1. San Juan vs.

Civil Service Commisssion

GR No. 92299, 19 April 1991
Facts: The Provincial Budget Officer of Rizal
(PBO) was left vacant; thereafter Rizal
Governor San Juan, peititioner, nominated
Dalisay Santos for the position and the latter
quickly assumed position. However, Director
Abella of Region IV Department of Budget and
Management (DBM) did not endorse the
nominee,
and
recommended
private
respondent Cecilia Almajose as PBO on the
ground that she was the most qualified. This
appointment was subsequently approved by
the DBM. Petitioner protested the appointment
of Almajose before the DBM and the Civil
Service Commission who both dismissed his
complaints. His arguments rest on his
contention that he has the sole right and
privilege to recommend the nominees to the
position of PBO and that the appointee should
come only from his nominees. In support
thereof, he invokes Section 1 of Executive
Order No. 112.
Issue: Whether or not DBM is empowered to
appoint a PBO who was not expressly
nominated by the provincial governor.
Held: Under the cited Sec 1 of EO 112, the
petitioner's power to recommend is subject to
the qualifications prescribed by existing laws
for the position of PBO. Consequently, in the
event that the recommendations made by the
petitioner fall short of the required standards,
the appointing authority, public respondent
DBM is expected to reject the same. In the
event that the Governor recommends an
unqualified person, is the Department Head
free to appoint anyone he fancies?
Petitioner states that the phrase of said law:
"upon recommendation of the local chief
executive
concerned"
must
be
given
mandatory application in consonance with the
state policy of local autonomy as guaranteed
by the 1987 Constitution under Art. II, Sec. 25
and Art. X, Sec. 2 thereof. He further argues
that his power to recommend cannot validly be
defeated by a mere administrative issuance of

public respondent DBM reserving to itself the

right to fill-up any existing vacancy in case the
petitioner's nominees do not meet the
qualification requirements as embodied in
public respondent DBM's Local Budget Circular
No. 31 dated February 9, 1988.
This case involves the application of a most
important constitutional policy and principle,
that of local autonomy. We have to obey the
clear mandate on local autonomy. Where a law
is capable of two interpretations, one in favor
of centralized power in Malacaang and the
other beneficial to local autonomy, the scales
must be weighed in favor of autonomy.
The 1935 Constitution clearly limited the
executive power over local governments to
"general supervision . . . as may be provided by
law." The President controls the executive
departments. He has no such power over local
governments. He has only supervision and that
supervision is both general and circumscribed
by statute. The exercise of greater local
autonomy is even more marked in the present
Constitution. Article II, Section 25 provides:
"The State shall ensure the autonomy of local
governments"
Thereby, DBM Circular is ultra vires and is,
accordingly, set aside. The DBM may appoint
only from the list of qualified recommendees
nominated by the Governor. If none is qualified,
he must return the list of nominees to the
Governor explaining why no one meets the
legal
requirements
and
ask
for
new
recommendees who have the necessary
eligibilities and qualifications.
2. Limbona vs. Mangelin
GR No. 80391 28 February 1989
Facts: Petitioner, Sultan Alimbusar Limbona,
was elected Speaker of the Regional Legislative
Assembly or Batasang Pampook of Central
Mindanao (Assembly). On October 21, 1987
Congressman Datu Guimid Matalam, Chairman
of the Committee on Muslim Affairs of the
House of Representatives, invited petitioner in

his capacity as Speaker of the Assembly of

Region XII in a consultation/dialogue with local
government officials. Petitioner accepted the
invitation and informed the Assembly members
through the Assembly Secretary that there
shall be no session in November as his
presence was needed in the house committee
hearing of Congress. However, on November 2,
1987, the Assembly held a session in defiance
of the Limbona's advice, where he was
unseated from his position. Petitioner prays
that the session's proceedings be declared null
and void and be it declared that he was still the
Speaker of the Assembly. Pending further
proceedings of the case, the SC received a
resolution from the Assembly expressly
expelling petitioner's membership therefrom.
Respondents argue that petitioner had "filed a
case before the Supreme Court against some
members of the Assembly on a question which
should have been resolved within the confines
of the Assembly," for which the respondents
now submit that the petition had become
"moot and academic" because its resolution.
Issue: Whether or not the courts of law have
jurisdiction over the autonomous governments
or regions. What is the extent of selfgovernment
given
to
the
autonomous
governments of Region XII?
Held: Autonomy is either decentralization of
administration or decentralization of power.
There is decentralization of administration
when the central government delegates
administrative powers to political subdivisions
in order to broaden the base of government
power and in the process to make local
governments
"more
responsive
and
accountable". At the same time, it relieves the
central government of the burden of managing
local affairs and enables it to concentrate on
national concerns. The President exercises
"general supervision" over them, but only to
"ensure that local affairs are administered
according to law." He has no control over their
acts in the sense that he can substitute their
judgments with his own. Decentralization of
power, on the other hand, involves an
abdication of political power in the favor of
local governments units declared to be

autonomous. In that case, the autonomous

government is free to chart its own destiny and
shape its future with minimum intervention
from central authorities.
An autonomous government that enjoys
autonomy of the latter category [CONST.
(1987), Art. X, Sec. 15.] is subject alone to the
decree of the organic act creating it and
accepted principles on the effects and limits of
"autonomy."
On
the
other
hand,
an
autonomous government of the former class is,
as we noted, under the supervision of the
national government acting through the
President (and the Department of Local
Government). If the Sangguniang Pampook (of
Region XII), then, is autonomous in the latter
sense, its acts are, debatably beyond the
domain of this Court in perhaps the same way
that the internal acts, say, of the Congress of
the Philippines are beyond our jurisdiction. But
if it is autonomous in the former category only,
it comes unarguably under our jurisdiction. An
examination of the very Presidential Decree
creating the autonomous governments of
Mindanao persuades us that they were never
meant to exercise autonomy in the second
sense (decentralization of power). PD No. 1618,
in the first place, mandates that "[t]he
President shall have the power of general
supervision and control over Autonomous
Regions." Hence, we assume jurisdiction. And if
we can make an inquiry in the validity of the
expulsion in question, with more reason can we
review the petitioner's removal as Speaker.
This case involves the application of a most
important constitutional policy and principle,
that of local autonomy. We have to obey the
clear mandate on local autonomy.
Where a law is capable of two interpretations,
one in favor of centralized power in
Malacaang and the other beneficial to local
autonomy, the scales must be weighed in favor
of autonomy.
Upon the facts presented, we hold that the
November 2 and 5, 1987 sessions were invalid.
It is true that under Section 31 of the Region XII

Sanggunian Rules, "[s]essions shall not be

suspended or adjourned except by direction of
the Sangguniang Pampook". But while this
opinion is in accord with the respondents' own,
we still invalidate the twin sessions in question,
since at the time the petitioner called the
"recess," it was not a settled matter whether or
not he could do so. In the second place, the
invitation tendered by the Committee on
Muslim Affairs of the House of Representatives
provided a plausible reason for the intermission
sought. Also, assuming that a valid recess
could not be called, it does not appear that the
respondents called his attention to this
mistake. What appears is that instead, they
opened the sessions themselves behind his
back in an apparent act of mutiny. Under the
circumstances, we find equity on his side. For
this reason, we uphold the "recess" called on
the ground of good faith.
3. Abbas v. COMELEC
179 SCRA 287
Facts: Datu Firdausi Abbas, et.al. challenged
the
constitutionality
of
R.A.
6734
on
thefollowing grounds:1) R. A. 6734 conflicts
with the Tripoli Agreement (what conflicts the
case doesnt say)2) R. A. 6734 provides for the
unconditional creation of the ARMM and not
through the modeof a plebiscite as provided in
the Constitution3) The Constitution provides
that ARMM shall be approved by a majority of
votes cast in aplebiscite by all voters residing
in the provinces and cities affected, but R.A.
6734 says by amajority or votes cast by the
constituent units in a plebiscite and only those
provinces andcities where a majority of votes
cast in favor of the Organic Act shall be
included in theAutonomous Region. R.A. 6734
thus conflicts the Constitution4) R. A. 6734
includes provinces and cities which do not have
the same cultural andhistorical heritage and
other relevant characteristics needed for
admission to the ARMM5) R. A. 6734 violates
constitutional guarantee on freedom of
exercise of religion as some itsprovisions run
counter to the Koran6) The creation of an
Oversight Committee to supervise the transfer
of power to the ARMM iscontrary to the

constitutional mandate that the creation of the

autonomous region hingessolely on the result
of the plebiscite7)R. A. 6734 says that only
the provinces and cities voting favorably in
such plebisciteshall be included in the ARMM.
The provinces and cities which in the plebiscite
do not votefor inclusion in the Autonomous
Region
shall
remain
in
the
existing
administrativeregions: Provided however, that
the
President
may,
by
administrative
determination, mergethe existing regions. This
provision, Abbas claims, is contrary to the
Constitutional mandatethat, No province city,
municipality or barangay may be created,
divided, merged,abolishedor its boundary
substantially altered, except in accordance with
the
criteria
established
withthelocal
government code and subject to approval by a
majority of the votes cast in aplebiscite in the
unitsdirectly affected. (Art. 10, Sec. 10, 1987
Constitution)
Held: Abbas is wrong. Reasons:1) R. A. 6734 as
an enactment of Congress, is superior to the
Tripoli Agreement, being asubsequent law to
the Tripoli Agreement (though in my opinion it
wouldnt matter if R. A.6734 was prior to the
Tripoli Agreement)2) The transitory provisions
of R. A. 6734 does provide for a plebiscite (1
guess nobodyreads the transitory provisions)3)
The framers of the Constitution must have
intended that the majority of votes must
comefrom each of the constituent units and not
all the votes of the provinces and cities (I
couldntunderstand how the justices arrived at
this conclusion)4) It is not for the Court to
decide on the wisdom of the law concerning
the inclusion of provinces and cities which
Abbas claims should not be included in a
plebiscite5) There is no actual controversy yet
as to any violation of freedom of religion, only
apotential one6) The creation of an Oversight
Committee is merely procedural and in fact will
aid in thetimely creation of the ARMM7) The
power of the President to merge administrative
regions is inherent in his power of general
supervisionover local governments. Besides,
administrative regions are notterritorial or
political regions. Examples of administrative
regions are Regions I to XII and theNCR
4. Ordillo vs Comelec

(192 SCRA 100)

Facts: On January 30, 1990, the people of the
provinces of Benguet, Mountain Province,
Ifugao, Abra and Kalinga-Apayao and the city of
Baguio cast their votes in a plebiscite held
pursuant to Republic Act No. 6766 entitled An
Act Providing for an Organic Act for the
Cordillera Autonomous Region.
The
official
Commission
on
Elections
(COMELEC) results of the plebiscite showed
that the creation of the Region was approved
by a majority of 5,889 votes in only the Ifugao
Province and was overwhelmingly rejected by
148,676 votes in the rest of the provinces and
city above-mentioned.
Consequently, the COMELEC, on February 14,
1990, issued Resolution No. 2259 stating that
the Organic Act for the Region has been
approved and/or ratified by majority of the
votes cast only in the province of Ifugao.
the petitioner filed a petition with COMELEC to
declare the non-ratification of the Organic Act
for the Region. The petitioners maintain that
there can be no valid Cordillera Autonomous
Region in only one province as the Constitution
and Republic Act No. 6766 require that the said
Region be composed of more than one
constituent unit.
Issue: The question raised in this petition is
whether or not the province of Ifugao, being
the only province which voted favorably for the
creation of the Cordillera Autonomous Region
can, alone, legally and validly constitute such
Region.
Held: The sole province of Ifugao cannot validly
constitute the Cordillera Autonomous Region.
It is explicit in Article X, Section 15 of the 1987
Constitution. The keywords provinces,
cities, municipalities and geographical
areas connote that region is to be made
up of more than one constituent unit. The
term region used in its ordinary sense
means two or more provinces. This is
supported by the fact that the thirteen
(13) regions into which the Philippines is
divided for administrative purposes are
groupings of contiguous provinces. Ifugao

is a province by itself. To become part of a

region, it must join other provinces,
cities, municipalities, and geographical
areas. It joins other units because of their
common and distinctive historical and cultural
heritage, economic and social structures and
other
relevant
characteristics.
The
Constitutional requirements are not present in
this case.
Article III, Sections 1 and 2 of Republic Act No.
6766 provide that the Cordillera Autonomous
Region is to be administered by the Cordillera
government
consisting of the Regional
Government and local government units. It
further provides that:
SECTION 2. The Regional Government shall
exercise powers and functions necessary for
the proper governance and development of all
provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangay
or ili within the Autonomous Region . . .
From these sections, it can be gleaned that
Congress never intended that a single
province may constitute the autonomous
region. Otherwise, we would be faced
with the absurd situation of having two
sets of officials, a set of provincial
officials and another set of regional
officials exercising their executive and
legislative powers over exactly the same
small area.
5. MMDA vs Bel-Air Village Assoc.
March 27, 2000Puno, J.
Facts
Petitioner MMDA is a government agency
tasked with the delivery of basic services in
Metro
Manila.Respondent
Bel-Air
Village
Association, Inc. (BAVA) is a non-stock, nonprofit
corporation
whose
members
arehomeowners in Bel-Air Village, a private
subdivision in Makati City. Respondent BAVA is
the registered ownerof Neptune Street, a road
inside Bel-Air Village.On December 30, 1995,
respondent received from petitioner, through
its Chairman, a notice dated December22,
1995 requesting respondent to open Neptune
Street to public vehicular traffic starting
January 2, 1996.Actions Filed:

1. BAVA applied for injunction; trial court

issued temporary restraining order but after
due hearing,trial court denied the issuance of a
preliminary injunction.
2. BAVA appealed to CA which issued
preliminary injunction and later ruled that
MMDA has noauthority to order the opening of
Neptune Street, a private subdivision road and
cause the demolitionof its perimeter walls. It
held that the authority is lodged in the City
Council of Makati by ordinance.
3. MMDA filed motion for reconsideration but
was denied by CA; hence the current recourse.
Issues
1. Has the MMDA the mandate to open
Neptune Street to public traffic pursuant to its
regulatory andpolice powers?
2. Is the passage of an ordinance a condition
precedent before the MMDA may order the
opening of subdivision roads to public traffic?
Held
The MMDA is, as termed in the charter itself,
"development authority." All its functions are
administrative innature.The powers of the
MMDA are limited to the following acts:
formulation,
coordination,
regulation,implementation,
preparation,
management, monitoring, setting of policies,
installation of a system andadministration.
There is no syllable in R.A. No. 7924 that grants
the
MMDA
police
power,
let
alone
legislativepower.The MMDA has no power to
enact ordinances for the welfare of the
community. It is the local governmentunits,
acting through their respective legislative
councils that possess legislative power and
police power. Inthe case at bar, the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati City did not
pass any ordinance or resolution orderingthe
opening of Neptune Street, hence, its proposed
opening by petitioner MMDA is illegal and the
respondentCourt of Appeals did not err in so
ruling.The MMDA was created to put some
order in the metropolitan transportation system
but unfortunately thepowers granted by its
charter are limited. Its good intentions cannot
justify the opening for public use of aprivate
street in a private subdivision without any legal
warrant. The promotion of the general welfare

is notantithetical to the preservation of the rule

of law.
Dispositive
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is denied. The
Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appealsare affirmed.