BEIJING

BEIRUT

BRUSSELS

MOSCOW

WA S H I N G T O N

RUSSIAN IDEOLOGY
AFTER CRIMEA
Andrei Kolesnikov
Carnegie.ru
SEPTEMBER 2015

RUSSIAN IDEOLOGY
AFTER CRIMEA
Andrei Kolesnikov

 2015 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. All rights reserved.

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Contents

About theAuthor

Acknowledgment vii
Summary 1
Making Unfreedom Sacred

Ideological Supply and Demand

Militarization and Stalinization

The Defenders of the Fortress

10

A Wave of Conservatism in Politics and Society

11

The Liberal Question

16

The New Social Contract

18

Modernization? 20
Notes 23
Carnegie Moscow Center

27

About the Author

Andrei Kolesnikov is asenior associate and thechair ofthe Russian Domestic

Politics and Political Institutions Program atthe Carnegie Moscow Center. He
is afrequent contributor toVedomosti, Gazeta.ru, andForbes.ru, and he is also
aboard member ofthe Yegor Gaidar Foundation.

Acknowledgment

The author would like to thank Vasily Zharkov, head of the Political Science
Department atthe Moscow School ofSocial and Economic Sciences, for his valuable contribution tothis work.

vii

Summary
Following the annexation of Crimea in March 2014, the Russian public has
embraced anincreasingly conservative and nationalistic ideology. Any repudiation ofthis ideology, let alone thetransformation ofthe country as awhole, will
only happen if demand for change from thebottom coincides with adesire for
modernization from thetop.
Key Findings
The new social contract demands that theRussian people surrender their freedom inreturn for Crimea and asense ofnational pride. It seizes onchanges
that have already occurred inthe minds ofmany Russians.
The new ideology is based ona deliberate recycling ofarchaic forms ofmass consciousness, aphenomenon that can be termed thesanctification ofunfreedom.
Confined to a besieged fortress, surrounded by external enemies, and faced
with adomestic fifth column, thepeople ofRussia have begun toexperience
Stockholm syndrome and have thrown their support behind thecommander
ofthe fortress, President Vladimir Putin. They have adopted his logic and even
defended his interests, believing that they are members ofhis team.
Freedom of expression has been significantly curtailed through a system
ofbans and strict forms ofpunishment, including criminal prosecution, which
have both didactic and deterrent components. Pressure ondemocratic media
outlets has also increased drastically.
Ideology inRussia is amass product that is easy toabsorb; it is legitimized by
constant references tothe past, glorious traditions, and occasionally fictional
historical events.
Although ideology emanates from the top, there is demand for it from
thebottom.
Looking tothe Future
With economic concerns mounting, atsome point, theenergy behind themass
mobilization ofthe Russian body politic will begin todissipate, and thesocial
contract that emerged during the period of high oil prices will start to lose
steam. At aminimum, thesausage that was exchanged for freedom, so tospeak,
will have toget worseand more expensive.
1

2|Russian Ideology After Crimea

While the Crimea gambit proved to be amazingly effective at generating

popular support for theleadership, theregime will have tosupply thepeople
with something new in the near future. Supply will have to drive demand.
Modernization of the new ideology will only come when there is a supply
ofreformist ideas from above and ademand for them from below.
The state ideology offers no overriding concept for thefuture; its foundation is
Russias past glory. Inthis sense, it may have adecidedly limited life span.
The strategic problem facing theregime is: What can it offer theRussian people now that theCrimean card has been played?

Making Unfreedom Sacred

Russias ideological matrix has deep historical roots, having taken shape over several hundred years. That makes its trajectory difficult to alter. This ideology is
entrenched inthe same way that graft is entrenched inthe Russian government
and economy. Ina private conversation, thecultural sociologist Daniil Dondurey
referred tograft as acultural prescription inRussia, and ideology might be similarly labeled. It is more comfortable toconform than todissent. When faced with
a choice between formal and informal economies, Russians frequently opt for
theinformal rules that they find more comfortable.
Russia remains a country of concepts based on relationships between two
parties. Thetwo most important pairs ofideas are power and property (having
power is linked toowning property) and civilization and thestate. Indiscussing
thelatter, Dondurey pointed out that the civilization-state as asuper-institution
protects people, traditions, its history, culture, morals, and therules ofliving, but
most importantly, it protects its own distinctness and sovereignty. That is its mandate. It must constantly demonstrate its mammoth power; otherwise, thepeople
will be disappointed. They have to be certain that any sacrifices are made for
ahigher purposeto protect thestate. Russian President Vladimir Putin talked
about this mandate for theentire second half of2014: We will not be subjugated,
he repeated over and over.1
Russian ideology is mystifying; like Putins approval ratings, it seems to be
enchanted. In The Spirit of Enlightenment, the French philosopher Tzvetan
Todorov wrote that Enlightenment removes thespell from theworld.2 Thecontemporary Russian regime is attempting toput theworld back under aspell, using
thetactics ofpre-Enlightenment theocracies rather than those ofmodern states.
This trend can be described as aprocess ofmaking unfreedom sacred, and it has
been accompanied by a newfound fundamentalism and intolerance toward all
things foreign.

Ideological Supply and Demand

Vladimir Nabokovs 1945 New Yorker story Conversation Piece, 1945, sheds
light on Russian conservatism, describing the kind of conversations that can
still be heard in Moscows conservative quarters, corporate backrooms, and
luxury apartments. Indeed, Russian conservative ideology has not changed
much since then. The words of the former White Guard colonel, a character
inthe story, brilliantly summarized thesentiments expressed by themainstream
3

4|Russian Ideology After Crimea

inmodern-day Russia: The great Russian people has waked up and my country
is again a great country. We had three great leaders. We had Ivan, whom his
enemies called Terrible, then we had Peter theGreat, and now we have Joseph
Stalin. I am aWhite Russian and have served inthe Imperial Guards, but also I
am aRussian patriot and aRussian Christian. Today, inevery word that comes
out ofRussia, I feel thepower, I feel thesplendor ofold Mother Russia. She is
again acountry ofsoldiers, religion, and true Slavs.3
What is behind the rapid ascent of this type of ideology-driven Slav, after
Russia annexed Crimea in2014? Why have these kinds ofpeople become so visible (it is hard to say whether they are in the majority or not) in post-Crimea
Russia, which had been moving toward theWest for aquarter ofacentury? Why
are talk show hosts onpublic television channels, Facebook users, visitors tothe
Kremlins cafeteria, and patrons of upscale restaurants suddenly so ideological?
Who are theconduits ofthis ideology?
The Polish philosopher Leszek Koakowski wrote that ideology is always
weaker than the social forces that express it and serve as conduits of its values.4 This is true. It is hard tocall anideology powerful when it is premised
on the czarist-era construct of Count Sergey Uvarov (the policy known as
Orthodoxy, Autocracy, and Nationality) and relies onthe prescriptions ofselfisolation and militarism toguide Russia inthe post-industrial twenty-first century. It is impossible toconsider territorial acquisition aparticularly resonant
geopolitical move inan age when seizing territory is no longer considered asign
ofstrength.
The ideology of the current Russian regime is antiquated and weak.
Nevertheless, theideology has been utilized atthe right place atthe right time
and has been sown onfertile ground. As Koakowski wrote, thesocial wave that
supported theideology turned out tobe more powerful than theactual ideology
borrowed from theeighteenth, nineteenth, and twentieth centuries.
The regime has attempted to rewrite Russian history, justifying the 1939
Winter War against Finland and the 19791989 invasion of Afghanistan
(among other revisionist interpretations). Still, it does not merely derive its
legitimacy from past policy and ideology by whitewashing dark pages ofhistory.
Thestate is also reproducing old ideological projects. Take Catherine theGreats
Crimean project, for example. Under her rule, Crimea became aRussian protectorateabuffer state ofsortsafter theTurks were driven out. InApril 1783,
thepeninsula was annexed toRussia without asingle shot being fired. Ashistorian of Russian culture Andrei Zorin wrote, Crimea endowed Russia with
enormous symbolic capital. It could represent both theChristian Byzantium and
theClassic Hellas.5
The Russian Orthodox Church has historically played alarge role inall ideological projects (except during theSoviet era). While talking about thecontinuity
ofRussian ideologies in2012, Zorin noted, The idea ofasymbiotic relationship
between thestate and thechurch is being revived. Thestate is relying onlegitimacy

Andrei Kolesnikov|5

derived from thechurch. On theother hand, thechurch is becoming anadministrative service ofthe state, which increases its authority.6
A simple ideology should consist ofsimple components, like designating enemies within and without. Putins March 18, 2014, speech justifying theannexation ofCrimea focused onthis aspect: This is adecision that we need tomake
for ourselves. Are we ready toconsistently defend our national interests, or will we
forever give in, retreat towho knows where? Some Western politicians are already
threatening us with not just sanctions but also theprospect ofincreasingly serious
problems onthe domestic front. I would like toknow what it is they have inmind
exactly: action by afifth column, this disparate bunch ofnational traitors, or are
they hoping toput us ina worsening social and economic situation so as toprovoke public discontent?7
Putins address to the Federal Assembly later that same year also outlined
another aspect ofcontemporary Russian ideology: Crimea, theancient Korsun
or Chersonesus, and Sevastopol have invaluable civilisational and even sacral
importance for Russia, like the Temple Mount in Jerusalem for the followers
ofIslam andJudaism. Andthis is how we will always consider it.8
All of this is part of the supply-side of contemporary Russian ideology. But
thedemand for it came first. Demand for aneclectic brand ofRussian nationalisolationist ideology was delayed by theperiod ofpolitical and economic reforms
inthe 1990s, but Putin has managed tocreate aproduct that is indemand and
can be easily and profitably sold, thus making it accessible toeveryone. Putin as
abrand is also part ofthis product, this new ideology.
Mass ideology, like any mass-marketed product, is simple, both interms ofsupply and demand. It is anideology created without much effort and absorbed without much reflection.

Militarization and Stalinization

At the end of December 2014, the Public Opinion Foundation conducted
anopinion poll entitled How Russia is Viewed Around theWorld. Respondents
were markedly more optimistic than they had been in a poll from ten months
earlier. In February, 57 percent of those polled thought that they were living
inadeveloped, advanced country; by December, that number had risen to69 percent. Thenumber ofRussians who believed that they were living ina rich country increased from 58 percent to66 percent; ina free countryfrom 60 percent
to73 percent; ina country that everyone fearsfrom 68 percent to86 percent;
and in country whose influence is growingfrom 55 percent to 67 percent.
Theonly problems facing Russia, according toRussians, had todo with thefact
that foreigners do not like Russia.9 According toa November 2014 Levada Center
poll, 68 percent ofrespondents considered Russia agreat power, compared to48
percent inSeptember 2012.10

6|Russian Ideology After Crimea

Russians think they are living ina besieged fortress. While some believe that
they have been taken hostage, others seem toenjoy their imprisonment. They have
Stockholm syndrome and have turned their unfreedom into something sacred.
This sacralization ofunfreedom gives birth tomilitarism. Russian society has
been militarized for decades, if not centuries. Being prepared for alightning-fast
military mobilization was arguably themain shared value inthe Soviet Union,
during and after Joseph Stalins rule. The badge that Soviet children received
upon successful completion of athletic challenges was even named Ready for
Labor and Defense. Soviet discourse was replete with rhetoric about thestruggle for peace, which gave birth toa rather canny joke about struggling for peace
until theworld was torn into pieces. Exorbitant military spending contributed
totheSoviet Unions collapse. But this lesson has been completely forgotten now.
There is aremarkable correlation between thelevel ofinflation inthe Russian
economy and thelevel ofantipathy toward theUnited States and European Union
(EU) countries (see figures 13). While inflation is afundamental problem that
has been worrying Russians agreat deal, according toa variety ofpolls, negative
views ofthe West have been hitting new record highs lately.

Figure 1: Russias Core Inflation Rate, as a Percent

Source: Federal State Statistics Services official website, last accessed September 8, 2015, www.gks.ru.

Andrei Kolesnikov|7

Figure 2: Russians Attitudes Toward the United States

Overall good

Overall bad

Sources: Levada Center, Otnosheniye k drugim stranam [Attitude toward other countries], April 2, 2015, www.levada.ru/02-04-2015/otnoshenie-k-drugimstranam; and Levada Center, Otnosheniye rossiyan k drugim stranam [Attitude of Russians toward other countries], June 5, 2014, www.levada.ru/05-06-2014/
otnoshenie-rossiyan-k-drugim-stranam.

8|Russian Ideology After Crimea

Figure 3: Russians Attitudes Toward the European Union

Overall good

Overall bad

Sources: Levada Center, Otnosheniye k drugim stranam [Attitude toward other countries], April 2, 2015, www.levada.ru/02-04-2015/otnoshenie-k-drugimstranam; and Levada Center, Otnosheniye rossiyan k drugim stranam [Attitude of Russians toward other countries], June 5, 2014, www.levada.ru/05-06-2014/
otnoshenie-rossiyan-k-drugim-stranam.

The decline inpositive attitudes toward theUnited States and theEU predates
theconquest ofCrimea. (In fact, public attitudes toward theWest declined significantly during Russias 2008 war with Georgia.) But following thestart ofdirect
confrontation with theWest and thehybrid war inthe eastern Donbas region
ofUkraine, negative opinions started setting one record after another.11
Another important public opinion indicatorattitudes toward Stalinhas
also been breaking records. According toa Levada Center poll from December
2014, 52 percent of Russians considered his historical role positive. In fact,
thenumber ofRussians who considered his role definitely positive has grown
most substantially. From February 2013 toDecember 2014, thenumber ofsuch
respondents grew by 7 percentage points, from 9 percent to16 percent.12
The number ofthose who greatly admired (2 percent), admired (7 percent),
and respected (30 percent) Stalin adds up to39 percent ofrespondents. Thenumber ofthose who saw thedeath ofStalin as theloss ofagreat leader and teacher
has also increased: from February 2013 toMarch 2015, it went up by 6 percentage
points, from 18 percent to24 percent. Most importantly, there has been aradical
increase inthe number ofthose who saw mass repression under Stalin as justified

Andrei Kolesnikov|9

by his great goals. InNovember 2012, 21 percent ofthose polled somewhat

agreed with this response, while 4 percent definitely agreed. As ofMarch 2015,
these numbers had increased to38 percent and 7 percent, respectively.13
The Russian public has generally endorsed greater Stalinization. Proposals
tocommemorate therole ofStalin as agreat military commander have become
commonplace. To cite just one notorious example, thePerm-36 Gulag museum
was turned into amuseum dedicated tothe camp guards. Inthis context, Russian
parliamentarian Irina Yarovayas proposal, which was signed into law in mid2015,14 toprovide state pensions tovolunteer law-enforcement assistants (that
is, informers) does not seem atall out ofthe ordinary.
To theCrimean majority, made up ofPutin supporters, Stalin is synonymous
with order and thegolden age ofRussian statehood. From anideological standpoint, thecurrent regime is insome ways thesuccessor toStalin and thegreat
Soviet empire, and anheir toits main achievementvictory inWorld War II. It
does not even occur tomost people that theSoviet Union won thewar despite
Stalin rather than because ofhim. They do not realize that, atthe very least, Stalin
is personally responsible for the destruction of the upper tier of military commanders, thepainful series ofdefeats atthe outset ofthe war, and theneedlessly
heavy human losses.
According to an April 2015 Public Opinion Foundation poll, 46 percent
ofRussians viewed Stalins role as thecountrys leader during World War II positively, and only 7 percent negatively. Thirty percent found the question hard
toanswer, which is usually thecase with serious historical analysis. On arelated
question, 24 percent ofthose polled gave Stalin credit for thevictory; moreover,
15 percent viewed his brutal tactics positively.15
Importantly, positive attitudes toward Stalin are not simply a by-product
ofthe annexation ofCrimea and theincreased ideological fervor; they have been
anideological fixture since atleast themid- tolate 2000s. Infact, pro-Stalin views
prevailed inpublic opinion toward theend ofPutins second term as president.
For instance, according toa Levada Center poll commissioned by theFriedrich
Naumann Foundation in2008, 37 percent ofrespondents expressed great admiration for theSoviet dictator as opposed to12 percent inApril 2001.16
The regimes direct or indirect appeal tothe greatness ofthe Stalin era is not
simply away tojustify its domestic crackdowns. If asignificant number ofRussians
give Stalin credit for the World War II victory, then to them, Putin is an heir
tothegood Stalin.
Those clamoring for a new ideology got what they wantedan old, almost
Soviet ideology replete with Stalinist social practices. This brings back thequestions ofwho drives demand, who consumes this ideology, and who exactly are
thedefenders ofthe besieged Russian fortress?

10|Russian Ideology After Crimea

The Defenders of the Fortress

In 1964, the philosopher Herbert Marcuse, who would later become a role
model for the 1968 generation, wrote a much-talked-about book entitled
One-Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society.
TheMarcusian one-dimensional man was aproduct ofcapitalismmore or less
thesame strand ofcapitalism adopted by theRussian state much later. Infact, even
thetitle ofthe introduction tohis book is quite telling when it comes tothe nature
ofRussian society: The Paralysis ofCriticism: Society Without Opposition.
In asociety that enjoys freedom from want, as Marcuse put it (like theburgeoning Russian middle class during the era of high oil prices and recovering
economic growth inthe early 2000s), Independence ofthought, autonomy, and
theright topolitical opposition are being deprived oftheir basic critical function
ina society. As aresult, thestate acquires aright todemand acceptance ofits
principles and institutions, and reduce opposition tothe discussion and promotion ofalternative policies within thestatus quo. Inthis respect, it seems tomake
little difference whether theincreasing satisfaction ofneeds is accomplished by
anauthoritarian or anon-authoritarian system.17
The social contract inRussia inthe 2000s conformed tothis theory. Russians
could profit from oil revenues inexchange for support for theregime. Put more
bluntly, Russians gave up their freedom inexchange for sausage. Now that thefreedom from want has been called into question by theeconomic crisis, thecontract
has been reformatted: Russians are being asked togive up freedom inexchange for
Crimea and spiritual bonds.
The totalitarian regimes ofpast centuries sought toforge anew type ofman,
replacing temples with spacious and efficient public facilities. As aresult, theSoviet
people, representing anew historic entity, were born from thepopulation and vast
expanses ofthe old empire.
In a similar vein, a new type of a persona post-Crimean oneemerged
inRussia in2014. Thearchetype is even more one-dimensional than theone that
matured amid therun-up inoil prices. It is impossible toauthoritatively conclude
whether this type of person now dominates in Russian society, but the postCrimean man clearly exists and impacts thesocial milieu around him.
This new person was forged as he watched his television screen during
theannexation ofCrimea. Marcuse described this phenomenon inthe context
of the society of total mobilization, which... combines in productive union
thefeatures ofthe Welfare State and theWarfare State.18
Eventually, however, living conditions become worse while thewar continues.
And inthis new state, even thepost-Crimean man starts tofear war.
Fifty-nine percent of those polled in a May 2015 Levada Center survey
responded definitely yes or likely yes toa question asking whether theUnited
States poses athreat toRussia. Their concept ofthe American threat was rather
vague, however. Compared to2007, more people believed that foreign opposition

Andrei Kolesnikov|11

toRussias development (an abstract concept) represents athreat tothe country.

Additionally, 31 percent ofRussians feared the possibility ofmilitary intervention or occupation (up 10 percentage points from 2007).19
These figures point toa whole host ofchanges insociety. Russian consciousness
has been militarized, making thepopulation increasingly fearful ofand prepared
for war; perceptions ofthe United States and Ukraine have also changedincluding theconcept that Ukraine is asatellite ofthe United States, and thus anoccupied country fighting against therebels inDonbas and, by extension, Russia.
As Russians have grown more confident oftheir countrys greatness and consolidated support around their leader and the annexation of Crimea, concerns
of other threats coming from the United States have dissipated. The Crimean
majority does not fear economic and political domination, and indeed many
Russians believe that their country is self-sufficient. The Crimean majority is
unafraid of the West imposing its values on Russia; its values, it seems, are no
longer susceptible toWestern influence.
Despite increased militarization, most Russians understand mutually assured
destruction perfectly well and are afraid of nuclear war between Russia and
theUnited States. Fifty-two percent ofRussians polled agreed that awar between
thetwo countries would have no winners. Still, 33 percent ofrespondents were
confident that Russia would win a nuclear war (5 percent think Russia would
lose). According tothe same poll, 32 percent ofrespondents believed that Putin
can authorize theuse ofnuclear weapons inthe event ofamilitary confrontation.
About one-third ofrespondents were scared by thepresidents recent statement
onthe possible use ofnuclear weapons.20
Even though there is plenty ofbelligerent triumphalism apparent inthe views
ofsome respondents, thelevel ofmilitarization actually leads asignificant portion
ofRussians tofear that their president would be more likely touse nuclear weapons than theU.S. government.

A Wave of Conservatism in Politics

and Society
The creation ofthe post-Soviet man was complete by theend ofthe effort toadopt
market principles inthe late 1990s. As strange as it may seem, this archetypal figure
more closely resembled the Soviet-era model than the post-Communist Russian
man of the early 1990s. The future Putin majority of the 2000s, which would
become theCrimean majority in2014, started taking shape atthe turn ofthe century as areaction tothe traumatic collapse ofthe empire and thedisruptive changes
inthe countrys sociopolitical and economic order. Paternalistic attitudes, anti-market opinions, and nationalist and imperialist beliefs began toprevail.
This wave ofconservatism has been gathering momentum and political strength
for years. It did not simply appear overnight with the annexation of Crimea.

12|Russian Ideology After Crimea

Former Russian president Dmitry Medvedevs four-year tenure, which nurtured

illusions about Russias modernization and integration into theWestern world,
only increased thepopulations level ofdisenchantment and created anopening
for conservative views togain ground. Inturn, the2012 presidential election gave
theregime amandate tostrengthen its authoritarian foundations.
The results of the 2008 Friedrich Naumann Foundation poll are quite telling inthis regard.21 InOctober 1991, immediately before theSoviet Unions collapse and theintroduction ofeconomic reforms, theLevada Center (which was,
atthetime, part ofthe Russian Public Opinion Study Center) found that 62 percent ofRussians viewed Western lifestyles positively. Only 10 percent held anegative view.22 This attitude undergirded Russians faith inthe omnipotence ofliberal
reforms and their desire todiscard theSoviet past. By 2008, 30 percent ofthose
polled viewed Western lifestyles negatively, even though asubstantial part ofthe
countrys population had already been living in the Western consumption paradigm. Perhaps this explains why thepercentage ofpositive responses did not hit
rock bottom, though it did decrease substantially, falling to46 percent in2008.23
When pollsters asked thesame questions inthe fall of2014 (after theannexation
ofCrimea), 34 percent ofrespondents viewed Western lifestyles positively and 42
percent negatively. An almost twenty-five-year-old trend had practically reversed.24
The so-called unique path (a national model distinct from theEuropean one),
however vaguely and intuitively understood, has invariably remained the most
popular model for Russias developmentits popularity hovered around 60 percent inthe 2000s, while about 20 percent supported aEuropean path.25
Interestingly, theunique path was not as popular atthe start ofthe 2010s as
atother times since thebreakup ofthe Soviet Union: it was supported by only
37 percent of Russians in 2013. That number increased to 55 percent in April
2015, after thefirst wave ofpost-Crimea patriotism. Nevertheless, theEuropean
path also enjoyed arelatively high level ofsupport31 percent, which is probably
related tothe fact that anentire generation ofRussians now considers Western
lifestyles and consumer behavior normal.26
By the end of former Russian president Boris Yeltsins tenure and at the start
ofPutins, asignificant number ofRussians had become supporters ofgovernment
intervention inthe economy, having lived through theshock ofmarket reforms and
the1998 devaluation ofthe ruble, when Russia defaulted onits foreign debts.27
Since then, people have generally become more critical ofeconomic reforms,
especially inthe housing, utilities, education, healthcare, pension, and energy sectors, and natural monopoly reforms that Putin proposed inthe early years ofhis
presidency. These reforms affected peoples everyday lives, and even though many
Russians were not satisfied with thestate ofaffairs, they feared that things would
only get worse and more confusing if changes were made.28
The failure ofthe 2005 mini-reforms, which sought tomonetize numerous
Soviet-era benefits, made thepublic and, importantly, elites even more resentful
ofreforms ofany kind: theupper echelon lost interest inthem and has remained

Andrei Kolesnikov|13

skeptical that reforms can be successfully managed. These concerns were later
realized as the regime flip-flopped on pension reform; botched implementation ofhealthcare reform; and poorly administrated theUnified State Exam for
high school graduates. Ordinary people, perhaps understandably, preferred no
change atall.29
The main driver of Russians post-Yeltsin self-identification was the growing
desire for Russia tobe seen as agreat power, acountry that is both feared and tobe
reckoned with, as they saw it. At thesame time, high living standards were seen
as themain characteristic ofabright future and astrong country. Moreover, pragmatic rather that ideological views gradually gained groundeconomic growth,
high oil prices, and theemergence ofaconsumption-oriented middle class were
beginning tochange Russian society fundamentally.30 While being paternalistic,
imperialist, and nationalist at heart, Russian citizens preferred to remain pragmatic individualists intheir daily lives.
After 2010, thedesire tosee Russia as agreat power began tomatch or prevail
over pragmatic concerns, according tothe Levada Center (see figure 4).

A country with high living standards, even if it is not one of the most powerful countries in the world

A powerful country that is respected and feared by other countries

Ma
r
c
h,
201
5

Ma
r
c
h,
201
4

Nov
embe
r
,
201
1

Nov
embe
r
,
201
0

Nov
embe
r
,
2007

Nov
embe
r
,
2006

Nov
embe
r
,
2005

It is difficult to say

Ma
r
c
h,
2004

70
65
60
55
50
45
40
35
30
25
20
1
5
1
0
5
0

Dec
e
mber
,
2003

Figure 4: What Kind of Country Do Russians Want Russia to Be?

Source: Levada Center, Bolshinstvo rossiyan schitayut Rossiyu velikoy derzhavoy [Most Russians consider Russia a great power], March 24, 2015,
www.levada.ru/24-03-2015/bolshinstvo-grazhdan-schitayut-rossiyu-velikoi-derzhavoi.

14|Russian Ideology After Crimea

Answers to the question Is Russia currently a great power? reveal changes

inhow Russians identify themselves (see figure 5). Though 31 percent ofrespondents to a Levada Center poll saw Russia as a great power in 1999, that number increased sharply to53 percent in2000 after Putin assumed thepresidency;
thenumber subsequently declined during his reign, then gradually increased to55
percent by 2010.31 InMarch 2015, 68 percent ofrespondents said that Russia is
agreat power.

Figure 5: Is Russia Currently a Great Power, in Russians Opinion?

In Your Opinion, Is Russia Currently a Great Power?
November 2005

It is difficult to say

4%

Definitely no

In Your Opinion, Is Russia Currently a Great Power?

March 2015

Definitely yes

7%

Definitely no

Definitely yes

3% 6%

Probably yes

23%

It is difficult to say

19%

Probably no

23%

44%

24%

49%
Probably yes

Probably no

Source: Levada Center, Pozitsii Rossii na mezhdunarodnoy arene [Russias position in the international arena], March 23, 2015, www.levada.ru/23-03-2015/pozitsiirossii-na-mezhdunarodnoi-arene.

Andrei Kolesnikov|15

The Russian political establishment has been eager to supply the ideology
called for by themasses. InMarch 2015, 49 percent ofRussians gave Putin credit
for restoring thecountry toits great-power status.32
The regime has generally benefited from a stable yet relatively high level
of demand for conservative ideology over the past fifteen years. After almost
a decade of sociopolitical transition, a transformational crisis, and a rupture
ofthesocioeconomic order, popular demand for something abstractly conservative was poised tocome tothe surface.
Against thebackdrop ofpatterns inRussian politics and ideology over thepast
decade and a half, the Putin majoritys strong support for the Russian leader
should come as no surprise.
The presidency is the only functioning institution in this political system.
Therest ofthe system exists largely tosupport theleader. All ofthe constitutional
institutions of governmentthat is, the parliament, courts, ministries, party
system, and civil societyare merely transmission belts, to borrow Vladimir
Lenins term.
Ideology and theRussian Orthodox Church sanctify this political system,
which closely resembles acorporate state. It is asystem inwhich every communityprofessional, gender, and othersis controlled by governing bodies and
cannot exist outside thestate.
In such asystem, thestate proffers its own version ofcivil society tosuppress
or thwart actual grassroots politics (for example, theCivic Chamber, asupervising group for civic activities; theUnited Peoples Front, aquasi-civil society group
that resembles Italian dictator Benito Mussolinis corporations; and governmentapproved and government-sponsored nongovernmental organizations). Thestate
legally enshrines concepts such as foreign agent and undesirable nongovernmental organization, among others, which gives it plenty oftools toexert complete control over real civil society.
The state takes a similar approach to the party system, where parliamentary
groups prop up theparty inpower (United Russia) from different sides, making
politics resemble anacrobatic circus routine. United Russia plays tomainstream
votersthe electorate with abstract patriotic tendencies and no independent
worldview. The Communist Party (CPRF) and the Liberal Democratic Party
(LDPR), as well as theostensibly social democratic Just Russia party, inessence
serve as thedepartments ofthe party inpower responsible for theleft- and rightwing electorates, making sure these voters do not radicalize and continue tosupport the system. For its part, the CPRF channels votes from the left-wing and
socially disenfranchised electorate, thus keeping it from joining nonparliamentary parties and preventing left-leaning voters with nostalgia for theSoviet past
from radicalizing. TheLDPR attracts and sterilizes thenationalist vote. Any other
nonmainstream nationalist, patriotic, ultra-left, or ultra-right views are blocked or
declared extremist. Theonly option voters are left with is tosupport governmentapproved parties; otherwise, they will be marginalized.

16|Russian Ideology After Crimea

The free-for-all multiparty system ofthe 1990s and therelatively free arrangement ofthe 2000s are long gone. The2010s offer one asimple choice: you are
either for theregime and its satellites and ideology, or you are against it.
The government-sponsored ideology is broad enough to keep any political
force or view that supports thecurrent regime under one umbrella. Therest end
up outside ofthe system, occupying amarginal, niche role, and sometimes supporters ofthese views are sent toprison.

The Liberal Question

The views expressed by opponents of the system are often called liberal
inRussian political discourse. This is anobvious overgeneralization. Ina similar
fashion, supporters ofaWesternized path ofdevelopment were all called democrats inthe1990s.
There are some important differences among opponents of the regime.
On the one hand, in the eyes of state propaganda, anyone defending Western
understandings ofhuman rights (for instance, same-sex marriage, which is adivisive issue in Russia) is a liberal. Anyone who stands up for Ukraine-inspired,
Euromaidan-like protests, which invariably are portrayed as financed by thehostile West, is also branded aliberal. On theother hand, there is theAtlantic lobby
inthe ruling elite, and it consists largely ofloyalist liberals. These people are trying toreshape thecontours ofthe systems development (or, rather, degradation)
from within. They are also occasionally referred toas thesixth column.
The public embraces aloosely articulated but clearly understood premise supported by state propaganda: theso-called liberalism ofthe 1990s was responsible for
thebreakup ofthe country, widespread poverty, wild capitalism, and oligarchic rule.
Inmany ways, Putins charisma rests onthe extremely important ideological basis
that he alone brought order and stability tothe country after thechaos ofthe1990s.
Nuanced understandings ofpolitics start from these premises.
According tothe Levada Centers research, people consider greed tobe themain
characteristic ofthe countrys current elites.33 Inmass consciousness, theidea that
everyone ontop steals serves as both anaxiom and anexcuse for political apathy,
because it is commonly believed that nothing can be done anyway.
Over time, all ofthis somewhat reduced Putins approval ratings (see table 1).
That is, until 2014, when his approval ratings skyrocketed.
The level ofmistrust toward thesystem diminished as thepresidents approval
ratings soared.34 Moreover, Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and Foreign Minister
Sergey Lavrov, who were integral tosome ofPutins accomplishments, also saw
their approval ratings go up between 2014 and 2015.35
So-called liberals and proponents ofthe Euromaidan revolution and Western
values will remain scapegoats, blamed for undermining thecentral accomplishment ofthe era, Russias return togreat-power status.

Andrei Kolesnikov|17

Table 1: Attitudes Toward Putin

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2010

2011

2012

2013

Admiration

Like

34

37

38

30

32

32

38

40

31

28

20

18

Cannot say anything negative

about him

38

37

39

35

36

36

34

31

38

36

33

30

Neutral/indifferent

11

10

14

11

13

10

11

18

19

22

Cautious

11

10

Cannot say anything positive

about him

Antipathy/loathing

49

46

49

49

47

49

43

41

49

54

52

52

Sum of indifferent and

nonnegative responses

Note: Numbers indicate the percentage of the total people polled. The sample size (nationwide representative sampling) was 1,600 individuals aged eighteen or older.
Source: Lev Gudkov, Resources of Putins Conservatism, in Putins Russia: How It Rose, How It Is Maintained, and How It Might End, edited by Leon Aron (Washington, DC:
American Enterprise Institute, 2015).

What makes liberal ideology, theliberal parties that disappeared from thefederal parliament in2003, and liberals themselves so unpopular?
First, against thebackdrop ofsweeping socioeconomic reforms, all post-Soviet
countries that implemented liberal economic reforms faced anatural conservative
backlash from elites and thegeneral population. Inalmost all states intransition,
liberal reformers were held accountable for delays in starting the reforms even
though most of the culpability lay with either the Communist or quasi-Communist nomenklatura. Still, thesocial and emotional price that had tobe paid for
reforms was ultimately quite high, particularly inRussia.
A large number ofsocial groups were not included inthe process ofreform,
leading many ofthem toview thecountrys transformation as hostile. When liberal reforms eventually led togrowth (boosted, no doubt, by high oil prices and
thefeeling ofafresh start after theYeltsin-to-Putin transition), liberals were not
given credit: they lost out inthe 2003 parliamentary election despite thesuccess
oftheir economic policies.
Second, thepeculiar characteristics ofthe transfer ofpower from Boris Yeltsin
to Vladimir Putin and the bungled creation of a system of private property
inRussia (in particular, therigged loans-for-shares auctions and thebarring offoreign investors from thefirst stages ofprivatization) led toan oligarchic takeover
ofthe top ofthe economic system and thefusion offinancial and political elites.
However, after making thedestruction ofthe oligarchy one ofhis main political goals and eliminating themost prominent and defiant figures, Putin changed
nothing else about how thesystem fundamentally worked. He hung onto theold
loyal oligarchs and redistributed a significant portion of assets among the new

18|Russian Ideology After Crimea

oligarchs, sometimes called Putins friends or, inreference tothe countrys security agency, the Russian Orthodox KGB officers (this somewhat simplified
name nevertheless aptly describes these peoples ideology). As aresult, Russia saw
areturn toa state-controlled economy, alack ofcompetition, and apaltry number
ofsmall and midsize businesses.
Third, many Russians interpreted thestate, social, and economic transformation ofthe 1990s as acontinuation ofdecay and theformation ofanew order
one ofchaos and disorder. When thependulum ofpublic opinion swung toward
conservatism, theregime did not just follow trends but also contributed togreater
statism and patriotism. On theone hand, this reflected theactual views oftheruling elite; onthe other hand, this ideological tilt contributed tothe preservation
and strengthening ofpaternalism and personalized power. Such asystem required
the image of an enemy, and the liberals and liberal ideology fit the profile.
Thepatriotic wave, which became atsunami after theannexation ofCrimea, compensated for Russias defeat inthe Cold War and theabandonment ofSoviet-era
social perks. Long-awaited victories were finally won, atleast inthe Russian mass
consciousness.

The New Social Contract

The key questions are: Where are thelimits ofthe ideologys effectiveness? And
when will its capacity tomobilize and anesthetize thepublic begin todissipate?
About 30 to35 percent ofthe Russian workforce is employed inthe public
sector or government-connected enterprises. According toestimates prepared
by economists Nikita Maslennikov and Boris Grozovsky, 60 to 70 percent
ofRussian citizens depend onthe state. These people know that they are living off ofoil rents; theregimes revenues come from oil and gas sales, and by
voting for theregime, they are voting for their wallets. As aresult ofthe economic crisis Russia is facing, as seen, for instance, inthe rising inflation rate and
falling gross domestic product,36 their wallets have been seriously depleted and
will remain so for quite some time. Thus, thesausage inexchange for freedom
social contract will start towither away, while theCrimea and spiritual bonds
inexchange for freedom contract will be unable tomaintain long-term social
harmony.
In anideal world, thestate might have recognized theimperative tohelp make
the public less dependent on it. However, the rent-redistribution state failed
tocreate theinstruments or theenvironment necessary for most ofRussian society tothrive ina market economy.
Rent revenues were not distributed equitably even during theperiod ofeconomic growthalthough they were distributed relatively equally to people
at the bottom. At the top of society, political leaders and oligarchic insiders
captured anoutsized share ofthese revenues. This, it can be said, was aperiod

Andrei Kolesnikov|19

oftrickle-down growth. Theeconomic slump seems tohave made some outside

thehalls ofpower happy; they can now rejoice inthe fact that everyoneeven
the richare suffering. Still, the recession does not guarantee equalitywhile
thecrisis has affected everyone, themost socially vulnerable segments ofthe population have been hardest hit. Various types ofrent are distributed toan increasingly narrower circle ofpeople and corporations.
Consequently, the social contract engineered during the period of high oil
prices will begin tolose its ability tospur mobilization ofsociety; its ideological
componenta unique brand ofRussian isolationismwill wither as well.
Nevertheless, information-based dictatorships, as economics professor Sergey
Guriev and political science professor Daniel Treisman have called authoritarian regimes that rely onpropaganda and information warfare, can stay inpower
for a long time. However, the worse the economy is doing, the tougher political repression becomes. Guriev and Treisman used Turkey as an example: As
theTurkish economic growth declined from 7.8 percent in2010 to0.8 percent
in2012, thenumber ofjailed journalists increased from 4 to49.37 Inaseparate
paper, they noted that in information-based dictatorships, Repression is used
against ordinary citizens only as alast resort when theopportunities tosurvive
through co-optation, censorship, and propaganda are exhausted... Difficult economic times prompt higher relative spending oncensorship and propaganda.38
Ideology and spiritual bonds substitute and cover up for defunct institutions.
This is, infact, thekey function ofthe Russian states (or quasi-states) ideology.
In this sense, present-day Russian ideology lacks astrategic mandate. It accomplishes the immediate, tactical goals of mobilizing and consolidating public
opinion. This is precisely why theideology ofisolationism and statism derives its
strength from thepastit looks tothe energy ofthe states bygone glory rather
than the energy of future glory. Thus it lacks key elements of Communist ideology: grand goals and new horizons. Inshort, contemporary Russian ideology
offers no overriding concept for thefuture and cannot provide thenation apath
todevelopment.
The post-Crimea social contract leaves Russians few choices. Political economist Albert Hirschmans exit-voice-loyalty model of organizational behavior is
anappropriate theory toapply tothis situation.39 According tothis theory, citizens can make their voices heard through protests and demands for change. They
can choose anexit strategy through internal migration or emigration. People can
also display loyalty by adjusting tothe circumstances, even if they are not desirable. (In one ofhis early works, former U.S. national security adviser Zbigniew
Brzezinski noted that under authoritarian regimes, one adjusts by complying
with prohibitions, while under totalitarian regimes, one also has to do what is
prescribed and required.40)
When peoples opinions fail tobring about change or are forcefully suppressed
(for example, theevents of2012 inRussia), they choose between exit (the dominant strategy inRussia before March 2014) and loyalty (the dominant strategy

20|Russian Ideology After Crimea

after 2014). Thelatter option is justified and supported by theisolationist ideology that bears out its moral rectitude.
The regime has reached thelimit ofits effectiveness because it destroyed institutions. Elites share alarge part ofthe blame for this institutional degradation. After
all, thequality ofinstitutions is contingent onthe quality ofthe elites. Theexcess
ofoil money is also toblame. These windfalls obviated theneed for reform and
encouraged rent-oriented redistribution practices that benefited state-affiliated
enterprises as well as thedefense and law-enforcement sectors.
The regimes increasing authoritarianism points tothe fact that theleadership
is afraid oflosing controlover thenationalists, for example. Theregime wants
tocontinue tobe Russias Number One Nationalist, thus monopolizing nationalist ideology and organizations. Overall, theregimes attempt tocontrol everything is one ofthe key trends ofthe Putin era: it extends tothe economy, politics,
ideology, and even peoples soulsthe Russian Orthodox Church has become
one ofthe leading broadcasters ofanisolationist ideology.
Not only is ideology aninstrument ofconsolidation, mobilization, and control, but it also allows theregime todelude itself. Having secured high confidence,
approval, and electoral ratings, theregime distances itself from reality and anesthetizes its anxiety and fears.

Modernization?
Is there a window of opportunity for a modernizing ideology? Is it possible
toendow aretrograde authoritarian project with acollective vision ofthe future?
What would such anideology look like?
Modernization begins with getting rid ofmythologizing and sacral thinking;
it requires asober reassessment and areturn totruth and arealistic worldview.
After that, avision ofthe future and astrategic program with anultimate goal and
aroad map could emerge. Other Russian reform projectsthen economic minister Yegor Gaidars reforms (19911992), the later structural reforms (1997),
then economic minister German Gref s program (2000), and the2020 Strategy
(2011)proceeded from thesame reassessment.
The events of2011 were aturning point inRussias development. First, elite
segments ofsociety realized that themodernization plan announced by Dmitry
Medvedev was not only an illusion but also a political ploy that strengthened
Vladimir Putins grip onpower. Unfair parliamentary elections followed shortly
thereafter. Educated and urbanized segments ofsociety were clearly ahead ofthe
state interms oftheir demands for functioning institutions. To use thephilosopher
Jrgen Habermass term, the20112012 protests were acatching-up revolution
(die nachholende revolution) caused by thestates refusal tocomplete reforms
and modernize.41 The state did not agree to such demands, applying repressive laws and using force toprove its rightness. Under these conditionsgiven

Andrei Kolesnikov|21

the lack of viable democratic, liberal, or civil-society representation in politics;

the dominance of quasi-patriotic ideology; and the adoption of repressive and
restrictive laws after the2012 electionsthe liberal project is impossible, atleast
inthe short or medium term.
Political and financial elites are not ready toincur thecosts ofreforms, including
personal costs (such as giving up their power and allowing market competition).
Yet, there are signs of a change in public opinion already: despite the conservative shift in mass consciousness and the unpopularity of so-called liberalism
inpublic opinion polls, many Russians still believe that thestate should provide
social benefits topeople while holding onto themarket economy, two core tenets
ofmodern liberalism. Although only 9 percent ofrespondents toan August 2013
Levada Center poll considered themselves liberal,42 55 percent ofRussians told
thesame pollsters inMarch 2015 that they rely only onthemselves, which testifies
tothestates inefficiency and acontinued lack oftrust instate institutions.43 They
are ready tobe responsible for themselves and inthis sense are less paternalistic.
This is agood basis for modernization.
Modernization requires aclear signal from thetop and demand from thebottom. Elites would likely be able to express their demands by indicating that
democratization and further movement away from state capitalism to a more
competitive market economy and afreer society are possible. This kind ofmodel
worked during perestroika.
It is almost impossible for aresearcher topredict atwhat point theregime will
shift from mythological thinking toa pragmatically formulated, strategic vision
ofthe future. However, state repression cannot eliminate thedemand for change
in 20112012 (among other things, liberals have since protested the murder
ofliberal politician Boris Nemtsov). Sooner or later both those ontop and those
at the bottom will create the demand for a pragmatically formulated, liberal
economic ideology. Historical and political logic suggest that asignal from thetop
will inevitably meet demand from thebottom atsome point. Modernization starts
when thelower echelons ofsociety start tosee stagnation and underdevelopment
asburdensome and theupper segments see them as dangerous.

Notes

Daniil Dondurey, Sverkhtsennosti opyat ostanavlivayut Rossiyu? [Are

Metavalues Stopping Russia Again?], Gefter.ru, February 2, 2015, http://gefter.ru/
archive/14175.

Tzvetan Todorov, Lesprit des Lumires [The Spirit ofEnlightenment] (Paris: Robert
Laffont, 2006). Cited from theRussian translation (Moscow: Moscow School
ofPolitical Studies, 2010), 8. Theterm, world under aspell, or Entzauberung der
Welt, was first used inthis sense by Max Weber in1919.

Vladimir Nabokov, Conversation Piece, 1945, New Yorker, June 23, 1945.

Ernest Gellner, Conditions ofLiberty: Civil Society and its Rivals (Penguin Books, 1996).

Andrei Zorin, Kormya dvukhglavogo orla Literatura i gosudarstvennaya ideologiya v

Rossii v posledney treti XVIIIpervoy treti XIX veka [Feeding theTwo-Headed Eagle.
Literature and State Ideology inRussia During theLast Third ofthe 18th Century
Through theFirst Third ofthe 19th Century] (Moscow, 2001), 100.

Andrei Kolesnikov, Esli est vashingtonskiy obkom, todolzhen byt i TsKa [If There
is aWashington Regional Committee, There Must be aCentral Committee], Novaya
gazeta, September 28, 2012.

Vladimir Putin, Address bythe President oftheRussian Federation, March 18, 2014,
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20603.

Vladimir Putin, Presidential Address totheFederal Assembly, December 4, 2014,

http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/47173.

Public Opinion Foundation, Otnoshenie k Rossii v mire: mneniya rossiyan [How

Russia is Viewed Around theWorld: theOpinions ofRussians], poll, January 16, 2015,
http://fom.ru/Mir/11911.

10 Levada Center, 68% rossiyan schitayut Rossiyu velikoy derzhavoy [68 Percent
ofRussians Consider Russia aGreat Power], press release, December 11, 2014, http://
www.levada.ru/11-12-2014/68-rossiyan-schitayut-rossiyu-velikoi-derzhavoi.
11 Levada Center, Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya [International Relations], press
release, February 9, 2015, http://www.levada.ru/09-02-2015/mezhdunarodnyeotnosheniya.
12 Levada Center, Rol lichnostey v istorii Rossii [The Role ofPersonality inthe History
ofRussia], press release, January 20, 2015, http://www.levada.ru/20-01-2015/rollichnostei-v-istorii-rossii.
13 Levada Center, Stalin i ego rol v istorii strany [Stalin and his Role inthe History
ofthe Country], press release, March 31, 2015, http://www.levada.ru/31-03-2015/
stalin-i-ego-rol-v-istorii-strany.
23

24|Russian Ideology After Crimea

14 Federalnyy zakon Rossiyskoy Federatsii ot 29 iyunya 2015 goda No 173-FZ [Federal

Law ofthe Russian Federation ofJune 29, 2015 No. 173-FZ], published by Rossiyskaya
gazeta, July 3, 2015, www.rg.ru/2015/07/03/pensiya-dok.html.
15 Public Opinion Foundation, Rol Stalina v Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyne [Stalins
Role inthe Great Patriotic War], poll, May 12, 2015, http://fom.ru/Proshloe/12154.
16 Umom Rossiyu ponimat [To Understand Russia With Ones Mind], Gumanitarnyy
kontekst [Humanitarian Context], no. 1 (2009): 3238.
17 Herbert Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man: Studies inthe Ideology ofAdvanced
Industrial Society (Beacon Press, 1964), available atwww.marcuse.org/herbert/
pubs/64onedim/odmcontents.html.
18 Ibid., 283.
19 Levada Center, Ugroza dlya Rossii so storony SShA [The Threat toRussia From
theUnited States], press release, May 12, 2015, http://www.levada.ru/12-05-2015/
ugroza-dlya-rossii-so-storony-ssha.
20 Ibid.
21 To Understand Russia, 3238.
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid.
24 Levada Center, Nuzhna li Rossii demokratiya? [Does Russia Need Democracy?],
press release, October 28, 2014, http://www.levada.ru/28-10-2014/nuzhna-li-rossiidemokratiya.
25 To Understand Russia.
26 Levada Center, Bolshinstvo rossiyan khotyat, chtoby Rossiya shla po sobstvennomu
puti [Most Russians Want Russia togo its Own Way], press release, April 21, 2015,
http://www.levada.ru/21-04-2015/bolshinstvo-rossiyan-khotyat-chtoby-rossiya-shlapo-sobstvennomu-puti.
27 Ibid.
28 Levada Center, Reformy, ozhidaniya rossiyan [Reforms, Russians Expectations],
press release, April 3, 2003, http://www.levada.ru/03-04-2003/reformy-ozhidaniyarossiyan.
29 Ibid.
30 Kakoy vy khoteli by videt seychas Rossiyu v pervuyu ochered? [How Would You Like
toSee Russia Today inthe First Place?], Levada.ru, http://www.levada.ru/archive/gosudarstvo-i-obshchestvo/rossiiskaya-identichnost/kakoi-vy-khoteli-videt-seichas-rossiyu-v-.
31 Levada Center, Pozitsii Rossii na mezhdunarodnoy arene [Russias Positions inthe
International Arena], March 23, 2015, www.levada.ru/23-03-2015/pozitsii-rossii-namezhdunarodnoi-arene.
32 Kira Latukhina, Rossiyane nazvali glavnye dostizheniya prezidenta [Russians Named
theMain Achievements ofthe President], Rossiyskaya gazeta, March 27, 2015, http://
www.rg.ru/2015/03/27/dostijenia-site.html.
33 Lev Gudkov, Resources ofPutins Conservatism, inPutins Russia: How it Rose, How
it is Maintained, and How It Might End, edited by Leon Aron (AEI, 2015).
34 Levada Center, Doverie institutam vlasti [Trust inState Institutions], November 13,
2014, http://www.levada.ru/13-11-2014/doverie-institutam-vlasti.

Andrei Kolesnikov|25

35 Levada Center, Avgustovskie reytingi odobreniya i doveriya [August Approval and

Credibility Ratings], August 26, 2015, www.levada.ru/26-08-2015/avgustovskie-reitingi-odobreniya-i-doveriya.
36 Anna Andrianova, Russian GDP Plunges 4.6%, Bloomberg, August 10, 2015, www.
bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-08-10/russian-economy-shrinks-4-6-as-oil-slumprisks-deeper-recession.
37 Sergey Guriev and Daniel Treisman, Avtoritarizm v vek informatsii
[Authoritarianism inthe Information Age], Vedomosti, March 25, 2013, http://www.
vedomosti.ru/opinion/articles/2015/03/25/avtoritarizm-v-vek-informatsii.
38 Sergey Guriev and Daniel Treisman, How Modern Dictators Survive: Cooptation,
Censorship, Propaganda, and Repression, Discussion Paper No 10454 (London:
Center for Economic Policy Research, 2015).
39 Albert O. Hirschman, Exit, Voice and Loyalty. Responses toDecline inFirms,
Organizations, and States (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970).
40 Zbig: TheStrategy and Statecraft ofZbigniew Brzezinski, edited by Charles Gati
(Baltimore: 2013), XV.
41 Jrgen Habermas, Die nachholende Revolution [The Catch-up Revolution] (Berlin:
Suhrkamp, 1990).
42 Levada Center, Politicheskie vzglyady rossiyan [Political Views ofRussians], press release, September 23, 2013, http://www.levada.ru/23-09-2013/politicheskie-vzglyadyrossiyan.
43 Levada Center, Vzaimodeystvie grazhdan i gosudarstva [Interaction Between
Citizens and theState], press release, April 6, 2015, http://www.levada.ru/06-04-2015/
vzaimodeistvie-grazhdan-i-gosudarstva.

Carnegie Moscow Center

Established in 1994 by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,

the Carnegie Moscow Center brings together senior researchers from across
the Russian political spectrum and Carnegies global centers to provide a free
and open forum for the discussion and debate of critical national, regional,
andglobal issues.
The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace is a unique global network of policy research centers in Russia, China, Europe, the Middle East,
andtheUnited States. Our mission, dating back more than acentury, is toadvance
the cause of peace through analysis and development of fresh policy ideas
and direct engagement and collaboration with decisionmakers in government,
business, and civil society. Working together, our centers bring the inestimable
benefit ofmultiple national viewpoints tobilateral, regional, andglobal issues.

27

BEIJING

BEIRUT

BRUSSELS

MOSCOW

WA S H I N G T O N

RUSSIAN IDEOLOGY
AFTER CRIMEA
Andrei Kolesnikov
Carnegie.ru
SEPTEMBER 2015