11

CHAPTER 2
PROBLEM FORMULATION FOR CONGESTION
MANAGEMENT

2.1

RESTRUCTURED POWER SYSTEMS

In the early 1990s the power supply industries started to undergo a

period of extensive changes. Electricity markets moved away from vertically

integrated monopolies towards liberalized structures with power delivery
being a bundle of several services mainly including generation, transmission
and distribution. One reason for restructuring lay in the expectation that
competition could lead to a reduction of electricity prices and could stimulate
the emergence of new technologies. The main motivation for the unbundling,
in the developed countries, stems from the desire of governments and policy
makers to foster competition in power generation and thus drive the cost of
electricity

down

while

enhancing

supply

quality

and

reliability

(Kankar Bhattacharya et al 2001). In developing countries, the main issues

have been high demand growth which could not be matched with investments
in generation and transmission. The financiers for the required investments
have forced the governments of these countries to undergo restructuring with
the hope of achieving efficiency in these companies (Shaidepour et al 2002).
The success of the reforms in the communication sector and airlines also gave
impetus to the deregulation process (Kothari and Dhillon 2004). The
underlying argument has been that an open market system is more efficient
than a monopoly.

12

United Kingdom was the first to restructure its nationally owned

power system, creating privately owned companies to compete with each
other to sell electric energy. Deregulation followed in Norway, Australia and
New Zealand, and then in the 1992 National Energy Policy Act (NEPA) in the
United States. The form of the deregulated electric power industry differs in
each country and among various regions in the United States.
2.2

MARKET STRUCTURES
At present, the deregulated electricity market comprises Generating

Companies (Gencos), Transmission Companies (Trancos) and Distribution

Companies (Discos), and these entities are independent. There may not be any
coordination between transmission and generation investment. This has
resulted in a marked increase in the level of risk and uncertainty associated
with transmission operation and investment (Kankar Bhattacharya et al 2001).
Three major models are being discussed as alternatives to the current
vertically integrated monopoly. The three models are PoolCo Model, Bilateral
Contracts Model and Hybrid Model.
2.2.1

PoolCo Model
A PoolCo is defined as a centralized marketplace that clears the

market for buyers and sellers where electric power sellers/buyers submit bids
and prices into the pool for the amounts of energy that they are willing to
sell/buy. The ISO or similar entities (e.g. Power Exchange PX) will forecast
the demand for the following day and receive bids that will satisfy the
demand at the lowest cost and prices for electricity on the basis of the most
expensive generator in operation (marginal generator). On the other hand, in
the second model, bilateral trades are negotiable and terms and conditions of
contracts are set by the traders without interference with system operators.

13

In a PoolCo, sellers and buyers submit their bids to inject power into
and out of the pool. Sellers compete for the right to inject power into the grid,
not for specific customers. If a power provider bids too high, they may not be
able to sell power. On the other hand, buyers compete for buying power and if
their bids are too low, they may not be getting any power. In this market, low
cost generators would essentially be rewarded. Power pools would implement
the economic dispatch and produce a single (spot) price for electricity, giving
participants a clear signal for consumption and investment decisions. Winning
bidders are paid the spot price that is equal to the highest bid of the winners.
Since the spot price may exceed the actual running of the selected bidders,
bidders are encouraged to expand their market share which will force high
cost generators to exit the market. Market dynamics will drive the spot price
to a competitive level that is equal to the marginal cost of the most efficient
firms (Shaidepour et al 2002).
The ISO in a Pool Co is independent of transmission and generation
owners for operating the transmission grid. Competitive generators submit
bids to the ISO on a day-ahead basis specifying the amount of energy
available, price and delivery points, while distribution companies do the same
for loads. The ISO, based on submitted bids, forecasts short run regional
energy demand and dispatches generation in the region to balance generation
with load and maintain reliability.
Power Exchange (PX)
Even though the short-term and long-term financial energy
transactions could be in bilateral forms in the electricity industry where
contracted parties agree individually for certain terms such as price,
availability and quality of products, industry restructuring proposals have
concluded the necessity of creating a new market place to trade energy and

14

other services in a competitive manner. This market place is termed Power

Exchange or, as sometimes called, Spot Price Pool (SPP). This market place
permits different participants to sell and buy energy and other services in a
competitive way based on quantity bids and prices (Shaidepour et al 2002).
Market Clearing Price (MCP)
PX accepts supply and demand bids to determine MCP for each of
the 24 periods in the trading day. Computers aggregate all valid (approved)
supply bids and demand bids into an energy supply curve and an energy
demand curve. MCP is determined at the intersection of the two curves and all
trades are executed at the MCP, in other words, the MCP is the balance price
at the market equilibrium for the aggregated supply and demand graphs.
Generators are encouraged to bid according to their operating cost because
bidding lower will lead to financial losses, if MCP is lower than the operating
cost, and bidding higher could cause units to run less frequently or not run at
all.
Day-ahead Market
In the day-ahead market and for each hour of the 24-hour scheduling
day, sellers bid a schedule of supply at various prices, buyers bid a schedule
of demand at various prices. For each hour, the bid of each producer is
monotonously increasing piecewise constant stacks of quantities and prices.
Analogously, the bid of each consumer is monotonously decreasing piecewise
constant stacks of quantities and prices, and MCP is determined for each hour.
Then, sellers specify the resources for the sold power, and buyers specify the
delivery points for the purchased power. PX schedules supply and demand
with the ISO for delivery. Supply and demand are adjusted to account for
congestion and ancillary services, and then PX finalizes the schedules.

15

Hour-ahead Market
The hour-ahead market is similar to day- ahead, except that trades
are for one hour, and the Available Transfer Capability (ATC) is reduced to
include day-ahead trades, and bids are not iterative in this market. Once the
MCP is determined in the PX, market participants submit additional data to
the PX. The data would include individual schedules by generating units, take
out point for demand, adjustment bids for congestion management and
ancillary service bids. After this stage, the ISO and the PX know the injection
points of individual generating units to the transmission system. A schedule
may include imports and/or exports. To account for transmission losses,
generators schedules are adjusted where real losses are only known after all
metered data are processed (Shaidepour et al 2002).
2.2.2

Bilateral Model
In the bilateral model the buyers and sellers negotiate the price and

amount of power traded between them. These contracts set the terms and
conditions of agreements independent of the ISO. The ISO is responsible for
ensuring that the bilateral agreements are feasible i.e. transmission capacity is
available.
2.2.3

Hybrid Model
The hybrid model combines the various features of the previous two

market models. The participation of a GENCO in the Pool is not obligatory.

Some GENCOs will therefore have contracts, and they can trade the excess
capacity on the pool market. GENCOs without contracts submit their sell bids
to the pool market. The customers therefore have a choice to negotiate a
power supply agreement directly with suppliers or may choose to accept the

16

spot market price. This market model is the closest to the established markets
for other goods and services.
2.3

CONGESTION AND ITS MANAGEMENT

Transmission congestion may be defined as the condition where

more power is scheduled or flows in transmission lines and transformers than

the physical limits of those lines and transformers.
Consider a simple example of a two zone system connected by an
interface, as shown in Figure 2.1. This example illustrates why transmission
congestion is potentially important from an economic standpoint. Let each
zone have a 100-MW constant load. Zone A has a 200 MW generator with an
incremental cost of $10/MWhr. Zone B has a 200 MW generator with an
incremental cost of $20/MWhr. Assume both generators bid their incremental
costs. If there is no limitation of power transfer between zones, all 200 MW of
load will be purchased from generator A at $10/MWhr, at a cost of $2000/hr,
as shown in Figure 2.1(a). If there is a 50 MW transfer limit, then 150 MW
will be purchased from A at $10/MWhr and the remaining 50 MW must be
bought from generator B at $ 20/MWhr, a total cost of $ 2500/hr as shown in
Figure 2.1 (b). Congestion has created a market inefficiency of 25% of the
optimal costs, even without strategic behavior by the generators. Congestion
has also created unlimited market power for generator B. B can increase its
bid as much as it wants, because the loads must still buy 50 MW from it.
Generator Bs market power would be limited, if there was an additional
generator in zone B with a higher incremental cost, or if the loads had non
zero price elasticity and reduced their energy purchase as prices increased
(Christie et al 2000). In the real power system, cases of both limited and
unlimited market power due to congestion can occur. Unlimited market power
is probably not socially tolerable.

17
Zone B
$ 20

Zone A
$ 10

0 MW

200 MW
100 MW

(a)

100 MW

100 MW

No congestion

Zone A

Zone B

$ 10

$ 20
50 MW

150
100

(b)

50 MW

100

With 50 MW transfer limit

Figure 2.1 Two zone system
Congestion management can be defined as the comprehensive set of

actions or procedures taken to avoid or relieve congestion. More broadly,

congestion management can be considered as any systematic approach used in
scheduling and matching generation and loads in order to manage congestion.
Congestion management is relatively simple in vertical integrated company.
This is because in VIC, the economic load dispatch was normally formulated
as an OPF problem with the objective of minimizing total generation cost
subject to, generation lower and upper limits, bus voltage limits, power flow
limits of lines and transformers etc. Congestion was therefore intrinsically
managed at the dispatch stage. In the deregulated market, congestion is likely
to occur more often, since the market for the selling and buying of energy
may be settled without the constraints of the power system imposed.

18

The ensuing generation schedules may result in some transmission paths

being congested. Congestion management remains the central issue in
transmission management in deregulated power systems.
More often than not, pool market results originate network
congestion problems, and the independent system operator in a competitive
electricity market is responsible for determining the necessary actions to
ensure that no violations of the grid constraints occur. In all the market
mechanisms, the ISO has to execute the schedules and ensure the reliability
and security as well as handling the emergencies like congestion in the
system.
Congestion management can be broadly classified into two types:
Technical methods and Non-technical methods.
The technical methods principally consist of the following methods.
Use of phase shifting transformers
Operation of FACTS devices
Out aging of congested lines
The classification of non-technical methods is as follows:
Market-based
Auctioning
Market splitting
Counter trading
Re-dispatching
Load curtailment
Nodal pricing
Zonal pricing

19

Non-market based
First come, first serve
Pro rata
2.4

PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this work, congestion management in a day-ahead electric energy

market based on a pool is considered. When congestion occurs in a pool after

market settlement, the ISO should determine the minimal changes in the
market results that ensure a secure operation. It should be noted that while the
time framework for the day-ahead electric energy market is 24 hours, the time
framework for congestion management is 1 hour, as congestion-relieving
actions are considered hour by hour. In this study it is considered that the pool
operator provides congestion free schedule of generation and load based on
the sellers and buyers bids of GENCOs and DISCOs i.e. the system is
considered as secure with initial market clearing values. Still, during
operation of power system congestion in transmission grids may occur due to
uncertainty of load or due to contingencies. The proposed work mainly
focuses on relieving congestion when overload occurs due to single line
outage and sudden change in load. Based on the incremental/decremented
price bids submitted by various GENCOs for congestion management, the
ISO finds the minimal re-dispatch of generators from the preferred schedules
in order to minimize the congestion management cost or to maximize the
social welfare.
2.4.1

Objective Function
The objective function of the congestion problem is formulated as

minimization of total congestion management cost by means of optimal

rescheduling of generators based on the price bids submitted by GENCOs.
Mathematically, this can be represented as detailed below:

20

Minimize

C u . P u C d P d ) $ / hr
k Ng k Gk k Gk

TC

(2.1)

where TC is the total cost for congestion management which is the total cost
incurred for adjusting real power generation of the participating generators by
the ISO for congestion management. This total cost is a measure of the
decrement in social welfare due to congestion management.
2.4.2

Constraints
Equality constraints

These constraints represent power flow equations as follows.

PGi PDi

Gi

Vi

Di

P
Gk

Pc
Gk

P
Dj

Pc ;
Dj

NB
j 1

V
i

V ( G ij Cos ij BijSin ij ); i 1,2,..., NB, i S

j

NB
j 1

Pu
Gk

B Cos ); i 1,2,..., Nd
V (G Sin
ij
ij
ij
j ij

P d ; k 1,2,..., Ng
Gk

j 1,2,..., Nd

(2.2)

(2.3)

(2.4)

(2.5)

Inequality constraints
The inequality constraints of the OPF reflect the limits on physical
devices in the power system as well as the limits created to ensure system
security.

21

min
PGk

PGk

min
Q Gk

Q Gk

P max ; k 1, 2,...., Ng
Gk
Q max ; k 1, 2,......, Ng
Gk

u
P max
Gk Gk

Pc
Gk

d
min
Pc
PGk
P
Gk
Gk

(2.6)

(2.7)

(2.8)

(2.9)

Security constraints:
For secure operation of power system, the real power flow in
transmission lines is limited by the power carrying capability, which is
determined by the thermal capacity of line or the surge impedance loading.
The security constraints express that branch real power is below its limit after
any specified contingency as well as in the base case:
Pij

P max ; i 1,2,.., NB; j 1,2,...NB

ij

(2.10)

where
P V [g (V
ij
i ij i

V cos ) b V sin ]
j
ij
ij j
ij

(2.11)

Voltage level at a load bus is maintained within a specific upper and

a lower limit, determined by the operator.

V
i

min

V
i

V
i

max

, i 1, 2,......, Nd

(2.12)

22

Equations (2.2) and (2.3) represent real and reactive power balances
in each bus. Equation (2.4) expresses final real power generation as a function
of market results and power increments/decrements to achieve a secure
operation. Equation (2.5) expresses real power demand as a function of
market clearing values. Equation (2.6) represents lower and upper bounds on
the active power generations at generator buses. Equation (2.7) represents
lower and upper bounds on the reactive power generations at generator buses.
Equation (2.8) represents lower and upper bounds for increment change in
generator real power. Equation (2.9) represents lower and upper bounds for
decrement change in generator real power. Equation (2.10) imposes
maximum line loading limit. Equation (2.11) expresses real power flow in
line i-j in terms of voltage magnitudes and phase angles and the parameters of
the transmission element. Equation (2.12) represents lower and upper bound
at load bus voltage.
2.4.3

Severity Index (SI)

Static security of a power system means that, after a disturbance, the

system reaches a steady state operating point without violating system

operating constraints called Security constraints. If any one constraint
violates, the system may experience disruption that could result in a black
out. The severity of a contingency related to line overload may be expressed
in terms of the following severity index, which expresses the stress on the
power system in the post contingency period (Devaraj and Yegnanarayana
2005).

Lo

Pk
SI
k 1 Pkmax

2n

(2.13)

23

2.4.4

Generator Sensitivity (GS) Factor

In a congested power system, the incremental or decremented

change in power outputs of all the generators do not affect the power flow on
the congested line to some extent. Hence, it is not necessary to reschedule the
outputs of generators whose generations have little impact to the congested
line flow. In this work, for large power systems, the participating generators
for congestion management are selected based on their sensitivities to the
congested line. The generators in the system under consideration have
different sensitivities to the flow on the congested line (Sudipta Dutta and
Singh, 2008). Generator sensitivity to congested line can be defined as the
ratio of change in real power in a transmission line k connected between bus i
and j to the change in power generation by generator g.
GS for line k can be expressed as

GSg

where

P
ij
P
Gg

(2.14)

Pij is the change in real power flow on congested line k connected

between bus i and j and PGg is the change in real power generated by the gth
generator.
GSg denotes how much active power flow over a transmission line
connecting buses i and j would change due to active power injection by
generator g.
The basic power flow equation (2.11) on congested line can be
written as
P
ij

V V g cos(
V 2 .g
i j ij
i
i ij

) V V b sin(
i j ij
i

(2.15)

24

GSg

P
ij

P
Gg

GSg

P
ij

a .m
ij ig

(2.16)

P
Gg

b m
ij jg

(2.17)

where

a ij

Pij

Vi V j

P
ij
ij

b
ij

m
ig

g sin(
ij
i

V V g sin(
i j ij
i

) b cos(
ij
i

) b cos(
ij
i

(2.18)

(2.19)

P
ij

(2.20)

(2.21)

P
Gg
j

jg

(2.22)

P
Gg

The active power injected at a bus p can be expressed as

Pp

P
Gp

P
Dp

(2.23)

where PDp is the active load at bus-p. Pp can be expressed as

Pp

NB
V
g cos p
p m 1 pm

P
p

V 2g pp
p

V
p

NB
m 1
m p

m + b pmsin p

g pm cos p

m Vm

b pmsin p

m Vm

(2.24)
(2.25)

25

Differentiating (2.25) with respect to

and

m,

the following

relations can be obtained:

Pp
m
Pp
p

Vp V g pm sin p
m

V
p

NB

g pmsin p

m 1
m S

b pm cos p

b pm cos p

m Vm

(2.26)

(2.27)

Neglecting P-V coupling, the relation between incremental change

in active power at system buses and the phase angles of voltages can be
written in matrix form as

(2.28)

where
P1

P1

P2

P2

P1

P2

NB

NB

.
.
PNB

.
.
PNB

.
.
PNB

(2.29)

NB

Thus

H 1 P
=M

(2.30)
(2.31)

where

H 1

(2.32)

26

To find the values of (

i)/(

PGg) and (

(2.16), [M] needs to be found out. Since

j)/(

PGg) in Equation

is a singular matrix of rank one

deficiency, it is not invertible. Hence, the elements of row and column

corresponding to slack bus of
H

can be eliminated to obtain a matrix

which can be inverted to obtain matrix

, where (.)-1 represents a

matrix with its row and column corresponds to slack bus deleted.
The actual vector

0
0

can be written as

0
M 1

(2.33)

Thus required elements of mig and mjg are found out from Equation (2.32).
It is to be noted that the sensitivity of the slack bus generator to any
congested line in the system is always zero. GSg denotes how much active
power flow over a transmission line connecting buses i and j would change
due to active power injection by generator g. The system operator selects the
generators which have non uniform and large magnitudes of sensitivity values
to the power flow on the congested line for congestion management.
2.4.5

Load Shedding
A power system continually experiences changes in its operating

state. The emergency state may occur as a result of a sudden increase in

system demand, the unexpected outage of a generator or a transmission line,
or a failure in any of the system components. Alleviation of the emergency
transmission line overload is a critical problem in power system operation and
a control action strategy is necessary to effectively reduce the line overloads
to the security limits in the minimum time. Hence, it is desirable to find a new

27

secure operating point with minimum control action, i.e. rescheduling of

generators with minimum deviation from the pre-adjustment state. When the
system enters into a state of non-correctable emergency, load shedding is the
last resort to avoid the risk due to thermal considerations.
In this work, alleviation of line overloads by optimal generation
rescheduling is the main concern. If overload is not relieved completely by
rescheduling, then load curtailment is made for power system restoration. If
Pk is the amount of power overload in line k connected between bus i and j,
then the load curtailed at bus j or bus i is

Pk. After rescheduling the real

power of load for relieving congestion, its reactive power is adjusted so that
the respective load power factor is maintained constant.
2.5

TEST SYSTEMS
To test the validity of the proposed methodology, the WSCC Nine

Bus System, IEEE30 Bus System and IEEE118 Bus System are considered as
test systems. Base case generations ( P c ) and demands ( P c ) of the respective
G

systems are taken as initial market clearing values. The systems are
considered as secure with initial market clearing values i.e. no overload in any
transmission lines and no violation of bus voltages.
2.5.1

WSCC Nine Bus System

This system consists of three generator buses, three load buses and

nine branches. System data are taken from [Zimmerman and Gan 1997]. The
total real and reactive power of load is 315 MW and 115 MVAR. Base case
generations and demands are taken as initial market clearing values. The
incremental or decremented price bids submitted by GENCOs for congestion
management are given in Table 2.1. These are the prices at which the
generators are willing to adjust their real power outputs. The incremental

28

price is taken as slightly greater than the corresponding marginal cost, and the
decremented price is taken as slightly lesser than the corresponding marginal
cost.
Table 2.1 Generator Price Bids-WSCC Nine Bus System

Gen. No.

Generator Price Bids ($/MWhr)

1
2

Cku
22
30

Ckd
20
28

23

21

Table 2.2 reports the maximum capacity of transmission line.

Table 2.2 Transmission line loading limit- WSCC Nine Bus System
Line no.

1-4

4-5

5-6

3-6

6-7

7-8

8-2

8-9

9-4

Line limit (MW)

94

40

77

111

31

97

212

112

53

2.5.2

IEEE30 Bus System

This system consists of 6 generator buses, 24 load buses and 41

branches. System data are taken from [Zimmerman and Gan 1997]. The total
real and reactive power of load is 283.4 MW and 126.2 MVAR. The upper
and lower limits for reactive power of generation are taken as 100 MVAR and
-30 MVAR. Price bids submitted by GENCOs for congestion management
and the initial market clearing values of generators
2.3. The line loading limits are given in Table 2.4.

(Pc )
Gk

are given in Table

29

Table 2.3 Generator Price Bids-IEEE30 Bus System

Gen. no.

Gen. Bus
no.

1
2
3
4
5
6

1
2
5
8
11
13

Generator Price Bids

($/MWhr)
u
Ck
Ckd
22
18
21
19
42
38
43
37
43
35
41
39

Pc
Gk
(MW)
138.59
57.56
24.56
35.00
17.93
16.91

Table 2.4 Transmission line loading limit- IEEE30 Bus System

Line
no.
1-2
1-3
2-4
3-4
2-5
2-6
4-6
5-7
6-7
6-8
6-9

2.5.3

Line
limit
(MW)
130
130
65
130
130
65
90
70
130
32
65

Line
no.
6-10
9-11
9-10
4-12
12-13
12-14
12-15
12-16
14-15
16-17
15-18

Line
limit
(MW)
32
65
65
65
65
32
32
32
16
16
16

Line
no.
18-19
19-20
10-20
10-17
10-21
10-22
21-22
15-23
22-24
23-24
24-25

Line
limit
(MW)
16
32
32
32
32
32
32
16
16
16
16

Line
no.
25-26
25-27
28-27
27-29
27-30
29-30
8-28
6-28

Line
limit
(MW)
16
16
65
16
16
16
32
32

IEEE118 Bus System

This system has 54 generators, 99 loads and 186 branches. Total

system load is 4242 MW and 1438 MVAR. System data are taken from
[Zimmerman and Gan 1997]. Initial generation values i.e. (PGc) are taken
from [Padiya Dutta and Sinha 2006]. The upper and lower limits for reactive
power of generation are taken as 100 MVAR and -30 MVAR. The price bids
submitted by GENCOs are given in Table 2.5 and the line loading limits are

30

given in Table 2.6. For all the test systems, the upper and lower bound for
load bus voltages are taken as 1.1p.u. and 0.9 p.u.
Table 2.5 Generator Price Bids- IEEE118 Bus System

Gen.
no.

Gen.
Bus no.

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27

1
4
6
8
10
12
15
18
19
24
25
26
27
31
32
34
36
40
42
46
49
54
55
56
59
61
62

Generator Price
Bids ($/MWhr)
Cku
Ckd
40
38
43
35
41
38
44
39
22
17
23
18
45
35
41
38
44
36
45
35
27
18
23
18
41
39
45
35
24
18
43
37
44
36
43
35
47
38
45
35
25
18
32
30
42
36
43
37
23
17
26
16
44
36

Gen.
no.

Gen.
Bus
no.

28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54

65
66
69
70
72
73
74
76
77
80
85
87
89
90
91
92
99
100
103
104
105
107
110
111
112
113
116

Generator Price
Bids ($/MWhr)
Cku
Ckd
25
17
26
18
28
15
43
39
47
38
44
36
43
39
44
36
47
38
23
15
43
39
25
17
44
36
42
38
41
38
44
36
43
37
42
36
24
17
44
38
43
39
42
38
43
37
22
18
42
38
47
33
45
35

31

Table 2.6 Transmission line loading limit-IEEE118 Bus System

Line no.

Line
limit
(MW)

Line
no.

Line
limit
(MW)

Line
no.

Line Line no.

limit
(MW)

Line
limit
(MW)

1-2

175

33-37

175

64-61

500

89-92

500

1-3

175

34-36

175

38-65

500

91-92

175

4-5

500

34-37

500

64-65

500

92-93

175

3-5

175

38-37

500

49-66

500

92-94

175

5-6

175

37-39

175

49-66

500

93-94

175

6-7

175

37-40

175

62-66

175

94-95

175

8-9

500

30-38

175

62-67

175

80-96

175

8-5

500

39-40

175

65-66

500

82-96

175

9-10

500

40-41

175

66-67

175

94-96

175

4-11

175

40-42

175

65-68

500

80-97

175

5-11

175

41-42

175

47-69

175

80-98

175

11-12

175

43-44

175

49-69

175

80-99

200

2-12

175

34-43

175

68-69

500

92-100

175

3-12
7-12
11-13
12-14
13-15
14-15
12-16
15-17
16-17
17-18
18-19
19-20
15-19
20-21
21-22

175
175
175
175
175
175
175
500
175
175
175
175
175
175
175

44-45
45-46
46-47
46-48
47-49
42-49
42-49
45-49
48-49
49-50
49-51
51-52
52-53
53-54
49-54

175
175
175
175
175
175
175
175
175
175
175
175
175
175
175

69-70
24-70
70-71
24-72
71-72
71-73
70-74
70-75
69-75
74-75
76-77
69-77
75-77
77-78
78-79

500
175
175
175
175
175
175
175
500
175
175
175
175
175
175

94-100
95-96
96-97
98-100
99-100
100-101
92-102
101-102
100-103
100-104
103-104
103-105
100-106
104-105
105-106

175
175
175
175
175
175
175
175
500
175
175
175
175
175
175

32

Table 2.6 (Continued)

22-23
23-24
23-25
26-25
25-27
27-28
28-29
30-17
8-30
26-30
17-31
29-31
23-32
31-32
27-32
15-33
19-34
35-36
35-37

2.6

175
175
500
500
500
175
175
500
175
500
175
175
140
175
175
175
175
175
175

49-54
54-55
54-56
55-56
56-57
50-57
56-58
51-58
54-59
56-59
56-59
55-59
59-60
59-61
60-61
60-62
61-62
63-59
63-64

175
175
175
175
175
175
175
175
175
175
175
175
175
175
500
175
175
500
500

77-80
77-80
79-80
68-81
81-80
77-82
82-83
83-84
83-85
84-85
85-86
86-87
85-88
85-89
88-89
89-90
89-90
90-91
89-92

500
500
175
500
500
200
200
175
175
175
500
500
175
175
500
500
500
175
500

105-107
105-108
106-107
108-109
103-110
109-110
110-111
110-112
17-113
32-113
32-114
27-115
114-115
68-116
12-117
75-118
76-118

175
175
175
175
175
175
175
175
175
500
175
175
175
500
175
175
175

CONCLUSION
Alleviation of the emergency transmission line overload is a critical

problem in power system operation. Hence, it is desirable to find a new secure

operating point with minimum control action, i.e. rescheduling of generators
with a little deviation from the pre-adjustment state. Since the congestion
management problem is formulated as a non-linear optimization problem with
more number of constraints, they cannot be directly solved by mathematical
methods. Hence, heuristic approach is essential. In this study, heuristics such
as EP, PSO, RCGA, HPSO and DE algorithms are developed. The feasibility
and robustness of the proposed method is tested on three test systems. It is

33

expected that DE gives better performances than the other approaches, since it
uses the differences of randomly sampled pairs of object vectors to guide the
mutation operation instead of using probability distribution functions as other
EAs. Furthermore, line overloads should be alleviated as fast as possible,
otherwise, it may lead to cascading outages. Hence, fast determination of line
overload is necessary in order to take necessary corrective actions. In this
study, intelligent cascade neural network is designed using BPN and RBF
training method. It is expected that the proposed CNN is able to classify the
overload cases correctly and can provide on-line operational aids to system
operators.