RETALASAM VS SMITH 45 PHIL 657

G.R. No. L-19495

February 2, 1924

HONORIO
LASAM,
vs.
FRANK SMITH, JR., defendant-appellant.

ET

AL., plaintiffs-appellants,

The plaintiff are husband and wife and this action is brought to recover damages in the sum of
P20,000 for physical injuries sustained by them in an automobile accident. The trial court rendered
a judgment in their favor for the sum of P1,254.10, with legal interest from the date of the
judgment. Both the plaintiffs and the defendant appeal, the former maintaining that the damages
awarded are insufficient while the latter denies all liability for any damages whatever.
It appears from the evidence that on February 27, 1918, the defendant was the owner of a public
garage in the town of San Fernando, La Union, and engaged in the business of carrying
passengers for hire from the one point to another in the Province of La Union and the surrounding
provinces. On the date mentioned, he undertook to convey the plaintiffs from San Fernando to
Currimao, Ilocos Norte, in a Ford automobile. On leaving San Fernando, the automobile was
operated by a licensed chauffeur, but after having reached the town of San Juan, the chauffeur
allowed his assistant, Remigio Bueno, to drive the car. Bueno held no driver's license, but had
some experience in driving, and with the exception of some slight engine trouble while passing
through the town of Luna, the car functioned well until after the crossing of the Abra River in
Tagudin, when, according to the testimony of the witnesses for the plaintiffs, defects developed in
the steering gear so as to make accurate steering impossible, and after zigzagging for a distance
of about half a kilometer, the car left the road and went down a steep embankment.
The defendant, in his testimony, maintains that there was no defect in the steering gear, neither
before nor after the accident, and expresses the opinion that the swaying or zigzagging of the car
must have been due to its having been driven at an excessive rate of speed. This may possibly be
true, but it is, from our point of view, immaterial whether the accident was caused by negligence on
the part of the defendant's employees, or whether it was due to defects in the automobile; the
result would be practically the same in either event.
In going over the bank of the road, the automobile was overturned and the plaintiffs pinned down
under it. Mr. Lasam escaped with a few contusions and a "dislocated" rib , but his wife, Joaquina
Sanchez, received serious injuries, among which was a compound fracture of one of the bones in
her left wrist. She also appears to have suffered a nervous breakdown from which she had not
fully recovered at the time of the trial.
The complaint in the case was filed about a year and a half after the occurrence above related. It
alleges, among other things, that the accident was due to defects in the automobile as well as to
the incompetence and negligence of the chauffeur, and the case appears to have been tried
largely upon the theory that it sounds in tort and that the liability of the defendant is governed by
article 1903 of the Civil Code. The trial court held, however, that the cause of action rests on the
defendant's breach of the contract of carriage and that, consequently, articles 1101-1107 of the
Civil Code, and not article 1903, are applicable. The court further found that the breach of the
contract was not due to fortuitous events and that, therefore, the defendant was liable in damages.
In our opinion, the conclusions of the court below are entirely correct. That upon the facts stated
the defendant's liability, if any, is contractual, is well settled by previous decisions of the court,
beginning with the case of Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf & Pacific Co. (7 Phil., 359), and the distinction
between extra-contractual liability and contractual liability has been so ably and exhaustively
discussed in various other cases, that nothing further need here be said upon that subject. (See

Cangco vs. Manila Railroad Co., 38 Phil., 768; Manila Railroad Co. vs. Compania Trasatlantica
and Atlantic, Gulf & Pacific Co., 38 Phil., 875; De Guia vs. Manila Electric Railroad & Light Co., 40
Phil., 706.) It is sufficient to reiterate that the source of the defendant's legal liability is the contract
of carriage; that by entering into that contract he bound himself to carry the plaintiffs safely and
securely to their destination; and that having failed to do so he is liable in damages unless he
shows that the failure to fulfill his obligation was due to causes mentioned in article 1105 of the
Civil Code, which reads as follows:
No one shall be liable for events which could not be foreseen or which, even if foreseen,
were inevitable, with the exception of the cases in which the law expressly provides
otherwise and those in which the obligation itself imposes such liability.
This brings us to the principal question in the case:
What is meant by "events which cannot be foreseen and which, having been foreseen, are
inevitable?" The Spanish authorities regard the language employed as an effort to define the
term caso fortuito and hold that the two expressions are synonymous. (Manresa, Comentarios al
Codigo Civil Espaol, vol. 8, pp. 88 et seq.; Scvola, Codigo Civil, vol. 19, pp. 526 et seq.)
The antecedent to article 1105 is found in Law 11, Title 33, Partida 7, which defines caso
fortuito as "occasion que a case por aventura de que non se puede ante ver. E son estos,
derrivamientos de casas e fuego que se enciende a so ora, e quebrantamiento de navio, fuerca
de ladrones. . . . (An event that takes place by accident and could not have been foreseen.
Examples of this are destruction of houses, unexpected fire, shipwreck, violence of robbers. . . .)"
Escriche defines caso fortuito as "an unexpected event or act of God which could either be
foreseen nor resisted, such as floods, torrents, shipwrecks, conflagrations, lightning, compulsion,
insurrections, destructions, destruction of buildings by unforseen accidents and other occurrences
of a similar nature."
In discussing and analyzing the term caso fortuito the Enciclopedia Juridica Espaola says: "In a
legal sense and, consequently, also in relation to contracts, a caso fortuito presents the following
essential characteristics: (1) The cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence, or of the
failure of the debtor to comply with his obligation, must be independent of the human will. (2) It
must be impossible to foresee the event which constitutes the caso fortuito, or if it can be
foreseen, it must be impossible to avoid. (3) The occurrence must be such as to render it
impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner. And (4) the obligor (debtor)
must be free from any participation in the aggravation of the injury resulting to the creditor."
(5 Enciclopedia Juridica Espaola, 309.)
As will be seen, these authorities agree that some extraordinary circumstance independent of the
will of the obligor, or of his employees, is an essential element of a caso fortuito. Turning to the
present case, it is at once apparent that this element is lacking. It is not suggested that the
accident in question was due to an act of God or to adverse road conditions which could not have
been foreseen. As far as the records shows, the accident was caused either by defects in the
automobile or else through the negligence of its driver. That is not a caso fortuito.
We agree with counsel that neither under the American nor Spanish law is a carrier of passengers
an absolute insurer against the risks of travel from which the passenger may protect himself by
exercising ordinary care and diligence. The case of Alba vs. Sociedad Anonima de
Tranvias, Jurisprudencia Civil, vol. 102, p. 928, cited by the defendant in support of his
contentions, affords a good illustration of the application of this principle. In that case Alba, a
passenger on a street car, was standing on the platform of the car while it was in motion. The car
rounded a curve causing Alba to lose his balance and fall off the platform, sustaining severe
injuries. In an action brought by him to recover damages, the supreme court of Spain held that

inasmuch as the car at the time of the accident was travelling at a moderate rate of speed and
there was no infraction of the regulations, and the plaintiff was exposed to no greater danger than
that inherent in that particular mode of travel, the plaintiff could not recover, especially so since he
should have been on his guard against a contingency as natural as that of losing his balance to a
greater or less extent when the car rounded the curve.
But such is not the present case; here the passengers had no means of avoiding the danger or
escaping the injury.
The plaintiffs maintain that the evidence clearly establishes that they are entitled to damages in
the sum of P7,832.80 instead of P1,254.10 as found by the trial court, and their assignments of
error relate to this point only.
There can be no doubt that the expenses incurred by the plaintiffs as a result of the accident
greatly exceeded the amount of the damages awarded. But bearing in mind that in determining the
extent of the liability for losses or damages resulting from negligence in the fulfillment of a
contractual obligation, the courts have "a discretionary power to moderate the liability according to
the circumstances" (De Guia vs. Manila Electric Railroad & Light Co., 40 Phil., 706; art. 1103, Civil
Code), we do not think that the evidence is such as to justify us in interfering with the discretion of
the court below in this respect. As pointed out by that court in its well-reasoned and wellconsidered decision, by far the greater part of the damages claimed by the plaintiffs resulted from
the fracture of a bone in the left wrist of Joaquina Sanchez and from her objections to having a
decaying splinter of the bone removed by a surgical operation. As a consequence of her refusal to
submit such an operation, a series of infections ensued and which required constant and
expensive medical treatment for several years. We agree with the court below that the defendant
should not be charged with these expenses.
For the reasons stated, the judgment appealed from is affirmed, without costs in this instance. So
ordered.

Lasam vs. Smith, Nature of responsibility; definition

FACTS
Frank Smith was engaged in the business of carrying passengers for hire from the one point to
another in the Province of La Union and the surrounding provinces. Smith undertook to convey
Honorio Lasam and Joaquina Sanchez in a Ford automobile.
On leaving, the automobile was operated by a licensed chauffeur, but the chauffeur allowed
his assistant, Remigio Bueno, to drive the car.

Bueno held no drivers license, but had some experience in driving, and with the exception of
some slight engine trouble.

The defects developed in the steering gear so as to make accurate steering impossible, and
after zigzagging for a distance of about half a kilometer, the car left the road and went down a
steep embankment.

The automobile was overturned and the plaintiffs pinned down under it. Mr. Lasam escaped
with a few contusions and a dislocated rib but his wife received serious injuries, among which
was a compound fracture of one of the bones in her left wrist.

Plaintiff Lasam brought the action to recover damages against Smith for the physical injuries
sustained in an automobile accident.
The Trial court ruled in favor of the plaintiff.
Both the plaintiffs and the defendant appeal, Lasam maintained that the damages awarded are
insufficient while the Smith denies all liability for any damages whatever.

ISSUE: W/N Smith is liable to the injuries caused by the accident

RULING:
Yes. Smiths liability is contractual. The source of the its liability is the contract of carriage; that
by entering into that contract he bound himself to carry the plaintiffs safely and securely to their
destination; and that having failed to do so he is liable in damages unless he shows that the
failure to fulfill his obligation was due to causes mentioned in article 1105 of the Civil Code.

Some extraordinary circumstance independent of the will of the obligor of his employees is an
essential element of a caso fortuito. This element is lacking. It is not suggested that the
accident was due to an act of God or to adverse road conditions which could not have been
foreseen. The accident was caused either by defects in the automobile or else through the
negligence of its driver.

Neither under the American nor Spanish law is a carrier of passengers an absolute insurer
against the risks of travel from which the passenger may protect himself by exercising ordinary
care and diligence. Here, the passengers had no means of avoiding the danger or escaping
the injury.

In determining the extent of the liability for losses or damages resulting from negligence in the
fulfillment of a contractual obligation, the courts have a discretionary power to moderate the
liability according to the circumstances.

As a consequence of her refusal to submit such an operation of Joaquina, a series of infections

ensued and which required constant and expensive medical treatment for several years. The
court agreed that the Smith should not be charged with these expenses.

Note:
Caso Fortuito- An event that takes place by accident and could not have been foreseen and
though foreseen is inevitable.
A caso fortuito presents the following essential characteristics: (1) The cause of the unforeseen
and unexpected occurrence, or of the failure of the debtor to comply with his obligation, must be
independent of the human will. (2) It must be impossible to foresee the event which constitutes the
caso fortuito, or if it can be foreseen, it must be impossible to avoid. (3) The occurrence must be
such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner. And (4) the
obligor (debtor) must be free from any participation in the aggravation of the injury resulting to the
creditor.

AMPANG VS GUINOO TRANS CO 92 PHIL 1085

Fortuitous Event: Ampang vs. Guinoo Transportation L5044, April 30,

1953
When the defendant bus which carried the passengers
capsized after being bumped on the left side by another bus which
caused the defendants driver to swerve his bus to the left so as to
prevent it from falling into the canal and striking a tree, a maneuver
which led the bus to skid and capsize. The Court was of the opinion
that this is an instance of fortuitous event where it resulted from
extraordinary circumstances of being struck by the other bus,
independent from the will of, and unforeseen by the defendants
driver.
G.R. No. L-5044, April 30, 1953
AMPANG (MORO), AMSIA (MORA) AND LUMPITAN (MORO), PLAINTIFFS AND
APPELLANTS, VS. GUINOO TRANSPORTATION CO. AND VICENTE GUINOO, DEFENDANTS
AND
APPELLEES.
DECISION
PARAS, C.J.:
On March 21, 1948, Moros Lambayong and Amsia were paid passengers in bus No. 24, bearing
TPU plate No. 7629, and belonging to the Guinoo Transportation Company, on its return trip from
Digos to Davao City. When said bus came to kilometer 44, it capsized on the road, as a result of
which Lambayong died and Amsia suffered physical injuries Amsia, Ampang and Lumpitan
instituted the present action in the Court of First Instance of Davao, to recover from the Guinoo
Transportation Company and its manager, Vicente Guinoo, P2,000.00 as damages for the death of
Lambayong and P1,000.00 as damages suffered by Amsia for the physical injuries. After hearing,
the court dismissed the complaint on the following grounds: "Sin embargo, del contenido de la
declaracion jurada suscrita por Amsia Puna y Lumpitan Dumingay se infiere claramente, que el
accidente que causo la muerte de Lambayong, las lessiones causadas en la persona de Amsia, y
la imposibilidad de los pasajeros de llegar a su destino, se debio' a un caso forfuito que estaba
fuera del alcance de los demandados y del chofer Quirino Piezas." The plaintiffs have appealed.
It appears that the case was submitted for decision practically on the pleadings and the meager
stipulation of facts entered into by the parties in open court, without any attempt on the part of the
plaintiffs to show by proper evidence that the accident in question was due to any fault of the
defendants' driver, and not to a fortuitous event. Upon the other hand, the records show that, as a
result of the accident, a criminal case was filed in the Justice of the Peace Court of Sta. Cruz
against the driver, Quirino Piezas, but said case was dismissed upon the joint affidavit of Amsia
and Lumpitan. This affidavit was presented in evidence and the lower court based its decision
mainly thereon. In said affidavit Amsia and Lumpitan declared as follows:
"That as the HABACCO bus No. 39 was overtaking the QUITRANCO bus we felt that the
HABACCO bus struck the QUITRANCO bus somewhere on its left side, thus suddenly pushing
the said QUITRANCO bus toward the canal on the right side of the road, and the driver of the
QUITRANCO bus swerved the truck to the left in order to prevent the truck from falling into the

canal, and striking a tree standing on the side of the road, and the HABACCO bus which was
running very fast proceeded on its way.
"Then when the driver of the truck of the QUITRANCO suddenly swerved the truck to the left in
order to prevent it from falling to the canal and striking a tree on the side of the road, the truck
skidded, thereby turning the truck upside down and as a result of which we suffered injuries
including Lamayong Mantuching who later died because of the injuries she received."
It is obvious from these statements that the accident could not be attributed in any manner to any
fault or omission of the defendants' driver. Of course, it is now pretended by counsel for the
appellants that "After investigation made by the PC officers and policemen in charge of the case,
the negligence imputed to the driver of the HABACCO truck No. 39 was found not true, because
no sign or mark of any collision was found on said two trucks and the driver of the Habacco truck
and the passengers of said two trucks denied that any such collision has ever taken place."
However, this allegation cannot be given any weight, there being nothing in the record to sustain it.
Upon the other hand, the affidavit of Amsia and Lumpitan was introduced at the hearing without
any objection from counsel for appellants.
It is urged for the appellants that the appellees are liable under their contract as transport safely
passengers Lambayong and Amsia to their destination, regardless of any fault or negligence that
cause the accident, reliance being placed on the case of Lasam vs. Smith, 45 Phil. 657. This
authority, however, comes to the aid of the appellees, because the carrier is thereunder excused
from liability if the accident is due to a fortuitous event, and this was the ruling in the appealed
decision. This Court, in interpreting "fortuitous event", stated that "As will be seen, these
authorities agree that some extraordinary circumstance independent of the will of the obligor, or of
his employees, is an essential element of a caso fortuito." From the facts of the case at bar it is
clear that the defendants' bus which carried Lambayong and Amsia capsized after being bumped
on the left side by Habacco bus No. 39, which caused the defendants' driver to swerve his bus to
the left so as to prevent it from falling into the canal and striking a tree, a maneuver which led the
bus to skid and capsize. This, in our opinion, resulted from the extraordinary circumstance of being
resulted from the extraordinary circumstance of being struck by the Habacco bus, independent of
the will of, and unforseen by the defendants' driver, in the absence of any showing to the contrary.
Wherefore, the appealed decision is affirmed, and it is so ordered without costs.
Feria, Bengzon, Pablo, Tuason, Montemayor, Reyes, Bautista Angelo, and Labrador, JJ., concur.
ISAAC VS AL AMMEN
G.R. No. L-9671

August 23, 1957

CESAR L. ISAAC, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
A. L. AMMEN TRANSPORTATION CO., INC., defendant-appellee.
Angel S. Gamboa for appellant.
Manuel O. Chan for appellee.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
A. L. Ammen Transportation Co., Inc., hereinafter referred to as defendant, is a corporation
engaged in the business of transporting passengers by land for compensation in the Bicol

provinces and one of the lines it operates is the one connecting Legaspi City, Albay with Naga City,
Camarines Sur. One of the buses which defendant was operating is Bus No. 31. On May 31, 1951,
plaintiff boarded said bus as a passenger paying the required fare from Ligao, Albay bound for Pili,
Camarines Sur, but before reaching his destination, the bus collided with a motor vehicle of the
pick-up type coming from the opposite direction, as a result of which plaintiff's left arm was
completely severed and the severed portion fell inside the bus. Plaintiff was rushed to a hospital in
Iriga, Camarines Sur where he was given blood transfusion to save his life. After four days, he was
transferred to another hospital in Tabaco, Albay, where he under went treatment for three months.
He was moved later to the Orthopedic Hospital where he was operated on and stayed there for
another two months. For these services, he incurred expenses amounting to P623.40, excluding
medical fees which were paid by defendant.
As an aftermath, plaintiff brought this action against defendants for damages alleging that the
collision which resulted in the loss of his left arm was mainly due to the gross incompetence and
recklessness of the driver of the bus operated by defendant and that defendant incurred in culpa
contractual arising from its non-compliance with its obligation to transport plaintiff safely to his,
destination. Plaintiff prays for judgment against defendant as follows: (1) P5,000 as expenses for
his medical treatment, and P3,000 as the cost of an artificial arm, or a total of P8,000; (2) P6,000
representing loss of earning; (3) P75,000 for diminution of his earning capacity; (4) P50,000 as
moral damages; and (5) P10,000 as attorneys' fees and costs of suit.
Defendant set up as special defense that the injury suffered by plaintiff was due entirely to the fault
or negligence of the driver of the pick-up car which collided with the bus driven by its driver and to
the contributory negligence of plaintiff himself. Defendant further claims that the accident which
resulted in the injury of plaintiff is one which defendant could not foresee or, though foreseen, was
inevitable.
The after trial found that the collision occurred due to the negligence of the driver of the pick-up
car and not to that of the driver of the bus it appearing that the latter did everything he could to
avoid the same but that notwithstanding his efforts, he was not able to avoid it. As a consequence,
the court dismissed complaint, with costs against plaintiff. This is an appeal from said decision.
It appears that plaintiff boarded a bus of defendant as paying passenger from Ligao, Albay, bound
for Pili, Camarines Sur, but before reaching his destination, the bus collided with a pick-up car
which was coming from the opposite direction and, as a, result, his left arm was completely
severed and fell inside the back part of the bus. Having this background in view, and considering
that plaintiff chose to hold defendant liable on its contractual obligation to carry him safely to his
place of destination, it becomes important to determine the nature and extent of the liability of a
common carrier to a passenger in the light of the law applicable in this jurisdiction.
In this connection, appellant invokes the rule that, "when an action is based on a contract of
carriage, as in this case, all that is necessary to sustain recovery is proof of the existence of the
contract of the breach thereof by act or omission", and in support thereof, he cites several
Philippine cases.1 With the ruling in mind, appellant seems to imply that once the contract of
carriage is established and there is proof that the same was broken by failure of the carrier to
transport the passenger safely to his destination, the liability of the former attaches. On the other
hand, appellee claims that is a wrong presentation of the rule. It claims that the decisions of this
Court in the cases cited do not warrant the construction sought to be placed upon, them by
appellant for a mere perusal thereof would show that the liability of the carrier was predicated not
upon mere breach of its contract of carriage but upon the finding that its negligence was found to
be the direct or proximate cause of the injury complained of. Thus, appellee contends that "if there
is no negligence on the part of the common carrier but that the accident resulting in injuries is due
to causes which are inevitable and which could not have been avoided or anticipated
notwithstanding the exercise of that high degree of care and skill which the carrier is bound to

exercise for the safety of his passengers", neither the common carrier nor the driver is liable
therefor.
We believe that the law concerning the liability of a common carrier has now suffered a substantial
modification in view of the innovations introduced by the new Civil Code. These innovations are
the ones embodied in Articles 1733, 1755 and 1756 in so far as the relation between a common
carrier and its passengers is concerned, which, for ready reference, we quote hereunder:
ART. 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of public
policy, are bound to observe extra ordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for
the safety of the passengers transported by them according to all the circumstances of
each case.
Such extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods is further expressed in articles
1734, 1735, and 1745, Nos. 5, 6, and 7, while the extraordinary diligence for the safety of
the passengers is further set forth in articles 1755 and 1756.
ART. 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care
and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due
regard for all the circumstances.
ART. 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are presumed to
have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed
extraordinary diligence as prescribed in articles 1733 and 1755.
The Code Commission, in justifying this extraordinary diligence required of a common carrier, says
the following:
A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and
foresight can provide, using the utmost deligence of very cautions persons, with due regard
for all circumstances. This extraordinary diligence required of common carriers is calculated
to protect the passengers from the tragic mishaps that frequently occur in connection with
rapid modern transportation. This high standard of care is imperatively demanded by the
precariousness of human life and by the consideration that every person must in every way
be safeguarded against all injury. (Report of the Code Commission, pp. 35-36)" (Padilla,
Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. IV, 1956 ed., p. 197).
From the above legal provisions, we can make the following restatement of the principles
governing the liability of a common carrier: (1) the liability of a carrier is contractual and arises
upon breach of its obligation. There is breach if it fails to exert extraordinary diligence according to
all circumstances of each case; (2) a carrier is obliged to carry its passenger with the utmost
diligence of a very cautious person, having due regard for all the circumstances; (3) a carrier is
presumed to be at fault or to have acted negligently in case of death of, or injury to, passengers, it
being its duty to prove that it exercised extraordinary diligence; and (4) the carrier is not an insurer
against all risks of travel.
The question that now arises is: Has defendant observed extraordinary diligence or the utmost
diligence of every cautious person, having due regard for all circumstances, in avoiding the
collision which resulted in the injury caused to the plaintiff?
After examining the evidence in connection with how the collision occurred, the lower court made
the following finding:
Hemos examinado muy detenidamente las pruebas presentadas en la vista,
principalmente, las declaraciones que hemos acotado arriba, y hernos Ilegado a la

conclusion de que el demandado ha hecho, todo cuanto estuviere de su parte para evitar el
accidente, pero sin embargo, no ha podido evitarlo.
EI hecho de que el demandado, antes del choque, tuvo que hacer pasar su truck encima
de los montones de grava que estaban depositados en la orilla del camino, sin que haya
ido mas alla, por el grave riesgo que corrian las vidas de sus pasajeros, es prueba
concluyente de lo que tenemos dicho, a saber: que el cuanto esuba de su parte, para
evitar el accidente, sin que haya podidoevitardo, por estar fuera de su control.
The evidence would appear to support the above finding. Thus, it appears that Bus No. 31,
immediately prior to the collision, was running at a moderate speed because it had just stopped at
the school zone of Matacong, Polangui, Albay. The pick-up car was at full speed and was running
outside of its proper lane. The driver of the bus, upon seeing the manner in which the pick-up was
then running, swerved the bus to the very extreme right of the road until its front and rear wheels
have gone over the pile of stones or gravel situated on the rampart of the road. Said driver could
not move the bus farther right and run over a greater portion of the pile, the peak of which was
about 3 feet high, without endangering the safety of his passengers. And notwithstanding all these
efforts, the rear left side of the bus was hit by the pick-up car.
Of course, this finding is disputed by appellant who cannot see eye to eye with the evidence for
the appellee and insists that the collision took place because the driver of the bus was going at a
fast speed. He contends that, having seen that a car was coming from the opposite direction at a
distance which allows the use of moderate care and prudence to avoid an accident, and knowing
that on the side of the road along which he was going there was a pile of gravel, the driver of the
bus should have stopped and waited for the vehicle from the opposite direction to pass, and
should have proceeded only after the other vehicle had passed. In other words, according to
appellant, the act of the driver of the bus in squeezing his way through of the bus in squeezing his
way through between the oncoming pick-up and the pile of gravel under the circumstances was
considered negligent.
But this matter is one of credibility and evaluation of the evidence. This is evidence. This is the
function of the trial court. The trial court has already spoken on this matter as we have pointed out
above. This is also a matter of appreciation of the situation on the part of the driver. While the
position taken by appellant appeals more to the sense of caution that one should observe in a
given situation to avoid an accident or mishap, such however can not always be expected from
one who is placed suddenly in a predicament where he is not given enough time to take the
course of action as he should under ordinary circumstances. One who is placed in such a
predicament cannot exercise such coolness or accuracy of judgment as is required of him under
ordinary circumstances and he cannot therefore be expected to observe the same judgment, care
and precaution as in the latter. For this reason, authorities abound where failure to observe the
same degree of care that as ordinary prudent man would exercise under ordinary circumstances
when confronted with a sadden emergency was held to be warranted and a justification to exempt
the carrier from liability. Thus, it was held that "where a carrier's employee is confronted with a
sudden emergency, the fact that he is obliged to act quickly and without a chance for deliberation
must be taken into account, and he is held to the some degree of care that he would otherwise be
required to exercise in the absence of such emergency but must exercise only such care as any
ordinary prudent person would exercise under like circumstances and conditions, and the failure
on his part to exercise the best judgement the case renders possible does not establish lack of
care and skill on his part which renders the company, liable. . . . (13 C. J. S., 1412; 10 C. J.,970).
Considering all the circumstances, we are persuaded to conclude that the driver of the bus has
done what a prudent man could have done to avoid the collision and in our opinion this relieves
appellee from legibility under our law.
A circumstances which miliates against the stand of appellant is the fact borne out by the evidence
that when he boarded the bus in question, he seated himself on the left side thereof resting his left

arm on the window sill but with his left elbow outside the window, this being his position in the bus
when the collision took place. It is for this reason that the collision resulted in the severance of said
left arm from the body of appellant thus doing him a great damage. It is therefore apparent that
appellant is guilty of contributory negligence. Had he not placed his left arm on the window sill with
a portion thereof protruding outside, perhaps the injury would have been avoided as is the case
with the other passenger. It is to be noted that appellant was the only victim of the collision.
It is true that such contributory negligence cannot relieve appellee of its liability but will only entitle
it to a reduction of the amount of damage caused (Article 1762, new Civil Code), but this is a
circumstance which further militates against the position taken by appellant in this case.
It is the prevailing rule that it is negligence per se for a passenger on a railroad voluntarily
or inadvertently to protrude his arm, hand, elbow, or any other part of his body through the
window of a moving car beyond the outer edge of the window or outer surface of the car, so
as to come in contact with objects or obstacles near the track, and that no recovery can be
had for an injury which but for such negligence would not have been sustained. (10 C. J.
1139)
Plaintiff, (passenger) while riding on an interurban car, to flick the ashes, from his cigar,
thrust his hand over the guard rail a sufficient distance beyond the side line of the car to
bring it in contact with the trunk of a tree standing beside the track; the force of the blow
breaking his wrist. Held, that he was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law.
(Malakia vs. Rhode Island Co., 89 A., 337.)
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed, with cost against appellant.

Transportation Case Digest: Isaac V. A.L. Ammen Trans. Co. (1957)

G.R.No.
Lessons

L-9671
Applicable: Legal

August

23,
Effect

1957
(Transportation)

FACTS:

May 31, 1951: Cesar Isaac boarded Bus No. 31 from Ligao, Albay bound for Pili,
Camarines Sur and seated himself on the left side resting his left arm on the window sill but
with his left elbow outside the window
Before reaching his destination, a pick-up car at full speed and was running outside
of its proper lane came from the opposite direction
The driver of the bus swerved the bus to the very extreme right of the road
until its front and rear wheels have gone over the pile of stones or gravel situated on the
rampart of the road.
The bus could not bus farther right and run over a greater portion of the pile of
gravel, the peak of which was about 3 feet high, without endangering the safety of his
passengers.
Despite efforts, the rear left side of the bus was hit by the pick-up car
He was rushed to a hospital in Iriga, Camarines Sur where he was given blood
transfusion to save his life
After 4 days, he was transferred to another hospital in Tabaco, Albay, where he under went
treatment for 3 months

Later, he was moved to the Orthopedic Hospital where he was operated on and stayed for
another 2 months.

He incurred expenses of P623.40, excluding medical fees which were paid by A.L. Ammen
Trans. Co.

Trial Court: Dismissed the complaint - collision occurred due to the negligence of the driver
of the pick-up car
ISSUE: W/N if there is no negligence on the part of the common carrier but that the accident
resulting in injuries is due to causes which are inevitable and which could not have been avoided
or anticipated notwithstanding the exercise of that high degree of care and skill which the carrier is
bound to exercise for the safety of his passengers neither the common carrier nor the driver is
liable therefor

HELD:

YES.

Appealed

decision

is

AFFIRMED.

ART. 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy,
are bound to observe extra ordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for the safety of
the passengers transported by them according to all the circumstances of each case.
Such extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods is further expressed in articles 1734,
1735, and 1745, Nos. 5, 6, and 7, while the extraordinary diligence for the safety of the
passengers
is
further
set
forth
in
articles
1755
and
1756
Ooom.
ART. 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and
foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard for all
the
circumstances.
ART. 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are presumed to have
been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed extraordinary
diligence
as
prescribed
in
articles
1733
and
1755.

principles governing the liability of a common carrier:

1. the liability of a carrier is contractual and arises upon breach of its obligation. There is
breach if it fails to exert extraordinary diligence according to all circumstances of each case
2. a carrier is obliged to carry its passenger with the utmost diligence of a very cautious
person, having due regard for all the circumstances
3. a carrier is presumed to be at fault or to have acted negligently in case of death of, or injury
to, passengers, it being its duty to prove that it exercised extraordinary diligence
4. the carrier is not an insurer against all risks of travel

where a carrier's employee is confronted with a sudden emergency, the fact that he is
obliged to act quickly and without a chance for deliberation must be taken into account, and he
is held to the some degree of care that he would otherwise be required to exercise in the
absence of such emergency but must exercise only such care as any ordinary prudent person
would exercise under like circumstances and conditions, and the failure on his part to exercise

the best judgment the case renders possible does not establish lack of care and skill on his
part
Considering all the circumstances, we are persuaded to conclude that the driver of
the bus has done what a prudent man could have done to avoid the collision
It is true that Isaac's contributory negligence cannot relieve A.L. Ammen of its liability but
will only entitle it to a reduction of the amount of damage caused (Article 1762, new Civil
Code), but this is a circumstance which further militates against the position taken by Isaac

MARANAN VS PEREZ
G.R. No. L-22272

June 26, 1967

ANTONIA
vs.
PASCUAL
PEREZ,
PASCUAL PEREZ, defendant appellant.
Pedro
Panganiban
Magno T. Bueser for defendant-appellant.

MARANAN, plaintiff-appellant,
ET

AL., defendants.

for

plaintiff-appellant.

BENGZON, J.P., J.:

Rogelio Corachea, on October 18, 1960, was a passenger in a taxicab owned and operated by
Pascual Perez when he was stabbed and killed by the driver, Simeon Valenzuela.
Valenzuela was prosecuted for homicide in the Court of First Instance of Batangas. Found guilty,
he was sentenced to suffer imprisonment and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of
P6,000. Appeal from said conviction was taken to the Court of Appeals.1wph1.t
On December 6 1961, while appeal was pending in the Court of Appeals, Antonia Maranan,
Rogelio's mother, filed an action in the Court of First Instance of Batangas to recover damages
from Perez and Valenzuela for the death of her son. Defendants asserted that the deceased was
killed in self-defense, since he first assaulted the driver by stabbing him from behind. Defendant
Perez further claimed that the death was a caso fortuito for which the carrier was not liable.
The court a quo, after trial, found for the plaintiff and awarded her P3,000 as damages against
defendant Perez. The claim against defendant Valenzuela was dismissed. From this ruling, both
plaintiff and defendant Perez appealed to this Court, the former asking for more damages and the
latter insisting on non-liability. Subsequently, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of
conviction earlier mentioned, during the pendency of the herein appeal, and on May 19, 1964, final
judgment was entered therein. (Rollo, p. 33).
Defendant-appellant relies solely on the ruling enunciated in Gillaco v. Manila Railroad Co., 97
Phil. 884, that the carrier is under no absolute liability for assaults of its employees upon the
passengers. The attendant facts and controlling law of that case and the one at bar are very
different however. In the Gillaco case, the passenger was killed outside the scope and the course
of duty of the guilty employee. As this Court there found:

x x x when the crime took place, the guard Devesa had no duties to discharge in
connection with the transportation of the deceased from Calamba to Manila. The stipulation
of facts is clear that when Devesa shot and killed Gillaco, Devesa was assigned to guard
the Manila-San Fernando (La Union) trains, and he was at Paco Station awaiting
transportation to Tutuban, the starting point of the train that he was engaged to guard. In
fact, his tour of duty was to start at 9:00 two hours after the commission of the
crime. Devesa was therefore under no obligation to safeguard the passengers of the
Calamba-Manila train, where the deceased was riding; and the killing of Gillaco was not
done in line of duty. The position of Devesa at the time was that of another would be
passenger, a stranger also awaiting transportation, and not that of an employee assigned to
discharge any of the duties that the Railroad had assumed by its contract with the
deceased. As a result, Devesa's assault can not be deemed in law a breach of Gillaco's
contract of transportation by a servant or employee of the carrier. . . . (Emphasis supplied)
Now here, the killing was perpetrated by the driver of the very cab transporting the passenger, in
whose hands the carrier had entrusted the duty of executing the contract of carriage. In other
words, unlike the Gillaco case, the killing of the passenger here took place in the course of duty of
the guilty employee and when the employee was acting within the scope of his duties.
Moreover, the Gillaco case was decided under the provisions of the Civil Code of 1889 which,
unlike the present Civil Code, did not impose upon common carriers absolute liability for the safety
of passengers against wilful assaults or negligent acts committed by their employees. The death of
the passenger in the Gillaco case was truly a fortuitous event which exempted the carrier from
liability. It is true that Art. 1105 of the old Civil Code on fortuitous events has been substantially
reproduced in Art. 1174 of the Civil Code of the Philippines but both articles clearly remove from
their exempting effect the case where the law expressly provides for liability in spite of the
occurrence of force majeure. And herein significantly lies the statutory difference between the old
and present Civil Codes, in the backdrop of the factual situation before Us, which further accounts
for a different result in theGillaco case. Unlike the old Civil Code, the new Civil Code of the
Philippines expressly makes the common carrier liable for intentional assaults committed by its
employees upon its passengers, by the wording of Art. 1759 which categorically states that
Common carriers are liable for the death of or injuries to passengers through the
negligence or willful acts of the former's employees, although such employees may have
acted beyond the scope of their authority or in violation of the orders of the common
carriers.
The Civil Code provisions on the subject of Common Carriers 1 are new and were taken from
Anglo-American Law.2 There, the basis of the carrier's liability for assaults on passengers
committed by its drivers rests either on (1) the doctrine of respondeat superior or (2) the principle
that it is the carrier's implied duty to transport the passenger safely.3
Under the first, which is the minority view, the carrier is liable only when the act of the employee is
within the scope of his authority and duty. It is not sufficient that the act be within the course of
employment only.4
Under the second view, upheld by the majority and also by the later cases, it is enough that the
assault happens within the course of the employee's duty. It is no defense for the carrier that the
act was done in excess of authority or in disobedience of the carrier's orders. 5 The carrier's liability
here is absolute in the sense that it practically secures the passengers from assaults committed by
its own employees.6
As can be gleaned from Art. 1759, the Civil Code of the Philippines evidently follows the rule
based on the second view. At least three very cogent reasons underlie this rule. As explained
in Texas Midland R.R. v. Monroe, 110 Tex. 97, 216 S.W. 388, 389-390, and Haver v. Central

Railroad Co., 43 LRA 84, 85: (1) the special undertaking of the carrier requires that it furnish its
passenger that full measure of protection afforded by the exercise of the high degree of care
prescribed by the law, inter alia from violence and insults at the hands of strangers and other
passengers, but above all, from the acts of the carrier's own servants charged with the
passenger's safety; (2) said liability of the carrier for the servant's violation of duty to passengers,
is the result of the formers confiding in the servant's hands the performance of his contract to
safely transport the passenger, delegating therewith the duty of protecting the passenger with the
utmost care prescribed by law; and (3) as between the carrier and the passenger, the former must
bear the risk of wrongful acts or negligence of the carrier's employees against passengers, since
it, and not the passengers, has power to select and remove them.
Accordingly, it is the carrier's strict obligation to select its drivers and similar employees with due
regard not only to their technical competence and physical ability, but also, no less important, to
their total personality, including their patterns of behavior, moral fibers, and social attitude.
Applying this stringent norm to the facts in this case, therefore, the lower court rightly adjudged the
defendant carrier liable pursuant to Art. 1759 of the Civil Code. The dismissal of the claim against
the defendant driver was also correct. Plaintiff's action was predicated on breach of contract of
carriage7 and the cab driver was not a party thereto. His civil liability is covered in the criminal case
wherein he was convicted by final judgment.
In connection with the award of damages, the court a quo granted only P3,000 to plaintiffappellant. This is the minimum compensatory damages amount recoverable under Art. 1764 in
connection with Art. 2206 of the Civil Code when a breach of contract results in the passenger's
death. As has been the policy followed by this Court, this minimal award should be increased to
P6,000. As to other alleged actual damages, the lower court's finding that plaintiff's evidence
thereon was not convincing,8 should not be disturbed. Still, Arts. 2206 and 1764
awardmoral damages in addition to compensatory damages, to the parents of the passenger killed
to compensate for the mental anguish they suffered. A claim therefor, having been properly made,
it becomes the court's duty to award moral damages. 9 Plaintiff demands P5,000 as moral
damages; however, in the circumstances, We consider P3,000 moral damages, in addition to the
P6,000 damages afore-stated, as sufficient. Interest upon such damages are also due to plaintiffappellant. 10
Wherefore, with the modification increasing the award of actual damages in plaintiff's favor to
P6,000, plus P3,000.00 moral damages, with legal interest on both from the filing of the complaint
on December 6, 1961 until the whole amount is paid, the judgment appealed from is affirmed in all
other respects. No costs. So ordered.

NECESITO VS PARAS
G.R. No. L-10605

June 30, 1958

PRECILLANO
NECESITO,
vs.
NATIVIDAD PARAS, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. L-10606

June 30, 1958

ETC., plaintiff-appellant,

GERMAN
NECESITO,
ET
vs.
NATIVIDAD PARAS, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
Tomas
Besa
and
Jose W. Diokno for appellees.

Federico

AL., plaintiffs-appellants,

Agrava

for

appellants.

REYES, J. B. L., J.:

These cases involve ex contractu against the owners and operators of the common carrier known
as Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, filed by one passenger, and the heirs of another, who injured as a
result of the fall into a river of the vehicle in which they were riding.
In the morning of January 28, 1964, Severina Garces and her one-year old son, Precillano
Necesito, carrying vegetables, boarded passenger auto truck or bus No. 199 of the Philippine
Rabbit Bus Lines at Agno, Pangasinan. The passenger truck, driven by Francisco Bandonell, then
proceeded on its regular run from Agno to Manila. After passing Mangatarem, Pangasinan truck
No. 199 entered a wooden bridge, but the front wheels swerved to the right; the driver lost control,
and after wrecking the bridge's wooden rails, the truck fell on its right side into a creek where water
was breast deep. The mother, Severina Garces, was drowned; the son, Precillano Necesito, was
injured, suffering abrasions and fracture of the left femur. He was brought to the Provincial
Hospital at Dagupan, where the fracture was set but with fragments one centimeter out of line. The
money, wrist watch and cargo of vegetables were lost.
Two actions for damages and attorney's fees totalling over P85,000 having been filed in the Court
of First Instance of Tarlac (Cases Nos. 908 and 909) against the carrier, the latter pleaded that the
accident was due to "engine or mechanical trouble" independent or beyond the control of the
defendants or of the driver Bandonell.
After joint trial, the Court of First Instance found that the bus was proceeding slowly due to the bad
condition of the road; that the accident was caused by the fracture of the right steering knuckle,
which was defective in that its center or core was not compact but "bubbled and cellulous", a
condition that could not be known or ascertained by the carrier despite the fact that regular thirtyday inspections were made of the steering knuckle, since the steel exterior was smooth and shiny
to the depth of 3/16 of an inch all around; that the knuckles are designed and manufactured for
heavy duty and may last up to ten years; that the knuckle of bus No. 199 that broke on January
28, 1954, was last inspected on January 5, 1954, and was due to be inspected again on February
5th. Hence, the trial court, holding that the accident was exclusively due to fortuitous event,
dismissed both actions. Plaintiffs appealed directly to this Court in view of the amount in
controversy.
We are inclined to agree with the trial court that it is not likely that bus No. 199 of the Philippine
Rabbit Lines was driven over the deeply rutted road leading to the bridge at a speed of 50 miles
per hour, as testified for the plaintiffs. Such conduct on the part of the driver would have provoked
instant and vehement protest on the part of the passengers because of the attendant discomfort,
and there is no trace of any such complaint in the records. We are thus forced to assume that the
proximate cause of the accident was the reduced strength of the steering knuckle of the vehicle
caused by defects in casting it. While appellants hint that the broken knuckle exhibited in court
was not the real fitting attached to the truck at the time of the accident, the records they registered
no objection on that ground at the trial below. The issue is thus reduced to the question whether or
not the carrier is liable for the manufacturing defect of the steering knuckle, and whether the
evidence discloses that in regard thereto the carrier exercised the diligence required by law (Art.
1755, new Civil Code).

ART. 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care
and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due
regard for the all the circumstances.
It is clear that the carrier is not an insurer of the passengers' safety. His liability rests upon
negligence, his failure to exercise the "utmost" degree of diligence that the law requires, and by
Art. 1756, in case of a passenger's death or injury the carrier bears the burden of satisfying the
court that he has duly discharged the duty of prudence required. In the American law, where the
carrier is held to the same degree of diligence as under the new Civil Code, the rule on the liability
of carriers for defects of equipment is thus expressed: "The preponderance of authority is in favor
of the doctrine that a passenger is entitled to recover damages from a carrier for an injury resulting
from a defect in an appliance purchased from a manufacturer, whenever it appears that the defect
would have been discovered by the carrier if it had exercised the degree of care which under the
circumstances was incumbent upon it, with regard to inspection and application of the necessary
tests. For the purposes of this doctrine, the manufacturer is considered as being in law the agent
or servant of the carrier, as far as regards the work of constructing the appliance. According to this
theory, the good repute of the manufacturer will not relieve the carrier from liability" (10 Am. Jur.
205, s, 1324; see also Pennsylvania R. Co. vs. Roy, 102 U. S. 451; 20 L. Ed. 141; Southern R. Co.
vs. Hussey, 74 ALR 1172; 42 Fed. 2d 70; and Ed Note, 29 ALR 788; Ann. Cas. 1916E 929).
The rationale of the carrier's liability is the fact that the passenger has neither choice nor control
over the carrier in the selection and use of the equipment and appliances in use by the carrier.
Having no privity whatever with the manufacturer or vendor of the defective equipment, the
passenger has no remedy against him, while the carrier usually has. It is but logical, therefore, that
the carrier, while not in insurer of the safety of his passengers, should nevertheless be held to
answer for the flaws of his equipment if such flaws were at all discoverable. Thus Hannen, J.,
in Francis vs. Cockrell, LR 5 Q. B. 184, said:
In the ordinary course of things, the passenger does not know whether the carrier has
himself manufactured the means of carriage, or contracted with someone else for its
manufacture. If the carrier has contracted with someone else the passenger does not
usually know who that person is, and in no case has he any share in the selection. The
liability of the manufacturer must depend on the terms of the contract between him and the
carrier, of which the passenger has no knowledge, and over which he can have no control,
while the carrier can introduce what stipulations and take what securities he may think
proper. For injury resulting to the carrier himself by the manufacturer's want of care, the
carrier has a remedy against the manufacturer; but the passenger has no remedy against
the manufacturer for damage arising from a mere breach of contract with the carrier . . . .
Unless, therefore, the presumed intention of the parties be that the passenger should, in the
event of his being injured by the breach of the manufacturer's contract, of which he has no
knowledge, be without remedy, the only way in which effect can be given to a different
intention is by supposing that the carrier is to be responsible to the passenger, and to look
for his indemnity to the person whom he selected and whose breach of contract has caused
the mischief. (29 ALR 789)
And in the leading case of Morgan vs. Chesapeake & O. R. Co. 15 LRA (NS) 790, 16 Ann. Cas.
608, the Court, in holding the carrier responsible for damages caused by the fracture of a car axle,
due to a "sand hole" in the course of moulding the axle, made the following observations.
The carrier, in consideration of certain well-known and highly valuable rights granted to it by
the public, undertakes certain duties toward the public, among them being to provide itself
with suitable and safe cars and vehicles in which carry the traveling public. There is no such
duty on the manufacturer of the cars. There is no reciprocal legal relation between him and
the public in this respect. When the carrier elects to have another build its cars, it ought not
to be absolved by that facts from its duty to the public to furnish safe cars. The carrier

cannot lessen its responsibility by shifting its undertaking to another's shoulders. Its duty to
furnish safe cars is side by side with its duty to furnish safe track, and to operate them in a
safe manner. None of its duties in these respects can be sublet so as to relieve it from the
full measure primarily exacted of it by law. The carrier selects the manufacturer of its cars, if
it does not itself construct them, precisely as it does those who grade its road, and lay its
tracks, and operate its trains. That it does not exercise control over the former is because it
elects to place that matter in the hands of the manufacturer, instead of retaining the
supervising control itself. The manufacturer should be deemed the agent of the carrier as
respects its duty to select the material out of which its cars and locomotive are built, as well
as in inspecting each step of their construction. If there be tests known to the crafts of car
builders, or iron moulders, by which such defects might be discovered before the part was
incorporated into the car, then the failure of the manufacturer to make the test will be
deemed a failure by the carrier to make it. This is not a vicarious responsibility. It extends,
as the necessity of this business demands, the rule of respondeat superior to a situation
which falls clearly within its scope and spirit. Where an injury is inflicted upon a passenger
by the breaking or wrecking of a part of the train on which he is riding, it is presumably the
result of negligence at some point by the carrier. As stated by Judge Story, in Story on
Bailments, sec. 601a: "When the injury or damage happens to the passenger by the
breaking down or overturning of the coach, or by any other accident occurring on the
ground, the presumption prima facie is that it occurred by the negligence of the coachmen,
and onus probandi is on the proprietors of the coach to establish that there has been no
negligence whatever, and that the damage or injury has been occasioned by inevitable
casualty, or by some cause which human care and foresight could not prevent; for the law
will, in tenderness to human life and limb, hold the proprietors liable for the slightest
negligence, and will compel them to repel by satisfactory proofs every imputation thereof."
When the passenger has proved his injury as the result of a breakage in the car or the
wrecking of the train on which he was being carried, whether the defect was in the
particular car in which he was riding or not, the burden is then cast upon the carrier to show
that it was due to a cause or causes which the exercise of the utmost human skill and
foresight could not prevent. And the carrier in this connection must show, if the accident
was due to a latent defect in the material or construction of the car, that not only could it not
have discovered the defect by the exercise of such care, but that the builders could not by
the exercise of the same care have discovered the defect or foreseen the result. This rule
applies the same whether the defective car belonged to the carrier or not.
In the case now before us, the record is to the effect that the only test applied to the steering
knuckle in question was a purely visual inspection every thirty days, to see if any cracks
developed. It nowhere appears that either the manufacturer or the carrier at any time tested the
steering knuckle to ascertain whether its strength was up to standard, or that it had no hidden
flaws would impair that strength. And yet the carrier must have been aware of the critical
importance of the knuckle's resistance; that its failure or breakage would result in loss of balance
and steering control of the bus, with disastrous effects upon the passengers. No argument is
required to establish that a visual inspection could not directly determine whether the resistance of
this critically important part was not impaired. Nor has it been shown that the weakening of the
knuckle was impossible to detect by any known test; on the contrary, there is testimony that it
could be detected. We are satisfied that the periodical visual inspection of the steering knuckle as
practiced by the carrier's agents did not measure up to the required legal standard of "utmost
diligence of very cautious persons" "as far as human care and foresight can provide", and
therefore that the knuckle's failure can not be considered a fortuitous event that exempts the
carrier from responsibility (Lasam vs. Smith, 45 Phil. 657; Son vs. Cebu Autobus Co., 94 Phil.,
892.)
It may be impracticable, as appellee argues, to require of carriers to test the strength of each and
every part of its vehicles before each trip; but we are of the opinion that a due regard for the
carrier's obligations toward the traveling public demands adequate periodical tests to determine

the condition and strength of those vehicle portions the failure of which may endanger the safe of
the passengers.
As to the damages suffered by the plaintiffs, we agree with appellee that no allowance may be
made for moral damages, since under Article 2220 of the new Civil Code, in case of suits for
breach of contract, moral damages are recoverable only where the defendant acted fraudulently or
in bad faith, and there is none in the case before us. As to exemplary damages, the carrier has not
acted in a "wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner" to warrant their award.
Hence, we believe that for the minor Precillano Necesito (G. R. No. L-10605), an indemnity of
P5,000 would be adequate for the abrasions and fracture of the femur, including medical and
hospitalization expenses, there being no evidence that there would be any permanent impairment
of his faculties or bodily functions, beyond the lack of anatomical symmetry. As for the death of
Severina Garces (G. R. No. L-10606) who was 33 years old, with seven minor children when she
died, her heirs are obviously entitled to indemnity not only for the incidental loses of property
(cash, wrist watch and merchandise) worth P394 that she carried at the time of the accident and
for the burial expenses of P490, but also for the loss of her earnings (shown to average P120 a
month) and for the deprivation of her protection, guidance and company. In our judgment, an
award of P15,000 would be adequate (cf Alcantara vs. Surro, 49 Off. Gaz. 2769; 93 Phil., 472).
The low income of the plaintiffs-appellants makes an award for attorney's fees just and equitable
(Civil Code, Art. 2208, par. 11). Considering that he two cases filed were tried jointly, a fee of
P3,500 would be reasonable.
In view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is reversed, and the defendants-appellees are
sentenced to indemnify the plaintiffs-appellants in the following amounts: P5,000 to Precillano
Necesito, and P15,000 to the heirs of the deceased Severina Garces, plus P3,500 by way of
attorney's fees and litigation expenses. Costs against defendants-appellees. So ordered.
Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, and Endencia, JJ., concur.
Felix, J., concurs in the result.

RESOLUTION

September 11, 1958

REYES, J. B. L., J.:

Defendants-appellees have Submitted a motion asking this Court to reconsider its decision of
June 30, 1958, and that the same be modified with respect to (1) its holding the carrier liable for
the breakage of the steering knuckle that caused the autobus No. 199 to overturn, whereby the
passengers riding in it were injured; (2) the damages awarded, that appellees argue to be
excessive; and (3) the award of attorneys' fees.
(1) The rule prevailing in this jurisdiction as established in previous decisions of this Court, cited in
our main opinion, is that a carrier is liable to its passengers for damages caused by mechanical
defects of the conveyance. As early as 1924, in Lasam vs. Smith, 45 Phil. 659 this Court ruled:
As far as the record shows, the accident was caused either by defects in the automobile or
else through the negligence of its driver. That is not caso fortuito.

And in Son vs. Cebu Autobus Company, 94 Phil., 892, this Court held a common carrier liable in
damages to passenger for injuries cause by an accident due to the breakage of a faulty drag-link
spring.
It can be seen that while the courts of the United States are at variance on the question of a
carrier's liability for latent mechanical defects, the rule in this jurisdiction has been consistent in
holding the carrier responsible. This Court has quoted from American and English decisions, not
because it felt bound to follow the same, but merely in approval of the rationale of the rule as
expressed therein, since the previous Philippine cases did not enlarge on the ideas underlying the
doctrine established thereby.
The new evidence sought to be introduced do not warrant the grant of a new trial, since the
proposed proof available when the original trial was held. Said evidence is not newly discovered.
(2) With regard to the indemnity awarded to the child Precilliano Necesito, the injuries suffered by
him are incapable of accurate pecuniary estimation, particularly because the full effect of the injury
is not ascertainable immediately. This uncertainty, however, does not preclude the right to an
indemnity, since the injury is patent and not denied (Civil Code, Art. 2224). The reasons behind
this award are expounded by the Code Commission in its report:
There are cases where from the nature of the case, definite proof of pecuniary loss cannot
be offered, although the court is convinced that there has been such loss. For instance,
injury to one's commercial credit or to the goodwill of a business firm is often hard to show
with certainty in terms of money. Should damages be denied for that reason? The judge
should be empowered to calculate moderate damages in such cases, rather than that the
plaintiff should suffer, without redress, from the defendant's wrongful act." (Report of the
Code Commission, p. 75)
In awarding to the heirs of the deceased Severina Garces an indemnity for the loss of her
"guidance, protection and company," although it is but moral damage, the Court took into account
that the case of a passenger who dies in the course of an accident, due to the carrier's negligence
constitutes an exception to the general rule. While, as pointed out in the main decision, under
Article 2220 of the new Civil Code there can be no recovery of moral damages for a breach of
contract in the absence of fraud malice or bad faith, the case of a violation of the contract of
carriage leading to a passenger's death escapes this general rule, in view of Article 1764 in
connection with Article 2206, No. 3 of the new Civil Code.
ART. 1764. Damages in cases comprised in this Section shall be awarded in accordance
with Title XVIII of this Book, concerning Damages. Article 2206 shall also apply to the death
of a passenger caused by the breach of contract by a comman carrier. ART. 2206. . . .
(3) The spouse, legitimate and eligimate descendants and ascendants of the deceased
may demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased.
Being a special rule limited to cases of fatal injuries, these articles prevail over the general rule of
Art. 2220. Special provisions control general ones (Lichauco & Co. vs. Apostol, 44 Phil. 138;
Sancio vs. Lizarraga, 55 Phil. 601).
It thus appears that under the new Civil Code, in case of accident due to a carrier's negligence,
the heirs of a deceased passenger may recover moral damages, even though a passenger who is
injured, but manages to survive, is not entitled to them. There is, therefore, no conflict between our
main decision in the instant case and that of Cachero vs. Manila Yellow Taxi Cab Co., 101 Phil.,
523, where the passenger suffered injuries, but did not lose his life.

(3) In the Cachero case this Court disallowed attorneys' fees to the injured plaintiff because the
litigation arose out of his exaggerated and unreasonable deeds for an indemnity that was out of
proportion with the compensatory damages to which he was solely entitled. But in the present
case, plaintiffs' original claims can not be deemed a priori wholly unreasonable, since they had a
right to indemnity for moral damages besides compensatory ones, and moral damages are not
determined by set and invariable bounds.
Neither does the fact that the contract between the passengers and their counsel was on a
contingent basis affect the former's right to counsel fees. As pointed out for appellants, the Court's
award is an party and not to counsel. A litigant who improvidently stipulate higher counsel fees
than those to which he is lawfully entitled, does not for that reason earn the right to a larger
indemnity; but, by parity of reasoning, he should not be deprived of counsel fees if by law he is
entitled to recover them.
We find no reason to alter the main decision heretofore rendered. Ultimately, the position taken by
this Court is that a common carrier's contract is not to be regarded as a game of chance wherein
the passenger stakes his limb and life against the carrier's property and profits.
Wherefore, the motion for reconsideration is hereby denied. So ordered.
CASE DIGEST (Transportation Law): Necesito vs. Paras
PRECILLANO NECESITO, ETC. vs. NATIVIDAD PARAS, ET AL.
G.R. No. L-10605, June 30, 1958)
FACTS:
A mother and her son boarded a passenger auto-truck of the Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines. While
entering a wooden bridge, its front wheels swerved to the right, the driver lost control and the truck
fell into a breast-deep creek. The mother drowned and the son sustained injuries. These cases
involve actions ex contractu against the owners of PRBL filed by the son and the heirs of the
mother. Lower Court dismissed the actions, holding that the accident was a fortuitous event.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the carrier is liable for the manufacturing defect of the steering knuckle, and
whether the evidence discloses that in regard thereto the carrier exercised the diligence required
by
law
(Art.
1755,
new
Civil
Code)
HELD:
Yes.
While the carrier is not an insurer of the safety of the passengers, the manufacturer of the
defective appliance is considered in law the agent of the carrier, and the good repute of the
manufacturer will not relieve the carrier from liability. The rationale of the carriers liability is the fact
that the passengers has no privity with the manufacturer of the defective equipment; hence, he
has no remedy against him, while the carrier has. We find that the defect could be detected. The
periodical, usual inspection of the steering knuckle did not measure up to the utmost diligence of
a very cautious person as far as human care and foresight can provide and therefore the

knuckles failure cannot be considered a fortuitous event that exempts the carrier from
responsibility.
LAGUNA TAYABAS BUS CO VS TIONGSON
G.R. No. L-22143

April 30, 1966

LAGUNA
TAYABAS
BUS
vs.
ANTONIO TIONGSON and FELICITAS J. TIONGSON, respondents.
Ozaeta, Gibbs and Ozaeta and D. E.
Ejercito, Velilla and Balonkita for respondents.

de

Lara

and

CO., petitioner,

Associates

for

petitioner.

DIZON, J.:
This is an appeal by certiorari taken by Laguna Tayabas Bus Co., a common carrier engaged in
the land transportation business in the southern Tagalog provinces, to review the decision of the
Court of Appeals affirming that of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan in Civil Case No. 1760
entitled "Antonio Tiongson, Paz C. Tiongson and Felicitas J. Tiongson, plaintiffs, vs. Laguna
Tayabas Bus Company, defendant" sentencing the latter to pay the former the sum of P50,000.00
by way of actual, compensatory and moral damages, and the further sum of P5,000.00 as
attorney's fees and costs.
On June 3, 1958, about two kilometers past the poblacion of Bay, Laguna, petitioner's LTB Bus
No. 204, coming from San Pablo City towards Manila, collided with a 7-Up delivery truck coming
from the opposite direction. As a consequence the bus fell on its right side on the shoulder of the
road resulting in injuries to many of its passengers and the death of Ricardo C. Tiongson and a
woman passenger. Both drivers were prosecuted for double homicide, multiple serious physical
injuries and damage to property, thru reckless imprudence, in the Court of First Instance of
Laguna, but a separate action for damages for breach of contract of carriage was filed in the Court
of First Instance of Bulacan (Civil Case No. 1760) by respondents herein, as heirs of the deceased
Ricardo C. Tiongson, against petitioner.
In its answer to the complaint, petitioner alleged that it had observed utmost diligence in operating
Bus No. 204 on June 3, 1958; that its driver could not have prevented or avoided the accident
which was fortuitous insofar as it was concerned; and that the proximate cause of the death of
passenger Tiongson "as the negligence and imprudence of one Porvenir Aralar Barretto and his
employer Santiago Syjuco, Inc. and/or Seven-Up Bottling Company of the Philippines, or, in the
alternative, the gross negligence of the highway authorities in failing to keep and maintain the
national roads in good repair at all times and safe condition for all motorists".
Finding petitioner's driver to blame for the accident, the trial court, on December 28, 1959,
rendered judgment as follows:
Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered sentencing defendant to pay to plaintiffs the sum
of P50,000.00 by way of actual, compensatory and moral damages, and the further sum of
P5,000.00 as counsel fees, with costs against defendant.
Both parties appealed to the Court of Appeals petitioner from the portion thereof holding it liable
for damages for breach of contract, and respondents from the portion determining the amount of
damages awarded to them.
Meanwhile, on July 31, 1961, the Court of First Instance of Laguna, in Criminal Case No. B-3311,
acquitted Claro Samonte, petitioner's driver, of the offense charged mentioned heretofore, on the

ground of reasonable doubt. Upon the other hand, on October 28, 1963, the Court of Appeals
rendered the decision appealed from.
In its first assignment of error, petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming
instead of reversing the findings made by the trial court to the effect that the driver of the LTB bus
and not the driver of the 7-Up truck was to blame for the accident in question.
The following are the pertinent facts found established by the trial court:
About two kilometers past the poblacion of Bay, Laguna, defendant's LTB Bus No. 204
collided with the 7-Up delivery truck which came from the opposite direction, that is, from
Manila towards San Pablo City. As a result of the collision, defendant's bus fell on the right
side on the shoulder of the road, which resulted in injuries to many passengers, and the
death of Ricardo C. Tiongson and a woman passenger. ... Having been notified of the
collision, Gerardo Dilla, chief of police of Bay, Laguna, immediately proceeded to the scene
thereof. The Bay Chief of Police made an on-the-spot investigation and prepared a sketch
of the spot where the collision occurred. From the findings of the chief of police, it appears
that the road had an asphalted pavement, 5-1/2 meters wide, and shoulders on both sides,
the shoulder going towards the poblacion of Bay being 65 cm. wide and the one on the
opposite side having a width of 70 cm. The chief of police also saw on the asphalted
pavement a somewhat rectangular depression, 3 meters long, 2 meters wide, and 12 cm.
deep, on the left side of the road going north, that is, going towards Manila . . . . .
Perhaps of most value to plaintiffs is the testimony of Rufo Reao, a farmer and a barrio
lieutenant of Tabon, Bay, Laguna. The substance of Rufo's testimony is that ... he saw two
LTB trucks, following each other, from south to north at a distance of about 30 meters from
each other; that he also saw a 7-Up truck going from north to south; that the leading LTB
bus (presumably Bus No. 204) was travelling faster than the 7-Up truck; that suddenly, he
heard the impact of a collision between the leading LTB bus and the 7-Up truck; that as a
result of the collision, the LTB bus fell on its side while the 7-Up truck turned crosswise on
the road; . . . .
Samonte testified that ... while he was in barrio Tabon, Bay, Laguna, at about 5:45 that
same afternoon, he first saw the 7-Up truck from a distance of about 150 meters; that he
was then running at about 30 kilometers per hour; that upon sighting the 7-Up truck, he
slackened his speed and placed his bus on the right side of the road; that when the
distance between his bus and the 7-Up truck had been reduced to about ten (10) meters
and foreseeing that he could not avoid being hit by the truck which had swerved to the left,
he applied his brakes and maneuvered his bus towards the right side of the road so much
so that the right wheels were already on the shoulder of the road; but that before he could
come to a complete stop, at a speed then of only 10 kilometers per hour, the left front
mudguard of his bus was hit by the 7-Up truck.
After thus evaluating the prosecution evidence and the testimony of petitioner's witnesses, namely,
Claro Samonte, its driver, Ernesto Alcantara, its conductor, and Teotimo de Mesa, its Chief Clerk,
the trial court said:
In moving forward to a conclusion in this case, certain general principles must be borne in
mind, namely: (1) the liability of a carrier is contractual and arises upon its breach of the
obligation, and there is a breach if it fails to exercise extraordinary diligence according to all
the circumstances of each case; (2) a carrier is obliged to carry its passengers with the
utmost diligence of a very cautious person, having due regard for all the circumstances; (3)
a carrier is presumed to be at fault or to have acted negligently in case of death of, or injury
to its passengers, it being its duty to prove that it exercised extra-ordinary diligence; (4) a
carrier is not an insurer against all risks of travel (Isaac vs. A.L. Ammen Transportation Co.,

Inc., G.R. No. L-9671, August 28, 1957); and (5) that a carrier shall not be responsible for
events which could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, were inevitable (Alfaro vs.
Ayson, 54 O.G. 7922).
In the light of the foregoing principles and the evidence of record, the main questions for
determination are whether defendant has successfully discharged its burden of disproving
its presumptive negligence because of its failure to transport safely to his destination the
deceased Ricardo C. Tiongson, and whether defendant has sufficiently established its
defense of fortuitous event.
After a review of the record, the court believes that defendant has not successfully
discharged its burden. Defendant's driver, Samonte, wanted to impress the court that he
was entirely free from fault or negligence in the collision between his bus and the 7-Up
truck. This he testified that when he first sighted the 7-Up truck, 150 meters away from his
bus, the said truck was then running between 50 and 60 kilometers per hour, while he, for
his part, was then going only at about 30 kilometers per hour. This testimony of Samonte is
to be seriously doubted. In the first place, he and his conductor, Alcantara, must be
necessarily biased witnesses for they are both employed by the defendant. In the second
place, it is of common knowledge that a delivery truck fully loaded with cases of soft drinks
is a slower-moving vehicle than a passenger bus. A passenger bus is necessarily designed
for speed because travellers usually want to arrive at their destinations within the shortest
possible time, whereas soft drinks delivery trucks are built for the safety of its bottled cargo
than for speed. In the third place, Samonte's claim that when he applied the brakes of his
bus when it was then about 10 meters away from the 7-Up truck, the speed of his bus was
only about 10 kilometers per hour cannot be given full credence. He stated that after
applying the brakes, his bus still moved less than 5 meters before being hit by the 7-Up
truck. If his speed had only been 10 kilometers per hour, upon the application of the brakes,
he would have stopped the bus within a much shorter distance.
But even assuming that defendant's bus was then running only at approximately 10
kilometers per hour when the driver Samonte first applied the brakes, it would seem that he
applied the brakes too late. Samonte testified that upon sighting the 7-Up truck at a
distance of approximately 150 meters, he slackened his speed by first reducing it to 20 and
then to 10 kilometers per hour, and brought his bus towards the right side of the road; and
that it was only when the distance between the two vehicles was only about 10 meters that
he first stepped on the brakes. The court feels that it was not enough for Samonte to
slacken his speed gradually until he came down to 10 kilometers per hour. He should have
stopped his bus immediately upon seeing the 7-Up truck veer towards his lane after
jumping out of the big depression on the asphalted pavement. He was not unaware of such
depression, and the location thereof for he had been travelling on the same route for a
considerable length of time prior to 3 June 1958.1wph1.t
It will not do for defendant's driver to claim that he could not avoid the 7-Up truck because if
he did he would have fallen into the ditch on his side of the highway. If he was placed in the
position claimed by him, it was entirely his fault, for he could have easily avoided the 7-Up
truck if he had applied his brakes on time, while the 7-Up truck was still more than 10
meters away from him. Besides, instead of applying the brakes while the 7-Up truck was
still some distance away from him, he could have veered to the left side of the road, going
north, where there was sufficient space for him, taking into account that the asphalted
pavement of the road was 5-1/2 meters wide with a shoulder of 65 cm. wide. In such
posture, he could have avoided collision with the 7-Up truck which, on the other hand,
would have also been free to right its direction after it came out from the big depression.
An examination of the sketch prepared by the chief of police of Bay, Laguna (Exhibit 1)
shows that the collision between defendant's bus and the 7-Up truck occurred only 8 meters

away from the big depression. This short distance would seem to indicate that defendant's
driver, Samonte, knowing exactly the location of the depression, and anticipating that the 7Up truck coming the opposite direction would veer to the left of the said depression in order
to avoid the same, raced with the 7-Up truck in order that he could first pass through the
space between the depression and what was left of the asphalted pavement of the lane on
which he was then travelling, obviously for the purpose of avoiding delay. Because of this,
the 7-Up truck driver who must have intended to pass on the said space in order to avoid
going through the depression, was suddenly forced into the depression, in order to avoid a
head-on collision with defendant's bus. But unfortunately, after bumping out of the
depression, the truck veered to the left and hit defendant's bus on the left front side, thereby
causing the bus to overturn on its right side.
The Court of Appeals agreed with the above being of the opinion that the testimony of Rufo
Reao, a barrio lieutenant and a disinterested eye-witness of the accident, was credible; that, to
the contrary, the testimony of Claro Samonte and Ernesto Alcantara, driver and conductor
respectively of petitioner's bus, was improbable and biased; that Samonte actually applied the
brakes on his bus too late to avoid the accident because at that time the distance between the two
vehicles was only ten meters; that Samonte was well aware of the condition of the road,
particularly of the existence of a depression near the place where the two vehicles collided,
because he had been driving through and along the same route for a considerable period of time
prior to the accident; that on May 16, 1958 or only two weeks before the fatal collission, Samonte
had been apprehended for overspeeding, and finally, that certain admissions made on the witness
stand by Teotimo de Mesa, petitioner's chief clerk since 1948, sufficiently showed that the
company had not exercised due care and diligence in connection with the hiring of Samonte. The
Court of Appeals therefore expressly found that petitioner not only failed to disprove the
presumption of negligence arising against it (Articles 1733, 1755, and 1756 of the New Civil Code)
but that, on the contrary, its negligence had been established by more than mere preponderance
of evidence.
A thorough review of the record by Us has not disclosed any material fact or circumstance
showing that the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in the respects covered by the issue
under consideration.
The remaining assignment of errors refer to the correctness of the decision appealed from in so far
as it grantsmoral damages to respondents, the amount of the award for loss of earnings, and the
additional award of P5,000 for attorney's fees.
Petitioner's liability for moral damages can not now be seriously questioned in view of the
provisions of Articles 1764 and 2206, Nos. 1 and 3 of the New Civil Code and the ruling
in Necesito, et al. vs. Paras, et al., G.R. Nos. L-10605-06, Resolution on motion to reconsider,
September 11, 1958 where, speaking through, Mr. Justice Jose B.L. Reyes, We said:
In awarding to the heirs of the deceased Severino Garces an indemnity for the loss of "her
guidance, protection and company," although it is but moral damages, the Court took into
account that the case of a passenger who dies in the course of an accident, due to the
carrier's negligence, constitutes an exception to the general rule. While, as pointed out in
the main decision, under Article 2220 of the new Civil Code there can be no recovery of
moral damages for a breach of contract in the absence of fraud (malice) or bad faith, the
case of a violation of the contract or carrier leading to a passenger's death escapes this
general rule, in view of Article 1764 in connection with Article 2206, No. 3 of the new Civil
Code.
"Art. 1764. Damages in cases comprised in this section shall be awarded in
accordance with Title XVIII of this Book, concerning Damages. Article 2206 shall also

apply to the death of a passenger caused by the breach of contract by a common

carrier.
"Art. 2206. x x x

xxx

xxx

"(3) The spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the
deceased may demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of
the deceased."
Being a special rule limited to cases of fatal injuries, these articles prevail over the general rule of
Article 2220. Special provisions control general ones (Lichauco & Co. vs. Apostol, 44 Phil. 138;
Sancho vs. Lizarrage, 55 Phil. 601).
It thus appears that under the new Civil Code, in case of accident due to a carrier's negligence,
the heirs of a deceased passenger may recover moral damages, even though a passenger who is
injured, but manages to survive, is not entitled to them. There is, therefore, no conflict between our
main decision in the instant case and that of Cachero vs. Manila Taxicab Co., G.R. No. 8721, May
23, 1957, where the passenger suffered injuries, but did not lose his life.
The above ruling was followed and applied in Cariaga vs. L.T.B., G.R. No. L-11037, December 29,
1960;Bernardo vs. Luna, G.R. Nos. L-13328-29, September 29, 1961; and Martinez vs. Gonzales,
G.R. No. L-17570, October 30, 1962.
Petitioner contends that the compensatory and moral damages awarded are excessive. We do not
find them to be so, considering the pertinent facts of record. The deceased Ricardo C. Tiongson,
at the time of his death on June 3, 1958, was only thirty-two years old. He was a Bachelor of
Science in Commerce (Far Eastern University - 1949) and obtained employment with the San
Pablo City Branch of the People's Bank in 1954 with a starting monthly salary of P150.00 which,
after six months in the service, was increased to P175.00. While thus employed with the People's
Bank, he was also administering his mother's farm in Calamba, Laguna. He was the only son of
respondent spouses Antonio Tiongson and Paz Cailles Tiongson, and had been married hardly
three years when he died. The foregoing circumstances, in our opinion, fully justify the damages
awarded in the appealed decision which are substantially in accord with the rules of law contained
in Articles 1764 and 2206, Nos. 1 and 3 of the New Civil Code.
Lastly, it is contended that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court's award for
attorney's fees. This contention is likewise untenable.
Considering the provisions of Article No. 2208, Nos. 2 and 11 of the New Civil Code, and the
proven fact that petitioner ignored respondents' demand for an amicable settlement of their claim,
the award of attorney's fees in this case seems to be completely justified (Rex Taxicab Co., Inc. vs.
Bautista, G.R. No. L-15392, September 30, 1960; Necesito vs. Paras, supra).
Wherefore, the decision appealed, from is affirmed, with costs.
LA MALLORCA VS CA
La Mallorca v. CA
Facts:
Mariano Beltran and his family rode a bus owned by petitioner. Upon reaching their desired
destination, they alighted from the bus. But Mariano returned to get their baggage. His youngest

daughter followed him without his knowledge. When he stepped into the bus again, it suddenly
accelerated. Marianos daughter was found dead. The bus ran over her.
Issue:
Whether the liability of a common carrier extends even after the passenger had alighted
Held:
The relation of carrier and passenger does not cease at the moment the passenger alights from
the carriers vehicle at a place selected by the carrier at the point of destination, but continues until
the passenger has had a reasonable time or reasonable opportunity to leave the current premises.

G.R. No. L-21486

May 14, 1966

LA
MALLORCA
and
PAMPANGA
BUS
COMPANY, petitioner,
vs.
VALENTIN DE JESUS, MANOLO TOLENTINO and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Manuel
O.
Sixto T. Antonio for respondents.

Chan

for

petitioners.

MAKALINTAL, J.:
La Mallorca and Pampanga Bus Company, Inc., commonly known as La Mallorca-Pambusco, filed
this appeal bycertiorari from the decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed that rendered by
the Court of First Instance of Bulacan in its civil case No. 2100, entitled "Valentin de Jesus and
Manolo Tolentino vs. La Mallorca-Pambusco." The court a quo sentenced the defendant, now
petitioner, "to pay to plaintiffs the amount of P2,132.50 for actual damages; P14,400.00 as
compensatory damages; P10,000.00 to each plaintiff by way of moral damages; and P3,000.00 as
counsel fees."
Two errors are attributed to the appellate Court: (1) "in sustaining the decision (of the court a quo)
holding that the petitioners were liable for the accident which was caused by a blow-out of one of
the tires of the bus and in not considering the same as caso fortuito," and (2) in holding petitioners
liable for moral damages.
The suit arose by reason of the death of Lolita de Jesus, 20-year old daughter of Valentin de
Jesus and wife of Manolo Tolentino, in a head-on collision between petitioner's bus, on which she
was a passenger, and a freight truck traveling in the opposite direction, in a barrio in Marilao
Bulacan, in the morning of October 8, 1959. The immediate cause of the collision was the fact that
the driver of the bus lost control of the wheel when its left front tire suddenly exploded.
Petitioner maintains that a tire blow-out is a fortuitous event and gives rise to no liability for
negligence, citing the rulings of the Court of Appeals in Rodriguez vs. Red Line Transportation Co.,
CA-G.R. No. 8136, December 29, 1954, and People vs. Palapad, CA-G.R. No. 18480, June 27,
1958. These rulings, however, not only are not not binding on this Court but were based on
considerations quite different from those that obtain in the at bar. The appellate Court there made
no findings of any specified acts of negligence on the part of the defendants and confined itself to
the question of whether or not a tire blow-out, by itself alone and without a showing as to the
causative factors, would generate liability. In the present case, the cause of the blow-out was
known. The inner tube of the left front tire, according to petitioner's own evidence and as found by

the Court of Appeals "was pressed between the inner circle of the left wheel and the rim which had
slipped out of the wheel." This was, said Court correctly held, a mechanical defect of the
conveyance or a fault in its equipment which was easily discoverable if the bus had been
subjected to a more thorough, or rigid check-up before it took to the road that morning.
Then again both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found as a fact that the bus was running
quite fast immediately before the accident. Considering that the tire which exploded was not new
petitioner describes it as "hindi masyadong kalbo," or not so very worn out the plea of caso
fortuito cannot be entertained.1wph1.t
The second issue raised by petitioner is already a settled one. In this jurisdiction moral damages
are recoverable by reason of the death of a passenger caused by the breach of contract of a
common carrier, as provided in Article 1764, in relation to Article 2206, of the Civil Code. These
articles have been applied by this Court in a number of cases, among them Necesito, etc. vs.
Paras, et al., L-10605-06, June 30, 1958; Mercado vs. Lira, L-13328-29, Sept. 29, 1961; Villa-Rey
Transit vs. Bello, L-18957, April 23, 1963.
Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs against petitioners.

La Mallorca and Pampanga Bus Co. vs. De Jesus, Tolentino and CA

LA MALLORCA and PAMPANGA BUS COMPANY vs. VALENTIN DE JESUS, MANOLO
TOLENTINO
G.R.

and
No.

COURT

OF

L-21486.

14

APPEALS
May

1966.

Appeal by Certiorari from the decision of the CA which affirmed that rendered by the CFI Bulacan
MAKALINTAL,

J.:

Facts: The suit arose by reason of the death of Lolita de Jesus, 20-year old daughter of Valentin
de Jesus and wife of Manolo Tolentino, in a head-on collision between petitioner's bus, on which
she was a passenger, and a freight truck traveling in the opposite direction, in a barrio in Marilao
Bulacan, in the morning of October 8, 1959. The immediate cause of the collision was the fact that
the driver of the bus lost control of the wheel when its left front tire suddenly exploded. The court a
quo sentenced the defendant, now petitioner, to pay to plaintiffs actual, compensatory, and moral
damages;

and

counsel

fees.

CA

affirmed.

Issues: (1) WON the petitioners are liable for the consequences of the accident. (2) WON
petitioners
Ruling: Judgment

are

liable

for

moral

damages.
affirmed.

(1) Petitioner maintains that a tire blow-out is a fortuitous event and gives rise to no liability for
negligence. Both the CFI and the CA found that the bus was running quite fast immediately before
the accident. Considering that the tire which exploded was not new, petitioner describes it
as "hindi masyadong kalbo," or not so very worn out, the plea of caso fortuito by petitioner cannot
be entertained. The cause of the blow-out was a mechanical defect of the conveyance or a fault in

its equipment which was easily discoverable if the bus had been subjected to a more thorough
check-up before it took to the road. Hence, petitioners are liable for the accident.
(2) The second issue raised by petitioner is already a settled one. In this jurisdiction moral
damages are recoverable by reason of the death of a passenger caused by the breach of contract
of a common carrier, as provided in Article 1764, in relation to Article 2206, of the Civil Code.

17 SCRA 22 Civil Law Torts and Damages Negligence

In October 1959, Lolita de Jesus was riding a bus owned by La Mallorca and Pampanga Bus
Company which had a head on collision against a freight truck. Apparently, the bus had a tire blow
out which resulted to the accident. Lolita died and so her father, Valentin de Jesus, filed a civil
case for damages against La Mallorca. The lower court rendered judgment in favor of De Jesus
and ordered La Mallorca to pay for actual, compensatory, and moral damages including counsel
fees. This decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. La Mallorca assailed the decision as it
argued that a tire blow out is a fortuitous event and should not be taken as negligence.
ISSUE: Whether or not a tire blow out is a fortuitous event.
HELD: No. As found by the lower court, the tire blow out in this case was due to the fact that the
inner circle of the wheel of the bus was pressed so closely to the rim which caused it to eventually
explode. This mechanical defect in the installation of the wheel could have been easily discovered
had the bus been subjected to a thorough check up before it was allowed to hit the road. La
Mallorca is therefore negligent and the tire explosion is not a fortuitous event for it could have
been avoided had the bus been properly maintained.
The Supreme Court also emphasized in this case that moral damages are recoverable by reason
of the death of a passenger caused by the breach of contract of a common carrier, as provided in
Article 1764, in relation to Article 2206, of the Civil Code.
JUNTILLA VS FONTANAR
G.R. No. L-45637 May 31, 1985
ROBERTO
JUNTILLA, petitioner,
vs.
CLEMENTE FONTANAR, FERNANDO BANZON and BERFOL CAMORO, respondents.
Valentin A. Zozobrado for petitioner.
Ruperto N. Alfarara for respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This is a petition for review, on questions of law, of the decision of the Court of First Instance of
Cebu which reversed the decision of the City Court of Cebu and exonerated the respondents from
any liability arising from a vehicular accident.

The background facts which led to the filing of a complaint for breach of contract and damages
against the respondents are summarized by the Court of First Instance of Cebu as follows:
The facts established after trial show that the plaintiff was a passenger of the public
utility jeepney bearing plate No. PUJ-71-7 on the course of the trip from Danao City
to Cebu City. The jeepney was driven by defendant Berfol Camoro. It was registered
under the franchise of defendant Clemente Fontanar but was actually owned by
defendant Fernando Banzon. When the jeepney reached Mandaue City, the right
rear tire exploded causing the vehicle to turn turtle. In the process, the plaintiff who
was sitting at the front seat was thrown out of the vehicle. Upon landing on the
ground, the plaintiff momentarily lost consciousness. When he came to his senses,
he found that he had a lacerated wound on his right palm. Aside from this, he
suffered injuries on his left arm, right thigh and on his back. (Exh. "D"). Because of
his shock and injuries, he went back to Danao City but on the way, he discovered
that his "Omega" wrist watch was lost. Upon his arrival in Danao City, he immediately
entered the Danao City Hospital to attend to his injuries, and also requested his
father-in-law to proceed immediately to the place of the accident and look for the
watch. In spite of the efforts of his father-in-law, the wrist watch, which he bought for
P 852.70 (Exh. "B") could no longer be found.
xxx xxx xxx
Petitioner Roberto Juntilla filed Civil Case No. R-17378 for breach of contract with damages before
the City Court of Cebu City, Branch I against Clemente Fontanar, Fernando Banzon and Berfol
Camoro.
The respondents filed their answer, alleging inter alia that the accident that caused losses to the
petitioner was beyond the control of the respondents taking into account that the tire that exploded
was newly bought and was only slightly used at the time it blew up.
After trial, Judge Romulo R. Senining of the Civil Court of Cebu rendered judgment in favor of the
petitioner and against the respondents. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the
defendants and the latter are hereby ordered, jointly and severally, to pay the plaintiff
the sum of P750.00 as reimbursement for the lost Omega wrist watch, the sum of
P246.64 as unrealized salary of the plaintiff from his employer, the further sum of
P100.00 for the doctor's fees and medicine, an additional sum of P300.00 for
attorney's fees and the costs.
The respondents appealed to the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch XIV.
Judge Leonardo B. Canares reversed the judgment of the City Court of Cebu upon a finding that
the accident in question was due to a fortuitous event. The dispositive portion of the decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered exonerating the defendants from any
liability to the plaintiff without pronouncement as to costs.
A motion for reconsideration was denied by the Court of First Instance.
The petitioner raises the following alleged errors committed by the Court of First Instance of Cebu
on appeal

a. The Honorable Court below committed grave abuse of discretion in failing to take
cognizance of the fact that defendants and/or their employee failed to exercise
"utmost and/or extraordinary diligence" required of common carriers contemplated
under Art. 1755 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
b. The Honorable Court below committed grave abuse of discretion by deciding the
case contrary to the doctrine laid down by the Honorable Supreme Court in the case
of Necesito et al. v. Paras, et al.
We find the petition impressed with merit.
The City Court and the Court of First Instance of Cebu found that the right rear tire of the
passenger jeepney in which the petitioner was riding blew up causing the vehicle to fall on its side.
The petitioner questions the conclusion of the respondent court drawn from this finding of fact.
The Court of First Instance of Cebu erred when it absolved the carrier from any liability upon a
finding that the tire blow out is a fortuitous event. The Court of First Instance of Cebu ruled that:
After reviewing the records of the case, this Court finds that the accident in question
was due to a fortuitous event. A tire blow-out, such as what happened in the case at
bar, is an inevitable accident that exempts the carrier from liability, there being
absence of a showing that there was misconduct or negligence on the part of the
operator in the operation and maintenance of the vehicle involved. The fact that the
right rear tire exploded, despite being brand new, constitutes a clear case of caso
fortuito which can be a proper basis for exonerating the defendants from liability. ...
The Court of First Instance relied on the ruling of the Court of Appeals in Rodriguez v. Red Line
Transportation Co., CA G.R. No. 8136, December 29, 1954, where the Court of Appeals ruled that:
A tire blow-out does not constitute negligence unless the tire was already old and
should not have been used at all. Indeed, this would be a clear case of fortuitous
event.
The foregoing conclusions of the Court of First Instance of Cebu are based on a misapprehension
of overall facts from which a conclusion should be drawn. The reliance of the Court of First
Instance on the Rodriguez case is not in order. In La Mallorca and Pampanga Bus Co. v. De
Jesus, et al. (17 SCRA 23), we held that:
Petitioner maintains that a tire blow-out is a fortuitous event and gives rise to no
liability for negligence, citing the rulings of the Court of Appeals in Rodriguez v. Red
Line Transportation Co., CA G.R. No. 8136, December 29, 1954, and People v.
Palapad, CA-G.R. No. 18480, June 27, 1958. These rulings, however, not only are
not binding on this Court but were based on considerations quite different from those
that obtain in the case at bar. The appellate court there made no findings of any
specific acts of negligence on the part of the defendants and confined itself to the
question of whether or not a tire blow-out, by itself alone and without a showing as to
the causative factors, would generate liability. ...
In the case at bar, there are specific acts of negligence on the part of the respondents. The
records show that the passenger jeepney turned turtle and jumped into a ditch immediately after
its right rear tire exploded. The evidence shows that the passenger jeepney was running at a very
fast speed before the accident. We agree with the observation of the petitioner that a public utility
jeep running at a regular and safe speed will not jump into a ditch when its right rear tire blows up.
There is also evidence to show that the passenger jeepney was overloaded at the time of the

accident. The petitioner stated that there were three (3) passengers in the front seat and fourteen
(14) passengers in the rear.
While it may be true that the tire that blew-up was still good because the grooves of the tire were
still visible, this fact alone does not make the explosion of the tire a fortuitous event. No evidence
was presented to show that the accident was due to adverse road conditions or that precautions
were taken by the jeepney driver to compensate for any conditions liable to cause accidents. The
sudden blowing-up, therefore, could have been caused by too much air pressure injected into the
tire coupled by the fact that the jeepney was overloaded and speeding at the time of the accident.
In Lasam v. Smith (45 Phil. 657), we laid down the following essential characteristics of caso
fortuito:
xxx xxx xxx
... In a legal sense and, consequently, also in relation to contracts, a caso
fortuito presents the following essential characteristics: (1) The cause of the
unforeseen and unexpected occurrence, or of the failure of the debtor to comply with
his obligation, must be independent of the human will. (2) It must be impossible to
foresee the event which constitutes the caso fortuito, or if it can be foreseen, it must
be impossible to avoid. (3) The occurrence must be such as to render it impossible
for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner. And (4) the obligor (debtor)
must be free from any participation in the aggravation of the injury resulting to the
creditor. (5 Encyclopedia Juridica Espanola, 309.)
In the case at bar, the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence was not independent
of the human will. The accident was caused either through the negligence of the driver or because
of mechanical defects in the tire. Common carriers should teach their drivers not to overload their
vehicles, not to exceed safe and legal speed limits, and to know the correct measures to take
when a tire blows up thus insuring the safety of passengers at all times. Relative to the
contingency of mechanical defects, we held in Necesito, et al. v. Paras, et al. (104 Phil. 75), that:
... The preponderance of authority is in favor of the doctrine that a passenger is
entitled to recover damages from a carrier for an injury resulting from a defect in an
appliance purchased from a manufacturer, whenever it appears that the defect would
have been discovered by the carrier if it had exercised the degree of care which
under the circumstances was incumbent upon it, with regard to inspection and
application of the necessary tests. For the purposes of this doctrine, the
manufacturer is considered as being in law the agent or servant of the carrier, as far
as regards the work of constructing the appliance. According to this theory, the good
repute of the manufacturer will not relieve the carrier from liability' (10 Am. Jur. 205,
s, 1324; see also Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Roy, 102 U.S. 451; 20 L. Ed. 141; Southern
R. Co. v. Hussey, 74 ALR 1172; 42 Fed. 2d 70; and Ed Note, 29 ALR 788.: Ann. Cas.
1916E 929).
The rationale of the carrier's liability is the fact that the passenger has neither choice
nor control over the carrier in the selection and use of the equipment and appliances
in use by the carrier. Having no privity whatever with the manufacturer or vendor of
the defective equipment, the passenger has no remedy against him, while the carrier
usually has. It is but logical, therefore, that the carrier, while not an insurer of the
safety of his passengers, should nevertheless be held to answer for the flaws of his
equipment if such flaws were at all discoverable. ...
It is sufficient to reiterate that the source of a common carrier's legal liability is the contract of
carriage, and by entering into the said contract, it binds itself to carry the passengers safely as far

as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of a very cautious person,
with a due regard for all the circumstances. The records show that this obligation was not met by
the respondents.
The respondents likewise argue that the petitioner cannot recover any amount for failure to prove
such damages during the trial. The respondents submit that if the petitioner was really injured, why
was he treated in Danao City and not in Mandaue City where the accident took place. The
respondents argue that the doctor who issued the medical certificate was not presented during the
trial, and hence not cross-examined. The respondents also claim that the petitioner was not
wearing any wrist watch during the accident.

It should be noted that the City Court of Cebu found that the petitioner had a lacerated wound on
his right palm aside from injuries on his left arm, right thigh and on his back, and that on his way
back to Danao City, he discovered that his "Omega" wrist watch was lost. These are findings of
facts of the City Court of Cebu which we find no reason to disturb. More so when we consider the
fact that the Court of First Instance of Cebu impliedly concurred in these matters when it confined
itself to the question of whether or not the tire blow out was a fortuitous event.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch IV appealed from is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the decision of the City Court of Cebu, Branch I is
REINSTATED, with the modification that the damages shall earn interest at 12% per annum and
the attorney's fees are increased to SIX HUNDRED PESOS (P600.00). Damages shall earn
interests from January 27, 1975.
SO ORDERED.

AUTHOR: Faye Cience C. Bohol

NOTES:

017 ROBERTO JUNTILLA vs. CLEMENTE FONTANAR, FERNANDO BANZON and

BERFOL CAMORO
[G.R. No. L-45637 May 31, 1985]
TOPIC: Diligence Required of Common Carriers
PONENTE: GUTIERREZ, JR., J.
FACTS:

1. Plaintiff Roberto Juntilla was a passenger of the public utility jeepney on the
course of the trip from Danao City to Cebu City. The jeepney was driven by
defendant Berfol Camoro. It was registered under the franchise of defendant
Clemente Fontanar but was actually owned by defendant Fernando Banzon.
2. When the jeepney reached Mandaue City, the right rear tire exploded causing the
vehicle to turn turtle. In the process, the plaintiff who was sitting at the front seat
was thrown out of the vehicle. Upon landing on the ground, the plaintiff
momentarily lost consciousness. When he came to his senses, he found that he
had a lacerated wound on his right palm, injuries on his left arm, right thigh and
on his back. Because of his shock and injuries, he went back to Danao City but
on the way, he discovered that his "Omega" wrist watch was lost and could no
longer be found.
3. Petitioner Roberto Juntilla filed a breach of contract with damages before the
Court of Cebu against Clemente Fontanar, Fernando Banzon and Berfol Camoro.
The respondents filed their answer, alleging inter alia that the accident that
caused losses to the petitioner was beyond the control of the respondents taking
into account that the tire that exploded was newly bought and was only slightly
used at the time it blew up.
4. The Court of Cebu ruled in favor of the petitioner (No ratio stated in the case.
Heres the original text: After trial, Judge Romulo R. Senining of the Civil Court of
Cebu rendered judgment in favor of the petitioner and against the respondents.
The dispositive portion of the decision reads: WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby
rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants and the latter are
hereby ordered, jointly and severally, to pay the plaintiff the sum of P750.00 as
reimbursement for the lost Omega wrist watch, the sum of P246.64 as unrealized
salary of the plaintiff from his employer, the further sum of P100.00 for the
doctor's fees and medicine, an additional sum of P300.00 for attorney's fees and
the costs).
5. CFI reversed the judgment upon a finding that the accident in question was due to a
fortuitous event. CFI relied on the ruling in Rodriguez v. Red Line Transportation Co.,
where the CA ruled that a tire blow-out does not constitute negligence unless the tire was
already old and should not have been used at all. Indeed, this would be a clear case of
fortuitous event.
ISSUE(S): Whether or not defendants and/or their employee failed to exercise "utmost and/or
extraordinary diligence" required of common carriers contemplated under Art. 1755 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines.
HELD: YES. The CFI relied on the mere fact of tire blow-out, not taking into account the
negligence on the defendants part.

BATACLAN VS MEDINA

SALUD VILLANUEVA VDA. DE BATACLAN and the minors NORMA,

LUZVIMINDA, ELENITA, OSCAR and ALFREDO BATACLAN, represented by
their Natural guardian, SALUD VILLANUEVA VDA. DE BATACLAN, plaintiffsappellants, vs. MARIANO MEDINA, defendant-appellant.
DOCTRINE:
PROXIMATE CAUSE: That cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any
efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have
occurred. ( see below for long version )
o When through the negligence of the driver a vehicle turn turtles and causes injuries to its
passengers and then subsequently the bus catches fire, the drivers negligence may still
be considered the proximate cause of the consequences of that fire.
COMMON CARRIER: Medina Transportation (owned by: Mariano Medina, defendant )
PROBLEM: Due to the negligence of the driver a bus flips out of control. Soon after it catches
fire killing the husband (and father) of plaintiffs.
Who WON: Salud Bataclan and minor children (plaintiffs)
ER
FACTS: Shortly after midnight, Juan Bataclan (deceased) was on a bus owned by Medina
Transportation (owned by: Mariano Medina, defendant ) travelling from Cavite to Pasay. While
on its way, the driver of the bus was speeding through and when he applied the brakes ( after the
tires burst) it cause the bus to be overturned. The driver, the conductor, and some passengers
were able to free themselves from the bus except Bataclan (deceased) and 3 others. The 4
stranded passengers called for help. Help arrived soon thereafter and as it was dark, the
villagers brought torch with them. The driver and the conductor failed to warn the would-be
helpers of the fact that gasoline has spilled from the overturned bus so a huge fire ensued which
engulfed the bus thereby killing the 4 passengers trapped inside. It was also found later in trial
that the tires of the bus were old.
ISSUE: Whether or not the proximate cause of the death of Bataclan et al was their burning by
reason of the torches which ignited the gasoline (or was it the fires?).
HELD: The drivers negligence was the proximate cause. The proximate cause was the
overturning of the bus which was caused by the negligence of the driver because he was
speeding and also he was already advised by Medina to change the tires yet he did not. Such
negligence resulted to the overturning of the bus. The torches carried by the would-be helpers
are not to be blamed. It is just but natural for the villagers to respond to the call for help from the
passengers and since it is a rural area which did not have flashlights, torches are the natural
source of lighting. Further, the smell of gas could have been all over the place yet the driver and
the conductor failed to provide warning about said fact to the villagers.
G.R. No. L-10126

October 22, 1957

SALUD VILLANUEVA VDA. DE BATACLAN and the minors NORMA, LUZVIMINDA, ELENITA,
OSCAR and ALFREDO BATACLAN, represented by their Natural guardian, SALUD VILLANUEVA
VDA.
DE
BATACLAN,
plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
MARIANO MEDINA, defendant-appellant.

Lope E. Adriano, Emmanuel Andamo and Jose R. Francisco for plaintiffs-appellants.

Fortunato Jose for defendant and appellant.
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
Shortly after midnight, on September 13, 1952 bus no. 30 of the Medina Transportation, operated
by its owner defendant Mariano Medina under a certificate of public convenience, left the town of
Amadeo, Cavite, on its way to Pasay City, driven by its regular chauffeur, Conrado Saylon. There
were about eighteen passengers, including the driver and conductor. Among the passengers were
Juan Bataclan, seated beside and to the right of the driver, Felipe Lara, sated to the right of
Bataclan, another passenger apparently from the Visayan Islands whom the witnesses just called
Visaya, apparently not knowing his name, seated in the left side of the driver, and a woman named
Natalia Villanueva, seated just behind the four last mentioned. At about 2:00 o'clock that same
morning, while the bus was running within the jurisdiction of Imus, Cavite, one of the front tires
burst and the vehicle began to zig-zag until it fell into a canal or ditch on the right side of the road
and turned turtle. Some of the passengers managed to leave the bus the best way they could,
others had to be helped or pulled out, while the three passengers seated beside the driver, named
Bataclan, Lara and the Visayan and the woman behind them named Natalia Villanueva, could not
get out of the overturned bus. Some of the passengers, after they had clambered up to the road,
heard groans and moans from inside the bus, particularly, shouts for help from Bataclan and Lara,
who said they could not get out of the bus. There is nothing in the evidence to show whether or not
the passengers already free from the wreck, including the driver and the conductor, made any
attempt to pull out or extricate and rescue the four passengers trapped inside the vehicle, but calls
or shouts for help were made to the houses in the neighborhood. After half an hour, came about
ten men, one of them carrying a lighted torch made of bamboo with a wick on one end, evidently
fueled with petroleum. These men presumably approach the overturned bus, and almost
immediately, a fierce fire started, burning and all but consuming the bus, including the four
passengers trapped inside it. It would appear that as the bus overturned, gasoline began to leak
and escape from the gasoline tank on the side of the chassis, spreading over and permeating the
body of the bus and the ground under and around it, and that the lighted torch brought by one of
the men who answered the call for help set it on fire.
That same day, the charred bodies of the four deemed passengers inside the bus were removed
and duly identified that of Juan Bataclan. By reason of his death, his widow, Salud Villanueva, in
her name and in behalf of her five minor children, brought the present suit to recover from Mariano
Medina compensatory, moral, and exemplary damages and attorney's fees in the total amount of
P87,150. After trial, the Court of First Instance of Cavite awarded P1,000 to the plaintiffs plus P600
as attorney's fee, plus P100, the value of the merchandise being carried by Bataclan to Pasay City
for sale and which was lost in the fire. The plaintiffs and the defendants appealed the decision to
the Court of Appeals, but the latter endorsed the appeal to us because of the value involved in the
claim in the complaint.
Our new Civil Code amply provides for the responsibility of common carrier to its passengers and
their goods. For purposes of reference, we are reproducing the pertinent codal provisions:
ART. 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of public
policy, are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for
the safety of the passengers transported by them, according to all the circumstances of
each case.
Such extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods is further expressed in articles
1734, 1735, and 1745, Nos. 5, 6, and 7, while the extra ordinary diligence for the safety of
the passengers is further set forth in articles 1755 and 1756.

ART. 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care
and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due
regard for all the circumstances.
ART. 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are presumed to
have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed
extraordinary diligence as prescribed in articles 1733 and 1755
ART. 1759. Common carriers are liable for the death of or injuries to passengers through
the negligence or willful acts of the former's employees, although such employees may
have acted beyond the scope of their authority or in violation of the order of the common
carriers.
This liability of the common carriers does not cease upon proof that they exercised all the
diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their employees.
ART. 1763. A common carrier responsible for injuries suffered by a passenger on account of
the willful acts or negligence of other passengers or of strangers, if the common carrier's
employees through the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a family could have
prevented or stopped the act or omission.
We agree with the trial court that the case involves a breach of contract of transportation for hire,
the Medina Transportation having undertaken to carry Bataclan safely to his destination, Pasay
City. We also agree with the trial court that there was negligence on the part of the defendant,
through his agent, the driver Saylon. There is evidence to show that at the time of the blow out, the
bus was speeding, as testified to by one of the passengers, and as shown by the fact that
according to the testimony of the witnesses, including that of the defense, from the point where
one of the front tires burst up to the canal where the bus overturned after zig-zaging, there was a
distance of about 150 meters. The chauffeur, after the blow-out, must have applied the brakes in
order to stop the bus, but because of the velocity at which the bus must have been running, its
momentum carried it over a distance of 150 meters before it fell into the canal and turned turtle.
There is no question that under the circumstances, the defendant carrier is liable. The only
question is to what degree. The trial court was of the opinion that the proximate cause of the death
of Bataclan was not the overturning of the bus, but rather, the fire that burned the bus, including
himself and his co-passengers who were unable to leave it; that at the time the fire started,
Bataclan, though he must have suffered physical injuries, perhaps serious, was still alive, and so
damages were awarded, not for his death, but for the physical injuries suffered by him. We
disagree. A satisfactory definition of proximate cause is found in Volume 38, pages 695-696 of
American jurisprudence, cited by plaintiffs-appellants in their brief. It is as follows:
. . . 'that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient
intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have
occurred.' And more comprehensively, 'the proximate legal cause is that acting first and
producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting
a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its
immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a
natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that
the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinary prudent and intelligent
person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury
to some person might probably result therefrom.
It may be that ordinarily, when a passenger bus overturns, and pins down a passenger, merely
causing him physical injuries, if through some event, unexpected and extraordinary, the overturned
bus is set on fire, say, by lightning, or if some highwaymen after looting the vehicle sets it on fire,

and the passenger is burned to death, one might still contend that the proximate cause of his
death was the fire and not the overturning of the vehicle. But in the present case under the
circumstances obtaining in the same, we do not hesitate to hold that the proximate cause was the
overturning of the bus, this for the reason that when the vehicle turned not only on its side but
completely on its back, the leaking of the gasoline from the tank was not unnatural or unexpected;
that the coming of the men with a lighted torch was in response to the call for help, made not only
by the passengers, but most probably, by the driver and the conductor themselves, and that
because it was dark (about 2:30 in the morning), the rescuers had to carry a light with them, and
coming as they did from a rural area where lanterns and flashlights were not available; and what
was more natural than that said rescuers should innocently approach the vehicle to extend the aid
and effect the rescue requested from them. In other words, the coming of the men with a torch
was to be expected and was a natural sequence of the overturning of the bus, the trapping of
some of its passengers and the call for outside help. What is more, the burning of the bus can also
in part be attributed to the negligence of the carrier, through is driver and its conductor. According
to the witness, the driver and the conductor were on the road walking back and forth. They, or at
least, the driver should and must have known that in the position in which the overturned bus was,
gasoline could and must have leaked from the gasoline tank and soaked the area in and around
the bus, this aside from the fact that gasoline when spilled, specially over a large area, can be
smelt and directed even from a distance, and yet neither the driver nor the conductor would
appear to have cautioned or taken steps to warn the rescuers not to bring the lighted torch too
near the bus. Said negligence on the part of the agents of the carrier come under the codal
provisions above-reproduced, particularly, Articles 1733, 1759 and 1763.
As regard the damages to which plaintiffs are entitled, considering the earning capacity of the
deceased, as well as the other elements entering into a damage award, we are satisfied that the
amount of SIX THOUSAND (P6,000) PESOS would constitute satisfactory compensation, this to
include compensatory, moral, and other damages. We also believe that plaintiffs are entitled to
attorney's fees, and assessing the legal services rendered by plaintiffs' attorneys not only in the
trial court, but also in the course of the appeal, and not losing sight of the able briefs prepared by
them, the attorney's fees may well be fixed at EIGHT HUNDRED (P800) PESOS for the loss of
merchandise carried by the deceased in the bus, is adequate and will not be disturbed.
There is one phase of this case which disturbs if it does not shock us. According to the evidence,
one of the passengers who, because of the injuries suffered by her, was hospitalized, and while in
the hospital, she was visited by the defendant Mariano Medina, and in the course of his visit, she
overheard him speaking to one of his bus inspectors, telling said inspector to have the tires of the
bus changed immediately because they were already old, and that as a matter of fact, he had
been telling the driver to change the said tires, but that the driver did not follow his instructions. If
this be true, it goes to prove that the driver had not been diligent and had not taken the necessary
precautions to insure the safety of his passengers. Had he changed the tires, specially those in
front, with new ones, as he had been instructed to do, probably, despite his speeding, as we have
already stated, the blow out would not have occurred. All in all, there is reason to believe that the
driver operated and drove his vehicle negligently, resulting in the death of four of his passengers,
physical injuries to others, and the complete loss and destruction of their goods, and yet the
criminal case against him, on motion of the fiscal and with his consent, was provisionally
dismissed, because according to the fiscal, the witnesses on whose testimony he was banking to
support the complaint, either failed or appear or were reluctant to testify. But the record of the case
before us shows the several witnesses, passengers, in that bus, willingly and unhesitatingly
testified in court to the effect of the said driver was negligent. In the public interest the prosecution
of said erring driver should be pursued, this, not only as a matter of justice, but for the promotion
of the safety of passengers on public utility buses. Let a copy of this decision be furnished the
Department of Justice and the Provincial Fiscal of Cavite.
In view of the foregoing, with the modification that the damages awarded by the trial court are
increased from ONE THOUSAND (P1,000) PESOS TO SIX THOUSAND (P6,000) PESOS, and

from SIX HUNDRED PESOS TO EIGHT HUNDRED (P800) PESOS, for the death of Bataclan and
for the attorney's fees, respectively, the decision appealed is from hereby affirmed, with costs.
BTCO VS CAGUIMBAL
G.R. No. L-22985

January 24, 1968

BATANGAS
TRANSPORTATION
COMPANY, petitioner,
vs.
GREGORIO CAGUIMBAL, PANCRACIO CAGUIMBAL, MARIA MARANAN DE CAGUIMBAL,
BIAN TRANSPORTATION COMPANY and MARCIANO ILAGAN, respondents.
Ozaeta,
Gibbs
and
Ozaeta
and
Victoriano H. Endaya for respondents.

Domingo

E.

de

Lara

for

petitioner.

CONCEPCION, C.J.:
Appeal by certiorari from a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The main facts are set forth in said decision from which we quote:
There is no dispute at all that the deceased Pedro Caguimbal, Barrio Lieutenant of Barrio
Calansayan, San Jose, Batangas, was a paying passenger of BTCO bus, with plate TPU507, going south on its regular route from Calamba, Laguna, to Batangas, Batangas, driven
by Tomas Perez, its regular driver, at about 5:30 o'clock on the early morning of April 25,
1954. The deceased's destination was his residence at Calansayan, San Jose, Batangas.
The bus of the Bian Transportation Company, bearing plate TPU-820, driven by Marciano
Ilagan, was coming from the opposite direction (north-bound). Along the national highway at
Barrio Daraza, Tanauan, Batangas, on the date and hour above indicated, a horse-driven
rig (calesa) managed by Benito Makahiya, which was then ahead of the Bian bus, was
also coming from the opposite direction, meaning proceeding towards the north. As to what
transpired thereafter, the lower court chose to give more credence to defendant Batangas
Transportation Company's version which, in the words of the Court a quo, is as follows: "As
the BTCO bus was nearing a house, a passenger requested the conductor to stop as he
was going to alight, and when he heard the signal of the conductor, the driver Tomas Perez
slowed down his bus swerving it farther to the right in order to stop; at this juncture,
a calesa, then driven by Benito Makahiya was at a distance of several meters facing the
BTCO bus coming from the opposite direction; that at the same time the Bian bus was
about 100 meters away likewise going northward and following the direction of the calesa;
that upon seeing the Bian bus the driver of the BTCO bus dimmed his light as established
by Magno Ilaw, the very conductor of the Bian bus at the time of the accident; that as
the calesa and the BTCO bus were passing each other from the opposite directions, the
Bian bus following the calesa swerved to its left in an attempt to pass between the BTCO
bus and thecalesa; that without diminishing its speed of about seventy (70) kilometers an
hour, the Bian bus passed through the space between the BTCO bus and
the calesa hitting first the left side of the BTCO bus with the left front corner of its body and
then bumped and struck the calesa which was completely wrecked; that the driver was
seriously injured and the horse was killed; that the second and all other posts supporting
the top of the left side of the BTCO bus were completely smashed and half of the back wall
to the left was ripped open. (Exhibits 1 and 2). The BTCO bus suffered damages for the
repair of its damaged portion.
As a consequence of this occurrence, two (2) passengers of BTCO died, namely, Pedro
Caguimbal and Guillermo Tolentino, apart from others who were injured. The widow and children
of Caguimbal instituted the present action, which was tried jointly with a similar action of the

Tolentinos, to recover damages from the Batangas Transportation Company, hereinafter referred
to as BTCO. The latter, in turn, filed a third-party complaint against the Bian Transportation
Company hereinafter referred to as Bian and its driver, Marciano Ilagan. Subsequently, the
Caguimbals amended their complaint, to include therein, as defendants, said Bian and Ilagan.
After appropriate proceedings, the Court of First Instance of Batangas rendered a decision
dismissing the complaint insofar as the BTCO is concerned, without prejudice to plaintiff's right to
sue Bian which had stopped participating in the proceedings herein, owing apparently, to a
case in the Court of First Instance of Laguna for the insolvency of said enterprise and Ilagan,
and without pronouncement as to costs.
On appeal taken by the Caguimbals, the Court of Appeals reversed said decision and rendered
judgment for them, sentencing the BTCO, Bian and Ilagan to, jointly and severally, pay to the
plaintiffs the aggregate sum of P10,500.00 1 and the costs in both instances. Hence, this appeal by
BTCO, upon the ground that the Court of Appeals erred: 1) in finding said appellant liable for
damages; and 2) in awarding attorney's fees.
In connection with the first assignment of error, we note that the recklessness of defendant was,
manifestly, a major factor in the occurrence of the accident which resulted, inter alia, in the death
of Pedro Caguimbal. Indeed, as driver of the Bian bus, he overtook Benito Makahiya's horsedriven rig or calesa and passed between the same and the BTCO bus despite the fact that the
space available was not big enough therefor, in view of which the Bian bus hit the left side of the
BTCO bus and then the calesa. This notwithstanding, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment
against the BTCO upon the ground that its driver, Tomas Perez, had failed to exercise the
"extraordinary diligence," required in Article 1733 of the new Civil Code, "in the vigilance for the
safety" of his passengers. 2
The record shows that, in order to permit one of them to disembark, Perez drove his BTCO bus
partly to the right shoulder of the road and partly on the asphalted portion thereof. Yet, he could
have and should have seen to it had he exercised "extraordinary diligence" that his bus was
completely outside the asphalted portion of the road, and fully within the shoulder thereof, the
width of which being more than sufficient to accommodate the bus. He could have and should
have done this, because, when the aforementioned passenger expressed his wish to alight from
the bus, Ilagan had seen the aforementioned "calesa", driven by Makahiya, a few meters away,
coming from the opposite direction, with the Bian bus about 100 meters behind the rig cruising at
a good speed.3 When Perez slowed down his BTCO bus to permit said passenger to disembark,
he must have known, therefore, that the Bian bus would overtake the calesa at about the time
when the latter and BTCO bus would probably be on the same line, on opposite sides of the
asphalted portions of the road, and that the space between the BTCO bus and the "calesa" would
not be enough to allow the Bian bus to go through. It is true that the driver of the Bian bus
should have slowed down or stopped, and, hence, was reckless in not doing so; but, he had no
especial obligations toward the passengers of the BTCO unlike Perez whose duty was to exercise
"utmost" or "extraordinary" diligence for their safety. Perez was thus under obligation to avoid a
situation which would be hazardous for his passengers, and, make their safety dependent upon
the diligence of the Bian driver. Such obligation becomes more patent when we considered the
fact of which the Court may take judicial cognizance that our motor vehicle drivers,
particularly those of public service utilities, have not distinguished themselves for their concern
over the safety, the comfort or the convenience of others. Besides, as correctly stated in the
syllabus to Brito Sy vs. Malate Taxicab & Garage, Inc., 4
In an action based on a contract of carriage, the court need not make an express finding of
fault or negligence on the part of the carrier in order to hold it responsible to pay the
damages sought for by the passenger. By the contract of carriage, the carrier assumes the
express obligation to transport the passenger to his destination safely and to observe
extraordinary diligence with a due regard for all the circumstances, and any injury that might

be suffered by the passenger is right away attributable to the fault or negligence of the
carrier (Article 1756, new Civil Code). This is an exception to the general rule that
negligence must be proved, and it is therefore incumbent upon the carrier to prove that it
has exercised extraordinary diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733 and 1755 of the new
Civil Code.
In the case at bar, BTCO has not proven the exercise of extraordinary diligence on its part. For this
reason, the case of Isaac vs. A. L. Ammen Trans. Co., Inc. 5 relied upon by BTCO, is not in point,
for, in said case, the public utility driver had done everything he could to avoid the accident, and
could not have possibly avoided it, for he "swerved the bus to the very extreme right of the road,"
which the driver, in the present case, had failed to do.
As regards the second assignment of error, appellant argues that the award of attorney's fees is
not authorized by law, because, of the eleven (11) cases specified in Article 1208 of the new Civil
Code, only the fifth and the last are relevant to the one under consideration; but the fifth case
requires bad faith, which does not exist in the case at bar. As regards the last case, which permits
the award, "where the court deems it just and equitable that attorney's fees . . . should be
recovered," it is urged that the evidence on record does not show the existence of such just and
equitable grounds.
We, however, believe otherwise, for: (1) the accident in question took place on April 25, 1954, and
the Caguimbals have been constrained to litigate for over thirteen (13) years to vindicate their
rights; and (2) it is high time to impress effectively upon public utility operators the nature and
extent of their responsibility in respect of the safety of their passengers and their duty to exercise
greater care in the selection of drivers and conductor and in supervising the performance of their
duties, in accordance, not only with Article 1733 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, but, also, with
Articles 1755 and 1756 thereof 6 and the spirit of these provisions, as disclosed by the letter
thereof, and elucidated by the Commission that drafted the same. 7
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from, should be, as it is hereby, affirmed, with the costs of
this instance against appellant Batangas Transportation Company.
Batangas Transport vs. Caguimbal, 22 SCRA 171
FACTS:
Caguimbal who was a paying passenger of BTCO bus died when the bus of the Bian
Transportation Company (Binan) which was coming from the opposite direction and a calesa,
which was then ahead of the Bian bus met an accident.
A passenger requested the conductor of BTCO to stop as he was going to alight, and when he
heard the signal of the conductor, the driver slowed down his bus swerving it farther to the right in
order to stop. A calesa was at a distance of several meters facing the BTCO bus coming from the
opposite direction. At the same time, Bian bus was going northward and following the direction of
the calesa. Upon seeing the Bian bus, the driver of the BTCO bus dimmed his light; that as the
calesa and the BTCO bus were passing each other from the opposite directions, the Bian bus
following the calesa swerved to its left in an attempt to pass between the BTCO bus and the
calesa; that without diminishing its speed, the Bian bus passed through the space between the
BTCO bus and the calesa hitting first the left side of the BTCO bus with the left front corner of its
body and then bumped and struck the calesa which was completely wrecked. The driver was
seriously injured and the horse was killed. The second and all other posts of the BTCO bus were
completely smashed and half of the back wall to the left was ripped open. The BTCO bus suffered

damages for the repair of its damaged portion. As a consequence of this occurrence, Caguimbal
and Tolentino died, apart from others who were injured.
The widow and children of Caguimbal sued to recover damages from the BTCO. The latter, in turn,
filed a third-party complaint against the Bian and its driver, Ilagan. Subsequently, the Caguimbals
amended their complaint, to include therein, as defendants, said Bian and Ilagan.
ISSUE: Whether or not BTCO is liable for the damages incurred by respondent
HELD: YES. BTCO failed to exercise extraordinary diligence.
RATIO:
The recklessness of the driver of Binan was, manifestly, a major factor in the occurrence of the
accident which resulted in the death of Pedro Caguimbal. He overtook the calesa and passed
between the same and the BTCO bus despite the fact that the space available was not big enough
hitting the left side of the BTCO bus and then the calesa.
Article 1733 of the Civil Code provides the general rule that extraordinary diligence must be
exercised by the driver of a bus in the vigilance for the safety of his passengers.
The record shows that, in order to permit one of them to disembark, the BTCO bus driver drove
partly to the right shoulder of the road and partly on the asphalted portion thereof. Yet, he could
have and should have seen to it had he exercised "extraordinary diligence" that his bus was
completely outside the asphalted portion of the road, and fully within the shoulder thereof, the
width of which being more than sufficient to accommodate the bus. When the BTCO bus driver
slowed down his BTCO bus to permit said passenger to disembark, he must have known,
therefore, that the Bian bus would overtake the calesa at about the time when the latter and
BTCO bus would probably be on the same line, on opposite sides of the asphalted portions of the
road, and that the space between the BTCO bus and the "calesa" would not be enough to allow
the Bian bus to go through. It is true that the driver of the Bian bus should have slowed down or
stopped, and, hence, was reckless in not doing so; but, he had no especial obligations toward the
passengers of the BTCO unlike the BTCO bus driver whose duty was to exercise "utmost" or
"extraordinary" diligence for their safety.