EN BANC This Court resolves a Petition for Review
on Certiorari 1 filed by Vivian A. Sanchez (Sanchez),
[G.R. No. 242257. October 15, 2019.]
IN THE MATTER OF PETITION FOR
WRIT OF AMPARO OF VIVIAN A.
SANCHEZ
VIVIAN A. SANCHEZ, petitioner, vs. PSUPT.
MARC ANTHONY D. DARROCA, Chief of
Police, San Jose Municipal Police Station;
PSSUPT. LEO IRWIN D. AGPANGAN,
Provincial Director, PNP-Antique; PCSUPT.
JOHN C. BULALACAO, Regional Director,
PNP-Region VI, and MEMBERS OF THE
PNP UNDER THEIR
AUTHORITY, respondents.
DECISION
LEONEN, J  : p officers, or they might suspect her and put her under
In determining whether a petition for a writ of amparo
should be granted, judges, as impartial inquisitors, must
assure themselves that there is no actual or future threat to the
petitioner's life, security, or liberty. Indeed, pursuing rebels is
a legitimate law enforcement objective, but the zeal with
which our law enforcement officers clamp down on persons
of interest or their loved ones must be bound by the
fundamental rights of persons.
assailing the Decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court, which
denied her Petition for a writ of amparo.
On August 16, 2018, Sanchez learned that her
estranged husband, Eldie Labinghisa (Labinghisa), was
among the seven (7) alleged members of the New People's
Army who were gunned down by the Philippine National
Police in Barangay Atabay, San Jose, Antique. 3
Upon discovering that the corpses were sent to St.
Peter's Funeral Home, Sanchez went there to verify the news
of her husband's death. At the funeral home, however, the
police officers stationed there took photos of her without her
permission. Fearing what the officers had done, she left
without being able to see or identify her husband's body. 4
A few hours after Sanchez had returned from the
funeral home, Police Officer 2 Nerissa A. De la Cruz (PO2
De la Cruz), a close friend of hers, informed her that her
photo was being circulated at the police station. The officer
urged her to tell the investigating officers her husband's name,
otherwise, they would go after her. 5 PO2 De la Cruz also
warned her to voluntarily cooperate with the investigating
surveillance. 6
The following day, Sanchez went back to the funeral
home, where she was confronted by three (3) police officers
who threatened to apprehend and charge her with obstruction
of justice if she refused to answer their questions. Again
fearing for her safety, Sanchez hurried home without
confirming the identity of her husband's body. 7
 Later that day, two (2) police officers went to
Sanchez's house and showed her a photo of a cadaver. She
confirmed the dead body as Labinghisa. 8
In the following days, Sanchez noticed the frequent
drive-bys of a police car in front of her house and a vehicle
that tailed her and her family when they went to Iloilo to
attend her husband's wake. 9 She also noticed someone
shadowing her when she was outside her house, causing her
to fear for her and her children's safety. 10
This fear was shared by her 15-year-old daughter,
Scarlet Labinghisa, who attested that the constant police
presence caused her anxiety as she worried for her mother's
security:
. . . (On that same night, after dinner and while we
were watching TV, I saw a patrol car pass by our
house twice that me and my younger sister was
puzzled and I began to feel nervous. We hurriedly
closed our gate and doors. Starting that night, I
already had trouble sleeping);
xxx xxx xxx
. . . (On August 17, 2018, around 3:00
o'clock (sic) in the morning, I woke up feeling tired
and nervous, but I continued preparing for school
when I saw a vehicle passing our house several
times but I just did not mind it. Around 6:00
o'clock (sic) in the morning, while
were (sic) waiting for our ride to school, a patrol car
passed in front of us, we hurriedly went inside our
house and observed what they will do);
xxx xxx xxx
. . . (While we were on our way to Dalipe, I
saw a vehicle following our ride but we
continuedon (sic), then when we were already on
our way to Iloilo, the same vehicle was still
following us);
xxx xxx xxx
. . . (From that time, I always feel anxious
for our security particularly that of my mother
because what will happen to me and my sister if she
will be gone, so my mother decided to seek help to
ensure our security)[.] 11
On August 24, 2018, Sanchez filed before the Regional
Trial Court of San Jose, Antique a Petition for Writ of
Amparo 12 against Police Superintendent Marc Anthony D.
Darroca (Police Superintendent Darroca), Police Senior
Superintendent Leo Irwin D. Agpangan, Police Chief
Superintendent John C. Bulalacao, and the police officers
under their authority.
Sanchez alleged that the police officers' constant
surveillance of her and her family made them fear for their
safety and prevented them from going out of their
house. 13 She pointed out that if the conduct of surveillance
and monitoring was for her and her family's safety, then the
police should have informed them of it beforehand. 14
In an August 28, 2018 Order, 15 the Regional Trial
Court issued a writ of amparo and a temporary protection
order. It also directed members of the Philippine National
Police to file a verified written return. The dispositive portion
of the Regional Trial Court Order read:
WHEREFORE, in consonance with Section
6 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC, also known as The Rule
on the Writ of Amparo, let a WRIT OF
AMPARO be issued, as follows:
1) ORDERING the RESPONDENTS to file
their verified written
RETURN within seventy-two (72)
hours after the service of this writ,
together with supporting affidavits,
which shall, among other things,
contain the following:
 a) The lawful defenses to show that the
respondent did not violate or
threaten with violation the right
to life, liberty and security of
the aggrieved party, through
any act or omission;
b) The steps or action taken by the
respondents to determine the
fate or whereabouts of the
aggrieved party and the person
or persons responsible for the
threat, act or omission;
c) All relevant information in the
possession of the respondents
pertaining to the threat, act or
omission against the aggrieved
party;
2) ORDERING the holding of a SUMMARY
HEARING of the petition
on September 04, 2018 [Tuesday]
at 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon in the
Session Hall of RTC Branch 12, Office
of the Executive Judge, Hall of Justice,
San Jose, Antique, and DIRECTING
the parties to personally appear thereat;
and
3) GRANTING a TEMPORARY
PROTECTION ORDER prohibiting
the respondents from going within a
radius of one kilometer from the
petitioner and her children, and to
REFRAIN the respondents from the
conduct of surveillance to the
petitioner and her children.
RELATIVE TO THE FOREGOING, Mr.
ELMER B. ESCAÑO, Branch Sheriff, under the
supervision of ATTY. MA. B.G. CANDIDA D.
RIVERO, Clerk of Court and Ex-Officio Provincial
Sheriff of this Court, is hereby directed to
PERSONALLY SERVE with DISPATCH this
WRIT to the respondents herein mentioned,
together with a copy of the Petition and its annexes.
Let copies of this WRIT be forthwith
furnished to Branch Sheriff Elmer B. Escaño, Atty.
Ma. BG Rivero, Atty. LV Jo T. Escartin and Atty.
Antonio A. Alcantara and petitioner Vivian A.
Sanchez, and let a separate copy hereof together
with a copy of the verified petition be served
personally upon all the respondents.
SO ORDERED. 16 (Emphasis in the
original)
In their Verified Return, 17 the police officers denied
violating or threatening to violate Sanchez and her family's
right to life, liberty, and security. 18 They stressed that
Sanchez's allegations were grounded on "baseless
assumptions, hearsay, mistaken belief, speculations,
impressions[,] and feelings[.]" 19
On September 4, 2018, a summary hearing was
conducted. 20
In a September 13, 2018 Decision, 21 the Regional
Trial Court dismissed the Petition for a writ of amparo.
The Regional Trial Court held that Sanchez failed to
substantiate her assertion that she became a person of interest
to the police after she had identified her husband's dead body.
This was because she was unable to specifically allege the
police officers' acts or the acts they sanctioned which
threatened her security and liberty. 22 The Regional Trial
Court stated:
Furthermore, there was scarcity of any
specific allegations that the public respondents had
 participated, authorized or at least sanctioned the
perceived threat to the petitioner's right to life,
liberty and security, and the evidence adduced thus
far, does not inspire a sensible and judicious
conclusion that a privilege of the Writ of Amparo is
justified. The petition consists merely of the
petitioner and her daughter's bare allegation of
monitoring and surveillance made by the police,
sans any corroborative evidence to support that she
was purposely singled out with the intention to
inflict harm, injury or damage, which thereby
threatened her security or a possible allusion to or
insinuation of extra-legal killing or enforced
disappearance. The court, at this point, cannot make
an enlightened deduction that it was really the
respondents who are responsible for the alleged
monitoring and surveillance, as no tangible
evidence was presented to prove such fact.
Assuming arguendo, that she and her daughters
were indeed tailed and monitored by the PNP, the
petitioner failed to offer any justification for the
said act, except her relationship with the deceased
Eldie Labinghisa and the latter's involvement with
the New People's Army, which rationale, at the very
least, is likely a mistaken belief. 23
The dispositive portion of the Regional Trial Court
Decision read:
DISPOSING THEREBY, the petitioner has
not sufficiently proven her instant Petition by
substantial evidence.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
Privilege of the Writ of Amparo is
hereby DENIED. Necessarily, the Temporary
Protection Order previously issued is LIFTED.
Let copies of this Decision be separately
furnished to Atty. Antonio A. Alcantara, Atty. LV
Jo T. Escartin, Atty. Connie T. Alian, Atty. Troy
Warren A. Cayanan, petitioner Vivian A. Sanchez,
and respondents PSupt. Mark Anthony D. Darroca,
PSSupt. Leo Irwin D. Agpangan and PCSupt. John
C. Bulalacao.
SO ORDERED. 24 (Emphasis in the
original)
Thus, Sanchez filed her Petition for Review
on Certiorari. 25 Before this Court, petitioner contends that
she was able to prove with substantial evidence that she and
her children were under constant police surveillance and
monitoring, which constitutes a clear violation of their right to
life, liberty, and security. She also insists that the police
officers' unauthorized taking and distribution of her photo was
likewise a violation of her right to privacy, which has caused
her great fear and anxiety. 26
Respondents were directed to comment 27 on the
Petition.
In their Comment, 28 respondents reiterate that
petitioner failed to prove that she was entitled to the grant of
the privilege of a writ of amparo, as her allegations against
them were unsubstantiated and merely speculative. 29 They
insist that as the wife of a member of the National People's
Army, she was a proper interview subject. They also claim
that taking her photo was merely part of the regular
investigation process. 30
Nonetheless, respondents denied that petitioner and her
children were under surveillance, or that they were tailed by
members of the police force. 31
Petitioner was directed 32 to reply to respondents'
Comment. However, she manifested 33 that she would not file
a reply, as respondents merely refuted the arguments she
raised in her Petition and did not raise any new issues. 34
 The sole issue for this Court's resolution is whether or
not petitioner Vivian A. Sanchez was able to prove with
substantial evidence her entitlement to the privilege of a writ
of amparo.
The Petition is meritorious.
I substantial evidence as "such evidence which affords a
The Rule on the Writ of Amparo was issued by this
Court as an exercise of its power to "promulgate rules
concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional
rights[.]" 35 Section 1 defines a petition for a writ of amparo
as "a remedy available to any person whose right to life,
liberty[,] and security is violated or threatened with violation
by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or
employee, or of a private individual or entity." The writ of
amparo is, thus, an equitable and extraordinary remedy
primarily meant to address concerns such as, but not limited
to, extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, or
threats thereof. 36
Section 17 37 of the Rule on the Writ of
Amparo specifies substantial evidence as the degree of proof
required of both parties to a petition. Section 18 further
reinforces the requirement of substantial evidence for the
petitioner to establish his or her allegations to warrant the
issuance of a writ of amparo:
SECTION 18. Judgment. — The court shall
render judgment within ten (10) days from the time
the petition is submitted for decision. If the
allegations in the petition are proven by substantial
evidence, the court shall grant the privilege of the
writ and such reliefs as may be proper and
appropriate; otherwise, the privilege shall be
denied. (Emphasis supplied)
In Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo, 38 this
Court explains that the remedy of a writ of amparo, being a
summary proceeding, requires only substantial evidence to
provide rapid judicial relief to the petitioner. 39 More than a
mere scintilla, substantial evidence is such relevant evidence
that a reasonable mind might determine as adequate to
support a conclusion. 40 In Philippine Metal Foundries, Inc.
v. Court of Industrial Relations, 41 this Court further defines
substantial basis from which the fact in issue can be
reasonably inferred." 42
Additionally, hearsay evidence, which is generally
considered inadmissible under the rules of evidence, may be
considered in a writ of amparo proceeding if required by the
unique circumstances of the case. 43 This Court in Razon, Jr.
v. Tagitis 44 concluded that the "totality of the obtaining
situation" 45 must be taken into consideration to determine if a
petitioner is entitled to a writ of amparo:
At this point, we need not go into another full
discussion of the justifications supporting an
evidentiary standard specific to the Writ of Amparo.
Suffice it to say that we continue to adhere to the
substantial evidence rule that the Rule on the Writ
of Amparo requires, with some adjustments for
flexibility in considering the evidence presented.
When we ruled that hearsay evidence (usually
considered inadmissible under the general rules of
evidence) may be admitted as the circumstances of
the case may require, we did not thereby dispense
with the substantial evidence rule; we merely
relaxed the evidentiary rule on the admissibility of
evidence, maintaining all the time the standards of
reason and relevance that underlie every evidentiary
situation. This, we did, by considering the totality of
the obtaining situation and the consistency of the
hearsay evidence with the other available evidence
in the case. 46 (Emphasis in the original)
 The totality of petitioner's evidence undoubtedly
showed that she became a person of interest after she had first
visited the funeral home, where her photo was taken. PO2 De
la Cruz tried to downplay the situation by claiming that
petitioner's photo was not "posted" in the police station, but
she likewise did not deny telling petitioner that she saw
petitioner's photo at the police station. 47 Whether petitioner's
photo was actually posted and distributed at the police station
or was just taken for future reference, the taking of the photo
bolsters petitioner's claims that she was being monitored by
the police.
Respondents try to paint petitioner's claims as the
ramblings of a paranoid and overly suspicious person, but
even her daughter confirmed the numerous times the police
drove by their house and being tailed whenever they set foot
outside their house. This shows that petitioner was not merely
imagining the threats against her and her family.
The totality of obtaining circumstances likewise shows
that petitioner and her children were the subject of
surveillance because of their relationship with a suspected
member of the New People's Army, creating a real threat to
their life, liberty, or security.
Being Labinghisa's widow, despite being separated in
fact from him for more than a decade, puts her at a precarious
position in light of the current administration's aggressive
efforts to stamp out the communist struggle in the country,
which is seen as the "scourge of society[.]" 48 Her
apprehension at being targeted as a suspected member of the
New People's Army was, thus, palpable and understandable,
causing her to "act suspiciously" as claimed by respondents,
who subjected her to threats and accusations.
Respondent Police Superintendent Darroca claims that
petitioner was only placed under general investigation
because they wanted to know the identity of the last
unclaimed cadaver. 49 However, the drive-bys and tailings
intensified after petitioner had identified her husband, belying
his assertions that their investigation was innocuous.
Further, petitioner's relationship with her husband
insulates her from any inquiries regarding Labinghisa's
purported membership in the New People's Army. Whatever
information respondents may hope to extract from her or her
children are protected by spousal and filial privileges, which
continue to exist even after Labinghisa's death.
II
Marriage 50 is an inviolable social institution and the
foundation of the family 51 which, in turn, is the foundation of
the nation. 52
In recognition of the significance of marriage to
Philippine society, testimonial privilege 53 and
communication privilege 54 have been granted to spouses.
This is to preserve their harmonious relationship and to
prevent any party, including a spouse, to take advantage of
the free communication between the spouses or of
information learned within the union.
This Court, in People v. Francisco, 55 explained the
reasons behind marital disqualification:
The rule contained in section 26 (d) of Rule
123 is an old one. Courts and text-writers on the
subject have assigned as reasons therefor the
following: First, identity of interest; second, the
consequent danger of perjury; third, the policy of
the law which deems it necessary to guard the
security and confidences of private life even at the
risk of an occasional failure of justice, and which
rejects such evidence because its admission would
lead to domestic disunion and unhappiness; and,
fourth, because where a want of domestic
[tranquility] exists, there is danger of punishing one
 spouse through the hostile testimony of the other.
This has been said in the case of Cargill vs.
State (220 Pac., 61, 6a; 25 Okl. Cr., 314; 35 A. L.
R., 133), thus:
"The reasons given by law
text-writers and courts why neither a
husband nor wife shall in any case be
a witness against the other except in
a criminal prosecution for a crime
committed by one against the other
have been stated thus: First, identity
of interests; second, the consequent
danger of perjury; third, the policy of
the law which deems it necessary to
guard the security and confidences of
private life even at the risk of an
occasional failure of justice, and
which rejects such evidence because
its admission would lead to domestic
disunion and unhappiness; and,
fourth, because, where a want of
domestic tranquillity exists, there is
danger of punishing one spouse
through the hostile testimony of the
other. (70 C. J., 119.)" 56
Therefore, the overriding consideration in the State's
support of marriage is the recognition of its status as an
inviolable social institution, with the State implicitly
acknowledging the importance of unfettered communication
between the spouses.
The family and its members likewise enjoy a similar
privilege. No one can be compelled to testify against his or
her direct descendants or direct ascendants. 57
Nonetheless, exceptions do exist to the general rule of
marital privilege or disqualification. Among these is when a
spouse commits an offense that "directly attacks, or directly
and vitally impairs, the conjugal relation[.]" 58 This Court
expounded in Francisco that when there is no more spousal
harmony to be preserved because of strained domestic
relations, the identity of interests and the danger of perjury
disappear, and the law's aim of protecting the security of
private life also ceases to exist. 59
None of the exceptions to marital privilege exist here.
Petitioner admits to being separated in fact from
Labinghisa for more than a decade. Yet, this does not suffice
as an exception, as separation is not tantamount to strained
marital relations. Further, neither spouse committed an
offense that impaired their conjugal union. Labinghisa's
supposed membership in the New People's Army is not an
offense envisioned by jurisprudence which would create an
exception to the general rule of marital disqualification.
Wives and children are not ordinary witnesses, as
evidenced by the privileges they enjoy against State incursion
into their relationships. Hence, respondents' surveillance of
petitioner and her children as witting or unwitting witnesses
against her husband or his activities is correctible by a writ of
amparo.
III
Similar to marital privilege, the right to privacy is also
a basic, fundamental right. The Constitution recognizes every
person's right to physical privacy, hence the explicit
limitations on unwarranted State intrusion into personal
affairs.
To safeguard against the enormous powers wielded by
the State and nip any potential abuse and interference into the
private sphere, the Constitution guarantees, among others,
every person's right to due process, 60 to be secure against
unreasonable searches and seizures, 61 and to the privacy of
their communication and correspondence. 62 The Civil
Code, 63 in turn, punishes with damages those who meddle
and pry into another person's private affairs.
This is why respondent Police Superintendent
Darroca's lack of contrition over his police officers' act of
taking petitioner's photo without her permission — and then
placing it on display at the police station — is disturbing. It
appears as though he sees nothing wrong in flagrantly and
inexcusably violating petitioner's right to privacy.
Petitioner was not a person of interest when she went
to the funeral parlor to identify her husband's body. Certainly,
the police officers stationed there did not know who she was.
Yet, they took her photo against her wishes and badgered her
into admitting her relationship with her husband, a suspected
member of the New People's Army.
Respondent Police Superintendent Darroca excused
the police officers' discourteous and threatening actions
toward a civilian by saying that such was merely part of the
investigation process and that the police officers acted in
good faith.
This Court is not convinced.
The Philippine National Police's Ethical Doctrine
Manual 64 enjoins its police officers to respect human dignity
and human rights, 65 and to judiciously use their authority in
the performance of duty. 66
The police officers' brusque treatment of petitioner,
threatening her with imprisonment and displaying her photo
at the police station, does not reflect the professional and
courteous image that the Philippine National Police wishes to
convey as an institution. What they did was clearly not part of
the usual investigation protocol. The police officers could not
be said to have acted in good faith when they ganged up on
and accosted a defenseless civilian.
Even the surreptitious surveillance of petitioner and
her family is an abuse of the Philippine National Police's
authority. If respondents wanted to interview petitioner and
her children, they should have done so formally: informing
them of their rights, holding the interview in an environment
free of intimidation, and making sure that they had access to
and were assisted by legal counsel or legal assistance groups.
Further, when a minor is being interviewed, the interviewer
should be specially trained to handle children.
Moreover, the Regional Trial Court erred in failing to
consider the gender and power issues at play here, and how
they affected the dynamics between the parties. Male police
officers were investigating and surveilling the widow and
daughter of an alleged communist, creating two (2) tiers of
power: (1) law enforcer-civilian; and (2) male-female.
The Philippine National Police Manual wishes to craft
the institution's image as a valiant peacekeeper dedicated to
ensuring public safety and community participation, 67 but the
bleak reality is that most people keep their guards up when
faced with a member of the police force. In a patriarchal
society where women have had to calibrate their responses
toward men, the additional layer of power presented by a man
in uniform would lead even an innocent civilian, especially a
woman, to act jittery and nervously, trying to find a way to
protect herself from her perceived vulnerabilities.
The gross imbalance in power dynamics makes it
understandable for petitioner to initially hesitate to reveal her
relationship with Labinghisa. As it turned out, she was correct
to do so, as the moment the police officers found out who she
was, she and her daughters became the subject of
surveillance.
In inferring conclusions involving power deficits in
relationships, judges must be careful not to be gender-blind.
In denying the Petition for the writ of amparo, the Regional
Trial Court echoed respondents' statement that the taking of
petitioner's photo and the threats of obstruction of justice
thrown at her were part of "the conduct of a logical
investigation." 68 It could not see, or it refused to see that
these actions, together with the surveillance done, were actual
or imminent threats against petitioner and her children.
In rendering judgment, judges must not impose a
standpoint viewed from their implicit status in society. They
must look beyond their status as well-connected people who
can assert themselves against men in uniform and who have
no filial relation to one tagged as a communist.
By advertently or inadvertently ignoring petitioner's
not so unique predicament as the spouse of a labeled
communist, the Regional Trial Court created standards that
would deny protection to those who need it most.
Petitioner's apprehension over the threat to her security
was duly supported by substantial evidence. It was further
corroborated by her daughter who also witnessed the constant
police drive-bys and the tailings done by an unmarked
vehicle. Thus, petitioner and her children deserve the
protection of a writ of amparo.
IV
Respondents' claim that the police officers reported
and asked for the investigation of the plate number of the car
that did the surveillance 69 should not have been enough for
the trial court. The trial court should have required a full
report from respondents. As compared with petitioner, they
had better, if not exclusive access to the information from the
Land Transportation Office.
In his Affidavit 70 attached to the Verified
Return, 71 respondent Police Superintendent Darroca denied
putting petitioner and her children under surveillance or
ordering his officers to follow them:
10. As regards the tinted vehicle with plate number
ALL 5385 who the petitioner alleged to have
followed her and her daughters to Iloilo City, I
categorically state that I have no knowledge about
it; Moreover, I have no knowledge about the alleged
call the petitioner received on August 22, 2018 nor I
did (sic) order any of my men to follow her or her
children[.] 72
However, his denial is not the lawful defense required
in a Verified Return, but a merely general denial, which is
proscribed in Section 9 73 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.
Further, he failed to show that he observed extraordinary
diligence in performing his duty, as required by Section 17 of
the Rule on the Writ of Amparo:
SECTION 17. Burden of Proof and Standard
of Diligence Required. — The parties shall establish
their claims by substantial evidence.
The respondent who is a private individual
or entity must prove that ordinary diligence as
required by applicable laws, rules and regulations
was observed in the performance of duty.
The respondent who is a public official or
employee must prove that extraordinary diligence
as required by applicable laws, rules and
regulations was observed in the performance of
duty.
The respondent public official or employee
cannot invoke the presumption that official duty has
been regularly performed to evade responsibility or
liability. (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner and her daughter categorically stated that
police cars have driven by their house with alarming
regularity after petitioner had identified her husband's body.
To this, respondent Police Superintendent Darroca only
issued a blanket denial that he did not direct his officers to tail
or monitor petitioner and her family. He did not present
affidavits from his police officers to support his claim.
Further, petitioner's report of being tailed by a vehicle only
merited a perfunctory request from the police to the Land
Transportation Office. The police, which had better resources
to perform the investigation, should have done more to follow
up her request. Their failure to exert the extraordinary
diligence expected of them hints at a motive against petitioner
and her family.
In granting the Petition for the writ of amparo, this
Court in Republic v. Cayanan 74 pointed out that the State, in
submitting its passive certificates, failed to comply with the
extraordinary diligence required of it by the Rule on the Writ
of Amparo:
In its return, the CIDG only attached passive
certificates issued by its operating divisions to the
effect that Pablo was not being detained by any of
them. Said certifications were severely inadequate.
It is almost needless to characterize the
certifications as non-compliant with the requirement
for a detailed return. As such, the certifications
amounted to a general denial on the part of the
CIDG. The quoted rule requires the verified written
return of the CIDG to be accompanied by
supporting affidavits. Such affidavits, which could
be those of the persons tasked by the CIDG and
other agencies like the NBI and probably the Land
Transportation Office (LTO) to collaborate in the
investigation of the abduction of Pablo, would have
specified and described the efforts expended in the
search for Pablo, if such search was really
conducted, and would have reported the progress of
the investigation of the definite leads given in the
Perez's sinumpaang salaysay on the abduction
itself. 75 (Emphasis in the original, citation omitted)
The proceedings for the issuance of writs of amparo
are extraordinary. They are significant not only in terms of
final relief. In determining whether the petition must be
granted, judges act as impartial inquisitors seeking to assure
themselves that there is no actual or future threat to the life or
liberty of petitioners. In a way, courts hearing writs of amparo
assist in ferreting out the truth by providing an antidote to the
naturally intimidating atmosphere of police investigations,
especially involving communist and other rebels against the
government.
The Rule on the Writ of Amparo was crafted in an era
when extrajudicial killings and involuntary disappearances
were on the rise allegedly due to the government's efforts to
defeat an insurgency. The Rule was, in part, this Court's
statement that the insurgents' narrative that fundamental rights
were not durable and universal at all times was false. It was
an affirmation of the belief that, perhaps unlike the rebels,
our Constitution protected civility and human rights, and that
this protection was what differentiated the government from
the insurgents. It was, and still is, a rule that underscores our
humanity and our civility.
While pursuing rebels is a legitimate law enforcement
objective, the zeal of our police must be bound by the
fundamental rights of persons, especially the loved ones of
persons of interest. After all, the values we have in
our Constitution are what differentiate us from lawless
elements.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED.
A PERMANENT PROTECTION ORDER is issued
prohibiting members of the Philippine National Police from
monitoring or surveilling petitioner Vivian A. Sanchez and
her children, Scarlet Sanchez Labinghisa and Star Sanchez
Labinghisa. The respondent police officers are reminded to
uphold the rights of citizens as contained in
 the Constitution as well as conduct investigations in MADRIAGA, EVERLY TAPUZ
accordance with their promulgated manuals including the MADRIAGA, EXCEL TAPUZ, IVAN TAPUZ
Ethical Doctrine Manual. AND MARIAN TIMBAS, petitioners, vs.
SO ORDERED. HONORABLE JUDGE ELMO DEL
ROSARIO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge
|||  (Sanchez v. Darroca, G.R. No. 242257, [October 15, 2019]) of RTC Br. 5 Kalibo, SHERIFF NELSON
DELA CRUZ, in his capacity as Sheriff of the
RTC, THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL
POLICE stationed in Boracay Island,
represented by the PNP STATION
COMMANDER, THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS IN CEBU 18th
DIVISION, SPOUSES GREGORIO SANSON
& MA. LOURDES T. SANSON, respondents.

RESOLUTION

BRION, J  :p

Before us for the determination of sufficiency of form

and substance (pursuant to Sections 1 and 4 of Rule 65 of the
Revised Rules of Court; Sections 1 and 5 of the Rule on the
Writ of Amparo;  1 and Sections 1 and 6 of the Rule on the
Writ of Habeas Data)  2 is the petition for certiorari and for
the issuance of the writs of amparo and habeas data filed by
the above-named petitioners against the Honorable Judge
Elmo del Rosario [in his capacity as presiding judge of RTC
EN BANC Br. 5, Kalibo], Sheriff Nelson de la Cruz [in his capacity as
Sheriff of the RTC], the Philippine National Police stationed
[G.R. No. 182484. June 17, 2008.] in Boracay Island, represented by the PNP Station
Commander, the Honorable Court of Appeals in Cebu, 18th
DANIEL MASANGKAY TAPUZ, AURORA Division, and the spouses Gregorio Sanson and Ma. Lourdes
TAPUZ-MADRIAGA, LIBERTY M. T. Sanson, respondents. aCIHAD

ASUNCION, LADYLYN BAMOS

 The petition and its annexes disclose the following
material antecedents:
The private respondents spouses Gregorio Sanson and
Ma. Lourdes T. Sanson (the "private respondents"), filed
with the Fifth Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Buruanga-
Malay, Aklan (the "MCTC" ) a complaint 3 dated 24 April
2006 for forcible entry and damages with a prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction against
the petitioners Daniel Masangkay Tapuz, Aurora Tapuz-
Madriaga, Liberty M. Asuncion, Ladylyn Bamos Madriaga,
Everly Tapuz Madriaga, Excel Tapuz, Ivan Tapuz and Marian
Timbas (the "petitioners") and other John Does numbering
about 120. The private respondents alleged in their complaint
that: (1) they are the registered owners under TCT No. 35813
of a 1.0093-hectare parcel of land located at Sitio Pinaungon,
Balabag, Boracay, Malay, Aklan (the "disputed land"); (2)
they were the disputed land's prior possessors when the
petitioners — armed with bolos and carrying suspected
firearms and together with unidentified persons numbering
120 — entered the disputed land by force and intimidation,
without the private respondents' permission and against the
objections of the private respondents' security men, and built
thereon a nipa and bamboo structure.  DCcHAa
In their Answer 4 dated 14 May 2006, the petitioners
denied the material allegations of the complaint. They
essentially claimed that: (1) they are the actual and prior
possessors of the disputed land; (2) on the contrary, the
private respondents are the intruders; and (3) the private
respondents' certificate of title to the disputed property is
spurious. They asked for the dismissal of the complaint and
interposed a counterclaim for damages.
The MCTC, after due proceedings, rendered on 2
January 2007 a decision 5 in the private respondents' favor. It
found prior possession — the key issue in forcible entry cases
— in the private respondents' favor, thus:
"The key that could unravel the answer to
this question lies in the Amended Commissioner's
Report and Sketch found on pages 245 to 248 of the
records and the evidence the parties have submitted.
It is shown in the Amended Commissioner's Report
and Sketch that the land in question is enclosed by a
concrete and cyclone wire perimeter fence in pink
and green highlighter as shown in the Sketch Plan
(p. 248). Said perimeter fence was constructed by
the plaintiffs 14 years ago. The foregoing findings
of the Commissioner in his report and sketch
collaborated the claim of the plaintiffs that after
they acquired the land in question on May 27, 1993
through a Deed of Sale (Annex 'A', Affidavit of
Gregorio Sanson, p. 276, rec.), they caused the
construction of the perimeter fence sometime in
1993 (Affidavit of Gregorio Sanson, pp. 271-275,
rec.). 
aICcHA
From the foregoing established facts, it
could be safely inferred that the plaintiffs were in
actual physical possession of the whole lot in
question since 1993 when it was interrupted by the
defendants  (sic)  when on January 4, 2005 claiming
to (sic) the Heirs of Antonio Tapuz entered a
portion of the land in question with view of
inhabiting the same and building structures therein
prompting plaintiff Gregorio Sanson to confront
them before BSPU, Police Chief Inspector Jack L.
Wanky and Barangay Captain Glenn Sacapaño. As
a result of their confrontation, the parties signed an
Agreement (Annex 'D', Complaint p. 20) wherein
they agreed to vacate the disputed portion of the
land in question and agreed not to build any
structures thereon.
 The foregoing is the prevailing situation of
the parties after the incident of January 4, 2005
when the plaintiff posted security guards, however,
sometime on or about 6:30 A.M. of April 19, 2006,
the defendants some with bolos and one carrying a
sack suspected to contain firearms with other John
Does numbering about 120 persons by force and
intimidation forcibly entered the premises along the
road and built a nipa and bamboo structure (Annex
'E', Complaint, p. 11) inside the lot in question
which incident was promptly reported to the proper
authorities as shown by plaintiffs' Certification
(Annex 'F', Complaint, p. 12) of the entry in the
police blotter and on same date April 19, 2006, the
plaintiffs filed a complaint with the Office of the
Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay Balabag,
Boracay Island, Malay, Aklan but no settlement was
reached as shown in their Certificate to File Action
(Annex 'G', Complaint, p. 13); hence the present
action. 
ETHCDS
Defendants' (sic) contend in their answer
that 'prior to January 4, 2005, they were already
occupants of the property, being indigenous settlers
of the same, under claim of ownership by open
continuous, adverse possession to the exclusion of
other (sic)'. (Paragraph 4, Answer, p. 25).
The contention is untenable. As adverted
earlier, the land in question is enclosed by a
perimeter fence constructed by the plaintiffs
sometime in 1993 as noted by the Commissioner in
his Report and reflected in his Sketch, thus, it is safe
to conclude that the plaintiffs where (sic) in actual
physical possession of the land in question from
1993 up to April 19, 2006 when they were ousted
therefrom by the defendants by means of force.
Applying by analogy the ruling of the Honorable
Supreme Court in the case of Molina, et al. vs. de
Bacud, 19 SCRA 956, if the land were in the
possession of plaintiffs from 1993 to April 19,
2006, defendants' claims to an older possession
must be rejected as untenable because possession as
a fact cannot be recognized at the same time in two
different personalities.
Defendants likewise contend that it was the
plaintiffs who forcibly entered the land in question
on April 18, 2006 at about 3:00 o'clock in the
afternoon as shown in their Certification (Annex 'D',
Defendants' Position Paper, p. 135, rec.). 
TIAEac
The contention is untenable for being
inconsistent with their allegations made to the
commissioner who constituted (sic) the land in
question that they built structures on the land in
question only on April 19, 2006 (Par. D.4,
Commissioner's Amended Report, pp. 246 to 247),
after there (sic) entry thereto on even date.
Likewise, said contention is contradicted by
the categorical statements of defendants' witnesses,
Rowena Onag, Apolsida Umambong, Ariel Gac,
Darwin Alvarez and Edgardo Pinaranda, in their
Joint Affidavit (pp. 143-'144,
rec.) [sic] categorically stated 'that on or about
April 19, 2006, a group of armed men entered the
property of our said neighbors and built plastic
roofed tents. These armed men threatened to drive
our said neighbors away from their homes but they
refused to leave and resisted the intruding armed
men'.
From the foregoing, it could be safely
inferred that no incident of forcible entry happened
on April 18, 2006 but it was only on April 19, 2006
when the defendants overpowered by their numbers
the security guards posted by the plaintiffs prior to
the controversy. 
acTDCI
 Likewise, defendants (sic) alleged burnt and
other structures depicted in their pictures attached as
annexes to their position paper were not noted and
reflected in the amended report and sketch
submitted by the Commissioner, hence, it could be
safely inferred that these structures are built
and (sic) situated outside the premises of the land in
question, accordingly, they are irrelevant to the
instant case and cannot be considered as evidence of
their actual possession of the land in question prior
to April 19, 2006." 6
The petitioners appealed the MCTC decision to the
Regional Trial Court ("RTC", Branch 6 of Kalibo, Aklan)
then presided over by Judge Niovady M. Marin ("Judge
Marin").
On appeal, Judge Marin granted the private
respondents' motion for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction through an Order dated 26 February
2007, with the issuance conditioned on the private
respondents' posting of a bond. The writ 7 — authorizing the
immediate implementation of the MCTC decision — was
actually issued by respondent Judge Elmo F. del Rosario
(the "respondent Judge") on 12 March 2007 after the private
respondents had complied with the imposed condition. The
petitioners moved to reconsider the issuance of the writ; the
private respondents, on the other hand, filed a motion for
demolition. 
TCaADS
The respondent Judge subsequently denied the
petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration and to Defer
Enforcement of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction in an
Order dated 17 May 2007. 8
Meanwhile, the petitioners opposed the motion for
demolition. 9 The respondent Judge nevertheless issued via a
Special Order 10 a writ of demolition to be implemented
fifteen (15) days after the Sheriff's written notice to the
petitioners to voluntarily demolish their house/s to allow the
private respondents to effectively take actual possession of
the land.
The petitioners thereafter filed on 2 August 2007 with
the Court of Appeals, Cebu City, a Petition for
Review 11 (under Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure) of the Permanent Mandatory Injunction and
Order of Demolition of the RTC of Kalibo, Br. 6 in Civil
Case No. 7990.
Meanwhile, respondent Sheriff Nelson R. dela Cruz
issued the Notice to Vacate and for Demolition on 19 March
2008. 12 
TEAaDC
It was against this factual backdrop that the petitioners
filed the present petition last 29 April 2008. The petition
contains and prays for three remedies, namely: a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court;
the issuance of a writ of habeas data under the Rule on the
Writ of Habeas Data; and finally, the issuance of the writ of
amparo under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.
To support the petition and the remedies prayed for,
the petitioners present factual positions diametrically opposed
to the MCTC's findings and legal reasons. Most importantly,
the petitioners maintain their claims of prior possession of the
disputed land and of intrusion into this land by the private
respondents. The material factual allegations of the petition
— bases as well of the petition for the issuance of the writ of
amparo — read:
"29. On April 29, 2006 at about 9:20 a.m.
armed men sporting 12 gauge shot guns intruded
into the property of the defendants [the land in
dispute]. They were not in uniform. They fired their
shotguns at the defendants. Later the following day
at 2:00 a.m. two houses of the defendants were
burned to ashes. 
EcHIAC
 30. These armed men [without uniforms]
removed the barbed wire fence put up by defendants
to protect their property from intruders. Two of the
armed men trained their shotguns at the defendants
who resisted their intrusion. One of them who was
identified as SAMUEL LONGNO y GEGANSO,
19 years old, single, and a resident of Binun-an,
Batad, Iloilo, fired twice.
31. The armed men torched two houses of
the defendants reducing them to ashes. [. . .]
32. These acts of TERRORISM and
(heinous crime) of ARSON were reported by one
of the HEIRS OF ANTONIO TAPUZ [. . .]. The
terrorists trained their shotguns and fired at
minors namely IVAN GAJISAN and MICHAEL
MAGBANUA, who resisted their intrusion.
Their act is a blatant violation of the law
penalizing Acts of Violence against women and
children, which is aggravated by the use of high-
powered weapons.
[. . .]
34. That the threats to the life and security of
the poor indigent and unlettered petitioners continue
because the private respondents Sansons have under
their employ armed men and they are influential
with the police authorities owing to their financial
and political clout. 
HSTAcI
35. The actual prior occupancy, as well as
the ownership of the lot in dispute by defendants
and the atrocities of the terrorists [introduced into
the property in dispute by the plaintiffs] are attested
by witnesses who are persons not related to the
defendants are therefore disinterested witnesses in
the case namely: Rowena Onag, Apolsida
Umambong, Ariel Gac, Darwin Alvarez and
Edgardo Penarada. Likewise, the affidavit of Nemia
T. Carmen is submitted to prove that the plaintiffs
resorted to atrocious acts through hired men in their
bid to unjustly evict the defendants." 13
The petitioners posit as well that the MCTC has no
jurisdiction over the complaint for forcible entry that the
private respondents filed below. Citing Section 33 of The
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended
by  Republic Act No. 7691, 14 they maintain that the forcible
entry case in fact involves issues of title to or possession of
real property or an interest therein, with the assessed value of
the property involved exceeding P20,000.00; thus, the case
should be originally cognizable by the RTC. Accordingly, the
petitioners reason out that the RTC — to where the MCTC
decision was appealed — equally has no jurisdiction to rule
on the case on appeal and could not have validly issued the
assailed orders. cDCHaS
OUR RULING
We find the petitions for certiorari and issuance of
a writ of habeas data fatally defective, both in substance
and in form. The petition for the issuance of the writ of
amparo, on the other hand, is fatally defective with
respect to content and substance.  SIcCEA
The Petition for  Certiorari
We conclude, based on the outlined material
antecedents that led to the petition, that the petition
for certiorari to nullify the assailed RTC orders has
been filed out of time. It is not lost on us that the petitioners
have a pending petition with the Court of Appeals (the "CA
petition") for the review of the same RTC orders now assailed
in the present petition, although the petitioners never
disclosedin the body of the present petition the exact status of
their pending CA petition. The CA petition, however, was
filed with the Court of Appeals on 2 August 2007, which
indicates to us that the assailed orders (or at the very least, the
latest of the interrelated assailed orders) were received on 1 misrepresentation before this Court and, at the very least, of
August 2007 at the latest. The present petition, on the other forum shopping.  ADcHES

hand, was filed on April 29, 2008 or more than eight months
from the time the CA petition was filed. Thus, the present
petition is separated in point of time from the assumed receipt
of the assailed RTC orders by at least eight (8) months, i.e.,
beyond the reglementary period of sixty (60) days 15 from
receipt of the assailed order or orders or from notice of the
denial of a seasonably filed motion for reconsideration. 
CcSEIH
We note in this regard that the petitioners' counsel
stated in his attached "Certificate of Compliance with
Circular #1-88 of the Supreme Court" 16 ("Certificate of
Compliance") that "in the meantime the RTC and the Sheriff
issued a NOTICE TO VACATE AND FOR DEMOLITION not
served to counsel but to the petitioners who sent photo copy
of the same NOTICE to their counsel on April 18, 2008 by
LBC." To guard against any insidious argument that the
present petition is timely filed because of this Notice to
Vacate, we feel it best to declare now that the counting of the
60-day reglementary period under Rule 65 cannot start from
the April 18, 2008 date cited by the petitioners' counsel. The
Notice to Vacate and for Demolition is not an order that exists
independently from the RTC orders assailed in this petition
and in the previously filed CA petition. It is merely a notice,
made in compliance with one of the assailed orders, and is
thus an administrative enforcement medium that has no life of
its own separately from the assailed order on which it is
based. It cannot therefore be the appropriate subject of an
independent petition for certiorari under Rule 65 in the
context of this case. The April 18, 2008 date cannot likewise
By the petitioners' own admissions, they filed a
petition with the Court of Appeals (docketed as CA — G.R.
SP No. 02859) for the review of the orders now also assailed
in this petition, but brought the present recourse to us,
allegedly because "the CA did not act on the petition up to
this date and for the petitioner (sic) to seek relief in the CA
would be a waste of time and would render the case moot and
academic since the CA refused to resolve pending urgent
motions and the Sheriff is determined to enforce a writ of
demolition despite the defect of LACK OF
JURISDICTION."  18
Interestingly, the petitioners' counsel — while making
this claim in the body of the petition — at the same time
represented in his Certificate of Compliance 19 that:
"xxx xxx xxx
(e) the petitioners went up to the Court of
Appeals to question the WRIT OF PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION copy of the petition is
attached (sic);
(f) the CA initially issued a resolution
denying the PETITION because it held that the
ORDER TO VACATE AND FOR
DEMOLITION OF THE HOMES OF
PETITIONERS is not capable of being the
subject of a PETITION FOR RELIEF, copy of
the resolution of the CA is attached
hereto; (underscoring supplied) 
IACDaS

be the material date for Rule 65 purposes as the above- (g) Petitioners filed a motion for
mentioned Notice to Vacate is not even directly assailed in reconsideration on August 7, 2007 but up to this
this petition, as the petition's Prayer patently shows. 17 date the same had not been resolved copy of the MR
is attached (sic).
Based on the same material antecedents, we find too
that the petitioners have been guilty of willful and deliberate xxx xxx xxx"
 The difference between the above representations on
what transpired at the appellate court level is replete with
significance regarding the petitioners' intentions. We discern
— from the petitioners' act of misrepresenting in the body of
their petition that "the CA did not act on the petition up to
this date" while stating the real Court of Appeals action in the
Certification of Compliance — the intent to hide the real state
of the remedies the petitioners sought below in order to
mislead us into action on the RTC orders without frontally
considering the action that the Court of Appeals had already
undertaken. EICSTa
At the very least, the petitioners are obviously seeking
to obtain from us, via the present petition, the same relief that
it could not wait for from the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 02859. The petitioners' act of seeking against the
same parties the nullification of the same RTC orders before
the appellate court and before us at the same time, although
made through different mediums that are both improperly
used, constitutes willful and deliberate forum shopping that
can sufficiently serve as basis for the summary dismissal of
the petition under the combined application of the fourth and
penultimate paragraphs of Section 3, Rule 46; Section 5, Rule
7; Section 1, Rule 65; and Rule 56, all of the Revised Rules of
Court. That a wrong remedy may have been used with the
Court of Appeals and possibly with us will not save the
petitioner from a forum-shopping violation where there is
identity of parties, involving the same assailed interlocutory
orders, with the recourses existing side by side at the same
time.
To restate the prevailing rules, "forum shopping is the
institution of two or more actions or proceedings involving
the same parties for the same cause of action,
either simultaneously or successively, on the supposition that
one or the other court would make a favorable disposition.
Forum shopping may be resorted to by any party against
whom an adverse judgment or order has been issued in one
forum, in an attempt to seek a favorable opinion in another,
other than by appeal or a special civil action for certiorari.
Forum shopping trifles with the courts, abuses their processes,
degrades the administration of justice and congest court
dockets. Willful and deliberate violation of the rule against it
is a ground for summary dismissal of the case; it may also
constitute direct contempt." 20 
ITESAc
Additionally, the required verification and certification
of non-forum shopping is defective as one (1) of the seven (7)
petitioners — Ivan Tapuz — did not sign, in violation of
Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 7; Section 3, Rule 46; Section 1,
Rule 65; all in relation with Rule 56 of the Revised Rules of
Court. Of those who signed, only five (5) exhibited their
postal identification cards with the Notary Public.
In any event, we find the present petition
for certiorari, on its face and on the basis of the supporting
attachments, to be devoid of merit. The MCTC correctly
assumed jurisdiction over the private respondents' complaint,
which specifically alleged a cause for forcible entry and not
— as petitioners may have misread or misappreciated — a
case involving title to or possession of realty or an interest
therein. Under Section 33, par. 2 of The Judiciary
Reorganization Act, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No.
7691, exclusive jurisdiction over forcible entry and unlawful
detainer cases lies with the Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.
These first-level courts have had jurisdiction over these cases
— called accion interdictal — even before the R.A.
7691 amendment, based on the issue of
pure physical possession (as opposed to the right of
possession). This jurisdiction is regardless of the assessed
value of the property involved; the law established no
distinctions based on the assessed value of the property forced
into or unlawfully detained. Separately from accion
interdictal are accion publiciana for the recovery of the right
of possession as a plenary action, and accion
reivindicacion for the recovery of ownership. 21 Apparently,
these latter actions are the ones the petitioners refer to when
they cite Section 33, par. 3, in relation with Section 19, par. 2
of The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended
by Republic Act No. 7691, in which jurisdiction may either
be with the first-level courts or the regional trial
courts, depending on the assessed value of the realty subject
of the litigation. As the complaint at the MCTC was patently
for forcible entry, that court committed no jurisdictional error
correctible by certiorari under the present petition.  aACEID
In sum, the petition for certiorari should be
dismissed for the cited formal deficiencies, for violation of
the non-forum shopping rule, for having been filed out of
time, and for substantive deficiencies.
The Writ of Amparo
To start off with the basics, the writ of amparo was
originally conceived as a response to the extraordinary rise in
the number of killings and enforced disappearances, and to
the perceived lack of available and effective remedies to
address these extraordinary concerns. It is intended to address
violations of or threats to the rights to life, liberty or security,
as an extraordinary and independent remedy beyond those
available under the prevailing Rules, or as a remedy
supplemental to these Rules. What it is not, is a writ to
protect concerns that are purely property or commercial.
Neither is it a writ that we shall issue on amorphous and
uncertain grounds. Consequently, the Rule on the Writ of
Amparo — in line with the extraordinary character of the writ
and the reasonable certainty that its issuance demands —
requires that every petition for the issuance of the writ must
be supported by justifying allegations of fact, to wit:  TCcSDE
"(a) The personal circumstances of the
petitioner;
(b) The name and personal circumstances of
the respondent responsible for the threat, act or
omission, or, if the name is unknown or uncertain,
the respondent may be described by an assumed
appellation;
(c) The right to life, liberty and security of
the aggrieved party violated or threatened with
violation by an unlawful act or omission of the
respondent, and how such threat or violation is
committed with the attendant circumstances
detailed in supporting affidavits;
(d) The investigation conducted, if any,
specifying the names, personal circumstances, and
addresses of the investigating authority or
individuals, as well as the manner and conduct of
the investigation, together with any report;
(e) The actions and recourses taken by the
petitioner to determine the fate or whereabouts of
the aggrieved party and the identity of the person
responsible for the threat, act or omission; and 
ESTcIA
(f) The relief prayed for.
The petition may include a general prayer
for other just and equitable reliefs." 22
The writ shall issue if the Court is preliminarily satisfied with
the prima facie existence of the ultimate facts determinable
from the supporting affidavits that detail the circumstances of
how and to what extent a threat to or violation of the rights to
life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party was or is being
committed.
The issuance of the writ of amparo in the present case
is anchored on the factual allegations heretofore
quoted, 23 that are essentially repeated in paragraph 54 of the
petition. These allegations are supported by the following
documents:
"(a) Joint Affidavit dated 23 May 2006 of
Rowena B. Onag, Apolsida Umambong, Ariel Gac,
Darwin Alvarez and Edgardo Pinaranda, supporting
the factual positions of the petitioners, id.,
petitioners' prior possession, private respondents'
intrusion and the illegal acts committed by the
private respondents and their security guards on 19
April 2006;  TSHIDa
(b) Unsubscribed Affidavit of Nemia
Carmen y Tapuz, alleging the illegal acts (firing of
guns, etc.) committed by a security guard against
minors — descendants of Antonio Tapuz;
(c) Unsubscribed Affidavit of Melanie
Tapuz y Samindao, essentially corroborating
Nemia's affidavit;
(d) Certification dated 23 April 2006 issued
by Police Officer Jackson Jauod regarding the
incident of petitioners' intrusion into the disputed
land;
(e) Certification dated 27 April 2006 issued
by Police Officer Allan R. Otis, narrating the
altercation between the Tapuz family and the
security guards of the private respondents, including
the gun-poking and shooting incident involving one
of the security guards;
(f) Certification issued by Police Officer
Christopher R. Mendoza, narrating that a house
owned by Josiel Tapuz, Jr., rented by a certain Jorge
Buenavente, was accidentally burned by a
fire." 
cSDHEC
On the whole, what is clear from these statements — both
sworn and unsworn — is the overriding involvement of
property issues as the petition traces its roots to questions of
physical possession of the property disputed by the private
parties. If at all, issues relating to the right to life or to liberty
can hardly be discerned except to the extent that the
occurrence of past violence has been alleged. The right to
security, on the other hand, is alleged only to the extent of the
threats and harassments implied from the presence of "armed
men bare to the waist" and the alleged pointing and firing of
weapons. Notably, none of the supporting affidavits
compellingly show that the threat to the rights to life,
liberty and security of the petitioners is imminent or is
continuing.
A closer look at the statements shows that at least two
of them — the statements of Nemia Carreon y Tapuz and
Melanie Tapuz are practically identical and unsworn. The
Certification by Police Officer Jackson Jauod, on the other
hand, simply narrates what had been reported by one Danny
Tapuz y Masangkay, and even mentions that the burning of
two residential houses was "accidental".  aCTHEA
As against these allegations are the cited MCTC
factual findings in its decision in the forcible entry case which
rejected all the petitioners' factual claims. These findings are
significantly complete and detailed, as they were made under
a full-blown judicial process, i.e., after examination and
evaluation of the contending parties' positions, evidence and
arguments and based on the report of a court-appointed
commissioner.
We preliminarily examine these conflicting factual
positions under the backdrop of a dispute (with incidents
giving rise to allegations of violence or threat thereof) that
was brought to and ruled upon by the MCTC; subsequently
brought to the RTC on an appeal that is still pending; still
much later brought to the appellate court without conclusive
results; and then brought to us on interlocutory incidents
involving a plea for the issuance of the writ of amparo that, if
decided as the petitioners advocate, may render the pending
RTC appeal moot.
Under these legal and factual situations, we are far
from satisfied with the prima facie existence of the ultimate
facts that would justify the issuance of a writ of amparo.
Rather than acts of terrorism that pose a continuing threat to
the persons of the petitioners, the violent incidents alleged
appear to us to be purely property-related and focused on the
disputed land. Thus, if the petitioners wish to seek redress and
hold the alleged perpetrators criminally accountable, the
remedy may lie more in the realm of ordinary criminal
prosecution rather than on the use of the extraordinary
remedy of the writ of amparo.  DcTAIH
Nor do we believe it appropriate at this time to disturb
the MCTC findings, as our action may carry the unintended
effect, not only of reversing the MCTC ruling independently
of the appeal to the RTC that is now in place, but also of
nullifying the ongoing appeal process. Such effect, though
unintended, will obviously wreak havoc on the orderly
administration of justice, an overriding goal that the Rule on
the Writ of Amparo does not intend to weaken or negate.
Separately from these considerations, we cannot fail
but consider too at this point the indicators, clear and patent to
us, that the petitioners' present recourse via the remedy of the
writ of amparo is a mere subterfuge to negate the assailed
orders that the petitioners sought and failed to nullify before
the appellate court because of the use of an improper remedial
measure. We discern this from the petitioners'
misrepresentations pointed out above; from their obvious act
of forum shopping; and from the recourse itself to the
extraordinary remedies of the writs of certiorari and amparo
based on grounds that are far from forthright and sufficiently
compelling. To be sure, when recourses in the ordinary course
of law fail because of deficient legal representation or the use
of improper remedial measures, neither the writ
of certiorari nor that of amparo — extraordinary though they
may be — will suffice to serve as a curative substitute. The
writ of amparo, particularly, should not issue when applied
for as a substitute for the appeal or certiorari process, or when
it will inordinately interfere with these processes — the
situation obtaining in the present case. DECSIT
While we say all these, we note too that the Rule on
the Writ of Amparo provides for rules on the institution of
separate actions, 24 for the effect of earlier-filed criminal
actions, 25 and for the consolidation of petitions for the
issuance of a writ of amparo with a subsequently filed
criminal and civil action. 26 These rules were adopted to
promote an orderly procedure for dealing with petitions for
the issuance of the writ of amparo when the parties resort to
other parallel recourses.
Where, as in this case, there is an ongoing civil process
dealing directly with the possessory dispute and the reported
acts of violence and harassment, we see no point in separately
and directly intervening through a writ of amparo in the
absence of any clear prima facie showing that the right to
life, liberty or security — the personal concern that the writ
is intended to protect — is immediately in danger or
threatened, or that the danger or threat is continuing. We see
no legal bar, however, to an application for the issuance of the
writ, in a proper case, by motion in a pending case on appeal
or on certiorari, applying by analogy the provisions on the
co-existence of the writ with a separately filed criminal
case. 
IaAScD
The Writ of Habeas Data
Section 6 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas
Data requires the following material allegations of ultimate
facts in a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas data:
 "(a) The personal circumstances of the
petitioner and the respondent;
(b)  The manner the right to privacy is
violated or threatened and how it affects the right
to life, liberty or security of the aggrieved party;
(c) The actions and recourses taken by the
petitioner to secure the data or information;
(d)  The location of the files, registers or
databases, the government office, and the person
in charge, in possession or in control of the data
or information, if known;
(e) The reliefs prayed for, which may
include the updating, rectification, suppression or
destruction of the database or information or files
kept by the respondent. aDcEIH
In case of threats, the relief may include a
prayer for an order enjoining the act complained of;
and
(f) Such other relevant reliefs as are just and
equitable."
Support for the habeas data aspect of the present
petition only alleges that:
"1. [ . . . ] Similarly, a petition for a WRIT
OF HABEAS DATA is prayed for so that the PNP
may release the report on the burning of the homes
of the petitioners and the acts of violence employed
against them by the private respondents, furnishing
the Court and the petitioners with copy of the same;
[...]
66. Petitioners apply for a WRIT OF
HABEAS DATA commanding the Philippine
National Police [PNP] to produce the police report
pertaining to the burning of the houses of the
petitioners in the land in dispute and likewise the
investigation report if an investigation was
conducted by the PNP."  SEHaTC
These allegations obviously lack what the Rule on
Writ of Habeas Data requires as a minimum, thus rendering
the petition fatally deficient. Specifically, we see no concrete
allegations of unjustified or unlawful violation of the right to
privacy related to the right to life, liberty or security. The
petition likewise has not alleged, much less demonstrated, any
need for information under the control of police authorities
other than those it has already set forth as integral annexes.
The necessity or justification for the issuance of the writ,
based on the insufficiency of previous efforts made to secure
information, has not also been shown. In sum, the prayer for
the issuance of a writ of habeas data is nothing more than
the "fishing expedition" that this Court — in the course of
drafting the Rule on habeas data — had in mind in
defining what the purpose of a writ of habeas data is not. In
these lights, the outright denial of the petition for the issuance
of the writ of habeas data is fully in order.  2upjur08
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby
DISMISS the present petition OUTRIGHT for deficiencies of
form and substance patent from its body and attachments.  aDcHIC
SO ORDERED.
Puno, C.J., Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Carpio,
Austria-Martinez, Corona, Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-Nazario,
Reyes and Leonardo-de Castro, JJ., concur.
Carpio-Morales, Velasco, Jr. and Nachura, JJ., are on
official leave.
 (Tapuz v. Del Rosario, G.R. No. 182484 (Resolution), [June 17,
|||
2008], 577 PHIL 636-658)
 PEREZ, J  :p

At bench is a Petition for Review

on Certiorari 1 assailing the Decision 2 dated 26 August 2009
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 00036-WRA — a
petition that was commenced jointly under the Rules on the
Writ of Amparo (Amparo Rule) and Habeas Data (Habeas
Data Rule). In its decision, the Court of Appeals extended to
the petitioner, Melissa C. Roxas, the privilege of the writs
of amparo and habeas data but denied the latter's prayers for
an inspection order, production order and return of specified
personal belongings. The fallo of the decision reads:
EN BANC WHEREFORE, the Petition is PARTIALLY
MERITORIOUS. This Court hereby grants Petitioner
the privilege of the Writ of Amparo and Habeas
[G.R. No. 189155. September 7, 2010.]
Data.

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR Accordingly, Respondents are enjoined to

THE WRIT OF AMPARO AND THE WRIT
OF HABEAS DATA IN FAVOR OF
MELISSA C. ROXAS,
MELISSA C. ROXAS, petitioner, vs. GLORIA
MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, GILBERT
TEODORO, GEN. VICTOR S. IBRADO,
P/DIR. GEN. JESUS AME VERZOSA, LT.
GEN. DELFIN N. BANGIT, PC/SUPT. LEON
NILO A. DELA CRUZ, MAJ. GEN. RALPH
VILLANUEVA, PS/SUPT. RUDY GAMIDO
LACADIN, AND CERTAIN PERSONS WHO
GO BY THE NAME[S] DEX, RC AND
ROSE, respondents.
DECISION
refrain from distributing or causing the distribution to
the public of any records in whatever form, reports,
documents or similar papers relative to Petitioner's
Melissa C. Roxas, and/or Melissa Roxas; alleged ties
to the CPP-NPA or pertinently related to the
complained incident. Petitioner's prayers for an
inspection order, production order and for the return
of the specified personal belongings are denied for
lack of merit. Although there is no evidence that
Respondents are responsible for the abduction,
detention or torture of the Petitioner, said
Respondents pursuant to their legally mandated duties
are, nonetheless, ordered to continue/complete the
investigation of this incident with the end in view of
prosecuting those who are responsible. Respondents
are also ordered to provide protection to the Petitioner
and her family while in the Philippines against any
and all forms of harassment, intimidation and
coercion as may be relevant to the grant of these
reliefs. 3
 We begin with the petitioner's allegations.
Petitioner is an American citizen of Filipino
descent. 4 While in the United States, petitioner enrolled in an
exposure program to the Philippines with the group Bagong
Alyansang Makabayan-United States of America (BAYAN-
USA) of which she is a member. 5 During the course of her
immersion, petitioner toured various provinces and towns of
Central Luzon and, in April of 2009, she volunteered to join
members of BAYAN-Tarlac 6 in conducting an initial health
survey in La Paz, Tarlac for a future medical mission. 7
In pursuit of her volunteer work, petitioner brought her
passport, wallet with Fifteen Thousand Pesos (P15,000.00) in
cash, journal, digital camera with memory card, laptop
computer, external hard disk, IPOD, 8 wristwatch,
sphygmomanometer, stethoscope and medicines. 9
After doing survey work on 19 May 2009, petitioner
and her companions, Juanito Carabeo (Carabeo) and John
Edward Jandoc (Jandoc), decided to rest in the house of one
Mr. Jesus Paolo (Mr. Paolo) in Sitio Bagong
Sikat, Barangay Kapanikian, La Paz, Tarlac. 10 At around
1:30 in the afternoon, however, petitioner, her companions
and Mr. Paolo were startled by the loud sounds of someone
banging at the front door and a voice demanding that they
open up. 11
Suddenly, fifteen (15) heavily armed men forcibly
opened the door, barged inside and ordered petitioner and her
companions to lie on the ground face down. 12 The armed
men were all in civilian clothes and, with the exception of
their leader, were also wearing bonnets to conceal their
faces. 13
Petitioner tried to protest the intrusion, but five (5) of
the armed men ganged up on her and tied her hands. 14 At this
juncture, petitioner saw the other armed men herding Carabeo
and Jandoc, already blindfolded and taped at their mouths, to
a nearby blue van. Petitioner started to shout her
name. 15 Against her vigorous resistance, the armed men
dragged petitioner towards the van — bruising her arms, legs
and knees. 16 Once inside the van, but before she can be
blindfolded, petitioner was able to see the face of one of the
armed men sitting beside her. 17 The van then sped away.
After about an hour of traveling, the van
stopped. 18 Petitioner, Carabeo and Jandoc were ordered to
alight. 19 After she was informed that she is being detained for
being a member of the Communist Party of the Philippines-
New People's Army (CPP-NPA), petitioner was separated
from her companions and was escorted to a room that she
believed was a jail cell from the sound of its metal
doors. 20 From there, she could hear the sounds of gunfire, the
noise of planes taking off and landing and some construction
bustle. 21 She inferred that she was taken to the military camp
of Fort Magsaysay in Laur, Nueva Ecija. 22
What followed was five (5) straight days of
interrogation coupled with torture. 23 The thrust of the
interrogations was to convince petitioner to abandon her
communist beliefs in favor of returning to "the fold." 24 The
torture, on the other hand, consisted of taunting, choking,
boxing and suffocating the petitioner. 25
Throughout the entirety of her ordeal, petitioner was
made to suffer in blindfolds even in her sleep. 26 Petitioner
was only relieved of her blindfolds when she was allowed to
take a bath, during which she became acquainted with a
woman named "Rose" who bathed her. 27 There were also a
few times when she cheated her blindfold and was able to
peek at her surroundings. 28
Despite being deprived of sight, however, petitioner
was still able to learn the names of three of her interrogators
who introduced themselves to her as "Dex," "James" and
"RC." 29 "RC" even told petitioner that those who tortured her
came from the "Special Operations Group," and that she was
abducted because her name is included in the "Order of
Battle." 30
On 25 May 2009, petitioner was finally released and
returned to her uncle's house in Quezon City. 31 Before being
released, however, the abductors gave petitioner a cellular
phone with a SIM 32 card, a slip of paper containing an e-mail
address with password, 33 a plastic bag containing biscuits
and books, 34 the handcuffs used on her, a blouse and a pair of
shoes. 35 Petitioner was also sternly warned not to report the
incident to the group Karapatan or something untoward will
happen to her and her family. 36
Sometime after her release, petitioner continued to
receive calls from RC via the cellular phone given to
her. 37 Out of apprehension that she was being monitored and
also fearing for the safety of her family, petitioner threw away
the cellular phone with a SIM card.
Seeking sanctuary against the threat of future harm as
well as the suppression of any existing government files or
records linking her to the communist movement, petitioner
filed a Petition for the Writs of Amparo and Habeas
Data before this Court on 1 June 2009. 38 Petitioner
impleaded public officials occupying the uppermost echelons
of the military and police hierarchy as respondents, on the
belief that it was government agents who were behind her
abduction and torture. Petitioner likewise included in her suit
"Rose," "Dex" and "RC." 39
The Amparo and Habeas Data petition prays that: (1)
respondents be enjoined from harming or even approaching
petitioner and her family; (2) an order be issued allowing the
inspection of detention areas in the 7th Infantry Division, Fort
Magsaysay, Laur, Nueva Ecija; (3) respondents be ordered to
produce documents relating to any report on the case of
petitioner including, but not limited to, intelligence report and
operation reports of the 7th Infantry Division, the Special
Operations Group of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
(AFP) and its subsidiaries or branch/es prior to, during and
subsequent to 19 May 2009; (4) respondents be ordered to
expunge from the records of the respondents any document
pertinent or connected to Melissa C. Roxas, Melissa Roxas or
any name which sounds the same; and (5) respondents be
ordered to return to petitioner her journal, digital camera with
memory card, laptop computer, external hard disk, IPOD,
wristwatch, sphygmomanometer, stethoscope, medicines and
her P15,000.00 cash. 40
In a Resolution dated 9 June 2009, this Court issued
the desired writs and referred the case to the Court of Appeals
for hearing, reception of evidence and appropriate
action. 41 The Resolution also directed the respondents to file
their verified written return. 42
On 18 June 2009, the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), filed a Return of the Writs 43 on behalf of the public
officials impleaded as respondents.
We now turn to the defenses interposed by the public
respondents.
The public respondents label petitioner's alleged
abduction and torture as "stage managed." 44 In support of
their accusation, the public respondents principally rely on the
statement of Mr. Paolo, as contained in the Special
Report 45 of the La Paz Police Station. In the Special
Report, Mr. Paolo disclosed that, prior to the purported
abduction, petitioner and her companions instructed him and
his two sons to avoid leaving the house. 46 From this
statement, the public respondents drew the distinct possibility
that, except for those already inside Mr. Paolo's house,
nobody else has any way of knowing where petitioner and her
companions were at the time they were supposedly
abducted. 47 This can only mean, the public respondents
concluded, that if ever there was any "abduction" it must
necessarily have been planned by, or done with the consent
of, the petitioner and her companions themselves. 48   2009, when Barangay Captain Michael M. Manuel came to
Public respondents also cited the Medical
Certificate 49 of the petitioner, as actually belying her claims
that she was subjected to serious torture for five (5) days. The
public respondents noted that while the petitioner alleges that
she was choked and boxed by her abductors — inflictions that
could have easily produced remarkable bruises —
her Medical Certificate only shows abrasions in her wrists
and knee caps. 50
For the public respondents, the above anomalies put in
question the very authenticity of petitioner's alleged abduction
and torture, more so any military or police involvement
therein. Hence, public respondents conclude that the claims of
abduction and torture was no more than a charade fabricated
by the petitioner to put the government in bad light, and at the
same time, bring great media mileage to her and the group
that she represents. 51
Nevertheless, even assuming the abduction and torture
to be genuine, the public respondents insist on the dismissal
of the Amparo and Habeas Data petition based on the
following grounds: (a) as against respondent President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, in particular, because of her
immunity from suit, 52 and (b) as against all of the public
respondents, in general, in view of the absence of any specific
allegation in the petition that they had participated in, or at
least authorized, the commission of such atrocities. 53
Finally, the public respondents posit that they had not
been remiss in their duty to ascertain the truth behind the
allegations of the petitioner. 54 In both the police and military
arms of the government machinery, inquiries were set-up in
the following manner:
Police Action
Police authorities first learned of the purported
abduction around 4:30 o'clock in the afternoon of 19 May
the La Paz Municipal Police Station to report the presence of
heavily armed men somewhere
in Barangay Kapanikian. 55 Acting on the report, the police
station launched an initial investigation. 56
The initial investigation revolved around the statement
of Mr. Paolo, who informed the investigators of an abduction
incident involving three (3) persons — later identified as
petitioner Melissa Roxas, Juanito Carabeo and John Edward
Jandoc — who were all staying in his house. 57 Mr. Paolo
disclosed that the abduction occurred around 1:30 o'clock in
the afternoon, and was perpetrated by about eight (8) heavily
armed men who forced their way inside his house. 58 Other
witnesses to the abduction also confirmed that the armed men
used a dark blue van with an unknown plate number and two
(2) Honda XRM motorcycles with no plate numbers. 59
At 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon of 19 May 2009, the
investigators sent a Flash Message to the different police
stations surrounding La Paz, Tarlac, in an effort to track and
locate the van and motorcycles of the suspects. Unfortunately,
the effort yielded negative results. 60
On 20 May 2009, the results of the initial investigation
were included in a Special Report 61 that was transmitted to
the Tarlac Police Provincial Office, headed by public
respondent P/S Supt. Rudy Lacadin (Supt. Lacadin). Public
respondent Supt. Lacadin, in turn, informed the Regional
Police Office of Region 3 about the abduction. 62 Follow-up
investigations were, at the same time, pursued. 63
On 26 May 2009, public respondent PC/Supt. Leon
Nilo Dela Cruz, as Director of the Regional Police Office for
Region 3, caused the creation of Special Investigation Task
Group — CAROJAN (Task Group CAROJAN) to conduct an
in-depth investigation on the abduction of the petitioner,
Carabeo and Jandoc. 64
Task Group CAROJAN started its inquiry by making a
series of background examinations on the victims of the
purported abduction, in order to reveal the motive behind the
abduction and, ultimately, the identity of the
perpetrators. 65 Task Group CAROJAN also maintained
liaisons with Karapatan and the Alliance for Advancement of
People's Rights — organizations trusted by petitioner — in
the hopes of obtaining the latter's participation in the ongoing
investigations. 66 Unfortunately, the letters sent by the
investigators requesting for the availability of the petitioner
for inquiries were left unheeded. 67
The progress of the investigations conducted by Task
Group CAROJAN had been detailed in the reports 68 that it
submitted to public respondent General Jesus Ame Verzosa,
the Chief of the Philippine National Police. However, as of
their latest report dated 29 June 2009, Task Group CAROJAN
is still unable to make a definitive finding as to the true
identity and affiliation of the abductors — a fact that task
group CAROJAN attributes to the refusal of the petitioner, or
any of her fellow victims, to cooperate in their investigative
efforts. 69
Military Action
Public respondent Gilbert Teodoro, the Secretary of
National Defense, first came to know about the alleged
abduction and torture of the petitioner upon receipt of the
Resolution of this Court directing him and the other
respondents to file their return. 70 Immediately thereafter, he
issued a Memorandum Directive 71 addressed to the Chief of
Staff of the AFP, ordering the latter, among others, to conduct
an inquiry to determine the validity of the accusation of
military involvement in the abduction. 72
Acting pursuant to the Memorandum Directive, public
respondent General Victor S. Ibrado, the AFP Chief of Staff,
sent an AFP Radio Message 73 addressed to public respondent
Lieutenant General Delfin N. Bangit (Lt. Gen. Bangit), the
Commanding General of the Army, relaying the order to
cause an investigation on the abduction of the petitioner. 74
For his part, and taking cue from the allegations in
the amparo petition, public respondent Lt. Gen. Bangit
instructed public respondent Major General Ralph A.
Villanueva (Maj. Gen. Villanueva), the Commander of the
7th Infantry Division of the Army based in Fort Magsaysay,
to set in motion an investigation regarding the possible
involvement of any personnel assigned at the camp in the
purported abduction of the petitioner. 75 In turn, public
respondent Maj. Gen. Villanueva tapped the Office of the
Provost Marshal (OPV) of the 7th Infantry Division, to
conduct the investigation. 76
On 23 June 2009, the OPV of the 7th Infantry Division
released an Investigation Report 77 detailing the results of its
inquiry. In substance, the report described petitioner's
allegations as "opinionated" and thereby cleared the military
from any involvement in her alleged abduction and torture. 78
The Decision of the Court of Appeals
In its Decision, 79 the Court of Appeals gave due
weight and consideration to the petitioner's version that she
was indeed abducted and then subjected to torture for five (5)
straight days. The appellate court noted the sincerity and
resolve by which the petitioner affirmed the contents of her
affidavits in open court, and was thereby convinced that the
latter was telling the truth. 80
On the other hand, the Court of Appeals disregarded
the argument of the public respondents that the abduction of
the petitioner was "stage managed," as it is merely based on
an unfounded speculation that only the latter and her
companions knew where they were staying at the time they
were forcibly taken. 81 The Court of Appeals further stressed
that the Medical Certificate of the petitioner can only affirm
the existence of a true abduction, as its findings are reflective
of the very injuries the latter claims to have sustained during
her harrowing ordeal, particularly when she was handcuffed
and then dragged by her abductors onto their van. 82
The Court of Appeals also recognized the existence of
an ongoing threat against the security of the petitioner, as
manifested in the attempts of "RC" to contact and monitor
her, even after she was released. 83 This threat, according to
the Court of Appeals, is all the more compounded by the
failure of the police authorities to identify the material
perpetrators who are still at large. 84 Thus, the appellate court
extended to the petitioner the privilege of the writ
of amparo by directing the public respondents to afford
protection to the former, as well as continuing, under the
norm of extraordinary diligence, their existing investigations
involving the abduction. 85
The Court of Appeals likewise observed a
transgression of the right to informational privacy of the
petitioner, noting the existence of "records of investigations"
that concerns the petitioner as a suspected member of the
CPP-NPA. 86 The appellate court derived the existence of
such records from a photograph and video file presented in a
press conference by party-list representatives Jovito Palparan
(Palparan) and Pastor Alcover (Alcover), which allegedly
show the petitioner participating in rebel exercises.
Representative Alcover also revealed that the photograph and
video came from a female CPP-NPA member who wanted
out of the organization. According to the Court of Appeals,
the proliferation of the photograph and video, as well as any
form of media, insinuating that petitioner is part of the CPP-
NPA does not only constitute a violation of the right to
privacy of the petitioner but also puts further strain on her
already volatile security. 87 To this end, the appellate court
granted the privilege of the writ of habeas data mandating the
public respondents to refrain from distributing to the public
any records, in whatever form, relative to petitioner's alleged
ties with the CPP-NPA or pertinently related to her abduction
and torture. 88
The foregoing notwithstanding, however, the Court of
Appeals was not convinced that the military or any other
person acting under the acquiescence of the government, were
responsible for the abduction and torture of the
petitioner. 89 The appellate court stressed that, judging by her
own statements, the petitioner merely "believed" that the
military was behind her abduction. 90 Thus, the Court of
Appeals absolved the public respondents from any complicity
in the abduction and torture of petitioner. 91 The petition was
likewise dismissed as against public respondent President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, in view of her immunity from
suit. 92  
Accordingly, the petitioner's prayers for the return of
her personal belongings were denied. 93 Petitioner's prayers
for an inspection order and production order also met the
same fate. 94
Hence, this appeal by the petitioner.
AMPARO
A.
Petitioner first contends that the Court of Appeals
erred in absolving the public respondents from any
responsibility in her abduction and torture. 95 Corollary to
this, petitioner also finds fault on the part of Court of Appeals
in denying her prayer for the return of her personal
belongings. 96
Petitioner insists that the manner by which her
abduction and torture was carried out, as well as the sounds of
construction, gun-fire and airplanes that she heard while in
detention, as these were detailed in her two affidavits and
affirmed by her in open court, are already sufficient evidence
to prove government involvement. 97
Proceeding from such assumption, petitioner invokes
the doctrine of command responsibility to implicate the high-
ranking civilian and military authorities she impleaded as
respondents in her amparo petition. 98 Thus, petitioner seeks
from this Court a pronouncement holding the respondents as
complicit in her abduction and torture, as well as liable for the
return of her belongings. 99
Command Responsibility in Amparo Proceedings
It must be stated at the outset that the use by the
petitioner of the doctrine of command responsibility as the
justification in impleading the public respondents in
her amparo petition, is legally inaccurate, if not incorrect.
The doctrine of command responsibility is a rule of
substantive law that establishes liability and, by this account,
cannot be a proper legal basis to implead a party-respondent
in an amparo petition. 100
The case of Rubrico v. Arroyo,  101 which was the
first to examine command responsibility in the context of
an amparo proceeding, observed that the doctrine is used to
pinpoint liability. Rubrico notes that: 102
The evolution of the command responsibility
doctrine finds its context in the development of laws
of war and armed combats. According to Fr. Bernas,
"command responsibility," in its simplest terms,
means the "responsibility of commanders for crimes
committed by subordinate members of the armed
forces or other persons subject to their control in
international wars or domestic conflict." 103 In this
sense, command responsibility is properly a form of
criminal complicity. The Hague Conventions of 1907
adopted the doctrine of command
responsibility, 104 foreshadowing the present-day
precept of holding a superior accountable for the
atrocities committed by his subordinates should he be
remiss in his duty of control over them. As then
formulated, command responsibility is "an omission
mode of individual criminal liability ," whereby the
superior is made responsible for crimes
committed by his subordinates for failing to prevent
or punish the perpetrators 105 (as opposed to crimes he
ordered). (Emphasis in the original, underscoring
supplied)
Since the application of command responsibility
presupposes an imputation of individual liability, it is more
aptly invoked in a full-blown criminal or administrative case
rather than in a summary amparo proceeding. The obvious
reason lies in the nature of the writ itself:
The writ of amparo is a protective remedy aimed at
providing judicial relief consisting of the appropriate remedial
measures and directives that may be crafted by the court, in
order to address specific violations or threats of violation of
the constitutional rights to life, liberty or security. 106 While
the principal objective of its proceedings is the initial
determination of whether an enforced disappearance,
extralegal killing or threats thereof had transpired — the
writ does not, by so doing, fix liability for such
disappearance, killing or threats, whether that may be
criminal, civil or administrative under the applicable
substantive law. 107 The rationale underpinning this peculiar
nature of an amparo writ has been, in turn, clearly set forth in
the landmark case of The Secretary of National Defense v.
Manalo: 108
. . . The remedy provides rapid judicial relief
as it partakes of a summary proceeding that requires
only substantial evidence to make the appropriate
reliefs available to the petitioner; it is not an action
 to determine criminal guilt requiring proof beyond
reasonable doubt, or liability for damages
requiring preponderance of evidence, or
administrative responsibility requiring substantial
evidence that will require full and exhaustive
proceedings. 109 (Emphasis supplied)
It must be clarified, however, that the inapplicability of
the doctrine of command responsibility
an amparo proceeding does not, by any measure, preclude
impleading military or police commanders on the ground that
the complained acts in the petition were committed with their
direct or indirect acquiescence. In which case, commanders
may be impleaded — not actually on the basis of command
responsibility — but rather on the ground of
their responsibility, or at least accountability. In Razon v.
Tagitis, 110 the distinct, but interrelated concepts of
responsibility and accountability were given special and
unique significations in relation to an amparo proceeding, to
wit:
. . . Responsibility refers to the extent the
actors have been established by substantial evidence
to have participated in whatever way, by action or
omission, in an enforced disappearance, as a measure
of the remedies this Court shall craft, among them,
the directive to file the appropriate criminal and civil
cases against the responsible parties in the proper
courts. Accountability, on the other hand, refers to
the measure of remedies that should be addressed to
those who exhibited involvement in the enforced
disappearance without bringing the level of their
complicity to the level of responsibility defined
above; or who are imputed with knowledge relating to
the enforced disappearance and who carry the burden
of disclosure; or those who carry, but have failed to
discharge, the burden of extraordinary diligence in the
investigation of the enforced disappearance.
Responsibility of Public Respondents
At any rate, it is clear from the records of the case that
the intent of the petitioner in impleading the public
respondents is to ascribe some form of responsibility on their
part, based on her assumption that they, in one way or the
other, had condoned her abduction and torture. 111
in To establish such assumption, petitioner attempted to
show that it was government agents who were behind her
ordeal. Thus, the petitioner calls attention to the
circumstances surrounding her abduction and torture
— i.e., the forcible taking in broad daylight; use of vehicles
with no license plates; utilization of blindfolds; conducting
interrogations to elicit communist inclinations; and the
infliction of physical abuse — which, according to her, is
consistent with the way enforced disappearances are being
practiced by the military or other state forces. 112
Moreover, petitioner also claims that she was held
inside the military camp Fort Magsaysay — a conclusion that
she was able to infer from the travel time required to reach the
place where she was actually detained, and also from the
sounds of construction, gun-fire and airplanes she heard while
thereat. 113
We are not impressed. The totality of the evidence
presented by the petitioner does not inspire reasonable
conclusion that her abductors were military or police
personnel and that she was detained at Fort Magsaysay.
First. The similarity between the circumstances
attending a particular case of abduction with those
surrounding previous instances of enforced disappearances
does not, necessarily, carry sufficient weight to prove that the
government orchestrated such abduction. We opine that
insofar as the present case is concerned, the perceived
similarity cannot stand as substantial evidence of the
involvement of the government.
 In amparo proceedings, the weight that may be
accorded to parallel circumstances as evidence of military
involvement depends largely on the availability or non-
availability of other pieces of evidence that has the potential
of directly proving the identity and affiliation of the
perpetrators. Direct evidence of identity, when obtainable,
must be preferred over mere circumstantial evidence based on
patterns and similarity, because the former indubitably offers
greater certainty as to the true identity and affiliation of the
perpetrators. An amparo court cannot simply leave to remote
and hazy inference what it could otherwise clearly and
directly ascertain.
In the case at bench, petitioner was, in fact, able to
include in her Offer of Exhibits, 114 the cartographic
sketches 115 of several of her abductors whose faces she
managed to see. To the mind of this Court, these cartographic
sketches have the undeniable potential of giving the greatest
certainty as to the true identity and affiliation of petitioner's
abductors. Unfortunately for the petitioner, this potential has
not been realized in view of the fact that the faces described
in such sketches remain unidentified, much less have been
shown to be that of any military or police personnel. Bluntly
stated, the abductors were not proven to be part of either the
military or the police chain of command.
Second. The claim of the petitioner that she was taken
to Fort Magsaysay was not adequately established by her
mere estimate of the time it took to reach the place where she
was detained and by the sounds that she heard while thereat.
Like the Court of Appeals, We are not inclined to take the
estimate and observations of the petitioner as accurate on its
face — not only because they were made mostly while she
was in blindfolds, but also in view of the fact that she was a
mere sojourner in the Philippines, whose familiarity with Fort
Magsaysay and the travel time required to reach it is in itself
doubtful. 116 With nothing else but obscure observations to
support it, petitioner's claim that she was taken to Fort
Magsaysay remains a mere speculation. 
In sum, the petitioner was not able to establish to a
concrete point that her abductors were actually affiliated,
whether formally or informally, with the military or the police
organizations. Neither does the evidence at hand prove that
petitioner was indeed taken to the military camp Fort
Magsaysay to the exclusion of other places. These
evidentiary gaps, in turn, make it virtually impossible to
determine whether the abduction and torture of the
petitioner was in fact committed with the acquiescence of
the public respondents. On account of this insufficiency in
evidence, a pronouncement of responsibility on the part of the
public respondents, therefore, cannot be made.
Prayer for the Return of Personal Belongings
This brings Us to the prayer of the petitioner for the
return of her personal belongings.
In its decision, the Court of Appeals denied the above
prayer of the petitioner by reason of the failure of the latter to
prove that the public respondents were involved in her
abduction and torture. 117 We agree with the conclusion of the
Court of Appeals, but not entirely with the reason used to
support it. To the mind of this Court, the prayer of the
petitioner for the return of her belongings is doomed to fail
regardless of whether there is sufficient evidence to hold
public respondents responsible for the abduction of the
petitioner.
In the first place, an order directing the public
respondents to return the personal belongings of the petitioner
is already equivalent to a conclusive pronouncement of
liability. The order itself is a substantial relief that can only be
granted once the liability of the public respondents has been
fixed in a full and exhaustive proceeding. As already
discussed above, matters of liability are not determinable in a
mere summary amparo proceeding. 118
But perhaps the more fundamental reason in denying
the prayer of the petitioner, lies with the fact that a person's
right to be restituted of his property is already subsumed
under the general rubric of property rights — which are no
longer protected by the writ of amparo. 119 Section 1 of
the Amparo Rule, 120 which defines the scope and extent of
the writ, clearly excludes the protection of property rights.
B.
The next error raised by the petitioner is the denial by
the Court of Appeals of her prayer for an inspection of the
detention areas of Fort Magsaysay. 121
Considering the dearth of evidence concretely pointing
to any military involvement in petitioner's ordeal, this Court
finds no error on the part of the Court of Appeals in denying
an inspection of the military camp at Fort Magsaysay. We
agree with the appellate court that a contrary stance would be
equivalent to sanctioning a "fishing expedition," which was
never intended by the Amparo Rule in providing for the
interim relief of inspection order. 122 Contrary to the explicit
position 123 espoused by the petitioner, the Amparo Rule does
not allow a "fishing expedition" for evidence.
An inspection order is an interim relief designed to
give support or strengthen the claim of a petitioner in
an amparo petition, in order to aid the court before making a
decision. 124 A basic requirement before an amparo court
may grant an inspection order is that the place to be inspected
is reasonably determinable from the allegations of the party
seeking the order. While the Amparo Rule does not require
that the place to be inspected be identified with clarity and
precision, it is, nevertheless, a minimum for the issuance of
an inspection order that the supporting allegations of a party
be sufficient in itself, so as to make a prima facie case. This,
as was shown above, petitioner failed to do.
Since the very estimates and observations of the
petitioner are not strong enough to make out aprima
facie case that she was detained in Fort Magsaysay, an
inspection of the military camp cannot be ordered. An
inspection order cannot issue on the basis of allegations that
are, in themselves, unreliable and doubtful.
HABEAS DATA
As earlier intimated, the Court of Appeals granted to
the petitioner the privilege of the writ of habeas data, by
enjoining the public respondents from "distributing or causing
the distribution to the public any records in whatever form,
reports, documents or similar papers" relative to the
petitioner's "alleged ties with the CPP-NPA or pertinently
related to her abduction and torture." Though not raised as an
issue in this appeal, this Court is constrained to pass upon and
review this particular ruling of the Court of Appeals in order
to rectify, what appears to Us, an error infecting the grant.
For the proper appreciation of the rationale used by the
Court of Appeals in granting the privilege of the writ
of habeas data, We quote hereunder the relevant
portion 125 of its decision:
Under these premises, Petitioner prayed that
all the records, intelligence reports and reports on the
investigations conducted on Melissa C. Roxas or
Melissa Roxas be produced and eventually expunged
from the records. Petitioner claimed to be included in
the Government's Order of Battle under Oplan Bantay
Laya which listed political opponents against whom
false criminal charges were filed based on made up
and perjured information.
Pending resolution of this petition and
before Petitioner could testify before Us, Ex-army
 general Jovito Palaparan, Bantay party-list, and
Pastor Alcover of the Alliance for Nationalism and
Democracy party-list held a press conference
where they revealed that they received an
information from a female NPA rebel who wanted
out of the organization, that Petitioner was a
communist rebel. Alcover claimed that said
information reached them thru a letter with photo
of Petitioner holding firearms at an NPA training
camp and a video CD of the training exercises.
Clearly, and notwithstanding Petitioner's
denial that she was the person in said video, there
were records of other investigations on Melissa
C. Roxas or Melissa Roxas which violate her right
to privacy. Without a doubt, reports of such nature
have reasonable connections, one way or another, to
petitioner's abduction where she claimed she had been
subjected to cruelties and dehumanizing acts which
nearly caused her life precisely due to allegation of
her alleged membership in the CPP-NPA. And if said
report or similar reports are to be continuously made
available to the public, Petitioner's security and
privacy will certainly be in danger of being violated
or transgressed by persons who have strong
sentiments or aversion against members of this group.
The unregulated dissemination of said unverified
video CD or reports of Petitioner's alleged ties with
the CPP-NPA indiscriminately made available for
public consumption without evidence of its
authenticity or veracity certainly violates Petitioner's
right to privacy which must be protected by this
Court. We, thus, deem it necessary to grant Petitioner
the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Data. (Emphasis
supplied).
The writ of habeas data was conceptualized as a
judicial remedy enforcing the right to privacy, most especially
the right to informational privacy of individuals. 126 The writ
operates to protect a person's right to control information
regarding himself, particularly in the instances where such
information is being collected through unlawful means in
order to achieve unlawful ends.
Needless to state, an indispensable requirement before
the privilege of the writ may be extended is the showing, at
least by substantial evidence, of an actual or threatened
violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or security of
the victim. 127 This, in the case at bench, the petitioner failed
to do.
The main problem behind the ruling of the Court of
Appeals is that there is actually no evidence on record that
shows that any of the public respondents had violated or
threatened the right to privacy of the petitioner. The act
ascribed by the Court of Appeals to the public respondents
that would have violated or threatened the right to privacy of
the petitioner, i.e., keeping records of investigations and other
reports about the petitioner's ties with the CPP-NPA, was not
adequately proven — considering that the origin of such
records were virtually unexplained and its existence, clearly,
only inferred by the appellate court from the video and
photograph released by Representatives Palparan and Alcover
in their press conference. No evidence on record even shows
that any of the public respondents had access to such video or
photograph.
In view of the above considerations, the directive by
the Court of Appeals enjoining the public respondents from
"distributing or causing the distribution to the public any
records in whatever form, reports, documents or similar
papers" relative to the petitioner's "alleged ties with the CPP-
NPA," appears to be devoid of any legal basis. The public
respondents cannot be ordered to refrain from distributing
something that, in the first place, it was not proven to have.
 Verily, until such time that any of the public
respondents were found to be actually responsible for the
abduction and torture of the petitioner, any inference
regarding the existence of reports being kept in violation of
the petitioner's right to privacy becomes farfetched, and
premature.
For these reasons, this Court must, at least in the
meantime, strike down the grant of the privilege of the writ
of habeas data.
DISPOSITION OF THE CASE
Our review of the evidence of the petitioner, while
telling of its innate insufficiency to impute any form of
responsibility on the part of the public respondents, revealed
two important things that can guide Us to a proper disposition
of this case. One, that further investigation with the use of
extraordinary diligence must be made in order to identify the
perpetrators behind the abduction and torture of the petitioner;
and two, that the Commission on Human Rights (CHR),
pursuant to its Constitutional mandate to "investigate all
forms of human rights violations involving civil and political
rights and to provide appropriate legal measures for the
protection of human rights," 128 must be tapped in order to fill
certain investigative and remedial voids.  the same time, comparatively silent as to other concrete steps
Further Investigation Must Be Undertaken
Ironic as it seems, but part and parcel of the reason
why the petitioner was not able to adduce substantial
evidence proving her allegations of government complicity in
her abduction and torture, may be attributed to the incomplete
and one-sided investigations conducted by the government
itself. This "awkward" situation, wherein the very persons
alleged to be involved in an enforced disappearance or
extralegal killing are, at the same time, the very ones tasked
by law to investigate the matter, is a unique characteristic of
these proceedings and is the main source of the "evidentiary
difficulties" faced by any petitioner in any amparo case. 129
Cognizant of this situation, however, the Amparo Rule
placed a potent safeguard — requiring the "respondent who is
a public official or employee" to prove that no less than
"extraordinary diligence as required by applicable laws, rules
and regulations was observed in the performance of
duty." 130 Thus, unless and until any of the public respondents
is able to show to the satisfaction of the amparo court that
extraordinary diligence has been observed in their
investigations, they cannot shed the allegations of
responsibility despite the prevailing scarcity of evidence to
that effect.
With this in mind, We note that extraordinary
diligence, as required by the Amparo Rule, was not fully
observed in the conduct of the police and military
investigations in the case at bar.
A perusal of the investigation reports submitted by
Task Group CAROJAN shows modest effort on the part of
the police investigators to identify the perpetrators of the
abduction. To be sure, said reports are replete with
background checks on the victims of the abduction, but are, at
the investigators have been taking to ascertain the authors of
the crime. Although conducting a background investigation
on the victims is a logical first step in exposing the motive
behind the abduction — its necessity is clearly outweighed by
the need to identify the perpetrators, especially in light of the
fact that the petitioner, who was no longer in captivity,
already came up with allegations about the motive of her
captors.
Instead, Task Group CAROJAN placed the fate of
their investigations solely on the cooperation or non-
cooperation of the petitioner — who, they claim, was less
than enthusiastic in participating in their investigative
efforts. 131 While it may be conceded that the participation of
the petitioner would have facilitated the progress of Task
Group CAROJAN's investigation, this Court believes that the
former's reticence to cooperate is hardly an excuse for Task
Group CAROJAN not to explore other means or avenues
from which they could obtain relevant leads. 132 Indeed, while
the allegations of government complicity by the petitioner
cannot, by themselves, hold up as adequate evidence before a
court of law — they are, nonetheless, a vital source of
valuable investigative leads that must be pursued and verified,
if only to comply with the high standard of diligence required
by the Amparo Rule in the conduct of investigations.
Assuming the non-cooperation of the petitioner, Task
Group CAROJAN's reports still failed to explain why it never
considered seeking the assistance of Mr. Jesus Paolo — who,
along with the victims, is a central witness to the abduction.
The reports of Task Group CAROJAN is silent in any attempt
to obtain from Mr. Paolo, a cartographic sketch of the
abductors or, at the very least, of the one who, by petitioner's
account, was not wearing any mask.
The recollection of Mr. Paolo could have served as a
comparative material to the sketches included in petitioner's
offer of exhibits that, it may be pointed out, were prepared
under the direction of, and first submitted to, the CHR
pursuant to the latter's independent investigation on the
abduction and torture of the petitioner. 133 But as mentioned
earlier, the CHR sketches remain to be unidentified as of this
date.
In light of these considerations, We agree with the
Court of Appeals that further investigation under the norm of
extraordinary diligence should be undertaken. This Court
simply cannot write finis to this case, on the basis of an
incomplete investigation conducted by the police and the
military. In a very real sense, the right to security of the
petitioner is continuously put in jeopardy because of the
deficient investigation that directly contributes to the delay in
bringing the real perpetrators before the bar of justice.
To add teeth to the appellate court's directive, however,
We find it fitting, nay, necessary to shift the primary task of
conducting further investigations on the abduction and torture
of the petitioner upon the CHR. 134 We note that the CHR,
unlike the police or the military, seems to enjoy the trust and
confidence of the petitioner — as evidenced by her
attendance and participation in the hearings already
conducted by the commission. 135 Certainly, it would be
reasonable to assume from such cooperation that the
investigations of the CHR have advanced, or at the very least,
bears the most promise of advancing farther, in terms of
locating the perpetrators of the abduction, and is thus, vital for
a final resolution of this petition. From this perspective, We
also deem it just and appropriate to relegate the task of
affording interim protection to the petitioner, also to the
CHR.
Hence, We modify the directive of the Court of the
Appeals for further investigation, as follows —
1.) Appointing the CHR as the lead agency tasked
with conducting further investigation
regarding the abduction and torture of the
petitioner. Accordingly, the CHR shall,
under the norm of extraordinary diligence,
take or continue to take the necessary
steps: (a) to identify the persons described
in the cartographic sketches submitted by
the petitioner, as well as their
whereabouts; and (b) to pursue any other
leads relevant to petitioner's abduction and
torture.
 2.) Directing the incumbent Chief of the
Philippine National Police (PNP), or his
successor, and the incumbent Chief of
Staff of the AFP, or his successor, to
extend assistance to the ongoing
investigation of the CHR, including but
not limited to furnishing the latter a copy
of its personnel records circa the time of
the petitioner's abduction and torture,
subject to reasonable regulations consistent
with the Constitution and existing laws.
3.) Further directing the incumbent Chief of the
PNP, or his successor, to furnish to this
Court, the Court of Appeals, and the
petitioner or her representative, a copy of
the reports of its investigations and their
recommendations, other than those that are
already part of the records of this case,
within ninety (90) days from receipt of this
decision.
4.) Further directing the CHR to (a) furnish to the
Court of Appeals within ninety (90) days
from receipt of this decision, a copy of the
reports on its investigation and its
corresponding recommendations; and to
(b) provide or continue to provide
protection to the petitioner during her stay
or visit to the Philippines, until such time
as may hereinafter be determined by this
Court.
Accordingly, this case must be referred back to the
Court of Appeals, for the purposes of monitoring compliance
with the above directives and determining whether, in light of
any recent reports or recommendations, there would already
be sufficient evidence to hold any of the public respondents
responsible or, at least, accountable. After making such
determination, the Court of Appeals shall submit its own
report with recommendation to this Court for final action. The
Court of Appeals will continue to have jurisdiction over this
case in order to accomplish its tasks under this decision.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is PARTIALLY
MERITORIOUS. We hereby render a decision:
1.) AFFIRMING the denial of the petitioner's
prayer for the return of her personal
belongings;
2.) AFFIRMING the denial of the petitioner's
prayer for an inspection of the detention
areas of Fort Magsaysay.
3.) REVERSING the grant of the privilege
of habeas data, without prejudice,
however, to any modification that this
Court may make on the basis of the
investigation reports and recommendations
submitted to it under this decision.
4.) MODIFYING the directive that further
investigation must be undertaken, as
follows —
a. APPOINTING the Commission on
Human Rights as the lead agency
tasked with conducting further
investigation regarding the
abduction and torture of the
petitioner. Accordingly, the
Commission on Human Rights
shall, under the norm of
extraordinary diligence, take or
continue to take the necessary steps:
 (a) to identify the persons described
in the cartographic sketches
submitted by the petitioner, as well
as their whereabouts; and (b) to
pursue any other leads relevant to
petitioner's abduction and torture.
b. DIRECTING the incumbent Chief of
the Philippine National Police, or
his successor, and the incumbent
Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines, or his successor,
to extend assistance to the ongoing
investigation of the Commission on
Human Rights, including but not
limited to furnishing the latter a
copy of its personnel
records circa the time of the
petitioner's abduction and torture,
subject to reasonable regulations
consistent with the Constitution and
existing laws.
c. Further DIRECTING the incumbent
Chief of the Philippine National
Police, or his successor, to furnish
to this Court, the Court of Appeals,
and the petitioner or her
representative, a copy of the reports
of its investigations and their
recommendations, other than those
that are already part of the records
of this case, within ninety (90) days
from receipt of this decision.
d. Further DIRECTING the Commission
on Human Rights (a) to furnish to
the Court of Appeals within ninety
(90) days from receipt of this
decision, a copy of the reports on its
investigation and its corresponding
recommendations; and (b) to
provide or continue to provide
protection to the petitioner during
her stay or visit to the Philippines,
until such time as may hereinafter
be determined by this Court. 
5.) REFERRING BACK the instant case to the
Court of Appeals for the following
purposes:
a. To MONITOR the investigations and
actions taken by the PNP, AFP, and
the CHR;
b. To DETERMINE whether, in light of
the reports and recommendations of
the CHR, the abduction and torture
of the petitioner was committed by
persons acting under any of the
public respondents; and on the basis
of this determination —
c. To SUBMIT to this Court within ten
(10) days from receipt of the report
and recommendation of the
Commission on Human Rights —
its own report, which shall include a
recommendation either for
the DISMISSAL of the petition as
against the public respondents who
were found not responsible and/or
accountable, or for
the APPROPRIATE REMEDIAL
 MEASURES, AS MAY BE
ALLOWED BY THE AMPARO
AND HABEAS DATA RULES,
TO BE UNDERTAKEN as against
those found responsible and/or
accountable.
Accordingly, the public respondents shall remain
personally impleaded in this petition to answer for any
responsibilities and/or accountabilities they may have
incurred during their incumbencies.
Other findings of the Court of Appeals in its Decision
dated 26 August 2009 in CA-G.R. SP No. 00036-WRA that
are not contrary to this decision are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Corona, C.J., Carpio, Carpio Morales, Velasco, Jr.,
Nachura, Leonardo-de Castro, Peralta, Bersamin, Del EN BANC
Castillo, Abad, Villarama, Jr., Mendoza and Sereno,
JJ., concur.
[G.R. No. 183871. February 18, 2010.]
Brion, J., is on official leave.
 (Roxas v. Macapagal Arroyo, G.R. No. 189155, [September 7,
||| LOURDES D. RUBRICO,
2010], 644 PHIL 480-517) JEAN RUBRICO APRUEBO, and MARY
JOY RUBRICO CARBONEL, petitioners, vs.
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, GEN.
HERMOGENES ESPERON, P/DIR. GEN.
AVELINO RAZON, MAJ. DARWIN SY a.k.a.
DARWIN REYES, JIMMY SANTANA,
RUBEN ALFARO, CAPT. ANGELO
CUARESMA, a certain JONATHAN, P/SUPT.
EDGAR B. ROQUERO, ARSENIO C.
GOMEZ, and OFFICE OF THE
OMBUDSMAN, respondents.
 DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J  : p
In this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court in relation to Section 19 1 of the Rule on the Writ of
Amparo 2 (Amparo Rule), Lourdes D. Rubrico,
Jean Rubrico Apruebo, and Mary Joy Rubrico Carbonel assail
and seek to set aside the Decision 3 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) dated July 31, 2008 in CA-G.R. SP No. 00003, a
petition commenced under the Amparo Rule.
The petition for the writ of amparo dated October 25,
2007 was originally filed before this Court. After issuing the
desired writ and directing the respondents to file a verified
written return, the Court referred the petition to the CA for
summary hearing and appropriate action. The petition and its
attachments contained, in substance, the following
allegations:
1. On April 3, 2007, armed men belonging to
the 301st Air Intelligence and Security Squadron
(AISS, for short) based in Fernando Air Base in Lipa
City abducted Lourdes D. Rubrico (Lourdes), then
attending a Lenten pabasa  in Bagong Bayan,
Dasmariñas, Cavite, and brought to, and detained at,
the air base without charges. Following a week of
relentless interrogation — conducted alternately by
hooded individuals — and what amounts to verbal
abuse and mental harassment, Lourdes, chair of
the Ugnayan ng Maralita para sa Gawa
Adhikan, was released at Dasmariñas, Cavite, her
hometown, but only after being made to sign a
statement that she would be a military asset.
After Lourdes' release, the harassment,
coming in the form of being tailed on at least two
occasions at different places,  i.e., Dasmariñas, Cavite
and Baclaran in Pasay City, by motorcycle-riding men
in bonnets, continued;
2. During the time Lourdes was missing, P/Sr.
Insp. Arsenio Gomez (P/Insp. Gomez), then sub-
station commander of Bagong Bayan, Dasmariñas,
Cavite, kept sending text messages to Lourdes'
daughter, Mary Joy R. Carbonel (Mary Joy), bringing
her to beaches and asking her questions
about Karapatan, an alliance of human rights
organizations. He, however, failed to make an
investigation even after Lourdes' disappearance had
been made known to him;  aSEDHC
3. A week after Lourdes' release, another
daughter, Jean R. Apruebo (Jean), was constrained to
leave their house because of the presence of men
watching them;
4. Lourdes has filed with the Office of the
Ombudsman a criminal complaint for kidnapping and
arbitrary detention and administrative complaint for
gross abuse of authority and grave misconduct against
Capt. Angelo Cuaresma (Cuaresma), Ruben Alfaro
(Alfaro), Jimmy Santana (Santana) and a certain
Jonathan, c/o Headquarters 301st AISS, Fernando Air
Base and Maj. Sy/Reyes with address at No. 09
Amsterdam Ext., Merville Subd., Parañaque City, but
nothing has happened; and the threats and harassment
incidents have been reported to the Dasmariñas
municipal and Cavite provincial police stations, but
nothing eventful resulted from their respective
investigations.
Two of the four witnesses to Lourdes'
abduction went into hiding after being visited by
government agents in civilian clothes; and
5. Karapatan  conducted an investigation on
the incidents. The investigation would indicate that
men belonging to the Armed Forces of the Philippines
 (AFP), namely Capt. Cuaresma of the Philippine Air
Force (PAF), Alfaro, Santana, Jonathan and Maj.
Darwin Sy/Reyes, led the abduction of Lourdes; that
unknown to the abductors, Lourdes was able to pilfer
a "mission order" which was addressed to CA Ruben
Alfaro and signed by Capt. Cuaresma of the PAF.
The petition prayed that a writ of amparo issue,
ordering the individual respondents to desist from performing
any threatening act against the security of the petitioners and
for the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB) to immediately file
an information for kidnapping qualified with the aggravating
circumstance of gender of the offended party. It also prayed
for damages and for respondents to produce documents
submitted to any of them on the case of Lourdes.
Before the CA, respondents President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, Gen. Hermogenes Esperon, then
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) Chief of Staff, Police
Director-General (P/Dir. Gen.) Avelino Razon, then
Philippine National Police (PNP) Chief, Police
Superintendent (P/Supt.) Roquero of the Cavite Police
Provincial Office, Police Inspector (P/Insp.) Gomez, now
retired, and the OMB (answering respondents, collectively)
filed, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), a
joint return on the writ specifically denying the material
inculpatory averments against them. The OSG also denied the
allegations against the following impleaded persons, namely:
Cuaresma, Alfaro, Santana, Jonathan, and Sy/Reyes, for lack
of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to
the allegations' truth. And by way of general affirmative
defenses, answering respondents interposed the following
defenses: (1) the President may not be sued during her
incumbency; and (2) the petition is incomplete, as it fails to
indicate the matters required by Sec. 5 (d) and (e) of
the Amparo Rule. 4  ESAHca
Attached to the return were the affidavits of the
following, among other public officials, containing their
respective affirmative defenses and/or statements of what
they had undertaken or committed to undertake regarding the
claimed disappearance of Lourdes and the harassments made
to bear on her and her daughters:
1. Gen. Esperon — attested that, pursuant to
a directive of then Secretary of National Defense
(SND) Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr., he ordered the
Commanding General of the PAF, with information to
all concerned units, to conduct an investigation to
establish the circumstances behind the disappearance
and the reappearance of Lourdes insofar as the
involvement of alleged personnel/unit is concerned.
The Provost Marshall General and the Office of the
Judge Advocate General (JAGO), AFP, also
undertook a parallel action.
Gen. Esperon manifested his resolve to
provide the CA with material results of the
investigation; to continue with the probe on the
alleged abduction of Lourdes and to bring those
responsible, including military personnel, to the bar of
justice when warranted by the findings and the
competent evidence that may be gathered in the
investigation process by those mandated to look into
the matter; 5
2. P/Dir. Gen. Razon — stated that an
investigation he immediately ordered upon receiving
a copy of the petition is on-going vis-à-vis Lourdes'
abduction, and that a background verification with the
PNP Personnel Accounting and Information System
disclosed that the names Santana, Alfaro, Cuaresma
and one Jonathan do not appear in the police
personnel records, although the PNP files carry the
name of Darwin Reyes Y. Muga.
 Per the initial investigation report of the
Dasmariñas municipal police station, P/Dir.
Gen. Razon disclosed, Lourdes was abducted by six
armed men in the afternoon of April 3, 2007 and
dragged aboard a Toyota Revo with plate number
XRR 428, which plate was issued for a Mitsubishi
van to AK Cottage Industry with address at 9
Amsterdam St., Merville Subd., Parañaque City. The
person residing in the apartment on that given address
is one Darius/Erwin See @ Darius Reyes allegedly
working, per the latter's house helper, in Camp
Aguinaldo.
P/Dir. Gen. Razon, however, bemoaned the
fact that Mrs. Rubrico never contacted nor
coordinated with the local police or other
investigating units of the PNP after her release,
although she is in the best position to establish the
identity of her abductors and/or provide positive
description through composite sketching.
Nonetheless, he manifested that the PNP is ready to
assist and protect the petitioners and the key witnesses
from threats, harassments and intimidation from
whatever source and, at the same time, to assist the
Court in the implementation of its orders. 6
3. P/Supt. Roquero — stated conducting,
upon receipt of Lourdes' complaint, an investigation
and submitting the corresponding report to the PNP
Calabarzon, observing that neither Lourdes nor her
relatives provided the police with relevant
information; SEHTAC
4. P/Insp. Gomez — alleged that Lourdes, her
kin and witnesses refused to cooperate with the
investigating Cavite PNP; and
5. Overall Deputy Ombudsman Orlando
Casimiro — alleged that cases for violation of
Articles 267 and 124, or kidnapping and arbitrary
detention, respectively, have been filed with, and are
under preliminary investigation by the OMB against
those believed to be involved in Lourdes' kidnapping;
that upon receipt of the petition for a writ
of amparo, proper coordination was made with the
Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military and
other Law Enforcement Offices (MOLEO) where the
subject criminal and administrative complaints were
filed.
Commenting on the return, petitioners pointed out that
the return was no more than a general denial of averments in
the petition. They, thus, pleaded to be allowed to present
evidence ex parte against the President, Santana, Alfaro,
Capt. Cuaresma, Darwin Sy, and Jonathan. And with leave of
court, they also asked to serve notice of the petition through
publication, owing to their failure to secure the current
address of the latter five and thus submit, as the CA required,
proof of service of the petition on them.
The hearing started on November 13, 2007. 7 In that
setting, petitioners' counsel prayed for the issuance of a
temporary protection order (TPO) against the answering
respondents on the basis of the allegations in the petition. At
the hearing of November 20, 2007, the CA granted
petitioners' motion that the petition and writ be served by the
court's process server on Darwin Sy/Reyes, Santana, Alfaro,
Capt. Cuaresma, and Jonathan.  
The legal skirmishes that followed over the propriety
of excluding President Arroyo from the petition, petitioners'
motions for service by publication, and the issuance of a TPO
are not of decisive pertinence in this recital. The bottom line
is that, by separate resolutions, the CA dropped the President
as respondent in the case; denied the motion for a TPO for the
court's want of authority to issue it in the tenor sought by
petitioners; and effectively denied the motion for notice by
publication owing to petitioners' failure to submit the affidavit
required under Sec. 17, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. 8
After due proceedings, the CA rendered, on July 31,
2008, its partial judgment, subject of this review, disposing of
the petition but only insofar as the answering respondents
were concerned. The fallo of the CA decision reads as
follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, partial
judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING the
instant petition with respect to respondent Gen.
Hermogenes Esperon, P/Dir. Gen. Avelino Razon,
Supt. Edgar B. Roquero, P/Sr. Insp. Arsenio C.
Gomez (ret.) and the Office of the Ombudsman.  SECAHa
Nevertheless, in order that petitioners'
complaint will not end up as another unsolved case,
the heads of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and
the Philippine National Police are directed to ensure
that the investigations already commenced are
diligently pursued to bring the perpetrators to justice.
The Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines and P/Dir. Gen. Avelino Razon are
directed to regularly update petitioners and this Court
on the status of their investigation.
SO ORDERED.
In this recourse, petitioners formulate the issue for
resolution in the following wise:
WHETHER OR NOT the [CA] committed
reversible error in dismissing [their] Petition and
dropping President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as party
respondent.
Petitioners first take issue on the President's purported
lack of immunity from suit during her term of office.
The 1987 Constitution, so they claim, has removed such
immunity heretofore enjoyed by the chief executive under the
1935 and 1973 Constitutions.
Petitioners are mistaken. The presidential immunity
from suit remains preserved under our system of government,
albeit not expressly reserved in the present constitution.
Addressing a concern of his co-members in the 1986
Constitutional Commission on the absence of an express
provision on the matter, Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S.J. observed that
it was already understood in jurisprudence that the President
may not be sued during his or her tenure. 9 The Court
subsequently made it abundantly clear
in David  v.  Macapagal-Arroyo, a case likewise resolved
under the umbrella of the 1987 Constitution, that indeed the
President enjoys immunity during her incumbency, and why
this must be so:
Settled is the doctrine that the President,
during his tenure of office or actual incumbency, may
not be sued in any civil or criminal case, and there is
no need to provide for it in the Constitution or law. It
will degrade the dignity of the high office of the
President, the Head of State, if he can be dragged into
court litigations while serving as such. Furthermore, it
is important that he be freed from any form of
harassment, hindrance or distraction to enable him to
fully attend to the performance of his official duties
and functions. Unlike the legislative and judicial
branch, only one constitutes the executive branch and
anything which impairs his usefulness in the
discharge of the many great and important duties
imposed upon him by the Constitution necessarily
impairs the operation of the Government. 10 . . .
And lest it be overlooked, the petition is simply bereft
of any allegation as to what specific presidential act or
omission violated or threatened to violate petitioners'
protected rights. EAcIST
 This brings us to the correctness of the assailed
dismissal of the petition with respect to Gen. Esperon, P/Dir.
Gen. Razon, P/Supt. Roquero, P/Insp. Gomez, and the OMB.
None of the four individual respondents immediately
referred to above has been implicated as being connected to,
let alone as being behind, the alleged abduction and
harassment of petitioner Lourdes. Their names were not even
mentioned in Lourdes' Sinumpaang Salaysay 11 of April
2007. The same goes for the respective Sinumpaang
Salaysay and/or Karagdagang Sinumpaang Salaysay of
Jean 12 and Mary Joy. 13
As explained by the CA, Gen. Esperon and P/Dir.
Gen. Razon were included in the case on the theory that they,
as commanders, were responsible for the unlawful acts
allegedly committed by their subordinates against petitioners.
To the appellate court, "the privilege of the writ
of amparo must be denied as against Gen. Esperon and P/Dir.
Gen. Razon for the simple reason that petitioners have not
presented evidence showing that those who allegedly
abducted and illegally detained Lourdes and later threatened
her and her family were, in fact, members of the military or
the police force." The two generals, the CA's holding broadly
hinted, would have been accountable for the abduction and
threats if the actual malefactors were members of the AFP or
PNP.
As regards the three other answering respondents, they
were impleaded because they allegedly had not exerted the
required extraordinary diligence in investigating and
satisfactorily resolving Lourdes' disappearance or bringing to
justice the actual perpetrators of what amounted to a criminal
act, albeit there were allegations against P/Insp. Gomez of
acts constituting threats against Mary Joy.
While in a qualified sense tenable, the dismissal by the
CA of the case as against Gen. Esperon and P/Dir.
Gen. Razon is incorrect if viewed against the backdrop of the
stated rationale underpinning the assailed decision vis-à-vis
the two generals, i.e., command responsibility. The Court
assumes the latter stance owing to the fact that command
responsibility, as a concept defined, developed, and applied
under international law, has little, if at all, bearing in amparo
proceedings.
The evolution of the command responsibility doctrine
finds its context in the development of laws of war and armed
combats. According to Fr. Bernas, "command responsibility,"
in its simplest terms, means the "responsibility of
commanders for crimes committed by subordinate members
of the armed forces or other persons subject to their control in
international wars or domestic conflict." 14 In this sense,
command responsibility is properly a form of criminal
complicity. The Hague Conventions of 1907 adopted the
doctrine of command responsibility, 15 foreshadowing the
present-day precept of holding a superior accountable for the
atrocities committed by his subordinates should he be remiss
in his duty of control over them. As then formulated,
command responsibility is "an omission mode of individual
criminal liability," whereby the superior is made responsible
for crimes committed by his subordinates for failing to
prevent or punish the perpetrators 16 (as opposed to crimes he
ordered). EcAISC
The doctrine has recently been codified in the Rome
Statute 17 of the International Criminal Court (ICC) to which
the Philippines is signatory. Sec. 28 of the Statute imposes
individual responsibility on military commanders for crimes
committed by forces under their control. The country is,
however, not yet formally bound by the terms and provisions
embodied in this treaty-statute, since the Senate has yet to
extend concurrence in its ratification. 18
 While there are several pending bills on command
responsibility, 19 there is still no Philippine law that provides
for criminal liability under that doctrine. 20
It may plausibly be contended that command
responsibility, as legal basis to hold military/police
commanders liable for extra-legal killings, enforced
disappearances, or threats, may be made applicable to this
jurisdiction on the theory that the command responsibility
doctrine now constitutes a principle of international law or
customary international law in accordance with the
incorporation clause of the Constitution. 21 Still, it would be
inappropriate to apply to these proceedings the doctrine of
command responsibility, as the CA seemed to have done, as a
form of criminal complicity through omission, for individual
respondents' criminal liability, if there be any, is beyond the
reach of amparo. In other words, the Court does not rule in
such proceedings on any issue of criminal culpability, even if
incidentally a crime or an infraction of an administrative rule
may have been committed. As the Court stressed in Secretary
of National Defense  v. Manalo (Manalo), 22 the writ of
amparo was conceived to provide expeditious and effective
procedural relief against violations or threats of violation of
the basic rights to life, liberty, and security of persons; the
corresponding amparo suit, however, "is not an action to
determine criminal guilt requiring proof beyond reasonable
doubt . . . or administrative liability requiring substantial
evidence that will require full and exhaustive
proceedings." 23 Of the same tenor, and by way of
expounding on the nature and role of amparo, is what the
Court said in Razon  v. Tagitis:
It does not determine guilt nor pinpoint
criminal culpability for the disappearance [threats
thereof or extra-judicial killings]; it
determines responsibility, or at
least  accountability, for the enforced disappearance
[threats thereof or extra-judicial killings] for purposes
of imposing the appropriate remedies to address the
disappearance [or extra-judicial killings].
xxx xxx xxx
As the law now stands, extra-judicial killings
and enforced disappearances in this jurisdiction are
not crimes penalized separately from the component
criminal acts undertaken to carry out these killings
and enforced disappearances and are now penalized
under the Revised Penal Code and special laws. The
simple reason is that the Legislature has not spoken
on the matter; the determination of what acts are
criminal . . . are matters of substantive law that only
the Legislature has the power to enact. 24 . . . 
If command responsibility were to be invoked and
applied to these proceedings, it should, at most, be only to
determine the author who, at the first instance, is accountable
for, and has the duty to address, the disappearance and
harassments complained of, so as to enable the Court to
devise remedial measures that may be appropriate under the
premises to protect rights covered by the writ of amparo. As
intimated earlier, however, the determination should not be
pursued to fix criminal liability on respondents preparatory to
criminal prosecution, or as a prelude to administrative
disciplinary proceedings under existing administrative
issuances, if there be any.  TAECSD
Petitioners, as the CA has declared, have not adduced
substantial evidence pointing to government involvement in
the disappearance of Lourdes. To a concrete point, petitioners
have not shown that the actual perpetrators of the abduction
and the harassments that followed formally or informally
formed part of either the military or the police chain of
command. A preliminary police investigation report,
however, would tend to show a link, however hazy, between
the license plate (XRR 428) of the vehicle allegedly used in
the abduction of Lourdes and the address of Darwin
Reyes/Sy, who was alleged to be working in Camp
Aguinaldo. 25 Then, too, there were affidavits and testimonies
on events that transpired which, if taken together, logically
point to military involvement in the alleged disappearance of
Lourdes, such as, but not limited to, her abduction in broad
daylight, her being forcibly dragged to a vehicle blindfolded
and then being brought to a place where the sounds of planes
taking off and landing could be heard. Mention may also be
made of the fact that Lourdes was asked about her
membership in the Communist Party and of being released
when she agreed to become an "asset."
Still and all, the identities and links to the AFP or the
PNP of the alleged abductors, namely Cuaresma, Alfaro,
Santana, Jonathan, and Sy/Reyes, have yet to be established.
Based on the separate sworn statements of Maj. Paul
Ciano 26 and Technical Sergeant John N. Romano, 27 officer-
in-charge and a staff of the 301st AISS, respectively, none of
the alleged abductors of Lourdes belonged to the 301st AISS
based in San Fernando Air Base. Neither were they members
of any unit of the Philippine Air Force, per the
certification 28 of Col. Raul Dimatactac, Air Force Adjutant.
And as stated in the challenged CA decision, a verification
with the Personnel Accounting and Information System of the
PNP yielded the information that, except for a certain Darwin
Reyes y Muga, the other alleged abductors,i.e., Cuaresma,
Alfaro, Santana and Jonathan, were not members of the PNP.
Petitioners, when given the opportunity to identify Police
Officer 1 Darwin Reyes y Muga, made no effort to confirm if
he was the same Maj. Darwin Reyes a.k.a. Darwin Sy they
were implicating in Lourdes' abduction.
Petitioners, to be sure, have not successfully
controverted answering respondents' documentary evidence,
adduced to debunk the former's allegations directly linking
Lourdes' abductors and tormentors to the military or the
police establishment. We note, in fact, that Lourdes, when
queried on cross-examination, expressed the belief that
Sy/Reyes was an NBI agent. 29 The Court is, of course, aware
of what was referred to in Razon 30 as the "evidentiary
difficulties" presented by the nature of, and encountered by
petitioners in, enforced disappearance cases. But it is
precisely for this reason that the Court should take care too
that no wrong message is sent, lest one conclude that any kind
or degree of evidence, even the outlandish, would suffice to
secure amparo remedies and protection.
Sec. 17, as complemented by Sec. 18 of the Amparo
Rule, expressly prescribes the minimum evidentiary
substantiation requirement and norm to support a cause of
action under the Rule, thus:
Sec. 17. Burden of Proof and Standard of Diligence
Required. — The parties shall establish their
claims by substantial evidence.  ISHaTA
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 18. Judgment.— . . . If the allegations in
the petition are proven by substantial evidence, the
court shall grant the privilege of the writ and such
reliefs as may be proper and appropriate; otherwise,
the privilege shall be denied. (Emphasis added.)
Substantial evidence is more than a mere imputation of
wrongdoing or violation that would warrant a finding of
liability against the person charged; 31 it is more than a
scintilla of evidence. It means such amount of relevant
evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate
to support a conclusion, even if other equally reasonable
minds might opine otherwise. 32 Per the CA's evaluation of
their evidence, consisting of the testimonies and affidavits of
the three Rubrico women and five other individuals,
petitioners have not satisfactorily hurdled the evidentiary bar
required of and assigned to them under the Amparo Rule. In a
very real sense, the burden of evidence never even shifted to
answering respondents. The Court finds no compelling reason
to disturb the appellate court's determination of the answering
respondents' role in the alleged enforced disappearance of
petitioner Lourdes and the threats to her family's security.
Notwithstanding the foregoing findings, the Court
notes that both Gen. Esperon and P/Dir. Gen. Razon, per their
separate affidavits, lost no time, upon their receipt of the
order to make a return on the writ, in issuing directives to the
concerned units in their respective commands for a thorough
probe of the case and in providing the investigators the
necessary support. As of this date, however, the investigations
have yet to be concluded with some definite findings and
recommendation.
As regards P/Supt. Romero and P/Insp. Gomez, the
Court is more than satisfied that they have no direct or
indirect hand in the alleged enforced disappearance of
Lourdes and the threats against her daughters. As police
officers, though, theirs was the duty to thoroughly investigate
the abduction of Lourdes, a duty that would include looking
into the cause, manner, and like details of the disappearance;
identifying witnesses and obtaining statements from them;
and following evidentiary leads, such as the Toyota Revo
vehicle with plate number XRR 428, and securing and
preserving evidence related to the abduction and the threats
that may aid in the prosecution of the person/s responsible. As
we said in Manalo, 33 the right to security, as a guarantee of
protection by the government, is breached by the superficial
and one-sided — hence, ineffective — investigation by the
military or the police of reported cases under their
jurisdiction. As found by the CA, the local police stations
concerned, including P/Supt. Roquero and P/Insp. Gomez, did
conduct a preliminary fact-finding on petitioners' complaint.
They could not, however, make any headway, owing to what
was perceived to be the refusal of Lourdes, her family, and
her witnesses to cooperate. Petitioners' counsel, Atty. Rex
J.M.A. Fernandez, provided a plausible explanation for his
clients and their witnesses' attitude, "[They] do not trust the
government agencies to protect them." 34 The difficulty
arising from a situation where the party whose complicity in
extra-judicial killing or enforced disappearance, as the case
may be, is alleged to be the same party who investigates it is
understandable, though.  ITSaHC
The seeming reluctance on the part of the Rubricos or
their witnesses to cooperate ought not to pose a hindrance to
the police in pursuing, on its own initiative, the investigation
in question to its natural end. To repeat what the Court said
in Manalo, the right to security of persons is a guarantee of
the protection of one's right by the government. And this
protection includes conducting effective investigations of
extra-legal killings, enforced disappearances, or threats of the
same kind. The nature and importance of an investigation are
captured in the Velasquez Rodriguez case, 35 in which the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights pronounced:
[The duty to investigate] must be undertaken
in a serious manner and not as a mere formality
preordained to be ineffective. An investigation must
have an objective and be assumed by the State as its
own legal duty, not a step taken by private interests
that depends upon the initiative of the victim or his
family or upon offer of proof, without an effective
search for the truth by the government. (Emphasis
added.)
This brings us to Mary Joy's charge of having been
harassed by respondent P/Insp. Gomez. With the view we
take of this incident, there is nothing concrete to support the
charge, save for Mary Joy's bare allegations of harassment.
We cite with approval the following self-explanatory excerpt
from the appealed CA decision:
 In fact, during her cross-examination, when
asked what specific act or threat P/Sr. Gomez (ret)
committed against her or her mother and sister, Mary
Joy replied "None . . ." 36 
IaSAHC
Similarly, there appears to be no basis for petitioners'
allegations about the OMB failing to act on their complaint
against those who allegedly abducted and illegally detained
Lourdes. Contrary to petitioners' contention, the OMB has
taken the necessary appropriate action on said complaint. As
culled from the affidavit 37 of the Deputy Overall
Ombudsman and the joint affidavits 38 of the designated
investigators, all dated November 7, 2007, the OMB had, on
the basis of said complaint, commenced criminal 39 and
administrative 40 proceedings, docketed as OMB-P-C-07-
0602-E and OMB-P-A 07-567-E, respectively, against
Cuaresma, Alfaro, Santana, Jonathan, and Sy/Reyes. The
requisite orders for the submission of counter-affidavits and
verified position papers had been sent out.
The privilege of the writ of amparo, to reiterate, is a
remedy available to victims of extra-judicial killings and
enforced disappearances or threats of similar nature,
regardless of whether the perpetrator of the unlawful act or
omission is a public official or employee or a private
individual. 
At this juncture, it bears to state that petitioners have
not provided the CA with the correct addresses of respondents
Cuaresma, Alfaro, Santana, Jonathan, and Sy/Reyes. The
mailed envelopes containing the petition for a writ of amparo
individually addressed to each of them have all been returned
unopened. And petitioners' motion interposed before the
appellate court for notice or service via publication has not
been accompanied by supporting affidavits as required by
the Rules of Court. Accordingly, the appealed CA partial
judgment — disposing of the underlying petition for a writ of
amparo without (1) pronouncement as to the accountability,
or lack of it, of the four non-answering respondents or (2)
outright dismissal of the same petition as to them — hews to
the prescription of Sec. 20 of the Amparo Rule on archiving
and reviving cases. 41 Parenthetically, petitioners have also
not furnished this Court with sufficient data as to where the
afore-named respondents may be served a copy of their
petition for review.
Apart from the foregoing considerations, the petition
did not allege ultimate facts as would link the OMB in any
manner to the violation or threat of violation of the
petitioners' rights to life, liberty, or personal security.
The privilege of the writ of amparo is envisioned
basically to protect and guarantee the rights to life, liberty,
and security of persons, free from fears and threats that vitiate
the quality of this life. 42 It is an extraordinary writ
conceptualized and adopted in light of and in response to the
prevalence of extra-legal killings and enforced
disappearances. 43 Accordingly, the remedy ought to be
resorted to and granted judiciously, lest the ideal sought by
the Amparo Rule be diluted and undermined by the
indiscriminate filing of amparo petitions for purposes less
than the desire to secure amparo reliefs and protection and/or
on the basis of unsubstantiated allegations.
In their petition for a writ of amparo, petitioners asked,
as their main prayer, that the Court order the impleaded
respondents "to immediately desist from doing any acts that
would threaten or seem to threaten the security of the
Petitioners and to desist from approaching Petitioners, . . .
their residences and offices where they are working under
pain of contempt of [this] Court." Petitioners, however, failed
to adduce the threshold substantive evidence to establish the
predicate facts to support their cause of action, i.e., the
adverted harassments and threats to their life, liberty, or
security, against responding respondents, as responsible for
the disappearance and harassments complained of. This is not
to say, however, that petitioners' allegation on the fact of the
abduction incident or harassment is necessarily contrived. The
reality on the ground, however, is that the military or police
connection has not been adequately proved either by
identifying the malefactors as components of the AFP or
PNP; or in case identification is not possible, by showing that
they acted with the direct or indirect acquiescence of the
government. For this reason, the Court is unable to ascribe the
authorship of and responsibility for the alleged enforced
disappearance of Lourdes and the harassment and threats on
her daughters to individual respondents. To this extent, the
dismissal of the case against them is correct and must,
accordingly, be sustained. ASHaTc
Prescinding from the above considerations, the Court
distinctly notes that the appealed decision veritably extended
the privilege of the writ of amparo to petitioners when it
granted what to us are amparo reliefs. Consider: the appellate
court decreed, and rightly so, that the police and the military
take specific measures for the protection of petitioners' right
or threatened right to liberty or security. The protection came
in the form of directives specifically to Gen. Esperon and
P/Dir. Gen. Razon, requiring each of them (1) to ensure that
the investigations already commenced by the AFP and PNP
units, respectively, under them on the complaints of Lourdes
and her daughters are being pursued with urgency to bring to
justice the perpetrators of the acts complained of; and (2) to
submit to the CA, copy furnished the petitioners, a regular
report on the progress and status of the investigations. The
directives obviously go to Gen. Esperon in his capacity as
head of the AFP and, in a sense, chief guarantor of order and
security in the country. On the other hand, P/Dir.
Gen. Razon is called upon to perform a duty pertaining to the
PNP, a crime-preventing, investigatory, and arresting
institution.
As the CA, however, formulated its directives, no
definitive time frame was set in its decision for the
completion of the investigation and the reportorial
requirements. It also failed to consider Gen. Esperon and
P/Dir. Gen. Razon's imminent compulsory retirement from
the military and police services, respectively. Accordingly,
the CA directives, as hereinafter redefined and amplified to
fully enforce the amparo remedies, are hereby given to, and
shall be directly enforceable against, whoever sits as the
commanding general of the AFP and the PNP.
At this stage, two postulates and their implications
need highlighting for a proper disposition of this case.
First, a criminal complaint for kidnapping and,
alternatively, for arbitrary detention rooted in the same acts
and incidents leading to the filing of the subject amparo
petition has been instituted with the OMB, docketed as OMB-
P-C-O7-0602-E. The usual initial steps to determine the
existence of a prima facie case against the five (5) impleaded
individuals suspected to be actually involved in the detention
of Lourdes have been set in motion. It must be pointed out,
though, that the filing 44 of the OMB complaint came before
the effectivity of the Amparo Rule on October 24, 2007.
Second, Sec. 22 45 of the Amparo Rule proscribes the
filing of an amparo petition should a criminal action have, in
the meanwhile, been commenced. The succeeding Sec.
23, 46 on the other hand, provides that when the criminal suit
is filed subsequent to a petition for amparo, the petition shall
be consolidated with the criminal action where the Amparo
Rule shall nonetheless govern the disposition of the relief
under the Rule. Under the terms of said Sec. 22, the present
petition ought to have been dismissed at the outset. But as
things stand, the outright dismissal of the petition by force of
that section is no longer technically feasible in light of the
interplay of the following factual mix: (1) the Court has,
pursuant to Sec. 6 47 of the Rule, already issued ex parte the
writ of amparo; (2) the CA, after a summary hearing, has
dismissed the petition, but not on the basis of Sec. 22; and (3)
the complaint in OMB-P-C-O7-0602-E named as respondents
only those believed to be the actual abductors of Lourdes,
while the instant petition impleaded, in addition, those tasked
to investigate the kidnapping and detention incidents and their
superiors at the top. Yet, the acts and/or omissions subject of
the criminal complaint and the amparo petition are so linked
as to call for the consolidation of both proceedings to obviate
the mischief inherent in a multiplicity-of-suits situation. 
IHCESD
Given the above perspective and to fully apply the
beneficial nature of the writ of amparo as an inexpensive and
effective tool to protect certain rights violated or threatened to
be violated, the Court hereby adjusts to a degree the literal
application of Secs. 22 and 23 of the Amparo Rule to fittingly
address the situation obtaining under the premises. 48 Towards
this end, two things are at once indicated: (1) the
consolidation of the probe and fact-finding aspects of the
instant petition with the investigation of the criminal
complaint before the OMB; and (2) the incorporation in the
same criminal complaint of the allegations in this petition
bearing on the threats to the right to security. Withal, the
OMB should be furnished copies of the investigation reports
to aid that body in its own investigation and eventual
resolution of OMB-P-C-O7-0602-E. Then, too, the OMB
shall be given easy access to all pertinent documents and
evidence, if any, adduced before the CA. Necessarily,
Lourdes, as complainant in OMB-P-C-O7-0602-E, should be
allowed, if so minded, to amend her basic criminal complaint
if the consolidation of cases is to be fully effective.
WHEREFORE, the Court PARTIALLY
GRANTS this petition for review and makes a decision:
(1) Affirming the dropping of President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo from the petition for a writ of
amparo;
(2) Affirming the dismissal of the amparo case as
against Gen. Hermogenes Esperon, and P/Dir. Gen.
Avelino Razon, insofar as it tended, under the command
responsibility principle, to attach accountability and
responsibility to them, as then AFP Chief of Staff and then
PNP Chief, for the alleged enforced disappearance of Lourdes
and the ensuing harassments allegedly committed against
petitioners. The dismissal of the petition with respect to the
OMB is also affirmed for failure of the petition to allege
ultimate facts as to make out a case against that body for the
enforced disappearance of Lourdes and the threats and
harassment that followed; and
(3) Directing the incumbent Chief of Staff, AFP, or his
successor, and the incumbent Director-General of the PNP, or
his successor, to ensure that the investigations already
commenced by their respective units on the alleged abduction
of Lourdes Rubrico and the alleged harassments and threats
she and her daughters were made to endure are pursued with
extraordinary diligence as required by Sec. 17 49 of
the Amparo Rule. They shall order their subordinate officials,
in particular, to do the following:
(a) Determine based on records, past and present,
the identities and locations of respondents
Maj. Darwin Sy, a.k.a. Darwin Reyes,
Jimmy Santana, Ruben Alfaro, Capt.
Angelo Cuaresma, and one Jonathan; and
submit certifications of this determination
to the OMB with copy furnished to
petitioners, the CA, and this Court; 
(b) Pursue with extraordinary diligence the
evidentiary leads relating to Maj. Darwin
 Sy and the Toyota Revo vehicle with Plate  (Rubrico v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 183871, [February
|||

No. XRR 428; and 18, 2010], 627 PHIL 37-100)

(c) Prepare, with the assistance of petitioners
and/or witnesses, cartographic sketches of
respondents Maj. Sy/Reyes, Jimmy
Santana, Ruben Alfaro, Capt. Angelo
Cuaresma, and a certain Jonathan to aid in
positively identifying and locating
them. CEDHTa

The investigations shall be completed not later than six

(6) months from receipt of this Decision; and within thirty
(30) days after completion of the investigations, the Chief of
Staff of the AFP and the Director-General of the PNP shall
submit a full report of the results of the investigations to the
Court, the CA, the OMB, and petitioners.
This case is accordingly referred back to the CA for
the purpose of monitoring the investigations and the actions
of the AFP and the PNP.
Subject to the foregoing modifications, the
Court AFFIRMS the partial judgment dated July 31, 2008 of
the CA.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, C.J., Corona, Nachura, Leonardo-de Castro,
Bersamin, Del Castillo, Abad, Villarama, Jr.,
Perez and Mendoza, JJ., concur. THIRD DIVISION
Carpio, J., I join the separate opinion of Justice Carpio
Morales. [A.M. No. RTJ-10-2236. July 5, 2010.]
(Formerly OCA I.P.I. NO. 09-3083-RTJ)
Carpio Morales, J., please see separate opinion.
Brion, J., please see separate opinion. RUBEN N. SALCEDO, complainant, vs.
JUDGE GIL G. BOLLOZOS, respondent.
Peralta, J., took no part.
 RESOLUTION
BRION, J  :
p
We pass upon the verified Letter-Complaint, dated
August 29, 2008, filed by Ruben N. Salcedo (complainant),
charging Judge Gil G. Bollozos (respondent judge), Presiding
Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 21, Cagayan de Oro
City, with Grave Misconduct and Ignorance of the Law in the
handling of SPEC. PROC. No. 2008-009, entitled "Jose
Tanmalack, Jr., represented by Jocelyn Tanmalack Tan v.
Police Officers of Police Precinct No. 3, Agora, Lapasan,
Cagayan De Oro City, and Insp. Wylen Rojo."
THE FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The complaint arose from a verified handwritten
petition for the Writ of Habeas Corpus and the Writ
of Amparo (the petition) filed by Jose Tanmalack, Jr. against
the Police Officers of Police Precinct No. 3, Agora, Lapasan,
Cagayan de Oro City, and Inspector Wylen Rojo. The
complainant alleged that he is a co-owner of a parcel of land
(disputed property) covered by Original Certificate of Title
No. O-740 and registered in the name of Patricio Salcedo.
The disputed property is about 126,112 square meters wide
and is situated in Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro City.
On January 23, 2008 at around 2:30 p.m., while the
complainant (together with his niece Rebecca R. Lumbay and
his nephew Alan Jose P. Roa) was supervising an on-going
construction over the disputed property, Tanmalack and
heavily armed men arrived and forced themselves inside the
fenced premises of the disputed property. The complainant
averred that Tanmalack and his companions harassed and
threatened to kill and to harm him and his workers; that
Tanmalack uttered defamatory statements and accused him of
land-grabbing; and that Tanmalack and his companions
occupied the property and destroyed building materials such
as G.I. sheets, lumber and other construction materials.
The complainant forthwith reported the incident to the
nearby police station. The police promptly responded and
arrested Tanmalack and brought him in for questioning. That
same afternoon at around 4:45 p.m., Tanmalack, represented
by his sister, Jocelyn Tanmalack Tan, filed the petition 1 on
his behalf while Tanmalack was detained by the police for
employing "self-help in preventing squatters from putting up
improvements in their titled property."
Clerk of Court Atty. Herlie Luis-Requerme narrated
the circumstances surrounding the filing of the petition and
how it came to be referred to the respondent judge's sala, as
follows: 
TIEHSA
1. In the late afternoon of January 23, 2008, a
query was received by the Office regarding the
procedure in filing a petition for a Writ of Amparo.
We gave the information that the established
procedure is to assign cases to the different branches
by raffling or in urgent cases, by a special raffle upon
proper motions. But since the office has not received
any case of that nature yet, and as the schedule of
raffling will still be in the afternoon of the next day, it
will be referred to the Executive Judge for instruction
and or appropriate action;
2. That since the Executive Judge was on
leave, I went to consult the 1st Vice Executive Judge
Evelyn Gamotin Nery. Since Judge Nery was busy at
that time, I went to see 2nd Vice Executive Judge Ma.
Anita Esguerra-Lucagbo;
3. That I clarified from Judge Lucagbo the
procedure to be adopted under the Rule on the Writ of
Amparo (A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC);
 4. That the issue if any judge can immediately
act on the petition was not clearly stated in the Rule
but if the case will be referred to her as the 2nd Vice
Executive Judge, she will be willing to look at the
petition;
5. That when I went back at the Office at a
little past 5:00 P.M. already, direct from the chamber
of Judge Lucagbo, I found out that a Petition for Writ
of Amparo was filed at around 4:45 P.M. as stamped
in the petition;
6. That since I was out of the office, the
Docket Clerk in charge, Mr. Rudy Exclamador,
referred the case to the Administrative Officer Mary
Lyn Charisse Lagamon;
7. That thinking I was no longer around as the
personnel to whom I left the information that I was
going to the sala of 1st Vice Executive Judge Nery
was not able to inform the Admin. Officer of my
whereabouts, Mr. Exclamador was instructed by her
to refer the case to you [referring to the respondent
judge];
8. That upon learning of the fact, I
immediately called Mr. Exclamador and Ms.
Lagamon to explain why they referred the case to
your sala without any instruction from me;
9. That they said that they are of the honest
belief that I was no longer around; that the lawyer was
insisting to refer the case immediately to a judge since
it is already 5:00 P.M. and considering the novelty,
urgency and importance of the case, and fearing that
no judge will be left to act on the petition if they still
discuss what to do, Mr. Exclamador, with the
concurrence of Admin. Officer Lagamon, referred the
case to you since your sala was the nearest to our
office, it being adjacent to your court;
10. That there is nobody from this Office who
brought the handwritten petition to Judge Lucagbo
nor was there any instruction from her to any of the
personnel to have the petition conform to a form
acceptable to the court, such fact was confirmed by
Judge Lucagbo;
11. That the office only acted what it deemed
best under the circumstances and was not motivated
by any ill motive or malice. 2
Based on the petition and answers to the clarificatory
questions propounded to Tanmalack's representative and
counsel, the respondent judge immediately issued a Writ
of Amparo dated January 23, 2008, directing "the police
officers of Agora Police Station 3 or Insp. Wylen Rojo . . . to
release immediately upon receipt of [the] writ but not later
than 6:00 P.M. today, petitioner Jose Tanmalack, Jr., to the
custody of Atty. Francis V. Ku." The respondent judge also
directed the police officers to file their verified return to the
petition within five (5) working days, together with
supporting affidavits, in conformity with Section 9 of the
Rule on the Writ of Amparo.
Around 5:30 p.m., the Writ of Amparo was served
upon SPO3 Aener O. Adajar, PNP Chief Investigator. At six
o'clock in the evening of that same day, the police released
Tanmalack to the custody of Atty. Francis Ku.
In his complaint, the complainant questions the
issuance of the Writ of Amparo which he claims had been
unusually issued with haste. The complainant claims that the
handwritten petition did not give any ground to warrant the
issuance of the Writ of Amparo; that the respondent judge
acted with grave abuse of discretion, bias, and obvious
partiality, and in grave disregard of the Rules and the rule of
law when he acted upon and granted the letter-petition for the
issuance of the Writ of Amparo. The complainant also alleges
that the respondent judge "accommodated" the issuance of the
Writ of Amparo because he and Atty. Francis Ku
(Tanmalack's counsel) are members of the Masonic fraternity.
The respondent judge filed his Comment dated March
30, 2009, in compliance with the directive of the Office of the
Court Administrator (OCA). In his defense, he alleged:  TcIAHS
(f) [A]lthough the Amparo rules mandate that a judge
(a) [W]hen he received the petition from the Office of
the Clerk of Court, he had no option but to
exercise his judicial duty without any bias or
partiality, nor did he consider that the
petitioner's counsel is a fraternal brother
(Mason);
(b) [A]lthough the petition is for the issuance of both
writ of amparo and writ of habeas corpus, he
deemed it more in consonance with the [Rule
on the Writ of Amparo];
(c) [I]t was not improper even if the . . . petition was
not raffled, and was immediately assigned to
his sala by the Office of the Clerk of Court,
since Par. 2, Sec. 3 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-
SC states that any judge of a Regional Trial
Court (RTC) can issue a writ and the said Sec.
3 further states that it can be filed on any day
and at any time;
(d) [T]he person who filed the petition is the sister of
Mr. Tanmalack who was detained at the Agora
Police Station, Cagayan de Oro City; that the
issuance of the writ was a matter of great
urgency because the alleged illegal
deprivation of liberty was made in the late
afternoon of January 23, 2008, which was a
Friday, and that if the Court would not act on
the petition, the detainee would certainly
spend the night in jail;
(e) [T]he petition, although in handwritten form, is
not improper because Section 5 of the SC
Circular (on the Writ of Amparo) only
requires that the same be signed and verified;
that he found the petition sufficient in form
and in substance;
shall immediately order the issuance of the
writ if on its face it ought to issue, he
propounded clarificatory questions on the
petitioner's representative and their counsel,
thus, the following information were elicited:
1) That the property of petitioner's family,
which is under their possession and
Tanmalack registered under TCT No.
T-1627491, was intruded by some
persons who wanted to fence the area
and put up improvements by
constructing "shanties" thereon;
2) That when petitioner Mr. Tanmalack
prevented the intrusion it resulted to
heated arguments and altercations
which prompted him to go to the
police station to report the incident and
be blottered;
3) That when Mr. Tanmalack arrived at the
police station in the late afternoon of
January 23, 2008 in order to air his
complaint, the intruders came and
introduced themselves as the owners of
the property;
4) That when Police Officer Rojo (Rojo) heard
the version of these intruders and
despite the protestations of petitioner
and his relatives, the police did not
anymore allow Mr. Tanmalack to leave
the police station; and,
 5) That petitioner's counsel called up Rojo to
secure the immediate release of his
client from police custody but to no
avail.
(g) [A]fter he assiduously evaluated the aforestated
facts, as well as the allegations in the petition,
respondent Judge, in the exercise of his
judicial function, found that the same
warranted the issuance of the writ; the arrest
of Mr. Tanmalack was unlawful because Rojo
was not present in the area where the alleged
incident happened, so that the statements of
the complainants (Salcedo, Lumbay and Roa)
would be hearsay; 
(h) [I]n the Writ of Amparo the respondents were
directed to file a verified return pursuant to the
rules; during the summary hearing of the
petition on 25 January 2008, it was only Rojo
who appeared, the alleged complainants
(Salcedo, Lumbay and Roa) who caused the
detention of the petitioner were absent; P/Insp.
Rojo, when asked by the Court, gave the
following answers:  IcDCaS
1) That he would no longer file his Answer
(which should be a verified return) on
the complaint considering that the
petitioner was already released;
2) That he confirmed that it was the petitioner
who came first to the police station to
complain, followed by the person who
wanted to fence the property; the
conflict between the petitioner and the
other persons is on a property dispute,
of which it was petitioner who is in
possession; and
3) That he denied that he had arrested the
petitioner and neither did he detain him
but only he could not release the
petitioner because of the complaint and
for further evaluation.
(i) [H]e noted that the police blotter did not state that
petitioner brought heavily armed men with
him when he allegedly harassed the
complainant.
[(j) That in the summary hearing on January 25, 2008,
the petitioner as well as the respondent Rojo
have arrived into an agreement that the writ be
considered permanent.]
THE REPORT OF THE OCA
The OCA informed the Court that the case was already
ripe for resolution in a Report dated April 8, 2010, signed by
Court Administrator Jose Midas P. Marquez and Deputy
Court Administrator Raul Bautista Villanueva. The Report
likewise presented a brief factual background of the case.
The OCA recommended that the administrative
complaint against the respondent judge be dismissed for lack
of merit. The recommendation was based on an evaluation
which reads:
EVALUATION: The complaint is bereft of
merit.
The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy
available to any person whose right to life, liberty and
security is violated or threatened with violation by an
unlawful act or omission of a public official or
employee, as in the instant case, or of a private
individual or entity. Whereas in other jurisdictions the
writ covers only actual violations, the Philippine
version is more protective of the right to life, liberty
 and security because it covers both actual
and threatened violations of such rights.
Nowhere in the records of the instant
complaint that the issuance of the writ of amparo was
attended by irregularities. The detainee's sister who
filed the petition is allowed under Section 2(b) of the
Rule on the Writ of Amparo (SC A.M. No. 07-9-12-
SC). Also, the petition was properly filed with the
Regional Trial Court "where the act or omission was
committed or where any of its elements occurred."
Respondent Judge, in whose sala the said
petition was assigned is deemed to have complied
with his oath and judicial duty when he ordered the
issuance of the writ of amparo upon determination
that the right to liberty of Mr. Tanmalack was being
violated or threatened to be violated. These is no
showing that respondent Judge, in granting the
petition for a writ of amparo was motivated by bad
faith, ignominy or ill will, thus, herein complainant's
allegation that respondent Judge's act was tainted with
grave abuse of discretion and authority, bias and
partiality, and grave disregard of the rules, deserves
scant consideration.
This Office agrees with respondent Judge's
observation that "Rojo's declaration not anymore to
contest the petition and that he (Rojo) did not arrest
nor detain petitioner, but admitted that he could not
release the latter for further evaluation because of the
complaint is an admission that he deprived [or
threatened to deprive] Jose [Dy Tanmalack] of his
liberty."
OUR RULING
We concur with the OCA's recommendation that the
administrative complaint against the respondent judge be
dismissed for lack of merit.
At the outset, we agree with the complainant that the
respondent judge erred in issuing the Writ of Amparo in
Tanmalack's favor. Had he read Section 1 of the Rule on the
Writ of Amparo more closely, the respondent judge would
have realized that the writ, in its present form, only applies to
"extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats
thereof." 3 The present case involves concerns that are purely
property and commercial in nature — concerns that we have
previously ruled are not covered by the Writ
of Amparo. 4 In Tapuz  v. Del Rosario, 5 we held:  SAHEIc
To start off with the basics, the writ of amparo
was originally conceived as a response to the
extraordinary rise in the number of killings and
enforced disappearances, and to the perceived lack of
available and effective remedies to address these
extraordinary concerns. It is intended to address
violations of or threats to the rights to life, liberty or
security, as an extraordinary and independent remedy
beyond those available under the prevailing Rules, or
as a remedy supplemental to these Rules. What it is
not, is a writ to protect concerns that are purely
property or commercial. Neither is it a writ that
we shall issue on amorphous and uncertain
grounds. Consequently, the Rule on the Writ of
Amparo — in line with the extraordinary character of
the writ and the reasonable certainty that its issuance
demands — requires that every petition for the
issuance of the writ must be supported by justifying
allegations of fact, to wit:
"(a) The personal circumstances of the
petitioner;
(b) The name and personal circumstances of
the respondent responsible for the threat, act or
omission, or, if the name is unknown or uncertain, the
respondent may be described by an assumed
appellation;
 (c) The right to life, liberty and security of
the aggrieved party violated or threatened with
violation by an unlawful act or omission of the
respondent, and how such threat or violation is
committed with the attendant circumstances detailed
in supporting affidavits;
(d)  The investigation conducted, if any,
specifying the names, personal circumstances, and
addresses of the investigating authority or
individuals, as well as the manner and conduct of
the investigation, together with any report;
(e) The actions and recourses taken by the
petitioner to determine the fate or whereabouts of
the aggrieved party and the identity of the person
responsible for the threat, act or omission; and
(f) The relief prayed for.
The petition may include a general prayer for
other just and equitable reliefs."
The writ shall issue if the Court is
preliminarily satisfied with the prima facie existence
of the ultimate facts determinable from the supporting
affidavits that detail the circumstances of how and to
what extent a threat to or violation of the rights to life,
liberty and security of the aggrieved party was or is
being committed.
In the present case, the Writ of Amparo ought not to
have been issued by the respondent judge since Tanmalack's
petition is fatally defective in substance and content, as it
does not allege that he is a victim of "extralegal killings and
enforced disappearances or the threats thereof." The petition
merely states that he is "under threat of deprivation of liberty
with the police stating that he is not arrested but merely 'in
custody.'" 6
Whether the respondent judge could be held
administratively liable for the error he committed in the
present case, is, however, a question we must answer in the
negative.
Plainly, the errors attributed to respondent judge
pertain to the exercise of his adjudicative functions. As a
matter of policy, in the absence of fraud, dishonesty, and
corruption, the acts of a judge in his official capacity are not
subject to disciplinary action. He cannot be subjected to
liability — civil, criminal, or administrative — for any of his
official acts, no matter how erroneous, as long as he acts in
good faith. Only judicial errors tainted with fraud,
dishonesty, gross ignorance, bad faith, or deliberate intent to
do an injustice will be administratively sanctioned. Settled is
the rule that errors committed by a judge in the exercise of his
adjudicative functions cannot be corrected through
administrative proceedings, but should instead be assailed
through judicial remedies. 7
In the present case, the propriety of the issuance of the
Writ of Amparo cannot be raised as an issue in the present
administrative case. The proper recourse for the complainant
should have been to file an appeal, from the final judgment or
order of the respondent judge, to this Court under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court, pursuant to Section 19 of the Rule on the
Writ of Amparo. In Bello III  v. Diaz, 8 we reiterated that
disciplinary proceedings against judges do not complement,
supplement, or substitute judicial remedies, whether ordinary
or extraordinary; an inquiry into their administrative liability
arising from judicial acts may be made only after other
available remedies have been settled. We laid down
the rationale for the rule in Flores  v. Abesamis, 9 viz.:
As everyone knows, the law provides ample
judicial remedies against errors or irregularities being
committed by a Trial Court in the exercise of its
jurisdiction. The ordinary remedies against errors or
irregularities which may be regarded as normal in
nature (i.e., error in appreciation or admission of
evidence, or in construction or application of
procedural or substantive law or legal principle)
include a motion for reconsideration (or after
rendition of a judgment or final order, a motion for
new trial), and appeal. The extraordinary remedies
against error or irregularities which may be deemed
extraordinary in character (i.e., whimsical, capricious,
despotic exercise of power or neglect of duty, etc.)
are, inter alia the special civil actions
of certiorari, prohibition or mandamus, or a motion
for inhibition, a petition for change of venue, as the
case may be. DTaSIc
Now, the established doctrine and policy is
that disciplinary proceedings and criminal actions
against Judges are not complementary or suppletory
of, nor a substitute for, these judicial remedies,
whether ordinary or extraordinary. Resort to and
exhaustion of these judicial remedies, as well as the
entry of judgment in the corresponding action or
proceeding, are pre-requisites for the taking of other
measures against the persons of the judges concerned,
whether of civil, administrative, or criminal nature. It
is only after the available judicial remedies have been
exhausted and the appellate tribunals have spoken
with finality, that the door to an inquiry into his
criminal, civil, or administrative liability may be said
to have opened, or closed.  of the Masonic fraternity does not justify or prove that the
Flores resorted to administrative prosecution
(or institution of criminal actions) as a substitute for
or supplement to the specific modes of appeal or
review provided by law from court judgments or
orders, on the theory that the Judges' orders had
caused him "undue injury." This is impermissible, as
this Court has already more than once ruled. Law and
logic decree that "administrative or criminal
remedies are neither alternative nor cumulative to
judicial review where such review is available, and
must wait on the result thereof." Indeed, since
judges must be free to judge, without pressure or
influence from external forces or factors, they should
not be subject to intimidation, the fear of civil,
criminal or administrative sanctions for acts they may
do and dispositions they may make in the
performance of their duties and functions; and it is
sound rule, which must be recognized independently
of statute, that judges are not generally liable for acts
done within the scope of their jurisdiction and in good
faith; and that exceptionally, prosecution of the
judge can be had only if "there be a final
declaration by a competent court in some
appropriate proceeding of the manifestly unjust
character of the challenged judgment or order,
and . . . also evidence of malice or bad faith,
ignorance or inexcusable negligence, on the part of
the judge in rendering said judgment or order" or
under the stringent circumstances set out in
Article 32 of the Civil Code. 10
We note, too, that although the respondent judge erred
in issuing the Writ of Amparo, we find, as the OCA did, that
there is no evidence on record that supports the complainant's
allegation that the issuance was tainted with manifest bias and
partiality, bad faith, or gross ignorance of the law. The fact
that the respondent judge and Atty. Francis Ku are members
former acted with bias and partiality. Bias and partiality can
never be presumed and must be proved with clear and
convincing evidence. While palpable error may be inferred
from respondent judge's issuance of the Writ of Amparo, there
is no evidence on record that would justify a finding of
partiality or bias. The complainant's allegation of partiality
will not suffice in the absence of a clear and convincing proof
that will overcome the presumption that the respondent judge
dispensed justice according to law and evidence, without fear
or favor. 11
Likewise, bad faith or malice cannot be inferred
simply because the judgment is adverse to a party. To hold a
judge administratively accountable simply because he erred in
his judgment has never been the intent of the law; reasonable
competence and good faith judgments, not complete
infallibility, are what the law requires.
The more significant issue in this case is the
complainant's charge of gross ignorance of the law against the
respondent judge.
A patent disregard of simple, elementary and well-
known rules constitutes gross ignorance of the law. Judges
are expected to exhibit more than just cursory acquaintance
with laws and procedural rules. They must know the law and
apply it properly in good faith. They are likewise expected to
keep abreast of prevailing jurisprudence. For, a judge who is
plainly ignorant of the law taints the noble office and great
privilege vested in him. 12
We find that the respondent judge's error does not rise
to the level of gross ignorance of the law that is defined by
jurisprudence. We take judicial notice of the fact that at the
time he issued the Writ of Amparo on January 23, 2008, the
Rule on the Writ of Amparo has been effective for barely
three months (The Rule on the Writ of Amparo became
effective on October 24, 2007). At that time, the respondent
judge cannot be said to have been fully educated and
informed on the novel aspects of the Writ of Amparo. Simply
stated, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo at that time cannot be
said to be a simple, elementary, and well-known rule that its
patent disregard would constitute gross ignorance of the law.
More importantly, for full liability to attach for
ignorance of the law, the assailed order, decision or actuation
of the judge in the performance of official duties must not
only be found to be erroneous; it must be established that he
was motivated by bad faith, dishonesty, hatred or some other
similar motive. 13 In the present case, the complainant failed
to prove by substantial evidence that the respondent judge
was motivated by bad faith and bias or partiality in the
issuance of the Writ of Amparo.
We take this occasion, however, to remind the
respondent judge that under Canon 1.01 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct, a judge must be "the embodiment of
competence, integrity and independence." A judge is called
upon to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with
statutes and procedural rules; it is imperative that he be
conversant with basic legal principles and be aware of well-
settled authoritative doctrines. He owes to the public and to
this Court the duty to be proficient in the law. He is expected
to keep abreast of laws and prevailing jurisprudence. Judges
must not only render just, correct, and impartial decisions,
resolutions, and orders, but must do so in a manner free of
any suspicion as to their fairness, impartiality, and integrity,
for good judges are men who have mastery of the principles
of law and who discharge their duties in accordance with
law. 14 We mentioned all these to emphasize to the respondent
judge the need to be more judicious and circumspect in the
issuance of extraordinary writs such as the Writ
of Amparo.  STcHEI
We also reiterate that in an administrative proceeding,
the complainant has the burden of proving the allegations in
the complaint by substantial evidence. 15 We cannot give
credence to charges based on mere suspicion or speculation.
Hence, when the complainant relies on mere conjectures and
suppositions, and fails to substantiate his claim, as in this
case, the administrative complaint must be dismissed for lack
of merit. 16
 WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the
Court RESOLVES to DISMISS the administrative complaint
against Judge Gil G. Bollozos, Presiding Judge, Regional
Trial Court, Branch 21, Cagayan de Oro City, for lack of
merit.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio Morales, Bersamin, Abad  * and Villarama, Jr.,
JJ., concur.
 (Salcedo v. Bollozos, A.M. No. RTJ-10-2236 (Resolution), [July
|||
5, 2010], 637 PHIL 27-45)
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 182498. December 3, 2009.]
GEN. AVELINO I. RAZON, JR., Chief,
Philippine National Police (PNP); Police Chief
Superintendent RAUL CASTAÑEDA, Chief,
Criminal Investigation and Detection Group
(CIDG); Police Senior Superintendent
LEONARDO A. ESPINA, Chief, Police Anti-
Crime and Emergency Response (PACER);
and GEN. JOEL R. GOLTIAO, Regional
Director of ARMM, PNP, petitioners, vs.
MARY JEAN B. TAGITIS, herein represented
by ATTY. FELIPE P. ARCILLA, JR.,
Attorney-in-Fact, respondent.

DECISION

BRION, J  :
p

We review in this petition for review

on certiorari 1 the decision dated March 7, 2008 of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in C.A-G.R. AMPARO No. 00009. 2 This
CA decision confirmed the enforced disappearance of
Engineer Morced N. Tagitis (Tagitis) and granted the Writ
of Amparo at the petition of his wife, Mary Jean
B. Tagitis (respondent). The dispositive portion of the CA
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered,
petition is hereby GRANTED. The Court
hereby FINDS that this is an "enforced
disappearance" within the meaning of the United
 Nations instruments, as used in the Amparo Rules.
The privileges of the writ of amparo are hereby
extended to Engr. Morced Tagitis.
Consequently: (1) respondent GEN.
EDGARDO M. DOROMAL, Chief, Criminal
Investigation and Detention Group (CIDG) who
should order COL. JOSE VOLPANE
PANTE, CIDG-9 Chief, Zamboanga City, to aid him;
(2) respondent GEN. AVELINO I. RAZON, Chief,
PNP, who should order his men, namely: (a)
respondent GEN. JOEL GOLTIAO, Regional
Director of ARMM PNP, (b) COL. AHIRON
AJIRIM, both head of TASK FORCE TAGITIS, and
(c) respondent SR. SUPERINTENDENT
LEONARDO A. ESPINA, Chief, Police Anti-Crime
and Emergency Response, to aid him as their
superior- are hereby DIRECTED to
exert extraordinary diligence and efforts, not only
to protect the life, liberty and security of Engr.
Morced Tagitis, but also to extend the privileges of
the writ of amparo to Engr. Morced Tagitis and his
family, and to submit a monthly report of their actions
to this Court, as a way of PERIODIC REVIEW to
enable this Court to monitor the action of
respondents.
This amparo case is
hereby DISMISSED as to respondent LT.
GEN. ALEXANDER YANO, Commanding
General, Philippine Army, and as to
respondent GEN. RUBEN RAFAEL, Chief
Anti-Terror Task Force Comet, Zamboanga
City, both being with the military, which is a
separate and distinct organization from the
police and the CIDG, in terms of operations,
chain of command and budget.  TIaCHA
This Decision reflects the nature of the Writ
of Amparo — a protective remedy against violations or
threats of violation against the rights to life, liberty and
security. 3 It embodies, as a remedy, the court's directive to
police agencies to undertake specified courses of action to
address the disappearance of an individual, in this case,
Engr. Morced N. Tagitis. It does not determine guilt nor
pinpoint criminal culpability for the disappearance; rather, it
determines responsibility, or at least accountability, for the
enforced disappearance for purposes of imposing the
appropriate remedies to address the
disappearance. Responsibility refers to the extent the actors
have been established by substantial evidence to have
participated in whatever way, by action or omission, in an
enforced disappearance, as a measure of the remedies this
Court shall craft, among them, the directive to file the
appropriate criminal and civil cases against the responsible
parties in the proper courts. Accountability, on the other
hand, refers to the measure of remedies that should be
addressed to those who exhibited involvement in the enforced
disappearance without bringing the level of their complicity
to the level of responsibility defined above; or who are
imputed with knowledge relating to the enforced
disappearance and who carry the burden of disclosure; or
those who carry, but have failed to discharge, the burden of
extraordinary diligence in the investigation of the enforced
disappearance. In all these cases, the issuance of the Writ
of Amparo is justified by our primary goal of addressing the
disappearance, so that the life of the victim is preserved and
his liberty and security are restored.
We highlight this nature of a Writ of Amparo case at
the outset to stress that the unique situations that call for the
issuance of the writ, as well as the considerations and
measures necessary to address these situations, may not at all
be the same as the standard measures and procedures in
ordinary court actions and proceedings. In this sense, the Rule
on the Writ of Amparo  4 (Amparo Rule) issued by this Court
 is unique. The Amparo Rule should be read, too, as a work in
progress, as its directions and finer points remain to evolve
through time and jurisprudence and through the substantive
laws that Congress may promulgate.
THE FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS
The background facts, based on the petition and the
records of the case, are summarized below.
The established facts show that Tagitis, a consultant
for the World Bank and the Senior Honorary Counselor for
the Islamic Development Bank (IDB) Scholarship
Programme, was last seen in Jolo, Sulu. Together with
Arsimin Kunnong (Kunnong), an IDB scholar, Tagitis arrived
in Jolo by boat in the early morning of October 31, 2007 from
a seminar in Zamboanga City. They immediately checked-in
at ASY Pension House. Tagitis asked Kunnong to buy him a
boat ticket for his return trip the following day to Zamboanga.
When Kunnong returned from this errand, Tagitis was no
longer around. 5 The receptionist related that Tagitis went out
to buy food at around 12:30 in the afternoon and even left his
room key with the desk. 6 Kunnong looked for Tagitis and
even sent a text message to the latter's Manila-based secretary
who did not know of Tagitis' whereabouts and activities
either; she advised Kunnong to simply wait. 7
On November 4, 2007, Kunnong and Muhammad
Abdulnazeir N. Matli, a UP professor of Muslim studies
and Tagitis' fellow student counselor at the IDB,
reported Tagitis' disappearance to the Jolo Police
Station. 8 On November 7, 2007, Kunnong executed a sworn
affidavit attesting to what he knew of the circumstances
surrounding Tagitis' disappearance. 9
More than a month later (on December 28, 2007), the
respondent filed a Petition for the Writ
of Amparo (petition) with the CA through her Attorney-in-
Fact, Atty. Felipe P. Arcilla. 10 The petition was directed
against Lt. Gen. Alexander Yano, Commanding General,
Philippine Army; Gen. Avelino I. Razon, Chief, Philippine
National Police (PNP); Gen. Edgardo M. Doromal, Chief,
Criminal Investigation and Detention Group (CIDG); Sr.
Supt. Leonardo A. Espina, Chief, Police Anti-Crime and
Emergency Response; Gen. Joel Goltiao, Regional Director,
ARMM-PNP; and Gen. Ruben Rafael, Chief, Anti-Terror
Task Force Comet [collectively referred to as petitioners].
After reciting Tagitis' personal circumstances and the facts
outlined above, the petition went on to state:  aCHDST
xxx xxx xxx
7. Soon after the student left the room,
Engr. Tagitis went out of the pension house to take
his early lunch but while out on the street, a couple of
burly men believed to be police intelligence
operatives, forcibly took him and boarded the
latter on a motor vehicle then sped away without
the knowledge of his student, Arsimin Kunnong;
8. As instructed, in the late afternoon of the
same day, Kunnong returned to the pension house,
and was surprised to find out that subject
Engr. Tagitis cannot [sic] be contacted by phone and
was not also around and his room was closed and
locked;
9. Kunnong requested for the key from the
desk of the pension house who [sic] assisted him to
open the room of Engr. Tagitis, where they
discovered that the personal belongings of
Engr. Tagitis, including cell phones, documents and
other personal belongings were all intact inside the
room;
10. When Kunnong could not locate
Engr. Tagitis, the former sought the help of another
IDB scholar and reported the matter to the local
police agency;
 11. Arsimin Kunnong including his friends
and companions in Jolo, exerted efforts in trying to
locate the whereabouts of Engr. Tagitis and when he
reported the matter to the police authorities in Jolo, he
was immediately given a ready answer that
Engr. Tagitis could have been abducted by the Abu
Sayyaf group and other groups known to be fighting
against the government;
12. Being scared with [sic] these suggestions
and insinuations of the police officers, Kunnong
reported the matter to the [respondent, wife of
Engr. Tagitis] by phone and other responsible officers
and coordinators of the IDB Scholarship Programme
in the Philippines, who alerted the office of the
Governor of ARMM who was then preparing to
attend the OIC meeting in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia;
13. [Respondent], on the other hand,
approached some of her co-employees with the Land
Bank in Digos branch, Digos City, Davao del Sur
who likewise sought help from some of their friends
in the military who could help them find/locate the
whereabouts of her husband;
14. All of these efforts of the [respondent] did
not produce any positive results except the
information from persons in the military who do not
want to be identified that Engr. Tagitis is in the hands
of the uniformed men;
15. According to reliable information received
by the [respondent], subject Engr. Tagitis is in the
custody of police intelligence operatives,
specifically with the CIDG, PNP Zamboanga City,
being held against his will in an earnest attempt of
the police to involve and connect
Engr. Tagitis with the different terrorist
groups;  CSEHcT
xxx xxx xxx
17. [Respondent] filed her complaint with the
PNP Police Station in the ARMM in Cotabato * and
in Jolo, as suggested by her friends, seeking their help
to find her husband, but [respondent's] request and
pleadings failed to produce any positive results; 
18. Instead of helping the [respondent], she
[sic] was told of an intriguing tale by the police that
her husband, subject of the petition, was not missing
but was with another woman having good time
somewhere, which is a clear indication of the
[petitioners'] refusal to help and provide police
assistance in locating her missing husband;
19. The continued failure and refusal of the
[petitioners] to release and/or turn-over subject
Engr. Tagitis to his family or even to provide truthful
information to [the respondent] of the subject's
whereabouts, and/or allow [the respondent] to visit
her husband Engr. Morced Tagitis, caused so much
sleepless nights and serious anxieties;
20. Lately, [the respondent] was again advised
by one of the [petitioners] to go to the ARMM Police
Headquarters again in Cotobato * City and also to the
different Police Headquarters including [those] in
Davao City, in Zamboanga City, in Jolo, and in Camp
Crame, Quezon City, and all these places have been
visited by the [respondent] in search for her husband,
which entailed expenses for her trips to these places
thereby resorting her to borrowings and
beggings [sic]  for financial help from friends and
relatives only to try complying [sic] to the different
suggestions of these police officers, despite of which,
her efforts produced no positive results up to the
present time;
21. In fact at times, some police officers, who
[sympathized with] the sufferings undergone by the
[respondent], informed her that they are not the
 proper persons that she should approach, but assured
her not to worry because her husband is [sic]  in good
hands;
22. The unexplained uncooperative behavior
of the [petitioners] to the [respondent's] request for
help and failure and refusal of the [petitioners] to
extend the needed help, support and assistance in
locating the whereabouts of Engr. Tagitis who had
been declared missing since October 30, 2007 which
is almost two (2) months now, clearly indicates that
the [petitioners] are actually in physical possession
and custody of [respondent's] husband, Engr. Tagitis;
xxx xxx xxx
25. [The respondent] has exhausted all
administrative avenues and remedies but to no avail,
and under the circumstances, [the respondent] has no
other plain, speedy and adequate remedy to protect
and get the release of subject Engr.
Morced Tagitis from the illegal clutches of the
[petitioners], their intelligence operatives and the like
which are in total violation of the subject's human and
constitutional rights, except the issuance of a WRIT
OF AMPARO. [Emphasis supplied]
On the same day the petition was filed, the CA
immediately issued the Writ of Amparo, set the case for
hearing on January 7, 2008, and directed the petitioners to file
their verified return within seventy-two (72) hours from
service of the writ. 11
In their verified Return filed during the hearing of
January 27, 2008, the petitioners denied any involvement in
or knowledge of Tagitis' alleged abduction. They argued that
the allegations of the petition were incomplete and did not
constitute a cause of action against them; were baseless, or at
best speculative; and were merely based on hearsay
evidence. 12
The affidavit of PNP Chief Gen. Avelino I. Razon,
attached to the Return, stated that: he did not have any
personal knowledge of, or any participation in, the alleged
disappearance; that he had been designated by President
Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as the head of a special body called
TASK FORCE USIG, to address concerns about extralegal
killings and enforced disappearances; the Task Force, inter
alia, coordinated with the investigators and local police, held
case conferences, rendered legal advice in connection to these
cases; and gave the following summary: 13
xxx xxx xxx
4.
a) On November 5, 2007, the Regional
Director, Police Regional Office ARMM submitted a
report on the alleged disappearance of one Engr.
Morced Tagitis. According to the said report, the
victim checked-in at ASY Pension House on October
30, 2007 at about 6:00 in the morning and then
roamed around Jolo, Sulu with an unidentified
companion. It was only after a few days when the said
victim did not return that the matter was reported to
Jolo MPS. Afterwards, elements of Sulu PPO
conducted a thorough investigation to trace and locate
the whereabouts of the said missing person, but to no
avail. The said PPO is still conducting investigation
that will lead to the immediate findings of the
whereabouts of the person.
b) Likewise, the Regional Chief, 9RCIDU
submitted a Progress Report to the Director, CIDG.
The said report stated among others that: subject
person attended an Education Development Seminar
set on October 28, 2007 conducted at Ateneo de
Zamboanga, Zamboanga City together with a Prof.
Matli. On October 30, 2007, at around 5:00 o'clock in
the morning, Engr. Tagitis reportedly arrived at Jolo
Sulu wharf aboard M/V Bounty Cruise, he was then
 billeted at ASY Pension House. At about 6:15 o'clock
in the morning of the same date, he instructed his
student to purchase a fast craft ticket bound for
Zamboanga City and will depart from Jolo, Sulu on
October 31, 2007. That on or about 10:00 o'clock in
the morning, Engr. Tagitis left the premises of ASY
Pension House as stated by the cashier of the said
pension house. Later in the afternoon, the student
instructed to purchase the ticket arrived at the pension
house and waited for Engr. Tagitis, but the latter did
not return. On its part, the elements of 9RCIDU is
now conducting a continuous case build up and
information gathering to locate the whereabouts of
Engr. Tagitis. 
DAcSIC
c) That the Director, CIDG directed the
conduct of the search in all divisions of the CIDG to
find Engr. Tagitis who was allegedly abducted or
illegally detained by covert CIDG-PNP Intelligence
Operatives since October 30, 2007, but after diligent
and thorough search, records show that no such
person is being detained in CIDG or any of its
department or divisions.
5. On this particular case, the Philippine
National Police exhausted all possible efforts, steps
and actions available under the circumstances and
continuously search and investigate [sic] the instant
case. This immense mandate, however, necessitates
the indispensable role of the citizenry, as the PNP
cannot stand alone without the cooperation of the
victims and witnesses to identify the perpetrators to
bring them before the bar of justice and secure their
conviction in court.
The petitioner PNP-CIDG Chief, Gen. Edgardo M.
Doromal, submitted as well his affidavit, also attached to the
Return of the Writ, attesting that upon receipt of the Writ
of Amparo, he caused the following: 14
xxx xxx xxx
That immediately upon receipt on December
29, 2007 of the Resolution of the Honorable Special
Fourth Division of the Court of Appeals, I
immediately directed the Investigation Division of
this Group [CIDG] to conduct urgent investigation on
the alleged enforced disappearance of Engineer
Morced Tagitis.
That based on record, Engr. Morced
N. Tagitis attended an Education Development
Seminar on October 28, 2007 at Ateneo de
Zamboanga at Zamboanga City together with Prof.
Abdulnasser Matli. On October 30, 2007, at around
six o'clock in the morning he arrived at Jolo, Sulu. He
was assisted by his student identified as Arsimin
Kunnong of the Islamic Development Bank who was
also one of the participants of the said seminar. He
checked in at ASY pension house located [sic]
Kakuyagan, Patikul, Sulu on October 30, 2007 with
[sic] unidentified companion. At around six o'clock in
the morning of even date, Engr. Tagitis instructed his
student to purchase a fast craft ticket for Zamboanga
City. In the afternoon of the same date, Kunnong
arrived at the pension house carrying the ticket he
purchased for Engr. Tagitis, but the latter was
nowhere to be found anymore. Kunnong immediately
informed Prof. Abdulnasser Matli who reported the
incident to the police. The CIDG is not involved in
the disappearance of Engr. Morced Tagitis to make
out a case of an enforced disappearance which
presupposes a direct or indirect involvement of the
government.
That herein [petitioner] searched all divisions
and departments for a person named Engr. Morced
N. Tagitis, who was allegedly abducted or illegally
detained by covert CIDG-PNP Intelligence
Operatives since October 30, 2007 and after a diligent
 and thorough research records show that no such
person is being detained in CIDG or any of its
department or divisions.
That nevertheless, in order to determine the
circumstances surrounding Engr. Morced Tagitis [sic]
alleged enforced disappearance, the undersigned had
undertaken immediate investigation and will pursue
investigations up to its full completion in order to aid
in the prosecution of the person or persons
responsible therefore.
Likewise attached to the Return of the Writ was PNP-
PACER 15 Chief PS Supt. Leonardo A. Espina's affidavit
which alleged that: 16
xxx xxx xxx
That, I and our men and women in PACER
vehemently deny any participation in the alleged
abduction or illegally [sic] detention of ENGR.
MORCED N. TAGITS on October 30, 2007. As a
matter of fact, nowhere in the writ was mentioned that
the alleged abduction was perpetrated by elements of
PACER nor was there any indication that
the alleged abduction or illegal detention of ENGR.
TAGITIS was undertaken jointly by our men and by
the alleged covert CIDG-PNP intelligence
operatives alleged to have abducted or illegally
detained ENGR. TAGITIS.
That I was shocked when I learned that I was
implicated in the alleged disappearance of ENGR.
MORCED in my capacity as the chief PACER
[sic] considering that our office, the Police Anti-
Crime and Emergency Response (PACER), a special
task force created for the purpose of neutralizing or
eradicating kidnap-for-ransom groups which until
now continue to be one of the menace of our society
is a respondent in kidnapping or illegal detention
case. Simply put, our task is to go after kidnappers
and charge them in court and to abduct or illegally
detain or kidnap anyone is anathema to our mission. 
That right after I learned of the receipt of the
WRIT OF AMPARO, I directed the Chief of PACER
Mindanao Oriental (PACER-MOR) to conduct pro-
active measures to investigate, locate/search the
subject, identify and apprehend the persons
responsible, to recover and preserve evidence related
to the disappearance of ENGR. MORCED TAGITIS,
which may aid in the prosecution of the person or
persons responsible, to identify witnesses and obtain
statements from them concerning the disappearance
and to determine the cause, manner, location and time
of disappearance as well as any pattern or practice
that may have brought about the disappearance.
That I further directed the chief of PACER-
MOR, Police Superintendent JOSE ARNALDO
BRIONES JR., to submit a written report regarding
the disappearance of ENGR. MORCED.
That in compliance with my directive, the
chief of PACER-MOR sent through fax his written
report.
That the investigation and measures being
undertaken to locate/search the subject in
coordination with Police Regional Office,
Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (PRO-
ARMM) and Jolo Police Provincial Office (PPO) and
other AFP and PNP units/agencies in the area are
ongoing with the instruction not to leave any stone
unturned so to speak in the investigation until the
perpetrators in the instant case are brought to the bar
of justice.
That I have exercised EXTRAORDINARY
DILIGENCE in dealing with the WRIT
OF AMPARO just issued.
 Finally, the PNP PRO ARMM Regional Director PC
Supt. Joel R. Goltiao (Gen. Goltiao), also submitted his
affidavit detailing the actions that he had taken upon receipt
of the report on Tagitis' disappearance, viz.: 17
xxx xxx xxx
3) For the record:
1. I am the Regional Director of Police
Regional Office ARMM now and during the time of
the incident;
xxx xxx xxx
4. It is my duty to look into and take
appropriate measures on any cases of reported
enforced disappearances and when they are being
alluded to my office;
5. On November 5, 2007, the Provincial
Director of Sulu Police Provincial Office reported to
me through Radio Message Cite No. SPNP3-1105-07-
2007 that on November 4, 2007 at around 3:30 p.m., a
certain Abdulnasser Matli, an employee of Islamic
Development Bank, appeared before the Office of the
Chief of Police, Jolo Police Station, and reported the
disappearance of Engr. Morced Tagitis, scholarship
coordinator of Islamic Development Bank, Manila;
6. There was no report that Engr. Tagibis was
last seen in the company of or taken by any member
of the Philippine National Police but rather he just
disappeared from ASY Pension House situated at
Kakuyagan Village, Village, * Patikul, Sulu, on
October 30, 2007, without any trace of forcible
abduction or arrest;
7. The last known instance of communication
with him was when Arsimin Kunnong, a student
scholar, was requested by him to purchase a vessel
ticket at the Office of Weezam Express, however,
when the student returned back to ASY Pension
House, he no longer found Engr. Tagitis there and
when he immediately inquired at the information
counter regarding his whereabouts [sic], the person in
charge in the counter informed him that
Engr. Tagitis had left the premises on October 30,
2007 around 1 o'clock p.m. and never returned back
to his room; 
aAHSEC
8. Immediately after learning the incident, I
called and directed the Provincial Director of Sulu
Police Provincial Office and other units through
phone call and text messages to conduct investigation
[sic] to determine the whereabouts of the aggrieved
party and the person or persons responsible for the
threat, act or omission, to recover and preserve
evidence related to the disappearance of Engr. Tagitis,
to identify witnesses and obtain statements from them
concerning his disappearance, to determine the cause
and manner of his disappearance, to identify and
apprehend the person or persons involved in the
disappearance so that they shall be brought before a
competent court;
9. Thereafter, through my Chief of the
Regional Investigation and Detection Management
Division, I have caused the following directives:
a) Radio Message Cite No. RIDMD-1122-07-
358 dated November 22, 2007
directing PD Sulu PPO to conduct
joint investigation with CIDG and
CIDU ARMM on the matter;
b) Radio Message Cite No. RIDMD-1128-07-
361 dated November 28, 2007
directing PD Sulu PPO to expedite
compliance to my previous directive;
c) Memorandum dated December 14, 2007
addressed to PD Sulu PPO reiterating
 our series of directives for
investigation and directing him to
undertake exhaustive coordination
efforts with the owner of ASY Pension
House and student scholars of IDB in
order to secure corroborative
statements regarding the disappearance
and whereabouts of said personality;
d) Memorandum dated December 24, 2007
addressed to PD Sulu PPO directing
him to maximize efforts to establish
clues on the whereabouts of
Engr. Tagitis by seeking the
cooperation of Prof. Abdulnasser Matli
and Arsimin Kunnong and/or
whenever necessary, for them to
voluntarily submit for polygraph
examination with the NBI so as to
expunge all clouds of doubt that they
may somehow have knowledge or idea
to his disappearance;
e) Memorandum dated December 27, 2007
addressed to the Regional Chief,
Criminal Investigation and Detection
Group, Police Regional Office 9,
Zamboanga City, requesting assistance
to investigate the cause and unknown
disappearance of
Engr. Tagitis considering that it is
within their area of operational
jurisdiction;
f) Memorandum from Chief, Intelligence
Division, PRO ARMM dated
December 30, 2007 addressed to PD
Sulu PPO requiring them to submit
complete investigation report
regarding the case of Engr. Tagitis;
10. In compliance to our directives, PD Sulu
PPO has exerted his [sic] efforts to conduct
investigation [sic] on the matter to determine the
whereabouts of Engr. Tagitis and the circumstances
related to his disappearance and submitted the
following:
a) Progress Report dated November 6, 2007
through Radio Message Cite No.
SPNP3-1106-10-2007;
b) Radio Message Cite No. SPIDMS-1205-47-
07 informing this office that they are
still monitoring the whereabouts of
Engr. Tagitis;
c) Investigation Report dated December 31,
2007 from the Chief of Police, Jolo
Police Station, Sulu PPO;
11. This incident was properly reported to the
PNP Higher Headquarters as shown in the following:
a) Memorandum dated November 6, 2007
addressed to the Chief, PNP informing
him of the facts of the disappearance
and the action being taken by our
office;
b) Memorandum dated November 6, 2007
addressed to the Director, Directorate
for Investigation and Detection
Management, NHQ PNP;
c) Memorandum dated December 30, 2007
addressed to the Director, DIDM;
4) In spite of our exhaustive efforts, the
whereabouts of Engr. Tagitis cannot be determined
but our office is continuously intensifying the conduct
of information gathering, monitoring and coordination
for the immediate solution of the case.
 Since the disappearance of Tagistis * was practically
admitted and taking note of favorable actions so far taken on the
disappearance, the CA directed Gen. Goltiao — as the officer in
command of the area of disappearance — to form TASK FORCE
TAGITIS. 18
Task Force Tagitis
On January 11, 2008, Gen. Goltiao designated PS
Supt. Ahiron Ajirim (PS Supt. Ajirim) to head TASK FORCE
TAGITIS. 19 The CA subsequently set three hearings to
monitor whether TASK FORCE TAGITIS was exerting
"extraordinary efforts" in handling the disappearance
of Tagitis. 20 As planned, (1) the first hearing would be to
mobilize the CIDG, Zamboanga City; (2) the second hearing
would be to mobilize intelligence with Abu Sayyaf and
ARMM; and (3) the third hearing would be to mobilize the
Chief of Police of Jolo, Sulu and the Chief of Police of
Zamboanga City and other police operatives. 21
In the hearing on January 17, 2008, TASK FORCE
TAGITIS submitted to the CA an intelligence report from
PSL Usman S. Pingay, the Chief of Police of the Jolo Police
Station, stating a possible motive for Tagitis'
disappearance. 22 The intelligence report was apparently
based on the sworn affidavit dated January 4, 2008 of
Muhammad Abdulnazeir N. Matli (Prof. Matli), Professor of
Islamic Studies at the University of the Philippines and an
Honorary Student Counselor of the IDB Scholarship Program
in the Philippines, who told the Provincial Governor of Sulu
that: 23
[Based] on reliable information from the
Office of Muslim Affairs in Manila, Tagitis has
reportedly taken and carried away . . . more or less
Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00) deposited and
entrusted to his . . . [personal] bank accounts by the
Central Office of IDB, Jeddah, Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia, which [was] intended for the . . . IDB
Scholarship Fund.  HDTISa
In the same hearing, PS Supt. Ajirim testified that
since the CIDG was alleged to be responsible, he personally
went to the CIDG office in Zamboanga City to conduct an
ocular inspection/investigation, particularly of their detention
cells. 24 PS Supt. Ajirim stated that the CIDG, while helping
TASK FORCE TAGITIS investigate the disappearance
of Tagitis, persistently denied any knowledge or complicity in
any abduction. 25 He further testified that prior to the hearing,
he had already mobilized and given specific instructions to
their supporting units to perform their respective tasks; that
they even talked to, but failed to get any lead from the
respondent in Jolo. 26 In his submitted investigation report
dated January 16, 2008, PS Supt. Ajirim concluded: 27
9. Gleaned from the undersigned inspection
and observation at the Headquarters 9 RCIDU and the
documents at hand, it is my own initial conclusion
that the 9RCIDU and other PNP units in the area had
no participation neither [sic] something to do
with [sic] mysterious disappearance of Engr.
Morced Tagitis last October 30, 2007. Since doubt
has been raised regarding the emolument on the
Islamic Development Bank Scholar program of IDB
that was reportedly deposited in the personal account
of Engr. Tagitis by the IDB central office in Jeddah,
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Secondly, it could
might [sic] be done by resentment or sour grape
among students who are applying for the
scholar [sic] and were denied which was allegedly
conducted/screened by the subject being the
coordinator of said program. 
20. It is also premature to conclude but it does
or it may and [sic] presumed that the motive behind
the disappearance of the subject might be due to the
funds he maliciously spent for his personal interest
 and wanted to elude responsibilities from the
institution where he belong as well as to the Islamic
student scholars should the statement of Prof. Matli
be true or there might be a professional jealousy
among them.
xxx xxx xxx
It is recommended that the Writ
of Amparo filed against the respondents be dropped
and dismissed considering on [sic] the police and
military actions in the area particularly the CIDG are
exerting their efforts and religiously doing their
tasked [sic] in the conduct of its intelligence
monitoring and investigation for the early resolution
of this instant case. But rest assured, our office, in
coordination with other law-enforcement agencies in
the area, are continuously and religiously conducting
our investigation for the resolution of this case.
On February 4, 2008, the CA issued an ALARM
WARNING that Task Force Tagitis did not appear to be
exerting extraordinary efforts in resolving Tagitis'
disappearance on the following grounds: 28
(1) This Court FOUND that it was only as late
as January 28, 2008, after the hearing, that GEN.
JOEL GOLTIAO and COL. AHIRON AJIRIM had
requested for clear photographs when it should have
been standard operating procedure in kidnappings or
disappearances that the first agenda was for the police
to secure clear pictures of the missing person, Engr.
Morced Tagitis, for dissemination to all parts of the
country and to neighboring countries. It had been
three (3) months since GEN. JOEL GOLTIAO
admitted having been informed on November 5, 2007
of the alleged abduction of Engr. Morced Tagitis by
alleged bad elements of the CIDG. It had been more
than one (1) month since the Writ of Amparo had
been issued on December 28, 2007. It had been three
(3) weeks when battle formation was ordered
through Task Force Tagitis, on January 17, 2008. It
was only on January 28, 2008 when the Task
Force Tagitis requested for clear and recent
photographs of the missing person, Engr.
Morced Tagitis, despite the Task Force Tagitis' claim
that they already had an "all points bulletin", since
November 5, 2007, on the missing person, Engr.
Morced Tagitis. How could the police look for
someone who disappeared if no clear photograph had
been disseminated?
(2) Furthermore, Task Force Tagitis' COL.
AHIROM AJIRIM informed this Court that P/Supt
KASIM was designated as Col. Ahirom Ajirim's
replacement in the latter's official designated post.
Yet, P/Supt KASIM's subpoena was returned to this
Court unserved. Since this Court was made to
understand that it was P/Supt KASIM who was the
petitioner's unofficial source of the military
intelligence information that Engr.
Morced Tagitis was abducted by bad elements of the
CIDG (par. 15 of the Petition), the close contact
between P/Supt KASIM and Col. Ahirom Ajirim of
TASK FORCE TAGITIS should have ensured the
appearance of Col. KASIM in response to this court's
subpoena and COL. KASIM could have confirmed
the military intelligence information that bad elements
of the CIDG had abducted Engr. Morced Tagitis.
Testimonies for the Respondent
On January 7, 2008, the respondent, Mary Jean
B. Tagitis, testified on direct examination that she went to
Jolo and Zamboanga in her efforts to locate her husband. She
said that a friend from Zamboanga holding a high position in
the military (whom she did not then identify) gave her
information that allowed her to "specify" her allegations,
"particularly paragraph 15 of the petition". 29 This friend also
told her that her husband "[was] in good hands". 30 The
respondent also testified that she sought the assistance of her
former boss in Davao City, Land Bank Bajada Branch
Manager Rudy Salvador, who told her that "PNP CIDG is
holding [her husband], Engineer Morced Tagitis". 31 The
respondent recounted that she went to Camp Katitipan in
Davao City where she met Col. Julasirim Ahadin Kasim (Col.
Kasim/Sr. Supt Kasim) who read to her and her friends (who
were then with her) a "highly confidential report" that
contained the "alleged activities of Engineer Tagitis" and
informed her that her husband was abducted because "he is
under custodial investigation" for being a liaison for "J.I. or
Jema'ah Islamiah". 32
On January 17, 2008, the respondent on cross-
examination testified that she is Tagitis' second wife, and they
have been married for thirteen years; Tagitis was divorced
from his first wife. 33 She last communicated with her
husband on October 29, 2007 at around 7:31 p.m. through
text messaging; Tagitis was then on his way to Jolo, Sulu,
from Zamboanga City. 34
The respondent narrated that she learned of her
husband's disappearance on October 30, 2007 when her
stepdaughter, Zaynah Tagitis (Zaynah), informed her that she
had not heard from her father since the time they arranged to
meet in Manila on October 31, 2007. 35 The respondent
explained that it took her a few days (or on November 5,
2007) to personally ask Kunnong to report her husband's
disappearance to the Jolo Police Station, since she had the
impression that her husband could not communicate with her
because his cellular phone's battery did not have enough
power, and that he would call her when he had fully-charged
his cellular phone's battery. 36 
cADaIH
The respondent also identified the high-ranking
military friend, who gave her the information found in
paragraph 15 of her petition, as Lt. Col. Pedro L. Ancanan,
Jr. (Col. Ancanan). She met him in Camp Karingal,
Zamboanga through her boss. 37 She also testified that she
was with three other people, namely, Mrs. Marydel Martin
Talbin and her two friends from Mati City, Davao Oriental,
when Col. Kasim read to them the contents of the "highly
confidential report" at Camp Katitipan, Davao City. The
respondent further narrated that the report indicated that her
husband met with people belonging to a terrorist group and
that he was under custodial investigation. She then told Col.
Kasim that her husband was a diabetic taking maintenance
medication, and asked that the Colonel relay to the persons
holding him the need to give him his medication. 38
On February 11, 2008, TASK FORCE TAGITIS
submitted two narrative reports, 39 signed by the respondent,
detailing her efforts to locate her husband which led to her
meetings with Col. Ancanan of the Philippine Army and Col.
Kasim of the PNP. In her narrative report concerning her
meeting with Col. Ancanan, the respondent recounted, viz.: 40
On November 11, 2007, we went to
Zamboanga City with my friend Mrs. Marydel Talbin.
Our flight from Davao City is 9:00 o'clock in the
morning; we arrived at Zamboanga Airport at around
10:00 o'clock. We [were] fetched by the two staffs of
Col. Ancanan. We immediately proceed [sic] to West
Mindanao Command (WESTMINCOM).
On that same day, we had private conversation
with Col. Ancanan. He interviewed me and got
information about the personal background of Engr.
Morced N. Tagitis. After he gathered all information,
he revealed to us the contents of text messages they
got from the cellular phone of the subject
Engr. Tagitis. One of the very important text
messages of Engr. Tagitis sent to his daughter
Zaynah Tagitis was that she was not allowed to
answer any telephone calls in his condominium unit.
 While we were there he did not tell us any
information of the whereabouts of Engr. Tagitis. After
the said meeting with Col. Ancanan, he treated us as
guests to the city. His two staffs accompanied us to
the mall to purchase our plane ticket going back to
Davao City on November 12, 2007.
When we arrived in Davao City on November
12, 2007 at 9:00 in the morning, Col. Ancanan and I
were discussing some points through phone calls. He
assured me that my husband is alive and he's last
looked [sic] in Talipapao, Jolo, Sulu. Yet I did not
believe his given statements of the whereabouts of my
husband, because I contacted some of my friends who
have access to the groups of MILF, MNLF and ASG.
I called up Col. Ancanan several times begging to tell
me the exact location of my husband and who held
him but he refused.
While I was in Jolo, Sulu on November 30,
2007, I called him up again because the PNP, Jolo did
not give me any information of the whereabouts of
my husband. Col. Ancanan told me that "Sana
ngayon alam mo na kung saan ang kinalalagyan ng
asawa mo". When I was in Zamboanga, I was
thinking of dropping by the office of Col. Ancanan,
but I was hesitant to pay him a visit for the reason that
the Chief of Police of Jolo told me not to contact any
AFP officials and he promised me that he can solve
the case of my husband (Engr. Tagitis) within nine
days.
I appreciate the effort of Col. Ancanan on
trying to solve the case of my husband Engr.
Morced Tagitis, yet failed to do so.
The respondent also narrated her encounter with Col.
Kasim, as follows: 41
On November 7, 2007, I went to Land Bank of
the Philippines, Bajada Branch, Davao City to meet
Mr. Rudy Salvador. I told him that my husband,
Engineer Morced Tagitis was presumed to be
abducted in Jolo, Sulu on October 30, 2007. I asked
him a favor to contact his connections in the military
in Jolo, Sulu where the abduction of
Engr. Tagitis took place. Mr. Salvador immediately
called up Camp Katitipan located in Davao City
looking for high-ranking official who can help me
gather reliable information behind the abduction of
subject Engineer Tagitis.
On that same day, Mr. Salvador and my
friend, Anna Mendoza, Executive Secretary,
accompanied me to Camp Katitipan to meet Col.
Kasim. Mr. Salvador introduced me to Col. Kasim
and we had a short conversation. And he assured me
that he'll do the best he can to help me find my
husband.
After a few weeks, Mr. Salvador called me up
informing me up informing me that I am to go to
Camp Katitipan to meet Col. Kasim for he has an
urgent, confidential information to reveal.  
On November 24, 2007, we went back to
Camp Katitipan with my three friends. That was the
time that Col. Kasim read to us the confidential report
that Engr. Tagitis was allegedly connected [with]
different terrorist [groups], one of which he
mentioned in the report was OMAR PATIK and a
certain SANTOS — a Balik Islam.
It is also said that Engr. Tagitis is carrying
boxes of medicines for the injured terrorists as a
supplier. These are the two information that I can still
remember. It was written in a long bond paper with
PNP Letterhead. It was not shown to us, yet Col.
Kasim was the one who read it for us.
He asked a favor to me that "Please don't
quote my Name! Because this is a raw report". He
 assured me that my husband is alive and he is in the
custody of the military for custodial investigation. I
told him to please take care of my husband because he
has aliments * and he recently took insulin for he is a
diabetic patient.
In my petition for writ of amparo, I On cross-examination, Mrs. Talbin clarified that the
emphasized the information that I got from Kasim.
On February 11, 2008, the respondent presented Mrs.
Marydel Martin Talbin (Mrs. Talbin) to corroborate her
testimony regarding her efforts to locate her husband, in
relation particularly with the information she received from
Col. Kasim. Mrs. Talbin testified that she was with the
respondent when she went to Zamboanga to see Col.
Ancanan, and to Davao City at Camp Katitipan to meet Col.
Kasim. 42
In Zamboanga, Mrs. Talbin recounted that they met
with Col. Ancanan, who told them that there was a report and
that he showed them a series of text messages from Tagitis'
cellular phone, which showed that Tagitis and his daughter
would meet in Manila on October 30, 2007. 43
She further narrated that sometime on November 24,
2007, she went with the respondent together with two other
companions, namely, Salvacion Serrano and Mini Leong, to
Camp Katitipan to talk to Col. Kasim. 44 The respondent
asked Col. Kasim if he knew the exact location of
Engr. Tagitis. Col. Kasim told them that Tagitis was in good
hands, although he was not certain whether he was with the
PNP or with the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). She
further recounted that based on the report Col. Kasim read in
their presence, Tagitis was under custodial investigation
because he was being charged with terrorism; Tagitis in fact
had been under surveillance since January 2007 up to the time
he was abducted when he was seen talking to Omar Patik and
a certain Santos of Bulacan, a "Balik Islam" charged with
terrorism. Col. Kasim also told them that he could not give a
copy of the report because it was a "raw report". 45 She also
related that the Col. Kasim did not tell them exactly
where Tagitis was being kept, although he mentioned
Talipapao, Sulu. 46
"raw report" read to them by Col. Kasim indicated
that Tagitis was last seen in Talipapao, Sulu. 47
Testimonies for the Petitioner
On January 28, 2008, on cross-examination by the
Assistant Solicitor General, Prof. Matli submitted a new
affidavit dated January 26, 2008 retracting the statements he
made in his affidavit dated January 4, 2008. Prof. Matli
testified that he relunctantly signed the January 4, 2008
affidavit which was prepared by PS Supt. Pingay of the Jolo
Police Station; he didn't want Pingay "to be disappointed or to
be hold as not cooperating with the investigation" of Tagitis'
disappearance. 48 Prof. Matli confirmed that he
knew Tagitis personally, as both of them were Honorary
Councilors in the IDB Scholarship program since the
1980s. 49 He recounted that after reporting Tagitis'
disappearance to the Jolo Police Station (where he also
executed the January 4, 2008 affidavit), a certain Nuraya
Lackian who was working in the Office Muslim Affairs in
Manila called Cecille Chan, Tagitis' secretary, to inquire
about Tagitis' whereabouts. Chan told him personally over the
phone that "Prof., lalabas din yan." 50 Prof. Matli also
emphasized that despite what his January 4, 2008 affidavit
indicated, 51 he never told PS Supt. Pingay, or made any
accusation, that Tagitis took away money entrusted to
him. 52 Prof. Matli confirmed, however, that that he had
received an e-mail report 53 from Nuraya Lackian of the
Office of Muslim Affairs in Manila that the IDB was seeking
assistance of the office in locating the funds of IDB scholars
deposited in Tagitis' personal account. 54
On cross-examination by the respondent's counsel,
Prof. Matli testified that his January 4, 2008 affidavit was
already prepared when PS Supt. Pingay asked him to sign
it. 55 Prof. Matli clarified that although he read the affidavit
before signing it, he "was not so much aware of . . . [its]
contents". 56
On February 11, 2008, the petitioners presented Col.
Kasim to rebut material portions of the respondent's
testimony, particularly the allegation that he had stated
that Tagitis was in the custody of either the military or the
PNP. 57 Col. Kasim categorically denied the statements made
by the respondent in her narrative report, specifically: (1)
that Tagitis was seen carrying boxes of medicines as supplier
for the injured terrorists; (2) that Tagitis was under the
custody of the military, since he merely said to the
respondent that "your husband is in good hands" and is
"probably taken cared of by his armed abductors"; and
(3) that Tagitis was under custodial investigation by the
military, the PNP or the CIDG Zamboanga City. 58 Col.
Kasim emphasized that the "informal letter" he received from
his informant in Sulu did not indicate that Tagitis was in the
custody of the CIDG. 59 He also stressed that the information
he provided to the respondent was merely a "raw report"
sourced from "barangay intelligence" that still needed
confirmation and "follow-up" as to its veracity. 60
On cross-examination, Col. Kasim testified that the
information he gave the respondent was given to him by his
informant, who was a "civilian asset", through a letter which
he considered as "unofficial". 61 Col. Kasim stressed that the
letter was only meant for his "consumption" and not for
reading by others. 62 He testified further that he destroyed the
letter right after he read it to the respondent and her
companions because “it was not important to him— and also
because the information it contained had no importance in
relation with the abduction of Tagitis. 63 He explained that he
did not keep the letter because it did not contain any
information regarding the whereabouts of Tagitis and the
person(s) responsible for his abduction. 64 
IaTSED
In the same hearing on February 11, 2008, the
petitioners also presented Police Senior Superintendent Jose
Volpane Pante (Col. Pante), Chief of the CIDG-9, to disprove
the respondent's allegation that Tagitis was in the custody of
CIDG-Zamboanga City. 65 Col. Pante clarified that the CIDG
was the "investigative arm" of the PNP, and that the CIDG
"investigates and prosecutes all cases involving violations in
the Revised Penal Code particularly those considered as
heinous crimes". 66 Col. Pante further testified that the
allegation that 9 RCIDU personnel were involved in the
disappearance of Tagitis was baseless, since they did not
conduct any operation in Jolo, Sulu before or after Tagitis'
reported disappearance. 67 Col. Pante added that the four (4)
personnel assigned to the Sulu CIDT had no capability to
conduct any "operation", since they were only assigned to
investigate matters and to monitor the terrorism
situation. 68 He denied that his office conducted any
surveillance on Tagitis prior to the latter's
disappearance. 69 Col. Pante further testified that his
investigation of Tagitis' disappearance was unsuccessful; the
investigation was "still facing a blank wall" on the
whereabouts of Tagitis. 70
THE CA RULING
On March 7, 2008, the CA issued its
decision 71 confirming that the disappearance of Tagitis was
an "enforced disappearance" under the United Nations (UN)
Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced
Disappearances. 72 The CA ruled that when military
intelligence pinpointed the investigative arm of the PNP
(CIDG) to be involved in the abduction, the missing-person
case qualified as an enforced disappearance. The conclusion
that the CIDG was involved was based on the respondent's
testimony, corroborated by her companion, Mrs. Talbin. The
CA noted that the information that the CIDG, as the police
intelligence arm, was involved in Tagitis' abduction came
from no less than the military — an independent agency of
government. The CA thus greatly relied on the "raw report"
from Col. Kasim's asset, pointing to the CIDG's involvement
in Tagitis' abduction. The CA held that "raw reports" from an
"asset" carried "great weight" in the intelligence world. It also
labeled as "suspect" Col. Kasim's subsequent and belated
retraction of his statement that the military, the police, or the
CIDG was involved in the abduction of Tagitis.
The CA characterized as "too farfetched and
unbelievable" and "a bedlam of speculation" police theories
painting the disappearance as "intentional" on the part
of Tagitis. He had no previous brushes with the law or any
record of overstepping the bounds of any trust regarding
money entrusted to him; no student of the IDB scholarship
program ever came forward to complain that he or she did not
get his or her stipend. The CA also found no basis for the
police theory that Tagitis was "trying to escape from the
clutches of his second wife", on the basis of the respondent's
testimony that Tagitis was a Muslim who could have many
wives under the Muslim faith, and that there was "no issue" at
all when the latter divorced his first wife in order to marry the
second. Finally, the CA also ruled out kidnapping for ransom
by the Abu Sayyaf or by the ARMM paramilitary as the cause
for Tagitis' disappearance, since the respondent, the police
and the military noted that there was no acknowledgement
of Tagitis' abduction or demand for payment of ransom — the
usual modus operandi of these terrorist groups.  
Based on these considerations, the CA thus extended
the privilege of the writ to Tagitis and his family, and directed
the CIDG Chief, Col. Jose Volpane Pante, PNP Chief Avelino
I. Razon, Task Force Tagitis heads Gen. Joel Goltiao and Col.
Ahiron Ajirim, and PACER Chief Sr. Supt. Leonardo A.
Espina to exert extraordinary diligence and efforts to protect
the life, liberty and security of Tagitis, with the obligation to
provide monthly reports of their actions to the CA. At the
same time, the CA dismissed the petition against the then
respondents from the military, Lt. Gen. Alexander Yano and
Gen. Ruben Rafael, based on the finding that it was PNP-
CIDG, not the military, that was involved.
On March 31, 2008, the petitioners moved to
reconsider the CA decision, but the CA denied the motion in
its Resolution of April 9, 2008. 73
THE PETITION
In this Rule 45 appeal questioning the CA's March 7,
2008 decision, the petitioners mainly dispute the sufficiency
in form and substance of the Amparo petition filed before the
CA; the sufficiency of the legal remedies the respondent took
before petitioning for the writ; the finding that the rights to
life, liberty and security of Tagitis had been violated; the
sufficiency of evidence supporting the conclusion
that Tagitis was abducted; the conclusion that the CIDG
Zamboanga was responsible for the abduction; and, generally,
the ruling that the respondent discharged the burden of
proving the allegations of the petition by substantial
evidence. 74
THE COURT'S RULING
We do not find the petition meritorious.
Sufficiency in Form and Substance
In questioning the sufficiency in form and substance of
the respondent's Amparo petition, the petitioners contend that
the petition violated Section 5(c), (d), and (e) of
the Amparo Rule. Specifically, the petitioners allege that the
respondent failed to:
1) allege any act or omission the petitioners
committed in violation of Tagitis' rights to
life, liberty and security;
2) allege in a complete manner how Tagitis was
abducted, the persons responsible for his
disappearance, and the respondent's source
of information;
3) allege that the abduction was committed at the
petitioners' instructions or with their
consent;
4) implead the members of CIDG regional office
in Zamboanga alleged to have custody
over her husband;
5) attach the affidavits of witnesses to support her
accusations;
6) allege any action or inaction attributable to the
petitioners in the performance of their
duties in the investigation of Tagitis'
disappearance; and
7) specify what legally available efforts she took
to determine the fate or whereabouts of her
husband.  DAaIEc
A petition for the Writ of Amparo shall be signed and
verified and shall allege, among others (in terms of the
portions the petitioners cite): 75
(c) The right to life, liberty and security of
the aggrieved party violated or threatened with
violation by an unlawful act or omission of the
respondent, and how such threat or violation is
committed with the attendant circumstances
detailed in supporting affidavits;
(d) The investigation conducted, if any,
specifying the names, personal circumstances, and
addresses of the investigating authority or
individuals, as well as the manner and conduct of
the investigation, together with any report;
(e) The actions and recourses taken by the
petitioner to determine the fate or whereabouts of
the aggrieved party and the identity of the person
responsible for the threat, act or omission; and
The framers of the Amparo Rule never intended
Section 5 (c) to be complete in every detail in stating the
threatened or actual violation of a victim's rights. As in any
other initiatory pleading, the pleader must of course state the
ultimate facts constituting the cause of action, omitting the
evidentiary details. 76 In an Amparo petition, however, this
requirement must be read in light of the nature and purpose of
the proceeding, which addresses a situation of uncertainty; the
petitioner may not be able to describe with certainty how the
victim exactly disappeared, or who actually acted to kidnap,
abduct or arrest him or her, or where the victim is detained,
because these information may purposely be hidden or
covered up by those who caused the disappearance. In this
type of situation, to require the level of specificity, detail and
precision that the petitioners apparently want to read into
the Amparo Rule is to make this Rule a token gesture of
judicial concern for violations of the constitutional rights to
life, liberty and security.
To read the Rules of Court requirement on pleadings
while addressing the unique Amparo situation, the test in
reading the petition should be to determine whether it
contains the details available to the petitioner under the
circumstances, while presenting a cause of action showing a
violation of the victim's rights to life, liberty and security
through State or private party action. The petition should
likewise be read in its totality, rather than in terms of its
isolated component parts, to determine if the required
elements — namely, of the disappearance, the State or private
action, and the actual or threatened violations of the rights to
life, liberty or security — are present.
In the present case, the petition amply recites in its
paragraphs 4 to 11 the circumstances under
which Tagitis suddenly dropped out of sight after engaging in
normal activities, and thereafter was nowhere to be found
despite efforts to locate him. The petition alleged, too, under
its paragraph 7, in relation to paragraphs 15 and 16, that
according to reliable information, police operatives were the
perpetrators of the abduction. It also clearly alleged
how Tagitis' rights to life, liberty and security were violated
when he was "forcibly taken and boarded on a motor vehicle
by a couple of burly men believed to be police intelligence
operatives", and then taken "into custody by the respondents'
police intelligence operatives since October 30, 2007,
specifically by the CIDG, PNP Zamboanga City, . . . held
against his will in an earnest attempt of the police to involve
and connect [him] with different terrorist groups." 77
These allegations, in our view, properly pleaded
ultimate facts within the pleader's knowledge about Tagitis'
disappearance, the participation by agents of the State in this
disappearance, the failure of the State to release Tagitis or to
provide sufficient information about his whereabouts, as well
as the actual violation of his right to liberty. Thus, the petition
cannot be faulted for any failure in its statement of a cause of
action.
If a defect can at all be attributed to the petition, this
defect is its lack of supporting affidavit, as required by
Section 5 (c) of the Amparo Rule. Owing to the summary
nature of the proceedings for the writ and to facilitate the
resolution of the petition, the Amparo Rule incorporated the
requirement for supporting affidavits, with the annotation that
these can be used as the affiant's direct testimony. 78 This
requirement, however, should not be read as an absolute one
that necessarily leads to the dismissal of the petition if not
strictly followed. Where, as in this case, the petitioner has
substantially complied with the requirement by submitting
a verified petition sufficiently detailing the facts relied upon,
the strict need for the sworn statement that an affidavit
represents is essentially fulfilled. We note that the failure to
attach the required affidavits was fully cured when the
respondent and her witness (Mrs. Talbin) personally testified
in the CA hearings held on January 7 and 17 and February 18,
2008 to swear to and flesh out the allegations of the petition.
Thus, even on this point, the petition cannot be faulted.
Section 5 (d) of the Amparo Rule requires that prior
investigation of an alleged disappearance must have been
made, specifying the manner and results of the investigation.
Effectively, this requirement seeks to establish at the earliest
opportunity the level of diligence the public authorities
undertook in relation with the reported disappearance. 79
We reject the petitioners' argument that the
respondent's petition did not comply with the Section 5 (d)
requirements of the Amparo Rule, as the petition specifies in
its paragraph 11 that Kunnong and his companions
immediately reported Tagitis' disappearance to the police
authorities in Jolo, Sulu as soon as they were relatively
certain that he indeed had disappeared. The police, however,
gave them the "ready answer" that Tagitis could have been
abducted by the Abu Sayyaf group or other anti-government
groups. The respondent also alleged in paragraphs 17 and 18
of her petition that she filed a "complaint" with the PNP
Police Station in Cotobato * and in Jolo, but she was told of "an
intriguing tale" by the police that her husband was having "a good
time with another woman". The disappearance was alleged to have
been reported, too, to no less than the Governor of the ARMM,
followed by the respondent's personal inquiries that yielded the
factual bases for her petition. 80
These allegations, to our mind, sufficiently specify that
reports have been made to the police authorities, and
that investigations should have followed. That the petition did
not state the manner and results of the investigation that
the Amparo Rule requires, but rather generally stated the
inaction of the police, their failure to perform their duty to
investigate, or at the very least, their reported failed efforts,
should not be a reflection on the completeness of the petition.
To require the respondent to elaborately specify the names,
personal circumstances, and addresses of the investigating
authority, as well the manner and conduct of the investigation
is an overly strict interpretation of Section 5 (d), given the
respondent's frustrations in securing an investigation with
meaningful results. Under these circumstances, we are more
than satisfied that the allegations of the petition on the
investigations undertaken are sufficiently complete for
purposes of bringing the petition forward.  DaIACS 
Section 5 (e) is in the Amparo Rule to prevent the use
of a petition — that otherwise is not supported by sufficient
allegations to constitute a proper cause of action — as a
means to "fish" for evidence. 81 The petitioners contend that
the respondent's petition did not specify what "legally
available efforts were taken by the respondent", and that there
was an "undue haste" in the filing of the petition when,
instead of cooperating with authorities, the respondent
immediately invoked the Court's intervention.
We do not see the respondent's petition as the
petitioners view it.
Section 5 (e) merely requires that
the Amparo petitioner (the respondent in the present case)
allege "the actions and recourses taken to determine the fate
or whereabouts of the aggrieved party and the identity of the
person responsible for the threat, act or omission". The
following allegations of the respondent's petition duly
outlined the actions she had taken and the frustrations she
encountered, thus compelling her to file her petition.
xxx xxx xxx
7. Soon after the student left the room,
Engr. Tagitis went out of the pension house to take
his early lunch but while out on the street, a couple of
burly men believed to be police intelligence
operatives, forcibly took him and boarded the latter
on a motor vehicle then sped away without the
knowledge of his student, Arsimin Kunnong;
xxx xxx xxx
10. When Kunnong could not locate
Engr. Tagitis, the former sought the help of another
IDB scholar and reported the matter to the local
police agency;
11. Arsimin Kunnong, including his friends
and companions in Jolo, exerted efforts in trying to
locate the whereabouts of Engr. Tagitis and when he
reported the matter to the police authorities in Jolo, he
was immediately given a ready answer that
Engr. Tagitis could [have been] abducted by the Abu
Sayyaf group and other groups known to be fighting
against the government;
12. Being scared with these suggestions and
insinuations of the police officers, Kunnong reported
the matter to the [respondent](wife of Engr. Tagitis)
by phone and other responsible officers and
coordinators of the IDB Scholarship Programme in
the Philippines who alerted the office of the Governor
of ARMM who was then preparing to attend the OIC
meeting in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia;
 13. [The respondent], on the other hand,
approached some of her co-employees with the Land
Bank in Digos branch, Digos City, Davao del Sur,
who likewise sought help from some of their friends
in the military who could help them find/locate the
whereabouts of her husband;
xxx xxx xxx
15. According to reliable information received
by the [respondent], subject Engr. Tagitis is in the
custody of police intelligence operatives, specifically
with the CIDG, PNP Zamboanga City, being held
against his will in an earnest attempt of the police to
involve and connect Engr. Tagitis with the different
terrorist groups;
xxx xxx xxx
17. [The respondent] filed her complaint with
the PNP Police Station at the ARMM in Cotobato and
in Jolo, as suggested by her friends, seeking their help
to find her husband, but [the respondent's] request and
pleadings failed to produce any positive results
xxx xxx xxx
20. Lately, [respondent] was again advised by
one of the [petitioners] to go to the ARMM Police
Headquarters again in Cotobato * City and also to the
different Police Headquarters including the police
headquarters in Davao City, in Zamboanga City, in
Jolo, and in Camp Crame, Quezon City, and all these
places have been visited by the [respondent] in search
for her husband, which entailed expenses for her trips
to these places thereby resorting her to borrowings
and beggings [sic] for financial help from friends and
relatives only to try complying to the different
suggestions of these police officers, despite of which,
her efforts produced no positive results up to the
present time;
xxx xxx xxx
25. [The respondent] has exhausted all
administrative avenues and remedies but to no avail,
and under the circumstances, [respondent] has no
other plain, speedy and adequate remedy to protect
and get the release of subject Engr.
Morced Tagitis from the illegal clutches of [the
petitioners], their intelligence operatives and the like
which are in total violation of the subject's human and
constitutional rights, except the issuance of a WRIT
OF AMPARO.
Based on these considerations, we rule that the
respondent's petition for the Writ of Amparo is sufficient in
form and substance and that the Court of Appeals had every
reason to proceed with its consideration of the case.
The Desaparecidos
The present case is one of first impression in the use
and application of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo in an
enforced disappearance situation. For a deeper appreciation of
the application of this Rule to an enforced disappearance
situation, a brief look at the historical context of the writ and
enforced disappearances would be very helpful.
The phenomenon of enforced disappearance arising
from State action first attracted notice in Adolf Hitler's Nact
und Nebel Erlass or Night and Fog Decree of December 7,
1941. 82 The Third Reich's Night and Fog Program, a State
policy, was directed at persons in occupied territories
"endangering German security"; they were transported
secretly to Germany where they disappeared without a trace.
In order to maximize the desired intimidating effect, the
policy prohibited government officials from providing
information about the fate of these targeted persons. 83
In the mid-1970s, the phenomenon of enforced
disappearances resurfaced, shocking and outraging the world
when individuals, numbering anywhere from 6,000 to 24,000,
were reported to have "disappeared" during the military
regime in Argentina. Enforced disappearances spread in Latin
America, and the issue became an international concern when
the world noted its widespread and systematic use by State
security forces in that continent under Operation
Condor 84 and during the Dirty War 85 in the 1970s and
1980s. The escalation of the practice saw political activists
secretly arrested, tortured, and killed as part of governments'
counter-insurgency campaigns. As this form of political
brutality became routine elsewhere in the continent, the Latin
American media standardized the term "disappearance" to
describe the phenomenon. The victims of enforced
disappearances were called the "desaparecidos", 86 which
literally means the "disappeared ones". 87 In general, there are
three different kinds of "disappearance" cases:
1) those of people arrested without witnesses or
without positive identification of the arresting
agents and are never found again;
2) those of prisoners who are usually arrested without
an appropriate warrant and held in complete
isolation for weeks or months while their
families are unable to discover their
whereabouts and the military authorities deny
having them in custody until they eventually
reappear in one detention center or another;
and
3) those of victims of "salvaging" who have
disappeared until their lifeless bodies are later
discovered. 88
In the Philippines, enforced disappearances generally
fall within the first two categories, 89 and 855 cases were
recorded during the period of martial law from 1972 until
1986. Of this number, 595 remained missing, 132 surfaced
alive and 127 were found dead. During former President
Corazon C. Aquino's term, 820 people were reported to have
disappeared and of these, 612 cases were documented. Of this
number, 407 remain missing, 108 surfaced alive and 97 were
found dead. The number of enforced disappearances dropped
during former President Fidel V. Ramos' term when only 87
cases were reported, while the three-year term of former
President Joseph E. Estrada yielded 58 reported cases.
KARAPATAN, a local non-governmental organization,
reports that as of March 31, 2008, the records show that there
were a total of 193 victims of enforced disappearance under
incumbent President Gloria M. Arroyo's administration. The
Commission on Human Rights' records show a total of 636
verified cases of enforced disappearances from 1985 to 1993.
Of this number, 406 remained missing, 92 surfaced alive, 62
were found dead, and 76 still have undetermined
status. 90 Currently, the United Nations Working Group on
Enforced or Involuntary Disappearance 91 reports 619
outstanding cases of enforced or involuntary disappearances
covering the period December 1, 2007 to November 30,
2008. 92
Enforced Disappearances
Under Philippine Law
The Amparo Rule expressly provides that the "writ
shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or
threats thereof". 93 We note that although the writ specifically
covers "enforced disappearances", this concept is neither
defined nor penalized in this jurisdiction. The records of the
Supreme Court Committee on the Revision of
Rules (Committee) reveal that the drafters of the Amparo Rule
initially considered providing an elemental definition of the
concept of enforced disappearance: 94  ECISAD
JUSTICE MARTINEZ:
I believe that first and foremost we should
come up or formulate a specific definition
 [for] extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances. From that definition, then we
can proceed to formulate the rules, definite
rules concerning the same.
CHIEF JUSTICE PUNO:
. . . As things stand, there is no law
penalizing extrajudicial killings and
enforced disappearances . . . so initially also
we have to [come up with] the nature of
these extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances [to be covered by the Rule]
because our concept of killings and
disappearances will define the jurisdiction
of the courts. So we'll have to agree among
ourselves about the nature of killings and
disappearances for instance, in other
jurisdictions, the rules only cover state actors.
That is an element incorporated in their
concept of extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances. In other jurisdictions, the
concept includes acts and omissions not only
of state actors but also of non state actors.
Well, more specifically in the case of the
Philippines for instance, should these rules
include the killings, the disappearances which
may be authored by let us say, the NPAs or
the leftist organizations and others. So, again
we need to define the nature of the
extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances that will be covered by these
rules. [Emphasis supplied] 95   enforced disappearances. The Court, through its procedural
In the end, the Committee took cognizance of several
bills filed in the House of Representatives 96 and in the
Senate 97 on extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances, and resolved to do away with a clear textual
definition of these terms in the Rule. The Committee instead
focused on the nature and scope of the concerns within its
power to address and provided the appropriate remedy
therefor, mindful that an elemental definition may intrude into
the ongoing legislative efforts. 98
As the law now stands, extra-judicial killings and
enforced disappearances in this jurisdiction are not crimes
penalized separately from the component criminal acts
undertaken to carry out these killings and enforced
disappearances and are now penalized under the Revised
Penal Code and special laws. 99 The simple reason is that the
Legislature has not spoken on the matter; the determination of
what acts are criminal and what the corresponding penalty
these criminal acts should carry are matters of substantive law
that only the Legislature has the power to enact under the
country's constitutional scheme and power structure.
Even without the benefit of directly applicable
substantive laws on extra-judicial killings and enforced
disappearances, however, the Supreme Court is not powerless
to act under its own constitutional mandate to
promulgate "rules concerning the protection and enforcement
of constitutional rights, pleading, practice and procedure in
all courts", 100 since extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances, by their nature and purpose, constitute State
or private party violation of the constitutional rights of
individuals to life, liberty and security. Although the Court's
power is strictly procedural and as such does not diminish,
increase or modify substantive rights, the legal protection that
the Court can provide can be very meaningful through the
procedures it sets in addressing extrajudicial killings and
rules, can set the procedural standards and thereby directly
compel the public authorities to act on actual or threatened
violations of constitutional rights. To state the obvious,
judicial intervention can make a difference — even if only
procedurally — in a situation when the very same
investigating public authorities may have had a hand in the
threatened or actual violations of constitutional rights.
Lest this Court intervention be misunderstood, we
clarify once again that we do not rule on any issue of criminal
culpability for the extrajudicial killing or enforced
disappearance. This is an issue that requires criminal action
before our criminal courts based on our existing penal laws.
Our intervention is in determining whether an enforced
disappearance has taken place and who is responsible or
accountable for this disappearance, and to define and impose
the appropriate remedies to address it. The burden for the
public authorities to discharge in these situations, under the
Rule on the Writ of Amparo, is twofold. The first is to ensure
that all efforts at disclosure and investigation are undertaken
under pain of indirect contempt from this Court when
governmental efforts are less than what the individual
situations require. The second is to address the disappearance,
so that the life of the victim is preserved and his or her liberty
and security restored. In these senses, our orders and
directives relative to the writ are continuing efforts that are
not truly terminated until the extrajudicial killing or enforced
disappearance is fully addressed by the complete
determination of the fate and the whereabouts of the victim,
by the production of the disappeared person and the
restoration of his or her liberty and security, and, in the proper
case, by the commencement of criminal action against the
guilty parties.
Enforced Disappearance
Under International Law
From the International Law perspective, involuntary or
enforced disappearance is considered a flagrant violation of
human rights. 101 It does not only violate the right to life,
liberty and security of the desaparecido; it affects their
families as well through the denial of their right to
information regarding the circumstances of the disappeared
family member. Thus, enforced disappearances have been
said to be "a double form of torture", with "doubly paralyzing
impact for the victims", as they "are kept ignorant of their
own fates, while family members are deprived of knowing the
whereabouts of their detained loved ones" and suffer as well
the serious economic hardship and poverty that in most cases
follow the disappearance of the household breadwinner. 102
The UN General Assembly first considered the issue of
"Disappeared Persons" in December 1978 under Resolution
33/173. The Resolution expressed the General Assembly's
deep concern arising from "reports from various parts of the
world relating to enforced or involuntary disappearances",
and requested the "UN Commission on Human Rights to
consider the issue of enforced disappearances with a view to
making appropriate recommendations". 103
In 1992, in response to the reality that the insidious
practice of enforced disappearance had become a global
phenomenon, the UN General Assembly adopted
the Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from
Enforced Disappearance (Declaration). 104 This
Declaration, for the first time, provided in its third preambular
clause a working description of enforced disappearance, as
follows: TDAHCS
Deeply concerned that in many countries,
often in a persistent manner, enforced disappearances
occur, in the sense that persons are arrested,
detained or abducted against their will or
otherwise deprived of their liberty by officials of
different branches or levels of Government, or by
organized groups or private individuals acting on
behalf of, or with the support, direct or indirect,
consent or acquiescence of the Government,
followed by a refusal to disclose the fate or
whereabouts of the persons concerned or a refusal
 to acknowledge the deprivation of their
liberty, which places such persons outside the
protection of the law. [Emphasis supplied]
Fourteen years after (or on December 20, 2006), the
UN General Assembly adopted the International Convention
for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced
Disappearance (Convention). 105 The Convention was opened
for signature in Paris, France on February 6, 2007. 106 Article
2 of the Convention defined enforced disappearance as
follows:
For the purposes of this
Convention, "enforced disappearance" is
considered to be the arrest, detention, abduction or
any other form of deprivation of liberty by agents of
the State or by persons or groups of persons acting
with the authorization, support or acquiescence of the
State, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the
deprivation of liberty or by concealment of the fate or
whereabouts of the disappeared person, which place
such a person outside the protection of the law.
[Emphasis supplied]
The Convention is the first universal human rights
instrument to assert that there is a right not to be subject to
enforced disappearance 107 and that this right is non-
derogable. 108 It provides that no one shall be subjected to
enforced disappearance under any circumstances, be it a state
of war, internal political instability, or any other public
emergency. It obliges State Parties to codify enforced
disappearance as an offense punishable with appropriate
penalties under their criminal law. 109 It also recognizes the
right of relatives of the disappeared persons and of the society
as a whole to know the truth on the fate and whereabouts of
the disappeared and on the progress and results of the
investigation. 110 Lastly, it classifies enforced disappearance
as a continuing offense, such that statutes of limitations shall
not apply until the fate and whereabouts of the victim are
established. 111
Binding Effect of UN
Action on the Philippines
To date, the Philippines has neither signed nor
ratified the Convention, so that the country is not yet
committed to enact any law penalizing enforced
disappearance as a crime. The absence of a specific penal law,
however, is not a stumbling block for action from this Court,
as heretofore mentioned; underlying every enforced
disappearance is a violation of the constitutional rights to life,
liberty and security that the Supreme Court is mandated by
the Constitution to protect through its rule-making powers.
Separately from the Constitution (but still pursuant to
its terms), the Court is guided, in acting on Amparo cases, by
the reality that the Philippines is a member of the UN, bound
by its Charter and by the various conventions we signed and
ratified, particularly the conventions touching on humans
rights. Under the UN Charter, the Philippines pledged to
"promote universal respect for, and observance of, human
rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinctions
as to race, sex, language or religion". 112 Although no
universal agreement has been reached on the precise extent of
the "human rights and fundamental freedoms" guaranteed to
all by the Charter, 113 it was the UN itself that issued the
Declaration on enforced disappearance, and this Declaration
states: 114
Any act of enforced disappearance is
an offence to dignity. It is condemned as a denial of
the purposes of the Charter of the United Nations
and as a grave and flagrant violation of human
rights and fundamental freedoms proclaimed in
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and
reaffirmed and developed in international instruments
in this field. [Emphasis supplied]
 As a matter of human right and fundamental freedom and as a
policy matter made in a UN Declaration, the ban on enforced
disappearance cannot but have its effects on the country,
given our own adherence to "generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the land". 115
In the recent case of Pharmaceutical and Health Care
Association of the Philippines v. Duque III,  116 we held that:
Under the 1987 Constitution, international law
can become part of the sphere of domestic law either
by transformation or incorporation. The
transformation method requires that an international
law be transformed into a domestic law through a
constitutional mechanism such as local
legislation. The incorporation method applies
when, by mere constitutional declaration,
international law is deemed to have the force of
domestic law. [Emphasis supplied]
We characterized "generally accepted principles of
international law" as norms of general or customary
international law that are binding on all states. We held
further: 117
[G]enerally accepted principles of
international law, by virtue of the incorporation clause
of the Constitution, form part of the laws of the land
even if they do not derive from treaty obligations.
The classical formulation in international law sees
those customary rules accepted as binding result
from the combination [of] two elements: the
established, widespread, and consistent practice on
the part of States; and a psychological element known
as the opinion juris sive necessitates (opinion as to
law or necessity). Implicit in the latter element is
a belief that the practice in question is rendered
obligatory by the existence of a rule of law
requiring it. [Emphasis in the original]
The most widely accepted statement of sources of
international law today is Article 38 (1) of the Statute of the
International Court of Justice, which provides that the Court
shall apply "international custom, as evidence of a general
practice accepted as law". 118 The material sources of custom
include State practice, State legislation, international and
national judicial decisions, recitals in treaties and other
international instruments, a pattern of treaties in the same
form, the practice of international organs, and resolutions
relating to legal questions in the UN General
Assembly. 119 Sometimes referred to as "evidence" of
international law, 120 these sources identify the substance and
content of the obligations of States and are indicative of the
"State practice" and "opinio juris" requirements of
international law. 121 We note the following in these
respects: 
EICSTa
First, barely two years from the adoption of the
Declaration, the Organization of American States (OAS)
General Assembly adopted the Inter-American Convention on
Enforced Disappearance of Persons in June 1994. 122 State
parties undertook under this Convention "not to practice,
permit, or tolerate the forced disappearance of persons, even
in states of emergency or suspension of individual
guarantees". 123 One of the key provisions includes the States'
obligation to enact the crime of forced disappearance in their
respective national criminal laws and to establish jurisdiction
over such cases when the crime was committed within their
jurisdiction, when the victim is a national of that State, and
"when the alleged criminal is within its territory and it does
not proceed to extradite him", which can be interpreted as
establishing universal jurisdiction among the parties to the
Inter-American Convention. 124 At present, Colombia,
Guatemala, Paraguay, Peru and Venezuela have enacted
separate laws in accordance with the Inter-American
Convention and have defined activities involving enforced
disappearance to be criminal. 125
Second, in Europe, the European Convention on
Human Rights has no explicit provision dealing with the
protection against enforced disappearance. The European
Court of Human Rights (ECHR), however, has applied the
Convention in a way that provides ample protection for the
underlying rights affected by enforced disappearance through
the Convention's Article 2 on the right to life; Article 3 on the
prohibition of torture; Article 5 on the right to liberty and
security; Article 6, paragraph 1 on the right to a fair trial; and
Article 13 on the right to an effective remedy. A leading
example demonstrating the protection afforded by the
European Convention is Kurt v. Turkey,  126 where the ECHR
found a violation of the right to liberty and security of the
disappeared person when the applicant's son disappeared after
being taken into custody by Turkish forces in the Kurdish
village of Agilli in November 1993. It further found the
applicant (the disappeared person's mother) to be a victim of a
violation of Article 3, as a result of the silence of the
authorities and the inadequate character of the investigations
undertaken. The ECHR also saw the lack of any meaningful
investigation by the State as a violation of Article 13. 127
Third, in the United States, the status of the prohibition
on enforced disappearance as part of customary international
law is recognized in the most recent edition of Restatement of
the Law: The Third,  128 which provides that "[a] State
violates international law if, as a matter of State policy, it
practices, encourages, or condones . . . (3) the murder or
causing the disappearance of individuals." 129 We
significantly note that in a related matter that finds close
identification with enforced disappearance — the matter of
torture — the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit Court held in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala  130 that the
prohibition on torture had attained the status of customary
international law. The court further elaborated on the
significance of UN declarations, as follows:
These U.N. declarations are significant
because they specify with great precision the
obligations of member nations under the Charter.
Since their adoption, "(m)embers can no longer
contend that they do not know what human rights
they promised in the Charter to promote". Moreover,
a U.N. Declaration is, according to one authoritative
definition, "a formal and solemn instrument, suitable
for rare occasions when principles of great and lasting
importance are being enunciated". Accordingly, it has
been observed that the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights "no longer fits into the dichotomy of
'binding treaty' against 'non-binding pronouncement,'
but is rather an authoritative statement of the
international community." Thus, a Declaration creates
an expectation of adherence, and "insofar as the
expectation is gradually justified by State practice, a
declaration may by custom become recognized as
laying down rules binding upon the States." Indeed,
several commentators have concluded that the
Universal Declaration has become, in toto, a part of
binding, customary international law. [Citations
omitted]
Fourth, in interpreting Article 2 (right to an effective
domestic remedy) of the International Convention on Civil
and Political Rights (ICCPR), to which the Philippines is both
a signatory and a State Party, the UN Human Rights
Committee, under the Office of the High Commissioner for
Human Rights, has stated that the act of enforced
disappearance violates Articles 6 (right to life), 7 (prohibition
on torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment) and 9 (right to liberty and security of the person)
of the ICCPR, and the act may also amount to a crime against
humanity. 131
 Fifth, Article 7, paragraph 1 of the 1998 Rome Statute
establishing the International Criminal Court (ICC) also
covers enforced disappearances insofar as they are defined as
crimes against humanity, 132 i.e., crimes "committed as part of
a widespread or systematic attack against any civilian
population, with knowledge of the attack". While more than
100 countries have ratified the Rome Statute, 133 the
Philippines is still merely a signatory and has not yet ratified
it. We note that Article 7 (1) of the Rome Statute has been
incorporated in the statutes of other international and hybrid
tribunals, including Sierra Leone Special Court, the Special
Panels for Serious Crimes in Timor-Leste, and the
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia. 134 In
addition, the implementing legislation of State Parties to the
Rome Statute of the ICC has given rise to a number of
national criminal provisions also covering enforced
disappearance. 135
While the Philippines is not yet formally bound by the
terms of the Convention on enforced disappearance (or by the
specific terms of the Rome Statute) and has not formally
declared enforced disappearance as a specific crime, the
above recital shows that enforced disappearance as a State
practice has been repudiated by the international
community, so that the ban on it is now a generally
accepted principle of international law, which we should
consider a part of the law of the land, and which we
should act upon to the extent already allowed under our
laws and the international conventions that bind us.  aHTEIA
The following civil or political rights under the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the ICCPR and the
International Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights (ICESR) may be infringed in the course of a
disappearance: 136
1) the right to recognition as a person before the law;
2) the right to liberty and security of the person;
3) the right not to be subjected to torture and other
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment;
4) the right to life, when the disappeared person is
killed;
5) the right to an identity;
6) the right to a fair trial and to judicial guarantees;
7) the right to an effective remedy, including
reparation and compensation;
8) the right to know the truth regarding the
circumstances of a disappearance.
9) the right to protection and assistance to the family;
10) the right to an adequate standard of living;
11) the right to health; and
12) the right to education [Emphasis supplied]
Article 2 of the ICCPR, which binds the Philippines as a
state party, provides:
Article 2
3. Each State Party to the present Covenant
undertakes:  
(a) To ensure that any person whose rights or
freedoms as herein recognized are violated shall have
an effective remedy, notwithstanding that the
violation has been committed by persons acting in
an official capacity;
(b) To ensure that any person claiming such
a remedy shall have his right thereto determined
by competent judicial, administrative or legislative
authorities, or by any other competent authority
 provided for by the legal system of the State, and to
develop the possibilities of judicial remedy;
(c) To ensure that the competent authorities
shall enforce such remedies when granted. [Emphasis
supplied]
In General Comment No. 31, the UN Human Rights
Committee opined that the right to an effective remedy under
Article 2 of the ICCPR includes the obligation of the State to
investigate ICCPR violations promptly, thoroughly, and
effectively, viz.: 137
15. Article 2, paragraph 3, requires that in
addition to effective protection of Covenant
rights, States Parties must ensure that individuals
also have accessible and effective remedies to
vindicate those rights . . . The Committee attaches
importance to States Parties' establishing appropriate
judicial and administrative mechanisms for
addressing claims of rights violations under domestic
law . . . Administrative mechanisms are
particularly required to give effect to the general
obligation to investigate allegations of violations
promptly, thoroughly and effectively through
independent and impartial bodies. A failure by a
State Party to investigate allegations of violations
could in and of itself give rise to a separate breach of
the Covenant. Cessation of an ongoing violation is an
essential element of the right to an effective remedy.
[Emphasis supplied]
The UN Human Rights Committee further stated in the
same General Comment No. 31 that failure to investigate as
well as failure to bring to justice the perpetrators of ICCPR
violations could in and of itself give rise to a separate breach
of the Covenant, thus: 138  SEcITC
18. Where the investigations referred to in
paragraph 15 reveal violations of certain Covenant
rights, States Parties must ensure that those
responsible are brought to justice. As with failure
to investigate, failure to bring to justice
perpetrators of such violations could in and of
itself give rise to a separate breach of the
Covenant. These obligations arise notably in
respect of those violations recognized as criminal
under either domestic or international law, such as
torture and similar cruel, inhuman and degrading
treatment (article 7), summary and arbitrary killing
(article 6) and enforced disappearance (articles 7
and 9 and, frequently, 6). Indeed, the problem of
impunity for these violations, a matter of sustained
concern by the Committee, may well be an important
contributing element in the recurrence of the
violations. When committed as part of a widespread
or systematic attack on a civilian population, these
violations of the Covenant are crimes against
humanity (see Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court, article 7). [Emphasis supplied]
In Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo,  139 this
Court, in ruling that the right to security of persons is a
guarantee of the protection of one's right by the government,
held that:
The right to security of person in this third
sense is a corollary of the policy that the State
"guarantees full respect for human rights" under
Article II, Section 11 of the 1987 Constitution. As the
government is the chief guarantor of order and
security, the Constitutional guarantee of the rights to
life, liberty and security of person is rendered
ineffective if government does not afford protection to
these rights especially when they are under
threat. Protection includes conducting effective
investigations, organization of the government
apparatus to extend protection to victims of
extralegal killings or enforced disappearances (or
 threats thereof) and/or their families, and bringing
offenders to the bar of justice. The Inter-American
Court of Human Rights stressed the importance of
investigation in the Velasquez Rodriguez Case, viz.:
(The duty to investigate) must be
undertaken in a serious manner and not as
a mere formality preordained to be
ineffective. An investigation must have an
objective and be assumed by the State as its
own legal duty, not as a step taken by
private interests that depends upon the
initiative of the victim or his family or upon
their offer of proof, without an effective
search for the truth by the government.
[Emphasis supplied]
Manalo significantly cited Kurt v. Turkey,  140 where the
ECHR interpreted the "right to security" not only as a
prohibition on the State against arbitrary deprivation of
liberty, but also as the imposition of a positive duty to afford
protection to the right to liberty. The Court notably quoted the
following ECHR ruling:
[A]ny deprivation of liberty must not only
have been effected in conformity with the substantive
and procedural rules of national law but must equally
be in keeping with the very purpose of Article 5,
namely to protect the individual from arbitrariness. . .
Having assumed control over that individual, it is
incumbent on the authorities to account for his or her
whereabouts. For this reason, Article 5 must be seen
as requiring the authorities to take effective
measures to safeguard against the risk of
disappearance and to conduct a prompt effective
investigation into an arguable claim that a person
has been taken into custody and has not been seen
since. [Emphasis supplied]
These rulings effectively serve as the backdrop for the
Rule on the Writ of Amparo, which the Court made effective
on October 24, 2007. Although the Amparo Rule still has
gaps waiting to be filled through substantive law, as
evidenced primarily by the lack of a concrete definition of
"enforced disappearance", the materials cited above, among
others, provide ample guidance and standards on how,
through the medium of the Amparo Rule, the Court can
provide remedies and protect the constitutional rights to
life, liberty and security that underlie every enforced
disappearance.
Evidentiary Difficulties Posed
by the Unique Nature of an
Enforced Disappearance
Before going into the issue of whether the respondent
has discharged the burden of proving the allegations of the
petition for the Writ of Amparo by the degree of proof
required by the Amparo Rule, we shall discuss briefly the
unique evidentiary difficulties presented by enforced
disappearance cases; these difficulties form part of the setting
that the implementation of the Amparo Rule shall encounter.
These difficulties largely arise because the State itself
— the party whose involvement is alleged — investigates
enforced disappearances. Past experiences in other
jurisdictions show that the evidentiary difficulties are
generally threefold.
First, there may be a deliberate concealment of the
identities of the direct perpetrators. 141 Experts note that
abductors are well organized, armed and usually members of
the military or police forces, thus:
The victim is generally arrested by the
security forces or by persons acting under some form
of governmental authority. In many countries the
units that plan, implement and execute the program
 are generally specialized, highly-secret bodies within
the armed or security forces. They are generally
directed through a separate, clandestine chain of
command, but they have the necessary credentials to
avoid or prevent any interference by the "legal" police
forces. These authorities take their victims to secret
detention centers where they subject them to
interrogation and torture without fear of judicial or
other controls. 142
In addition, there are usually no witnesses to the crime;
if there are, these witnesses are usually afraid to speak out
publicly or to testify on the disappearance out of fear for their
own lives. 143 We have had occasion to note this difficulty
in Secretary of Defense v. Manalo  144 when we
acknowledged that "where powerful military officers are
implicated, the hesitation of witnesses to surface and testify
against them comes as no surprise".
Second, deliberate concealment of pertinent
evidence of the disappearance is a distinct possibility; the
central piece of evidence in an enforced disappearance
— i.e., the corpus delicti or the victim's body — is usually
concealed to effectively thwart the start of any investigation
or the progress of one that may have begun. 145 The problem
for the victim's family is the State's virtual monopoly of
access to pertinent evidence. The Inter-American Court of
Human Rights (IACHR) observed in the landmark case
of Velasquez Rodriguez 146 that inherent to the practice of
enforced disappearance is the deliberate use of the State's
power to destroy the pertinent evidence. The IACHR
described the concealment as a clear attempt by the State to
commit the perfect crime. 147  ECDHIc
Third is the element of denial; in many cases, the
State authorities deliberately deny that the enforced
disappearance ever occurred. 148 "Deniability" is central to the
policy of enforced disappearances, as the absence of any
proven disappearance makes it easier to escape the
application of legal standards ensuring the victim's human
rights. 149 Experience shows that government officials
typically respond to requests for information about
desaparecidos by saying that they are not aware of any
disappearance, that the missing people may have fled the
country, or that their names have merely been invented. 150
These considerations are alive in our minds, as these
are the difficulties we confront, in one form or another, in our
consideration of this case.
Evidence and Burden of Proof in
Enforced Disappearances Cases
Sections 13, 17 and 18 of the Amparo Rule define the
nature of an Amparo proceeding and the degree and burden of
proof the parties to the case carry, as follows: 
Section 13. Summary Hearing. — The hearing
on the petition shall be summary. However, the
court, justice or judge may call for a preliminary
conference to simplify the issues and determine the
possibility of obtaining stipulations and admissions
from the parties.
xxx xxx xxx
Section 17. Burden of Proof and Standard of
Diligence Required. — The parties shall establish
their claims by substantial evidence.
The respondent who is a private individual
must prove that ordinary diligence as required by
applicable laws, rules and regulations was observed in
the performance of duty.
The respondent who is a public official or
employee must prove that extraordinary diligence as
required by applicable laws, rules and regulations was
observed in the performance of duty.
 The respondent public official or employee
cannot invoke the presumption that official duty has
been regularly performed or evade responsibility or
liability.
Section 18. Judgment. — . . . If
the allegations in the petition are proven by
substantial evidence, the court shall grant the
privilege of the writ and such reliefs as may be proper
and appropriate; otherwise, the privilege shall
be denied. [Emphasis supplied]
These characteristics — namely, of being summary
and the use of substantial evidence as the required level of
proof (in contrast to the usual preponderance of evidence or
proof beyond reasonable doubt in court proceedings) —
reveal the clear intent of the framers of the Amparo Rule to
have the equivalent of an administrative proceeding, albeit
judicially conducted, in addressing Amparo situations. The
standard of diligence required — the duty of public officials
and employees to observe extraordinary diligence — point,
too, to the extraordinary measures expected in the protection
of constitutional rights and in the consequent handling and
investigation of extra-judicial killings and enforced
disappearance cases.
Thus, in these proceedings, the Amparo petitioner
needs only to properly comply with the substance and form
requirements of a Writ of Amparo petition, as discussed
above, and prove the allegations by substantial evidence.
Once a rebuttable case has been proven, the respondents must
then respond and prove their defenses based on the standard
of diligence required. The rebuttable case, of course, must
show that an enforced disappearance took place under
circumstances showing a violation of the victim's
constitutional rights to life, liberty or security, and the failure
on the part of the investigating authorities to appropriately
respond.
The landmark case of Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial
Relations  151 provided the Court its first opportunity to define
the substantial evidence required to arrive at a valid decision
in administrative proceedings. To directly quote Ang Tibay:
Substantial evidence is more than a mere
scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion. [citations omitted] The statute
provides that 'the rules of evidence prevailing in
courts of law and equity shall not be controlling.' The
obvious purpose of this and similar provisions is to
free administrative boards from the compulsion of
technical rules so that the mere admission of matter
which would be deemed incompetent in judicial
proceedings would not invalidate the administrative
order. [citations omitted] But this assurance of a
desirable flexibility in administrative procedure does
not go so far as to justify orders without a basis in
evidence having rational probative force. [Emphasis
supplied]
In Secretary of Defense v. Manalo,  152 which was the
Court's first petition for a Writ of Amparo, we recognized that
the full and exhaustive proceedings that the substantial
evidence standard regularly requires do not need to apply due
to the summary nature of Amparo proceedings. We said:
The remedy [of the writ of amparo] provides
rapid judicial relief as it partakes of a summary
proceeding that requires only substantial evidence to
make the appropriate reliefs available to the
petitioner; it is not an action to determine criminal
guilt requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt, or
liability for damages requiring preponderance of
evidence, or administrative responsibility
requiring substantial evidence that will require
full and exhaustive proceedings. [Emphasis
supplied]
 Not to be forgotten in considering the evidentiary
aspects of Amparo petitions are the unique difficulties
presented by the nature of enforced disappearances,
heretofore discussed, which difficulties this Court must
frontally meet if the Amparo Rule is to be given a chance to
achieve its objectives. These evidentiary difficulties compel
the Court to adopt standards appropriate and responsive to the
circumstances, without transgressing the due process
requirements that underlie every proceeding.  TDAHCS
In the seminal case of Velasquez Rodriguez,  153 the
IACHR — faced with a lack of direct evidence that the
government of Honduras was involved in Velasquez
Rodriguez' disappearance — adopted a relaxed and informal
evidentiary standard, and established the rule that presumes
governmental responsibility for a disappearance if it can be
proven that the government carries out a general practice of
enforced disappearances and the specific case can be linked to
that practice. 154 The IACHR took note of the realistic fact
that enforced disappearances could be proven only through
circumstantial or indirect evidence or by logical inference;
otherwise, it was impossible to prove that an individual had
been made to disappear. It held:
130. The practice of international and
domestic courts shows that direct evidence, whether
testimonial or documentary, is not the only type of
evidence that may be legitimately considered in
reaching a decision. Circumstantial evidence,
indicia, and presumptions may be considered, so
long as they lead to conclusions consistent with the
facts.
131. Circumstantial or presumptive
evidence is especially important in allegations of
disappearances, because this type of repression is
characterized by an attempt to suppress all
information about the kidnapping or the
whereabouts and fate of the victim. [Emphasis
supplied]
In concluding that the disappearance of Manfredo
Velásquez (Manfredo) was carried out by agents who acted
under cover of public authority, the IACHR relied on
circumstantial evidence including the hearsay
testimony of Zenaida Velásquez, the victim's sister, who
described Manfredo's kidnapping on the basis of
conversations she had with witnesses who saw Manfredo
kidnapped by men in civilian clothes in broad daylight. She
also told the Court that a former Honduran military official
had announced that Manfredo was kidnapped by a special
military squadron acting under orders of the Chief of the
Armed Forces. 155 The IACHR likewise considered the
hearsay testimony of a second witness who asserted that he
had been told by a Honduran military officer about the
disappearance, and a third witness who testified that he had
spoken in prison to a man who identified himself as
Manfredo. 156
Velasquez stresses the lesson that flexibility is
necessary under the unique circumstances that enforced
disappearance cases pose to the courts; to have an effective
remedy, the standard of evidence must be responsive to the
evidentiary difficulties faced. On the one hand, we cannot be
arbitrary in the admission and appreciation of evidence, as
arbitrariness entails violation of rights and cannot be used as
an effective counter-measure; we only compound the problem
if a wrong is addressed by the commission of another wrong.
On the other hand, we cannot be very strict in our evidentiary
rules and cannot consider evidence the way we do in the usual
criminal and civil cases; precisely, the proceedings before us
are administrative in nature where, as a rule, technical rules of
evidence are not strictly observed. Thus, while we must
follow the substantial evidence rule, we must observe
flexibility in considering the evidence we shall take into
account.
The fair and proper rule, to our mind, is to consider all
the pieces of evidence adduced in their totality, and to
consider any evidence otherwise inadmissible under our usual
rules to be admissible if it is consistent with the admissible
evidence adduced. In other words, we reduce our rules to
the most basic test of reason — i.e., to the relevance of the
evidence to the issue at hand and its consistency with all
other pieces of adduced evidence. Thus, even hearsay
evidence can be admitted if it satisfies this basic minimum
test.
We note in this regard that the use of flexibility in the
consideration of evidence is not at all novel in the Philippine
legal system. In child abuse cases, Section 28 of the Rule on
Examination of a Child Witness 157 is expressly recognized as
an exception to the hearsay rule. This Rule allows the
admission of the hearsay testimony of a child describing any
act or attempted act of sexual abuse in any criminal or non-
criminal proceeding, subject to certain prerequisites and the
right of cross-examination by the adverse party. The
admission of the statement is determined by the court in light
of specified subjective and objective considerations that
provide sufficient indicia of reliability of the child
witness. 158 These requisites for admission find their
counterpart in the present case under the above-described
conditions for the exercise of flexibility in the consideration
of evidence, including hearsay evidence, in extrajudicial
killings and enforced disappearance cases.
Assessment of the Evidence
The threshold question for our resolution is: was there
an enforced disappearance within the meaning of this term
under the UN Declaration we have cited?
The Convention defines enforced disappearance as
"the arrest, detention, abduction or any other form of
deprivation of liberty by agents of the State or by persons or
groups of persons acting with the authorization, support or
acquiescence of the State, followed by a refusal to
acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or by concealment of
the fate or whereabouts of the disappeared person, which
place such a person outside the protection of the
law." 159 Under this definition, the elements that constitute
enforced disappearance are essentially fourfold: 160  
(a) arrest, detention, abduction or any form of
deprivation of liberty;
(b) carried out by agents of the State or persons or
groups of persons acting with the
authorization, support or acquiescence of
the State;
(c) followed by a refusal to acknowledge the
detention, or a concealment of the fate of the
disappeared person; and
(d) placement of the disappeared person outside the
protection of the law. [Emphasis supplied]
We find no direct evidence indicating how the victim
actually disappeared. The direct evidence at hand only shows
that Tagitis went out of the ASY Pension House after
depositing his room key with the hotel desk and was never
seen nor heard of again. The undisputed conclusion, however,
from all concerned — the petitioner, Tagitis' colleagues and
even the police authorities — is that Tagistis disappeared
under mysterious circumstances and was never seen again.
The respondent injected the causal element in her petition and
testimony, as we shall discuss below.  aHSAIT
We likewise find no direct evidence showing that
operatives of PNP CIDG Zamboanga abducted or
arrested Tagitis. If at all, only the respondent's allegation that
Tagistis was under CIDG Zamboanga custody stands on
record, but it is not supported by any other evidence, direct or
circumstantial.
In her direct testimony, the respondent pointed to two
sources of information as her bases for her allegation that
Tagistis had been placed under government custody (in
contrast with CIDG Zamboanga custody). The first was an
unnamed friend in Zamboanga (later identified as Col.
Ancanan), who occupied a high position in the military and
who allegedly mentioned that Tagitis was in good hands.
Nothing came out of this claim, as both the respondent herself
and her witness, Mrs. Talbin, failed to establish that Col.
Ancanan gave them any information that Tagitis was in
government custody. Col. Ancanan, for his part, admitted the
meeting with the respondent but denied giving her any
information about the disappearance.
The more specific and productive source of
information was Col. Kasim, whom the respondent, together
with her witness Mrs. Talbin, met in Camp Katitipan in
Davao City. To quote the relevant portions of the respondent's
testimony:
Q: Were you able to speak to other military officials
regarding the whereabouts of your husband
particularly those in charge of any records or
investigation?
A: I went to Camp Katitipan in Davao City. Then one
military officer, Col. Casim, told me that my
husband is being abducted [sic] because he
is under custodial investigation because he
is allegedly "parang liason ng J.I.", sir.
Q: What is J.I.?
A: Jema'ah Islamiah, sir.
Q: Was there any information that was read to you
during one of those visits of yours in that
Camp?
A: Col. Casim did not furnish me a copy of his
report because he said those reports are
highly confidential, sir.
Q: Was it read to you then even though you were
not furnished a copy?
A: Yes, sir. In front of us, my friends.
Q: And what was the content of that highly
confidential report?
A: Those alleged activities of Engineer Tagitis,
sir. 161 [Emphasis supplied]
She confirmed this testimony in her cross-examination:
Q: You also mentioned that you went to Camp
Katitipan in Davao City?
A: Yes, ma'am.
Q: And a certain Col. Kasim told you that your
husband was abducted and under custodial
investigation?
A: Yes, ma'am.
Q: And you mentioned that he showed you a
report?
A: Yes, ma'am.
Q: Were you able to read the contents of that
report?
A: He did not furnish me a copy of those [sic]
report because those [sic] were highly
confidential. That is a military report,
ma'am.
Q: But you were able to read the contents?
 A: No. But he read it in front of us, my friends,
ma'am.
Q: How many were you when you went to see Col.
Kasim?
A: There were three of us, ma'am.
Q: Who were your companions?
A: Mrs. Talbin, tapos yung
dalawang friends nya from Mati City, Davao
Oriental, ma'am. 162
xxx xxx xxx
Q: When you were told that your husband is in good
hands, what was your reaction and what did
you do?  AcSEHT
A: May binasa kasi sya that  my husband has
a  parang  meeting with other people  na
parang mga terorista na mga tao. Tapos at
the end of the report is [sic] under custodial
investigation. So I told him "Colonel, my
husband is sick. He is diabetic at
nagmemaintain yun ng gamot. Pakisabi lang
sa naghohold sa asawa ko na bigyan siya ng
gamot, ma'am."  163
xxx xxx xxx
Q: You mentioned that you received information that
Engineer Tagitis is being held by the CIDG in
Zamboanga, did you go to CIDG Zamboanga
to verify that information?
A: I did not go to CIDG Zamboanga. I went to Camp
Karingal instead. Enough na yun
na effort ko because I know that they would
deny it, ma'am. 164
On February 11, 2008, the respondent presented Mrs.
Talbin to corroborate her testimony that her husband was
abducted and held under custodial investigation by the PNP-
CIDG Zamboanga City, viz.:
Q: You said that you went to Camp Katitipan in
Davao City sometime November 24, 2007,
who was with you when you went there?
A: Mary Jean Tagitis, sir.
Q: Only the two of you?
A: No. We have some other companions. We were
four at that time, sir.
Q: Who were they?
A: Salvacion Serrano, Mini Leong, Mrs. Tagitis and
me, sir.
Q: Were you able to talk, see some other officials at
Camp Katitipan during that time?
A: Col. Kasim (PS Supt. Julasirim Ahadin Kasim)
only, sir.
Q: Were you able to talk to him?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: The four of you?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What information did you get from Col. Kasim
during that time?
A: The first time we met with [him] I asked him if he
knew of the exact location, if he can furnish us
the location of Engr. Tagitis. And he was
reading this report. He told us that
Engr. Tagitis is in good hands. He is with
the military, but he is not certain whether
he is with the AFP or PNP. He has this
serious case. He was charged of terrorism
because he was under surveillance from
 January 2007 up to the time that he was
abducted. He told us that he was under
custodial investigation. As I've said earlier,
he was seen under surveillance from
January. He was seen talking to Omar
Patik, a certain Santos of Bulacan who is
also a Balik Islam and charged with
terrorism. He was seen carrying boxes of
medicines. Then we asked him how long will
he be in custodial investigation. He said until
we can get some information. But he also told
us that he cannot give us that report because it
was a raw report. It was not official, sir.
Q: You said that he was reading a report, was that
report in document form, in a piece of paper or
was it in the computer or what?
A: As far as I can see it, sir, it is written in white bond
paper. I don't know if it was computerized but
I'm certain that it was typewritten. I'm not sure
if it used computer, fax or what, sir.
Q: When he was reading it to you, was he reading it
line by line or he was reading in a summary
form?
A: Sometimes he was glancing to the report and
talking to us, sir. 165
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Were you informed as to the place where he was
being kept during that time?
A: He did not tell us where he [Tagitis] was being
kept. But he mentioned this Talipapao,
Sulu, sir.
Q: After that incident, what did you do if any?
A: We just left and as I've mentioned, we just waited
because that raw information that he was
reading to us [sic] after the custodial
investigation, Engineer Tagitis will be
released. [Emphasis supplied] 166
Col. Kasim never denied that he met with the
respondent and her friends, and that he provided them
information based on the input of an unnamed asset. He
simply claimed in his testimony that the "informal letter" he
received from his informant in Sulu did not indicate
that Tagitis was in the custody of the CIDG. He also stressed
that the information he provided the respondent was merely a
"raw report" from "barangay intelligence" that still needed
confirmation and "follow up" as to its veracity. 167
To be sure, the respondent's and Mrs. Talbin's
testimonies were far from perfect, as the petitioners pointed
out. The respondent mistakenly characterized Col. Kasim as a
"military officer" who told her that "her husband is being
abducted because he is under custodial investigation because
he is allegedly 'parang liason ng J.I.'" The petitioners also
noted that "Mrs. Talbin's testimony imputing certain
statements to Sr. Supt. Kasim that Engr. Tagitis is with the
military, but he is not certain whether it is the PNP or AFP is
not worthy of belief, since Sr. Supt. Kasim is a high ranking
police officer who would certainly know that the PNP is not
part of the military." 
SCEHaD
Upon deeper consideration of these inconsistencies,
however, what appears clear to us is that the petitioners never
really steadfastly disputed or presented evidence to refute the
credibility of the respondent and her witness, Mrs. Talbin.
The inconsistencies the petitioners point out relate, more than
anything else, to details that should not affect the credibility
of the respondent and Mrs. Talbin; the inconsistencies are not
on material points. 168 We note, for example, that these
witnesses are lay people in so far as military and police
matters are concerned, and confusion between the police and
the military is not unusual. As a rule, minor inconsistencies
such as these indicate truthfulness rather than
prevarication 169 and only tend to strengthen their probative
value, in contrast to testimonies from various witnesses
dovetailing on every detail; the latter cannot but generate
suspicion that the material circumstances they testified to
were integral parts of a well thought of and prefabricated
story. 170
Based on these considerations and the unique
evidentiary situation in enforced disappearance cases, we
hold it duly established that Col. Kasim informed the
respondent and her friends, based on the informant's
letter, that Tagitis, reputedly a liaison for the JI and who
had been under surveillance since January 2007, was "in
good hands" and under custodial investigation for
complicity with the JI after he was seen talking to one
Omar Patik and a certain "Santos" of Bulacan, a "Balik
Islam" charged with terrorism. The respondent's and Mrs.
Talbin's testimonies cannot simply be defeated by Col.
Kasim's plain denial and his claim that he had destroyed his
informant's letter, the critical piece of evidence that supports
or negates the parties' conflicting claims. Col. Kasim's
admitted destruction of this letter — effectively, a
suppression of this evidence — raises the presumption that
the letter, if produced, would be proof of what the respondent
claimed. 171 For brevity, we shall call the evidence of what
Col. Kasim reported to the respondent to be the "Kasim
evidence".   flexibility that these difficulties demand.
Given this evidence, our next step is to decide whether
we can accept this evidence, in lieu of direct evidence,
as proof that the disappearance of Tagitis was due to action
with government participation, knowledge or consent and
that he was held for custodial investigation. We note in this
regard that Col. Kasim was never quoted to have said that the
custodial investigation was by the CIDG Zamboanga. The
Kasim evidence only implies government intervention
through the use of the term "custodial investigation", and does
not at all point to CIDG Zamboanga as Tagitis' custodian.
Strictly speaking, we are faced here with a classic case
of hearsay evidence — i.e., evidence whose probative value is
not based on the personal knowledge of the witnesses (the
respondent, Mrs. Talbin and Col. Kasim himself) but on the
knowledge of some other person not on the witness stand (the
informant). 172
To say that this piece of evidence is incompetent and
inadmissible evidence of what it substantively states is to
acknowledge — as the petitioners effectively suggest — that
in the absence of any direct evidence, we should simply
dismiss the petition. To our mind, an immediate dismissal for
this reason is no different from a statement that
the Amparo Rule — despite its terms — is ineffective, as it
cannot allow for the special evidentiary difficulties that are
unavoidably present in Amparo situations, particularly in
extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances.
The Amparo Rule was not promulgated with this intent or
with the intent to make it a token gesture of concern for
constitutional rights. It was promulgated to provide effective
and timely remedies, using and profiting from local and
international experiences in extrajudicial killings and
enforced disappearances, as the situation may require.
Consequently, we have no choice but to meet the evidentiary
difficulties inherent in enforced disappearances with the
To give full meaning to our Constitution and the rights
it protects, we hold that, as in Velasquez, we should at least
take a close look at the available evidence to determine the
correct import of every piece of evidence — even of those
usually considered inadmissible under the general rules of
evidence — taking into account the surrounding
circumstances and the test of reason that we can use as basic
minimum admissibility requirement. In the present case, we
should at least determine whether the Kasim evidence before
us is relevant and meaningful to the disappearance of Tagistis
and reasonably consistent with other evidence in the case.
The evidence about Tagitis' personal circumstances
surrounded him with an air of mystery. He was reputedly a
consultant of the World Bank and a Senior Honorary
Counselor for the IDB who attended a seminar in Zamboanga
and thereafter proceded to Jolo for an overnight stay,
indicated by his request to Kunnong for the purchase of a
return ticket to Zamboanga the day after he arrived in
Jolo. Nothing in the records indicates the purpose of his
overnight sojourn in Jolo. A colleague in the IDB, Prof.
Matli, early on informed the Jolo police that Tagitis may have
taken funds given to him in trust for IDB scholars. Prof. Matli
later on stated that he never accused Tagitis of taking away
money held in trust, although he confirmed that the IDB was
seeking assistance in locating funds of IDB scholars deposited
in Tagitis' personal account. Other than these pieces of
evidence, no other information exists in the records relating to
the personal circumstances of Tagitis.
The actual disappearance of Tagitis is as murky as his
personal circumstances. While the Amparo petition recited
that he was taken away by "burly men believed to be police
intelligence operatives", no evidence whatsoever was
introduced to support this allegation. Thus, the available
direct evidence is that Tagitis was last seen at 12.30 p.m. of
October 30, 2007 — the day he arrived in Jolo — and was
never seen again.
The Kasim evidence assumes critical materiality given
the dearth of direct evidence on the above aspects of the case,
as it supplies the gaps that were never looked into and
clarified by police investigation. It is the evidence, too, that
colors a simple missing person report into an enforced
disappearance case, as it injects the element of participation
by agents of the State and thus brings into question how the
State reacted to the disappearance.
Denials on the part of the police authorities, and
frustration on the part of the respondent, characterize the
attempts to locate Tagitis. Initially in Jolo, the police
informed Kunnong that Tagitis could have been taken by the
Abu Sayyaf or other groups fighting the government. No
evidence was ever offered on whether there was active Jolo
police investigation and how and why the Jolo police arrived
at this conclusion. The respondent's own inquiry in Jolo
yielded the answer that he was not missing but was with
another woman somewhere. Again, no evidence exists that
this explanation was arrived at based on an investigation. As
already related above, the inquiry with Col. Ancanan in
Zamboanga yielded ambivalent results not useful for
evidentiary purposes. Thus, it was only the inquiry from Col.
Kasim that yielded positive results. Col. Kasim's story,
however, confirmed only the fact of his custodial
investigation (and, impliedly, his arrest or abduction), without
identifying his abductor/s or the party holding him in custody.
The more significant part of Col. Kasim's story is that the
abduction came after Tagitis was seen talking with Omar
Patik and a certain Santos of Bulacan, a "Balik Islam"
charged with terrorism. Mrs. Talbin mentioned, too,
that Tagitis was being held at Talipapao, Sulu. None of the
police agencies participating in the investigation ever
pursued these leads. Notably, Task Force Tagitis to which
this information was relayed did not appear to have lifted a
finger to pursue these aspects of the case. 
DICSaH
More denials were manifested in the Returns on the
writ to the CA made by the petitioners. Then PNP Chief Gen.
Avelino I. Razon merely reported the directives he sent to the
ARMM Regional Director and the Regional Chief of the
CIDG on Tagitis, and these reports merely reiterated the
open-ended initial report of the disappearance. The CIDG
directed a search in all of its divisions with negative results.
These, to the PNP Chief, constituted the exhaustion "of all
possible efforts". PNP-CIDG Chief General Edgardo M.
Doromal, for his part, also reported negative results after
searching "all divisions and departments [of the CIDG] for a
person named Engr. Morced N. Tagitis . . . and after a diligent
and thorough research, records show that no such person is
being detained in the CIDG or any of its department or
divisions." PNP-PACER Chief PS Supt. Leonardo A. Espina
and PNP PRO ARMM Regional Director PC Superintendent
Joel R. Goltiao did no better in their affidavits-returns, as they
essentially reported the results of their directives to their units
to search for Tagitis.
The extent to which the police authorities acted was
fully tested when the CA constituted Task Force Tagitis, with
specific directives on what to do. The negative results
reflected in the Returns on the writ were again replicated
during the three hearings the CA scheduled. Aside from the
previously mentioned "retraction" that Prof. Matli made to
correct his accusation that Tagitis took money held in trust for
students, PS Supt. Ajirim reiterated in his testimony that the
CIDG consistently denied any knowledge or complicity in
any abduction and said that there was no basis to conclude
that the CIDG or any police unit had anything to do with the
disappearance of Tagitis; he likewise considered it premature
to conclude that Tagitis simply ran away with the money in
his custody. As already noted above, the Task Force notably
did not pursue any investigation about the personal
circumstances of Tagitis, his background in relation to the
IDB and the background and activities of this Bank itself, and
the reported sighting of Tagistis with terrorists and his alleged
custody in Talipapao, Sulu. No attempt appears to have ever
been made to look into the alleged IDB funds
that Tagitis held in trust, or to tap any of the "assets" who are
indispensable in investigations of this nature. These omissions
and negative results were aggravated by the CA findings that
it was only as late as January 28, 2008 or three months after
the disappearance that the police authorities requested for
clear pictures of Tagitis. Col. Kasim could not attend the trial
because his subpoena was not served, despite the fact that he
was designated as Ajirim's replacement in the latter's last
post. Thus, Col. Kasim was not then questioned. No
investigation — even an internal one — appeared to have
been made to inquire into the identity of Col. Kasim's "asset"
and what he indeed wrote.
We glean from all these pieces of evidence and
developments a consistency in the government's denial of
any complicity in the disappearance of Tagitis, disrupted
only by the report made by Col. Kasim to the respondent
at Camp Katitipan. Even Col. Kasim, however, eventually
denied that he ever made the disclosure that Tagitis was under
custodial investigation for complicity in terrorism. Another
distinctive trait that runs through these developments is
the government's dismissive approach to the
disappearance, starting from the initial response by the Jolo
police to Kunnong's initial reports of the disappearance, to the
responses made to the respondent when she herself reported
and inquired about her husband's disappearance, and even at
Task Force Tagitis itself.
As the CA found through Task Force Tagitis, the
investigation was at best haphazard since the authorities were
looking for a man whose picture they initially did not even
secure. The returns and reports made to the CA fared no
better, as the CIDG efforts themselves were confined to
searching for custodial records of Tagitis in their various
departments and divisions. To point out the obvious, if the
abduction of Tagitis was a "black" operation because it was
unrecorded or officially unauthorized, no record of custody
would ever appear in the CIDG records; Tagitis, too, would
not be detained in the usual police or CIDG detention
places. In sum, none of the reports on record contains any
meaningful results or details on the depth and extent of
the investigation made. To be sure, reports of top police
officials indicating the personnel and units they directed to
investigate can never constitute exhaustive and meaningful
investigation, or equal detailed investigative reports of the
activities undertaken to search for Tagitis. Indisputably, the
police authorities from the very beginning failed to come up
to the extraordinary diligence that the Amparo Rule requires.  The victim's father in this case brought a claim against Turkey
CONCLUSIONS AND THE AMPARO REMEDY
Based on these considerations, we conclude that Col.
Kasim's disclosure, made in an unguarded moment,
unequivocally point to some government complicity in the
disappearance. The consistent but unfounded denials and the
haphazard investigations cannot but point to this conclusion.
For why would the government and its officials engage in
their chorus of concealment if the intent had not been to deny
what they already knew of the disappearance? Would not an
in-depth and thorough investigation that at least credibly
determined the fate of Tagitis be a feather in the government's
cap under the circumstances of the disappearance? From this
perspective, the evidence and developments, particularly the
Kasim evidence, already establish a concrete case of enforced
disappearance that the Amparo Rule covers. From the prism
of the UN Declaration, heretofore cited and quoted, 173 the
evidence at hand and the developments in this case confirm
the fact of the enforced disappearance and government
complicity, under a background of consistent and unfounded
government denials and haphazard handling. The
disappearance as well effectively placed Tagitis outside the
protection of the law — a situation that will subsist unless this
Court acts.
This kind of fact situation and the conclusion reached
are not without precedent in international enforced
disappearance rulings. While the facts are not exactly the
same, the facts of this case run very close to those
of Timurtas v. Turkey, 174 a case decided by ECHR. The
European tribunal in that case acted on the basis of the
photocopy of a "post-operation report" in finding that
Abdulvahap Timurtas (Abdulvahap) was abducted and later
detained by agents (gendarmes) of the government of Turkey.
for numerous violations of the European Convention,
including the right to life (Article 2) and the rights to liberty
and security of a person (Article 5). The applicant contended
that on August 14, 1993, gendarmes apprehended his son,
Abdulvahap for being a leader of the Kurdish Workers' Party
(PKK) in the Silopi region. The petition was filed in southeast
Turkey nearly six and one half years after the apprehension.
According to the father, gendarmes first detained Abdulvahap
and then transferred him to another detainment
facility. Although there was no eyewitness evidence of the
apprehension or subsequent detainment, the applicant
presented evidence corroborating his version of events,
including a photocopy of a post-operation report signed
by the commander of gendarme operations in Silopi,
Turkey. The report included a description of Abdulvahap's
arrest and the result of a subsequent interrogation during
detention where he was accused of being a leader of the PKK
in the Silopi region. On this basis, Turkey was held
responsible for Abdulvahap's enforced disappearance.  DScTaC
Following the lead of this Turkish experience —
adjusted to the Philippine legal setting and
the Amparo remedy this Court has established, as applied
to the unique facts and developments of this case — we
believe and so hold that the government in general,
through the PNP and the PNP-CIDG, and in particular,
the Chiefs of these organizations together with Col.
Kasim, should be held fully accountable for the enforced
disappearance of Tagitis.
The PNP and CIDG are accountable because Section
24 of Republic Act No. 6975, otherwise known as the "PNP
Law", 175 specifies the PNP as the governmental office with
the mandate "to investigate and prevent crimes, effect the
arrest of criminal offenders, bring offenders to justice and
assist in their prosecution". The PNP-CIDG, as Col. Jose
Volpane Pante (then Chief of CIDG Region 9) testified, is the
"investigative arm" of the PNP and is mandated to
"investigate and prosecute all cases involving violations of
the Revised Penal Code, particularly those considered as
heinous crimes". 176 Under the PNP organizational structure,
the PNP-CIDG is tasked to investigate all major crimes
involving violations of the Revised Penal Code and operates
against organized crime groups, unless the President assigns
the case exclusively to the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI). 177 No indication exists in this case
showing that the President ever directly intervened by
assigning the investigation of Tagitis' disappearance
exclusively to the NBI.
Given their mandates, the PNP and PNP-CIDG
officials and members were the ones who were remiss in their
duties when the government completely failed to exercise the
extraordinary diligence that the Amparo Rule requires. We
hold these organizations accountable through their incumbent
Chiefs who, under this Decision, shall carry the personal
responsibility of seeing to it that extraordinary diligence, in
the manner the Amparo Rule requires, is applied in
addressing the enforced disappearance of Tagitis.
We hold Col. Kasim accountable for his failure to
disclose under oath information relating to the enforced
disappearance. For the purpose of this accountability, we
order that Col. Kasim be impleaded as a party to this
case. The PNP is similarly held accountable for the
suppression of vital information that Col. Kasim could
and did not provide, and, as the entity with direct
authority over Col. Kasim, is held with the same
obligation of disclosure that Col. Kasim carries. We shall
deal with Col. Kasim's suppression of evidence under oath
when we finally close this case under the process outlined
below.
To fully enforce the Amparo remedy, we refer this
case back to the CA for appropriate proceedings directed
at the monitoring of the PNP and the PNP-CIDG
investigations and actions, and the validation of their
results through hearings the CA may deem appropriate to
conduct. For purposes of these investigations, the PNP/PNP-
CIDG shall initially present to the CA a plan of action for
further investigation, periodically reporting the detailed
results of its investigation to the CA for its consideration and
action. On behalf of this Court, the CA shall pass upon: the
need for the PNP and the PNP-CIDG to make disclosures of
matters known to them as indicated in this Decision and as
further CA hearings may indicate; the petitioners'
submissions; the sufficiency of their investigative efforts; and
submit to this Court a quarterly report containing its actions
and recommendations, copy furnished the petitioners and the
respondent, with the first report due at the end of the first
quarter counted from the finality of this Decision. The PNP
and the PNP-CIDG shall have one (1) full year to undertake
their investigation. The CA shall submit its full report for the
consideration of this Court at the end of the 4th quarter
counted from the finality of this Decision.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the
petitioners' petition for review on certiorari for lack of merit,
and AFFIRM the decision of the Court of Appeals dated
March 7, 2008 under the following terms:
a. Recognition that the disappearance of Engineer
Morced N. Tagitis is an enforced
disappearance covered by the Rule on the
Writ of Amparo;
b. Without any specific pronouncement on exact
authorship and responsibility, declaring the
government (through the PNP and the
PNP-CIDG) and Colonel Julasirim Ahadin
Kasim accountable for the enforced
disappearance of Engineer Morced
N. Tagitis;
c. Confirmation of the validity of the Writ
of Amparo the Court of Appeals issued;
d. Holding the PNP, through the PNP Chief, and
the PNP-CIDG, through its Chief, directly
responsible for the disclosure of material
facts known to the government and to their
offices regarding the disappearance of
Engineer Morced N. Tagitis, and for the
conduct of proper investigations using
extraordinary diligence, with the
obligation to show investigation results
acceptable to this Court;
e. Ordering Colonel Julasirim Ahadin Kasim
impleaded in this case and holding him
accountable with the obligation to disclose
information known to him and to his
"assets" in relation with the enforced
disappearance of Engineer Morced
N. Tagitis;
f. Referring this case back to the Court of
Appeals for appropriate proceedings
directed at the monitoring of the PNP and
PNP-CIDG investigations, actions and the
validation of their results; the PNP and the
PNP-CIDG shall initially present to the
Court of Appeals a plan of action for
further investigation, periodically reporting
their results to the Court of Appeals for
consideration and action;
g. Requiring the Court of Appeals to submit to
this Court a quarterly report with its
recommendations, copy furnished the
incumbent PNP and PNP-CIDG Chiefs as
petitioners and the respondent, with the
first report due at the end of the first
quarter counted from the finality of this
Decision;
h. The PNP and the PNP-CIDG shall have one (1)
full year to undertake their investigations;
the Court of Appeals shall submit its full
report for the consideration of this Court at
the end of the 4th quarter counted from the
finality of this Decision; 
TDEASC
These directives and those of the Court of Appeals'
made pursuant to this Decision shall be given to, and shall be
directly enforceable against, whoever may be the incumbent
Chiefs of the Philippine National Police and its Criminal
Investigation and Detection Group, under pain of contempt
from this Court when the initiatives and efforts at disclosure
and investigation constitute less than the extraordinary
diligence that the Rule on the Writ of Amparo and the
circumstances of this case demand. Given the unique nature
of Amparo cases and their varying attendant circumstances,
these directives — particularly, the referral back to and
monitoring by the CA — are specific to this case and are not
 standard remedies that can be applied to GEN. ALEXANDER B. YANO, Chief of Staff,
every Amparo situation. Armed Forces of the Philippines, LT. GEN.
The dismissal of the Amparo petition with respect to VICTOR S. IBRADO, Commanding General,
General Alexander Yano, Commanding General, Philippine Philippine Army, and MAJ. GEN. RALPH A.
Army, and General Ruben Rafael, Chief, Anti-Terrorism Task VILLANUEVA, Commander, 7th Infantry
Force Comet, Zamboanga City, is hereby AFFIRMED.  Division, Philippine Army, petitioners, vs.
CLEOFAS SANCHEZ and MARCIANA
SO ORDERED. MEDINA, respondents.
Puno, C.J., Carpio, Corona, Carpio Morales, Chico-
Nazario, Velasco, Jr., Nachura, Leonardo-de Castro, Peralta,
Bersamin, Del Castillo, Abad and Villarama, Jr., JJ., concur. DECISION
 (Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis, G.R. No. 182498, [December 3, 2009],
|||

621 PHIL 536-635)

CARPIO MORALES, J  : p

On December 28, 2007, respondent

Cleofas Sanchez (Cleofas) filed before this Court a petition
docketed as G.R. No. 180839 for issuance of a Writ
of Amparo with Motion for Production and Inspection
directed against Gen. Hermogenes Esperon (Gen. Esperon),
the then Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
(AFP).
On January 2, 2008, the Court 1 resolved to issue a
Writ of Amparo and ordered Gen. Esperon to make a verified
return of the writ before Court of Appeals Justice Edgardo
Sundiam, who was ordered to hear and decide the case which
was eventually redocketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 00010 WR/A.
Cleofas amended her petition 2 on January 14, 2008 to
include herein co-respondent Marciana Medina (Marciana) as
therein additional petitioner, and to implead other military
officers 3 including Lt. Ali Sumangil (Lt. Sumangil) and Sgt.
Gil Villalobos 4 (Sgt. Villalobos) as therein additional
EN BANC respondents.

[G.R. No. 186640. February 11, 2010.]

 In the Amended Petition, Cleofas and Marciana
(respondents) alleged that on September 17, 2006 at around
8:00 p.m., their respective sons Nicolas Sanchez and
Heherson Medina were catching frogs outside their home in
Sitio Dalin, Barangay Bueno, Capas, Tarlac; that at around
1:00 a.m. of the next day, September 18, 2006, Nicolas'
"wives" Lourdez and Rosalie Sanchez, who were then at
home, heard gunshots and saw armed men in soldiers'
uniforms passing by; that at around 4:00 a.m. of the same day,
Lourdez and Rosalie went out to check on Nicolas and
Heherson but only saw their caps, slippers, pana and airgun
for catching frogs, as well as bloodstains; and that they
immediately reported the matter to the barangay officials. 
HIAESC
Respondents narrated that they, together with other
family members, proceeded on September 19, 2006 to the
Capas Station of the Philippine National Police (PNP).
Accompanied by officials of the National Commission on
Indigenous Peoples (NCIP), 5 they also tried to search for
Nicolas and Heherson at the Camp Detachment of the 71st
Infantry Batallion of the Philippine Army (Army) in
Barangay Burgos, San Jose, Tarlac, and at the Camp of the
Bravo Company of the Army's 71st Infantry Batallion inside
Hacienda Luisita, Tarlac City, but to no avail.
Furthermore, respondents alleged that Josephine
Galang Victoria, also known as Antonina Galang (Josephine),
niece of a neighbor, later informed them that she had seen two
men inside Camp Servillano Aquino of the Northern Luzon
Command (Nolcom) in San Miguel, Tarlac City on
September 21, 2006, whom Josephine later identified as
Nicolas and Heherson (the victims) after respondents had
shown her their photographs; and that Josephine informed
them that she saw the victims again on September 24, 2006
and November 1, 2006, 6 this time at the Camp of the Bravo
Company of the Army's 71st Infantry Batallion inside
Hacienda Luisita, where she had occasion to talk to Lt.
Sumangil and Sgt. Villalobos. Respondents filed a case on
December 21, 2006 before the Commission on Human Rights
(CHR), which endorsed 7 the same to the Ombudsman for
appropriate action.
Contending that the victims' life, liberty and security
had been and continued to be violated on account of their
forced disappearance, respondents prayed for the issuance of
a writ of Amparo, the production of the victims' bodies during
the hearing on the Writ, the inspection of certain military
camps, 8 the issuance of temporary and permanent protection
orders, and the rendition of judgment under Section 18 of
the Rule on the Writ of Amparo. 9
Meanwhile, a consolidated Return of the
Writ, 10 verified by Gen. Esperon, Lt. Sumangil, Sgt.
Villalobos, Maj. Gen. Juanito Gomez (Maj. Gen. Gomez) as
Commander of the Army's 7th Infantry Division, and Lt. Col.
Victor Bayani (Lt. Col. Bayani) as Camp Commander of
Camp Servillano Aquino of the Nolcom in Tarlac City, was
filed with the appellate court on January 24, 2008. Lt. Gen.
Alexander Yano (Lt. Gen. Yano), Commanding General of
the Army, filed a Return of the Writ upon his return from an
official trip abroad.
In their Return, the military officers denied having
custody of the victims. They posited that the proper remedy
of respondents was to file a petition for the issuance of a Writ
of Habeas Corpus, since the petition's ultimate objective was
the production of the bodies of the victims, as they were
allegedly abducted and illegally detained by military
personnel; 11 that the petition failed to indicate the matters
required by paragraphs (c), (d) and (e), Section 5 of the Rule
on the Writ of Amparo, such that the allegations were
incomplete to constitute a cause of action, aside from being
based on mere hearsay evidence, and are, at best, speculative;
that respondents failed to present the affidavits of some other
competent persons which would clearly validate their claim
that the military violated the victims' right to life, liberty or
security by abducting or detaining them; and that the petition
did not allege any specific action or inaction attributable to
the military officers with respect to their duties; or allege that
respondents took any action by filing a formal complaint or
visiting the military camps adverted to in order to verify
Josephine's claim that she saw the victims on two different
occasions inside the camps, or that they took efforts to follow
up on the PNP Capas Station's further action on their
complaint. 12 ISCDEA
Denying he violated the victims' right to life, liberty
and security, Gen. Esperon specifically asserted that, in
compliance with the Defense Secretary's directive in relation
to cases of Writ of Amparo against the AFP, he issued
directives to the Nolcom Commander and the Army's
Commanding General to investigate and establish the
circumstances surrounding reported disappearances of victims
insofar as the claim on the possible involvement of the
military units was concerned; and undertook to bring any
military personnel involved, when warranted by the evidence,
to the bar of justice. 13
Maj. Gen. Gomez likewise denied having custody or
knowledge of the whereabouts of the victims, stating that it
was not army policy to abduct civilians in his area of
responsibility, 14 and that he was away on official business at
the time of the alleged disappearance of the victims. 15
Lt. Col. Bayani attested that he was designated Camp
Commander only on September 1, 2007 and thus had no
personal knowledge about the victims' alleged disappearance
or abduction on September 18, 2006; that he was informed by
his immediate predecessor that no individuals were detained
in the camp as it did not even have detention facilities; and
that in compliance with Gen. Esperon's directive, their
command was conducting further investigation to verify the
allegations in the petition. 16
Lt. Sumangil denied having spoken to Josephine inside
the camp on September 24, 2006, on which date civilians
were not allowed to enter except on official missions or when
duly authorized to conduct transactions inside the camp. He
thus concluded that Josephine lied in claiming to have seen
the two victims inside the Camp of the Bravo Company of the
71st Infantry Batallion inside Hacienda Luisita on September
24, 2006 or at any time thereafter. He instead recounted that
on September 24, 2006, he spoke for the first and only time,
but only at the gate of the camp, with a person who identified
herself as "Antonina Galang," who informed him about the
disappearance of the victims since September 18, 2006.
Warning him that these men were members of the New
People's Army (NPA), she advised him not to entertain any
queries or complaints relative to their alleged
disappearance. 17
Sgt. Villalobos echoed Sumangil's disclaimer about
having any of the victims in his custody or meeting anyone
named Josephine Victoria, or about the latter having entered
the camp's kitchen to drink water.
Lt. Gen. Yano stated that upon his return from his
official functions overseas, he immediately inquired on the
actions taken on the case. He averred that he had never
participated directly or indirectly; or consented, permitted or
sanctioned any illegal or illegitimate military operations. He
declared that it had always been his policy to respect human
rights and uphold the rule of law, and to bring those who
violated the law before the court of justice. 
cHAaCE
In opposing the request for issuance of inspection and
production orders, the military officers posited that apart from
compromising national security should entry into these
military camps/bases be allowed, these orders partook of the
nature of a search warrant, such that the requisites for the
issuance thereof must be complied with prior to their
issuance. They went on to argue that such request relied
solely on bare, self-serving and vague allegations contained in
Josephine's affidavit, for aside from merely mentioning that
she saw Nicolas and Heherson on board an army truck near
the Nolcom gate and, days later, inside the kitchen of the 71st
Infantry Battalion Camp inside Hacienda Luisita and while
logging outside said camp, Josephine had stated nothing more
to ascertain the veracity of the places where she allegedly saw
Nicolas and Heherson. 18
On whether the impleaded military officers were either
directly or indirectly connected with the disappearance of the
victims, the appellate court, after hearing, absolved, by the
assailed Decision of September 17, 2008, 19 Gen. Esperon, Lt.
Gen. Yano, Maj. Gen. Gomez, and Lt. Col. Bayani for lack of
evidence linking them to the disappearances, and further ruled
as follows:  Army, 7th Infantry Division in Fort Magsaysay
All said, this Court is convinced
that petitioners have not adequately and convincingly
established any direct or indirect link between
respondents individual military officers and the
disappearances of Nicolas and Heherson. Neither did
the concerned Philippine Army Units have exerted
fully their efforts to investigate and unearth the truth
and bring the culprits before the bar of justice.
The concerned Philippine Army units (such as
the Northern Command and the 7th Infantry Division,
which had jurisdiction over the place of
disappearance of Nicolas and Heherson, should exert
extraordinary diligence to follow all possible leads to
solve the disappearances of Nicolas and Heherson.
The Philippine Army should be reminded of its
constitutional mandate as the protector of the people
and the State.
RELIEFS
While as We stated hereinbefore that We
could not find any link between respondents
individual military officers to the disappearance of
Nicolas and Heherson, nonetheless, the fact remains
that the two men are still missing. Hence, We find it
equitable to grant petitioners some reliefs in the
interest of human rights and justice as follows:
1. Inspections of the following camps: Camp
Servillano Aquino, San Miguel, Tarlac City, any
military camp of the 7th Infantry Division located in
Aqua Farm, Hacienda Luisita, Tarlac City, within
reasonable working hours of any day except when the
military camp is on red alert status. 
TcIaHC
2. Thorough and Impartial Investigation — for
the appropriate Investigating Unit of the Philippine
Army at Camp Servillano Aquino and the Philippine
to conduct their respective investigation of all angles
pertaining to the disappearances of Nicolas and
Heherson and to immediately file charges against
those found guilty and submit their written report to
this Court within three (3) months from notice.
SO ORDERED. 20 (underscoring supplied)
The military officers filed a Motion for Partial
Reconsideration (Motion), arguing in the main that since
respondents failed to prove the allegations in their petition by
substantial evidence, the appellate court should not have
granted those reliefs. 21
The appellate court denied the Motion by the
assailed Resolution of March 3, 2009. 22
Taking up the cudgels for the military, Gen.
Alexander Yano, 23 Lt. Gen. Victor Ibrado, 24 and Maj. Gen.
Ralph Villanueva 25 (petitioners) filed the present petition for
review of the appellate court's assailed issuances, faulting it
for
. . . NOT CATEGORICALLY DENYING THE
PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF
AMPARO PURSUANT TO SECTION 18 OF THE
RULE ON THE WRIT OF AMPARO DESPITE ITS
FINDING THAT RESPONDENTS FAILED TO
PROVE THEIR ALLEGATIONS IN THEIR
PETITION FOR AMPARO BY SUBSTANTIAL
EVIDENCE. . . . [AND] . . . DIRECTING
PETITIONERS TO:
(A) ALLOW RESPONDENTS TO
INSPECT CAMP SERVILLANO AQUINO,
NORTH LUZON COMMAND, PHILIPPINE
ARMY, SAN MIGUEL, TARLAC CITY
AND ANY MILITARY CAMP OF THE 7TH
INFANTRY D IVISION LOCATED IN
AQUA FARM, HACIENDA LUISITA,
TARLAC CITY; AND.
(B) CONDUCT THOROUGH AND
IMPARTIAL INVESTIGATION OF THE
DISAPPEARANCE OF THE AGGRIEVED
PARTIES, FILE CHARGES AGAINST
THOSE FOUND GUILTY AND SUBMIT
WRITTEN REPORT WITHIN THREE
MONTHS FROM NOTICE. 26 (emphasis and
underscoring supplied) HEcIDa
The Court finds merit in the petition.
In ruling in favor of Lt. Sumangil and Sgt. Villalobos,
the appellate court resolved the case on the basis of the
credibility of Josephine as a witness. It arrived at the
following findings:
To prove that these two military officers took
or have custody of Nicolas and Heherson, petitioners
presented Josephine Galang Victoria, also known as
Antonina Galang, a niece of petitioner
Cleofas Sanchez' neighbor, who allegedly saw
Nicolas and Heherson inside Camp Servillano Aquino
on September 21, 2006 when she visited her uncle, a
certain Major Henry Galang, who is allegedly living
inside the camp; that a few days later, she again saw
Nicolas and Heherson at Aqua Farm at Hacienda
Luisita, where the camp of Bravo Company of the
71st Infantry Battalion is located and where Heherson
was seen sweeping the floor and Nicolas was seen
cooking, having wounds in their legs near the feet as
if sustained from a gunshot wound; that on November
1, 2006, she went back upon advice of Lt. Sumangil
to give her a cellfone which Tech. Sgt. Villalobos
handed to her for her to know where Nicolas and
Heherson will be brought; that they [sic] saw the two
outside getting some woods under the watchful eye of
a soldier when Sumangil kicked Nicolas for being
slow and thereafter, she did not see the two anymore.
While Josephine Galang Victoria's story of
how she saw the subject two missing persons (Nicolas
and Heherson) appeared initially as plausible,
however, her credibility as a witness had been
successfully destroyed by the following witnesses
presented by the respondents.
1) Barangay Captain Rodolfo P. Supan of Cut-
Cut II, Tarlac City, attested that she n  knows a certain
woman named Josephine Galang Victoria who
introduces herself as Antonina Galang, niece through
the cousin of his wife and a long-time resident of Cut-
Cut II since birth until she lived with her partner —
Philip Victoria and they still visit and goes to her
auntie or sibling's house; that he knows the reputation
of Josephine Victoria as bad regarding her telling the
truth, her truthfulness and integrity, known to fool
others and invents stories for money reasons, that she
cannot be trusted even if she is under oath before God
and the State.
 2) As if that is not yet enough, Gloria Galang
Mansalay testified that she is a resident of Cut-Cut II
since birth in 1964 and she knows Josephine Galang
Victoria because she is her niece being the daughter
of her older brother; that she even took care of
Antonina as a child but her general reputation in
telling the truth, her fidelity and integrity is bad,
known to fool others, a liar and invent [sic] stories for
reason of money.  DSETac
3) Clarita Galang Ricafrente saying that she is
a resident of Cut-cut II and Antonina Galang is a
niece and attested the same negative reputations
against Antonina.
It appears that said negative testimonies of
Josephine Galang Victoria's relatives were never
successfully rebutted by her and the Court gives
credence to them. No ill motive [sic] were established
against the said witnesses to testify against Antonina
Galang.
Furthermore, Antonina Galang stated that she
was in Camp Servillano Aquino when she first saw
Nicolas and Heherson riding in an army truck because
she was visiting her uncle, Major Henry Galang,
allegedly living in the camp. Parenthetically, this
story of Antonina Galang was put to doubt. TSG
Edgard Reyes who attested that as a meter reader in
the camp, Major Galang was no longer residing there
in September 2006. This testimony and revelation of
TSG Reyes only bolstered the testimonies of the other
witnesses on Antonina Galang's penchant to invent
stories or tell a lie.
In sum, We are not inclined to give credence
to the claims of Antonina Galang that the two missing
person [sic] she saw first in Camp Servillano Aquino
and later, in Aqua Farm, were Nicolas and Heherson.
Notably, Antonina Galang never did see the faces of
the two but were known to her through photographs.
Certainly, there may be a difference between
photographs and the faces in person.
To be noted also is that even the two wives of
Nicolas did not make an express attestation that they
saw Nicolas and Heherson in the company of those
armed men who passed their place in the early
morning of September 18, 2006. 27 (underscoring
supplied)
NOTABLY, respondents neither moved for
reconsideration nor appealed the appellate court's September
17, 2008 Decision.
The entrenched procedural rule in this jurisdiction is
that a party who did not appeal cannot assign such errors as
are designed to have the judgment modified. All that said
appellee can do is to make a counter-assignment of errors or
to argue on issues raised at the trial only for the purpose of
sustaining the judgment in his favor, even on grounds not
included in the decision of the court a quo or raised in the
appellant's assignment of errors or arguments. 28
This tenet is enshrined as one of the basic principles in
our rules of procedure, specifically to avoid ambiguity in the
presentation of issues, facilitate the setting forth of arguments
by the parties, and aid the court in making its determinations.
A party who fails to acquire complete relief from a decision
of the court has various remedies to correct an omission by
the court. He may move for a correction or clarification of
judgment, or even seek its modification through ordinary
appeal. There is thus no basis for the Court to skip the rule
and excuse herein respondents for failure to properly avail
themselves of the remedies in the face of the parties'
contentions that have remained disputed. 29  TIESCA
What is thus left for the Court to resolve is the issue of
whether the grant of the RELIEFS 30 by the appellate court
after finding want of substantial evidence are valid and
proper.
Sections 17 and 18 of the Amparo Rule lay down the
requisite standard of proof necessary to prove either party's
claim, viz.:
SEC. 17. Burden of Proof and Standard of
Diligence Required. — The parties shall establish
their claim by substantial evidence.
The respondent who is a private individual or
entity must prove that ordinary diligence as required
by applicable laws, rules and regulations was
observed in the performance of duty.
The respondent who is a public official or
employee must prove that extraordinary diligence as
required by applicable laws, rules and regulations was
observed in the performance of duty.
The respondent public official or employee
cannot invoke the presumption that official duty has
been regularly performed to evade responsibility or
liability.
SEC. 18. Judgment. — The Court shall render
judgment within ten (10) days from the time the
petition is submitted for decision. If the allegations in
the petition are proven by substantial evidence, the
court shall grant the privilege of the writ and such
reliefs as may be proper and appropriate;  otherwise,
the privilege shall be denied. (emphasis and
underscoring supplied)  reliefs:
The requisite standard of proof — substantial
evidence — speaks of the clear intent of the Rule to have the
equivalent of an administrative proceeding, albeit judicially
conducted, in resolving amparo petitions.
To the appellate court, the evidence adduced in the
present case failed to measure up to that standard– substantial
evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate
to support a conclusion. Since respondents did not avail of
any remedy against the adverse judgment, the appellate
court's decision is, insofar as it concerns them, now beyond
the ambit of review.
Meanwhile, the requirement for a government official
or employee to observe extraordinary diligence in the
performance of duty stresses the extraordinary measures
expected to be taken in safeguarding every citizen's
constitutional rights as well as in the investigation of cases of
extra-judicial killings and enforced disappearances. 31 
CAScIH
The failure to establish that the public official observed
extraordinary diligence in the performance of duty does not
result in the automatic grant of the privilege of
the amparo writ. It does not relieve the petitioner from
establishing his or her claim by substantial evidence. The
omission or inaction on the part of the public official
provides, however, some basis for the petitioner to move and
for the court to grant certain interim reliefs.
In line with this, Section 14 of the Amparo
Rule provides for interim or provisional reliefs that the
courts may grant in order to, inter alia, protect the witnesses
and the rights of the parties, and preserve all relevant
evidence, viz.:
SEC. 14. Interim Reliefs. — Upon filing of
the petition or at anytime before final judgment, the
court, justice or judge may grant any of the following
(a) Temporary Protection Order. — The
court, justice or judge, upon motion or motu
proprio, may order that the petitioner or the aggrieved
party and any member of the immediate family be
protected in a government agency or by an accredited
person or private institution capable of keeping and
securing their safety. If the petitioner is an
organization, association or institution referred to in
Section 3 (c) of this Rule, the protection may be
extended to the officers involved.
The Supreme Court shall accredit the persons
and private institutions that shall extend temporary
protection to the petitioner or the aggrieved party and
any member of the immediate family, in accordance
with guidelines which it shall issue.
The accredited persons and private institutions
shall comply with the rules and conditions that may
be imposed by the court, justice or judge.
(b) Inspection Order. — The court, justice or
judge, upon verified motion and after due
hearing, may order any person in possession or
control of a designated land or other property, to
permit entry for the purpose of inspecting, measuring,
surveying, or photographing the property or any
relevant object or operation thereon.
The motion shall state in detail the place or
places to be inspected. It shall be supported by
affidavits or testimonies of witnesses having personal
knowledge of the enforced disappearance or
whereabouts of the aggrieved party.
If the motion is opposed on the ground of
national security or of the privileged nature of the
information, the court, justice or judge may conduct a
hearing in chambers to determine the merit of the
opposition. 
CDcHSa
The movant must show that the inspection
order is necessary to establish the right of the
aggrieved party alleged to be threatened or violated.
The inspection order shall specify the person
or persons authorized to make the inspection and the
date, time, place and manner of making the inspection
and may prescribe other conditions to protect the
constitutional rights of all parties. The order shall
expire five (5) days after the date of its issuance,
unless extended for justifiable reasons.
(c) Production Order. — The court, justice, or
judge, upon verified motion and after due
hearing, may order any person in possession, custody
or control of any designated documents, papers,
books, accounts, letters, photographs, objects or
tangible things, or objects in digitized or electronic
form, which constitute or contain evidence relevant to
the petition or the return, to produce and permit their
inspection, copying or photographing by or on behalf
of the movant.
The motion may be opposed on the ground of
national security or of the privileged nature of the
information, in which case the court, justice or judge
may conduct a hearing in chambers to determine the
merit of the opposition.
The court, justice or judge shall prescribe
other conditions to protect the constitutional rights of
all the parties. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
These provisional reliefs are intended to assist the
court before it arrives at a judicious determination of
the amparo petition. For the appellate court to, in the present
case, still order the inspection of the military camps and order
the army units to conduct an investigation into the
disappearance of Nicolas and Heherson after it absolved
petitioners is thus not in order. The reliefs granted by the
appellate court to respondents are not in sync with a finding
that petitioners could not be held accountable for the
disappearance of the victims.
Respondents posit that there appears to be some shared
confusion as to whether the reliefs granted by the appellate
court are final or interlocutory. They thus implore this Court
 to modify the appellate court's judgment by considering the [G.R. No. 182165. November 25, 2009.]
reliefs as temporary or interlocutory and by adding thereto an
order for the production of logbooks and reports. 32 P/SUPT. FELIXBERTO CASTILLO,
At this late stage, respondents can no longer avail POLICE OFFICERS ROMEO BAGTAS,
themselves of their stale remedies in the guise of praying for RUPERTO BORLONGAN, EDMUNDO
affirmative reliefs in their Comment. No modification of DIONISIO, RONNIE MORALES, ARNOLD
judgment could be granted to a party who did not TRIA, and GILBERTO PUNZALAN, ENGR.
appeal. 33 
ASTcEa
RICASOL P. MILLAN, ENGR. REDENTOR
S. DELA CRUZ, MR. ANASTACIO L.
If respondents believed that the September 17, 2008 BORLONGAN, MR. ARTEMIO
Decision of the appellate court was merely interlocutory, they ESGUERRA, "TISOY", and JOHN
had every opportunity to question the conclusion of said DOES, petitioners, vs. DR. AMANDA
court, but they did not. They could have opposed petitioners' T. CRUZ, NIXON T. CRUZ, and
motion for reconsideration filed with the appellate court, it FERDINAND T. CRUZ, respondents.
being a prohibited pleading 34 under the Amparo Rule, but
they did not.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The DECISION
assailed September 17, 2008 Decision and March 3, 2009
Resolution of the Court of Appeals, insofar as it grants the
assailed earlier-quoted reliefs are SET ASIDE. CARPIO MORALES, J  : p

SO ORDERED.
Petitioners, 1 employees and members of the local
Puno, C.J., Carpio, Corona, Velasco, Jr., Nachura, police force of the City Government of Malolos, challenge the
Leonardo-de Castro, Brion, Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo, March 28, 2008 Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
Abad, Villarama, Jr., Perez and Mendoza, JJ., concur. of Malolos, Branch 10 in a petition for issuance of writs
 (Yano v. Sanchez, G.R. No. 186640, [February 11, 2010], 626
||| of amparo and habeas data instituted by respondents.
PHIL 262-279) The factual antecedents.
Respondent Amanda Cruz (Amanda) who, along with
her husband Francisco G. Cruz (Spouses Cruz), leased a
parcel of land situated at Barrio Guinhawa, Malolos (the
property), refused to vacate the property, despite demands by
the lessor Provincial Government of Bulacan (the Province)
which intended to utilize it for local projects.
EN BANC
 The Province thus filed a complaint for unlawful
detainer against the Spouses Cruz before the then Municipal
Trial Court (MTC) of Bulacan, Bulacan.
By Decision of September 5, 1997, the MTC rendered
judgment against the Spouses Cruz, which judgment,
following its affirmance by the RTC, became final and
executory.
The finality of the decision in the ejectment case
notwithstanding, the spouses Cruz refused to vacate the
property. They thereupon filed cases against the
Province 2 and the judges who presided over the case. 3 Those
cases were dismissed except their petition for annulment of
judgment lodged before Branch 18 of the RTC of Malolos,
and a civil case for injunction 833-M-2004 lodged before
Branch 10 of the same RTC Malolos.
The Spouses Cruz sought in the case for injunction the
issuance of a permanent writ of injunction to prevent the
execution of the final and executory judgment against them.
By Order of July 19, 2005, the RTC, finding merit in
the Spouses Cruzes' allegation that subsequent events
changed the situation of the parties to justify a suspension of
the execution of the final and executory judgment, issued a
permanent writ of injunction, the dispositive portion of which
reads: 
ESaITA
WHEREFORE, the foregoing petitioners'
Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated
August 10, 2004 is hereby GRANTED. Order dated
August 10, 2004 is
hereby RECONSIDERED and SET ASIDE.
Further, the verified petition dated November 05,
2002 are hereby REINSTATED and MADE
PERMANENT until the MTC-Bulacan, Bulacan
finally resolves the pending motions of petitioners
with the same determines the metes and bounds of
400 sq. meters leased premises subject matter of this
case with immediate dispatch.
Accordingly, REMAND the determination of the
issues raised by the petitioners on the issued writ of
demolition to the MTC of Bulacan, Bulacan.
SO ORDERED. 4 (Emphasis in the original;
underscoring supplied)
Finding that the fallo of the RTC July 19, 2005 Order
treats, as a suspensive condition for the lifting of the
permanent injunction, the determination of the boundaries of
the property, the Province returned the issue for the
consideration of the MTC. In a Geodetic Engineer's Report
submitted to the MTC on August 31, 2007, the metes and
bounds of the property were indicated.
The MTC, by Order of January 2, 2008, approved the
Report and ruled that the permanent injunction which the
RTC issued is ineffective. On motion of the Province, the
MTC, by Order of January 21, 2008, thus issued a Second
Alias Writ of Demolition.
On receiving notice of the January 2, 2008 MTC
Order, the Spouses Cruz filed a motion before Branch 10 of
the RTC for the issuance of a temporary restraining order
(TRO) which it set for hearing on January 25, 2008 on which
date, however, the demolition had, earlier in the day, been
implemented. Such notwithstanding, the RTC issued a
TRO. 5 The Spouses Cruz, along with their sons-respondents
Nixon and Ferdinand, thereupon entered the property, placed
several container vans and purportedly represented
themselves as owners of the property which was for lease.
On February 21, 2008, petitioners Police
Superintendent Felixberto Castillo et al., who were deployed
by the City Mayor in compliance with a memorandum issued
by Governor Joselito R. Mendoza instructing him to "protect,
secure and maintain the possession of the property", entered
the property.
Amanda and her co-respondents refused to turn over
the property, however. Insisting that the RTC July 19, 2005
Order of Permanent Injunction enjoined the Province from
repossessing it, they shoved petitioners, forcing the latter to
arrest them and cause their indictment for direct assault,
trespassing and other forms of light threats.
Respondents later filed on March 3, 2008 a
"Respectful Motion-Petition for Writ of Amparo and Habeas
Data", docketed as Special Civil Action No. 53-M-2008,
which was coincidentally raffled to Branch 10 of the RTC
Malolos.
Respondents averred that despite the Permanent
Injunction, petitioners unlawfully entered the property with
the use of heavy equipment, tore down the barbed wire fences
and tents, 6 and arrested them when they resisted petitioners'
entry; and that as early as in the evening of February 20,
2008, members of the Philippine National Police had already
camped in front of the property.
On the basis of respondents' allegations in their
petition and the supporting affidavits, the RTC, by Order of
March 4, 2008, issued writs of amparo and habeas data. 7  AIDTHC
The RTC, crediting respondents' version in this wise:
Petitioners have shown by preponderant
evidence that the facts and circumstances of the
alleged offenses examined into on Writs of Amparo
and Habeas Data that there have been an on-going
hearings on the verified Petition for Contempt,
docketed as Special Proceedings No. 306-M-2006,
before this Court for alleged violation by the
respondents of the Preliminary Injunction Order dated
July 16, 2005 [sic] in Sp. Civil Action No. 833-M-
2002, hearings were held on January 25, 2008,
February 12 and 19, 2008, where the respondents
prayed for an April 22, 2008 continuance, however, in
the pitch darkness of February 20, 2008, police
officers, some personnel from the Engineering
department, and some civilians proceeded purposely
to the Pinoy Compound, converged therein and with
continuing threats of bodily harm and danger and
stone-throwing of the roofs of the homes thereat from
voices around its premises, on a pretext of an ordinary
police operation when enterviewed [sic] by the media
then present, but at 8:00 a.m. to late in the afternoon
of February 21, 2008, zoomed in on the petitioners,
subjecting them to bodily harm, mental torture,
degradation, and the debasement of a human being,
reminiscent of the martial law police brutality,
sending chill in any ordinary citizen. 8
rendered judgment, by Decision of March 28, 2008, in favor
of respondents, disposing as follows:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
Commitment Orders and waivers in Crim. Cases Nos.
08-77 for Direct assault; Crim. Case No. 08-77 for
Other Forms of Trespass; and Crim. Case No. 08-78
for Light Threats are hereby DECLARED illegal,
null and void, as petitioners were deprived of their
substantial rights, induced by duress or a well-
founded fear of personal violence. Accordingly, the
commitment orders and waivers are hereby SET
ASIDE. The temporary release of the petitioners is
declared ABSOLUTE.
Without any pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED." 9 (Emphasis in the original;
underscoring supplied)
Hence, the present petition for review
on certiorari, pursuant to Section 19 10 of The Rule on the
Writ of Amparo (A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC), 11 which is
essentially reproduced in the Rule on the Writ of Habeas
Data (A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC). 12
In the main, petitioners fault the RTC for:
. . . giving due course and issuing writs of
amparo and habeas data when from the allegations of
the petition, the same ought not to have been issued as
(1) the petition in [sic] insufficient in substance as the
same involves property rights; and (2) criminal cases
had already been filed and pending with the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 1, City of
Malolos. (Underscoring supplied)
The petition is impressed with merit.
The Court is, under the Constitution, empowered to
promulgate rules for the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights. 13 In view of the heightening prevalence
of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, the Rule
on the Writ of Amparo was issued and took effect on October
24, 2007 which coincided with the celebration of United
Nations Day and affirmed the Court's commitment towards
internationalization of human rights. More than three months
later or on February 2, 2008, the Rule on the Writ of Habeas
Data was promulgated.  HaAIES
Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides:
Section 1. Petition. — The petition for a writ
of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose
right to life, liberty and security is violated or
threatened with violation by an unlawful act or
omission of a public official or employee, or of a
private individual or entity. The writ shall cover
extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or
threats thereof. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas
Data provides:
Section 1. Habeas Data. — The writ of habeas
data is a remedy available to any person whose right
to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or
threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a
public official or employee or of a private individual
or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or
storing of data or information regarding the person,
family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved
party. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
From the above-quoted provisions, the coverage of the
writs is limited to the protection of rights to life,
liberty and security. And the writs cover not only actual but
also threats of unlawful acts or omissions.
Secretary of National Defense  v. Manalo  14 teaches:
As the Amparo Rule was intended to address
the intractable problem of "extralegal killings" and
"enforced disappearances", its coverage, in its present
form, is confined to these two instances or to threats
thereof. "Extralegal killings" are "killings committed
without due process of law, i.e., without legal
safeguards or judicial proceedings". On the other
hand, "enforced disappearances" are "attended by the
following characteristics: an arrest, detention or
abduction of a person by a government official or
organized groups or private individuals acting with
the direct or indirect acquiescence of the government;
the refusal of the State to disclose the fate or
whereabouts of the person concerned or a refusal to
acknowledge the deprivation of liberty which places
such persons outside the protection of
law. 15 (Underscoring supplied, citations omitted)
To thus be covered by the privilege of the writs,
respondents must meet the threshold requirement that their
right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with
an unlawful act or omission. Evidently, the present
controversy arose out of a property dispute between the
Provincial Government and respondents. Absent any
considerable nexus between the acts complained of and its
effect on respondents' right to life, liberty and security, the
Court will not delve on the propriety of petitioners' entry into
the property.
Apropos is the Court's ruling in Tapuz  v.
Rosario: 16
To start off with the basics, the writ of amparo
was originally conceived as a response to the
extraordinary rise in the number of killings and
enforced disappearances, and to the perceived lack of
available and effective remedies to address these
extraordinary concerns. It is intended to address
violations of or threats to the rights to life, liberty or
security, as an extraordinary and independent remedy
beyond those available under the prevailing Rules, or
as a remedy supplemental to these Rules. What it is
not, is a writ to protect concerns that are purely
property or commercial. Neither is it a writ that
we shall issue on amorphous and uncertain
grounds. Consequently, the Rule on the Writ of
Amparo — in line with the extraordinary character of
the writ and the reasonable certainty that its issuance
demands — requires that every petition for the
issuance of the writ must be supported by justifying
allegations of fact, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
The writ shall issue if the Court is
preliminarily satisfied with the prima facie existence
of the ultimate facts determinable from the supporting
affidavits that detail the circumstances of how and to
what extent a threat to or violation of the rights to life,
liberty and security of the aggrieved party was or is
being committed. 17 (Emphasis and italics in the
original, citation omitted) DACTSH
Tapuz also arose out of a property dispute, albeit
between private individuals, with the petitioners therein
branding as "acts of terrorism" the therein respondents'
alleged entry into the disputed land with armed men in tow.
The Court therein held:
Del On the whole, what is clear from these
statements — both sworn and unsworn — is the
overriding involvement of property issues as the
petition traces its roots to questions of physical
possession of the property disputed by the private
parties. If at all, issues relating to the right to life or to
liberty can hardly be discerned except to the extent
that the occurrence of past violence has been alleged.
The right to security, on the other hand, is alleged
only to the extent of the treats and harassments
implied from the presence of "armed men bare to the
waist" and the alleged pointing and firing of
weapons. Notably, none of the supporting
affidavits compellingly show that the threat to the
rights to life, liberty and security of the petitioners
is imminent or continuing. 18 (Emphasis in the
original; underscoring supplied)
It bears emphasis that respondents' petition did not
show any actual violation, imminent or continuing threat to
their life, liberty and security. Bare allegations that petitioners
"in unison, conspiracy and in contempt of court, there and
then willfully, forcibly and feloniously with the use of force
and intimidation entered and forcibly, physically manhandled
the petitioners (respondents) and arrested the herein
petitioners (respondents)" 19 will not suffice to prove
entitlement to the remedy of the writ of amparo. No undue
confinement or detention was present. In fact, respondents
were even able to post bail for the offenses a day after their
arrest. 20
Although respondents' release from confinement does
not necessarily hinder supplication for the writ
of amparo, absent any evidence or even an allegation in the
petition that there is undue and continuing restraint on their
liberty, and/or that there exists threat or intimidation that
destroys the efficacy of their right to be secure in their
persons, the issuance of the writ cannot be justified.
That respondents are merely seeking the protection of
their property rights is gathered from their Joint
Affidavit, viz.:
xxx xxx xxx
11. Kami ay humarang at humiga sa harap ng
mga heavy equipment na hawak hawak ang nasabing
kautusan ng RTC Branch 10 (PERMANENT
INJUNCTION at RTC ORDERS DATED February
12, 17 at 19 2008) upang ipaglaban ang dignidad ng
kautusan ng korte, ipaglaban ang prinsipyo ng
"SELF-HELP" at batas ukol sa "PROPERTY
RIGHTS", Wala kaming nagawa ipagtanggol ang
aming karapatan sa lupa na 45 years naming "IN
POSSESSION". (Underscoring supplied)
Oddly, respondents also seek the issuance of a writ
of habeas data when it is not even alleged that petitioners are
gathering, collecting or storing data or information regarding
their person, family, home and correspondence.
As for respondents' assertion of past
incidents 21 wherein the Province allegedly violated the
Permanent Injunction order, these incidents were already
raised in the injunction proceedings on account of which
respondents filed a case for criminal contempt against
petitioners. 22
Before the filing of the petition for writs
of amparo and habeas data, or on February 22, 2008,
petitioners even instituted a petition for habeas corpus which
was considered moot and academic by Branch 14 of the
Malolos RTC and was accordingly denied by Order of April
8, 2008. 
SCADIT
More. Respondent Amanda and one of her sons,
Francisco Jr., likewise filed a petition for writs
of amparo and habeas data before the Sandiganbayan, they
alleging the commission of continuing threats by petitioners
after the issuance of the writs by the RTC, which petition
was dismissed for insufficiency and forum shopping.
It thus appears that respondents are not without
recourse and have in fact taken full advantage of the legal
system with the filing of civil, criminal and administrative
charges. 23
It need not be underlined that respondents' petitions for
writs of amparo and habeas data are extraordinary remedies
which cannot be used as tools to stall the execution of a final
and executory decision in a property dispute.
AT ALL EVENTS, respondents' filing of the petitions
for writs of amparo and habeas data should have been
barred, for criminal proceedings against them had
commenced after they were arrested in flagrante delicto and
proceeded against in accordance with Section 6, Rule
112 24 of the Rules of Court. Validity of the arrest or the
proceedings conducted thereafter is a defense that may be set
up by respondents during trial and not before a petition for
writs of amparo and habeas data. The reliefs afforded by the
writs may, however, be made available to the aggrieved party
by motion in the criminal proceedings. 25
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The
challenged March 4, 2008 Order of Branch 10 of the Regional
Trial Court of Malolos is DECLARED NULL AND VOID,
and its March 28, 2008 Decision is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Special Civil Action No. 53-M-2008 is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
 Puno, C.J., Carpio, Chico-Nazario, Nachura, CARPIO MORALES, J  : p

Leonardo-de Castro, Brion, Bersamin, Del Castillo,

Abad and Villarama, Jr., JJ., concur. The Court is once again confronted with an
opportunity to define the evolving metes and bounds of the
Corona, Velasco, Jr. and Peralta, JJ., are on official writ of habeas data. May an employee invoke the remedies
leave. available under such writ where an employer decides to
 (Castillo v. Cruz, G.R. No. 182165, [November 25, 2009], 620
||| transfer her workplace on the basis of copies of an
PHIL 654-667) anonymous letter posted therein — imputing to her disloyalty
to the company and calling for her to leave, which imputation
it investigated but fails to inform her of the details thereof?
Rosario G. Lim (respondent), also known as Cherry
Lim, is an administrative clerk at the Manila Electric
Company (MERALCO).
On June 4, 2008, an anonymous letter was posted at
the door of the Metering Office of the Administration
building of MERALCO Plaridel, Bulacan Sector, at which
respondent is assigned, denouncing respondent. The letter
reads:
Cherry Lim:
MATAPOS MONG LAMUNIN LAHAT NG
BIYAYA NG MERALCO, NGAYON NAMAN AY
GUSTO MONG PALAMON ANG BUONG
EN BANC KUMPANYA SA MGA BUWAYA NG
GOBYERNO. KAPAL NG MUKHA MO,
LUMAYAS KA RITO, WALANG UTANG NA
[G.R. No. 184769. October 5, 2010.] LOOB . . . . 1

MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, Copies of the letter were also inserted in the lockers of
ALEXANDER S. DEYTO and RUBEN A. MERALCO linesmen. Informed about it, respondent reported
SAPITULA, petitioners, vs. ROSARIO the matter on June 5, 2008 to the Plaridel Station of the
GOPEZ LIM, respondent. Philippine National Police. 2
By Memorandum 3 dated July 4, 2008, petitioner
Alexander Deyto, Head of MERALCO's Human Resource
DECISION Staffing, directed the transfer of respondent to MERALCO's
Alabang Sector in Muntinlupa as "A/F OTMS Clerk,"
effective July 18, 2008 in light of the receipt of ". . . reports
that there were accusations and threats directed against [her]
from unknown individuals and which could possibly
compromise [her] safety and security."  ADcEST
Respondent, by letter of July 10, 2008 addressed to
petitioner Ruben A. Sapitula, Vice-President and Head of
MERALCO's Human Resource Administration, appealed her
transfer and requested for a dialogue so she could voice her
concerns and misgivings on the matter, claiming that the
"punitive" nature of the transfer amounted to a denial of due
process. Citing the grueling travel from her residence in
Pampanga to Alabang and back entails, and violation of the
provisions on job security of their Collective Bargaining
Agreement (CBA), respondent expressed her thoughts on the
alleged threats to her security in this wise:
xxx xxx xxx
I feel that it would have been better . . . if you
could have intimated to me the nature of the alleged
accusations and threats so that at least I could have
found out if these are credible or even serious. But as
you stated, these came from unknown individuals and
the way they were handled, it appears that the veracity
of these accusations and threats to be [ sic]
highly suspicious, doubtful or are just mere jokes if
they existed at all.
Assuming for the sake of argument only, that
the alleged threats exist as the management
apparently believe, then my transfer to an unfamiliar
place and environment which will make me a "sitting
duck" so to speak, seems to betray the real intent of
management which is contrary to its expressed
concern on my security and safety . . . Thus, it made
me think twice on the rationale for management's
initiated transfer. Reflecting further, it appears to me
that instead of the management supposedly extending
favor to me, the net result and effect of management
action would be a punitive one. 4 (emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Respondent thus requested for the deferment of the
implementation of her transfer pending resolution of the
issues she raised.
No response to her request having been received,
respondent filed a petition 5 for the issuance of a writ
of habeas data against petitioners before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Bulacan, docketed as SP. Proc. No. 213-M-
2008.
By respondent's allegation, petitioners' unlawful act
and omission consisting of their continued failure and
refusal to provide her with details or information about the
alleged report which MERALCO purportedly
received concerning threats to her safety and security amount
to a violation of her right to privacy in life, liberty and
security, correctible by habeas data. Respondent thus prayed
for the issuance of a writ commanding petitioners to file a
written return containing the following:
a) a full disclosure of the data or information
about respondent in relation to the report
purportedly received by petitioners on the
alleged threat to her safety and security;
the nature of such data and the purpose for
its collection; 
caSDCA
b) the measures taken by petitioners to ensure the
confidentiality of such data or information;
and
c) the currency and accuracy of such data or
information obtained.
 Additionally, respondent prayed for the issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) enjoining petitioners
from effecting her transfer to the MERALCO Alabang Sector.
By Order 6 of August 29, 2008, Branch 7 of the
Bulacan RTC directed petitioners to file their verified written
return. And by Order of September 5, 2008, the trial court
granted respondent's application for a TRO.
Petitioners moved for the dismissal of the petition and
recall of the TRO on the grounds that, inter alia, resort to a
petition for writ of habeas data was not in order; and the
RTC lacked jurisdiction over the case which properly belongs
to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). 7
By Decision 8 of September 22, 2008, the trial court
granted the prayers of respondent including the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction directing petitioners to desist
from implementing respondent's transfer until such time that
petitioners comply with the disclosures required.
The trial court justified its ruling by declaring
that, inter alia, recourse to a writ of habeas data should
extend not only to victims of extra-legal killings and political
activists but also to ordinary citizens, like respondent whose
rights to life and security are jeopardized by petitioners'
refusal to provide her with information or data on the reported
threats to her person.
Hence, the present petition for review under Rule 45
of 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and the Rule on the Writ
of Habeas Data  9 contending that 1) the RTC lacked
jurisdiction over the case and cannot restrain MERALCO's
prerogative as employer to transfer the place of work of its
employees, and 2) the issuance of the writ is outside the
parameters expressly set forth in the Rule on the Writ
of Habeas Data. 10  cIACaT
Maintaining that the RTC has no jurisdiction over what
they contend is clearly a labor dispute, petitioners argue that
"although ingeniously crafted as a petition for habeas data,
respondent is essentially questioning the transfer of her place
of work by her employer" 11 and the terms and conditions of
her employment which arise from an employer-employee
relationship over which the NLRC and the Labor Arbiters
under Article 217 of the Labor Code have jurisdiction.
Petitioners thus maintain that the RTC had no authority
to restrain the implementation of the Memorandum
transferring respondent's place of work which is purely a
management prerogative, and that OCA-Circular No. 79-
2003 12 expressly prohibits the issuance of TROs or injunctive
writs in labor-related cases.
Petitioners go on to point out that the Rule on the Writ
of Habeas Data directs the issuance of the writ only against
public officials or employees, or private individuals or
entities engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data
or information regarding an aggrieved party's person, family
or home; and that MERALCO (or its officers) is clearly not
engaged in such activities.
The petition is impressed with merit.
Respondent's plea that she be spared from complying
with MERALCO's Memorandum directing her reassignment
to the Alabang Sector, under the guise of a quest for
information or data allegedly in possession of petitioners,
does not fall within the province of a writ of habeas data.
Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas
Data provides:
Section 1. Habeas Data. — The writ of
habeas data is a remedy available to any person
whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is
violated or threatened by an unlawful act or
omission of a public official or employee or of a
 private individual or entity engaged in the gathering,
collecting or storing of data or
information regarding the person, family, home and
correspondence of the aggrieved party. (emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
The habeas data rule, in general, is designed to protect
by means of judicial complaint the image, privacy, honor,
information, and freedom of information of an individual. It is
meant to provide a forum to enforce one's right to the truth
and to informational privacy, thus safeguarding the
constitutional guarantees of a person's right to life, liberty and
security against abuse in this age of information technology.
It bears reiteration that like the writ of amparo, habeas
data was conceived as a response, given the lack of effective
and available remedies, to address the extraordinary rise in
the number of killings and enforced disappearances. Its intent
is to address violations of or threats to the rights to life,
liberty or security as a remedy independently from those
provided under prevailing Rules. 13
Castillo v. Cruz  14 underscores the emphasis laid down
in Tapuz v. Del Rosario  15 that the writs of amparo
and habeas data will NOT issue to protect purely property or
commercial concerns nor when the grounds invoked in
support of the petitions therefor are vague or
doubtful. 16 Employment constitutes a property right under
 (Manila Electric Co. v. Lim, G.R. No. 184769, [October 5,
the context of the due process clause of the Constitution. 17 It
|||
2010], 646 PHIL 497-505)
is evident that respondent's reservations on the real reasons
for her transfer — a legitimate concern respecting the terms
and conditions of one's employment — are what prompted
her to adopt the extraordinary remedy of habeas
data. Jurisdiction over such concerns is inarguably lodged by
law with the NLRC and the Labor Arbiters. 
In another vein, there is no showing from the facts
presented that petitioners committed any unjustifiable or
unlawful violation of respondent's right to privacy vis-a-
vis the right to life, liberty or security. To argue that
petitioners' refusal to disclose the contents of reports allegedly
received on the threats to respondent's safety amounts to a
violation of her right to privacy is at best speculative.
Respondent in fact trivializes these threats and accusations
from unknown individuals in her earlier-quoted portion of her
July 10, 2008 letter as "highly suspicious, doubtful or are just
mere jokes if they existed at all." 18 And she even suspects
that her transfer to another place of work "betray[s] the real
intent of management" and could be a "punitive move." Her
posture unwittingly concedes that the issue is labor-related.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The
assailed September 22, 2008 Decision of the Bulacan RTC,
Branch 7 in SP. Proc. No. 213-M-2008 is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. SP. Proc. No. 213-M-
2008 is, accordingly, DISMISSED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.  DTAHEC
Corona, C.J., Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Nachura,
Leonardo-de Castro, Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Abad,
Villarama, Jr., Perez, Mendoza and Sereno, JJ., concur.
Brion, J., is on official leave.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 101083. July 30, 1993.]
JUAN ANTONIO, ANNA ROSARIO and
JOSE ALFONSO, all surnamed OPOSA,
minors, and represented by their parents
ANTONIO and RIZALINA OPOSA,
ROBERT A NICOLE SADIUA, minor,
represented by her parents CALVIN and
ROBERTA SADIUA, CARLO, AMANDA
SALUD and PATRISHA, all surnamed
FLORES, minors and represented by their
parents ENRICO and NIDA FLORES,
GIANINA DITA R. FORTUN, minor,
represented by her parents SIGFRID and
DOLORES FORTUN, GEORGE II and MA.
CONCEPCION, all surnamed MISA, minors
and represented by their parents GEORGE
and MYRA MISA, BENJAMIN ALAN V.
PASIGAN, minor, represented by his parents
ANTONIO and ALICE PESIGAN, JOVIE
MARIE ALFARO, minor, represented by her
parents JOSE and MARIA VIOLETA
ALFARO, MARIA CONCEPCION T.
CASTRO, minor, represented by her parents
FREDENIL and JANE CASTRO, JOHANNA
DESAMPARADO, minor, represented by her
parents JOSE and ANGELA
DESAMPARADO, CARLO JOAQUIN T.
NARVASA, minor, represented by his parents
GREGORIO II and CRISTINE CHARITY
NARVASA, MA. MARGARITA, JESUS
IGNACIO, MA. ANGELA and MARIE
GABRIELLE, all surnamed SAENZ, minors,
represented by their parents ROBERTO and
AURORA SAENZ, KRISTINE, MARY
ELLEN, MAY, GOLDA MARTHE and
DAVID IAN, all surnamed KING, minors,
represented by their parents MARIO and
HAYDEE KING, DAVID, FRANCISCO and
THERESE VICTORIA, all surnamed
ENDRIGA, minors, represented by their
parents BALTAZAR and TERESITA
ENDRIGA, JOSE MA. and REGINA MA., all
surnamed ABAYA, minors, represented by
their parents ANTONIO and MARICA
ABAYA, MARILIN, MARIO, JR. and
MARIETTE, all surnamed CARDAMA,
minors, represented by their parents MARIO
and LINA CARDAMA, CLARISSA, ANN
MARIE, NAGEL and IMEE LYN, all
surnamed OPOSA, minors and represented by
their parents RICARDO and
MARISSA OPOSA, PHILIP JOSEPH,
STEPHEN JOHN and ISAIAH JAMES, all
surnamed QUIPIT, minors, represented by
their parents JOSE MAX and VILMI
QUIPIT, BUGHAW CIELO, CRISANTO,
ANNA, DANIEL and FRANCISCO, all
surnamed BIBAL, minors, represented by
their parents FRANCISCO, JR. and
MILAGROS BIBAL, and THE PHILIPPINE
ECOLOGICAL NETWORK,
INC., petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE
FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., in his
capacity as the Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources, and
THE HONORABLE ERIBERTO U.
ROSARIO, Presiding Judge of the RTC,
Makati, Branch 66, respondents.
Oposa Law Office for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
 SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; DECLARATION OF
PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES; RIGHT TO A
BALANCED AND HEALTHFUL ECOLOGY, CONSTRUED.
— The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right
— the right to a balanced and healthful ecology which, for the
first time in our nation's constitutional history, is solemnly
incorporated in the fundamental law. Section 16, Article II of
the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides: "SEC. 16. The State
shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced
and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of
nature." This right unites with the right to health which is
provided for in the preceding section of the same article: "SEC.
15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the
people and instill health consciousness among them." While the
right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the
Declaration of Principles and State Policies and not under the Bill
of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any of
the civil and political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right
belongs to a different category of rights altogether for it concerns
nothing less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation — aptly
and fittingly stressed by the petitioners — the advancement of
which may even be said to predate all governments and
constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic rights need not even
be written in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist from
the inception of humankind. If they are now explicitly mentioned
in the fundamental charter, it is because of the well-founded fear
of its framers that unless the rights to a balanced and healthful
ecology and to health are mandated as state policies by the
Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their continuing
importance and imposing upon the state a solemn obligation to
preserve the first and protect and advance the second, the day
would not be too far when all else would be lost not only for the
present generation, but also for those to come — generations
which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of
sustaining life. The right to a balanced and healthful ecology
carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the
environment.
2. ID.; ID.; TIMBER LICENSES; NATURE THEREOF; NON-
IMPAIRMENT CLAUSE MAY NOT BE INVOKED; CASE
AT BAR. — all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by
executive action. It is not a contract, property or a property right
protected by the due process clause of the Constitution. In Tan
vs. Director of Forestry, (125 SCRA 302, 325 [1983]) This Court
held: ". . . A timber license is an instrument by which the State
regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the
end that public welfare is promoted. A timber license is not a
contract within the purview of the due process clause; it is only a
license or privilege, which can be validly withdrawn whenever
dictated by public interest or public welfare as in this case. 'A
license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise
would be unlawful, and is not a contract between the authority,
federal, state, or municipal, granting it and the person to whom it
is granted; neither is it property or a property right, nor does it
create a vested right; nor is it taxation' (37 C.J. 168). Thus, this
Court held that the granting of license does not create irrevocable
rights, neither is it property or property rights (People vs. Ong
Tin, 54 O.G. 7576) . . ." We reiterated this pronouncement
in Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc. vs. Deputy Executive Secretary:
(190 SCRA 673 684 [1990]) ". . . Timber licenses, permits and
license agreements are the principal instruments by which the
State regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources
to the end that public welfare is promoted. And it can hardly be
gainsaid that they merely evidence a privilege granted by the
State to qualified entities, and do not vest in the latter a
permanent or irrevocable right to the particular concession area
and the forest products therein. They may be validly amended,
modified, replaced or rescinded by the Chief Executive when
national interests so require. Thus, they are not deemed contracts
within the purview of the due process of law clause [See Sections harm. Equally fundamental with the private right is that of the
3(ee) and 20 of Pres. Decree No. 705, as amended. Also, Tan v. public to regulate it in the common interest.'" In court, the non-
Director of Forestry,G.R. No. L-24548, October 27, 1983, 125 impairment clause must yield to the police power of the state.
SCRA 302]." Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non- (Ongsiako vs. Gamboa, 86 Phil. 50 [1950]; Abe vs. Foster
impairment clause, which reads: "SEC. 10. No law impairing the Wheeler Corp., supra; Phil. American Life Insurance Co. vs.
obligation of contracts shall be passed." In the second place, even Auditor General, supra; Alalyan vs. NLRC, 24 scra 172 [1968];
if it is to be assumed that the same are contracts, the instant case Victoriano vs. Elizalde Rope Workers Union, 59 SCRA 54
does not involve a law or even an executive issuance declaring [1974]; Kabiling vs. National Housing Authority, 156 SCRA 623
the cancellation or modification of existing timber licenses. [1987]).
Hence, the non-impairment clause cannot as yet be invoked.
3. ID.; JUDICIAL REVIEW; NO LONGER IMPAIRED BY
Nevertheless, granting further that a law has actually been passed
THE POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE; RATIONALE. —
mandating cancellations or modifications, the same cannot still
It must, nonetheless, be emphasized that the political question
be stigmatized as a violation of the non-impairment clause. This
doctrine is no longer the insurmountable obstacle to the exercise
is because by its very nature and purpose, such a law could have
of judicial power or the impenetrable shield that protects
only been passed in the exercise of the police power of the state
executive and legislative actions from judicial inquiry or review.
for the purpose of advancing the right of the people to a balanced
The second paragraph of section 1, Article VIII of the
and healthful ecology, promoting their health and enhancing the
Constitution states that: "Judicial power includes the duty of the
general welfare. In Abe vs. Foster Wheeler Corp., (110 Phil. 198,
courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
203 [1960]) this Court stated: "The freedom of contract, under
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
our system of government, is not meant to be absolute. The same
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
is understood to be subject to reasonable legislative regulation
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
aimed at the promotion of public health, moral, safety and
branch or instrumentality of the Government." Commenting on
welfare. In other words, the constitutional guaranty of non-
this provision in his book, Philippine Political Law, Mr. Justice
impairment of obligations of contract is limited by the exercise of
Isagani A. Cruz, a distinguished member of this Court, says:
the police power of the State, in the interest of public health,
"The first part of the authority represents the traditional concept
safety, moral and general welfare." The reason for this is
of judicial power, involving the settlement of conflicting rights as
emphatically set forth in Nebia vs. New York, (291 U.S. 502, 523,
conferred by law. The second part of the authority represents a
78 L. ed. 940 947-949) quoted in Philippine American Life
broadening of judicial power to enable the courts of justice to
Insurance Co. vs. Auditor General, (22 SCRA 135, 146-147
review what was before forbidden territory, to wit, the discretion
[1968]) to wit: "'Under our form of government the use of
of the political departments of the government. As worded, the
property and the making of contracts are normally matters of
new provision vests in the judiciary, and particularly the Supreme
private and not of public concern. The general rule is that both
Court, the power to rule upon even the wisdom of the decisions
shall be free of governmental interference. But neither property
of the executive and the legislature and to declare their acts
rights nor contract rights are absolute; for government cannot
invalid for lack or excess of jurisdiction because tainted with
exist if the citizen may at will use his property to the detriment of
grave abuse of discretion. The catch, of course, is the meaning of
his fellows, or exercise his freedom of contract to work them
'grave abuse of discretion,' which is a very elastic phrase that can Caseñas vs. Rosales, 19 SCRA 462 [1967];
expand or contract according to the disposition of the judiciary." Virata vs. Sandiganbayan, 202 SCRA 680 [1991];
In Daza vs. Singson, (180 SCRA 496, 501-502 [1989]. See also Madrona vs. Rosal, 204 SCRA 1 [1991].
Coseteng vs. Mitra, 187 SCRA 377 [1990];
5. ID.; ID.; MOTION TO DISMISS; LACK OF CAUSE OF
Gonzales vs. Macaraig, 191 SCRA 844 [1991];
ACTION, AS A GROUND; RULE; CASE AT BAR. — It is
Bengzon vs. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, 203 SCRA 767
settled in this jurisdiction that in a motion to dismiss based on the
[1991]) Mr. Justice Cruz, now speaking for this Court, noted: "In
ground that the complaint fails to state a cause of action, the
the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes even
question submitted to the court for resolution involves the
less tenable and decisive. The reason is that, even if we were to
sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint itself. No other
assume that the issue presented before us was political in nature,
matter should be considered; furthermore, the truth or falsity of
we would still not be precluded from resolving it under the
the said allegations is beside the point for the truth thereof is
expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us that now covers, in
deemed hypothetically admitted. The only issue to be resolved in
proper cases, even the political question. Article VII, Section 1,
such a case is: admitting such alleged facts to be true, may the
of the Constitution clearly provides: . . ."
court render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer in
  the complaint? In Militante vs. Edrosolano, this Court laid down
the rule that the judiciary should "exercise the utmost care and
4. REMEDIAL LAW; PLEADINGS; CAUSE OF ACTION,
circumspection in passing upon a motion to dismiss on the
DEFINED; CASE AT BAR. — the right of the petitioners (and
ground of the absence thereof [cause of action] lest, by its failure
all those they represent) to a balanced and healthful ecology is as
to manifest a correct appreciation of the facts alleged and deemed
clear as the DENR's duty — under its mandate and by virtue of
hypothetically admitted, what the law grants or recognizes is
its powers and functions under E.O. No. 192 and
effectively nullified. If that happens, there is a blot on the legal
the Administrative Code of 1987 — to protect and advance the
order. The law itself stands in disrepute." After a careful
said right. A denial or violation of that right by the other who has
examination of the petitioners' complaint, We find the statements
the correlative duty or obligation to respect or protect the same
under the introductory affirmative allegations, as well as the
gives rise to a cause of action. Petitioners maintain that the
specific averments under the subheading CAUSE OF ACTION,
granting of the TLAs, which they claim was done with grave
to be adequate enough to show, prima facie, the claimed
abuse of discretion, violated their right to a balanced and
violation of their rights. On the basis thereof, they may thus be
healthful ecology; hence, the full protection thereof requires that
granted, wholly or partly, the reliefs prayed for.
no further TLAs should be renewed or granted. A cause of action
is defined as: ". . . an act or omission of one party in violation of FELICIANO, J., concurring:
the legal right or rights of the other; and its essential elements are
1. REMEDIAL LAW; ACTIONS; LOCUS STANDI,
legal right of the plaintiff, correlative obligation of the defendant,
CONSTRUED; CASE AT BAR. — The Court explicitly states
and act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal
that petitioners have the locus standi necessary to sustain the
right." (Marao Sugar Central Co. vs. Barrios, 79 Phil. 666 [1947];
bringing and maintenance of this suit (Decision, pp. 11-
Community Investment and Finance Corp. vs. Garcia, 88 Phil.
12). Locus standi is not a function of petitioners' claim that their
215 [1951]; Remitere vs. vda. de Yulo, 16 SCRA 251 [1966];
suit is properly regarded as a class suit. I understand locus
standi to refer to the legal interest which a plaintiff must have in
the subject matter of the suit. Because of the very broadness of
the concept of "class" here involved — membership in this
"class" appears to embrace everyone living in the country
whether now or in the future — it appears to me that everyone
who may be expected to benefit from the course of action
petitioners seek to require public respondents to take, is vested
with the necessary locus standi. The Court may be seen therefore
to be recognizing a beneficiaries' right of action in the field of
environmental protection, as against both the public
administrative agency directly concerned and the private persons
or entities operating in the field or sector of activity involved.
Whether such a beneficiaries' right of action may be found under
any and all circumstances, or whether some failure to act, in the
first instance, on the part of the governmental agency concerned
must be shown ("prior exhaustion of administrative remedies"), is
not discussed in the decision and presumably is left for future
determination in an appropriate case.
2. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; DECLARATION OF
PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES; RIGHT TO "A
BALANCE AND HEALTHFUL ECOLOGY";
INTERPRETATION. — The Court has also declared that the
complaint has alleged and focused upon "one specific
fundamental legal right — the right to a balanced and healthful
ecology" (Decision, p. 14). There is no question that "the right to
a balanced and healthful ecology" is "fundamental" and that,
accordingly, it has been "constitutionalized." But although it is
fundamental in character, I suggest, with very great respect, that
it cannot be characterized as "specific," without doing excessive
violence to language. It is in fact very difficult to fashion
language more comprehensive in scope and generalized in
character than a right to "a balanced and healthful ecology." The
list of particular claims which can be subsumed under this rubric
appears to be entirely open-ended: prevention and control of
emission of toxic fumes and smoke from factories and motor
vehicles; of discharge of oil, chemical effluents, garbage and raw
sewage into rivers, inland and coastal waters by vessels, oil rigs,
factories, mines and whole communities; of dumping of organic
and inorganic wastes on open land, streets and thoroughfares;
failure to rehabilitate land after strip-mining or open-pit
mining; kaingin or slash-and-burn farming; destruction of
fisheries, coral reefs and other living sea resources through the
use of dynamite or cyanide and other chemicals; contamination
of ground water resources; loss of certain species of fauna and
flora; and so on. The other statements pointed out by the Court:
Section 3, Executive Order No. 192 dated 10 June 1987; Section
1, Title XIV, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code; and P.D.
No. 1151, dated 6 June 1977 — all appear to be formulations
of policy, as general and abstract as the constitutional statements
of basic policy in Article II, Sections 16 ("the right — to a
balanced and healthful ecology") and 15 ("the right to health").
As a matter of logic, by finding petitioners' cause of action as
anchored on a legal right comprised in the constitutional
statements above noted, the Court is in effect saying that Section
15 (and Section 16) of Article II of the Constitution are self-
executing and judicially enforceable even in their present form.
The implications of this doctrine will have to be explored in
future cases; those implications are too large and far-reaching in
nature even to be hinted at here.
3. ID.; RIGHT TO HEALTH; SHOULD SPECIFICALLY
EXIST IN OUR CORPUS OF LAW. — Justice Feliciano
suggestion is simply that petitioners must, before the trial court,
show a more specific legal right — a right cast in language of a
significantly lower order of generality than Article II (15) of the
Constitution — that is or may be violated by the actions, or
failures to act, imputed to the public respondent by petitioners so
that the trial court can validly render judgment granting all or
part of the relief prayed for. To my mind, the Court should be
understood as simply saying that such a more specific legal right
or rights may well exist in our corpus of law, considering the
general policy principles found in the Constitution and the
existence of the Philippine Environment Code, and that the trial
court should have given petitioners an effective opportunity so to
demonstrate, instead of aborting the proceedings on a motion to
dismiss.
4. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; CAUSE OF
ACTION; LEGAL RIGHTS, AS ESSENTIAL COMPONENTS;
STANDARDS. — the legal right which is an essential
component of a cause of action be a specific, operable legal right,
rather than a constitutional or statutory policy, for at least two (2)
reasons. One is that unless the legal right claimed to have been
violated or disregarded is given specification in operational
terms, defendants may well be unable to defend themselves
intelligently and effectively; in other words, there are due process
dimensions to this matter. The second is a broader-gauge
consideration — where a specific violation of law or applicable
regulation is not alleged or proved, petitioners can be expected to
fall back on the expanded conception of judicial power in the
second paragraph of Section 1 of Article VIII of the
Constitution which reads: "Section 1 . . . Judicial power includes
the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable,
and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part
of any branch or instrumentality of the Government." When
substantive standards as general as "the right to a balanced and
healthy ecology" and "the right to health" are combined with
remedial standards as broad ranging as "a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction," the result
will be, it is respectfully submitted, to propel courts into the
uncharted ocean of social and economic policy making. At least
in respect of the vast area of environmental protection and
management, our courts have no claim to special technical
competence and experience and professional qualifications.
Where no specific, operable norms and standards are shown to
exist, then the policy making departments — the legislative and
executive departments — must be given a real and effective
opportunity to fashion and promulgate those norms and
standards, and to implement them before the courts should
intervene.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., J  : p
In a broader sense, this petition bears upon the right of Filipinos
to a balanced and healthful ecology which the petitioners
dramatically associate with the twin concepts of "inter-
generational responsibility" and "inter-generational justice."
Specifically, it touches on the issue of whether the said
petitioners have a cause of action to "prevent the
misappropriation or impairment" of Philippine rainforests and
"arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital life-
support systems and continued rape of Mother Earth."
 
The controversy has its genesis in Civil Case No. 90-777 which
was filed before Branch 66 (Makati, Metro Manila) of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), National Capital Judicial Region.
The principal plaintiffs therein, now the principal petitioners, are
all minors duly represented and joined by their respective
parents. Impleaded as an additional plaintiff is the Philippine
Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), a domestic, non-stock and non-
profit corporation organized for the purpose of, inter alia,
engaging in concerted action geared for the protection of our
environment and natural resources. The original defendant was
the Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., then Secretary of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). His
substitution in this petition by the new Secretary, the Honorable
Angel C. Alcala, was subsequently ordered upon proper motion
by the petitioners. 1 The complaint 2 was instituted as a taxpayers'
class suit 3 and alleges that the plaintiffs "are all citizens of the
Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the full
benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is
the country's virgin tropical rainforests." The same was filed for
themselves and others who are equally concerned about the
preservation of said resource but are "so numerous that it is
impracticable to bring them all before the Court." The minors
further asseverate that they "represent their generation as well as
generations yet unborn." 4 Consequently, it is prayed for that
judgment be rendered:
". . . ordering defendant, his agents, representatives
and other persons acting in his behalf to —
(1) Cancel all existing timber license agreements in
the country;
(2) Cease and desist from receiving, accepting,
processing, renewing or approving new timber license
agreements."
and granting the plaintiffs ". . . such other reliefs just and
equitable under the premises." 5
The complaint starts off with the general averments that the
Philippine archipelago of 7,100 islands has a land area of thirty
million (30,000,000) hectares and is endowed with rich, lush and
verdant rainforests in which varied, rare and unique species of
flora and fauna may be found; these rainforests contain a genetic,
biological and chemical pool which is irreplaceable; they are also
the habitat of indigenous Philippine cultures which have existed,
endured and flourished since time immemorial; scientific
evidence reveals that in order to maintain a balanced and
healthful ecology, the country's land area should be utilized on
the basis of a ratio of fifty-four per cent (54%) for forest cover
and forty-six per cent (46%) for agricultural, residential,
industrial, commercial and other uses; the distortion and
disturbance of this balance as a consequence of deforestation
have resulted in a host of environmental tragedies, such as (a)
water shortages resulting from the drying up of the water table,
otherwise known as the "aquifer," as well as of rivers, brooks and
streams, (b) salinization of the water table as a result of the
intrusion therein of salt water, incontrovertible examples of
which may be found in the island of Cebu and the Municipality
of Bacoor, Cavite, (c) massive erosion and the consequential loss
of soil fertility and agricultural productivity, with the volume of
soil eroded estimated at one billion (1,000,000,000) cubic meters
per annum — approximately the size of the entire island of
Catanduanes, (d) the endangering and extinction of the country's
unique, rare and varied flora and fauna, (e) the disturbance and
dislocation of cultural communities, including the disappearance
of the Filipino's indigenous cultures, (f) the siltation of rivers and
seabeds and consequential destruction of corals and other aquatic
life leading to a critical reduction in marine resource
productivity, (g) recurrent spells of drought as is presently
experienced by the entire country, (h) increasing velocity of
typhoon winds which result from the absence of windbreakers, (i)
the flooding of lowlands and agricultural plains arising from the
absence of the absorbent mechanism of forests, (j) the siltation
and shortening of the lifespan of multi-billion peso dams
constructed and operated for the purpose of supplying water for
domestic uses, irrigation and the generation of electric power,
and (k) the reduction of the earth's capacity to process carbon
dioxide gases which has led to perplexing and catastrophic
climatic changes such as the phenomenon of global warming,
otherwise known as the "greenhouse effect."
Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and detrimental
consequences of continued deforestation are so capable of
unquestionable demonstration that the same may be submitted as
a matter of judicial notice. This notwithstanding, they expressed
their intention to present expert witnesses as well as
documentary, photographic and film evidence in the course of the
trial.
As their cause of action, they specifically allege that:
"CAUSE OF ACTION
7. Plaintiffs replead by reference the foregoing
allegations.
8. Twenty-five (25) years ago, the Philippines had
some sixteen (16) million hectares of rainforests
constituting roughly 53% of the country's land mass.
9. Satellite images taken in 1987 reveal that there
remained no more than 1.2 million hectares of said
rainforests or four per cent (4.0%) of the country's
land area.
10. More recent surveys reveal that a mere 850,000
hectares of virgin old-growth rainforests are left,
barely 2.8% of the entire land mass of the Philippine
archipelago and about 3.0 million hectares of
immature and uneconomical secondary growth
forests.
11. Public records reveal that defendant's
predecessors have granted timber license agreements
('TLA's') to various corporations to cut the aggregate
area of 3.89 million hectares for commercial logging
purposes.
A copy of the TLA holders and the corresponding
areas covered is hereto attached as Annex 'A'.
12. At the present rate of deforestation, i.e. about
200,000 hectares per annum or 25 hectares per hour
— nighttime, Saturdays, Sundays and holidays
included — the Philippines will be bereft of forest
resources after the end of this ensuing decade, if not
earlier.
13. The adverse effects, disastrous consequences,
serious injury and irreparable damage of this
continued trend of deforestation to the plaintiff
minors' generation and to generations yet unborn are
evident and incontrovertible. As a matter of fact, the
environmental damages enumerated in paragraph 6
hereof are already being felt, experienced and
suffered by the generation of plaintiff adults.
14. The continued allowance by defendant of TLA
holders to cut and deforest the remaining forest stands
will work great damage and irreparable injury to
plaintiffs — especially plaintiff minors and their
successors — who may never see, use, benefit from
and enjoy this rare and unique natural resource
treasure.
This act of defendant constitutes a misappropriation
and/or impairment of the natural resource property he
holds in trust for the benefit of plaintiff minors and
succeeding generations.
15. Plaintiffs have a clear and constitutional right to a
balanced and healthful ecology and are entitled to
protection by the State in its capacity as the parens
patriae.
16. Plaintiffs have exhausted all administrative
remedies with the defendant's office. On March 2,
1990, plaintiffs served upon defendant a final demand
to cancel all logging permits in the country.
A copy of the plaintiffs' letter dated March 1, 1990 is
hereto attached as Annex 'B'.
17. Defendant, however, fails and refuses to cancel
the existing TLA's, to the continuing serious damage
and extreme prejudice of plaintiffs.
18. The continued failure and refusal by defendant to
cancel the TLA's is an act violative of the rights of
plaintiffs, especially plaintiff minors who may be left
with a country that is desertified (sic), bare, barren
and devoid of the wonderful flora, fauna and
indigenous cultures which the Philippines has been
abundantly blessed with.
19. Defendant's refusal to cancel the aforementioned
TLA's is manifestly contrary to the public policy
enunciated in the Philippine Environmental
Policy which, in pertinent part, states that it is the
policy of the State —
'(a) to create, develop, maintain and
improve conditions under which man and
nature can thrive in productive and enjoyable
harmony with each other;
'(b) to fulfill the social, economic and
other requirements of present and future
generations of Filipinos and;
'(c) to ensure the attainment of an
environmental quality that is conducive to a
life of dignity and well-being'. (P.D. 1151, 6
June 1977).
20. Furthermore, defendant's continued refusal to
cancel the aforementioned TLA's is contradictory to
the Constitutional policy of the State to —
a. effect 'a more equitable distribution
of opportunities, income and wealth' and
'make full and efficient use of natural
resources (sic).' (Section 1, Article XII of the
Constitution);
b. 'protect the nation's marine wealth.'
(Section 2, ibid);
c. 'conserve and promote the nation's
cultural heritage and resources (sic).' (Section
14, Article XIV, id.);
d. 'protect and advance the right of the
people to a balanced and healthful ecology in
accord with the rhythm and harmony of
nature.' (Section 16, Article II, id.)
21. Finally, defendant's act is contrary to the highest
law of humankind — the natural law — and violative
of plaintiffs' right to self-preservation and
perpetuation.
22. There is no other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in law other than the instant action to arrest
the unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital life-
support systems and continued rape of Mother
Earth." 6
On 22 June 1990, the original defendant, Secretary Factoran, Jr.,
filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint based on two (2)
grounds, namely: (1) the plaintiffs have no cause of action
against him and (2) the issue raised by the plaintiffs is a political
question which properly pertains to the legislative or executive
branches of Government. In their 12 July 1990 Opposition to the
Motion, the petitioners maintain that (1) the complaint shows a
clear and unmistakable cause of action, (2) the motion is dilatory
and (3) the action presents a justiciable question as it involves the
defendant's abuse of discretion.
 
On 18 July 1991, respondent Judge issued an order granting the
aforementioned motion to dismiss. 7 In the said order, not only
was the defendant's claim — that the complaint states no cause of
action against him and that it raises a political question —
sustained, the respondent Judge further ruled that the granting of
the reliefs prayed for would result in the impairment of contracts
which is prohibited by the fundamental law of the land.
Plaintiffs thus filed the instant special civil action
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court and
ask this Court to rescind and set aside the dismissal order on the
ground that the respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in
dismissing the action. Again, the parents of the plaintiffs-minors
not only represent their children, but have also joined the latter in
this case. 8
On 14 May 1992, We resolved to give due course to the petition
and required the parties to submit their respective Memoranda
after the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Comment
in behalf of the respondents and the petitioners filed a reply
thereto.
Petitioners contend that the complaint clearly and unmistakably
states a cause of action as it contains sufficient allegations
concerning their right to a sound environment based on Articles
19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code (Human Relations), Section 4
of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 192 creating the DENR, Section 3
of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1151 (Philippine
Environmental Policy), Section 16, Article II of the 1987
Constitution recognizing the right of the people to a balanced and
healthful ecology, the concept of generational genocide in
Criminal Law and the concept of man's inalienable right to self-
preservation and self-perpetuation embodied in natural law.
Petitioners likewise rely on the respondent's correlative
obligation, per Section 4 of E.O. No. 192, the safeguard the
people's right to a healthful environment.
It is further claimed that the issue of the respondent Secretary's
alleged grave abuse of discretion in granting Timber License
Agreements (TLAs) to cover more areas for logging than what is
available involves a judicial question.
Anent the invocation by the respondent Judge of the
Constitution's non-impairment clause, petitioners maintain that
the same does not apply in this case because TLAs are not
contracts. They likewise submit that even if TLAs may be
considered protected by the said clause, it is well settled that they
may still be revoked by the State when public interest so requires.
On the other hand, the respondents aver that the petitioners failed
to allege in their complaint a specific legal right violated by the
respondent Secretary for which any relief is provided by law.
They see nothing in the complaint but vague and nebulous
allegations concerning an "environmental right" which
supposedly entitles the petitioners to the "protection by the state
in its capacity as parens patriae." Such allegations, according to
them, do not reveal a valid cause of action. They then reiterate
the theory that the question of whether logging should be
permitted in the country is a political question which should be
properly addressed to the executive or legislative branches of
Government. They therefore assert that the petitioners' recourse
is not to file an action in court, but to lobby before Congress for
the passage of a bill that would ban logging totally.
As to the matter of the cancellation of the TLAs, respondents
submit that the same cannot be done by the State without due
process of law. Once issued, a TLA remains effective for a
certain period of time — usually for twenty-five (25) years.
During its effectivity, the same can neither be revised nor
cancelled unless the holder has been found, after due notice and
hearing, to have violated the terms of the agreement or other
forestry laws and regulations. Petitioners' proposition to have all
the TLAs indiscriminately cancelled without the requisite hearing
would be violative of the requirements of due process.
Before going any further, We must first focus on some
procedural matters. Petitioners instituted Civil Case No. 90-777
as a class suit. The original defendant and the present
respondents did not take issue with this matter. Nevertheless, We
hereby rule that the said civil case is indeed a class suit. The
subject matter of the complaint is of common and general interest
not just to several, but to all citizens of the Philippines.
Consequently, since the parties are so numerous, it becomes
impracticable, if not totally impossible, to bring all of them
before the court. We likewise declare that the plaintiffs therein
are numerous and representative enough to ensure the full
protection of all concerned interests. Hence, all the requisites for
the filing of a valid class suit under Section 12, Rule 3 of the
Revised Rules of Court are present both in the said civil case and
in the instant petition, the latter being but an incident to the
former.
This case, however, has a special and novel element. Petitioners
minors assert that they represent their generation as well as
generations yet unborn. We find no difficulty in ruling that they
can, for themselves, for others of their generation and for the
succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their personality to sue
in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the
concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to
a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right, as
hereinafter expounded, considers the "rhythm and harmony of
nature." Nature means the created world in its entirety. 9 Such
rhythm and harmony indispensably include, inter alia, the
judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and
conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, waters,
fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources to
the end that their exploration, development and utilization be
equitably accessible to the present as well as future
generations. 10 Needless to say, every generation has a
responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony
for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a
little differently, the minors' assertion of their right to a sound
environment constitutes, at the same time, the performance of
their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the
generations to come.
The locus standi of the petitioners having thus been addressed,
We shall now proceed to the merits of the petition.
After a careful perusal of the complaint in question and a
meticulous consideration and evaluation of the issues raised and
arguments adduced by the parties, We do not hesitate to find for
the petitioners and rule against the respondent Judge's challenged
order for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The pertinent portions of the
said order read as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
"After a careful and circumspect evaluation of the
Complaint, the Court cannot help but agree with the
defendant. For although we believe that plaintiffs
have but the noblest of all intentions, it (sic) fell short
of alleging, with sufficient definiteness, a specific
legal right they are seeking to enforce and protect, or
a specific legal wrong they are seeking to prevent and
redress (Sec. 1, Rule 2, RRC). Furthermore, the Court
notes that the Complaint is replete with vague
assumptions and vague conclusions based on
unverified data. In fine, plaintiffs fail to state a cause
of action in its Complaint against the herein
defendant.
Furthermore, the Court firmly believes that the matter
before it, being impressed with political color and
involving a matter of public policy, may not be taken
cognizance of by this Court without doing violence to
the sacred principle of 'Separation of Powers' of the
three (3) co-equal branches of the Government.
The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot,
no matter how we stretch our jurisdiction, grant the
reliefs prayed for by the plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all
existing timber license agreements in the country and
to cease and desist from receiving, accepting,
processing renewing or approving new timber license
agreements. For to do otherwise would amount to
'impairment of contracts' abhored (sic) by the
fundamental law." 11
We do not agree with the trial court's conclusion that the
plaintiffs failed to allege with sufficient definiteness a specific
legal right involved or a specific legal wrong committed, and that
the complaint is replete with vague assumptions and conclusions
based on unverified data. A reading of the complaint itself belies
these conclusions.
The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right —
the right to a balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first
time in our nation's constitutional history, is solemnly
incorporated in the fundamental law. Section 16, Article II of
the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides:
"SEC. 16. The State shall protect and advance the
right of the people to a balanced and healthful
ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of
nature."
This right unites with the right to health which is provided for
in the preceding section of the same article:
"SEC. 15. The State shall protect and promote the
right to health of the people and instill health
consciousness among them."
While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found
under the Declaration of Principles and State Policies and not
under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important
than any of the civil and political rights enumerated in the latter.
Such a right belongs to a different category of rights altogether
for it concerns nothing less than self-preservation and self-
perpetuation — aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners —
the advancement of which may even be said to predate all
governments and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic
rights need not even be written in the Constitution for they are
assumed to exist from the inception of humankind. If they are
now explicitly mentioned in the fundamental charter, it is
because of the well-founded fear of its framers that unless the
rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and to health are
mandated as state policies by the Constitution itself, thereby
highlighting their continuing importance and imposing upon the
state a solemn obligation to preserve the first and protect and
advance the second, the day would not be too far when all else
would be lost not only for the present generation, but also for
those to come — generations which stand to inherit nothing but
parched earth incapable of sustaining life.
 
The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the
correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment.
During the debates on this right in one of the plenary sessions of
the 1986 Constitutional Commission, the following exchange
transpired between Commissioner Wilfrido Villacorta and
Commissioner Adolfo Azcuna who sponsored the section in
question:
"MR. VILLACORTA:
 Does this section mandate the State to provide
sanctions against all forms of pollution — air,
water and noise pollution?
MR. AZCUNA:
 Yes, Madam President. The right to healthful (sic)
environment necessarily carries with it the
correlative duty of not impairing the same and,
therefore, sanctions may be provided for
impairment of environmental balance." 12
The said right implies, among many other things, the judicious
management and conservation of the country's forests. Without
such forests, the ecological or environmental balance would be
irreversibly disrupted.
Conformably with the enunciated right to a balanced and
healthful ecology and the right to health, as well as the other
related provisions of the Constitution concerning the
conservation, development and utilization of the country's natural
resources, 13 then President Corazon C. Aquino promulgated on
10 June 1987 E.O. No. 192, 14 Section 4 of which expressly
mandates that the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources "shall be the primary government agency responsible
for the conservation, management, development and proper use
of the country's environment and natural resources, specifically
forest and grazing lands, mineral resources, including those in
reservation and watershed areas, and lands of the public domain,
as well as the licensing and regulation of all natural resources as
may be provided for by law in order to ensure equitable sharing
of the benefits derived therefrom for the welfare of the present
and future generations of Filipinos." Section 3 thereof makes the
following statement of policy:
"SEC. 3. Declaration of Policy. — It is hereby
declared the policy of the State to ensure the
sustainable use, development, management, renewal,
and conservation of the country's forest, mineral,
land, off-shore areas and other natural resources,
including the protection and enhancement of the
quality of the environment, and equitable access of
the different segments of the population to the
development and use of the country's natural
resources, not only for the present generation but for
future generations as well. It is also the policy of the
state to recognize and apply a true value system
including social and environmental cost implications
relative to their utilization; development and
conservation of our natural resources."
This policy declaration is substantially re-stated in Title XIV,
Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987, 15 specifically in
Section 1 thereof which reads:
"SEC. 1. Declaration of Policy. — (1) The State shall
ensure, for the benefit of the Filipino people, the full
exploration and development as well as the judicious
disposition, utilization, management, renewal and
conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land,
waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other
natural resources, consistent with the necessity of
maintaining a sound ecological balance and protecting
and enhancing the quality of the environment and the
objective of making the exploration, development and
utilization of such natural resources equitably
accessible to the different segments of the present as
well as future generations.
(2) The State shall likewise recognize and apply a true
value system that takes into account social and
environmental cost implications relative to the
utilization, development and conservation of our
natural resources."
The above provision stresses "the necessity of maintaining a
sound ecological balance and protecting and enhancing the
quality of the environment." Section 2 of the same Title, on the
other hand, specifically speaks of the mandate of the DENR;
however, it makes particular reference to the fact of the agency's
being subject to law and higher authority. Said section provides:
"SEC. 2. Mandate. — (1) The Department of
Environment and Natural Resources shall be
primarily responsible for the implementation of the
foregoing policy.
(2) It shall, subject to law and higher authority, be in
charge of carrying out the State's constitutional
mandate to control and supervise the exploration,
development, utilization, and conservation of the
country's natural resources."
Both E.O. No. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 have set
the objectives which will serve as the bases for policy
formulation, and have defined the powers and functions of the
DENR.
It may, however, be recalled that even before the ratification of
the 1987 Constitution, specific statutes already paid special
attention to the "environmental right" of the present and future
generations. On 6 June 1977, P.D. No. 1151 (Philippine
Environmental Policy) and P.D. No. 1152 (Philippine
Environment Code) were issued. The former "declared a
continuing policy of the State (a) to create, develop, maintain and
improve conditions under which man and nature can thrive in
productive and enjoyable harmony with each other, (b) to fulfill
the social, economic and other requirements of present and future
generations of Filipinos, and (c) to insure the attainment of an
environmental quality that is conducive to a life of dignity and
well-being." 16 As its goal, it speaks of the "responsibilities of
each generation as trustee and guardian of the environment for
succeeding generations." 17 The latter statute, on the other hand,
gave flesh to the said policy.
Thus, the right of the petitioners (and all those they represent) to
a balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as the DENR's duty
— under its mandate and by virtue of its powers and functions
under E.O. No. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 — to
protect and advance the said right.
A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the
correlative duty or obligation to respect or protect the same gives
rise to a cause of action. Petitioners maintain that the granting of
the TLAs, which they claim was done with grave abuse of
discretion, violated their right to a balanced and healthful
ecology; hence, the full protection thereof requires that no further
TLAs should be renewed or granted.
A cause of action is defined as:
". . . an act or omission of one party in violation of the
legal right or rights of the other; and its essential
elements are legal right of the plaintiff, correlative
obligation of the defendant, and act or omission of the
defendant in violation of said legal right." 18
It is settled in this jurisdiction that in a motion to dismiss based
on the ground that the complaint fails to state a cause of
action, 19 the question submitted to the court for resolution
involves the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint
itself. No other matter should be considered; furthermore, the
truth or falsity of the said allegations is beside the point for the
truth thereof is deemed hypothetically admitted. The only issue to
be resolved in such a case is: admitting such alleged facts to be
true, may the court render a valid judgment in accordance with
the prayer in the complaint? 20 In Militante
vs. Edrosolano, 21 this Court laid down the rule that the judiciary
should "exercise the utmost care and circumspection in passing
upon a motion to dismiss on the ground of the absence thereof
[cause of action] lest, by its failure to manifest a correct
appreciation of the facts alleged and deemed hypothetically
admitted, what the law grants or recognizes is effectively
nullified. If that happens, there is a blot on the legal order. The
law itself stands in disrepute."
After a careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, We find
the statements under the introductory affirmative allegations, as
well as the specific averments under the subheading CAUSE OF
ACTION, to be adequate enough to show, prima facie, the
claimed violation of their rights. On the basis thereof, they may
thus be granted, wholly or partly, the reliefs prayed for. It bears
stressing, however, that insofar as the cancellation of the TLAs is
concerned, there is the need to implead, as party defendants, the
grantees thereof for they are indispensable parties.
The foregoing considered, Civil Case No. 90-777 cannot be said
to raise a political question. Policy formulation or determination
by the executive or legislative branches of Government is not
squarely put in issue. What is principally involved is the
enforcement of a right vis-a-vis policies already formulated and
expressed in legislation. It must, nonetheless, be emphasized that
the political question doctrine is no longer the insurmountable
obstacle to the exercise of judicial power or the impenetrable
shield that protects executive and legislative actions from judicial
inquiry or review. The second paragraph of section 1, Article
VIII of the Constitution states that:
 "Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of
justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government."
Commenting on this provision in his book, Philippine Political
Law, 22 Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz, a distinguished member of
this Court, says:
"The first part of the authority represents the
traditional concept of judicial power, involving the
settlement of conflicting rights as conferred by law.
The second part of the authority represents a
broadening of judicial power to enable the courts of
justice to review what was before forbidden territory,
to wit, the discretion of the political departments of
the government.
 
As worded, the new provision vests in the judiciary,
and particularly the Supreme Court, the power to rule
upon even the wisdom of the decisions of the
executive and the legislature and to declare their acts
invalid for lack or excess of jurisdiction because
tainted with grave abuse of discretion. The catch, of
course, is the meaning of 'grave abuse of discretion,'
which is a very elastic phrase that can expand or
contract according to the disposition of the judiciary."
In Daza vs. Singson, 23 Mr. Justice Cruz, now speaking for this
Court, noted:
"In the case now before us, the jurisdictional
objection becomes even less tenable and decisive. The
reason is that, even if we were to assume that the
issue presented before us was political in nature, we
would still not be precluded from resolving it under
the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us that now
covers, in proper cases, even the political question.
Article VII, Section 1, of the Constitution clearly
provides: . . ."
The last ground invoked by the trial court in dismissing the
complaint is the non-impairment of contracts clause found in the
Constitution. The court a quo declared that:
"The Court is likewise of the impression that it
cannot, no matter how we stretch our jurisdiction,
grant the reliefs prayed for by the plaintiffs, i.e., to
cancel all existing timber license agreements in the
country and to cease and desist from receiving,
accepting, processing, renewing or approving new
timber license agreements. For to do otherwise would
amount to 'impairment of contracts' abhored (sic) by
the fundamental law." 24
We are not persuaded at all; on the contrary, We are amazed, if
not shocked, by such a sweeping pronouncement. In the first
place, the respondent Secretary did not, for obvious reasons, even
invoke in his motion to dismiss the non-impairment clause. If he
had done so, he would have acted with utmost infidelity to the
Government by providing undue and unwarranted benefits and
advantages to the timber license holders because he would have
forever bound the Government to strictly respect the said licenses
according to their terms and conditions regardless of changes in
policy and the demands of public interest and welfare. He was
aware that as correctly pointed out by the petitioners, into every
timber license must be read Section 20 of the Forestry Reform
Code (P.D. No. 705) which provides:
". . . Provided, That when the national interest so
requires, the President may amend, modify, replace or
rescind any contract, concession, permit, licenses or
any other form of privilege granted herein . . ."
 Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded
by executive action. It is not a contract, property or a property
right protected by the due process clause of the Constitution.
In Tan vs. Director of Forestry, 25 this Court held:
". . . A timber license is an instrument by which the
State regulates the utilization and disposition of forest
resources to the end that public welfare is promoted.
A timber license is not a contract within the purview
of the due process clause; it is only a license or
privilege, which can be validly withdrawn whenever
dictated by public interest or public welfare as in this
case.
'A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what
otherwise would be unlawful, and is not a contract
between the authority, federal, state, or municipal,
granting it and the person to whom it is granted;
neither is it property or a property right, nor does it
create a vested right; nor is it taxation' (37 C.J. 168).
Thus, this Court held that the granting of license does
not create irrevocable rights, neither is it property or
property rights (People vs. Ong Tin, 54 O.G.
7576) . . ."
We reiterated this pronouncement in Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co.,
Inc. vs. Deputy Executive Secretary: 26
". . . Timber licenses, permits and license agreements
are the principal instruments by which the State
regulates the utilization and disposition of forest
resources to the end that public welfare is promoted.
And it can hardly be gainsaid that they merely
evidence a privilege granted by the State to qualified
entities, and do not vest in the latter a permanent or
irrevocable right to the particular concession area and
the forest products therein. They may be validly
amended, modified, replaced or rescinded by the
Chief Executive when national interests so require.
Thus, they are not deemed contracts within the
purview of the due process of law clause
[See Sections 3(ee) and 20 of Pres. Decree No. 705,
as amended. Also, Tan v. Director of Forestry,G.R.
No. L-24548, October 27, 1983, 125 SCRA 302]."
Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment
clause, which reads:
"SEC. 10. No law impairing the obligation of
contracts shall be passed." 27
cannot be invoked.
In the second place, even if it is to be assumed that the same are
contracts, the instant case does not involve a law or even an
executive issuance declaring the cancellation or modification of
existing timber licenses. Hence, the non-impairment clause
cannot as yet be invoked. Nevertheless, granting further that a
law has actually been passed mandating cancellations or
modifications, the same cannot still be stigmatized as a violation
of the non-impairment clause. This is because by its very nature
and purpose, such a law could have only been passed in the
exercise of the police power of the state for the purpose of
advancing the right of the people to a balanced and healthful
ecology, promoting their health and enhancing the general
welfare. In Abe vs. Foster Wheeler Corp., 28 this Court stated:
"The freedom of contract, under our system of
government, is not meant to be absolute. The same is
understood to be subject to reasonable legislative
regulation aimed at the promotion of public health,
moral, safety and welfare. In other words, the
constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of
obligations of contract is limited by the exercise of
the police power of the State, in the interest of public
health, safety, moral and general welfare."
The reason for this is emphatically set forth in Nebia vs. New
York, 29 quoted in Philippine American Life Insurance Co. vs.
Auditor General, 30 to wit:
 " 'Under our form of government the use of property
and the making of contracts are normally matters of
private and not of public concern. The general rule is
that both shall be free of governmental interference.
Vitug, J ., took no part; I was not yet with the Court when the
case was deliberated upon.
 (Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., G.R. No. 101083, [July 30, 1993])
|||

But neither property rights nor contract rights are

absolute; for government cannot exist if the citizen
may at will use his property to the detriment of his
fellows, or exercise his freedom of contract to work
them harm. Equally fundamental with the private
right is that of the public to regulate it in the common
interest.' "
In court, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police
power of the state. 31
Finally, it is difficult to imagine, as the trial court did, how the
non-impairment clause could apply with respect to the prayer to
enjoin the respondent Secretary from receiving, accepting,
processing, renewing or approving new timber licenses for, save
in cases of renewal, no contract would have as of yet existed in
the other instances. Moreover, with respect to renewal, the holder
is not entitled to it as a matter of right.
WHEREFORE, being impressed with merit, the instant Petition
is hereby GRANTED, and the challenged Order of respondent
Judge of 18 July 1991 dismissing Civil Case No. 90-777 is
hereby set aside. The petitioners may therefore amend their
complaint to implead as defendants the holders or grantees of the
questioned timber license agreements.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
Cruz, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Regalado, Romero, Nocon,
Bellosillo, Melo and Quiason, JJ ., concur. [G.R. No. 195482 : June 21, 2011]

Narvasa, C . J . , took no part; related to one of the parties. ELIZA M. HERNANDEZ, ET AL. V. PLACER DOME, INC.
Puno, J ., took no part in the deliberations.
Sirs/Mesdames:

Please take notice that the Court en banc issued a Resolution
dated  JUNE 21, 2011, which reads as follows:  through any of in the means provided under Section 12, Rule 14
"G.R. No. 195482 (ELIZA M. HERNANDEZ, ET AL. v.
PLACER DOME, INC.)  summons through any of the following means to a foreign
RESOLUTION  without a resident agent, viz.: (a) by personal service coursed
In the Resolution dated 8 March 2011, the Court granted
petitioners' prayer for the issuance of a Writ of Kalikasan and
for the service of said writ as well as the summons issued in the
case, by their counsel and representative, Civic Action Group
Ltd./APS International, Ltd. In the same resolution, the Court
likewise ordered respondents Placer Dome, Inc. (PDI) and
Barrick Gold Corporation (BGC) to make a verified return of the
same writ and referred the case to the Court of Appeals (CA) for
hearing, reception of evidence and rendition of judgment. On 29
March 2011, the Court additionally issued a resolution granting
petitioners' motion for the inclusion of AI Legal Service &
Training Ltd.  and Select Document Services  among those
authorized to serve summons on respondents, on the ground
that Civic Action Group Ltd./APS International, Ltd.  had limited
their services to the United States of America.
Subsequent to its filing of a 29 March 2011 Urgent Motion to
Suspend Filing of Return, BGC filed a 31 March 2011 Urgent
Motion for Ruling on Jurisdiction, questioning the
constitutionality of Rule 7 of the Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases (AMC No. 09-6-8-SC) as well as the
validity of the issuance and service of summons in the case. On
4 April 2011, BGC also filed a Return Ad Cautelam,
accompanied by a Manifestation  dated 4 April 2011,
undertaking to submit within a reasonable time the
authenticated copies of the sworn statements attached to
said Return in view of time constraints. On 12 April 2011, the
Court issued a Resolution noting the foregoing motions and
incidents and requiring petitioners to file their comment to
BGC's Urgent Motion for Ruling on Jurisdiction.   authorize them to receive said Discovery Papers for and in
On 12 April 2011, petitioners also filed an  Urgent Motion of
even date, seeking leave to serve summons upon respondents
of the Rules of Court. As amended by A.M. No. 11-3-6-SC which
was issued on 15 March 2011, said provision allows service of
private juridical entity not registered in the Philippines or
through the appropriate court in the foreign country with the
assistance of the Department of Foreign Affairs; (b) by
publication once in a newspaper of general circulation in the
country where the defendant may be found and by serving a
copy of the summons and the court order by registered mail at
the last known address of the defendant; (c) by facsimile or any
recognized electronic means that could generate proof of
service; and, (d) by such other means as the court may in its
discretion direct.
On 18 April 2011, petitioners filed a Manifestation and
Compliance dated 15 April 2011, submitting the affidavit
executed by Brian Nolan of the Civic Action Group Ltd./APS
International, Ltd.  attesting to the 25 March 2011 service of
summons on BGC. Without prejudice to the Urgent Motion for
Ruling on Jurisdiction it earlier filed, BGC in turn filed
a Submission dated 19 April 2011, proffering the original
authenticated copies of the affidavits executed by Debra Bilous
and James Donald Robertson and reiterating its commitment to
submit within a reasonable time the authenticated copies of the
other affidavits attached to its Return Ad Cautelam. On 6 May
2011, Sycip Salazar Hernandez and Gatmaitan, BGC's counsel
of record, filed a Manifestation dated 5 May 2011 stating,
among other matters, that they have been served with copies of
petitioners' Notice of Deposition, Interrogatories and Motion for
Production of Inspection of Documents (Discovery Papers)
intended for their client, in connection with the proceedings
pending before the CA as CA-G.R. SP No. 00001; that being for
the limited purpose of raising constitutional and jurisdictional
issues, their special appearance is not of such nature as would
behalf of BCG.
On 12 May 2011, petitioners filed their Manifestation with
Reiterated Motion dated 11 May 2011, alleging that they have
received a copy of the 3 May 2011 Manifestation and
Motion filed before the CA by the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) on behalf of the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI),
praying that petitioners be directed to manifest whether they
have already caused the service of summons upon PDI and, if
not, to coordinate with the OSG with respect to the mode of
service as well as the manner of payment thereof; that although
it had been served with copies of their petition and its annexes
by registered mail, PDI has yet to be served with summons;
and, that while they are willing to coordinate with the OSG
regarding the mode and manner of payment for the service of
summons to PDI, the Court has yet to resolve their motions for
the inclusion of  AI Legal Service & Training Ltd. and Select
Document Services among those authorized to serve summons
on respondents and for the service of summons in accordance
with Section 12, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court, as amended.
On 17 May 2011, BGC filed a Clarificatory Manifestation  dated
16 May 2011, alleging that it received the Resolution dated 4
May 2011 issued by the CA's First Division in CA-G.R. SP No.
00001, the decretal portion of which states:  00001 and its conduct of proceedings relative thereto, it is
"ACTING on the pending incidents, We hereby resolve as
follows:                referred to said Court in observance of the doctrine of hierarchy
1) In order to attain a judicious determination of the Urgent Motion for
Ruling on Jurisdiction, the petitioners are DIRECTED to submit
their COMMENT within ten (10) days from receipt hereof.
Perforce, Our resolution on petitioners' Motion for Production and
Inspection of Documents is held in abeyance;
 
2) Petitioners are ORDERED to manifest whether or not respondent
Placer Dome has been served with Summons and if none had been
served yet, to coordinate with the DTI, through the OSG, for the
implementation thereof.
SO ORDERED."
BGC calls the attention of the Court to the fact, among other
matters, that the foregoing resolution is in conflict with our
resolution dated 12 April 2011 which required petitioners to file
their comment to its Urgent Motion for Ruling on Jurisdiction;
and, that consequently, there is a need to clarify which court
exercises jurisdiction over the case in order to shed light to the
procedural paths available to the parties. Subsequent to its
filing of a Submission dated 18 May 2011 submitting the
original of the authenticated affidavit of Geoffrey Marlow, BGC
filed a Manifestation  dated 6 June 2011 reiterating the need for
said clarification, in view of petitioners' filing on 2 June 2011 of
their Opposition to its Urgent Motion for Ruling on Jurisdiction. 
Pursuant to Section 3, Rule VII of the Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases, petitions for the Writ of Kalikasan "shall
be filed with the Supreme Court or with any of the stations of
the Court of Appeals." It was in consonance with this provision
that, on 8 March 2011, the Court issued the Resolution which,
after granting the Writ of Kalikasan sought by petitioners,
referred the case to the CA for hearing, reception of evidence
and rendition of judgment. Considering said referral of the case
to the CA, its re-docketing of the petition as CA-G.R. SP No.
imperative that the various motions and incidents filed by the
parties, together with the entire records of the case, be likewise
of courts and in the interest of the orderly and expeditious
conduct of the proceedings in the case. With respect to
petitioners' Manifestation with Reiterated Motion dated 11 May
2011, attention is, however, called to the fact that the motion
for the inclusion of AI Legal Service & Training Ltd. and Select
Document Services among those authorized to serve summons
on respondents had already been granted in the Court's 29
March 2011 Resolution.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the records of the case
are REFERRED to the CA, for appropriate action on the various
motions and incidents filed by the parties."