Global justice

Global justice is an issue in political philosophy arising from the concern that the world
at large is unjust.

History[edit]
Henrik Syse says that the main theory of global ethics and international justice in
western tradition is the natural-law tradition which goes back to beyond written record.
It has been organized and identifiable teaching
within our culture since Latin times of Middle Stoa and Cicero and the early Christian
philosophers Ambrose and Augustine. He states "This early natural-law theorizing
teaching centered around the idea of a ius naturale, i.e., a system of right which is
natural and as such common to all people, available to humankind as a measuring stick
of right and wrong."[1]

Context[edit]
Marion Young states that "A widely accepted philosophical view continues to hold that
the scope of obligations of justice is defined by membership in a common political
community. On this account, people have obligations of justice only to other people
with whom they live together under a common constitution, or whom they recognize as
belonging to the same nation as themselves." Philosopher David Miller also agrees that
obligations only apply to people living together or that are part of the same Nation.[2]
What we owe one another in the global context is one of the questions the global justice
concept seeks to answer.[3] There are positive and negative duties which may be in
conflict with ones moral rules.[citation needed] Cosmopolitans, reportedly including the ancient
Greek Diogenes of Sinope, have described themselves as citizens of the world.[4]
Thinkers including the utilitarian anarchist William Godwin have argued that everyone
has an impartial duty to do the most good he or she can, without preference for any one
human being over another.[5]
The broader political context of the debate is the longstanding conflict between more
and less local institutions: tribes against states, villages against cities, local communities
against empires, nation-states against the UN. The relative strength of the local versus
the global has waxed and waned over recorded history. From the early modern period
until the twentieth century, the preeminent political institution was the state, which is
sovereign, territorial, claims a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence in its
territory, and exists in an international system of other sovereign states.[6] Over the same
period, and relatedly, political philosophers' interest in justice focused almost
exclusively on domestic issues: how should states treat their subjects, and what do
fellow-citizens owe one another? Justice in relations between states, and between
individuals across state borders, was put aside as a secondary issue or left to
international relations theorists.[7]

Since the First World War, however, the state system has been transformed by
globalization and by the creation of supranational political and economic institutions
such as the League of Nations, the United Nations, and the World Bank.[8] Over the same
period, and especially since the 1970s, global justice became an important issue in
political philosophy.[9] In the contemporary global justice debate, the general issue of
impartiality centers on the moral significance of borders and of shared citizenship.
Realists, particularists, nationalists, members of the society of states tradition, and
cosmopolitans take contesting positions in response to these problems.

Central questions[edit]
Three related questions, concerning the scope of justice, justice in the distribution of
wealth and other goods, and the institutions responsible for justice, are central to the
problem of global justice. When these questions are addressed in non ideal
circumstances, they are part of the "ethics of process," a branch of political ethics.

Scope[edit]
Are there, as the moral universalist argues, objective ethical standards that apply to all
humans regardless of culture, race, gender, religion, nationality or other distinguishing
features?[10] Or do ethical standards only apply within such limited contexts as cultures,
nations, communities, or voluntary associations?
A Moral Conception of Social Justice is only Universalistic if:

It subjects all persons to the same system of fundamental moral principles

These principles assign the same fundamental moral benefits and burdens to all:
and

These fundamental benefits and burdens do not privilege or disadvantage certain

groups arbitrarily.[11]

Further information: Moral universalism, Moral relativism

Distributive equality[edit]
Gillian Brock asks "Do we have an obligation to ensure people have their basic needs
met and can otherwise lead decent lives, or should we be more concerned with global
socio-economic equality?".[12] 1.1 billion people 18% of humanity live below the
World Bank's $2/day.[13] Is this distribution of wealth and other goods just? What is the
root cause of poverty, and are there systemic injustices in the world economy? John
Rawls has said that international obligations are between states as long as "states meet a
minimal condition of decency" where as Thomas Nagel argues that obligations to the
others are on an individual level and that moral reasons for restraint do not need to be
satisfied for an individual to deserve equal treatment internationally .[14] Peter Singer
argues in Famine, Affluence, and Morality that the rich have a moral obligation to give
their money away to those who need it.[15][16]

Further information: Distributive justice, Poverty, Social Justice, International

inequality

Institutions[edit]
What institutions states, communes, federal entities, global financial institutions like
the World Bank, international NGOs, multinational corporations, international courts, a
world state would best achieve the ideal of global justice?[17] How might they gain our
support, and whose responsibility is it to create and sustain such institutions? How free
should movement between the jurisdictions of different territorial entities be?
Thomas Pogge says that States can not achieve global justice by themselves "It has
never been plausible that the interests of states that is, the interests of governments
should furnish the only considerations that are morally relevant in international
relations." [16] Organizations like the World Trade Organization have advocated free trade
but allow protectionism in affluent developed countries to this point according to Pogge
and Moellendorf.[3]
Public polls have shown that there is support for the International Criminal Court.[18] 130
Civil Society groups in Africa have recognized that the ICC operates unevenly but in the
interest of reaching global justice remain supportive of it.[19] In Cambodia the
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, some observers had said "the court
will not truly be effective unless it can properly address the crucial issue of how
reparations will be given to victims of the regime" while others supported it, I think the
case is going to be the most important trial in Cambodian history. said Youk Chhang
the director of the Documentation Centre of Cambodia,[20][21] One worldwide institution,
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, responsible for creating agreements on
climate change has been criticized for not acting fast enough. by Truthout. Anne
Petermann and Orin Langelle of the Global Justice Ecology Project have noted that in
2007 industry insiders were given preferential treatment over "civil society observers
and delegates from poorer countries whose visas were delayed."[22]
Further information: Immigration, Freedom of movement

Minimum criteria of global justice[edit]

Nayef Al-Rodhan[edit]
Philosopher Nayef Al-Rodhan argues in his 2009 book, Sustainable History and the
Dignity of Man: A Philosophy of History and Civilisational Triumph, that human wellbeing is dependent on the preservation and promotion of human dignity and that human
dignity is directly linked to global justice. In order to achieve global justice, eight
minimum criteria must be met. These are 1) dialogue, 2) effective and representative
multilateral institutions, 3) representative decision-making structures, 4) fair treatment,
5) empathy, 6) accountability, 7) transparency, and 8) adherence to international law.
Because interconnectedness between peoples and geo-cultural domains is becoming
increasingly common, Al-Rodhan maintains that the fate of one geo-cultural domain
will affect the fate of others. Justice is central to human dignity, individual geo-cultural
triumph, and the overall well-being of human civilization. Thus, according to Al-

Rodhan, meeting the minimum criteria of global justice is a prerequisite to the triumph
of human civilization.[23]
Global justice is the paramount to global security, because injustice can lead to feelings
of anger, humiliation, and alienation, which can undermine human dignity. Al-Rodhan
argues that humans are primarily driven by emotional self-interest and that protecting
humans emotional needs is fundamental to human well-being and human dignity. When
people feel that they have been the victim of unjust decisions, they may try and seek
justice by less conventional means such as violence. This, in turn, can promote
insecurity. Therefore, justice and not just military power, is essential to maintaining
global security. Some obstacles might however arise. Al-Rodhan identifies the disparity
in power that exists between states in the current global order as a major obstacle in
achieving global justice. Calls for greater global justice are thus likely to continue from
disadvantaged societies because they often feel that they are unjustly subjected to the
rules set by more powerful players. However, dominant states that benefit from the
current status quo are unlikely to want to alter established institutions or governance
structures.[23]
Al-Rodhan therefore recommends that fairness in terms of the participants in dialogue is
a prerequisite for the promotion of universal justice. Similarly, he argues that diplomacy
must be based on openness to hearing and acknowledging the concerns and positions of
others. Empathy and an acknowledgement of the grievances and past pains of others are
crucial, as is giving all stakeholders a voice in the decision-making process. Finally, AlRodhan argues that all states, no matter how powerful, must be bound by international
law and its obligations.[23]
Thomas Pogge[edit]
Thomas Pogge contends that an "institutional order can not be just if it fails to meet the
minimal human rights standard", That standard is based on the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights.[16] To contend that there needs to be global justice one might analyze
whether or not there is an injustice, Mathias Risse has argued that an injustice is not
present, "While indeed 1.2 billion people in 1998 lived below the poverty line of $1.08
PPP 1993 per day, it is also true that there is now less misery than ever before," Less
Misery is his standard for justice. He states that "progress made over the last 200 years
is miraculous".[24]

Main positions[edit]
Five main positions realism, particularism, nationalism, the society of states
tradition, and cosmopolitanism (in two forms) have been taken by contributors to the
global justice debate.

Realism[edit]
Main article: Realism in international relations
Realists, such as Charles Yeo, Hashim Tilab argue that there are no global ethical
standards, and that to imagine that there are is a dangerous fantasy.[25] States are the main

actors in an international anarchy, and they either will or should always attempt to act
rationally in their own interests. So, in response to the three central questions above:
moral universalism is either false, or merely says that nothing is forbidden to any state
in pursuit of its interests. There is no obligation to help the poor, unless doing so helps
to further a states strategic aims. And the state system is taken as the fundamental and
unchallengeable global institutional arrangement.

Particularism[edit]
Particularists, such as Michael Walzer and James Tully, argue that ethical standards
arise out of shared meanings and practices, which are created and sustained by discrete
cultures or societies. Moral and social criticism is possible within the boundaries of such
groups, but not across them. If a society is egalitarian, for instance, its citizens can be
morally wrong, and can meaningfully criticise each other, if they do not live up to their
own egalitarian ideals; but they cannot meaningfully criticise another, caste-based
society in the name of those ideals. "A given society is just if its substantive life is lived
in a certain way that is, in a way faithful to the shared understandings of [its]
members."[26] It is unjust if not. Each society has its own, different standards, and only
those inside it are bound by those standards and can properly criticise themselves. So,
moral universalism is false, because objective ethical standards vary between cultures or
societies. We should not apply the same criteria of distributive justice to strangers as we
would to compatriots. Nation-states that express their peoples' shared and distinctive
ethical understandings are the proper institutions to enable local and different justices.
For Charles Blattberg, however, there exists a particularist approach to global justice,
one based upon what he calls a "global patriotism."[27]
Further information: Communitarianism, Cultural relativism, Multiculturalism

Nationalism[edit]
Main article: Nationalism
Nationalists, such as David Miller and Yael Tamir, argue that demanding mutual
obligations are created by a particular kind of valuable association, the nation.[28] We
may have humanitarian duties to aid the particularly badly off worldwide, but these are
much less stringent and pressing than our duties to our fellow-citizens. Nationalism has
traditionally included this assumption of differing moral obligations to those within and
those outside the nation, reflected for example in the fact that the benefits of the welfare
state are not available to citizens of other countries. So, moral universalism is too
simple, because the ethical standards that apply between compatriots differ from those
that apply between strangers (although some nationalists argue for the universal ethical
standard that nations should have their own states). Distributive justice is an issue
within nations but not necessarily between them. And a world-system of nation-states is
the appropriate organiser of justice for all, in their distinct associational groups.

Society of states[edit]
In the society of states tradition, states are seen as individual entities that can mutually
agree on common interests and rules of interaction, including moral rules, in much the

same way as human individuals can. Often, this idea of agreement between peers is
formalised by a social contract argument.
One prominent exemplar of the tradition is John Rawls. In The Law of Peoples, Rawls
extends the method of his A Theory of Justice to the question of global justice. His
argument is that we can justify a global regime by showing that it would be chosen by
representatives of Peoples in an imagined original position, which prevents them
knowing which particular People they represent. This decision-in-ignorance models
fairness because it excludes selfish bias. When Rawls applied this method in the case of
domestic justice, with parties in the original position representing individual members
of a single society, he argued that it supported a redistributive, egalitarian liberal
politics. In contrast, Rawls argues that when his method is applied to global justice, it
supports a quite traditional, Kantian international ethics: duties of states to obey treaties
and strict limits on warmaking, but no global repossession of private property. So,
different justices apply to the domestic and international cases. Even if justice requires
egalitarianism within states, it does not do so between them. And a system of
cooperating but independent states is the just global institutional arrangement. Rawls
describes this ideal as a 'realistic utopia'.[29] Apart from Rawls, other notable exponents
of this position include Hedley Bull.
Further information: The Law of Peoples, Social contract

Cosmopolitanism[edit]
John Gower, Vox Clamantis detail (c. 1400): the world
Cosmopolitans argue that some form of moral universalism is true, and therefore that all
humans, and not merely compatriots or fellow-citizens, fall within the scope of justice.
Their arguments typically appeal to consistency, as follows:
1. The moral standing of individuals is based on some morally significant
characteristics.
2. These characteristics are shared by all humans (and not only by the members of
some nation, culture, society, or state).
3. Therefore, all humans have moral standing (and the boundaries between nations,
cultures, societies and states are morally irrelevant).[30]
Cosmopolitans differ, however, over which shared human characteristics are morally
significant.
Consequentialist cosmopolitans, amongst whom Peter Singer is prominent, argue that
the proper standard of moral judgement for actions, practices or institutions is their
consequences, and that the measure of consequences is the welfare of humans (or even
of all sentient creatures). The capacity to experience welfare and suffering is therefore
the shared basis for moral standing. This means that the fact that some people are
suffering terrible deprivations of welfare, caused by poverty, creates a moral demand
that anyone who is able to help them do so. Neither the physical distance between the

rich and the poor, nor the fact that they are typically citizens of different countries, has
any moral relevance.[31]
Human rights defenders of cosmopolitanism, such as Thomas Pogge and Simon
Caney, argue that all humans have rights,[32][33] perhaps those set out in the UN's
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It may be argued that these rights create a
positive duty of the rich to provide what they guarantee (security, a livelihood, etc.); or,
alternatively, it may be argued that the rich are currently violating their negative duty
not to impose a global order that systematically violates rights of the poor.[34]
Others defend neoconservative interventionist foreign policy from a view of
cosmopolitanism for the added benefits to human rights that such intervention could
bring. Some defended the 2003 invasion of Iraq from this motive due to the human
rights abuses Saddam had inflicted on countless members of the Kurdish and Shiite
communities.
Individual cosmopolitans also differ considerably in how they understand the
requirements of distributive justice and the legitimacy of global institutions. Some, for
instance Kai Nielsen, endorse world government; others, such as Simon Caney, do not.
The extent to which cosmopolitans advocate global redistribution of resources also
varies. All cosmopolitans, however, believe that individuals, and not states, nations, or
other groups, are the ultimate focus of universal moral standards.

Demands of global justice[edit]

None of the five main positions described above imply complete satisfaction with the
current world order. Realists complain that states that pursue utopian moral visions
through intervention and humanitarian aid, instead of minding their own strategic
interests, do their subjects harm and destabilise the international system.[35] Particularists
object to the destruction of traditional cultures by cultural colonialism, whether under
the guise of economic liberalism or defence of human rights.[36] Nationalists deplore the
fact that so many people are stateless or live under inefficient and tyrannical regimes.[37]
Advocates of the society of states are concerned about rogue states and about the
imperial ambitions of the powerful.[38] Cosmopolitans believe that the contemporary
world badly fails to live up to their standards, and that doing so would require
considerable changes in the actions of wealthy individuals and states.[39] It might, for
instance, require them to transfer most of their wealth to the poor. It might require the
building of international institutions able to limit, or even replace, the self-interested
action of powerful states and corporations. It might require each of us to do much more
than most now do.

See also[edit]