S A R T R E O N T H E E X T E N T OF F R E E D O M :

AN EIGHT-STAGE DIALECTIC

RON SMETANA
Lawrence, Kansas

Sartre says consciousness is "wholly and forever free. ''1 How literally does
he mean this ? The fullest explanation occurs in the last sections of Being
and Nolhingness, where Sartre studies the extent of freedom in a series of
positions and transitions :
(1) Consciousness is wholly free (pp. 433--45). These pages examine
the equation of freedom and consciousness, first made on pp. 24--8. Phenomena 2 cannot motivate any conscious act. Sartre emphasizes the freedom
of consciousness to interpret phenomena (pp. 435--6). Consdousness is
free even in interpreting the given world as magical or raional (p. 445).
(2) Consciousness is not wholly free--it is affected by values within
current activities (pp. 452--64). This section looks at the givenness of
phenomena. Objects and activities can be seen as having value that is
independent of human subjectivity. This perspective results in anguish when
consciousness contemplates changing projects since change involves the
abandonment of former values. Anguish can appear as the "price paid" for
acting freely (pp. 454--64). Choices are not arbitrary or capricious since
consciousness is affected by values within current projects.
(3) Consciousness is wholly free (pp. 464---81). These pages take a
look at the freedom of consciousness with respect to given phenomena.
Consciousness exists in terms of the given, but it is not conditioned by the
given (p. 478). Choices are unjustifiable (p. 464) and absurd (p. 479).
Choice creates all foundations and reasons (p. 479). Even the most fundamental projects can be rechosen (pp. 46/1 6), and this suggests that
fm;dameataI values can also be re-chosen without anguish (in the next

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R. Smetana

chapter, pp. 580--1, Sartre retracts the term "anguish" as the name for the
apprehension of freedom).
(4) Consciousness is not wholly free it is affected by "concrete" givens
(pp. 481--4). These passages explore the nature of givens with respect to
freedom. Freedom does seem to encounter limits due to given concrete facts
despite the ability to alter human projects and interpretations of phenomena.
It would be absurd to say freedom creates its own obstades (pp. 483 4).
(5) The extent of freedom is ambiguous (pp. 484 551). This section
presents a view of consciousness and givens that is synthesized from previous
positions Nos 1--4 which are inadequate but do help "clear the ground"
(p. 484) for a comprehensive understanding. The extent of freedom is
"ambiguous" (p. 488) since "the situation," including givens and obstacles,
is partially given, partially chosen, and the elements cannot be predsely
discriminated. There is a paradox of freedom (p. 489).
"Obstacle" can refer to a concrete given and/or to an interpretation of a
concrete given. As far as hermeneutics is concerned, consciousness can elect
to. interpret given phenomena as obstacles or not as obstacles (pp. 489, 550).
But there also, exists freedom with respect to "concrete" givens. For example,
the rock which the climber perceives either as scalable or not scalable is
never perceived by the person who chose to stay in town. For the person
in town, the rock remains "dissolved in the totality 'world'" (p. 489). As
opposed to position No 4, then, consciousness not only interprets things as
obstacles or not, but consciousness has something to do with concrete
phenomena.
(6) Man is wholly free (pp. 553--6). This section is a look at the
preceding position as it appears to Sartre "the ethidst" (p. 553). Consciousness can change the world as well as interpret it, so any inaction is
susceptible to the charge of passivity, and Sartre is willing to make this
charge (p. 556). The ambiguous extent of freedom implies total moral
responsibility. Man is the author of his situation (p. 554), totally free and
responsible for everything except his responsibility (p. 555).
(7) Consdousness is not wholly free, in the sense that the meaning of
freedom is universally given, not chosen. Particular actions are free, but
they can universally be interpreted ("existentially psychoanalyzed") as the
desire and attempt to achieve an identity (i.e., to become an "in-itsdf-foritself" being, "God"). God is the. %neaning" of all conscious acts (p. 569).
"Man fundamentally is the desire to be God" (p. 566). Consdousness

Sartre's Extent of Freedom

231

cannot have in-itself being, however3 Corollary : it is in "anguish" (p. 464)

or "despair" (p. 627) that consciousness recognizes its free existence. "Man
i s a useless passiod' (p. 615). This position is apparent in pp. 557-620.
(8) Consciousness is free to choose the meaning of its existence and acts.
All interpretations and values are chosen. It is a mistake to believe the
desire to be God is "written in things" (p. 627). It seems that consciousness
can "put an end to the reign of this value" (p. 627). Corollary: the
awareness of freedom need not be anguished. It could "just as well" be
chosen otherwise (p. 581). This position is apparent in pp. 620--8. a
This last position seems to be the one which Sartre adopts as "authentic"
(p. 70n) and which he develops somewhat in "Existentialism is a Humanism. ''4 Consciousness interprets the world, it can change the world, and
it is ethically culpable for everything except its existence. It is possible to
interpret consciousness as the desire and attempt to. achieve an identity, but
consciousness and its acts are not univocal. Consciousness establishes and
can re-choose the meaning of its existence.

Notes
1 Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, trans. Hazel Barnes (New York : Philosophical Library, x956), pp. 441, 442. References to this work are noted parenthetically in the text of this paper.
2 Sartre claims there are "two absolutely separated regions of being" (p. Ixv):
"consciousness," which is % real subjectivity" (p. lxii) and does not include any
objectivity (p. liii), and "phenomena," which do not have any subjectivity (see
p. Ii--Sartre describes consciousness as "my eyes" which "concentrate on" or
"turn . . . away from" the "phenomenon").
s These positions on the extent of freedom are presented in this order in the last two
chapters and "Conclusion" of Being and Nothinsness. There is some overlapping of
positions.
4 Sartre, "Existentialism is a Humanism," trans. Philip Mairet, in Existentialism from
Dostoevs~y to Sartre, ed. Walter Kaufmann (Cleveland : World Press, 1975).