Schweingruber
2000; Edwards,
and
Foley, and Diani 2001; Ferreeet al. 2002). They also include terror,terrorism,
This briefsurveyshowshow and why.
terrorists.
In his addressto Congressninedays afterthedevastatingattacksof September11,
2001, U.S. PresidentGeorge W. Bush declaredthat "our war on terrorbeginswith
al-Qaida, but it does not end there.It willnot end untileveryterrorist
groupof global
reach has been found,stopped,and defeated"(State Department2002a:i). Echoed
Secretaryof State Colin L. Powell in May 2002: "In this global campaignagainst
no countryhas theluxuryofremaining
on thesidelines.Thereareno sidelines.
terrorism,
Terrorists
no
or
moral.
are everywhere
and the
The frontlines
respect limits,geographic
stakesarehigh.Terrorism
notonlykillspeople.It also threatens
democraticinstitutions,
undermineseconomies,and destabilizesregions"(State Department2002a:iii).In the
wordsofthepresident
and thesecretary
ofstate,terror,
and terrorists
become
terrorism,
coherent
efficacious
and
enemies
to
eradicated.
be
entities,
actors,
inseparableconcepts,
Studentsof politicalprocessesand collectiveviolencecertainlyshould pay attention to such reification;it exertsa significant
influenceon world politics.But they
should not incorporatethe categorieswholesale into their own descriptionsand
explanationsof the political processesat hand. In particular,social scientistswho
attemptto explainsuddenattackson civiliantargetsshould doubt theexistenceof a
distinct,coherentclass of actors (terrorists)who specialize in a unitaryform of
politicalaction(terror)and thusshouldestablisha separatevarietyof politics(terrorism). This essay arguesthe followingpointsinstead:
* Thewordterror
recurrent
butimprecisely
boundedpolitical
pointsto a widely
strategy.

* We can reasonablydefinethat strategyas asymmetrical

deployment
of threats
and violenceagainstenemiesusingmeansthatfall outsidetheformsofpolitical
struggleroutinely
operatingwithinsome currentregime.

*Addresscorrespondenceto: 514 FayerweatherHall, MC 2552, Columbia University,

New York, NY
10027;email:ctl35@columbia.edu.
SociologicalTheory22:1 March 2004
DC 20005-4701
? AmericanSociologicalAssociation.1307New YorkAvenueNW, Washington,

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SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY
* A greatvarietyof individualsand groupsengagein terror,thusdefined,from
terrorwithotherpoliticalstrategiesor with
timeto time,mostoftenalternating
politicalinaction.
* Groups and networksspecializingin terrorand no otherformsof political
action do sometimesform,but theytypicallyremainunstableand ephemeral.
* Most groups and networksthat engage in terroroverlap extensivelywith
and government-backed
specialistsin coercion-armies,
government-employed
like.
and
the
militias,
paramilitaries,
police,
* Even whentheyorganizein oppositionto existinggovernments,
specialistsin
coercion typicallyadopt forms of organization,externalconnections,and
sourcesof supplyresemblingthoseof government-employed
specialists.
* Most usesofterroractuallyoccuras complements
in
ofstruggles
oras byproducts
simulterrorists-are
the
so-called
whichparticipants-often
engaging
including
in othermoreroutinevarietiesofpoliticalclaimmaking.
taneouslyor successively
* Terroras a strategytherefore
actionsby members
rangesfrom(1) intermittent
of groups that are engagedin widerpoliticalstrugglesto (2) one segmentin
the modus operandi of durably organized specialistsin coercion,including
and government-backed
specialistsin coercion to (3)
government-employed
committed
thedominantrationalefordistinct,
groupsand networksofactivists.
* Despite thepublicityit has receivedrecently,
variety(3) accountsfora highly
variable but usually very small share of all the terrorthat occurs in the
world.
contemporary

In fact,theStateDepartment'sown reportingon worldaffairsgenerallyconfirmsthis

argument.The State Departmenttracksthe world's vindictiveviolence fromtwo
distinctperspectives.Mandated by Congress,it issues separate annual reportson
of JohnF. Kennedy,
humanrightsand on global terrorism.
Undertheadministration
as Congressappropriatedfundsforforeignaid it also requiredtheexecutivebranchto
reporton human rightsviolations.In its currentversion,the annual human rights
report draws informationfrom American embassies across the world on local
instancesof government-backed
torture,cruelpunishment,
irregulardetention,drastic civillibertiesrestrictions,
compulsorylabor, childlabor, and relatedabuses.
on humanrightsduring2001
Issued in May 2002,theStateDepartment'sstatement
that
made an obligatoryreference
to fighting
terrorism,
roughlyequatinggovernments
It declaredthat
terror.
violatehumanrightswithgovernments
thatpromoteinternational
itscountryreportscapture"a worldstillreelingand reactingto theeventsoflastSeptember.Yet thereports'centralmissionremainsthesame- to givevoiceto thosewho have
beendeniedthefreedoms
and rights
providedforin theUniversalDeclarationon Human
confirm
thatthebattleofideasbetweenthosewhosuppressdemocracy
Rights.The reports
and humanrightsand thosewho would see themflourishremainsfarfromover.Only
thepromotion
and protection
freedoms
can the
ofhumanrightsand fundamental
through
international
be securefromthe scourgeof terrorism"
community
(State Department
focused
the 2001 reporton humanrights,like its predecessors,
2002b:1).Nevertheless,
on waysthatgovernments
mistreat
of) theirowncitizens.
(or toleratethemistreatment
The StateDepartment'sannual humanrightsreportcomplements
theworkof such
organizationsas Human RightsWatch and Freedom House by cataloguingspecific
abuses one countryat a time(see Human RightsWatch2000; Karatnycky
2000). Each
one of theseagenciesissuesan annual inventory
actionsand of
of grimgovernmental

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TERROR, TERRORISM, TERRORISTS

withotherpeople'sassaultson citizens.By no meansall of the

governmental
complicity
abusestheyreportqualifyas violencein thebruteforcesenseof immediate
infliction
of
of the violentevents,furthermore,
physicaldamage.Only a minority
qualifiesas terror
definedas asymmetrical
of threatsand violenceagainstenemiesusingmeans
deployment
thatfalloutsidetheformsofpoliticalstruggle
withinthecurrent
regime.
routinely
operating
Butall ofthemconstitute
threats
to thequalityoflifein theoffending
countries.
significant
Sincethe1980s,theStateDepartmentalso sendsCongressan annualdocumentcalled
PatternsofGlobalTerrorism
as
(Johnson2001). The StateDepartmentdefinesterrorism
motivatedviolenceperpetrated
"politically
againstnoncombatant
targetsbysubnational
an audience"(Ruby2002:10).
groupsor clandestine
agents,usuallyintendedto influence
has thedisadvantageof requiringinformation
on motivationsand
Anysuchdefinition
in fact,solidevidenceon motivations
and intentions
intentions;
rarelybecomesavailable
forcollectiveviolence.Still,thereport'simplicitselectionprinciples
singleout attackson
noncombatant
nationalmilitary
forces,espetargetsbyother-than-regularly-constituted
ciallywhensomeonebroadcastspoliticalclaimson behalfof theattackers.The annual
kinds of events:(1) what theycall significant
reportsactuallydescribetwo different
terrorist
attackstheirspecialistsregardas crossinginternational
lines-because
incidents,
the attackerscame fromthe outside the country,because theyreceivedsubstantial
and (2) otherattacksby
backingfromoutside,or because theyassaultedforeigners;
domesticgroupson domestictargets.
On a fairlysmall scale, the State Department'slocally knowledgeableobservers
probablyreportthebulk of qualifyingactionsin the firstcategoryfortheworldas a
whole.Those are theeventsforwhichtheysupplysynopsesone byone and makeannual
counts.Theysurelymissthevastmajorityoftheworld'sviolenteventsin category2 (cf.
Bonneuiland Auriat2000; Davenport2000; Martinez2001; Tilly2003). Figure 1 displaysthetrendofeventsin thefirstcategoryfrom1980through2001 (StateDepartment
2000, 2001, 2002a). Clearly,the overalltrendran downward.The StateDepartment's
count of international
terrorist
incidentsreacheda highpoint in 1988 and generally
declinedthereafter.
The numberofdeathsin attacksrosefrom233 to 405 to an estimated
3,547(including3,000deathsassignedto September11) from1999to 2001.Nevertheless,
700
600
500
.
.E

400
300
200
100
0

1980

1984

1988

Years

1992

Figure 1. Total internationalterrorist

attacks,1980-2001.

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1996

2000

SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

the346 attacksof2001layfarbelowthefrequencies
ofthe1980s,and theoveralllevelsof
casualtiesdeclinedas wellfromthe1980sonward.(The similarly
definedEnders-Sandler
eventsalone from1970to 1999showsa secondlethal
(2002:161)seriesfordeath-dealing
Fromthelater1990s,around
peak duringtheearly1990s,and a steepdeclinethereafter.)
halfofall talliedattacksconsistednotofinjuriesto personsbutofbombsdirectedat oil
pipelines,especiallypipelinescarryingoil northwardto the United States through
Colombia.That factin itselfdemonstrates
thatStateDepartmentspecialistsinterpreted
the"politicalmotivation"requiredby theirdefinition
of terrorratherbroadly.
Whentheydidvoicedemands,attackersdescribedin thereportsmostoftencalledfor
of
autonomyor independenceforsome subnationalpopulationor region,replacement
or redressof wrongsdone to some organization.On thewhole,
existinggovernments,
international
terrorist
incidentsidentified
by StateDepartmentobserversrose and fell
withthe activityof independencemovements.Whetherthe minorrise that occurred
a newsortofpoliticalcampaignremainsto be seen.The
duringthelater1990srepresents
overalltrendstillrunsdownward.
the State Department'ssummariesof internationalterrorist
inciUnsurprisingly,
dents give special attentionto attacks on Americaninterests-Americancitizens,
Americanservicepersonnelattackedoutside of theirnormalmilitaryactivity,proand U.S. territory
itself.Thus,
pertyownedby Americansor by theU.S. government,
the airborneattacks of September11 receivedexceptionalattentionin the year's
reportbut stillcounted as just 4 of the year's 346 "significantterroristincidents"
(State Department2002a). The previousyear's reporthad singledout South Asia
directedtoward U.S. interests;had called special
explicitlyas a base for terrorism
attentionto the AfghanTaliban's provisionof safe haven forOsama bin Ladin and
hisnetwork;had linkedthelethalbombingof the U.S.S. Cole in Yemen (October2000)
to bin Ladin; and had added, "The government
of Pakistanincreaseditssupportto the
Talibanand continueditssupportto militant
groupsactivein Indian-heldKashmir,such
as the Harakat ul-Mujahadin(HUM), some of whichengagedin terrorism"
(State
Department2001:Asia Overview2). As mirroredin its annual reportson the subject,
ofterrorsinglesoutviolencecommitted
then,theStateDepartment's
workingdefinition
well-connected
and
directed
byrelatively
groups
targetsof
againstpoliticallysignificant
othernationalities,
of
are
American
Terrorists
the
especially
nationality.
people who
is thefactof theirperforming
it.
performsuchacts,and terrorism

TO DEFINE TERROR
as suchcannotbe trueor false,in social scienceusefuldefinitions
Althoughdefinitions
shouldpointto detectablephenomenathatexhibitsomedegreeofcausal coherence-in
principleall instancesshould displaycommonpropertiesthatembodyor resultfrom
similarcause-effect
relations.By thatcriterion,
what violenteventsactuallyoughtto
as
terrorism?
with
citations
from
the 1790s,the OxfordEnglishDicqualify
Beginning
two
definitions
for
terrorism:
as directed
tionarygives
(1) "government
by intimidation
and carriedout bythepartyin powerin FranceduringtheRevolutionof 1789-94... "
and (2) "policyintendedto strikewithterrorthoseagainstwhomit is adopted."Both
definitions
ofthreatsand violenceagainstenemies
pointto theasymmetrical
deployment
outsidetheformsof politicalstruggle
routinely
operatingwithinthecurrentregime.
The word terroritselfenteredtheWest'spoliticalvocabularyas a name forFrench
revolutionaries'
actionsagainsttheirdomesticenemiesin 1793and 1794.It referred
to
governmental
repression,mostdirectlyin theformof executions.About 17,000legal

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TERROR, TERRORISM, TERRORISTS

executionsoccurredunder the Reign of Terror,and somethinglike 23,000 more

occurredillegally(Greer 1935). Some scholarsalso argue that deaths in the fierce
Vendee civilwars of 1793-1795shouldcountas consequencesof theReignof Terror;
theirinclusionwould bringthe total up to the vicinityof 200,000 dead on all sides
includingregulartroops(Gerard 1999;Guenniffey
2000:234-35).At eitherextremeof
the estimates,historiansof the French Revolutioncontinueto thinkof the original
or state-backedvisitationof violenceon France's
Reign of Terroras state-organized
dissidentcitizenryduringthe two centralyearsof radical revolutionary
power.
Since the FrenchRevolution,the word terrorhas expandedin scope. Writerson
terrorcontinueto use it forgovernmental
of citizens,as in JosephStalin's
intimidation
use of executionsto stilldissentwithinthe SovietUnion (Mayer 2000). But theyalso
to designateclandestineattackson governmental
use the termfrequently
targetsby
domesticopponentssuch as Basque separatists,the Irish RepublicanArmy,and Sri
Lanka's LiberationTigersof Tamil Eelam (Schmid2001). At times,furthermore,
such
civilwar practicesas ethniccleansingand genocidereceivethedesignationterror(e.g.,
Taylor 1999). Thus, thetermsprawlsacrossa wide rangeof humancruelties.
Amid the sprawl,is a coherentphenomenonat work?No usefulgeneralization
coversall thedifferent
sortsofpoliticalinteractionforwhichobservers,analysts,and
sometimes
use thetermterror,
muchless forterrorists
and terrorism.
But
participants
we can identifysome orderin the phenomenonby means of foursteps:(1) noticing
that a recurrentstrategyof intimidationoccurs widelyin contentiouspoliticsand
correspondsapproximatelyto whatmanypeople mean byterror;(2) recognizingthat
a wide varietyof individuals,groups,and networkssometimesemploythatstrategy;
to otherformsof politicalstruggleproceeding
(3) relatingthestrategysystematically
in the same settingsand populations; and (4) seeing that specialistsin coercion
rangingfrom governmentemployees to bandits sometimesdeploy terrorunder
certainpolitical circumstances,usually with far more devastatingeffectsthan the
terroroperationsof nonspecialists.
Terroras a Strategy
Asymmetrical
deploymentof threatsand violenceagainstenemiesoutsidethe forms
of politicalstruggleroutinelyoperatingwithinthe currentregimedoes have a crude
logic of its own. In additionto whateverharmit inflictsdirectly,it sends signalssignals that the targetis vulnerable,that the perpetratorsexist,and that the perpetratorshave thecapacityto strikeagain. The signalstypicallyreachthreedifferent
audiences:thetargetsthemselves,
and thirdparties
potentialallies of theperpetrators,
that mightcooperate with one or the other. Althoughsome users of terror(for
of 19th-century
example,a minority
anarchists)operateon thetheorythatdestruction
of evil objects is a good in itself,most terrorsupportsdemands for recognition,
redress,autonomy,or transfersof power. Considered as a strategy,terrorworks
best when it alters or inhibits the target's disapproved behavior, fortifiesthe
perpetrators'standingwithpotentialallies, and moves thirdpartiestoward greater
cooperationwiththeperpetrators'organizationand announcedprogram.
MultipleUses of Terror
From Mafiosi to ruthlessgovernments,
people who operateprotectionracketsinterterror
enemies
and
uncertainclients(Gambetta1993; Stanley
mittently
deploy
against
1996; Varese 2001; Volkov 2000, 2002). Whetheror not they operate large-scale

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10

SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

protectionrackets,repressivegovernmentsfrequentlyapply terrorto threatening

minorities.Weak, beleagueredgovernments
commonlyadopt the strategyof exemplary punishment:inflictingterriblepublic retaliationon those few enemies they
on others
manage to seize withthe announcedthreatof visitingsimilarpunishments
who dare to challengethem.But dissidentsseekingautonomy,strikingat theirrivals,
or tryingto bring down governmentslikewisesometimesengage in asymmetrical
deploymentof threatsand violenceagainst enemiesby means that fall outside the
formsof politicalstruggleroutinelyoperatingwithinthecurrentregime.
Duringthelast fewdecades,religiousand ethnicactivistshave been byfarthemost
frequentnongovernmental
strategistsof terror(see, e.g., Kakar 1996; Gurr 2000;
Beissinger2001; Horowitz2001). Sometimestheyhave demandedautonomy,sometimestheyhave soughtcontrolof existinggovernments,
but oftenenoughtheyhave
struckdirectlyat theirreligiousand ethnicrivals.The terribleRwandan genocideof
1994 pivoted ultimatelyon ethniccontrol of the Rwandan state, and despite the
slaughterof hundredsof thousandsof Tutsi, ended withseizureof state power by
Tutsi-dominated
uses
militaryforces.The genocideitselfactivatedall thesedifferent
of terror(Prunier1995, 2001; Des Forges et al. 1999; Taylor 1999; Mamdani 2001;
Pillay2001; Uvin 2001).
Terrorand OtherFormsof Struggle
As thesevariedexamplessuggest,thestrategyof terrorappears across a wide variety
ofpoliticalcircumstances,
in thecompanyof verydifferent
sortsof politicalstruggle.
Attacksof IrishProtestantand Catholic activistson each otherand on governmental
targets,for instance,frequentlyfollow the strategyof terror,but they generally
intersectwithotherformsof negotiationat international,national,and local levels
(Jarman1997; Keogh 2001). In manypartsoftheworld,specializedmilitaryforcesand antigovernmental-frequently
governmental,
nongovernmental,
engage in kidand
in
mutilation
addition
to
their
occasional
murder,
napping,
pitchedbattleswith
otherarmedforces.
To take just one case, duringthe late 1990s the self-styled
Allied Democratic
Forces (ADF) ravaged the Rwenzorimountainregionof westernUganda, "brutalizing and killingcivilians and looting. Hundreds of civilianswere killed in ADF
raids and ambushes on unprotectedcivilianhomes throughoutthe year. Some of
those killed by the ADF were mutilated,sometimesby beheading.Civilians,both
adults and children,were abducted duringADF raids to serve as portersor for
forcedrecruitment
into the rebel army" (Human RightsWatch 2000:84). Because
armed forcesdepend on arms,equipment,food, and pay even when theyare living
off the land, such terror-wielding
armies thriveespecially where they can seize
control of income-generatingresources such as drugs, timber,diamonds, and
other minerals.They then oftenadopt terrorto maintain control of the crucial
resourcesratherthan concentratingon the seizure of state power. Extensiveconnections with emigrantdiasporas magnifythose effects,most likely because the
exiles both provide externalsupportfor rebels and offerconduitsfor contraband
into and out of rebel territory
(Collier and Hoeffler2001).
Terrorand Specialistsin Coercion
The prominenceof organizedarmed forcesin certaintypesof terrorlends itselfto
analyticconfusion.It is all too easy to conflateterror-deploying
armies,
governments,

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11

TERROR, TERRORISM, TERRORISTS

and rebelswithconspiratorialzealots.The StateDepartment's

militias,paramilitaries,
general statementsabout human rightsand terrorin 2001 featuredjust such a
conflation.We actuallyneed a twofolddistinction:firstbetweenviolentspecialists
and others,and thenbetweenactors who deploy terrorwithintheirown operating
territories
and thosewho directit elsewhere.
names to the
Figure 2 schematizesthe two distinctions,assigningcharacteristic
stand for all those politically
fourcornersof a two-dimensional
space. Autonomists
active groupswhose memberssometimeslaunch terrorattackson authorities,symbolic objects, rivals, or stigmatizedpopulations on their own territorieswithout
becomingdurablyorganizedspecialistsin coercion.Zealots maintainsimilarconnections witheach otherbut committheirviolentacts outside of theirown base territories; they include long-termexiles who returnhome to attack their enemies.
militiasmaintainenduring
and antigovernmental
Governmental,nongovernmental,
organizationsof coercivespecialistsand exerciseterrorwithintheirbase territories.
Finally, conspiratorsorganize specialized strikingforcesfor operationsaway from
armiesoperatingabroad also fitinto thiscornerof the diabase. (Terror-inflicting
gram,but theystrikeevenmorerarelythando mobileorganizationsof conspirators.)
The diagramas a whole summarizesthispaper's main point:A remarkablearrayof
no coherentset of causeactors sometimesadopt terroras a strategy,and therefore
as a whole.
effectpropositionscan explainterrorism
sortsof relationsbetween
The crude typologydistinguishesfourratherdifferent
varietiesof politics. It also
the authors and victimsof terror,hence fourdifferent
emphasizesa crucialfactabout actuallyexistingterror:Verylittleofitactuallyoccurs
in thediagram'supper-right-hand
corner-wherewe findspecialistsin coercionwho
operateoutsidetheirhome bases. Most terroroccurson theperpetrators'own home
and nonspecialists-zealots -inflict a significantshare of the terrorthat
territory,
does occur outside of home territory.The fact does not diminishthe horror of
September11. But it does warnagainstanalyzingall terroras ifit consistedof closer
or moredistantapproximationsto thatterribleseriesofattackson theUnitedStates.
Properlyunderstood,terroris a strategy,not a creed.Terroristsrangeacross a wide
Specialists MILITIAS

CONSPIRATORS

Degreeof
in
Specialization
Coercion

Nonspecialists
Territory

AUTONOMISTS

ZEALOTS

HomeTerritory

OutsideHome

Attacks
MajorLocusofViolent

Figure2. A crudetypologyof terror-wielding

groupsand networks.

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12

SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

spectrumof organizations,circumstances,and beliefs. Terrorismis not a single

causally coherentphenomenon.No social scientistcan speak responsiblyas though
it were.

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