DANDY DUNGO and GREGORIO SIBAL, JR. vs.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 209464 July 1, 2015
Facts:
On January 14, 2006, at Villa Novaliches, Brgy. Pansol,
Calamba City, Laguna, the Alpha Phi Omega Fraternity in
conspiracy with more or less twenty other members and
officers conducted initiation rite. MARLON VILLANUEVA
y MEJILLA, a neophyte was subjected to physical harm.
After the initiation rites, accused Sibal inquired about
Villanueva's condition but he was ignored by Castillo. He
then called co-accused Dungo for help. After Dungo
arrived at the resort, they hailed a tricycle and brought
Villanueva to JP Rizal Hospital. There, he gave a false
name to the security guard as he heard that Dungo had
done the same.
Classes of direct participants are: the first class of
principals would be the actual participants in the hazing.
If the person subjected to hazing or other forms of
initiation rites suffers any physical injury or dies as a result
thereof, the officers and members of the fraternity, sorority
or organization who actually participated in the infliction of
physical harm shall be liable as principals. The second
class of principals would be the officers, former officers,
or alumni of the organization, group, fraternity or sorority
who actually planned the hazing. The third class of
principals would be the officers or members of an
organization group, fraternity or sorority who knowingly
cooperated in carrying out the hazing by inducing the
victim to be present thereat due to their indispensable
cooperation in the crime by inducing the victim to attend
the hazing. The next class of principals would be the
fraternity or sorority's adviser. The last class of principals
would be the parents of the officers or members of the
fraternity, group, or organization.

RTC found Dungo and Sibal guilty of the crime of violating
Section 4 of the Anti-Hazing Law and sentenced them to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
The CA ruled that the appeal of Dungo and Sibal was
bereft of merit.
Exceptionally, under R.A. No. 8049, the participation of
the offenders in the criminal conspiracy can be proven by
the prima facie evidence due to their presence during the
hazing, unless they prevented the commission of the acts
therein.

Issue:

Whether or not herein accused were guilty of violation of

R.A. No. 8049.

Ruling:

Yes, they are guilty of violation of R.A. No. 8049.

Section 1 of R.A. No. 8049 defines hazing as an initiation

rite or practice as a prerequisite for admission into
membership in a fraternity, sorority or organization by
placing the recruit, neophyte or applicant in some
embarrassing or humiliating situations such as forcing him
to do menial, silly, foolish and other similar tasks or
activities or otherwise subjecting him to physical or
psychological suffering or injury. From the said definition,
the elements of the crime of hazing can be determined:
1. That there is an initiation rite or practice as a
prerequisite for admission into membership in a fraternity,
sorority or organization;

2. That there must be a recruit, neophyte or applicant of

the fraternity, sorority or organization; and

3. That the recruit, neophyte or applicant is placed in

some embarrassing or humiliating situations such as
forcing him to do menial, silly, foolish and other similar
tasks or activities or otherwise subjecting him to physical
or psychological suffering or injury.
 PEOPLE V AGUILOS
G.R. No. 121828. June 27, 2003
FACTS:
On February 5, 1988 11:30 in the evening, Elisa
Roldan was inside their store waiting for husband to
arrive. Joselito Capa and Julian Azul, Jr. were drinking
beer. Although already drunk, Edmar Aguilos and Odilon
Lagliba joined them. Aguilos had a heated argument with
Azul. Elisa pacified Edmar and advised them to go home
as she was already going to close her store. Aguilos and
Lagliba left then returned to block Capa and Azul. Aguilos
took off his eyeglasses and punched Azul in the face.
Elisa shouted "Tama na, tama na!" but she was ignored
as they continue to rumble until they reach the end of the
street. Lagliba positioned himself on top of a pile of hollow
blocks and watched the two swapped punches. As Capa
tried to stop the fight, Lagliba pulled out his knife with his
right hand and stepped down from his perch. He placed
his left arm around Capa's neck, and stabbed
him. Ronnie and Rene Gayot Pilola, who were across the
street, saw their gang-mate Lagliba stabbing the victim
and decided to join the fray. Ronnie took a knife from the
kitchen of Teresita and the two rushed to the scene and
stabbed Capa. As Capa was stabbed 11 times (6 fatal
stab wounds), he fell in the canal. Lagliba and Pilola fled
while Ronnie went after Azul who ran dear life. When
Azul noticed that Ronnie was no longer running after him,
he looked back and saw Ronnie pick up a piece of hollow
block and bashed Capa's head. Then, Ronnie got a piece
of broken bottle and struck Capa once more before fleeing
from the scene. Capa died on the spot. Elisa rushed to
Capa's house and informed his wife and brother of the
incident.
Agripina Gloria, a female security guard, saw
Ronnie repeatedly stabbed Capa and fled towards the
direction of the mental hospital. She did not see Lagliba.
On the other hand, Elisa's cross-examination had
an inconsistency, she stated that it was Aguilos who
struck the victim (before it was Ronnie)
RTC: Pilola GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
Murder punished under Art. 248 of the RPC qualified by
treachery and sentenced to reclusion perpetua. Pilola is
hereby ordered to indemnify the heirs of Capa in the
amount of 50,000 as civil indemnity ex delictom and moral
damages of 50,000 and exemplary damages of 25,000
ISSUE: WON Pilola is guilty of murder
RULING: Yes. Pilola is GUILTY of murder.
• The identity of the person who hit the victim with
a hollow block is of de minimis importance. The
perceived inconsistency in Elisa's account of events
is a minor and collateral detail that does not affect
the substance of her testimony, as it even served to
strengthen rather than destroy her credibility. No
showing of any improper motive on the part of a
witness to testify falsely against the accused or to
falsely implicate the latter in the commission of the
crime - the testimony is worthy of full faith and
credence
• There is conspiracy when two or more persons
agree to commit a felony and decide to commit it.
Conspiracy as a mode of incurring criminal liability
must be proved separately from and with the same
quantum of proof as the crime itself. Secrecy and
concealment are essential features of a successful
conspiracy. Conspiracy may be implied if it is
proved that two or more persons aimed by their acts
towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful
object, each doing a part so that their combined
acts, though apparently independent of each other,
were, in fact, connected and cooperative, indicating
a closeness of personal association and a
concurrence of sentiment. There may be
conspiracy even if an offender does not know the
identities of the other offenders, and even though
he is not aware of all the details of the plan of
operation or was not in on the scheme from the
beginning. One need only to knowingly contribute
his efforts in furtherance of it. One who joins a
criminal conspiracy in effect adopts as his own the
criminal designs of his co-conspirators. If
conspiracy is established, all the conspirators are
liable as co-principals regardless of the manner and
extent of their participation since in contemplation
of law, the act of one would be the act of all. Each
of the conspirators is the agent of all the others.
• Even if two or more offenders do not conspire to
commit homicide or murder, they may be held
criminally liable as principals by direct participation
if they perform overt acts which mediately or
immediately cause or accelerate the death of the
victim.
• Art. 4. Criminal liability. – Criminal
liability shall be incurred:
By any person committing a felony
(delito) although the wrongful act done be
different from that which he intended
• Art 18. Accomplices. - Accomplices are
the persons who, not being included in Article
17, cooperate in the execution of the offense
by previous or simultaneous acts.
 • To hold a person liable as an accomplice, two
elements must concur:
1. the community of criminal design - knowing the
criminal design of the principal by
direct participation, he concurs with the latter in
his purpose
2. the performance of previous or simultaneous
acts that are not indispensable to the
commission of the crime

• Accomplices do not decide whether the crime

should be committed; they merely assent to the plan of
the principal by direct participation and cooperate on its
accomplishment. However, where one cooperates in
the commission of the crime by performing overt acts
which by themselves are acts of execution, he is a
principal by direct participation, and not merely an
accomplice.

• There is treachery when the offender commits

any of the crimes against persons, employing means,
methods or forms in the execution thereof, which tend
directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk
to himself arising from the defense, which the offended
party might make. The essence of treachery is the swift
and unexpected attack on the unarmed victim without
the slightest provocation on his part - attack on the
unarmed victim was sudden. The aggravating
circumstance of abuse of superior strength is absorbed
by treachery.
Manaban vs. CA and People of the Philippines
Ramonito Manaban, petitioner vs.
Court of Appeals and People of the Philippines,
respondent.
G.R. No. 150723
July 11, 2006
FACTS:
At around 1:25 o’clock in the morning of October 11,
1996, the victim, Joselito Bautista, who was a member of
the UP Police Force, took his daughter, Frinzi, who
complained of difficulty in breathing, to the UP Health
Center. The doctors gave him prescriptions and so he
went to BPI Kalayaan to withdraw some money from its
Automated Teller Machine (ATM). When Bautista could
not withdraw money, he started kicking and pounding
the machine which caught the attention of herein
petitioner. Bautista said that the machine captured his
card and that he did not get the money he badly needed.
Manaban said that the PIN entered was incorrect that is
why the card was captured. Angered by what Manaban
said, Bautista then continued kicking and pounding the
machine. The former advised the latter to call the
customer service which Bautista did but still kicked the
machine. Failing to pacify the victim, petitioner fired a
warning shot, and according to him fired the second one
hitting, and eventually, killing Bautista. Manaban said
that he feared that Bautista would pull his gun first and
might kill him so he fired his gun and shot Bautista.
The trial court found the petitioner guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide. This decision
was later affirmed by the Court of Appeals with
modification respect only to the award of loss of earning
capacity.
This case is then submitted before this court for review.
he turned his back at Manaban is mere speculation.
Aggression presupposes that the person attacked must
face a real threat to his life and the peril sought to be
avoided is imminent and actual, not imaginary. Absent
such actual or imminent peril to one’s life or limb, there is
nothing to repel and there is no justification for taking the
life or inflicting injuries on another.
2. It is undisputed that Manaban called the police to
report the shooting incident. When the police arrived,
Manaban surrendered his service firearm and voluntarily
went with the police to the police station for investigation.
Thus, Manaban is entitled to the benefit of the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender.
On obfuscation, we find that the facts of the case do not
entitle Manaban to such mitigating circumstance. The
threat was only in the mind of Manaban and is mere
speculation which is not sufficient to produce obfuscation
which is mitigating.41 Besides, the threat or danger was
not grave or serious considering that Manaban had the
advantage over Bautista because Manaban was already
pointing his firearm at Bautista when the latter turned his
back. The defense failed to establish by clear and
convincing evidence the cause that allegedly produced
obfuscation.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the justifying circumstance of self-
defense is applicable.
2. Whether or not the mitigating circumstances of
voluntary surrender and obfuscation are present.

RULINGS:
1. Under paragraph 1, Article 11 of the Revised Penal
Code, the three requisites to prove self-defense as a
justifying circumstance which may exempt an accused
from criminal liability are: (1) unlawful aggression on the
part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means
employed to prevent or repel the aggression; and (3)
lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the accused
or the person defending himself. Unlawful aggression is
an actual physical assault or at least a threat to attack or
inflict physical injury upon a person. A mere threatening
or intimidating attitude is not considered unlawful
aggression, unless the threat is offensive and menacing,
manifestly showing the wrongful intent to cause injury.
There must be an actual, sudden, unexpected attack or
imminent danger thereof, which puts the defendant’s life
in real peril. In this case, there was no unlawful
aggression on the part of the victim. The allegation of
Manaban that Bautista was about to draw his gun when
G.R. No. 160341 October 19, 2004
EXEQUIEL SENOJA, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in People v.
Exequiel Senoja, docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 26564,
affirming with modification the Decision2 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Baler, Aurora, Branch 96, in
Criminal Case No. 2259, for homicide.
The Case For the People
As culled by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) in
its comment on the petition, the case stemmed from the
following:
1. On April 16, 1997, petitioner Exequiel Senoja,
Fidel Senoja, Jose Calica, and Miguel Lumasac
were drinking gin in the hut of Crisanto Reguyal
in Barangay Zarah, San Luis, Aurora. An angry
Leon Lumasac suddenly arrived at the said
place, holding a bolo in his right hand and
looking for his brother Miguel. Petitioner and
Jose tried to pacify Leon. But when petitioner
approached Leon, the latter tried to hack him so
he embraced Leon and Jose took Leon’s bolo.
Then, Leon and petitioner talked things out and
later reconciled (pp. 2-4, TSN, November 16,
1998; pp. 2-4, TSN, August 30, 2002; p. 2, TSN,
April 21, 1998; p. 5, TSN, March 14, 2001; p. 2,
CA Decision).
2. Subsequently, Leon walked out of Crisanto’s
hut followed by petitioner. Suddenly, about ten
meters from the hut, petitioner stabbed Leon at
the back. When Leon turned around, petitioner
continued stabbing him until he fell to the
ground. Then, petitioner ran towards the
barangay road and threw away the "kolonial"
knife he used in stabbing Leon. The latter died
on the spot (pp. 2-6, TSN, November 22, 2000;
p. 5, TSN, August 30, 2002; p. 3, CA Decision).
3. Dr. Pura Deveza Valenzuela-Uy, San Luis
Municipal Health Officer, examined the cadaver
of Leon and found multiple lesions on his body
and five fatal wounds on his chest. Dr. Uy issued
a medico-legal report and death certificate
(Exhibits A and B, pp. 13-14, Records; pp. 3-5,
TSN, November 20, 1997).3
On August 13, 1997, an Information was filed charging
petitioner Exequiel Senoja with homicide, the accusatory
portion of which reads:
That on April 16, 1997 at around 11 o’clock in
the morning in Barangay Zarah, San Luis,
Aurora, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the said accused, did then
and there, willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously,
with intent to kill, attack, assault, and use
personal violence upon the person of one Leon
Lumasac by then and there stabbing him with a
bladed weapon locally known as "kolonyal" at
the different parts of his body thereby inflicting
upon the latter mortal stab wounds which were
the direct and immediate cause of his death
thereafter.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
The petitioner admitted killing the victim but invoked the
affirmative defense of self-defense. His version of the
fatal incident is set forth in his petition at bar:
1. On April 16, 1997 at about 11 o’clock in the
morning, Crisanto Reguyal, Fidel Senoja, Jose
Calica, Miguel Lumasac, and Exequiel Senoja
were in the hut of Crisanto Reguyal in Barangay
Zarah, San Luis, Aurora, drinking gin;
2. Leon Lumasac suddenly arrived holding a
bolo and hacked the doorpost of Crisanto’s hut,
angrily demanding for his brother, Miguel
Lumasac, whom he suspected of drying up the
ricefield he was plowing;
3. At this time, Miguel Lumasac was no longer
inside the hut but fetching water;
4. To prevent Leon Lumasac from entering the
hut, Exequiel Senoja (appellant) and Jose Calica
stood by the door while simultaneously trying to
pacify Leon Lumasac;
5. Exequiel Senoja with a knife then went
outside and tried to pacify Leon Lumasac but the
latter angered by the gestures of the former tried
to hack Exequiel Senoja;
6. To avoid any injury, Exequiel Senoja
embraced Leon which gave an opportunity to
disarm the duo. Jose Calica got the bolo of Leon
and threw it away while Fidel Senoja took the
"colonial" knife of Exequiel;
7. Jose Calica and Fidel Senoja were able to
pacify Leon Lumasac so they invited him to get
inside the hut. Inside the hut, Leon Lumasac
tried to box Fidel Senoja for siding with his
 brother, Miguel, but was prevented by Exequiel
Senoja who held Leon’s hands;
8. After a while, Leon Lumasac left but returned
and angrily demanded for his bolo. Jose Calica
gave his own bolo with a sabbard to replace the
bolo of Leon which he threw away;
9. With Jose Calica’s bolo in him, Leon Lumasac
left but only after leaving a threat that something
will happen to Exequiel Senoja for siding with his
brother;
10. After walking for about 10 meters away from
the hut, Leon Lumasac turned around and saw
Exequiel Senoja on his way home following him;
11. Leon Lumasac walked back to meet
Exequiel Senoja and upon reaching him, the
former suddenly and treacherously hacked the
latter at the left side of his head and right thigh;
12. Unable to evade the treacherous attack by
Leon Lumasac who persisted in his criminal
design, Exequiel Senoja drew his "colonial" knife
and stabbed Leon Lumasac in self-defense,
inflicting upon him multiple wounds which
caused his death.5
On June 7, 2002, the trial court rendered judgment
against the petitioner, finding him guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged. The fallo of the
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court
finds accused Exequiel Senoja GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide for
the death of victim Leon Lumasac and hereby
sentences him, applying Article 64, paragraph 1
of the Revised Penal Code and Section 1 of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, (a) to suffer the
penalty of twelve (12) years of prision mayor as
minimum to seventeen (17) years and four (4)
months of reclusion temporal as maximum; (b)
to pay the heirs of the victim the amount of
Fifteen (sic) Thousand Pesos (Php 50,000.00)
by way of civil indemnity; and (c) to pay the
costs.
SO ORDERED.6
In due course, the petitioner appealed the decision to the
CA which rendered judgment affirming, with
modification, the decision of the RTC. The petitioner now
seeks relief from this Court, contending that:
The Honorable Court of Appeals failed to
appreciate vital facts which, if considered, would
probably alter the result of this case on appeal
finding appellant’s plea of self-defense credible.7
The petitioner faults the CA for its analysis of his
testimony, as follows:
The injuries suffered by the petitioner at the left
side of his head and right thigh was confirmed
by Dr. Rodolfo Eligio in open court. The relative
positions of the wounds clearly show that the
drunken Leon Lumasac brandished and
executed several hacking blows against
Exequiel Senoja before he was stabbed,
neutralized and finished by the latter. It would be
physically and highly improbable for the victim if
he was treacherously hit at the left buttock and
as he turned around to face the petitioner, the
latter stabbed him successively and without let-
up hitting him 9 times resulting in 9 fatal wounds.
This did not give a chance to the victim to
retaliate and inflict those wounds upon the
aggressor. The victim used Mr. Jose Calica’s
bolo which was secured by its scabbard. Unless
earlier drawn, it would be impossible for the
victim to use it in defending himself from the
surprise attack and stabbing at a lightning
fashion inflicting nine (9) fatal wounds. Time
element was the essence of this encounter
which, as narrated by the Honorable Court, after
the assailant poked the victim at the left side of
the buttock with the use of the "colonial" knife he
stabbed him successively until he fell down
dead. Under these circumstances, how could
Exequiel Senoja suffered (sic) those hacking
(sic) wounds inflicted by the victim using Calica’s
bolo? In all indications, it was Leon Lumasac
who attacked his adversary first but lost in the
duel considering that he was older than Exequiel
Senoja and drunk. Clearly, therefore, it was
Leon Lumasac who was the aggressor both in
the first and second phases of the incident and
Exequiel Senoja was compelled to defend
himself.
A closer scrutiny of the attending circumstances
which resulted in this stabbing incident shows
that Exequiel Senoja has no compelling reasons
to kill his godfather. On that same occasion, Mr.
Exequiel Senoja was with the brother of the
victim, Miguel Lumasac, which only shows that
there was no pre-existing grudge between these
families. And still, what titillates our imagination
is the fact that Miguel Lumasac, who was then
with the group drinking gin at the hut of Crisanto
Reguyal did not clearly impute this crime to
petitioner. On the contrary, when he was
presented to the witness stand, he was very
evasive in answering the questions profounded
by the prosecutors if he wanted the petitioner to
be imprisoned. Miguel Lumasac could have told
the real truth that Senoja murdered his brother.8
The CA declared that, based on the evidence on record:
 As seen from appellant’s testimony, Leon
Lumasac’s actions can be divided into two (2)
phases: the first phase, when Leon entered
Crisanto Reguyal’s hut, up to the time he and
the appellant reconciled. The second phase was
when Leon left to go home. In phase one where
Leon entered Reguyal’s hut, Leon was the
aggressor but his aggression was mostly
directed to his brother Miguel who was not inside
the hut anymore, although it was also partly
directed at the appellant and even at Fidel
Soneja (sic). But Leon’s aggression against the
appellant and Fidel Senoja ceased since, as
appellant testified, when Leon tried to box Fidel
Senoja and he (appellant) told Leon "Huwag po,
Huwag po," Leon was pacified.
In the second phase, when Leon left the hut to
go home, his aggression had already ceased.
It is uncontroverted that the appellant followed
the victim when the latter went out of the hut to
go home. Appellant’s testimony is that when he
was two meters outside the hut, Leon turned
around to face him saying "if you’re not only my
godson" in a threatening way, then approached
and hacked him (with Calica’s bolo) inflicting
wounds on the left side of his head and his right
thigh, thus, he (appellant) attacked the victim
with the kolonial knife he was holding. That
appellant suffered such injuries was
corroborated by the testimony of Dr. Rodolfo
Eligio.9
The petition is denied.
Paragraph 1, Article 11, of the Revised Penal Code
provides:
ART. 11. Justifying circumstances. – The
following do not incur any criminal liability:
1. Anyone who acts in defense of his
person or rights, provided that the
following circumstances concur;
First. Unlawful aggression;
Second. Reasonable necessity of the
means employed to prevent or repel it;
Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on
the part of the person defending himself.
The affirmative defense of self-defense
may be complete or incomplete. It is
complete when all the three essential
requisites are present; it is incomplete if
only unlawful aggression on the part of
the victim and any of the two essential
requisites were present. In fine, unlawful
aggression on the part of the victim is a
condition sine qua non to self-defense,
complete or incomplete. Whether or not
the accused acted in self-defense is a
question of fact. Like alibi, the
affirmative defense of self-defense is
inherently weak because, as experience
has demonstrated, it is easy to fabricate
and difficult to disprove.10
The right of self-defense proceeds from necessity and
limited by it. The right begins where necessity does, and
ends where it ends.11 There is, however, a perceptible
difference between necessity and self-defense, which is
that, self-defense excuses the repulse of a wrong;
necessity justifies the invasion of a right. Hence, it is
essential to self-defense that it should be a defense
against a present unlawful attack.12
Life can be taken under the plea of necessity, when
necessary for the preservation of the life on the party
setting up the plea. Self-defense is an act to save life;
hence, it is right and not a crime.13 There is a need for
one, indeed, for it is a natural right for one to defend
oneself when confronted by an unlawful aggression by
another. It is a settled rule that to constitute aggression,
the person attacked must be confronted by a real threat
on his life and limb; and the peril sought to be avoided is
imminent and actual, not merely imaginary. Absent such
an actual or imminent peril to one’s life or limb, there is
nothing to repel; there is no necessity to take the life or
inflict injuries on another.14
But then what is the standard to use to determine
whether the person defending himself is confronted by a
real and imminent peril to his life or limb? We rule that
the test should be: does the person invoking the defense
believe, in due exercise of his reason, his life or limb is in
danger? After all, the rule of law founded on justice and
reason: Actus no facit remin, nisi mens sit rea. Hence,
the guilt of the accused must depend upon the
circumstances as they reasonably appear to him.15
Unlawful aggression presupposes an actual, sudden,
unexpected attack or imminent danger thereof, not
merely a threatening or intimidating attitude.16 Hence,
when an inceptual/unlawful aggression ceases to exist,
the one making a defense has no right to kill or injure the
former aggressor.17 After the danger has passed, one is
not justified in following up his adversary to take his life.
The conflict for blood should be avoided if possible.18 An
assault on his person, he cannot punish when the
danger or peril is over. When the danger is over, the
right of self-defense ceases. His right is defense, not
retribution.19
When the accused offers the affirmative defense of self-
defense, he thereby admits killing the victim or inflicting
injuries on him. The burden of evidence is shifted on the
accused to prove, with clear and convincing evidence,
that he killed the victim or inflicted injuries on him to
defend himself. The accused must rely on the strength of
his own evidence and not on the weakness of that of the
prosecution because if the evidence of the prosecution
were weak, the accused can no longer be acquitted. 20
We agree with the CA that, as gleaned, even from the
testimony of the petitioner, there were two separate but
interrelated incidents that culminated in the petitioner’s
stabbing and killing of the victim Leon Lumasac. The first
was the arrival of the victim, who was armed with a bolo,
in the hut of Crisanto Reguyal, looking for his brother
Miguel Lumasac, whom he was angry at. The victim
hacked the wall of the house in anger. The petitioner,
who was armed with a knife, tried to pacify the victim.
The victim attempted to hack the petitioner;
nevertheless, the latter embraced and managed to
pacify the victim. Forthwith, Jose Calica took the bolo of
the victim and threw it away. For his part, Fidel Senoja
took the petitioner’s knife. As it was, the victim was
already pacified. He and the petitioner were already
reconciled.21 Fidel even gave back the knife to the
petitioner.
The second incident took place when the victim
demanded that Calica return his bolo as he wanted to go
home already. Because he had thrown away the victim’s
bolo, Calica was, thus, impelled to give his own. The
victim then warned the petitioner three times, "May
mangyayari sa iyo, kung hindi ngayon, bukas," and left
the hut. When the victim had already gone about ten
meters from the hut, the petitioner followed the victim.
The victim turned around and told the petitioner, "Kung
hindi lang kita inaanak." The victim then hacked the
petitioner, hitting the latter on the left side of his head
and thigh. Believing that the victim would attack him
anew, the petitioner stabbed the victim frontally several
times.22 He also stabbed the victim on the left buttock.
The petitioner could not recall how many times he
stabbed the victim and what parts of the latter’s body
had been hit.
The first episode inside the hut had been completed with
the protagonist, the victim, and the petitioner reconciled.
The second episode commenced inside the hut and
continued outside, and ended with the petitioner
stabbing the victim several times.
The trial and the appellate courts gave no credence and
probative weight to the testimony of the petitioner. So do
we.
First. The findings of fact of the trial court and its
conclusions based on the said findings are accorded by
this Court high respect, if not conclusive effect,
especially when affirmed by the CA. This is because of
the unique advantage of the trial court of having been
able to observe, at close range, the demeanor and
behavior of the witnesses as they testify. This rule,
however, is inapplicable if the trial court ignored,
overlooked, or misinterpreted cogent facts and
circumstances which, if considered, will alter or reverse
the outcome of the case. We have reviewed the records
and found no justification for a reversal of the findings of
the trial court and its conclusions based thereon.
Second. The victim sustained six hack wounds and one
lacerated wound. This is gleaned from the Necropsy
Report of Dr. Pura Uy, to wit:
FINDINGS: The victim lies in supine position,
stocky in built; his clothing completely soaked
with fresh blood.
CHEST:
(+) stab wound 2 inches below the L
nipple 4 inches deep running medially to
the anterior median line.
(+) stab wound 2 inches to the L of the
anterior median line at the level of the L
nipple 5½ inches deep running
posteriorly.
(+) stab wound 1 inch above the L
nipple 4 inches deep running
inferomedially.
(+) stab wound 2 inches to the left of the
anterior median line 4 inches deep
running inferoposteriorly.
(+) stab wound 1 inch to the right of the
anterior median line at the level of the
second right intercostal space 0.5 inch
in depth.
(+) stab wound ½ inch to the right of the
anterior median line at the level of the
xyphoid process 3½ inches deep
running superiorly.
(+) stab wound at the level of the L
nipple L anterior axillary line 4½ inches
in depth running superiorly to the left
armpit.
(+) hack wound at the left armpit 3
inches long injuring the muscles and the
blood vessels.
(+) lacerated wound on the left palm
almost cutting off the proximal phalanx
of the left thumb.23
Five of the wounds of the victim on his chest were
fatal.24 The victim also sustained a stab wound on the
left buttock. According to the doctor, it was unlikely for
the victim to have survived even with medical
attention.25 After the doctor made her initial autopsy and
submitted her report, she noted that the victim sustained
a stab wound of about two inches deep at the left
buttock, thus:
Q In this medico-legal report, you indicated that
the cause of death of the victim is "Hypovolemic
shock 2º to multiple stab wounds, chest." Will
you please explain this?
A "Ito pong nakalagay o dahilan ng pagkamatay
ng biktima sa sobrang natapon na dugo gawa ng
maraming saksak na tinamo ng biktima sa
kanyang dibdib ang nagbigay ng daan sa
kanyang kamatayan."
Q Will you please tell us, Dr. Uy, if there is one
amont (sic) these lesions that is located at the
back of the victim?
A I forgot to tell you that a day after I submitted
the report, the funeral parlor which attended the
victim has called my attention because of the
wound at the back of the victim and I attended
immediately to see these lesions at the home of
the victim. I reviewed for (sic) these lesions and I
saw one lesion located at the left buttock of the
victim.
Q What is the nature of the injury?
A Stab wound, about two inches deep.
Q By the nature of the lesion, is it not fatal?
A It is not that fatal.
Q In your expert opinion, by the nature of the
wound sustained by the victim, what could have
been the relative position of the victim in relation
to his assailant?
A Based on my examination, I think the victim
and the assailant were facing each other.
"Masyadong malapit."
Q How many fatal wounds have (sic) the victim
sustained in his chest?
A Five fatal stab wounds on the chest.26
Considering the number, nature and location of the
wounds sustained by the victim, the petitioner’s plea of
self-defense is incredible.27 It bears stressing that the
petitioner resolutely denied stabbing the victim at the
buttock and insisted that he stabbed the victim frontally:
Q As a matter of fact, he sustained an injury at
the back of his buttock (pigi) and when he faced
you, you stabbed him again several times?
A That is not true, Sir.
Q But you are admitting that you stabbed him
several times frontally?
A Yes, Sir, because I am (sic) defending myself.
Q You also stabbed him in his left armpit?
A I don’t know, Sir.
Q But you knew that you stabbed him in his
buttock?
A No, Sir.
Q After stabbing him several times and felt that
he was already dead, you already left the place?
A Yes, Sir.28
The testimony of the petitioner is belied by the physical
evidence on record. The settled rule is that physical
evidence is evidence of the highest order; it speaks
more eloquently than a hundred witnesses.29
Third. The petitioner threw away his knife and failed to
surrender it to the policemen; neither did he inform the
policemen that he killed the victim in self-defense. The
petitioner’s claim that the victim was armed with a bolo is
hard to believe because he even failed to surrender the
bolo.30
Fourth. The petitioner’s version of the events that
transpired immediately before he stabbed the victim
does not inspire belief. He claims that when he saw the
victim emerged from the hut, the victim walked towards
the petitioner saying, "Kung hindi lang kita inaanak," but
hit and hacked the latter on the left buttock.31 As gleaned
from his statement, the victim was not disposed, much
less determined to assault the petitioner. And yet, the
petitioner insists that without much ado, the victim,
nevertheless, hit him on the head and on the thigh with
his bolo.
Fifth. According to the petitioner, the victim warned him
three times before leaving the hut, "May mangyayari sa
iyo, kung hindi ngayon, bukas." The petitioner testified
that shortly before the victim uttered these words, the
latter even touched the blade of the bolo to see if it was
sharp.32 The petitioner was, thus, aware of the peril to
his life if he followed the victim. The petitioner,
nevertheless, followed the victim and left the hut after
the victim had gone barely ten meters. He should have
waited until after the victim had already gone far from the
hut before going home to avoid any untoward incident.
Sixth. The petitioner presented his brother-in-law Ruben
Dulay to corroborate his testimony that the victim
stabbed the petitioner and that this impelled the latter to
stab the former. But the testimony of Dulay contradicted
the testimony of the petitioner:
Q When Exequiel Senoja stabbed Leon
Lumasac several times, he immediately fell to
the ground and was fatal[ly] wounded,
immediately died because of several stabs and
lay (sic) down?
A I did not see that scene because Exequiel
Senoja stabbed Leon Lumasac, I turn (sic) back
upon seeing Leon Lumasac hack Exequiel
Senoja, I turn (sic) back because I was afraid
then. When I turn (sic) back I saw them
embracing each other, Sir.
Q And that is the time when Exequiel Senoja
stabbed Leon Lumasac?
A I did not see the stabbing. What I only saw
was that they were embracing each other, Sir.
Q So you are now changing your answer, you
actually saw Exequiel Senoja stabbing Leon
Lumasac several times, after he was hack[ed] by
Leon Lumasac?
A I did not see that Exequiel Senoja stab Leon
Lumasac, Sir.33
Seventh. The bare fact that the petitioner sustained a
five-centimeter wound at the left temporal region and an
eight-centimeter hack wound on the anterior portion of
his right thigh does not preclude the fact that he was the
unlawful aggressor; nor buttress his plea that he acted in
self-defense. The petitioner failed to inform the doctor
that he sustained the wounds to defend himself.
Moreover, the doctor testified that the wounds the
petitioner sustained were slight:
Pros. Ronquillo:
Q Does (sic) the wound at the right anterior thigh
vertical, diagonal or what?
A I did not place it, Sir.
Q So, you don’t know?
A It is vertical, Sir, but I did not place it on the
record. And the hack wound on the temporal
region is oblique.
Q Were the injuries only slight?
A Yes, Sir.
Q So, it is (sic) possible that these injuries were
self-inflicted?
A Probably, Sir, but I cannot comment on that.
Q You said that the patient was under the
influence of alcohol? Would you say that the
patient was then so drunk at that time?
A When I saw him at that time, he was
moderately drunk.34
The doctor gave the petitioner due medications for 30
minutes and the petitioner then went home:
Q How did it happen that you were able to kill
the victim in this case Mr. Leon Lumasac?
A Because when I went out, he hacked me, Sir.
Q Were you hit by the hack made by the victim
in this case?
A Yes, Sir.
Q Where?
A Here, Sir.
And Witness is pointing to his left head.
Q Where else?
A (His) right thigh.
Q In what place did this incident happen?
A In the hut of Tata Santos, Sir.
Q What is his real name?
A Crisanto Reguyal, Sir.35
If, as claimed by the petitioner, the victim stabbed him
frontally, it is incredible that the victim was able to hack
the anterior part of his right thigh.
Eighth. The testimony of the petitioner that the victim
stabbed him outside the hut on the left side of his head
and the anterior portion of his right thigh is belied by his
testimony on direct examination that the victim stabbed
him while still inside the hut of Reguyal:
 Q How did it happen that you were able to kill
the victim in this case Mr. Leon Lumasac?
A Because when I went out, he hacked me, Sir.
Q Were you hit by the hack made by the victim
in this case?
accused Exequiel Senoja was now the unlawful
aggressor in this second phase of their
confrontation. It bears mentioning that appellant
contradicted himself with respect for (sic) the
reason why he left the hut. First, it was to pacify
Leon and the second reason was that he was
going home.

As for appellant’s injuries, it is clear that they

A Yes, Sir.
were sustained in the course of the victim’s
attempt to defend himself as shown by the
Q Where? lacerated wound on the victim’s left palm, a
defensive wound.37
A Here, Sir.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition
And Witness is pointing to his left head. is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals is AFFIRMED.
Q Where else?
SO ORDERED.
A (His) right thigh.
Puno, Austria-Martinez, Tinga, and Chico-Nazario,
Q In what place did this incident happen? JJ., concur.

A In the hut of Tata Santos, Sir.

Q What is his real name?

A Crisanto Reguyal, Sir.36

But then, after the said incident, the petitioner and the
victim had reconciled. We agree with the following
findings of the appellate court:

The question that must be resolved is whether or

not the victim was the unlawful aggressor as the
appellant’s testimony pictures him to be. The
Court rules in the negative. The victim had
already left the hut and was ten (10) meters
away from it. There is no showing that the victim,
who was drunk, was aware that appellant was
following him, or that the appellant called out to
him so that he (the victim) had to turn around
and notice him. It is clear that at that point in
time, the victim was simply walking toward his
home; he had stopped being an aggressor. It
was the appellant who, smarting from the earlier
incident in the hut where Leon told him "hindi ka
tatagal, sa loob ng tatlong araw mayroong
mangyayari sa iyo, kung hindi ngayon, bukas"
repeated three times, wanted a confrontation.
Appellant stabbed or poked the victim in the left
buttock resulting in the non-fatal wound, and
when the latter turned around, successively
stabbed and hacked the victim in the armpit and
chest until he fell. In all, the victim suffered nine
(9) wounds.

It is the well-considered finding of this Court that

while Leon Lumasac had ceased being the
aggressor after he left the hut to go home,
PEOPLE v DECENA  Witnesses: Jaime was staggering or wobbling
as he walked – the victim could not have persisted in
Facts: attacking the appellant with his current state.
 Testimony of the uncle: imaginative or
 On Christmas day, around 4pm, Luzviminda (14 y.o., coached witness
daughter of the Jaime Ballesteros, victim), saw Decena
rushing towards her father with a long bladed weapon
prompting her to warn her father.
 Decena, however, stabbed him on the right chest
causing his death.
 Narration of the defense:
 At about 4pm, the victim was drunk and for no
apparent reason, he held the appellant by the neck
and poked a fork against it. A barangay tanod
intervened and advised the appellant to go home.
Appellant left but was later followed by Jaime (victim).
 Biala, uncle of the appellant, testified that he
saw Jaime attacking the appellant with a balisong.
Appellant was able to parry the blow, and
overpowering Jaime, thruste the knife into his body.

Issue: W/N the appellant acted in complete self-defense that in

killing Jaime Ballesteros absolving him from criminal liability.

Held: No.

Ratio:

 In criminal cases, the burden of proof is on the

prosecution which may rely on the strength of its evidence
and not on the weakness of the defense. However, upon
invoking self-defense, the accused admits that he killed the
victim and the burden of proof is upon him in proving that
he really acted in self-defense.
 Basic requirement for self-defense as a justifying
circumstance is unlawful aggression against the person
defending himself.
 It must be shown that there was a previous
unlawful and unprovoked attack that placed the life of
the accused in danger forcing him to inflict wounds
upon his assailant
 According to the defense, the unlawful
aggression started when the victim started poking the
appellant with a fork
 Elementary rule: when the aggressor
leaves, the aggression ceases. It follows that
when appellant and Jaime heeded the advice of
the barangay tanod, the unlawful aggression
had ended. Since the aggression no longer
existed, appellant had no right to kill or even
wound the former aggressor.
 The defense failed to establish that
the victim persisted in his design to attack the
appellant

 Defense: continuing aggression

 Whenever the victim was drunk, he would
look for trouble (refuted by the testimony of the wife)
PEOPLE v DELA CRUZ  When the appellant confronted the victim, instead of taking
precautionary measures, appellant could no longer argue
Facts: that there was no provocation on his part

 dela Cruz and San Antonio were currently living together  Claim of self defense rejected
when Macapagal (victim, San Antonio’s ex-live-in partner)
went to their apartment, holding a gun (9mm caliber pistol)
and banged the door of the bedroom ahere dela Cruz was
demanding him to go out
 Dela Cruz opened the door, and upon seeing that
Macapagal was pointing the gun at him, he immediately
went back to the room and closed the door.
 The next time he went out, he, too, was already holding a
gun (.35 caliber revolver).
 The two immediately grappled each other and not long
after, shots were heard and Macapagal fell dead on the
floor.
 Appellant told San Antonio to call the police and when they
arrive, he surrendered the gun he used and told the police
that he shot Macapagal in self defense.
 According to the autopsy, Macapagal sustained 4 wounds.
3 of which were non-penetrating (upper jaw, below the left
shoulder, right side of the waist). The shot that took his life
was on the left side of the chest penetrating the heart.
 Dela Cruz had no license to carry the firearm.

Issue: W/N the accused is able to prove to the court the

elements of self-defense in order to extenuate him from the
crime.

Held: No.

Ratio:

 Three conditions must concur to extenuate him:

1. Unlawful aggression by the person injured or killed

 presuppose an actual, sudden, and unexpected attack or

imminent danger on the life and limb of a person – not a
mere threatening or intimidating attitude – but most
importantly at the time the defensive action was taken
against the aggressor.
 In this case, the victim banged at the bedroom door with his
gun but the appellant, upon seeing the victim pointing a gun
at him was able to prevent at this stage harm to himself by
promptly closing the door. He could have stopped there.
Instead, he confronted the victim.

1. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent

or repel that unlawful aggression

 The number of wounds sustained by the victim would

negate this component of self defense. The four gunshot
wounds indicate a determined effort to kill.

1. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person

defending himself
People v. Jaurigue et al, C.A. No. 384 (1946)
Topic. Commission of crime in a place of worship
Case. Petition to review lower court decision finding
Avelina guilty of homicide with ACs
Facts. Victim Amado was courting Avelina. In one
occasion, while Avelina’s cousing washed the latter’s
hankerchief, Amado stole it. Amado proposed her love to
Avelina. Avelina refused. Amado grabbed her, kissed
her, and touched her chest. To this, Avelina slapped
him, threw fist blows, and kicked him. Avelina told her
mother the next day. Her mother gave her a fan knife for
protection.
Not long after, Amado intruded in Avelina’s house while
she was asleep. He kissed her hand which woke her up.
She screamed for help, he hid under the bed. Her
parents arrive in the room. He apologized.
Days after, Avelina and her family attended services in
the Seventh Day Adventists chapel. Avelina’s father got
there first, Avelina followed and sat on one of the
benches. Amado saw Avelina, sat beside her and put his
hand in her right thigh. Avelina tried to get her knife with
right hand. Amado held her right hand to stop her.
Avelina quickly grabbed the knife with her left hand and
stabbed Amado in the neck.
Amado staggered. Avelina’s father saw Amado bleeding.
Her father asked why she did it, she said she could not
endure it anymore. CFI found Avelina guilty of homicide
wit the aggravating circumstance of having committed
the act in a place of worship, inter alia. Avelina
appealed.
Issue. Is the AC of offending a place of worship
applicable? -No
Ratio. While it is true that the crime occurred in a chapel,
this does not necessarily denote the attachment of said
AC. As per law, for a proper appreciation of AC of having
committed the crime in a place of worship, there should
be premeditation that the offender intended to do it in the
place of worship. As the facts show, Avelina did not plan
to kill Amado nor to kill him in a chapel. Avelina had in
her case the fan knife just for protection whenever and
wherever she might need it. It just so happened that
Amado provoked her in the chapel and that was where
Avelina could not bear it anymore. With this in mind, the
present court ruled that the lower court erred in
assigning the AC in its judgment against Avelina.
PEOPLE VS JAURIGUE
Facts: Defendant Avelina Jarigue(girl) and appellant
Amado Capino lived in the same barrio. Prior to the
incident at hand, Capino had been courting Jarigue to no
avail. A month prior to the incident, Capino stole a hanky
belonging to Jarigue bearing her nickname “aveling” while
I was being washed. On another night, Jarigue was
feeding a dog under her house, when Capino approached
her and spoke to her of his love, which she flatly refused,
and he thereupon suddenly embraced and kissed her and
touched her boobs. She thereafter kept a long fan knife to
protect herself. A few days later, Capino climbed up the
house of Jarigue and entered the room where she was
sleeping. He felt her forehead with the intention of raping
her. She immediately screamed for help, which awakened
her parents and brought them to her side. Capino then
came out from where he was hiding, under the bed, and
kissed the hand of Jarigue’s father to beg for forgiveness.
Several days later on the fateful night, her family went to
the local church where it was quite bright. When Jarigue
was left alone in the bench while her father tended to
some business, Capino sat beside Jarigue and placed his
hand on top of her thigh. On observing this highly
improper conduct, Jaurigue stabbed Capino in the neck,
fatally causing a single wound from which he died.
Jaurigue surrendered without question.
Issue: WON defendant acted in the legitimate defense of
her honor and should be completely absolved from all
criminal liability.
Side issue: WON there were mitigating and aggravating
circumstances.
Held: She is not absolved from criminal liability. If the
defendant had killed Capino when he climbed up her
house to rape her, she could have been perfectly justified
in killing him. However, when the deceased sat beside
defendant on the same bench in a well lit chapel with
several people inside, including her own father and the
barrio lieutenant where there is no possibility of being
raped. She cannot be legally declared completely exempt
from criminal liability for fatally wounding the deceased
since the means employer by her in the defense of her
honor was evidently excessive.
On the side:
 The fact that she voluntarily surrendered to
the lieutenant in the chapel and admitted to stabbing the
deceased , and the fact that she had acted in the
immediate vindication of a grave offense committed
against her a few moments before, and upon such
provocation as to produce passion or temporary loss of
reason, should be considered as mitigating
circumstances in her favor.
The aggravating circumstance that the killing was done in
a place dedicated to religious worship cannot be legally
sustained as there is no evidence to show that defendant
had murder in her heart when she entered the chapel. She
should therefore be charged with homicide without
aggravating circumstances and with mitigating
circumstances.
PEOPLE VS. NARVAEZ
FACTS: Mamerto Narvaez has been convicted of murder
(qualified by treachery) of David Fleischer and Flaviano
Rubia. Narvaez shot Fleischer and Rubia when the two
were constructing a fence (that would prevent Narvaez
from getting into his house and rice mill). Narvaez, who
was taking a nap when he heard sounds of construction,
awoke and asked them to stop destroying his house and
asking if they could talk things over. Fleischer responded
with "No, gadamit, proceed, go ahead." Narvaez lost his
"equilibrium," and shot Fleisher first, then Rubia, who was
running towards the jeep to get his gun. Both died.
Narvaez voluntarily surrendered and claimed he killed in
defense of his person and of his rights. The CFI convicted
him of murder qualified by treachery with the aggravating
circumstance of evident premediation and the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender.
Prior to the shooting, Fleischer and Co. (the company of
Fleischer's family) was involved in a legal battle with the
Narvaez over certain pieces of property. At the time of the
shooting, the civil case was still pending for annulment
(settlers wanted granting of property to Fleisher and Co.
to be annulled). Narvaez had leased his property from
Fleisher (though case pending and ownership uncertain)
to avoid trouble. On June 25, Narvaez received a letter
terminating the contract because he allegedly didn't pay
rent. He was given 6 months to remove his house from
the land. Shooting was barely 2 months after letter.
ISSUE: W/N CFI erred in convicting Narvaez despite the
fact that he was acting in defense of his person and of his
rights.
HELD/RATIO: YES (with respect to rights) Narvaez
ordered released immediately coz his penalty was
reduced and he had already served it as he was
imprisoned for 14 years.
Defense of his person - NO
The courts said that although the fencing of Narvaez’
house was indeed a form of aggression against him, this
aggression was not done against his person but rather on
his rights to property. However, in consideration of the
violation of property rights, the courts referred to Art. 30 of
the civil code, which recognizes the right of owners to
close and fence their land. But the Narvaez can’t
subscribe to the article because his ownership of the land
being awarded by the government was still pending,
therefore putting ownership into question. It is accepted
that Narvaez
Defense of his rights – YES (although incomplete)
The argument of the justifying circumstance of self-
defense is applicable only if the 3 requirements are
fulfilled, according to Art. 11(1) RPC:
1. Unlawful aggression.
2. Reasonable necessity of means employed to
prevent or repel attack.
3. Lack of sufficient provocation on part of
person defending himself.
Unlawful aggression due to the utterance of
Fleischer and the invasion of Narvaez’s property was
clear. The pending case regarding ownership was
decided only over a year after the incident, and even then,
Fleischer had given Narvaez until the end of the year to
leave the land. Lack of sufficient provocation was clear
because Narvaez was asleep in his house, then asked
Fleischer to stop so they could talk. Firing a shotgun from
a window, however, was a disproportionate means of
resistance.
Since not all requisites present, defendant is credited w/
the special mitigating circumstance of incomplete
defense, pursuant to A13(6) RPC. These mitigating
circumstances are: voluntary surrender & passion &
obfuscation.
DISSENTS:
Abad Santos: Self-defense in the penal code refers to
unlawful aggression on persons and not property.
Gutierrez, Jr.: Appellant defended from an attack on his
property that was not coupled with an attack on his
person. There should be no special mitigating
circumstance of incomplete defense. The sentence
should have been modified to prision mayor and the
defendant should have been ordered released
immediately.