PERSPECTIVES

A Telangana State?
An Illustrative Analysis of the Stakes
in Modifying Internal Borders
Lorraine Hohler

The internal boundaries within

the Indian Union indicate how the
central government recognises
ethnic and linguistic realities.
Through the example of the
movement of the creation for
Telangana, this article seeks to
analyse the limits of the Indian
administrative framework and its
linguistic foundations, the issues
at stake, and the likely impact of
new territorial changes.

Lorraine Hohler (lorraine.hohler@yahoo.fr) is

a PhD student in Political Geography, affiliated
to the University of Reims Champagne-Ardenne,
France and to the Centre for Human Sciences,
New Delhi.
Economic & Political Weekly

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August 24, 2013

Administrative Network of India

he process of territorial division

by the State stems from two fundamental objectives: territorial
control and integration. Optimal control
and efficient administration of the geographical area require that the latter be
broken up into a series of smaller units
joined together constituting either a
simple subdivision of central power, or
individual geopolitical players in their own
right. The desire to mitigate the centrifugal forces that can threaten territorial
integrity also justifies the creation of units
based, partly, on the recognition of regional specificities or local territoriality.1
The structure of the network and the
powers attributed to each subdivision
are specific to each state and are based
on political, geographical, historical and
even linguistic criteria, the ultimate aim
being to bring together the territory as
an organised unit. While some states
choose to opt for an equal division favouring geometrical subdivisions, others
adopt an administrative architecture
where big and small entities stand alongside each other. The analysis of the administrative network does not focus on the
geographical structure of the subdivisions
alone, but also on their status in terms of
power, and on the relations that each
link has with the higher or lower links.
The changes in the internal boundaries of the Indian Union that took place
from 1956 onwards fulfil the two imperatives mentioned above. By juxtaposing
state boundaries with linguistic frontiers,
the central government made it easier
to manage them by facilitating contact
between the populations and their administrators. It also reduced the centrifugal tensions resulting from regional
feelings. While the Hindi-speaking area
vol xlviii no 34

was fragmented into a dozen states,

without taking into account some strong
regional dialects like Bhojpuri or Marwari, which could legitimately serve as
the basis for separate states, each of the
Dravidian languages in the south enjoyed
political recognition.
The process of decentralisation initiated in the 1990s itself aimed at delegating part of the central governments
responsibilities to the lower levels and
favouring a better distribution of power
between the different subdivisions by
giving more independence to the states
and by giving a political identity to the
districts and the panchayats.
The choice of altering, or not, the administrative network should also be considered as a strategic act resulting from
a political scenario imposed by the ruling power or from a situation of crisis.
Rosire (2008) argues that, In no case
administrative boundaries are the result
of happenstance. They always express a
political will, if not a compromise between several wills. In India, the relevance of the linguistic argument cannot
hide other more debatable stakes. The
choice of linguistic boundaries met the
aspirations and pressures of the dominant castes whose areas of influence
matched the areas of their vernacular
language. On the other hand, by homogenising states in terms of dominant
castes, the Congress was able to rely on
them and on their influence at the local
level to politically dominate the Indian
Union. By creating large states in the
north, the centre also ensured political
dominance of the Hindi belt. The changes
in borders since 1956 have followed the
same logic of political accounts. Behind
the linguistic or ethnic arguments,
formation of new states also took place
taking into account geopolitical considerations (the north-east), political gains
(Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand and Uttarakhand) or as a remedial measure to an
emergency (Gujarat).
The Case of Telangana
From the very beginning, the demand
for the creation of Telangana was characterised by its opposition to the linguistic
31

PERSPECTIVES

principle. Right from the time when

Andhra Pradesh (AP) was created in
1956, by integrating Telangana with the
State of Andhra, created in 1953, the
opponents of the merging put forth the
idea that linguistic homogeneity did not
justify a political union of the two regions, which had different pasts, different cultures and different levels of
development. The latter were afraid of
an internal colonialism within the new
state. Nehru made the comment that an
innocent girl called Telangana is being
married to a naughty boy called Andhra.
It is their choice to continue or to get
separated. While the majority of Telangana politicians were opposed to the
unification of the two Telugu areas,
other arguments had influenced the final
decision, including the strengthening of
the Reddy caste who supported the Congress Party, the reduction of water conflicts, and the choice of Hyderabad as an
acceptable capital.
The movement rose once again in
2009, after the death of Y S Rajasekhara
Reddy, the then chief minister of AP, and
was strongly backed by the people, even
more than in its first attempt. The current
leaders of the movement have always
condemned the economic, political and
cultural disparities that divide the state
and the diversion of resources of
Telangana (lands, water and jobs). The
central governments decision on 30 July
2013, to finally divide the state of AP,
puts an end to more than 50 years of
political and social struggle for equity
and justice. The future creation of the
state poses a twofold challenge to the
linguistic principle, as it will require the
division of the first state in India created
on linguistic lines and will mark the aspirations of a heterogeneous subregion
in terms of language and people. In the
case of Telangana, the regional identity
clearly prevailed over the linguistic or
caste identity.
While language is generally a symbol
and a powerful instrument of the unity
of a population or a nation, it is not
enough to maintain the community cohesion, with the latter being fragmented
by inequalities, even discrimination.
Economic disparities and the feeling of
negation of local cultures can create
32

solidarities and social consensus, which

result in political repercussions that are
just as strong as those stemming from
linguistic and religious differences.
Though it seems unlikely that the
centre will once again reverse its decision as in 2009,2 it is necessary to understand the governments reluctance to
allow a new border change and to analyse the stakes and the consequences of
this political act.
National Stakes
At the national level, the stakes involved
in the creation of Telangana are to be seen
in the short-term and long-term perspectives. For the Congress Party, currently
in power in AP, the state has always been
an important vote bank. It has sent
in the maximum number of Congress
Members of Parliament (MPs) during
the 2004 and 2009 general elections.
Seriously undermined during the last
by-elections, the party doubted whether it
would keep power in Telangana, where
the regional party Telangana Rashtra
Samithi (TRS), whose unique agenda
was the creation of the new state, was
benefiting from the discontent simmering in the region.
On the other hand, by finally granting
statehood to the region, the Congress
risks losing the rest of AP, whose leaders
were largely opposed to the division, and
where the new regional party the YSR
Congress won the last by-elections. This
unstable equilibrium explains the indecisiveness of the centre until now, which
was looking at the 2014 elections more
than the democratic aspirations of people.
The final decision is more the result of a
cold political calculation that led the
party to choose the best alternative in
terms of votes. It has forced the party to
reconsider its political allies in AP as
well as at the national level in order to
offset any likely reverses that the party
might suffer in the region. By conceding
to the demand of the Telanganites, the
party could also lose some of its regional
partners who are also facing separatist
movements in their respective states.
But, the Congress is not the only party
that was pondering over the political
equation Telangana represents. The
Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) too saw the
August 24, 2013

region as a likely vote bank for the 2014

elections, with the same political logic
that had led it to create three new states
in 2000. The Telangana region looked
even more important as the party had
just lost in Karnataka. The decision of
the centre has pulled the rug out from
under the BJP, which will have to reconsider its tactic in Telangana. The latter
had promised the formation of the state
in the case of victory of the National
Democratic Alliance (NDA) in the next
elections. But, challenged at the regional
level by the TRS, the BJP appeared to
have adopted a dangerous tactic of religious polarisation, which might have
helped the party get the votes of the
Hindu community.
The debate regarding the creation of
Telangana is part of the larger debate on
whether or not a reorganisation of the
Indian states is necessary. The decision
in favour of Telangana will strongly
reinforce the claims of other separatist
movements, and this risk of reopening
the Pandoras box also explains the
doubts of the centre. Therefore, immediately after the announcement by the
centre, the Gorkhaland activists renewed their campaign for the splitting
of West Bengal. While some of the claims
are based on linguistic and ethnic arguments, most subregional demands are
based on economic interests and issues
of governance in view of the increasing
geographical disparities in the contemporary economic context.
Within a very weak network, big
states like AP, Uttar Pradesh or Maharashtra, for example, despite their larger
resources, failed to efficiently overcome
the disparities in development between
the poor regions and those which
already had good infrastructure and
had benefited from private and public
investments. Distance, population density, existence of political minorities at
the subregional level, and historical and
territorial differences are seen as the
many obstacles between individuals and
the existing authorities, preventing an
efficient and egalitarian management of
the region. With the central government
largely withdrawing its sphere of influence from the social sectors and delegating a part of its authority to the states,
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the least developed subregions3 could

benefit from a redrawing of their borders, from a new sovereignty that would
allow them to manage their own development programmes.
However, the creation of new states,
based on a divisive logic, brings up the
question of a likely geographical, economic and political fragmentation of the
Indian Union. In the context of liberalisation and globalisation, the states are
increasingly tempted to attract private
investment by offering favourable tax
policies, setting up of special economic
zones (SEZs) with special facilities and
privatisation of their natural resources.
This, all the more so, as the states,
starting with AP have taken the initiative of breaking the state/centre relationship in order to establish new state/
international relations by taking out
international loans. An increase in the
number of territorial units, without national regulation, will only intensify this
economic competition between the
states without necessarily improving the
overall situation of the population or
even guaranteeing equitable territorial
development.4
The states of the Indian Union are not
merely administrative units, but increasingly sovereign political entities in position of negotiating their support to the
central government. Thus, an increase
in their number, coupled with the temptation to use their influence to defend
their own regional interests, increasingly
risks weakening the coalitions at the
centre and the implementation of national policies, which are the only guarantors of territorial equity.
However, the formation of new states
can also weaken the capacity of the
bigger states to take decisions or block
them, thus allowing a larger number of
states to make their voices heard. The
division of the bigger states would allow
the political centre of gravity of the
Indian Union to shift towards a more
equitable structure in terms of decisionmaking. By lessening the feeling that
the big northern states dominate the
Indian political scenario, the smaller
states, until now considered to be mere
satellites, could feel more integrated
and heard.
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Finally, the question of financing the

new subdivisions, their political and economic viability, the geopolitical issues related to certain demands in Assam or in
West Bengal, and the real intentions of
the separatist leaders have all got to be
taken into consideration.
Regional Stakes
At the regional level, the issues involved
are varied in nature. In India, the majority of internal border conflicts are related
to water. The states are fighting even
more for this resource, as most of their
population is engaged in agriculture and
depends on it. Moreover, the demand for
water is increasing with the development of mega cities and industries. When
AP was created in 1956, one of the main
justifications for merging Telangana
with AP was that the merger of the two
Telugu entities would considerably reduce water-related conflicts as the two
major rivers of the region flowed through
the new state. With Telangana state, the
river Krishna will mark the new border
between the new state and the rest of AP
(now referred to as Seemandhra), requiring a common management of the
river basin, whereas the river Godavari
will mainly fall within Telangana. Thus,
there is no doubt that if the authorities
of the new state try to exploit to the
maximum its water resources, the authorities of Seemandhra will insist on an
equitable sharing of these waters.
The issue is further complicated by
the fact that the coastal regions of AP
have based their economic development
on the exploitation of the water resources of the separatist region. The major
hydro projects built over these two rivers, which have mainly enabled the
irrigation of the Seemandhra regions,
will see their usage diverted with the
birth of a new border. With the entry of a
new player, new water-related conflicts
are likely to crop up, adding to those
already existing between AP and its
neighbours.5
The future of Hyderabad is also an
issue in the conflict that is pitting the
proponents of Telangana against those
in favour of a united AP. The metropolis,
which is today a major economic centre
and the cause of disagreement between
vol xlviii no 34

the two parties, was mainly developed

during the 1990s under the Telugu
Desam Party (TDP) government, headed
by leaders from the Seemandhra region.
Apart from international investments,
the government encouraged in particular the arrival of a business class from
coastal AP, which had reinvested the surplus money that it earned from agriculture, thanks to the green revolution, in
the capital city.
In the metropolis, 75% of the regional
companies belong to the Andhras and
80%6 of the employees are from the
same region. The Andhras have also
made investments in the nearby districts
of Medak and Rangareddy, where they
own more than 50% of the regional
businesses. For all the people of Seemandhra, the metropolis presents an opportunity not only for young students
wishing to pursue their studies, but also
for those seeking employment.
For the people of Telangana, Hyderabad is all the more important, as the urban framework of the region is practically non-existent beyond the capital
and because of the hardly developed
second-rank cities and lack of infrastructure. The proposal to make Hyderabad a
union territory or a common capital for
the two future states was unanimously
rejected by the proponents of Telangana.
Apart from the problem of geographical
discontinuity that such a solution would
entail due to the landlocked nature of
Hyderabad, the borders of the neighbouring districts would also have to be
redefined as the city spills over into
them. The future of Hyderabad seems
still uncertain even though the centre
appears to be in favour of a temporary
joint capital for the two states, till the
new AP state builds a capital with necessary infrastructure. However, this solution raises a lot of issues, for example,
temporary status of governmental jobs,
common management of the land and
redistribution of taxes between the two
states. The tribal question also requires
special attention. The tribal population
of AP lives almost exclusively on the
edges of the border areas of the state
contiguous with the tribal zones of
Madhya Pradesh, Odisha and Chhattisgarh, with which the connections are
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PERSPECTIVES

important. The tribes are one of the

poorest and least developed segments of
the population of the state. Less educated
than the rest of the population, dependant on agricultural revenues and living
with poorly equipped infrastructure and
in areas with difficult access, they continue to be the victims of a long, old
process of land alienation. In the past,
the process of land grabbing was mostly
organised by migrant farmers from
Telangana and coastal AP, but today it is
more an appropriation by the state for
development purposes. The tribes of
Telangana mainly support the creation
of the new state with the hope that the
new leaders will finally conduct targeted
and concrete policies for them.
However, for a few years now, a new
political movement has surfaced demanding the formation of a big tribal
state, Manyaseema, comprising all the
tribal majority areas of AP. This movement is indicative of the conflict between
the Telangana primitive tribes living in
forested areas, and the Lambada7 population, localised mostly in the plains, and
considered as non-locals and migrants
from other Indian states grabbing the
benefits being extended to the scheduled
tribes (STs). While several tribal organisations demand categorisation of the STs
on the basis of their socio-economic status, others consider that the primitive
tribes will not have their chance in a
Telangana state where they will have to
compete with the Lambada population,
which is more developed and has benefited in the past from the majority of the
ST reservations.
As, until now, the movement has been
missing strong tribal leaders and
presents little involvement from the rest
of the population, the risk of future territorial fragmentation cannot be ruled
out. From this viewpoint, the progress of
this political movement will depend on
the manner in which the state of Telangana will tackle the tribal issue and
bring about the political and economic
integration of the primitive tribes.
Telangana Level
With regard to Telangana, the formation
of a smaller unit will provide autonomy
to the region, which until now was
34

considered the preserve of a political

minority and was subject to the decisions
of the leaders from Seemandhra. This
will also alter the demography of the new
state in terms of castes and minorities.
The population of Muslims that today
constitutes 8.9% of the population of AP
will go up to 12.5%, whereas the tribal
population will go up from 6.5% to
10%.8 Apart from the fact that their
political representation will be strengthened thanks to their numbers, these
two minorities hope to improve their
visibility and see that their interests are
better served. The former, in return for
their votes, could ensure that certain
measures are taken in their favour such
as recognising minority languages or a
renegotiation of the reservation quotas
for their community. In this context, it is
not surprising that the TRS leader has
promised to make Urdu an official
language if his party wins the elections
in the new state. The advantages of
small states for minorities were already
noticed by Ambedkar (1955) before the
creation of linguistic states:
The fi rst safeguard is not to have too large
a State. The consequences of too large a
State on the minority living within it are
not understood by many. The larger the
State the smaller the proportion of the
minority to the majority... A small stone
of a consolidated majority placed on the
chest of the minority may be borne. But
the weight of a huge mountain it cannot
bear. It will crush the minorities. Therefore
creation of smaller States is a safeguard to
the minorities.

Conversely, the demographic importance of the dominant castes will

undergo a change. In AP, the dominant
castes are numerically superior in the
Seemandhra districts, where they account for about 30% of the population,
whereas in Telangana they represent
just about 10% of the population. Some
leaders of the movement put forth the
idea that in a state with 90%9 of the
population being lower castes and
minorities, they will not fail to improve
their socio-economic situation and will
be able to better reorient the policies of
their representatives in their favour.
The creation of Telangana will in part
resolve the long conflict between the
two main scheduled caste (SC) groups, the
August 24, 2013

Malas and the Madigas, for subcategorisation. As most of them come from
Seemandhra, the Malas benefited from
the politics of education and development
started by the British missionaries during the colonisation, whereas the Madigas,
more localised in Telangana, saw their
situation as having improved only recently. As with the primitive tribes, the
Madigas consider that in a united state
they were not able to compete with the
Malas, who took most of the reserved
jobs and positions in the universities.
While some believe that there will be
a redistribution of powers within the
future state of Telangana, others, on the
contrary, believe that class and caste
domination, already present in the
region, will just continue. If most of the
power remains in the hands of the state
government and largely delegated to its
representatives at the local level, and
not to elected political institutions, the
formation of a new state does not appear
to be very meaningful. Similarly, the
process of decentralisation at the local
level cannot be effective if the already
dominant castes and elite classes appropriate the political and technical powers
conferred on districts, mandals, panchayats, and if real agrarian reform does
not take place.
In the last years of the movement a
significant change could be observed
with the increasingly visible participation of the lower castes, who were demanding, besides a geographical Telangana, a truly social Telangana. Now that
the decision of the centre seems irreversible, the voices of the dalits, Other Backward Classes (OBCs) and tribal civil
servants and students are again making
themselves heard in order to demand
a recasting of the social relations within the new state. Today, these groups
are demanding their integration into
the decision-making process, not by
forming caste-based parties, but by
fighting for the replacement of the
traditional elites.
Moreover, two demands define their
political fight: the need for real agrarian
reforms, and job reservations in private
companies. In Osmania and Warangal
Universities, movements based on the
Dalit-Bahujan ideology are spreading and
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PERSPECTIVES

claim more political and economic space

for the backward castes of Telangana
and the recognition of their identity and
culture. The objective could be seen both
as a fight against the social and economical influence of the forward castes and
the political influence of the BJP. There
is strong hope in Telangana concerning
the student movement and its ability to
influence the policies of the future state
as noticed by Kannabiran et al (2012):
Students from oppressed classes are not
only holding mainstream political formations to account in unprecedented
ways, but are also providing direction to
the movement.
Recently, the president of TRS reiterated his wish to make a dalit the first
chief minister of Telangana, if his party
is chosen to rule the future state.10 Beyond an obvious policy of accommodation, would this gesture be followed by a
real policy of social integration? Indeed,
many dalit and OBC leaders consider the
TRS as the party of Velamas, a dominant
caste, less powerful than the Reddys and
Kammas, which could politically arise
with the creation of the state. In addition, many intellectuals and activists are
denouncing, through the movement for
Telangana, the comeback into politics of
the old landlords who were defending
the idea of a Telangana state in which
their interests could be protected against
the rich migrants and investors from
Seemandhra.
Conclusions
Though the Telangana movement does
not represent the only or the most
important movement for autonomy in
India, it is illustrative of the limits of the
Indian administrative network, in terms
of design as well as the distribution of
powers between different levels, and of
its dependence on political considerations. While there is no doubt that linguistic boundaries are pertinent in the
interests of administrative rationalisation and democracy, these cannot ignore
the fact that linguistic homogeneity is
not synonymous with regional cohesion.
Any alteration in an administrative
boundary must not be seen only in the
light of the changes that are likely to
take place within the new state, but must
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August 24, 2013

be examined from a multidimensional

perspective.
The formation of a new state in India
results in the formation of a new
geopolitical player who has to engage
not only with the central government,
but also with its neighbouring states.
To maintain national cohesion this new
entity should act with a view to cooperation, not competition with its partners. Similarly, the formation of a
new state involves a re-examination of
the division of powers and resources
between the different levels and finding the perfect balance between the
measures undertaken by the central
government, the states and the local
players. The sovereignty that the central government offers the new state
does not necessarily signify that the
local population will benefit if the
powers devolved are grabbed by the administrative elite and political structures that already exist.
An administrative reorganisation of
India must be accompanied by an assessment of the efficiency of decentralisation and administration, and the role
of the central government, as guarantor
of territorial equality, vis--vis the failure
of the states with respect to development
and democratisation from the bottom up.
Finally, the creation of new states
should not be determined by political
reasons and electoral short-term logic,
or happen when the level of crisis
and violence reaches a point of no
return. Modification of the administrative network must follow the aspirations of people with the desire to live
together and build an egalitarian development project, within an integrated
national space.
Notes
1 For Richard Hartshorne (1950) the management of diversity is the most important challenge that influences the territorial action of
the State, as he wrote, The primary and continuing problem of every state is how to bind
together more or less separate and diverse
areas into an effective whole.
2 In December 2009, Union Minister for Home
Affairs P Chidambaram announced that the
government would start the process of APs
division. It backed down later under pressure
from public opinion and political leaders from
Seemandhra.
3 Duncan B Forrester (1970: 6) gives the
definition of a subregion as a smaller area
within a region or nation which for economic,
vol xlviii no 34

6
7

8
9
10

geographic, historical, and social reasons is

aware of possessing a distinct identity.
At the AP-level, Haragopal (2010) denounces
the economic competition between spaces due
to globalisation. The state, which is expected
to be a protector of the sovereign power of the
people and resources, has turned into a
facilitator of the movement of the global capital a shift in the very role and character of the
nation stateSince there was no viable opposition the process led to widening of inequalities
across the castes, classes, gender, rural, urban,
and forward and the backward regions. It is
these widening inequalities between the agriculture and service sector, between metropolitan Hyderabad and rest of the state, between
the backward regions and relatively advanced
regions.
AP is currently in conflict with Maharashtra
and Karnataka regarding the sharing of the
waters of river Krishna. AP also contests the
Babli dam project on river Godavari decided
by Maharashtra. Finally, the state is at odds
with Chhattisgarh and Odisha regarding the
Polavaram project.
Source: Telangana Chambers of Commerce
and Industry.
Originally from Rajasthan, the Lambada population is in majority living in the rural areas of
AP, but not far from the cities where they got
their education and governmental employment. AP is the only state in India that gave
them the status of ST, whereas they are
classified as OBC in Maharashtra and scheduled
caste (SC) in Tamil Nadu.
Source: Srikrishna Committee Report (2011).
Ibid.
The TRS has announced, in the past, a probable merger with the Congress, if the latter created Telangana. Since the centres decision to
finally divide AP, the regional party has remained silent on this idea.

References
Ambedkar, B R (1955): Thoughts on Linguistic
States (Aligarh: Anand Sahitya Sadan).
Forrester, D B (1970): Subregionalism in India:
The Case of Telangana, Pacific Affairs, 43(1):
5-21.
Haragopal, G (2010): The Telangana Peoples
Movement: The Unfolding Political Culture,
Economical & Political Weekly, 45(42): 51-60.
Hartshorne, R (1950): The Functional Approach in
Political Geography, Annals of the Association
of American Geographers, 40(2): 95-130.
Kannabiran, K, N Madhusudhan, S Ashalatha,
S Ramdas and M P Kumar (2012): On the
Telangana Trail, Economic & Political Weekly,
45(13): 69-82.
Rosire, S (2008): Dictionnaire de lEspace
Politique : Gographie Politique et Gopolitique
(Dictionary of Political Space: Political
Geography and Geopolitics) (Paris: Armand
Colin).

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