NPC v.

CA
Facts:
At the height of the typhoon Kading, a flash flood covered the towns near the Angat Dam,
causing deaths and destructions to residents and their properties. Respondents blamed the
tragedy to the reckless and imprudent opening of the 3 floodgates by petitioner, without prior
warning to the residents within the vicinity of the dam. Petitioners denied the allegations and
contended that they have kept the water at a safe level, that the opening of floodgates was done
gradually, that it exercises diligence in the selection of its employees, and that written warnings
were sent to the residents. It further contended that there was no direct causal relationship
between the damage and the alleged negligence on their part, that the residents assumed the risk
by living near the dam, and that what happened was a fortuitous event and are of the nature of
damnum absque injuria.
Issues:
(1) Whether the petitioner can be held liable even though the coming of the typhoon is a
fortuitous event
(2) Whether a notice was sent to the residents
(3) Whether the damage suffered by respondents is one of damnum absque injuria
Held:
(1) The obligor cannot escape liability, if upon the happening of a fortuitous event or an act of
God, a corresponding fraud, negligence, delay or violation or contravention in any manner of the
tenor of the obligation as provided in Article 1170 of the Civil Code which results in loss or
damage. Even if there was no contractual relation between themselves and private respondents,
they are still liable under the law on quasi-delict. Article 2176 of the Civil Code explicitly
provides "whoever by act or omission causes damage to another there being fault or negligence
is obliged to pay for the damage done." Act of God or force majeure, by definition, are
extraordinary events not foreseeable or avoidable, events that could not be foreseen, or which,
though foreseen, are inevitable. It is therefore not enough that the event should not have been
foreseen or anticipated, as is commonly believed, but it must be one impossible to foresee or to
avoid. The principle embodied in the act of God doctrine strictly requires that the act must be
occasioned solely by the violence of nature. Human intervention is to be excluded from creating
or entering into the cause of the mischief. When the effect is found to be in part the result of the
participation of man, whether due to his active intervention or neglect or failure to act, the whole
occurrence is then humanized and removed from the rules applicable to the acts of God. In the
case at bar, although the typhoon "Kading" was an act of God, petitioners can not escape liability
because their negligence was the proximate cause of the loss and damage.

(2) The letter itself, addressed merely "TO ALL CONCERNED", would not strike one to be of
serious importance, sufficient enough to set alarm and cause people to take precautions for their
safety's sake. The notices were not delivered, or even addressed to responsible officials of the
municipalities concerned who could have disseminated the warning properly. They were
delivered to ordinary employees and policemen. As it happened, the said notices do not appear to
have reached the people concerned, which are the residents beside the Angat River. The plaintiffs
in this case definitely did not receive any such warning. Indeed, the methods by which the
defendants allegedly sent the notice or warning was so ineffectual that they cannot claim, as they
do in their second assignment of error, that the sending of said notice has absolved them from
liability.
(3) We cannot give credence to petitioners' third assignment of error that the damage caused by
the opening of the dam was in the nature of damnum absque injuria, which presupposes that
although there was physical damage, there was no legal injury in view of the fortuitous events.
There is no question that petitioners have the right, duty and obligation to operate, maintain and
preserve the facilities of Angat Dam, but their negligence cannot be countenanced, however
noble their intention may be. The end does not justify the means, particularly because they could
have done otherwise than simultaneously opening the spillways to such extent. Needless to say,
petitioners are not entitled to counterclaim.
SOUTHEASTERN COLLEGE vs. CA
G.R. No. 126389 July 10, 1998
Facts:
On October 11, 1989, powerful typhoon Saling hit Metro Manila. Buffeted by very strong
winds, the roof of Southeastern Colleges building was partly ripped off and blown away,
landing on and destroying portions of the roofing of private respondents Dimaanos house.
Private respondent alleged that the damage to their house rendered the same
uninhabitable, forcing them to stay temporarily in others houses.
An ocular inspection of the destroyed building was conducted by a team of engineers
headed by the city building official. The fourth floor of subject school building was declared
as a structural hazard.
Lower court awarded damages. CA affirmed but reduced damages.
Issue:
WON the damage of the PRs house resulting from the impact of the falling portions of the
school buildings roof ripped off was due to fortuitous event? NO

Held:
Private respondents, in establishing the culpability of petitioner, merely relied on the
aforementioned report submitted by a team which made an ocular inspection of petitioners
school building after the typhoon. As the term imparts, an ocular inspection is one by means
of actual sight or viewing. What is visual to the eye through is not always reflective of the
real cause behind.
Petitioners obtained a permit from the city building official before the construction of its
building. Having obtained both building permit and certificate of occupancy is prima facie
evidence of the regular and proper construction of subject school building. When part of its
roof needed repairs of the damage inflicted by typhoon Saling, the city engineer gave the
go-signal for such repairs without any deviation from the original design. It subsequently
authorized the use of the entire fourth floor of the same building. These only prove that
subject building suffers from no structural defect.
Petitioner presented its vice president for finance and administration who testified that an
annual maintenance inspection and repair of subject school building were regularly
undertaken. Petitioner was even willing to present its maintenance supervisor to attest to
the extent of such regular inspection but private respondents agreed to dispense with his
testimony and simply stipulated that it would be corroborative of the vice presidents
narration. Besides, no complaint regarding any defect on the same structure has ever been
lodged before his office prior to the institution of the case at bench. It is a matter of judicial
notice that typhoons are common occurrences in this country. If subject school buildings
roofing was not firmly anchored to its trusses, obviously, it could not have withstood long
years and several typhoons even stronger than Saling.
Petitioner has not been shown negligent or at fault regarding the construction and
maintenance of its school building in question and that typhoon Saling was the proximate
cause of the damage suffered by private respondents house.
PLEASANTVILLE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION VS. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. NO. 79688

253 SCRA 10

FEBRUARY 1, 1996

PONENTE: PANGANIBAN, J.
Doctrine: Good faith consists in the belief of the builder that he land he is building on is his and his
ignorance of any defect or flaw in his title. The burden of proving bad faith belongs to the one asserting it.

Facts: Edith Robillo purchased from Pleasantville Development Corporation, herein petitioner a parcel of
land at Pleasantville Subdivision, Bacolod City. The property was designated as Lot 9, Phase II. In 1975,
herein respondent Eldred Jardinico bought the said subject lot from the former purchaser. Eldred later
discovered that the property he purchased had improvements introduced therein by respondent Wilson
Kee.
Kee on the other hand bought on installments Lot 8 of the same subdivision from C.T. Torres
Enterprises, Inc. (CTTEI) which is the exclusive real estate agent of the petitioner. Under the contract Kee
was allowed to take possession of the property even before full payment of the price. CTTEI through an
employee, Zenaida Octaviano accompanied Kees wife Donabelle to inspect Lot No. 8. Octaviano
however mistakenly pointed towards Lot 9. Hence spouses Kee had their residence, an auto repair shop,
a store and other improvements constructed on the wrong lot.
Upon discovery of the blunder both Kee and Jardinico tried to reach an amicable settlement but
they failed. Jardinico demanded that the improvements be removed but as Kee refused, Jardinico filed a
complaint for ejectment with damages against Kee at the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of
Bacolod City. Kee filed a third-party complaint against herein petitioner and CTTEI.
The MTCC found that the error was attributable to CTTEI also since at present the contract with
Kee has rescinded for Kees failure to pay installments. Kee no longer had any right over the subject
property and must pay rentals for its use. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City ruled that
petitioner and CTTEI were not at fault or were not negligent. It argued that Kee was a builder in bad faith.
Even if assuming that he was in good faith, he was no longer so and must pay rentals from the time that
he was given notice to vacate the lot. The Court of Appeals ruled that Kee was a builder in good faith as
he was unaware of the mix-up when he constructed the improvements. It was in fact due to the
negligence and wrongful delivery of CTTEI which included its principal the herein petitioner. It further ruled
that the award of rental was without basis.
Pending the resolution of the case at the Court of Appeals Jardinico and Kee entered into a deed
of sale, wherein Lot 9 was sold to Kee. In the said deed a provision stating that regardless of the outcome
of the decision, such shall not be pursued by the parties and shall be considered dismissed and without
effect. The appellate court was not informed of this deal.
Issue: Whether or not a lot buyer who constructs improvements on the wrong property erroneously
delivered by the owners agent, a builder in good faith?

Held: Yes. Article 527 of the Civil Code provides the presumption that petitioner has the burden of proving
that Kee was a builder in bad faith. Kee may be made liable for the violation of the contract with CTTEI
but this may not be used as a basis of bad faith and as a sufficient ground to negate the presumption of
good faith. Jardinico is presently only allowed to file a complaint for unlawful detainer. Good faith is based
on the belief of the builder that the land he is building on is his and his ignorance of any flaw or defect in is
title. Since at the time when Kee constructed his improvements on Lot 8, he was not aware that it was
actually Lot 9 that was delivered to him. Petitioner further contends that Kee was negligent as a provision
in the Contract of Sale on Installment stated that the vendee must have personally examined the property
and shall bear on his own the consequential expenses in the changes that may happen thereon. The
court held that such provision cannot be interpreted as a waiver of the vendees right to recover damages
resulting from petitioners negligence. Such interpretation of the waiver is contrary to law and public policy
and cannot be allowed. Petitioner cannot claim and excuse itself from liability by claiming that it was not
directly involved in the delivery of the property. The principal must be responsible for the acts of the agent
done within the scope of his authority. CTTEI was the sole real estate representative of the petitioner
when the delivery was made. Wilson Kee is therefore declared a builder in good faith. Petitioner and
respondent CTTEI are declared solidarily liable for damages due to negligence. The award of rentals to
Jardinico is dispensed with.

Phoenix Construction v. IAC

Facts:
At about 1:30 a.m. on November 15, 1975, private respondent Leonardo Dionisio was on his
way home from cocktails and dinner meeting with his boss. He was proceeding down General
Lacuna Street when he saw a Ford dump truck parked askew, partly blocking the way of
oncoming traffic, with no lights or early warning reflector devices. The truck was driven earlier
by Armando Carbonel, a regular driver of the petitioner company. Dionisio tried to swerve his
car to the left, but it was too late. He suffered some physical injuries and nervous breakdown.
Dionision filed an action for damages against Carbonel and Phoenix Insurance. Petitioners
countered the claim by imputing the accident to respondents own negligence in driving at high
speed without curfew pass and headlights, and while intoxicated. The trial court and the Court of
Appeals ruled in favor of private respondent.
Issue:
Whether the collision was brought about by the way the truck was parked, or by respondents
own negligence
Held:

We find that private respondent Dionisio was unable to prove possession of a valid curfew pass
during the night of the accident and that the preponderance of evidence shows that he did not
have such a pass during that night. It is the petitioners' contention that Dionisio purposely shut
off his headlights even before he reached the intersection so as not to be detected by the police in
the police precinct which he (being a resident in the area) knew was not far away from the
intersection. We believe that the petitioners' theory is a more credible explanation than that
offered by private respondent Dionisio, i.e., that he had his headlights on but that, at the crucial
moment, these had in some mysterious if convenient way malfunctioned and gone off, although
he succeeded in switching his lights on again at "bright" split seconds before contact with the
dump truck. We do not believe that this evidence is sufficient to show that Dionisio was so
heavily under the influence of liquor as to constitute his driving a motor vehicle per se an act of
reckless imprudence. The conclusion we draw from the factual circumstances outlined above is
that private respondent Dionisio was negligent the night of the accident. He was hurrying home
that night and driving faster than he should have been. Worse, he extinguished his headlights at
or near the intersection of General Lacuna and General Santos Streets and thus did not see the
dump truck that was parked askew and sticking out onto the road lane.
Nonetheless, we agree with the Court of First Instance and the Intermediate Appellate Court that
the legal and proximate cause of the accident and of Dionisio's injuries was the wrongful or
negligent manner in which the dump truck was parked in other words, the negligence of
petitioner Carbonel. The collision of Dionisio's car with the dump truck was a natural and
foreseeable consequence of the truck driver's negligence.
The distinctions between "cause" and "condition" which the 'petitioners would have us adopt
have already been "almost entirely discredited. If the defendant has created only a passive static
condition which made the damage possible, the defendant is said not to be liable. But so far as
the fact of causation is concerned, in the sense of necessary antecedents which have played an
important part in producing the result it is quite impossible to distinguish between active forces
and passive situations, particularly since, as is invariably the case, the latter are the result of other
active forces which have gone before. Even the lapse of a considerable time during which the
"condition" remains static will not necessarily affect liability. "Cause" and "condition" still find
occasional mention in the decisions; but the distinction is now almost entirely discredited. So far
as it has any validity at all, it must refer to the type of case where the forces set in operation by
the defendant have come to rest in a position of apparent safety, and some new force
intervenes. But even in such cases, it is not the distinction between "cause" and "condition"
which is important but the nature of the risk and the character of the intervening cause.
We believe, secondly, that the truck driver's negligence far from being a "passive and static
condition" was rather an indispensable and efficient cause. The improper parking of the dump
truck created an unreasonable risk of injury for anyone driving down General Lacuna Street and
for having so created this risk, the truck driver must be held responsible. In our view, Dionisio's
negligence, although later in point of time than the truck driver's negligence and therefore closer
to the accident, was not an efficient intervening or independent cause.
The defendant cannot be relieved from liability by the fact that the risk or a substantial and
important part of the risk, to which the defendant has subjected the plaintiff has indeed come to

pass. Foreseeable intervening forces are within the scope original risk, and hence of the
defendant's negligence. The courts are quite generally agreed that intervening causes which fall
fairly in this category will not supersede the defendant's responsibility. Thus, a defendant who
blocks the sidewalk and forces the plaintiff to walk in a street where the plaintiff will be exposed
to the risks of heavy traffic becomes liable when the plaintiff is run down by a car, even though
the car is negligently driven; and one who parks an automobile on the highway without lights at
night is not relieved of responsibility when another negligently drives into it. We hold that
private respondent Dionisio's negligence was "only contributory," that the "immediate and
proximate cause" of the injury remained the truck driver's "lack of due care" and that
consequently respondent Dionisio may recover damages though such damages are subject to
mitigation by the courts.
Petitioners also ask us to apply what they refer to as the "last clear chance" doctrine. The
common law notion of last clear chance permitted courts to grant recovery to a plaintiff who had
also been negligent provided that the defendant had the last clear chance to avoid the casualty
and failed to do so. Accordingly, it is difficult to see what role, if any, the common law last clear
chance doctrine has to play in a jurisdiction where the common law concept of contributory
negligence as an absolute bar to recovery by the plaintiff, has itself been rejected, as it has been
in Article 2179 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Under Article 2179, the task of a court, in
technical terms, is to determine whose negligence - the plaintiff's or the defendant's - was the
legal or proximate cause of the injury. The relative location in the continuum of time of the
plaintiff's and the defendant's negligent acts or omissions, is only one of the relevant factors that
may be taken into account. Of more fundamental importance are the nature of the negligent act
or omission of each party and the character and gravity of the risks created by such act or
omission for the rest of the community. Our law on quasi-delicts seeks to reduce the risks and
burdens of living in society and to allocate them among the members of society. To accept the
petitioners' pro-position must tend to weaken the very bonds of society.
We believe that the demands of substantial justice are satisfied by allocating most of the damages
on a 20-80 ratio. Thus, 20% of the damages awarded by the respondent appellate court, except
the award of P10,000.00 as exemplary damages and P4,500.00 as attorney's fees and costs, shall
be borne by private respondent Dionisio; only the balance of 80% needs to be paid by petitioners
Carbonel and Phoenix who shall be solidarity liable therefor to the former. The award of
exemplary damages and attorney's fees and costs shall be borne exclusively by the petitioners.
Phoenix is of course entitled to reimbursement from Carbonel. 18 We see no sufficient reason for
disturbing the reduced award of damages made by the respondent appellate court.

Gatchalian v. Delim
Facts:

On July 11, 1973, petitioner Reynalda Gatchalian boarded as paying passenger a minibus
owned by respondents. While the bus was running along the highway, a snapping
sound was heard, and after a short while, the bus bumped a cement flower pot, turned
turtle and fell into a ditch. The passengers were confined in the hospital, and their bills
were paid by respondents spouse on July 14. Before Mrs. Delim left, she had the injured
passengers sign an already prepared affidavit waiving their claims against respondents.

Petitioner was among those who signed. Notwithstanding the said document, petitioner
filed a claim to recover actual and moral damages for loss of employment opportunities,
mental suffering and inferiority complex caused by the scar on her forehead.
Respondents raised in defense force majeure and the waiver signed by petitioner. The
trial court upheld the validity of the waiver and dismissed the complaint. The appellate
court ruled that the waiver was invalid, but also that the petitioner is not entitled to
damages.
Issues:
(1) Whether there was a valid waiver
(2) Whether the respondent was negligent
(3) Whether the petitioner is entitled to actual and moral damages
Held:
(1) We agree with the majority of the Court of Appeals who held that no valid waiver of
her cause of action had been made by petitioner. A waiver, to be valid and effective,
must in the first place be couched in clear and unequivocal terms which leave no doubt
as to the intention of a person to give up a right or benefit which legally pertains to him.
A waiver may not casually be attributed to a person when the terms thereof do not
explicitly and clearly evidence an intent to abandon a right vested in such person.
The circumstances under which the Joint Affidavit was signed by petitioner Gatchalian
need to be considered. Petitioner testified that she was still reeling from the effects of
the vehicular accident when the purported waiver in the form of the Joint Affidavit was
presented to her for signing; that while reading the same, she experienced dizziness but
that, seeing the other passengers who had also suffered injuries sign the document, she
too signed without bothering to read the Joint Affidavit in its entirety. Considering these
circumstances, there appears substantial doubt whether petitioner understood fully the
import of the Joint Affidavit (prepared by or at the instance of private respondent) she
signed and whether she actually intended thereby to waive any right of action against
private respondent.
Finally, because what is involved here is the liability of a common carrier for injuries
sustained by passengers in respect of whose safety a common carrier must exercise
extraordinary diligence, we must construe any such purported waiver most strictly
against the common carrier. To uphold a supposed waiver of any right to claim damages
by an injured passenger, under circumstances like those exhibited in this case, would be
to dilute and weaken the standard of extraordinary diligence exacted by the law from
common carriers and hence to render that standard unenforceable. We believe such a
purported waiver is offensive to public policy.
(2) In case of death or injuries to passengers, a statutory presumption arises that the
common carrier was at fault or had acted negligently "unless it proves that it [had]
observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733 and 1755." To overcome
this presumption, the common carrier must show to the court that it had exercised

extraordinary diligence to present the injuries. The standard of extraordinary diligence

imposed upon common carriers is considerably more demanding than the standard of
ordinary diligence. A common carrier is bound to carry its passengers safely "as far as
human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of a very cautious
person, with due regard to all the circumstances".
The records before the Court are bereft of any evidence showing that respondent had
exercised the extraordinary diligence required by law. The obvious continued failure of
respondent to look after the roadworthiness and safety of the bus, coupled with the
driver's refusal or neglect to stop the mini-bus after he had heard once again the
"snapping sound" and the cry of alarm from one of the passengers, constituted wanton
disregard of the physical safety of the passengers, and hence gross negligence on the
part of respondent and his driver.
(3) At the time of the accident, she was no longer employed in a public school. Her
employment as a substitute teacher was occasional and episodic, contingent upon the
availability of vacancies for substitute teachers. She could not be said to have in fact lost
any employment after and by reason of the accident. She may not be awarded damages
on the basis of speculation or conjecture.
Petitioner's claim for the cost of plastic surgery for removal of the scar on her forehead,
is another matter. A person is entitled to the physical integrity of his or her body; if that
integrity is violated or diminished, actual injury is suffered for which actual or
compensatory damages are due and assessable. Petitioner Gatchalian is entitled to be
placed as nearly as possible in the condition that she was before the mishap. A scar,
especially one on the face of the woman, resulting from the infliction of injury upon her,
is a violation of bodily integrity, giving raise to a legitimate claim for restoration to her
conditio ante.
Moral damages may be awarded where gross negligence on the part of the common
carrier is shown. Considering the extent of pain and anxiety which petitioner must have
suffered as a result of her physical injuries including the permanent scar on her
forehead, we believe that the amount of P30,000.00 would be a reasonable award.
Petitioner's claim for P1,000.00 as attorney's fees is in fact even more modest.

VICKY C. TY, petitioner, vs.

respondent.

PEOPLE

OF

THE

PHILIPPINES,

DECISION
TINGA, J.:

Petitioner Vicky C. Ty (Ty) filed the instant Petition for Review under Rule
45, seeking to set aside the Decision of the Court of Appeals Eighth Division
in
CA-G.R.
CR
No.
20995,
promulgated
on 31
July
2001. The Decision affirmed with modification the judgment of the Regional
[1]

Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 19, dated 21 April 1997, finding her guilty
of seven (7) counts of violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (B.P. 22),
otherwise known as the Bouncing Checks Law.
[2]

This case stemmed from the filing of seven (7) Informations for violation of
B.P. 22 against Ty before the RTC of Manila. The Informations were docketed
as Criminal Cases No. 93-130459 to No. 93-130465. The accusatory portion
of the Information in Criminal Case No. 93-130465 reads as follows:
That on or about May 30, 1993, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously make or draw and issue to
Manila Doctors Hospital to apply on account or for value to Editha L. Vecino Check
No. Metrobank 487712 dated May 30, 1993 payable to Manila Doctors Hospital in the
amount of P30,000.00, said accused well knowing that at the time of issue she did not
have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for payment of such check in
full upon its presentment, which check when presented for payment within ninety (90)
days from the date hereof, was subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for
Account Closed and despite receipt of notice of such dishonor, said accused failed to
pay said Manila Doctors Hospital the amount of the check or to make arrangement for
full payment of the same within five (5) banking days after receiving said notice.
Contrary to law.

[3]

The other Informations are similarly worded except for the number of the
checks and dates of issue. The data are hereunder itemized as follows:
Criminal Case No. Check No. Postdated Amount
93-130459 487710 30 March 1993 30,000.00
93-130460 487711 30 April 1993 P30,000.00
93-130461 487709 01 March 1993 P30,000.00
93-130462 487707 30 December 1992 P30,000.00
93-130463 487706 30 November 1992 P30,000.00
93-130464 487708 30 January 1993 P30,000.00

93-130465 487712 30 May 1993 P30,000.00

[4]

The cases were consolidated and jointly tried. At her arraignment, Ty

pleaded not guilty.
[5]

The evidence for the prosecution shows that Tys mother Chua Lao So Un
was confined at the Manila Doctors Hospital (hospital) from 30 October
1990 until 4 June 1992. Being the patients daughter, Ty signed the
Acknowledgment of Responsibility for Payment in the Contract of Admission
dated 30 October 1990. As of 4 June 1992, the Statement of Account shows
the total liability of the mother in the amount of P657,182.40. Tys sister, Judy
Chua, was also confined at the hospital from 13 May 1991 until 2 May 1992,
incurring hospital bills in the amount of P418,410.55. The total hospital bills of
the two patients amounted to P1,075,592.95. On 5 June 1992, Ty executed a
promissory note wherein she assumed payment of the obligation in
installments. To assure payment of the obligation, she drew several
postdated checks against Metrobank payable to the hospital. The seven (7)
checks, each covering the amount of P30,000.00, were all deposited on their
due dates. But they were all dishonored by the drawee bank and returned
unpaid to the hospital due to insufficiency of funds, with the Account Closed
advice. Soon thereafter, the complainant hospital sent demand letters to Ty by
registered mail. As the demand letters were not heeded, complainant filed the
seven (7)Informations subject of the instant case.
[6]

[7]

[8]

[9]

[10]

For her defense, Ty claimed that she issued the checks because of an
uncontrollable fear of a greater injury. She averred that she was forced to
issue the checks to obtain release for her mother whom the hospital
inhumanely and harshly treated and would not discharge unless the hospital
bills are paid. She alleged that her mother was deprived of room facilities,
such as the air-condition unit, refrigerator and television set, and subject to
inconveniences such as the cutting off of the telephone line, late delivery of
her mothers food and refusal to change the latters gown and bedsheets. She
also bewailed the hospitals suspending medical treatment of her mother. The
debasing treatment, she pointed out, so affected her mothers mental,
psychological and physical health that the latter contemplated suicide if she
would not be discharged from the hospital. Fearing the worst for her mother,
and to comply with the demands of the hospital, Ty was compelled to sign a
promissory note, open an account with Metrobank and issue the checks to
effect her mothers immediate discharge.
[11]

Giving full faith and credence to the evidence offered by the prosecution,
the trial court found that Ty issued the checks subject of the case in payment
of the hospital bills of her mother and rejected the theory of the defense.
Thus, on 21 April 1997, the trial court rendered a Decision finding Ty guilty
of seven (7) counts of violation of B.P. 22 and sentencing her to a prison
term. The dispositive part of the Decision reads:
[12]

CONSEQUENTLY, the accused Vicky C. Ty, for her acts of issuing seven (7) checks
in payment of a valid obligation, which turned unfounded on their respective dates of
maturity, is found guilty of seven (7) counts of violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22,
and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of SIX MONTHS per
count or a total of forty-two (42) months.
SO ORDERED.

[13]

Ty interposed an appeal from the Decision of the trial court. Before the
Court of Appeals, Ty reiterated her defense that she issued the checks under
the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of a greater injury or in avoidance of a
greater evil or injury. She also argued that the trial court erred in finding her
guilty when evidence showed there was absence of valuable consideration for
the issuance of the checks and the payee had knowledge of the insufficiency
of funds in the account. She protested that the trial court should not have
applied the law mechanically, without due regard to the principles of justice
and equity.
[14]

In its Decision dated 31 July 2001, the appellate court affirmed the
judgment of the trial court with modification. It set aside the penalty of
imprisonment and instead sentenced Ty to pay a fine of sixty thousand pesos
(P60,000.00) equivalent to double the amount of the check, in each case.
[15]

In its assailed Decision, the Court of Appeals rejected Tys defenses of

involuntariness in the issuance of the checks and the hospitals knowledge of
her checking accounts lack of funds.It held that B.P. 22 makes the mere act of
issuing a worthless check punishable as a special offense, it being a malum
prohibitum. What the law punishes is the issuance of a bouncing check and
not the purpose for which it was issued nor the terms and conditions relating
to its issuance.
[16]

Neither was the Court of Appeals convinced that there was no valuable
consideration for the issuance of the checks as they were issued in payment
of the hospital bills of Tys mother.
[17]

In sentencing Ty to pay a fine instead of a prison term, the appellate court

applied the case of Vaca v. Court of Appeals wherein this Court declared that
in determining the penalty imposed for violation of B.P. 22, the philosophy
underlying the Indeterminate Sentence Law should be observed, i.e.,
redeeming valuable human material and preventing unnecessary deprivation
of personal liberty and economic usefulness, with due regard to the protection
of the social order.
[18]

[19]

Petitioner now comes to this Court basically alleging the same issues
raised before the Court of Appeals. More specifically, she ascribed errors to
the appellate court based on the following grounds:
A. THERE IS CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE THAT PETITIONER WAS
FORCED TO OR COMPELLED IN THE OPENING OF THE ACCOUNT AND THE
ISSUANCE OF THE SUBJECT CHECKS.
B. THE
CHECKS
WERE
ISSUED
UNDER
THE
IMPULSE
OF
AN UNCONTROLLABLE FEAR OF A GREATER INJURY OR IN AVOIDANCE OF A
GREATER EVIL OR INJURY.
C. THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD PATENTLY SHOW[S] ABSENCE OF VALUABLE
CONSIDERATION IN THE ISSUANCE OFTHE SUBJECT CHECKS.
D. IT IS AN UNDISPUTED FACT THAT THE PAYEE OF THE CHECKS WAS FULLY
AWARE OF THE LACK OF FUNDS IN THE ACCOUNT.
E. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, AS WELL AS THE HONORABLE TRIAL
COURT [,] SHOULD NOT HAVE APPLIED CRIMINAL LAW MECHANICALLY,
WITHOUT DUE REGARD TO THE PRINCIPLES OF JUSTICE AND EQUITY.

In its Memorandum, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), citing

jurisprudence, contends that a check issued as an evidence of debt, though
not intended to be presented for payment, has the same effect as an ordinary
check; hence, it falls within the ambit of B.P. 22. And when a check is
presented for payment, the drawee bank will generally accept the same,
regardless of whether it was issued in payment of an obligation or merely to
guarantee said obligation. What the law punishes is the issuance of a
bouncing check, not the purpose for which it was issued nor the terms and
[20]

conditions relating to its issuance. The mere act of issuing a worthless check
is malum prohibitum.
[21]

We find the petition to be without merit and accordingly sustain Tys

conviction.
Well-settled is the rule that the factual findings and conclusions of the trial
court and the Court of Appeals are entitled to great weight and respect, and
will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of any clear showing that the
trial court overlooked certain facts or circumstances which would substantially
affect the disposition of the case. Jurisdiction of this Court over cases
elevated from the Court of Appeals is limited to reviewing or revising errors of
law ascribed to the Court of Appeals whose factual findings are conclusive,
and carry even more weight when said court affirms the findings of the trial
court, absent any showing that the findings are totally devoid of support in the
record or that they are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute serious abuse of
discretion.
[22]

[23]

In the instant case, the Court discerns no compelling reason to reverse the
factual findings arrived at by the trial court and affirmed by the Court of
Appeals.
Ty does not deny having issued the seven (7) checks subject of this
case. She, however, claims that the issuance of the checks was under the
impulse of an uncontrollable fear of a greater injury or in avoidance of a
greater evil or injury. She would also have the Court believe that there was no
valuable consideration in the issuance of the checks.
However, except for the defenses claim of uncontrollable fear of a greater
injury or avoidance of a greater evil or injury, all the grounds raised involve
factual issues which are best determined by the trial court. And, as previously
intimated, the trial court had in fact discarded the theory of the defense and
rendered judgment accordingly.
Moreover, these arguments are a mere rehash of arguments
unsuccessfully raised before the trial court and the Court of Appeals. They
likewise put to issue factual questions already passed upon twice below,
rather than questions of law appropriate for review under a Rule 45 petition.

The only question of law raisedwhether the defense of uncontrollable fear

is tenable to warrant her exemption from criminal liabilityhas to be resolved in
the negative. For this exempting circumstance to be invoked successfully, the
following requisites must concur: (1) existence of an uncontrollable fear; (2)
the fear must be real and imminent; and (3) the fear of an injury is greater
than or at least equal to that committed.
[24]

It must appear that the threat that caused the uncontrollable fear is of such
gravity and imminence that the ordinary man would have succumbed to it. It
should be based on a real, imminent or reasonable fear for ones life or limb.
A mere threat of a future injury is not enough. It should not be speculative,
fanciful, or remote. A person invoking uncontrollable fear must show
therefore that the compulsion was such that it reduced him to a mere
instrument acting not only without will but against his will as well. It must be
of such character as to leave no opportunity to the accused for escape.
[25]

[26]

[27]

[28]

[29]

In this case, far from it, the fear, if any, harbored by Ty was not real and
imminent. Ty claims that she was compelled to issue the checksa condition
the hospital allegedly demanded of her before her mother could be
dischargedfor fear that her mothers health might deteriorate further due to the
inhumane treatment of the hospital or worse, her mother might commit
suicide. This is speculative fear; it is not the uncontrollable fear contemplated
by law.
To begin with, there was no showing that the mothers illness was so lifethreatening such that her continued stay in the hospital suffering all its alleged
unethical treatment would induce a well-grounded apprehension of her
death. Secondly, it is not the laws intent to say that any fear exempts one from
criminal liability much less petitioners flimsy fear that her mother might commit
suicide. In other words, the fear she invokes was not impending or
insuperable as to deprive her of all volition and to make her a mere instrument
without will, moved exclusively by the hospitals threats or demands.
Ty has also failed to convince the Court that she was left with no choice
but to commit a crime. She did not take advantage of the many opportunities
available to her to avoid committing one. By her very own words, she admitted
that the collateral or security the hospital required prior to the discharge of her
mother may be in the form of postdated checks or jewelry. And if indeed she
[30]

was coerced to open an account with the bank and issue the checks, she had
all the opportunity to leave the scene to avoid involvement.
Moreover, petitioner had sufficient knowledge that the issuance of checks
without funds may result in a violation of B.P. 22. She even testified that her
counsel advised her not to open a current account nor issue postdated checks
because the moment I will not have funds it will be a big problem. Besides,
apart from petitioners bare assertion, the record is bereft of any evidence to
corroborate and bolster her claim that she was compelled or coerced to
cooperate with and give in to the hospitals demands.
[31]

Ty
likewise
suggests
in
the
prefatory
statement
of
her Petition and Memorandum that the justifying circumstance of state of
necessity under par. 4, Art. 11 of the Revised Penal Code may find application
in this case.
We do not agree. The law prescribes the presence of three requisites to
exempt the actor from liability under this paragraph: (1) that the evil sought to
be avoided actually exists; (2) that the injury feared be greater than the one
done to avoid it; (3) that there be no other practical and less harmful means of
preventing it.
[32]

In the instant case, the evil sought to be avoided is merely expected or

anticipated. If the evil sought to be avoided is merely expected or anticipated
or may happen in the future, this defense is not applicable. Ty could have
taken advantage of an available option to avoid committing a crime. By her
own admission, she had the choice to give jewelry or other forms of security
instead of postdated checks to secure her obligation.
[33]

Moreover, for the defense of state of necessity to be availing, the greater

injury feared should not have been brought about by the negligence or
imprudence, more so, the willful inaction of the actor. In this case, the
issuance of the bounced checks was brought about by Tys own failure to pay
her mothers hospital bills.
[34]

The Court also thinks it rather odd that Ty has chosen the exempting
circumstance of uncontrollable fear and the justifying circumstance of state of
necessity to absolve her of liability. It would not have been half as bizarre had
Ty been able to prove that the issuance of the bounced checks was done

without her full volition. Under the circumstances, however, it is quite clear that
neither uncontrollable fear nor avoidance of a greater evil or injury prompted
the issuance of the bounced checks.
Parenthetically, the findings of fact in the Decision of the trial court in the
Civil Case for damages filed by Tys mother against the hospital is wholly
irrelevant for purposes of disposing the case at bench. While the findings
therein may establish a claim for damages which, we may add, need only be
supported by a preponderance of evidence, it does not necessarily engender
reasonable doubt as to free Ty from liability.
[35]

As to the issue of consideration, it is presumed, upon issuance of the

checks, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that the same was issued
for valuable consideration. Section 24 of the Negotiable Instruments Law
creates a presumption that every party to an instrument acquired the same for
a consideration or for value. In alleging otherwise, Ty has the onus to prove
that the checks were issued without consideration. She must present
convincing evidence to overthrow the presumption.
[36]

[38]

[37]

[39]

A scrutiny of the records reveals that petitioner failed to discharge her

burden of proof. Valuable consideration may in general terms, be said to
consist either in some right, interest, profit, or benefit accruing to the party
who makes the contract, or some forbearance, detriment, loss or some
responsibility, to act, or labor, or service given, suffered or undertaken by the
other aide. Simply defined, valuable consideration means an obligation to
give, to do, or not to do in favor of the party who makes the contract, such as
the maker or indorser.
[40]

In this case, Tys mother and sister availed of the services and the facilities
of the hospital. For the care given to her kin, Ty had a legitimate obligation to
pay the hospital by virtue of her relationship with them and by force of her
signature on her mothers Contract of Admission acknowledging responsibility
for payment, and on the promissory note she executed in favor of the hospital.
Anent Tys claim that the obligation to pay the hospital bills was not her
personal obligation because she was not the patient, and therefore there was
no consideration for the checks, the case of Bridges v. Vann, et al. tells us
that it is no defense to an action on a promissory note for the maker to say
that there was no consideration which was beneficial to him personally; it is
[41]

sufficient if the consideration was a benefit conferred upon a third person, or a

detriment suffered by the promisee, at the instance of the promissor. It is
enough if the obligee foregoes some right or privilege or suffers some
detriment and the release and extinguishment of the original obligation of
George Vann, Sr., for that of appellants meets the requirement.Appellee
accepted one debtor in place of another and gave up a valid, subsisting
obligation for the note executed by the appellants. This, of itself, is sufficient
consideration for the new notes.
At any rate, the law punishes the mere act of issuing a bouncing check,
not the purpose for which it was issued nor the terms and conditions relating
to its issuance. B.P. 22 does not make any distinction as to whether the
checks within its contemplation are issued in payment of an obligation or to
merely guarantee the obligation. The thrust of the law is to prohibit the
making of worthless checks and putting them into circulation. As this Court
held in Lim v. People of the Philippines, what is primordial is that such issued
checks were worthless and the fact of its worthlessness is known to the
appellant at the time of their issuance, a required element under B.P. Blg. 22.
[42]

[43]

[44]

[45]

The law itself creates a prima facie presumption of knowledge of

insufficiency of funds. Section 2 of B.P. 22 provides:
Section 2. Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds. The making, drawing and
issuance of a check payment of which is refused by the drawee bank because of
insufficient funds in or credit with such bank, when presented within ninety (90) days
from the date of the check, shall be prima facie evidence of knowledge of such
insufficiency of funds or credit unless such maker or drawer pays the holder thereof
the amount due thereon, or makes arrangements for payment in full by the drawee of
such check within five (5) banking days after receiving notice that such check has not
been paid by the drawee.
Such knowledge is legally presumed from the dishonor of the checks for
insufficiency of funds. If not rebutted, it suffices to sustain a conviction.
[46]

[47]

Petitioner likewise opines that the payee was aware of the fact that she did
not have sufficient funds with the drawee bank and such knowledge
necessarily exonerates her liability.

The knowledge of the payee of the insufficiency or lack of funds of the

drawer with the drawee bank is immaterial as deceit is not an essential
element of an offense penalized by B.P. 22. The gravamen of the offense is
the issuance of a bad check, hence, malice and intent in the issuance thereof
is inconsequential.
[48]

In addition, Ty invokes our ruling in Magno v. Court of Appeals wherein

this Court inquired into the true nature of transaction between the drawer and
the payee and finally acquitted the accused, to persuade the Court that the
circumstances surrounding her case deserve special attention and do not
warrant a strict and mechanical application of the law.
[49]

Petitioners reliance on the case is misplaced. The material operative facts

therein obtaining are different from those established in the instant petition. In
the 1992 case, the bounced checks were issued to cover a warranty deposit
in a lease contract, where the lessor-supplier was also the financier of the
deposit. It was a modus operandi whereby the supplier was able to sell or
lease the goods while privately financing those in desperate need so they may
be accommodated. The maker of the check thus became an unwilling victim
of a lease agreement under the guise of a lease-purchase agreement. The
maker did not benefit at all from the deposit, since the checks were used as
collateral for an accommodation and not to cover the receipt of an actual
account or credit for value.
In the case at bar, the checks were issued to cover the receipt of an actual
account or for value. Substantial evidence, as found by the trial court and
Court of Appeals, has established that the checks were issued in payment of
the hospital bills of Tys mother.
Finally, we agree with the Court of Appeals in deleting the penalty of
imprisonment, absent any proof that petitioner was not a first-time offender nor
that she acted in bad faith.Administrative Circular 12-2000, adopting the
rulings in Vaca v. Court of Appeals and Lim v. People, authorizes the nonimposition of the penalty of imprisonment in B.P. 22 cases subject to certain
conditions. However, the Court resolves to modify the penalty in view of
Administrative Circular 13-2001 which clarified Administrative 12-2000. It is
stated therein:
[50]

[51]

[53]

[52]

The clear tenor and intention of Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 is not to remove
imprisonment as an alternative penalty, but to lay down a rule of preference in the
application of the penalties provided for in B.P. Blg. 22.
Thus, Administrative Circular 12-2000 establishes a rule of preference in the
application of the penal provisions of B.P. Blg. 22 such that where the circumstances
of both the offense and the offender clearly indicate good faith or a clear mistake of
fact without taint of negligence, the imposition of a fine alone should be considered as
the more appropriate penalty. Needless to say, the determination of whether
circumstances warrant the imposition of a fine alone rests solely upon the
Judge. Should the judge decide that imprisonment is the more appropriate penalty,
Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 ought not be deemed a hindrance.
It is therefore understood that: (1) Administrative Circular 12-2000 does
not remove imprisonment as an alternative penalty for violations of B.P. 22; (2)
the judges concerned may, in the exercise of sound discretion, and taking into
consideration the peculiar circumstances of each case, determine whether the
imposition of a fine alone would best serve the interests of justice, or whether
forbearing to impose imprisonment would depreciate the seriousness of the
offense, work violence on the social order, or otherwise be contrary to the
imperatives of justice; (3) should only a fine be imposed and the accused
unable to pay the fine, there is no legal obstacle to the application of the
Revised Penal Code provisions on subsidiary imprisonment.
[54]

WHEREFORE,
the
instant Petition is
DENIED
and
the
assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated 31 July 2001, finding
petitioner Vicky C. Ty GUILTY of violating Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 is
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Petitioner Vicky C. Ty is ORDERED to pay
a FINE equivalent to double the amount of each dishonored check subject of
the seven cases at bar with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency in
accordance with Article 39 of the Revised Penal Code. She is also ordered to
pay private complainant, Manila Doctors Hospital, the amount of Two Hundred
Ten Thousand Pesos (P210,000.00) representing the total amount of the
dishonored checks. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.