CORE Report No.

2005-04

SAFETY OF OFFSHORE
STRUCTURES
by

TORGEIR MOAN
Professor
Norwegian University of Science and Technology
and
Keppel Professor
National University of Singapore

Centre for Offshore Research & Engineering

National University of Singapore

Keppel Offshore and Marine Lecture

November 26. 2004

Safety of Offshore Structures

By

Professor Torgeir Moan

Director, Centre for Ships and Ocean Structures,
Norwegian University of Science and Technology
Keppel Professor, National University of Singapore

Foreword
The Second Keppel Offshore & Marine Lecture was delivered by Professor Torgeir
Moan at the National University of Singapore (NUS) on 26 November 2004. This report
is the written version of the lecture.

The Lecture was supported by many professional

societies, including American Society of Mechanical Engineers (Singapore Section), The

Institution of Engineers Singapore, The Institute of Structural Engineers, The Joint
Branch of Royal Institution of Naval Architects and Institute of Marine Engineering
Science & Technology, Society of Naval Architects and Marine Engineers Singapore,
Singapore Shipping Association and Singapore Structural Steel Society.
The Keppel Professorship in Ocean, Offshore and Marine Technology in NUS was
launched officially by His Excellency, President S.R. Nathan of Singapore and
Chancellor of NUS on 19 September 2002.

The Professorship has been established

under the Department of Civil Engineering, and is part of the bigger umbrella of the
Centre for Offshore Research & Engineering (CORE) in NUS. CORE has received seed
funding from Keppel Offshore & Marine Ltd and Economic Development Board
(Singapore). The Centre aims to be a focal point for industry participation and activities
in Singapore, and promotes multi-disciplinary research by drawing on the expertise of
various universities, research institutes, and centres for integrated R&D.
Professor Moan, the first Keppel Professor, is an academic of international stature
through his 30 years of close involvement in the international offshore oil and gas and
marine fraternity. He brings a global perspective to promote R&D in Singapore, with a
particular emphasis on the technological interests of Keppel Offshore & Marine. He will
serve as the beacon of guidance and inspiration for academics as well as industry.
CORE acknowledges the significant support of everyone in Keppel Offshore & Marine,
especially Mr Choo Chiau Beng, Mr Tong Chong Heong and Mr Charles Foo, for their
immense contributions. CORE is working closely in partnership with Keppel on R&D,
Education and Training to draw young talents into the offshore and marine industry.

Safety of Offshore Structures

Torgeir Moan
Centre for Ships and Ocean Structures
Norwegian University of Science and Technology

Summary

An overview of important developments regarding safety management of offshore

structures is given. Based on relevant experiences with accidents, the hazards and the
means to control the associated risk are categorized from a technical-physical as well
as human and organizational point of view. This includes considerations of the risk
associated with fatigue, corrosion and other degrading phenomena. The risk can be
controlled by use of adequate design criteria, inspection, repair and maintenance of
the structures as well as quality assurance and control of the engineering processes.
Such measures are briefly outlined, while the emphasis is placed upon a quantitative
design approach for dealing with structural robustness. In this connection the inherent
differences in the robustness of various structural concepts are pointed out. The application of reliability methodology to obtain quantitative measures of structural safety
relating to ultimate failure as well as handle the combined effect of design, inspection and repair strategy on fatigue failure is highlighted. The application of risk
analysis to establish robustness criteria corresponding to a certain risk acceptance
level is briefly mentioned. The challenges of Quality Assurance and Control to new
structures are briefly outlined, with particular reference to recent examples of new
loading phenomena such as ringing and springing of platforms.

1. Introduction
Oil and gas are the dominant sources of energy in our society. Twenty percent of
these hydrocarbons are recovered from reservoirs beneath the seabed. Various kinds
of platforms are used to support exploratory drilling equipment, and the chemical
(production) plants required to process the hydrocarbons. Large production platforms,
such as some of those in the North Sea, represent investment of billions of U.S. dollars and significant operational costs. Pipelines or tankers are used to transport the
hydrocarbons to shore. This paper is limited to deal with offshore structures, see Fig.
1.

a) Offshore oil and gas

exploitation

b) Platform for exploratory

drilling operation

c) Platform for oil and gas

production (chemical processing)

Fig. 1 Subsea oil and gas exploitation

The continuous innovations to deal with new serviceability requirements and demanding environments as well the inherent potential of risk of fires and explosions have
lead to an industry which has been in the forefront of development of design and
analysis methodology. Fig. 2 shows phases in the life cycle of offshore structures. The
life cycle of marine systems is similar to that of other systems. In view of the ecological issue removal or clean-up need to be considered. In this aspect the recycling of the
material is an important issue. In the life cycle phases of structures the design phase is
particularly important. Offshore structures need to fulfil serviceability and safety requirements. Serviceability requirements depend upon the function of the structure,
which is to provide a platform and support of equipment for drilling or for the production of hydrocarbons. Drilling units need to be mobile while production platforms are
generally permanent. Production platforms are commonly designed to carry large
chemical factories together with large hydrocarbon inventories (Fig. 1c). Safety re1

quirements are introduced to limit fatalities as well as environmental and property

damages.
The focus here is on the structural safety during the life cycle of the platforms. A rational safety approach should be based on:
-

Goal-setting; not prescriptive

Probabilistic; not deterministic
First principles; not purely experimental
Integrated total; not separately
Balance of safety elements; not hardware
Design
for
- serviceability &
- producability
- safety

Fabrication
- Fabrication plan - Inspection/repair
Operation
- Operation plan
Inspection/
monitoring/
repair /
maintenance
Reassessment

Data, methods,
criteria

Layout/
Scantlings

Fabrication &
Operation
data

Removal and reuse

Fig. 2: Life cycle phases of offshore structures

The safety management of structures is different for different industries depending on

the organisation as well as regulatory contents. For instance the safety management of
offshore structures differs from that for trading ships. One reason for this difference is
the fact that safety management of trading vessels emerged for centuries through empiricism while off-shore structures have primarily come about in the last 50 years
when first principles of engineering science had been adequately developed to serve
as basis for design. Similarly the regulatory regime differs between ships and offshore
structures in that offshore operation take place on continental shelves under the jurisdiction of the local government. Typically authorities in the continental shelf states
have to issue regulations. Examples of these are MMS/API in USA, HSE in UK and
NPD in Norway. However the provisions for stability and other maritime issues are
based on those of IMO and their corresponding national organizations. Classification
societies primarily provide rules for drilling units and services for production facilities, which primarily are handled by national authorities. Since early 1990s ISO has
been developing a harmonized set of codes for offshore structures with contribution
from all countries with major offshore operations.
Over the time safety management of offshore structures has been developed, in parallel with the evolvement of the technology and the competence to deal with it. Initially
civil engineering was the driving force for structural safety management. Later the

aeronautical and nuclear industries also played an important role. However in the last
20-30 years the developments in the offshore industry has had a significant impact on
the development of safety approaches. This is partly because the offshore industry
plays a key role in the worlds economy. Moreover the oil and gas represent energy
with large potential accident consequences. Companies involved in structures and/or
facilities that experience accidents may suffer loss of reputation and this may damage
the publics trust on the companies.
The rationalisation of safety management of offshore structures began in early 70s.
Among the milestones is the introduction of Risk Analysis in 1981 and Accidental
Collapse Design criterion in 1984 by the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate and the
HSE Safety case approach in 1992, when the ALARP principle - as large as reasonably practicable was introduced for determining the target safety level.
To limit the likelihood of fatalities and environmental and property damages, offshore
structures should be designed, fabricated and operated in such a manner that the probability of the following failure modes is adequately small:
- overall, rigid body instability (capsizing) under permanent, variable and environmental loads
- failure of (parts of) the structure foundation or mooring systems, considering
permanent, variable, and environmental as well as accidental loads
Stability requirements for floating platforms affect the layout and the internal structure subdivision in compartments. Criteria to prevent progressive structural failure
after fatigue failure or accidental damage would have implications on overall layout
of all types of platforms. Otherwise a structural strength criterion affects the scantlings of the stiffened, flat, and cylindrical panels that typically constitute floating offshore structures.
If the location is far off shore then evacuation and rescue will be difficult. On the
other hand, this implies that accidents on offshore facilities affect the general public to
a lesser extent than accidents on similar facilities on land.
In the following sections accident experiences on offshore structures will be briefly
explained. Then, an outline of various measures to manage the safety or ensure that
the risk is within acceptable limits, is given. This includes: Design and inspection
criteria as well as reliability methodology to calibrate the partial safety factors to correspond to a defined acceptable safety level. In particular it is explained how fatigue
failures can be avoided by design as well as inspections and regular monitoring of the
structure. Emphasis is placed on how structural robustness can be ensured by using
so-called Accidental Collapse Limit State (ALS) criteria. Such criteria are exemplified in relation to fires, explosions and other accidental loads. Finally, Quality Assurance and/or Quality Control of the engineering process will be described with particular reference to dealing with unknown wave loading and response phenomena.
2. Accident Experiences
2.1 Accident experiences at large
Safety may be regarded as the absence of accidents or failures. Hence the insight
about safety features can be gained from detailed information about accidents and
failures. To learn about the intrinsic nature of accidents, it is mandatory to study the
detailed accounts provided from investigations of catastrophic accidents since the
3

necessary resources are then spent to investigate such accidents. Such studies include
those of the platforms Alexander Kielland in 1980 (ALK, 1981, Moan and Holand,
1981b), Ocean Ranger in 1982 (OR, 1984), Piper Alpha in 1988 (PA, 1990), and P-36
in 2001 (P-36, 2003). See also Bea (2000a, 2000b). In addition, the statistics about
offshore accidents, such as ones given in WOAD (1996), provide an overview.
Global failure modes of concern are
- capsizing/sinking
- structural failure
- positioning system failure
the former two modes represent catastrophic events while the latter one is only critical
for Tension-leg platforms. Global failures normally develop in a sequence of technical
and physical events. However, to fully understand accidents it is necessary to interpret
them in the view of human and organizational factors (HOF). This includes possible
deficiencies in relevant codes, possible unknown phenomena that have materialized as
well as possible errors and omissions made in engineering processes, fabrication
processes or in the operation itself.

a) Alexander L. Kielland
before and after capsizing
in 1980

b) Model of Ocean
Ranger, which capsized in
1982, during survival
testing

c) Piper Alpha fire

and explosion in 1988

d) P - 36 accident in 2001

Fig. 3: Examples of accidents which resulted in a total loss.

Let us consider an example: The platform shown in Figure 4a in the Gulf of Mexico.
This is one of many platforms that were damaged during the passage of the hurricane
Lilli. Physically there is no doubt that this accident was due to extreme wave forces.
To explain from a human and organizational point of view why the platform was not
strong enough to resist the wave forces, we have to look at the decisions that were
made during the design phase regarding loads, load effects, resistance and safety factors. The explanation might be that design was based on an inadequate wave conditions or load calculation. The damage could also be due to the occurrence of a particular a wave phenomenon, such as an abnormal wave crest (see Fig. 4b) or another unknown wave phenomenon. In the case of the exceptional wave in Fig. 4b, the question is whether the extreme crest height of 18.5 m should be considered as the socalled freak wave or simply a rare wave. Alternatively, the reason could be inadequate air-gap provided in the design. Yet another explanation might be that an improper strength formulation was used (as was the case in design of early generation
platforms). Finally, the safety factors might not have been sufficient to cover the inherent uncertainties. For each of these possible causes, two explanations need to be
4

considered, namely 1) The state of art in offshore engineering was inadequate at the
time of design ; 2) Errors and omission were made during design or fabrication! Obviously, these two explanations have different implications on the risk reducing actions.
In this connection it is noted that several types of environmental load phenomena,
such as green water on deck and slamming (Fig. 4 c-d) are subjected to large uncertainties. In general, if the phenomenon is known but subject to significant uncertainties, the design approach taken is normally conservative.
18

b) Wave record from a platform site in the

North Sea on January 1. 1995.

a)Severe damage caused on a jacket

platform in the Gulf of Mexico by
Hurricane Lilli
c) Green water and deck slamming
on FPSO

d) Deck slamming on semisubmersible platform

Fig. 4 Structural damage due to environmental loads

The technical-physical sequence of events for the Alexander Kielland platform was:
fatigue failure of one brace, overload failure of 5 other braces, loss of column, flooding into deck, and capsizing. For Ocean Ranger the accident sequence was: flooding
through broken window in ballast control room, closed electrical circuit, disabled ballast pumps, erroneous ballast operation, flooding through chain lockers and capsizing.
Piper Alpha suffered total loss after: a sequence of accidental release of hydrocarbons,
as well as escalating explosion and fire events. P-36 was lost after: an accidental release of explosive gas, burst of emergency tank, accidental explosion in a column,
progressive flooding, capsizing and sinking after 6 days.
Table 1 shows accident rates for mobile (drilling) and fixed (production) platforms
according to the initiating event of the accident WOAD (1996). Table 1 is primarily
based upon technical-physical causes. Severe weather conditions would normally affect capsizing/ foundering as well as structural damage. In most cases there existed
human errors or omissions by designers, fabricators or operators of the given installation was a major contributor to the accident. The most notable in this connection is,
of course accidents caused by loads such as ship impacts, fires and explosions which
should not occur but do so because of errors and omissions during operation.
In general, accidents take place in sequences. For floating platforms, the loss of buoyancy and stability is commonly an important aspect of total loss scenarios. Structural
damage can cause progressive structural failure or flooding. Progressive flooding at5

tributes to a greater probability of total loss of floating structures than progressive

structural failure.
Degradation due to corrosion and fatigue crack growth are gradual phenomena. However, if the fatigue life is insufficient to make Inspection, Monitoring, Maintenance
and Repair (IMMR) effective or if there is lack of robustness, fatigue can cause catastrophic accidents, see Fig. 5. Both cases shown in Fig.5 occurred for statically determinate platforms. In other situations through-the-thickness cracks were detected by
inspections before they caused catastrophic failures (Moan, 2004). Corrosion is not
known to have caused accidents with floating offshore structures of significance. On
the other hand, maintenance related events for floating structures is limited. We need
to be aware of this problem, especially for structures with a low fatigue life.
Table 1: Number of accidents per 1000 platform-years. Adapted after WOAD
(1996).
World wide
Type of
accident

Mobile

Fixed

Gulf of Mexico

North Sea

Fixed

Fixed

1970-79 /80-95 1970-79 /80-95 1970-79 /80-95

1970-79 /80-95

Blowout

18.8/ 11.4

2.5/0.9

2.2/1.0

2.6/1.6

Capsizing/
foundering

24.0/ 19.5

0.5/0.8

0.3/1.1

2.6/0.5

Collision / contact 24.6/ 14.6

1.6/1.0

1.3/0.7

5.1/6.3

Dropped object

4.2/ 6.1

0.5/0.8

0.1/0.4

10.3/10.6

Explosion

7.4/3.3

0.7/1.6

0.3/0.4

2.6/8.3

Fire

12.3/
11.9

2.0/7.5

1.0/7.8

18.0/42.5

Grounding

6.1/3.3

Spill/release

4.9/5.9

1.8/8.7

1.0/5.8

23.1/98.3

0.5/0.6

0.4/0.5

10.3/6.0

Structural damage 25.6/ 18.4

Column D

Missing braces
that cause no
redundancy

Ranger I, 1979

Alexander Kielland, 1980

Fig. 5: The total losses of Ranger I in 1979 and Alexander Kielland in 1981 were
initiated by fatigue failure
6

An overall picture of the accident rate in an industry may be displayed by the socalled Frequency-Consequence diagram as shown in Figure 6. The horizontal axis is
plotted the consequence, in this case in terms of fatalities, N. The vertical axis is
shown the frequency of N or more fatalities per accident. We see that the accident rate
for mobile drilling units is much higher than for fixed production platforms. Fixed
platforms are mainly used as production facilities. Moan and Holand (1981b) explained the main reasons for the differences in safety levels between mobile and fixed
platforms. Floating production platforms are not included because of the limited experience with such platforms. The risk is similar that that of passenger vessels and
tankers.

Annual frquency of an event

with N or more fatalities

100

Marginally acceptable
Acceptable

10-1

Oil platforms
Mobile
Fixed

10-2

10-3
10-4

10-5

Passenger
ferries
(not ro-ro)
Tankers
Merchant
vessels
1

10

100

1000

10000

Number of lives lost, N

Fig. 6: Comparison of experienced overall accident rates with respect to fatalities

in the offshore and shipping industries

2.2 Human and organizational factors

Basically, structural failure occurs when the resistance, R is less than the load effect,
S as indicated in Fig. 7. From a Human and Organizational Factor (HOF) point of
view this can be due to too small safety factors to account for the normal uncertainty
and variability in R and S relating to design criteria. But the main causes of actual
structural failures are the abnormal resistance and accidental loads due to human errors and omissions.
Design errors materialise as a deficient (or excessive) resistance, which cannot be
derived from the parameters affecting the normal variability of resistance. Fabrication imperfections (such as cracks, plate misalignment, etc.), which also affect the
resistance, are influenced by human actions. The normal variability of welders performance, environmental conditions, and soon lead to a normal variability in the
imperfection size. This is characterised by a smooth variation of the relevant imperfection parameter. Occasionally a deviation from normal practice does occur, for
instance as an abnormality caused by using a wet electrode, or another gross fabrication error. The Alexander L. accident in 1980 was caused by a fatigue failure of a
brace and design checks had not been carried out. The implied fatigue life was further
reduced to 3.5 years - by a fabrication error (70 mm weld defect) as well as inadequate inspections (ALK, 1981). Although the fatigue failures that had been experienced in semi-submersibles in the period 1965-70 resulted in fatigue standards, these

standards were not properly implemented even for platforms built in the 1970s.
Many platforms built in the 1970s had joints with design fatigue lives as low as 2-5
years. This fact was evidenced in the extraordinary surveys undertaken after Alexander Kielland accident. The same happened to the first purpose built FPSO and shuttle
tankers put into service in the mid-1980s. However, ships are obviously more robust
or damage-tolerant than mobile semi-submersible platforms.
Man-made live loads also have a normal and an abnormal component. While
some loads, notably fires and explosions, ship collisions, etc. do not have a normal
counterpart, they are simply caused by operational errors or technical faults. The mobile platform Ocean Ranger capsized in the offshore of Newfoundland in 1982. The
accident was initiated by control room window breaking due to wave slamming. The
water entering the control room lead to the short circuit of the ballast valve system,
thereby leading to a spurious operation of ballast valves. The resulting accidental ballast condition could not be controlled partly because of lack of crew training and
partly because of inadequate ballast pumps, and open chain lockers (OR, 1984).
The catastrophic explosion and fire on the Piper Alpha platform in 1988 was initiated
by a gas leak from a blind flange of a condensation pump that was under maintenance
but not adequately shut down (PA, 1990). The main issue that caused the initiation of
this accident was the lack of communication between the maintenance team and the
control room operators. The gas ignited and the initial explosion lead to damage of an
oil pipe and subsequent oil fires and explosions.
In 2001 the platform P-36 in Brazil experienced a collapse of the emergency drainage
tank, accidental explosion and subsequent flooding capsizing and sinking. A series of
operational errors were identified as the main cause of the first event and also the
sinking (P-36, 2001).
It is a well known fact that the gross errors dominate as the cause of accidents, and
therefore appropriate control measures should be implemented. It is found that the
gross errors cause 80-90% of the failure of buildings and bridges and other civil engineering structures (Matousek and Schneider, 1976). The same applies to offshore
structures.
R&D

Risk
reduction
Do the job
properly in
the first place

QA/QC
of design

QA/QC
of the asfabricated
structure

Unknown material or
load phenomenon

Do the job
properly in
the first place

Causes

Design
error

Abnormally
Failure
low
Fabrication resistance
R<S
error

QA/QC of
Design error
- oversight of load

Operational error
- accidental load

ULS: RC/R > S1SC1 + S2SC2

FLS: D=ni/Ni Dallowable
Inadequate safety factors for
normal variability of R and S

design

QA/QC of
operation
Event
control
(leak, etc)

ALS
design
check

Apply adequate safety factors

in ULS/FLS design check

Fig. 7 Interpretation of causes of structural failure and risk reduction measures.

It has been observed that errors and omissions occur especially in dealing with novel
materials and concepts as well as during periods with economic and time pressures.
In some cases, accidents have been caused by inadequate engineering practice such as
the lack of knowledge regarding new phenomena. Recently new phenomena such as
ringing and spinning of TLPs, degradation failure mechanism of flexible risers, have
been discovered. Nevertheless they were observed in time before any catastrophic
accident could occur.

3. Safety Management
3.1 General
Offshore drilling, production or transport facilities are systems consisting of structures, equipments and other hardwares, as well as specified operational procedures
and operational personnel. Ideally these systems should be designed and operated to
comply with a certain acceptable risk levels as specified for example by the probability of undesirable consequences and their implications. The safety management needs
to be synchronised with the life cycle of the structure. Structural failures are mainly
attributed to errors and omissions in design, fabrication and, especially, during operation. Therefore, Quality Assurance and Control (QA/QC) of procedures and the structure during fabrication and use (operation) is crucial.
To do a truly risk based design, by carrying out the design iteration on the basis of a
risk acceptance criterion, and to achieve a design that satisfies the acceptable safety
level, is not feasible. In reality, different subsystems, like:
-

loads-carrying structure & mooring system

process equipment
evacuation and escape system

are designed according to criteria given for that particular subsystems. For instance, to
achieve a certain target level, which implies a certain residual risk level, safety criteria
for structural design are given in terms of Ultimate Limit State (ULS) and Fatigue
Limit State (FLS) criteria. Using appropriate probabilistic definitions of loads and
resistance together with safety factors, the desired safety level is achieved. The implicit risk associated with these common structural design criteria is generally small!
The philosophy behind the Accidental Collapse Limit (ALS) criteria is discussed below.
The nature of human errors differs from that of natural phenomena and normal
man-made variability and uncertainty. Different safety measures are required to control error-induced risks. A number of people maintain that gross errors are Acts of
God and cannot be dealt with.
However,
-

weld defects and fatigue failures due to gross errors had occurred before the Kielland accident
ballast errors had occurred before the Ocean Ranger accident
fires and explosions had occurred before the Piper Alpha accident

and so on

The occurrence of gross errors have been avoided by adequate competence, skills,
attitude and self-checking of those who do the design, fabrication or operation in the
first place; and by exercising self-checking in their work.
In addition, quality assurance and control should be implemented in all stages of design, fabrication and operation. While the QA/QC in the design phase is concerned
with scrutinizing the analysis, design checks and the final scantlings arrived at, the
QA/QC during fabrication and operation phases refers to inspection of the structure
itself.
As mentioned above, operational errors typically result in fires or explosions or other
accidental loads. Such events may be controlled by appropriate measures such as detecting the gas/oil leakage and activating shut down valve; extinguishing of a fire by
an automatically-activated deluge system. These actions are often denoted as Event
Control.
Finally, Accidental Collapse Limit State criteria are implemented to achieve robust
offshore structures, that is to prevent that the structural damage occurring as fabrication defects or due to accidental loads, escalate into total losses (Moan 1994).
Table 2 summarises the causes of structural failure from a risk management point of
view, and how the associated risk may be ameliorated.
Adequate evacuation and escape systems and associated procedures are crucial for
controlling failure consequences in terms of fatalities.
Table 2: Causes of structural failures and risk reduction measures
Cause

Risk Reduction Measure

Less than adequate safety margin to

cover normal inherent uncertainties.

- Increased safety factor or margin in ULS, FLS;

- Improve inspection of the structure(FLS)

Gross error or omission

during
- design (d)
- fabrication (f)
- operation (o)

- Improve skills, competence, self- checking (for

d, f, o)
- QA/QC of engineering process (for d)
- Direct design for damage tolerance (ALS) and
provide adequate damage condition (for f, o)
- Inspection/repair of the structure (for f, o)

Unknown phenomena

- Research & Development

3.2 Design and inspection criteria

Adequate performance of offshore structures is ensured by designing them to comply
with serviceability and safety requirements for a service life of 20 years or more, as
well as carrying out load or response monitoring, or inspection and taking the necessary actions to reduce loads directly or indirectly, by, e.g., removal of marine growth,
or to repair, when necessary.
Serviceability criteria are introduced to make the structure comply with the functions
required. These criteria are commonly specified by the owner. Production platforms
are usually made to be site- specific, while drilling units are commonly intended for
operation in specific regions or world wide.

10

Safety requirements are imposed to avoid ultimate consequences such as fatalities and
environmental or property damages. Depending upon the regulatory regime, separate
acceptance criteria for these consequences are established. Property damage is measured in economic terms. Fatalities and pollution obviously also have economic implications. In particular, the increasing concern about environmental well-being can
cause small damages to have severe economic implications. While fatalities caused by
structural failures would be related to global failure, i.e. capsizing or total failure of
deck support, smaller structural damages may result in pollution; or property damage
which is costly to repair such as the damages of an underwater structure.
The current practice which is implemented in new offshore codes, issued e.g. by API
(1993/97), ISO 19900 (1994-) and NORSOK (1998a, 1998b, 1999, 2002) as well as
by many classification societies, and the most advanced codes are characterized by
-

design criteria formulated in terms of limit states (ISO 19900, 1994)

see Table 3

- semi-probabilistic methods for ultimate strength design which have been calibrated by reliability or risk analysis methodology
- fatigue design checks depending upon consequences of failure (damagetolerance) and access for inspection
- explicit accidental collapse design criteria to achieve damage-tolerance for the
system
- considerations of loads that include payload; wave, current and wind loads, ice
(for arctic structures), earthquake loads (for bottom supported structures), as
well as accidental loads such as e.g. fires, explosions and ship impacts
- global and local structural analysis by finite element methods for ultimate
strength and fatigue design checks
- nonlinear analyses to demonstrate damage tolerance in view of inspection planning and progressive failure due to accidental damage
Fatigue crack growth is primarily a local phenomenon. It requires stresses to be calculated with due account of the long-term wave conditions, global behaviour as well as
the geometric stress concentrations at all potential hot spot locations, and suitable
fatigue criteria (e.g. Miners rule). Fatigue strength is commonly described by SNcurves, which have been obtained by laboratory experiments. Fracture mechanics
analysis of fatigue strength have been adopted to assess more accurately the different
stages of crack growth including calculation of residual fatigue life beyond throughthickness crack, which is normally defined as fatigue failure. Detailed information
about crack propagation is also required to plan inspections and repair.

11

Table 3 Limit State Criteria for safety with focus on structural integrity
L im it s ta te s

P h y s ic a l a p p e a r a n c e
o f fa ilu r e m o d e

U ltim a te
(U L S )
- O v e r a l l r ig i d b o d y
s t a b i lit y
- U lt im a t e s t r e n g t h o f
s t r u c t u r e , m o o r in g o r
p o s s ib le f o u n d a t io n

D if f e r e n t f o r b o t t o m
s u p p o rte d , o r b u o y a n t
s tru c tu re s .
C o m p o n e n t d e s ig n c h e c k

C o lla p s e d
c y lin d e r

F a tig u e
(F L S )
- F a ilu r e o f w e ld e d jo in t s
d u e t o r e p e t it iv e lo a d s

C o m p o n e n t d e s ig n c h e c k
d e p e n d in g o n r e s i d u a l
s y s te m s tre n g th a n d
a c c e s s f o r in s p e c t io n

F a t ig u e fra c tu re

A c c id e n ta l c o lla p s e ( A L S )
- U lt im a t e c a p a c it y 1 ) o f
d a m a g e d s t r u c t u r e w it h
c r e d i b le d a m a g e

R e m a rk s

S y s t e m d e s ig n c h e c k

J a c k -u p
c o lla p s e d

An adequate safety against fatigue failure is ensured by design as well as by inspections and repairs. Fatigue design requirements depends upon inspect ability and failure consequences. Current requirements for fatigue design check in NORSOK are
shown in Table 4. These values were established by the NPD code committee in 1984
by judgement.
Table 4 Fatigue design factor, FDF to multiply with the planned service life to
obtain the required design fatigue life (NORSOK N-001, 2002).
Access for inspection and repair
No access or
in the splash zone

Accessible (inspection according to generic scheme

is carried out)
Below splash zone

Above splash zone

or internal

Substantial
consequences

10

Without substantial
consequences

1)

The consequences are substantial if the Accidental Collapse Limit State (ALS) criterion is
not satisfied in case of a failure of the relevant welded joint considered in the fatigue check.

Traditionally we design for dead-loads, payloads as well as environmental loads. But,

loads can also be induced by human errors or omissions during operation and
cause accidental loads. They commonly develop though a complex chain of events.
For instance hydrocarbon fires and explosions result as a consequence of an accidental leak, spreading, ignition and combustion process. Accidental Collapse Limit State
(ALS) requirements are motivated by the design philosophy that small damages,
which inevitably occur, e.g. due to ship impacts, explosions and other accidental
loads, should not cause disproportionate consequences.

12

The first explicit requirements were established in Britain following the Ronan Point
apartment building progressive failure in 1968. In 1984 such criteria were extended
by NPD, to include such robustness criteria for the structure and mooring system.
While robustness requirements to the mooring are generally applied today, explicit
ALS criteria are not yet widespread. The World Trade Centre and other recent catastrophes have lead to further developments of robustness criteria for civil engineering
structures. See Figure 8.
ALS checks should apply to all relevant failure modes as shown in Figure 9. It is interesting in this connection to note that ALS-type criteria were introduced for sinking/
instability of ships long before such criteria were established for structural integrity as
such. Thus, ALS were introduced in the first mobile platform rules (as described e.g.
by Beckwith and Skillman, 1976). The damage stability check has typically been
specified with damage limited to be one or two compartments flooded. According to
NPD this damage should be estimated by risk analysis, as discussed subsequently.
The criterion was formally introduced for all failure modes of offshore structures in
Norway in 1984 (NPD, 1984).

Ronan point
appartment building
accident, 1968
Flixborough explosion,
1974
ECCS model codes,
1978
Alexander L. Kielland
accident, 1980
NPD Regulations for
Risk analysis, 1981
NPDs ALS criterion,
1984
HSE Safety Case, 1992
WTC, September 11., 2001

Applied
since
early
codes

Motivation:
small damages,
which inevitably occur,
should not cause
disproportionate
consequences!

Flooded
volume

a) Capsizing/sinking due to (progressive) flooding

Explosion damage

Gaining
acceptance

b) Structural failure e.g. due to impact damage,....

Failure of Dynamic
Positioning System
is handled in a similar
manner

One
tether
failed

One
mooring
line failed

Generally
applied

c) Failure of mooring system due to "premature" failure

Fig. 8: Historical development of ALS

assessment of structures

Fig. 9: Accidental Collapse Limit State

(ALS) requirements

The assessment of structures during operation is necessary in connection with a

planned change of platform function, extension of service life, occurrence of overload
damage due to hurricanes (Dunlap and Ibbs, 1994), subsidence of North Sea jackets
(Broughton, 1997), explosions, fires and ship impact, updating of inspection plans etc
(ISO 19900). Basically, the reassessment involves the same analyses and design
checks as carried out during initial design. However, depending upon the inherent
damage tolerance ensured by the initial design, the measures that have to be implemented to improve the strength of an existing structure may be much more expensive
than ones for a new structure. This fact commonly justifies more advanced analyses of
loads, responses, resistances as well as use of reliability analysis and risk-based approaches than in the initial design (Moan, 2000a).

13

3.3 Inspection, Monitoring, Maintenance and Repair

Inspection, Monitoring, Maintenance and Repair (IMMR) are important measures for
maintaining safety, especially with respect to fatigue, corrosion and other deterioration phenomena. To ensure structural integrity within the offshore sector in the North
Sea, the regulatory body defines the general framework while the audit of the oil
companies or rig owners defines: inspection and maintenance needs, reports planned
activity, findings and evaluates conditions annually and every fourth or fifth year.
Hence, the inspection history of a given structure is actively incorporated in the planning of future activities. The inspection and repair history is important for a rational
condition assessment procedure of the relevant structure and other, especially for sister structures.
The objective of inspections is to detect cracks, buckling, corrosion and other damages. Overload phenomena are often associated with a warning for which the inspection can be targeted, while degradation needs continuous surveillance. However, normally ample time for repair will be available in the latter cases.
An inspection plan involves:
- prioritizing which locations are to be inspected
- selecting inspection method (visual inspection, Magnet Particle Inspection, Eddy
Current) depending upon the damage of concern
- scheduling inspections
- establishing a repair strategy (size of damage to be repaired, repair method and
time aspects of repair)
Whether the inspection should be chosen to aim at detecting cracks by non-destructive
examination (NDE), close visual inspection, detect through-thickness cracks e.g. by
leak detection, or member failures would depend on how much resources are spent to
make the structure damage tolerant. The choice again would have implication on the
inspection method. The main inspection methods being the NDE methods consist of
detection of through-thickness crack by e.g. leak detection, and visual inspection by
failed members. The quality of visual inspection of NDE methods depends very much
upon the conditions during inspection. A large volume offshore structure is normally
accessible from the inside, while members with a small diameter such as TLP tethers
and joints in jacket braces, are not.
Permanent repairs are made by cutting out the old component and butt welding a new
component, re-welding, adding or removing scantlings, brackets, stiffeners, lugs or
collar plates.
Typically major inspections of offshore structures (special surveys, renewal surveys)
are carried every 4 - 5th year, while intermediate and annual inspections are normally
less extensive. Further refinement of the inspection planning has been made by introducing probabilistic methods as described below.
Inspection, monitoring and repair measures can contribute to the safety only when
there is a certain damage tolerance. This implies that there is an interrelation between
design criteria (fatigue life, damage tolerance) and the inspection and the repair criteria. Fatigue design criteria, hence, depend upon inspection and failure consequences
as shown e.g. by Table 4.
However, during the operation, the situation is different. The strengthening of the
structure by increased scantlings is very expensive. The most relevant measure to influence safety relating to fatigue and other degradation phenomena is by using an im-

14

proved inspection method or increased frequency of inspections. The following section briefly describes how fatigue design and inspection plans (based on an assumed
inspection method) can be established by reliability analysis to ensure an acceptable
safety level.
3.4 Quantitative Measures of Safety
Ideally the structural safety should be measured in a quantitative manner. Structural
reliability methods are applied to determine the failure probability, Pf which is associated with normal uncertainties and variability in loads and resistance. Quantitative
risk assessment can be used to deal with the probability of undesirable events and
their consequences in general terms. This includes events induced by errors and omissions, see Fig. 10.
Structural reliability analysis
Prob. density function

Deck
Column

Load effect
fS(s)
R,S
Resistance fR(r)

Wave
pressure

PF=P[RS]

r,s

Uncertainty in R and S can be

modelled by probability density

Quantitative risk analysis

End
events

Fault
tree

Critical
event
Event
tree
Consequences

Fig. 10: Methods for quantifying the risk or safety level

The quantitative safety approach is based on estimating the implied failure probability
and comparing it with an acceptance level. This target safety level should depend
upon the following factors (e.g. Moan, 1998):
- type of initiating events (hazards) such as environmental loads, various accidental
loads, .. which may lead to different consequences
- type of SRA method or structural risk analysis, especially which uncertainties are
included
- failure cause and mode
- the possible consequences of failure in terms of risk to life, injury, economic losses
and the level of social inconvenience.
- the expense and effort required to reduce the risk.
In principle a target level which reflects all hazards (e.g. loads) and failure modes
(collapse, fatigue, ... ) as well as the different phases (in-place operation and temporary phases associated with fabrication, installation and repair) is defined with respect
to each of the three categories of ultimate consequences. The most severe of them
governs the decisions to be made. If all consequences are measured in economic
terms, then a single target safety level could be established. However, in practice it is
convenient to treat different hazards, failure modes, and phases separately, with separate target levels. This may be reasonable because it is rare that all hazard scenarios
15

and failure modes contribute equally to the total failure probability. The principle of
establishing target levels for each hazard separately was adopted by NPD for accidental loads; see e.g. Moan et al. (1993b). It was also advocated by Cornell (1995). In
general it is recommended to calibrate the target level to correspond to that inherent in
structures which are considered to have an acceptable safety.
3.5 Structural reliability analysis
General
Structural reliability methods for calculating the failure probability are readily available. If the uncertainty in the resistance R and load effect S are described by probability density functions. The failure probability can be calculated as P (R<S). It is important to recognize that there are different types of uncertainties used to determine the
resultant uncertainties associated with loads and resistances. One type of uncertainty
(Type 1) is natural or inherent; this type of uncertainty is information insensitive and
random. A second type of uncertainty (Type 2) is associated with modelling, parametric, and state uncertainties; this type of uncertainty is information sensitive and systematic. Type 2 model uncertainties may be defined as the ratio of the actual or true
value of the variable to the predicted or nominal (design) value of the variable. A variety of methods can be used to characterize the model uncertainty, including field test
data, laboratory test data, numerical data, and expert judgment. Often it is not possible to develop explicit separations of Type 1 and Type 2 uncertainties and it is important not to include them twice.
SRA is applied to determine the failure probability considering fundamental
variability, as well as uncertainties due to the lack of knowledge in loads, load effects
and resistance. The state of the art methods for calculating the failure probability are
the numerical First Order and Second Order Reliability as well as Monte Carlo
simulation methods (e.g. Melchers, 1999). However, analytical solutions exists for a
few cases, for instance, when failure is expressed by g( ) =R S 0 and both the
resistance R and the load effect S are lognormal random variables.
The failure probability is expressed by:
Pf = P( g () 0) = ( ) or = 1 ( Pf )

(1)

where (-) is the standard cumulative normal distribution, with numerical values as
shown in Table 5, and the reliability index, = LN can be exactly written as follows,
see e.g. Melchers (1999):

1 + V 2S

ln R
S 1 + V 2R
ln ( R /S )
= ' LN

LN =
2
2
ln[(1 + V R )(1 + V S )]
V 2R + V 2S

(2)

This simple expression has turned out to be useful and was applied in the API reliability based code calibration (Moses, 1987). The analytical formulation can also conveniently be used to express the relationship between Pf and safety factors.

16

Table 5 Relation between and Pf.

1.0

1.4

1.8

Pf 0.16 0.081

2.2

0.036

0.014

3.0

2.6
0.47 10

-2

0.14 10

3.4
-2

0.34 10

3.8
-3

0.72 10

4.2
-4

0.13 10

4.6
-4

0.21 105

Reliability estimates are found to be sensitive to the distributions used for R and S.
The failure probability should refer to a time interval, e.g. a year or the service life. This
can be achieved by considering a load effect S that refers to an annual or service life
time maximum value. We note that the results of code calibration depend upon the
choice of reference period.
Reliability based code calibration
Reliability methods are increasingly used to make optimal decisions regarding safety
and the life cycle costs of offshore structures (see e.g. ISSC, 1988-1994; Moan, 1994).
In particular the efforts by Fjeld (1977); Lloyd and Karsan (1988), Moan (1988), Jordan and Maes (1991) to calibrate their codes to a certain reliability. An evaluation of
previous efforts on calibration of offshore codes was provided by Moan (1995) in
conjunction with the ISO effort to harmonize the safety level in codes for offshore
structures across the variety of structural types (ISO, 1994). However, safety factors
on loads are not properly varied to reflect the differences in uncertainty in load predictions for different types of structures.
To illustrate the relationship between partial safety factors, the uncertainty in resistance and loads as well as Pf , consider the simplest design format, often used in code
calibration,
R c / R SSc

(3)

where Rc and Sc are characteristic resistance and load effect, respectively. Let the (true)
random load effect, S and resistance, R be defined by their mean value () and the
coefficient of variation (V):
S = BSSC ,BS 1; VS = 0.15 0.30
R = BR R C ,BR 1; VR = 0.1

The BS reflects the ratio of the mean load (which refers to an annual maximum if the
annual failure probability is to be calculated,) and the characteristic load effect (typically the 100 year value) as well as a possible bias in predicting wave load effects,
e.g. due to model uncertainty.
By inserting the design equation Eq.(3) into the approximate expression of Eq.(2)
LN

ln ( R /S )

VR2 + VS2

ln(BR R S /BS )

VR2 + VS2

or R S = (BR /BS ) exp(' L N VR2 +VS2 )

(4)

With R S = 1.5; a typical BS = 0.8 for wave-induced load effects; BR = 1.1 and VR =
0.1, it is found that LN is about 3.2 for a VS of 0.20. This reliability index corresponds to a Pf of 6 10-4. By decreasing BR/BS by 10 % reduces LN by 15%. It is
noted that the Similarly, by increasing Vs by 10 % reduces LN by 8%. At the same
time it is noted that the uncertainty in R has minimal influence on the safety level. Yet
it is important to estimate the mean bias of the resistance, BR accurately. It is also possible to approximately express R and S by (BR, VR) and (BS, VS), respectively, and
17

hence to express partial factors by the relevant uncertainties. (e.g. Melchers, 1999).
It is important to recognize that variables used in designing offshore structures are
often conservative. Thus, there exists sources of bias that must be recognized
quantitatively by the Bi's.
Goal: Implied Pf Pft

WSD:
RC/ > DC + LC + EC
Target
Pf or

R
resistance
D, L, E load effects due to
permanent
live
load
environmental
effects

LRFD:
RC/R > DDC + LLC + EEC
Load ratio, Ec/(Lc+Ec)

Fig. 11: Schematic illustration on how the implied safety level in a design code
for ultimate strength can be calibrated to be close to a given target level.
Fatigue Reliability Analysis

Structural reliability methods can also be used to calculate the probability of fatigue
failure. In Figure 12 the solid line with diamond symbol shows the fatigue failure
probability in the service life as a function of the design criterion the fatigue design
factor, FDF. It is shown that the cumulative failure probability in the service life varies from 10-1 to 10-4 when FDF varies from 1 to 10.
1.0E+00

Cumulative f ailure probability

Cumulative, stdv (lnA )=0.15

1.0E-01

Cumulative, stdv (lnA )=0.3

A nnual f ailure probability
A nnual, stdv (lnA )=0.15
A nnual, stdv (lnA )=0.3

Failure probability

1.0E-02

1.0E-03

1.0E-04

1.0E-05

1.0E-06
1

10

Fatigue de s ign factor

Fig. 12: Fatigue failure probabilities in the 20 year service period, as a function of the
fatigue design factor and the uncertainty level. A is an equivalent constant stress
range that represents the long term stress level (Moan, 2004).

A consistent fatigue safety level can be achieved, by varying the FDF versus the effect of an inspection program as well as the consequences of failure.

18

Reliability estimates by account of inspection

The effect of the inspection on the reliability level can be illustrated by representing
the crack depth using a random variable, A(t) which is a function of time t. The quality of the inspection in terms of the detectable crack size is also represented by a random variable, Ad. The distribution of Ad corresponds to the Probability of Detection
(POD) curve for the inspection method in question.
The failure probability at the time, t (N-cycles) can be formulated
Pf ( t ) = P(a f - a N 0 ) = P [ F ( 0, t )]

(5)

where af and aN are the crack size at failure and after N cycles, respectively.
The outcomes of inspections are assumed to be no crack detection (ND) or crack detection (D) at time t after N cycles, which are described by:
I ND ( t ) : a N -a d 0

(6a)

I D ( t ):a N -a d 0

(6b)

In general, it is difficult to determine the distribution of the crack size (A) explicitly
when taking into account all uncertainties that affect the distribution as well as the
effect of inspections. Based on the Paris crack propagation law, Eqs. (5-6) can be
recasted into a convenient form for analysis as shown e.g. by Madsen and Srensen
(1990).
The effect of inspection may be viewed in two different ways depending upon
whether it is assessed before inspections are done, e. g. during the design phase, or
afterwards during operation. If the effect of inspections is estimated before they are
carried out, two outcomes: D and ND are possible. The exact outcome is not known
but the probability of the outcomes can be estimated based on the reliability method.
At the design stage, the outcomes (e.g., crack detection or no detection) are not
known. When a single inspection is assumed to be made at time tI and possible cracks
detected are repaired, the failure probability in the period t tI can be determined by:
Pf (t) = P [ F(0, t I )] + P [S(0, t I ) and F(t I , t) | ID (t I )] P [ ID (t I )] + P [S(0, t I )and F(t1 , t) | I ND (t I )] P [ I ND (t I )]

(7)

where F(t1,t2) and S(t1,t2) are, respectively, mean failure and survival in time period
(t1,t2). Equation (7) can be generalised to cover cases with several inspections with
two alternative outcomes. Moan et al. (1993a) showed, based on reliability analysis,
how the allowable cumulative damage (D) at the design stage can be relaxed when
inspections are carried out. Such analyses served as basis for Table 4.
On the other hand if no failure has occurred before time tI and it is known that no
crack is detected at time tI, then the failure probability in the period t tI is
Pf (t) = P [ F(t I , t) | I ND (t I )]

(8)

The knowledge of survival up to time tI and no crack detection at time tI reduces the
uncertainty and makes the failure probability drop. The reliability index increases at
the time of inspection as illustrated by the example shown in Fig. 13.

19

Event tree analysis

Basic case, No inspection
Upd, full inspection history

Upd, ONLY last inspection

Inspection
during
operation with
No crack detection

Reliability Index

10-3
310-3

No inspection

Effect of Inspection
predicted at design stage

3.510-2
Pf

1
0

10

15

20

Time (years)

Fig. 13: Reliability index as a function of time and inspection strategy. Inspection
Event Tree analysis is based on predictions at the design stage. The other
curves are based on inspections with known outcome during the service
life (Ayala-Uraga and Moan, 2002)

The updating methodology is useful in connection with extension of service life for
structures with joints governed by the fatigue criterion (Vrdal et al, 2000). In such
cases, the design fatigue life is in principle exhausted at the end of the planned service
life. Nevertheless, if no cracks have been detected during inspections, then a remaining fatigue life can be demonstrated. However, it is not possible to bring the structure
back to its initial condition by inspection only. This is because the mean detectable
crack depth by NDE methods typically is 1.0 2.0 mm, while the initial crack depth
is 0.1 0.4 mm.
The calculation of the system failure probability after inspection may be approximated by independent system failure modes (Moan et al., 1999, 2002, 2004)
n

PFSYS|up = P [ FSYS | I]P [ FSYS(U)] + P Fj | I P FSYS(U) | Fj +....

j=1

(9)

This formulation is based on modeling the ultimate failure of the system by a single
mode. Moreover, the formulation is limited to failure modes initiated by a single fatigue failure and followed by ultimate global failure. The failure probability in Eq. (9)
is applicable when the inspection event I aims at detecting cracks before the failure of
individual members, (i.e. before they have caused rupture of the member). Another
inspection strategy would be to apply visual inspection to detect members failure and
repair failed members after the winter season in which those particular members
failed. In this case the Eq. (9) will have to be modified as follows: the individual fatigue failures of components (Fj ) does not depend on the inspection event, and, rather
such an inspection and repair strategy will have implication on the time period, for
which the failure probability P[FSYS(U)|Fj] should be calculated.
A further simplification is to update the failure probability of each joint based on the
inspection result for that joint. This is conservative if no cracks are detected, but nonconservative if cracks are detected.
Inspections may be prioritized by using Eq. (9) for each joint separately by allowing a
20

certain target probability level, PfSYS(T) to each term in the sum of Eq. (9). The target
fatigue failure probability for joint i, PFfT(i) is then obtained from
(10)

PfSYS(i) = P[FSYS | Fi ] PFfT(i) PfSYS(T)

Reliability level,

where the system failure probability, PfSYS(i) is associated with a fatigue failure of
member (i) followed by an ultimate system failure. PfSYS(T) is obtained by generalizing
the acceptance criteria implied by Table 4. This approach has been implemented for
template-space frame structures (Moan et al., 1999).
Given the target level for a given joint, inspections and repairs by grinding or other
modifications are scheduled to maintain the reliability level at the target level as
shown in Fig. 14.
No
inspection

Inspection at time t=8

with no crack detection

Target level
for a given joint

12

1st inspection

16

20

Time (years)

2nd inspection

Fig. 14: Scheduling of inspections to achieve a target safety level of PFfT(i).

This methodology is used to calibrate fatigue design requirements. It is then found

that the criteria in Table 4 are slightly non-conservative.

3.6 Safety implications of Ultimate and Fatigue Limit State criteria and Inspection,
Monitoring, Maintenace and Repair
The failure probability estimated by structural reliability analysis (SRA) normally
does not represent the experienced Pf for structures. This is because the safety factors
or margins normally applied to ensure safety are so large that Pf calculated by SRA
becomes much smaller than that related to other causes. For instance when proper
fatigue design checks and inspections have not been carried out, the likelihood of fatigue failures (through-thickness cracks) for platforms (e.g. in the North Sea), is large
and cracks have occurred. However, with the exception of the Ranger I (1979) and
Alexander Kielland failure (1980) such cracks have been detected before they caused
total losses. As discussed above, errors and omissions in design, fabrication and operation represent the main causes of the accidents experienced.
On the other hand, frequent occurrences of cracks provide a basis for correlating actual crack occurrences with state of art predictions for various offshore structures.
Hence, the current predictions for jackets are found to be conservative (Vrdal and
Moan, 1997), while for semi-submersibles and ships, the predictions seem to be reasonable, as summarized by Moan (2004). This agreement is achieved when the SN
approach (or a calibrated fracture mechanics approach) is applied to predict the occurrence of fatigue failure (e.g. through thickness crack). Yet, if ULS and FLS design
checks are properly carried out, Pf will be negligible within the current safety regime. This reserve capacity, implied by ULS and FLS requirements, provides some
21

resistance against other hazards like fires, explosions etc. However providing safety
for the mentioned hazards in this indirect manner is not an optimal risk-based design.
If more efforts were directed towards risk reduction actions by implementing ALS
criteria, then current safety factors for ULS and FLS could be reduced without increasing the failure rate noticeably.
As explained above, SRA does not provide a measure of the actual total risk level
associated with offshore facilities. Yet, it is useful in ensuring that the ultimate
strength and fatigue design criteria are consistent by calibrating safety factors. Moreover, SRA provides a measure of the influence of various parameters on the reliability
and, hence, the effect of reducing the uncertainty on the failure probability.
Finally, it is noted that the random uncertainties in the ultimate strength commonly
have limited effect on the reliability compared to that inherent in load effects. On the
other hand, the systematic uncertainty (bias) in strength and load effects has the same
effect on the reliability measure.
3.7 Risk assessment
Risk assessment (Qualitative Risk assessment or Formal Safety Analysis etc.) is a tool
to support decision making regarding the safety of systems. The application of risk
assessment has evolved over 25 years in the offshore industry (Moan and Holand,
1981b, NPD (1981)). The Piper Alpha disaster (PA, 1990), was the direct reason for
introducing PRA, (or QRA), in the UK in 1992 (HSE, 1992). In the last 5 years such
methods have been applied in the maritime industry, albeit in different directions
(Moore et al. 2003). The offshore industry has focused on the application of risk assessment to evaluate the safety of individual offshore facilities. The maritime industry
has primarily focused on the application of risk assessment to further enhance and
bring greater clarity to the process of making new ship rules or regulations.
The risk assessment methods is used because they provide a reliable direct determination of events probabilities e.g. probabilities as low as 10-4 per year. Up to now the
accumulated number of platform years world wide is about 120 000, 15 000 and 1 200
for fixed, mobile structures and FPSOs, respectively. However, to determine probabilities as low as 10-4 per year requires about 23000 years of experiences to have a
90% chance of one occurrence. A further complexity is that the available data refer to
various types of platforms and, not least, different technologies over the years. Application of a systems risk assessment is therefore attractive. The basis for this approach
is the facts that : a)almost every major accidental events have originated from a small
fault and gradually developed through long sequences or several parallel sequences
of increasingly more serious events, and culminates in the final event b) it is often
reasonably well known how a system responds to a certain event.
By combining the knowledge about system build-up with the knowledge about failure
rates for the elements of the system, it is possible to achieve an indication of the risks
in the system (Vinnem, 1999; Moan, 2000b).
The risk analysis process normally consists in the following steps (Fig 15):
-

definition and description of the system

identification of hazards
analysis of possible causal event of hazards
determination of the influence of the environmental conditions
determination of the influence of active/passive safety systems (capacity; reliability, accident action integrity, maintenance system ..)
22

estimation of event probabilities/event magnitudes

estimation of risk
Risk
RiskAnalysis
AnalysisPlanning
Planning
System
SystemDefinition
Definition

Risk
Risk
Acceptance
Acceptance
Criteria
Criteria

Risk
Risk
Reducing
Reducing
Measures
Measures

Hazard
HazardIdentification
Identification

Frequency
Analysis

Consequence
Analysis

RISK
RISKESTIMATION
ESTIMATION

Risk
RiskPicture
Picture
RISK
RISKANALYSIS
ANALYSIS
Risk
RiskEvaluation
Evaluation

Unacceptable

Tolerable
Acceptable
Acceptable

Fig. 15: General approach for risk based decision making

In most cases an Event-Fault Tree technique (Figure 16) is the most appropriate tool
for systematizing and documenting the analyses made. Although the Event-Fault tree
methodology is straightforward, there are many problems. An important challenge is
to determine the dominant of the (infinitely) many sequences. Events are not uniquely
defined in a single sequence but appear in many combinations. Moreover, human factors are difficult to account for in the risk assessment. However, operational errors
that result in accidental loads are implicitly dealt with by using data on experienced
releases of hydrocarbons, probability of ignition etc. Explicit prediction of design and
fabrication errors and omissions for a given structure is impossible. However, it is
possible to rate the likelihood of accidents as compared to gross errors (Bea, 2000a-b,
Lotsberg et al., to appear).
The risk analysis methodology currently applied in offshore engineering is reviewed
in detail by Vinnem (1999). In connection with accidental loads, the purpose of the
risk analysis is to determine the accidental events which annually are exceeded by a
probability of 10-4.
End
event

Critical
event
Fault tree

Event tree
Consequences

Fig.16 Schematic sketch of the event fault tree method.

23

3.8 Failure probability implied by Accidental Collapse Limit State Criteria

The initial damage in the ALS criterion, (e.g. due to fires explosions, ship impacts, or,
fabrication defects causing abnormal fatigue crack growth), corresponds to a characteristic event for each of the types of accidental loads which is exceeded by an annual
probability of 10-4, as identified by risk analyses. The (local) damage, or permanent
deformations or rupture of components need to be estimated by accounting for
nonlinear effects.
The structure is required to survive in the various damage conditions without global
failure when subjected to expected still-water and characteristic sea loads which are
exceeded by an annual probability of 10-2. In some cases compliance with this requirement can be demonstrated by removing the damaged parts and then accomplishing a conventional ULS design check based on a global linear analysis and component
design checks using truly ultimate strength formulations. However, such methods may
be very conservative and more accurate nonlinear analysis methods should be applied,
as described subsequently.
The conditional probability of failure in a year, for the damaged structure, can be estimated by Eqs. (1-2), assuming that the system failure can be modelled by one failure
mode and that the design criterion is fully utilized. The design checks in the ALS criterion is based on a characteristic value of the resistance corresponding to a 95% or
5% fractile, implying a BR = 1.1. The characteristic load effect due to functional and
sea loads are 1.0-1.2 and 1.2-1.3 of the corresponding mean annual values, respectively. The safety (load and resistance) factors are generally equal to 1.0 for both
checks. For environmental loads, this conditional failure probability will be of the
order of 0.1.
The intended probability of total loss implied by the ALS criterion for each category
of abnormal strength and accidental load would then be of the order of 10-5 (Moan,
1983). Obviously, such estimates are not possible to substantiate by experiences.

3.9 Design for damage tolerance

Introduction
The current regulations for offshore structures in Norway are based on the following
principles:
-

Design the structure to withstand environmental and operational loading throughout its lifecycle.

Prevent accidents and protect against their effects

Tolerate at least one failure or operational error without resulting in a major hazard or damage to structure

Provide measures to detect, control, and mitigate hazards at an early time accidental escalation.

Accidental Collapse Limit State criteria can be viewed as a means to reduce the consequences of accidental events (Fig. 17). The NORSOK N-001 code specifies quantitative ALS criteria based on an estimated damage condition and a survival check. The
robustness criteria in most other codes, however, do not refer to any specific hazard
but rather require that progressive failure of the structure with one element removed at
a time, is prevented. Hence, no performance objective for a real threat is created.

24

The weakness with such a criterion is that it does not distinguish between the differences in vulnerability
In a risk analysis perspective the ALS check of offshore structures is aimed at preventing progressive failure and hence reduce the consequences due to accidental
loads, as indicated in Figure 17. Beside progressive structural failure, such events
may induce progressive flooding and hence the capsizing of floating structures.

P, F

Risk control of accidental events

Reduce probability

Reduce consequences
"known
events"

Reduce
errors &
omissions

Event
Control

Estimate the damage due to accidental loads (A)

at an annual probability of 10 -4
- apply risk analysis to establish
design accidental loads

Direct ALS design

- Abnormal resistance
- Accidental loads

"unknown
events"

Critical
event

Indirect design
- robustness
- redundancy
- ductility

Fault
tree
P, F

Risk Analysis, or,

Prescriptive code requirements

Event tree

End events:
Accidental loads
Survival check of the damaged structure as a whole,
considering P, F and
environmental loads ( E ) at a probability of 10 -2

Target annual probability of total loss:

10 -5 for each type of hazard

Fig. 17: The role of ALS in risk control

Fig. 18: Accidental Collapse Limit State

(NPD, 1984)

The relevant accidental loads and abnormal conditions of structural strength are
drawn from the risk analysis, see e.g. Vinnem (1999) and Moan (2000b), where the
relevant factors that affect the accidental loads are accounted for. In particular, the
risk reduction can be achieved by minimizing the probability of initiating events:
leakage and ignition (that can cause fire or explosion), ship impact, etc. or by minimizing the consequences of hazards. The passive or active measures can be used to
control the magnitude of an accidental event and, thereby, its consequences. For instance, fire loads are partly controlled by sprinkler/inert gas system or firewalls.
Fenders are commonly used to reduce the damage due to collisions.
ALS checks apply to all relevant failure modes as indicated in Table 6. An account of
accidental loads in conjunction with the design of the structure, equipment, and safety
systems is a crucial safety measure to prevent escalating accidents. Typical situations
where direct design may affect the layout and scantlings are indicated by Table 7 for
different subsystems:
- loads-carrying structure & mooring system
- process equipment
- evacuation and escape system

25

Table 6 Examples of accidental loads for relevant failure modes of platforms.

Structural
concept

Failure mode

Relevant accidental load or condition

Fixed platforms

Structural failure

All

Structural failure

All

Instability

Floating
platforms

Collision, dropped object, unintended

pressure, unintended ballast that
initiate flooding

Mooring system strength

Tension-leg platforms

Collision on platform
Abnormal strength

Structural failure

All

Mooring - slack
system - strength

Accidental actions that initiate flooding

Collision on platform
Dropped object on tether
(Abnormal strength)

Table 7 Design implications of accidental loads for hull structure

Load

Structure
Columns /deck (if not protected)

Equipment

Passive protection
system

Exposed equipment (if not

protected)

Fire barriers

Explosion Topside (if not protected)

Exposed equipment (if not

protected)

Blast / Fire
barriers

Ship
impact

Waterline structure (subdivision) (if not protected)

Possibly exposed risers, (if

not protected)

Possible fender
systems

Dropped
object

Deck Buoyancy elements

Equipment on deck, risers

and subsea (if not protected)

Impact
protection

Fire

Design accidental loads

The characteristic value of accidental loads is defined as the load which annually is
exceeded by a probability of 10-4 and should be determined by risk analysis. For each
physical phenomenon (fire, explosions, collisions, ..) there is normally a continuous
spectrum of accidental events. A finite number of events have to be selected by
judgement. These events represent different load intensity at different probabilities.
The characteristic accidental load on different components of a given installation can
be determined as follows (Moan, 2000b):
-

establish exceedance diagram for the load on each component

allocate a certain portion of the reference exceedance probability (10-4) to each
component
determine the characteristic load for each component from the relevant load
exceedance diagram and reference probability.

If the accidental load is described by several parameters (e.g. heat flux and duration
for a fire; pressure peak and duration for an explosion) design values may be obtained
from the joint probability distribution by contour curves (NORSOK N-003, 1999).
26

However, in view of the uncertainties associated with the probabilistic analysis, a

more pragmatic approach is sufficient. Yet significant analysis efforts are involved in
identifying the relevant design scenarios for the different types of accidental loads.
For each design accident scenario, the damage imposed on the offshore installation
needs to be estimated followed by an analysis of the residual ultimate strength of the
damaged structure in order to demonstrate survival of the installation. To estimate
damage, (permanent deformation, rupture etc of parts of the structure), the nonlinear
material and the geometrical structural behaviour need to be accounted for. While in
general the nonlinear finite element methods are applied, simplified methods (e.g.
based on plastic mechanisms) are developed and calibrated using more refined methods, to limit the computational effort required.
The risk analysis of novel structures and systems, is found to be useful, in that they
provide insight which results in systems that have significant increase in safety at the
same expense. This applies in particular to the topside system. However, for mature
systems, the outcomes of risk analyses tend to confirm the results of previous analyses. This fact together with the desire to simplify design practice suggests using specific, generic values for such cases. Examples of typical values for some accidental
loads are given in subsequent sections.
Analysis tools for estimating the initial damage and survival
Current ultimate strength code checks of marine structures are commonly based on
load effects (member and joint forces) that are obtained by a linear global analysis.
Experiments or theory which accounts for plasticity and large deflections are used to
obtain resistances of the members and joints. Hence, this methodology focuses on the
first failure of a structural component and not the overall collapse of the structure,
which is of main concern. The advent of computer technology and the finite element
method have made it possible to develop analysis tools that account for nonlinear
geometrical and material effects, and, therefore, make it possible to account for redistribution of the forces and subsequent component failures until the systems collapse.
By using such methods a more realistic measure of the overall strength of structures is
achieved. Recently, Skallerud and Amdahl (2002) prepared a state-of-the-art review
of methods for nonlinear analysis of space frame offshore structures. Paik and Thayamballi (2003) gave an overview of methods for ultimate strength analysis of steelplated structures.
Simplified methods for calculating the hull girder strength are based on considerations
of the intact longitudinal elements and beam theory, essentially based on Smiths
work (1977), and reviewed by e.g. Yao et al. (2000). Such an approach has also been
extended to estimate the ultimate capacity of the damaged hull girder (Smith, 1977).
However, it is necessary to further investigate the implication of an initial damage that
involves rupture and, hence, represent an initial crack type damage which could cause
rupture before reaching the ultimate capacity obtained by calculation models based
upon ductile material behaviour.
Fires and explosions effects
The dominant fire and explosion events are associated with hydrocarbon leak from
flanges, valves, equipment seals, nozzles etc. As indicated in Fig. 19 fire and explosion events are strongly correlated. Commonly the effect of 40 60 scenarios needs to
be analyzed. This means that the location and magnitude of relevant hydrocarbon

27

leaks, the likelihood of ignition, as well as the combustion and temperature development (in a fire) and the pressure-time development (for an explosion) need to be estimated and followed by a structural assessment of the potential damage.
No damage
No Ignition
Damage to
Personnel and
Material
Immediate Ignition

Fire

Release of
Gas and/or
Liquid

Formation of
Combustible Fuel-Air
Cloud (Pre-mixed)

Fire
Ignition
(delayed)

Gas Explosion
Fire and
BLEVE

Fig. 19: Fire and explosion scenarios.

The fire thermal flux may be calculated on the basis of the type of hydrocarbons, its
release rate, combustion, time and location of ignition, ventilation and structural geometry, using simplified conservative semi-empirical formulae or analytical/numerical models of the combustion process. The heat flux may be determined by
empirical, phenomenological or numerical method (SCI, 1993; BEFETS, 1998).
Typical thermal loading in hydrocarbon fire scenarios may be 200- 300 kW/m2 for a
15 minutes up to a two hours period. The structural effect is primarily due to the reduced strength with increasing temperature. An A-60 fire protection wall may be applied for a heat load of 100kW/m2 and less, while H-rated protection walls are needed
for higher heat loading.
In the case of explosion scenarios, the analysis of leaks is followed by a gas dispersion and possible formation of gas clouds, ignition, combustion and the development
of overpressure. Tools such as FLACS, PROEXP, or AutoReGas are available for this
purpose (Moan, 2000b; Czujko, 2001, Walker et al., 2003). The variability of conditions is accounted for by using a probabilistic approach.
The results from the gas explosion simulations are the pressure time history. If the
pressure duration is short compared to the natural period, the pressure impulse governs the structural response. Figure 20 compares the predicted impulse by state of a
state of the art CFD method with measured values in large scale tests for deterministic
explosion scenarios. The vertical axis is a logarithmic plot of the ratio of the predicted
and measured value. The scattering is seen to be significant. The pressure peaks
would obviously be even more uncertain.

28

Ratio of predicted and measured Impulse

10.0

1.0

0.1

Experiment No

Fig. 20: Comparison of predicted and measured pressure impulse for deterministic
explosion scenarios, obtained by the computer code FLACS.

The typical overpressures for topsides of North Sea platforms are in the range 0.2-0.6
barg, with duration of 0.1-0.5s., while an explosion in open air at the drill floor typically implies 0.1 barg with duration of 0.2s. The explosion pressure in a totally enclosed compartment might be 4 barg.
The damage due to explosions may be determined by simple and conservative singledegree-of freedom models (NORSOK N-004). In several cases where simplified
methods have not been calibrated, nonlinear time domain analyses based on numerical
methods like the finite element method should be applied. A recent overview of such
methods may be found in Czujko (2001). Fig. 21 shows an explosion panel with deformations as determined by an experiment and finite element analysis. The calculated and measured deflections of the specimen are compared in Figure 21c.
Fire and explosion events that result from the same scenario of released combustibles
and ignition should be assumed to occur at the same time, i.e. to be fully dependent.
The fire and blast analyses should be performed by taking into account the effects of
one on the other. The damage done to the fire protection by an explosion preceding
the fire should be considered.
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
PRESSURE [N/

0.2

0
2]

a) Experiment

b) FE analysis

Experiment

0.1

20

Analysis

40
60
DISPLACEMENT [mm]

80

c) Loadresponse histories

Fig. 21: Explosion response of an explosion wall (Czujko, 2001).

29

100

Pmax > 5bar

Fig. 22: Survival analysis of a deck suffering explosion damage (Amdahl, 2003).
Deformations in the lower figure are not to scale.

Fig. 22 shows results from an analysis of a deck structure in a floating platform (Amdahl, 2003). The upper left figure in this slide illustrates the deck structure of a floating production platform. The design pressure on the East Wall is also indicated. In
this case it is assumed that the panels are badly damaged that they can be removed.
The lower figure shows the deformation pattern of the damaged deck.
Ship impacts
Significant efforts have been devoted to ship-ship collisions, as reviewed by the ISSC
Committee on Collision and Grounding (Paik et al., 2003). The analysis of ship impacts on offshore structures follows the same principles but the collision scenarios and
consequences are different; see e.g. NORSOK N-003 and -004 as well as Amdahl
(1999).
All ship traffic in the relevant area of the offshore installation should be mapped and
should account for possible future changes in the operational pattern of vessels. The
impact velocity can be determined based on the assumption of a drifting ship or on the
assumption of erroneous operation of the ship. Ship traffic may therefore for this purpose be divided into categories: trading vessels and other ships outside the offshore
activity, offshore tankers, and supply or other service vessels. Merchant vessels are
often found to be the greatest platform collision hazard which depends upon the location of the structure relative to shipping lanes. Fig. 23a indicates situations where offshore structures are operating in close proximity. For the scenario in Fig. 23b the stern
impact on the FPSO by the shuttle tanker is a challenge (Chen and Moan, 2004 )

30

a) Semi- submersible and jacket b) FPSO and shuttle tanker

Fig. 23: Special offshore collision scenarios.

Impact scenarios are established by considering bow, stern, and side impacts on the
structure as appropriate.
While historical data provides information about supply vessel impacts, risk analysis
models are necessary to predict other types of impacts, such as incidents caused by
trading vessels (see e.g. NORSOK N-003(1999) and Moan (2000b)). A minimum
accidental load corresponding to 14 MJ and 11 MJ sideways and head-on impact, respectively, is required to be considered.
The impact damage can normally be determined by splitting the problem into two
uncoupled analyses. They are the external collision mechanics dealing with global
inertia forces and hydrodynamic effects and internal mechanics dealing with the energy dissipation and distribution of damage in the two structures (Fig. 24).
The external mechanics analysis is carried out by assuming a central impact and applying the principle of conservation of momentum and conservation of energy.
The next step is to estimate how the energy is shared among the offshore structure and
the ship. Methods for assessing the impact damage are described by Amdahl (1999),
based on simplified load-indentation curves or direct finite element analysis. For the
general case where both structures absorb energy, the analysis has to be carried out
incrementally on the basis of the current deformation field, contact area and force
distribution over the contact area.
External mechanics

The fraction of the kinetic energy

to be absorbed as deformation
energy (structural damage) is
determined by means of:
9 Conservation of momentum
9 Conservation of energy

External mechanics
Rs

Ri

Es,i

Es,s
dws

Ship

FPSO

dwi

Internal mechanics

Energy dissipated by vessel

and offshore structure
9 Equal force level
9 Area under force-def. curve

Internal mechanics

Fig. 24: Simplified methods for calculating impact damage (NORSOK N- 004)
31

The recent advances in computer hardware and software have made nonlinear finite
element analysis (NLFEM) a viable tool for assessing collisions. A careful choice of
element type and mesh is required. It is found that a particularly fine mesh is required
in order to obtain accurate results for components deformed by axial crushing. A major challenge in NLFEM analysis is the prediction of ductile crack initiation and
propagation. This problem is yet to be solved. The crack initiation and propagation
should be based on fracture mechanics analysis using the J-integral or Crack Tip
Opening Displacement method rather than simple strain considerations.
While the main concern about ship impacts on fixed platforms is the reduction of
structural strength and possible progressive structural failure, the main effect for
buoyant structures is damage that can lead to flooding and, hence, loss of buoyancy.
The measure of such damages is the maximum indentation implying loss of water
tightness. However, in the case of large damage, reduction of structural strength, as
expressed by the indentation, is also a concern for floating structures.
A ship impact involving the minimum energy of 14 MJ will normally imply an indentation of 0.4 1.2 m in a semi-submersible column. A 75-100 MJ impact may be required to cause an indentation equal to the column radius (Moan and Amdahl, 1989).
The effect is highly dependent upon the location of impact contact area relative to
decks and bulkheads in the column.
Moan and Amdahl (2001) considered supply or merchant vessels with a displacement
of 2000- 5000 tons which caused bow impacts on a typical side structure of an FPSO
with displacement of about 100 000 t. For this case the limiting energy for rupture of
the outer ship side was found to be ~10 MJ (700mm bow displacement). The energy
at 1500mm bow indentation was estimated to be ~43 MJ while the limiting energy for
rupture of the inner side is ~230 MJ, at 3700 mm bow displacement. This corresponds
to a critical speed of 18.5 knots for a 5000 tons displacement vessel. We recall that
rupture of plate material is very uncertain such that the quoted energy level should be
used with cautiously. If the FPSO side structure is assumed to be sufficiently rigid to
ensure that all energy is absorbed by the bow, then the maximum collision force (peak
force) is 30 MN. However most of the time the force oscillates between 15-25 MN.
Another situation dealt with by Moan and Amdahl was stern impact on the FPSO
caused by a shuttle tanker, see Fig. 23b and 25. A 70 kdwt shuttle tanker was found
to penetrate the machine room of a 140 kdwt FPSO after an energy dissipation of 38
MJ. On the other hand, it was demonstrated that it was feasible to strengthen the stern
of the FPSO corresponding to ice-strengthening dimensions so that all dissipation
could occur in the shuttle tanker bow.
F o r ca s tle d ec k

Shuttle
U p p er d ec k
tanker

FPSO

Fig. 25: Shuttle tanker in ballast condition impacting FPSO stern (Moan and Amdahl,
2001).
32

Environmental events
The ALS criterion is supposed to be applicable to any abnormal wave loading as
well. Obviously, the two-step ALS procedure then becomes a survival check based on
a load event which annually is exceeded by a probability of 10-4. Consider a wave
loading, F, which for simplicity is characterised only by the wave height, H. Assume
that F is a smooth function of wave height. H i.e. F=cH and that the wave height
follows a Weibull distribution with a shape parameter B. If it is assumed that there are
5108 waves in 100 years, the ratio between the loads at a 10-4 and 10-2 annual probability level, respectively, becomes Fc(-4)/Fc(-2) = (H(-4)/H(-2)) = (1.23)/B. The ratio of
the required strength would then be Rc(-4)/Rc(-2) = Fc(-4)/ (T Fc(-2) ) = 1.23/B/T where T
is the total ULS safety factor while the safety factor for ALS is 1.0. This implies that
ULS will be governing for North Sea and other conditions (B=0.9-1.0) if < 1.8-2.0.
In benign conditions (e.g.with B=0.6) ULS will be governing if < 1.2.

Courtesy:
Statoil, Marintek

Fig. 26: Wave in deck load for a fixed platform

However, there are two issues that need to be observed in this connection. The first
issue is the occurrence of possible abnormal waves, with high crest or other unusual
shape which is not a simple extrapolation of the 10-2 event (Haver, 2000, Prevost
and Forristall, 2002). The second issue is the possible sudden change in force, F, at a
certain wave height. The most interesting case is when the wave reaches the platform
deck, implying that the wave force will increase very fast with the wave height. By
ensuring a deck clearance such that the 10-4 crest does not reach the deck, the ULS
criterion would normally be governing. Otherwise, the ALS criterion based on the 104
wave event may govern the dimensions.
Abnormal resistance
It is not possible to determine the abnormal resistance (e. g. due to fabrication defects), using risk analyses. Up to now, abnormal resistance has been explicitly specified by generic values for specific types of structures based on some considerations of
the vulnerability of the structural components. For instance, the ALS check is carried
out for platforms with slender braces by considering the damage in terms of severed
individual braces. This condition was established in the aftermath of the Alexander
Kielland accident and was initially aimed to cover the effects of frequently occurring
ship impacts relating to supply vessels as well as abnormal fatigue cracks. This damage condition is also applicable to the tether and other mooring systems.

33

Crack control
Most degradations of the structure are due to corrosion and crack growth. The effect
of corrosion is ameliorated by corrosion allowance or a protection system, which
makes the corrosion development gradual and, hence, be easy to control. The crack
growth is more critical because cracks can result is a sudden rupture. Moreover,
cracks are hard to detect because they are small for a significant part of the time service life.
Abnormal defects, i.e. defects much larger than those implicit in fatigue design curves,
are also of concern. As mentioned by Moan (2004), observations with jackets show
that 2-3 % of cracks found in inspections can be attributed to abnormal defects. This
also occurs in other offshore structures.
Therefore, the crack control strategy, in general needs to include a combination of the
following safety measures:
-

design for adequate fatigue life and critical crack size

design for robustness in relation to member failure
plan inspection of the as-fabricated structure as well as during the service life, possibly using the Leak Before Break principle

An adequate design fatigue life gives ample time to detect cracks. For instance, if the
fatigue life from the occurrence of a through thickness cracks to rupture is 25 % of the
fatigue life determined by SN-curves, a 20-year characteristic life implies a characteristic value of the time to failure of 5 years and a mean time to failure of 15 years after
a possible leak.
The implementation of the Accidental Collapse Limit State criteria obviously provides a safety barrier with respect to the system failure given the fatigue failure of a
member in a framed structure.
When inspections are prioritised, the potential of gross fabrication defects (e.g. because of difficult access), should also be considered. Since inspections after fabrication on shore can be carried at less costs and with higher reliability than during operation offshore, it is worthwhile to emphasise such inspections, at least for critical components.
Different strategies may be relevant for different types of offshore structures. This is
because the existing structures possess different robustness and because inspection,
repair and failure costs vary significantly.
As an example of structural components with particular safety focus, consider tethers
in TLPs. They are designed with a Fatigue Design Factor of 10 and the ALS criterion
is implemented by requiring survival of any tether failed. Moreover, the tethers in the
Heidrun platform in the North Sea, are tubular members which were joined by butt
welds ground flush and were inspected twice with respect to surface defects on the
outside and the inside of the tubular wall. Furthermore a 60-70 % X-ray examination
for internal defects after fabrication was carried out in the yard. The first service inspection is now taking place after 10 years in service.
The crack control in semi-submersibles with slender braces is based on a balanced
fatigue design criterion and ALS according to Table 4 as well as leak detection during
operation.
A major difference between a trading tanker and an FPSO is that the routing, the
speed reduction and the heading angle toward wave can be used for the tanker to re-

34

duce wave loads, but not for the FPSO. Also, a dry-docking for inspections is more
complicated for FPSOs because it needs to be stationary at the offshore site. The fatigue criteria for FPSOs were established before they became common practice for
tankers (Bach-Gansmo et al., 1987). Normally, the required cumulative damage is D
= 1.0 for a 20-year service life for production ships. The thousands of welded joints of
similar type and location encountered in the ships imply a high probability of fatigue
cracking which suggests application of a more restrictive fatigue criterion. On the
other hand, the significant residual strength of damaged ships makes it possible to
detect cracks using the leak-before-break detection and a close visual inspection.
However, it is desirable to clarify the crack propagation and critical crack length of
large cracks. The critical crack length estimated by current methods, (e.g. BS 7910,
1999) is found to be much smaller than crack lengths experienced in ship hulls. The
treatment of residual stresses and constraint seems to be important factors in this connection (Bjrheim et al., 2004). However, this issue is still open for debate.
However, for economical reasons, it may be advantageous to apply more restrictive
fatigue criteria when the consequences are high. This may be the case when the crack
causes a leak from the cargo tank into the ballast tank, leading to an explosion hazard.
For that matter, the number of potential crack sites in FPSOs and tankers emphasises
such a consideration.
Novel structures, for which there is no or limited service experiences, need a more
rigorous monitoring and inspection, until adequate confidence is gained. This is because new structures involve a high utilisation of static strength, new structural details, possibly with high stress concentration, as well as large uncertainty in the response.
3.10 Quality assurance and control of the design process
The quality assurance and control of the engineering process have to address two different situations, which require different type of attention, namely:
-

detect, control and mitigate errors made in connection with technology that is
known in the engineering community as such
identify possible unknown phenomena, e.g. associated with load, response and
resistance, and clarify the basis for accounting for such phenomena in design

Offshore structures are developed in several stages: conceptual, engineering and detailed engineering phases. QA/QC needs to be hierarchical, too, with an emphasis of
the latter QA/QC process in the conceptual and early design phases.
Errors can occur due to individual errors and omissions, inadequate procedures, software and lack of robustness of the organizations. Errors of omission and commission,
violations (circumventions), mistakes, rejection of information, and incorrect transmission of information (communication errors) have been the dominant causes of
failures. The lack of adequate training, time, and teamwork or back-up (insufficient
redundancy) have been responsible for not detecting and correcting many of these
errors (Bea, 2000b).
With the advent of computers and their integration into many aspects of the design,
construction, and operation of oil and gas structures, software errors are also a concern. Newly developed, advanced, and frequently very complex design technology
applied in the development of design procedures and the design of the offshore structures has not been sufficiently debugged and failures have resulted.

35

Software errors, in which incorrect and inaccurate algorithms were coded into computer programs, have been at the root-cause of several recent failures of offshore
structures. Guidelines have been developed to address the quality of the computer
software for the performance of finite element analyses. An extensive benchmark testing is required to assure that the software performs as it should and that the documentation is sufficient. One particular importance is the provision of independent checking procedures that can be used to validate the results from analyses.
It is found that errors are often made by individuals in organizations with a culture
that does not promote quality and reliability in the design process. The culture and the
organizations do not provide the incentives, values, standards, goals, resources, and
controls that are required to achieve adequate quality.
The loss of corporate memory in companies responsible for structural safety also has
been a factor contributing to many cases of structural failures. Knowledge of the painful lessons in the past was lost and the lessons were repeated with generally even
more painful results. Such loss of corporate memory is particularly probable in times
of down-sizing, outsourcing and mergers (Bea, 2000a-b).
QA/QC of the engineering process
QA is the proactive process in which the planning is developed to help preserve desirable quality. QC is the interactive element in which the planning is implemented and
carried out. QA/QC measures are focused both on error prevention and error detection
and correction (Harris and Chaney, 1969). There can be a real danger in excessively
formalized QA/QC processes. If not properly managed, they can lead to generation of
paperwork, a waste of scarce resources that can be devoted to QA/QC, and a minimum compliance mentality.
It is important that the QA/QC is hierarchical, in other words it should be performed
by designers and others doing the work, their colleagues, and third parties. While selfchecking is very important, Matousek and Schneider (1976) found that 87% of the
errors causing accidents in the construction industry, could have been detected either
by the person next in line or by properly organized additional checks. Therefore, an
additional QA/QC is necessary. A good support in organization by experienced managers, who have daily responsibilities for the quality of the project organizations and
processes, is crucial. In the same way as the structure should be damage tolerant, the
design organizations also need to be robust. It is when the organization or the operating team encounters defects and damage and is under serious stress, that the benefits
of robustness become evident. Robust organizations have extensive auditing procedures to help spot safety problems and they have reward systems that encourage risk
mitigating behaviours.
Nevertheless, knowledgeable, trained, experienced, and sensitive third parties can
help, encourage, and assist the owners of the concept to improve. The third-party QA
and QC checking measures which are an integral part of the offshore structure design
process provide an independent review. This checking should start with the basic
tools (guidelines, codes, computer programs) of the structure design process to assure
that standardized errors have not been embedded in the design tools. The checking
should continue through the major phases of the design process, with a particular attention given to the loading analysis. Moreover the plans for fabrication and operation
(manuals) also constitute an important part of the QA and QC process. The provision
of adequate resources and motivations is also necessary, particularly the willingness

36

of management and engineering to provide integrity to the process and to be prepared

to deal adequately with bad news.
The true value of QA and QC lies in the disciplined process. The main objective of
QA/QC is detection of errors and omissions and not their prediction. Yet the attempt
made by Lotsberg et al. (to appear) is an interesting effort to assess the risk associated
with gross errors and omissions. Unfortunately, sometimes the results of formal risk
analysis approaches are only used to justify a compliance with regulatory targets and,
in some cases the implementation is not clearly justified and
needs improvements
in the reliability of an engineered system.
The intensity and the extent of the design checking process need to be matched to the
particular design situation. Repetitive designs that have been adequately tested in operations to demonstrate that they have the required quality do not need to be verified
and checked as closely as those that are first-offs and new designs that may push
the boundaries of the current technology. New technologies compound the problems
of latent system flaws (Reason, 1997).
Identification of new phenomena
The early phases of design are particularly important for the QA and QC of novel
concepts. Novel concepts that could imply new physical phenomena relating for instance to loads and response need particular attention. Examples of phenomena discovered in the recent two decades include the ringing experienced in connection with
the Draugen mono-tower shown in Fig. 27. In this case the extreme loading increased
by about 30% due to a particular combination of hydrodynamic excitation on large
diameter columns and a natural structural period in the range of 2-8s. The phenomenon was discovered when most of the manufacturing process had been completed. So,
the safety was ensured by operational restrictions. Another example is the high frequency springing and ringing response of TLPs. It is noted that these phenomena, like
many others in the history of offshore structures, became important due to a combination of nonlinear wave load excitation at certain natural structural frequencies. Model
testing is crucial in this connection. Another recent, but more obvious, issue is the
possible ship impact scenario associated with the tandem off-loading.
Offshore structural engineeringtoday
- partlymature
( manyaspectsof
fixedplatformtechnology)

16.4m

267m

44.5m

30

Moment (kNm)

20

- partlyinnovative technologyemerging
(e.g. in relatingto floatingplatforms/
risers/offloadingof gas)

QA/QC of novel conceptsrepresent

particular challenges
- requiresrobust control, i.e. indepent reviews
- InnovationdependsuponR&D

10
0
-10
-20
-30

e.g. Ringing in the Draugen platform

Linear
analysis
Line
r beregning
Ikkeliner beregning
-40 Nonlinear analysis
1860 1865 1870 1875 1880 1885 1890 1895 1900
Time (s)

Fig. 27: Ringing in Draugen monotower

Fig. 28: Springing and ringing

in TLP

37

From a safety point of view, the most important issue is to identify a new phenomenon that represents a new or altered hazard. When it is identified, the uncertainties
associated with the hazard are commonly accounted for by conservative design approach. However, there is a strong incentive to reduce the uncertainties to limit the
design conservatism for economical reasons.
To a large extent the offshore industry has matured. Yet, the development of new offshore facilities are still expected in the future, for instance in connection with new
environmental conditions- i.e. involving new combinations of wind waves and swell
or ice or use of novel concepts in connection with production and transport of liquefied natural gas. Then sloshing in FPSOs with several slack tanks as well as possible interaction between fluid in tanks and rigid body motions of the vessels, need attention. In general, the aging of the existing offshore structures, especially due to
crack growth, needs attention in the years to come.
S afe ty issu es
C o m plex and com pact
p rocess facility
(fire/e xplosion hazards)
C o nsequence of LN G leakage
P rocess near sto rage facility
(m ight im ply e scalation of
fire..)
C a rgo transfe r in open sea s

F loa ting production of LN G

S loshing of LN G in partly
filled tanks (m ight im pair
ta nk integrity)
O p e ration of vessels close
to p roduction/term inal
fa cilities (collision hazard)
O ffsho re off-loa ding term ina ls
(a w a y from den sly populate d a rea s and
busy ports)

Fig. 29: Safety assessment of transport system for Liquefied Natural Gas

4. Concluding remarks
Various measures to ensure an adequate safety in offshore structures have been reviewed based upon relevant accidents. A design criteria as well as load and structural
analysis methods have been briefly presented. It is demonstrated how structural reliability analysis can be used to establish consistent design criteria for ultimate resistance and fatigue, and especially how refinement of analysis methods and additional
information reduce uncertainty and hence the necessary safety factors. On the other
hand, it is shown that the failure probability implied by current ultimate and fatigue
limit state criteria is small and does not show up in the accident statistics. The main
cause of accidents is human and organizational errors and omissions. Therefore, to
achieve an acceptable safety level, QA and QC of the engineering process are required. This includes inspection, monitoring and repair of the structure, as well as
design for structural robustness. The QA and QC tasks, to possibly identify new phenomena, especially associated with the loading and dynamic response, are particularly
challenging in connection with novel concepts for new environmental conditions or
new functions. In this paper, a particular emphasis is placed on the Accidental Collapse Limit State design check related to accidental loads and abnormal strength. The

38

philosophy behind this robustness criterion is described and it is shown how information has been established for a proper implementation of the criterion. In the view of
the aging of offshore structures, crack growth and rupture are particularly addressed.
It is shown how fatigue and robustness design criteria, as well as inspection strategy
can be combined for different types of offshore structures, to yield an acceptable
safety level.
Acknowledgement
I would like to acknowledge the invitation to serve a Keppel Professor at the National
University of Singapore as well as the cooperation with its Department of Civil Engineering and the Centre for Offshore Research and Enginneering. I would also like to
thank the many people I have been working with in carrying out the research as well
as code development for the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, ISO and other regulatory bodies that are reported in this paper. They particularly include J. Amdahl, S.
Fjeld, S. Haver, I. Holand (deceased), D. Karsan, J. Lloyd and J.E.Vinnem. The opinions expressed, however, are those of the author.

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Acronyms
ALS - Accidental Collapse Limit State
API - American Petroleum Institute
FDF Fatigue Design Factor
(to multiply with the service life to get desired characteristic value of fatigue
life)
FLS - Fatigue Limit State
HOF - Human and Organizational Factors
HSE - Health and Safety Executive, UK
IMO - International Maritime Organization
ISO - International Standardization Organization
MMS-Mineral Management Services, USA
NPD - Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (now: Petroleum Safety Authority, Norway)
TLP - Tension Leg Platform
WOAD World Accident Data Bank, issued by Det Norske Veritas

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