Introduction to Global Justice

The broader philosophical context of the global justice debate, in both its contemporary and
historical forms, is the issue of impartiality. Many people believe they have more important
duties to family members, friends and compatriots than to strangers and foreigners. But are they
right to endorse such partiality? Cosmopolitans, reportedly including the ancient Greek
Diogenes of Sinope, have described themselves as citizens of the world. Thinkers including the
utilitarian anarchist William Godwin have argued that everyone has an impartial duty to do the
most good he or she can, without preference for any one human being over another.

The broader political context of the debate is the longstanding conflict between more and less
local institutions: tribes against states, villages against cities, local communities against
empires, nation-states against the UN. The relative strength of the local versus the global has
waxed and waned over recorded history. From the early modern period until the twentieth
century, the preeminent political institution was the state, which is sovereign, territorial, claims
a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence in its territory, and exists in an international
system of other sovereign states. Over the same period, and relatively, political philosophers'
interest in justice focused almost exclusively on domestic issues: how should states treat their
subjects, and what do fellow-citizens owe one another? Justice in relations between states, and
between individuals across state borders, was put aside as a secondary issue or left to
international relations theorists.

Since the First World War, however, the state system has been transformed by globalization and
by the creation of supranational political and economic institutions such as the League of
Nations, the United Nations, and the World Bank. Over the same period, and especially since
the 1970s, global justice became an important issue in political philosophy. In the contemporary
global justice debate, the general issue of impartiality centers on the moral significance of
borders and of shared citizenship. Realists, particularists, nationalists, members of the society
of states tradition, and cosmopolitans take contesting positions in response to these problems.

Central questions

Three related questions, concerning the scope of justice, justice in the distribution of wealth and
other goods, and the institutions responsible for justice, are central to the problem of global
justice. When these questions are addressed in non ideal circumstances, they are part of the
"ethics of process," a branch of political ethics.

Scope

Are there, as the moral Universalist argues, objective ethical standards that apply to all humans
regardless of culture, race, gender, religion, nationality or other distinguishing features? Or do
ethical standards only apply within such limited contexts as cultures, nations, communities, or
voluntary associations?

Distributive equality

1.1 billion People — 18% of humanity — live below the World Bank's $2/day poverty line
while the Canadian government provides farmers with $3/day per animal for cattle feed. So the
food we consume is eating better than the people in developing countries. Is this distribution of
wealth and other goods just? What is the root cause of poverty, and are there systemic injustices
in the world economy? Do the rich have an obligation to help the poor, or is aid a matter of
charity, and therefore admirable but not morally required? If the poor should be helped, how
much help is required — just enough that they can meet their basic needs, enough that they can
flourish as humans, or until they are no longer worse off than the rich?

Institutions

What institutions – states, communes, federal entities, global financial institutions like the
World Bank, international NGOs, multinational corporations, international courts, and a world
state – would best achieve the ideal of global justice? How might they gain our support, and
whose responsibility is it to create and sustain such institutions? How free should movement
between the jurisdictions of different territorial entities be?

Minimum criteria of global justice

Philosopher Nayef Al-Rodhan argues in his 2009 book, Sustainable History and the Dignity of
Man: A Philosophy of History and Civilisation Triumph, that human well-being is dependent on
the preservation and promotion of human dignity and that human dignity is directly linked to
global justice. In order to achieve global justice, eight minimum criteria must be met. These are
1) Dialogue,
2) Effective and representative multilateral institutions,
3) Representative decision-making structures,
4) Fair treatment,
5) Empathy,
6) Accountability,
7) Transparency, and
8) Adherence to international law.
9) Respect for Sovereignty of nations

Because interconnectedness between peoples and geo-cultural domains is becoming

increasingly common, Al-Rodhan maintains that the fate of one geo-cultural domain will affect
the fate of others. Justice is central to human dignity, individual geo-cultural triumph, and the
overall well-being of human civilization. Thus, according to Al-Rodhan, meeting the minimum
criteria of global justice is a prerequisite to the triumph of human civilization.

Global justice is the paramount to global security, because injustice can lead to feelings of
anger, humiliation, and alienation, which can undermine human dignity. Al-Rodhan argues that
humans are primarily driven by emotional self-interest and that protecting humans’ emotional
needs is fundamental to human well-being and human dignity. When people feel that they have
been the victim of unjust decisions, they may try and seek justice by less conventional means
such as violence. This, in turn, can promote insecurity. Therefore, justice and not just military
power, is essential to maintaining global security. Some obstacles might however arise. Al-
Rodhan identifies the disparity in power that exists between states in the current global order as
a major obstacle in achieving global justice. Calls for greater global justice are thus likely to
continue from disadvantaged societies because they often feel that they are unjustly subjected
to the rules set by more powerful players. However, dominant states that benefit from the
current status quo are unlikely to want to alter established institutions or governance structures.

Al-Rodhan therefore recommends that fairness in terms of the participants in dialogue is a

prerequisite for the promotion of universal justice. Similarly, he argues that diplomacy must be
based on openness to hearing and acknowledging the concerns and positions of others.
Empathy and an acknowledgement of the grievances and past pains of others are crucial, as is
giving all stakeholders a voice in the decision-making process. Finally, Al-Rodhan argues that
all states, no matter how powerful, must be bound by international law and its obligations.
Main positions

Five main positions —

 Realism,
 Particularism,
 Nationalism,
 The society of states tradition,
 And cosmopolitanism (in two forms) — have been taken by contributors to the global
justice debate.

Realism- (States are main Actors)

Realists, such as Charles Yeo, Hashim Tilab argue that there are no global ethical standards, and
that to imagine that there are is a dangerous fantasy. States are the main actors in an
international anarchy, and they either will or should always attempt to act rationally in their
own interests. So, in response to the three central questions above: moral universalism is either
false or merely says that nothing is forbidden to any state in pursuit of its interests. There is no
obligation to help the poor, unless doing so helps to further a state’s strategic aims. And the
state system is taken as the fundamental and unchallengeable global institutional arrangement.

Particularism- (Particular rules for Distinct Societies)

Particularists, such as Michael Walzer and James Tully, argue that ethical standards arise out of
shared meanings and practices, which are created and sustained by discrete cultures or
societies. Moral and social criticism is possible within the boundaries of such groups, but not
across them. If a society is egalitarian, for instance, its citizens can be morally wrong, and can
meaningfully criticise each other, if they do not live up to their own egalitarian ideals; but they
cannot meaningfully criticise another, caste-based society in the name of those ideals. "A given
society is just if it’s substantive life is lived in a certain way — that is, in a way faithful to the
shared understandings of members." It is unjust if not. Each society has its own, different
standards, and only those inside it are bound by those standards and can properly criticise
themselves. So, moral universalism is false, because objective ethical standards vary between
cultures or societies. We should not apply the same criteria of distributive justice to strangers as
we would to compatriots. Nation-states that express their people shared and distinctive ethical
understandings are the proper institutions to enable local and different justices.

For Charles Blattberg, however, there exists a particularist approach to global justice, one based
upon what he calls a "global patriotism."

Nationalism

Nationalists, such as David Miller and Yael Tamir, argue that demanding mutual obligations are
created by a particular kind of valuable association, the nation. We may have humanitarian
duties to aid the particularly badly off worldwide, but these are much less stringent and
pressing than our duties to our fellow-citizens. Nationalism has traditionally included this
assumption of differing moral obligations to those within and those outside the nation, reflected
for example in the fact that the benefits of the welfare state are not available to citizens of other
countries. So, moral universalism is too simple, because the ethical standards that apply
between compatriots differ from those that apply between strangers (although some nationalists
argue for the universal ethical standard that nations should have their own states). Distributive
justice is an issue within nations but not necessarily between them. And a world-system of
nation-states is the appropriate organiser of justice for all, in their distinct associational groups.
Society of states

In the society of states tradition, states are seen as individual entities that can mutually agree on
common interests and rules of interaction, including moral rules, in much the same way as
human individuals can. Often, this idea of agreement between peers is formalised by a social
contract argument.

One prominent exemplar of the tradition is John Rawls. In The Law of Peoples, Rawls extends
the method of his A Theory of Justice to the question of global justice. His argument is that we
can justify a global regime by showing that it would be chosen by representatives of Peoples in
an imagined original position, which prevents them knowing which particular People they
represent. This decision-in-ignorance models fairness because it excludes selfish bias. When
Rawls applied this method in the case of domestic justice, with parties in the original position
representing individual members of a single society, he argued that it supported a redistributive,
egalitarian liberal politics. In contrast, Rawls argues that when his method is applied to global
justice, it supports a quite traditional, Kantian international ethics: duties of states to obey
treaties and strict limits on war making, but no global repossession of private property. So,
different justices apply to the domestic and international cases. Even if justice requires
egalitarianism within states, it does not do so between them. And a system of cooperating but
independent states is the just global institutional arrangement. Rawls describes this ideal as a
'realistic utopia'. Apart from Rawls, other notable exponents of this position include Hedley
Bull.

Cosmopolitanism

Cosmopolitans argue that some form of moral universalism is true, and therefore that all
humans, and not merely compatriots or fellow-citizens, fall within the scope of justice. Their
arguments typically appeal to consistency, as follows:

The moral standing of individuals is based on some morally significant characteristics.

These characteristics are shared by all humans (and not only by the members of some nation,
culture, society, or state).
Therefore, all humans have moral standing (and the boundaries between nations, cultures,
societies and states are morally irrelevant).

Cosmopolitans differ, however, over which shared human characteristics are morally
significant.

Consequentialist cosmopolitans, amongst whom Peter Singer is prominent, argue that the
proper standard of moral judgement for actions, practices or institutions is their consequences,
and that the measure of consequences is the welfare of humans (or even of all sentient
creatures). The capacity to experience welfare and suffering is therefore the shared basis for
moral standing. This means that the fact that some people are suffering terrible deprivations of
welfare, caused by poverty, creates a moral demand that anyone who is able to help them do so.
Neither the physical distance between the rich and the poor, nor the fact that they are typically
citizens of different countries, has any moral relevance.

Human rights defenders of cosmopolitanism, such as Thomas Pogge and Simon Caney, argue
that all humans have rights, perhaps those set out in the UN's Universal Declaration of Human
Rights. It may be argued that these rights create a positive duty of the rich to provide what they
guarantee (security, a livelihood, etc.); or, alternatively, it may be argued that the rich are
currently violating their negative duty not to impose a global order that systematically violates
rights of the poor.
Others defend neoconservative interventionist foreign policy from a view of cosmopolitanism
for the added benefits to human rights that such intervention could bring. Some defended the
2003 invasion of Iraq from this motive due to the human rights abuses Saddam had inflicted on
countless members of the Kurdish and Shiite communities.

Individual cosmopolitans also differ considerably in how they understand the requirements of
distributive justice and the legitimacy of global institutions. Some, for instance Kai Nielsen,
endorse world government; others, such as Simon Caney, do not. The extent to which
cosmopolitans advocate global redistribution of resources also varies. All cosmopolitans,
however, believe that individuals, and not states, nations, or other groups, are the ultimate focus
of universal moral standards.
Demands of global justice

None of the five main positions described above imply complete satisfaction with the current
world order. Realists complain that states that pursue utopian moral visions through
intervention and humanitarian aid, instead of minding their own strategic interests, do their
subjects harm and destabilise the international system. Particularists object to the destruction of
traditional cultures by cultural colonialism, whether under the guise of economic liberalism or
defence of human rights. Nationalists deplore the fact that so many people are stateless or live
under inefficient and tyrannical regimes. Advocates of the society of states are concerned about
rogue states and about the imperial ambitions of the powerful. Cosmopolitans believe that the
contemporary world badly fails to live up to their standards, and that doing so would require
considerable changes in the actions of wealthy individuals and states. It might, for instance,
require them to transfer most of their wealth to the poor. It might require the building of
international institutions able to limit, or even replace, the self-interested action of powerful
states and corporations. It might require each of us to do much more than most now do.