DELEGATION OF POWERS

Enrique Garcia vs Executive Secretary

Political Law Congress Authorizing the President to Tax
On 27 November 1990, Cory issued Executive Order 438 which imposed, in addition
to any other duties, taxes and charges imposed by law on all articles imported into
the Philippines, an additional duty of 5% ad valorem. This additional duty was
imposed across the board on all imported articles, including crude oil and other oil
products imported into the Philippines. In 1991, EO 443 increased the additional
duty to 9%. In the same year, EO 475 was passed reinstating the previous 5% duty
except that crude oil and other oil products continued to be taxed at 9%. Garcia, a
representative from Bataan, avers that EO 475 and 478 are unconstitutional for they
violate Sec 24 of Art 6 of the Constitution which provides: All appropriation,
revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local
application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments. He
contends that since the Constitution vests the authority to enact revenue bills in
Congress, the President may not assume such power of issuing Executive Orders
Nos. 475 and 478 which are in the nature of revenue-generating measures.

Held : Petition grantedRatio : Emergency Power is for a limited period only and it
has been defined as restricted.: Emergency, in order to justify the delegation of
emergency powers must be temporary or it can not besaid to be an emergency.: In
the language of Emergency Powers Act, the National Assembly restricted the life
of the emergencypowers of the President to the time the Legislature was prevented
from holding sessions due to enemy action orother causes brought on by war.
Rodriguez vs Gella
Political Law Second Emergency Powers Cases
Rodriguez et al seek to invalidate Executive Orders 545 and 546 issued in 1952, the
first appropriating the sum of P37,850,500 for urgent and essential public works, and
the second setting aside the sum of P11,367,600 for relief in the provinces and cities
visited by typhoons, floods, droughts, earthquakes, volcanic action and other
calamities. These EOs were pursuant to Commonwealth Act 671. Note that prior
to Araneta vs Dinglasan, Congress passed House Bill 727 intending to revoke CA
671 but the same was vetoed by the President due to the Korean War and his
perception that war is still subsisting as a fact.
ISSUE: Whether or not the EOs are valid.

ISSUE: Whether or not EO 475 and 478 are constitutional.

HELD: Under Section 24, Article VI of the Constitution, the enactment of
appropriation, revenue and tariff bills, like all other bills is, of course, within the
province of the Legislative rather than the Executive Department. It does not follow,
however, that therefore Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478, assuming they may be
characterized as revenue measures, are prohibited to the President, that they must be
enacted instead by the Congress of the Philippines. Section 28(2) of Article VI of the
Constitution provides as follows: (2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the
President to fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and
restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and
wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national
development program of the Government. There is thus explicit constitutional
permission to Congress to authorize the President subject to such limitations and
restrictions as [Congress] may impose to fix within specific limits tariff rates . . .
and other duties or imposts . . . .

HELD: As similarly decided in the Araneta case, the EOs issued in pursuant to CA
671 shall be rendered ineffective. The president did not invoke any actual
emergencies or calamities emanating from the last world war for which CA 671 has
been intended. Without such invocation, the veto of the president cannot be of merit
for the emergency he feared cannot be attributed to the war contemplated in CA 671.
Even if the president vetoed the repealing bill the intent of Congress must be given
due weight. For it would be absurd to contend otherwise. For while Congress might
delegate its power by a simple majority, it might not be able to recall them except by
two-third vote. In other words, it would be easier for Congress to delegate its powers
than to take them back. This is not right and is not, and ought not to be the law. Act
No. 671 may be likened to an ordinary contract of agency, whereby the consent of
the agent is necessary only in the sense that he cannot be compelled to accept the
trust, in the same way that the principal cannot be forced to keep the relation in
eternity or at the will of the agent. Neither can it be suggested that the agency created
under the Act is coupled with interest.

Araneta v. Dinglasan

People vs Vera

Facts : Petitioners questioned the exercise of President Quirino of emergency

powers that was vested toPresident Quezon during the Philippine-Japanese war.:
They questioned the validity of several executive orders providing for public funds
on operation of national government and conduction of 1949 election, control of
exports, and regulation of rentals of lots.: Emergency Powers Act has ceased to have
any force and effect.

Cu Unjieng was convicted by the trial court in Manila. He filed for reconsideration
which was elevated to the SC and the SC remanded the appeal to the lower court for
a new trial. While awaiting new trial, he appealed for probation alleging that the he is
innocent of the crime he was convicted of. Judge Tuason of the Manila CFI directed
the appeal to the Insular Probation Office. The IPO denied the application. However,
Judge Vera upon another request by petitioner allowed the petition to be set for

hearing. The City Prosecutor countered alleging that Vera has no power to place Cu
Unjieng under probation because it is in violation of Sec. 11 Act No. 4221 which
provides that the act of Legislature granting provincial boards the power to provide a
system of probation to convicted person. Nowhere in the law is stated that the law is
applicable to a city like Manila because it is only indicated therein that only
provinces are covered. And even if Manila is covered by the law it is unconstitutional
because Sec 1 Art 3 of the Constitution provides equal protection of laws. The said
law provides absolute discretion to provincial boards and this also constitutes undue
delegation of power. Further, the said probation law may be an encroachment of the
power of the executive to provide pardon because providing probation, in effect, is
granting freedom, as in pardon.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is undue delegation of power.
HELD: The act of granting probation is not the same as pardon. In fact it is limited
and is in a way an imposition of penalty. There is undue delegation of power because
there is no set standard provided by Congress on how provincial boards must act in
carrying out a system of probation. The provincial boards are given absolute
discretion which is violative of the constitution and the doctrine of the non
delegability of power. Further, it is a violation of equity so protected by the
constitution. The challenged section of Act No. 4221 in section 11 which reads as
follows: This Act shall apply only in those provinces in which the respective
provincial boards have provided for the salary of a probation officer at rates not
lower than those now provided for provincial fiscals. Said probation officer shall be
appointed by the Secretary of Justice and shall be subject to the direction of the
Probation Office. This only means that only provinces that can provide appropriation
for a probation officer may have a system of probation within their locality. This
would mean to say that convicts in provinces where no probation officer is instituted
may not avail of their right to probation.
United States vs Ang Tang Ho
Political Law Delegation of Power Administrative Bodies
On 30July 1919, the Philippine Legislature (during special session) passed and
approved Act No. 2868 entitled An Act Penalizing the Monopoly and Hoarding of
Rice, Palay and Corn. The said act under extraordinary circumstances authorizes the
Governor General to issue the necessary Rules and Regulations in regulating the
distribution of such products. Pursuant to this Act, On 01 August 1919, the GG
issued EO 53 which was published on 20 August 1919. The said EO fixed the price
at which rice should be sold. On the other hand, Ang Tang Ho, a rice dealer,
voluntarily, criminally and illegally sold a ganta of rice to Pedro Trinidad at the price
of eighty centavos. The said amount was way higher than that prescribed by the EO.
The sale was done on the 6th of August 1919. On 08 August 1919, he was charged in
violation of the said EO. He was found guilty as charged and was sentenced to 5
months imprisonment plus a P500.00 fine. He appealed the sentence countering that
there is an undue delegation of power to the Governor General.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is undue delegation to the Governor General.

HELD: Fist of, Ang Tang Hos conviction must be reversed because he committed
the act prior to the publication of the EO. Hence, he cannot be ex post facto charged
of the crime. Further, one cannot be convicted of a violation of a law or of an order
issued pursuant to the law when both the law and the order fail to set up an
ascertainable standard of guilt. The said Act, as to the judgment of the SC, wholly
fails to provide definitely and clearly what the standard policy should contain, so that
it could be put in use as a uniform policy required to take the place of all others
without the determination of the insurance commissioner in respect to matters
involving the exercise of a legislative discretion that could not be delegated, and
without which the act could not possibly be put in use. The law must be complete in
all its terms and provisions when it leaves the legislative branch of the government
and nothing must be left to the judgment of the electors or other appointee or
delegate of the legislature, so that, in form and substance, it is a law in all its
details in presenti, but which may be left to take effect in future, if necessary, upon
the ascertainment of any prescribed fact or event.
Restituto Ynot vs Intermediate Appellate Court
Police Power Not Validly Exercised
There had been an existing law which prohibited the slaughtering of carabaos (EO
626). To strengthen the law, Marcos issued EO 626-A which not only banned the
movement of carabaos from interprovinces but as well as the movement of carabeef.
On 13 Jan 1984, Ynot was caught transporting 6 carabaos from Masbate to Iloilo. He
was then charged in violation of EO 626-A. Ynot averred EO 626-A as
unconstitutional for it violated his right to be heard or his right to due process. He
said that the authority provided by EO 626-A to outrightly confiscate carabaos even
without being heard is unconstitutional. The lower court ruled against Ynot ruling
that the EO is a valid exercise of police power in order to promote general welfare so
as to curb down the indiscriminate slaughter of carabaos.
ISSUE: Whether or not the law is valid.
HELD: The SC ruled that the EO is not valid as it indeed violates due process. EO
626-A ctreated a presumption based on the judgment of the executive. The
movement of carabaos from one area to the other does not mean a subsequent
slaughter of the same would ensue. Ynot should be given to defend himself and
explain why the carabaos are being transferred before they can be confiscated. The
SC found that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power
because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary
to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is violated
because the owner of the property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his
defense and is immediately condemned and punished. The conferment on the
administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender
is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and militates against the doctrine of

separation of powers. There is, finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative

powers to the officers mentioned therein who are granted unlimited discretion in the
distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken.

in this act shall be construed to inhibit any college of medicine from establishing, in
addition to the preceding, other entrance requirements that may be deemed
admissible.

TABLARIN VS. GUTIERREZ

MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, issued by the then Minister of Education, Culture and
Sports and dated 23 August 1985, established a uniform admission test called the
National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) as an additional requirement for issuance
of a certificate of eligibility for admission into medical schools of the Philippines,
beginning with the school year 1986-1987. This Order goes on to state that: "2. The
NMAT, an aptitude test, is considered as an instrument toward upgrading the
selection of applicants for admission into the medical schools and its calculated to
improve the quality of medical education in the country. The cutoff score for the
successful applicants, based on the scores on the NMAT, shall be determined every
year by the Board of Medical Education after consultation with the Association of
Philippine Medical Colleges. The NMAT rating of each applicant, together with the
other admission requirements as presently called for under existing rules, shall serve
as a basis for the issuance of the prescribed certificate of eligibility for admission
into the medical colleges.

Facts: The petitioners sought to enjoin the Secretary of Education, Culture and
Sports, the Board of Medical Education and the Center for Educational Measurement
from enforcing Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, and
MECS Order No. 52, series of 1985, dated 23 August 1985 and from requiring the
taking and passing of the NMAT as a condition for securing certificates of eligibility
for admission, from proceeding with accepting applications for taking the NMAT and
from administering the NMAT as scheduled on 26 April 1987 and in the future. The
trial court denied said petition on 20 April 1987. The NMAT was conducted and
administered as previouslyscheduled.
Republic Act 2382, as amended by Republic Acts Nos. 4224 and 5946, known as the
"Medical Act of 1959" defines its basic objectives in the following manner:
"SECTION 1. Objectives. This Act provides for and shall govern (a) the
standardization and regulation of medical education; (b) the examination for
registration of physicians; and (c) the supervision, control and regulation of the
practice of medicine in the Philippines."
The statute, among other things, created a Board of Medical Education. Its functions
as specified in Section 5 of the statute include the following:
"(a) To determine and prescribe requirements for admission into a recognized college
of medicine;
xxx
(f) To accept applications for certification for admission to a medical school and
keep a register of those issued said certificate; and to collect from said applicants the
amount of twenty-five pesos each which shall accrue to the operating fund of the
Board of Medical Education;
Section 7 prescribes certain minimum requirements for applicants to medical
schools:
"Admission requirements. The medical college may admit any student who has
not been convicted by any court of competent jurisdiction of any offense involving
moral turpitude and who presents (a) a record of completion of a bachelor's degree in
science or arts; (b) a certificate of eligibility for entrance to a medical school from
the Board of Medical Education; (c) a certificate of good moral character issued by
two former professors in the college of liberal arts; and (d) birth certificate. Nothing

Issue: Whether or not Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended,
and MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985 are constitutional.
Held: Yes. We conclude that prescribing the NMAT and requiring certain minimum
scores therein as a condition for admission to medical schools in the Philippines, do
not constitute an unconstitutional imposition.
The police power, it is commonplace learning, is the pervasive and non-waivable
power and authority of the sovereign to secure and promote all the important
interests and needs in a word, the public order of the general community. An
important component of that public order is the health and physical safety and well
being of the population, the securing of which no one can deny is a legitimate
objective of governmental effort and regulation. Perhaps the only issue that needs
some consideration is whether there is some reasonable relation between the
prescribing of passing the NMAT as a condition for admission to medical school on
the one hand, and the securing of the health and safety of the general community, on
the other hand. This question is perhaps most usefully approached by recalling that
the regulation of the practice of medicine in all its branches has long been recognized
as a reasonable method of protecting the health and safety of the public.
MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985 articulates the rationale of regulation of this type: the
improvement of the professional and technical quality of the graduates of medical
schools, by upgrading the quality of those admitted to the student body of the
medical schools. That upgrading is sought by selectivity in the process of admission,
selectivity consisting, among other things, of limiting admission to those who exhibit
in the required degree the aptitude for medical studies and eventually for medical
practice. The need to maintain, and the difficulties of maintaining, high standards in

our professional schools in general, and medical schools in particular, in the current
stage of our social and economic development, are widely known. We believe that
the government is entitled to prescribe an admission test like the NMAT as a means
for achieving its stated objective of "upgrading the selection of applicants into [our]
medical schools" and of "improv[ing] the quality of medical education in the
country. We are entitled to hold that the NMAT is reasonably related to the securing
of the ultimate end of legislation and regulation in this area. That end, it is useful to
recall, is the protection of the public from the potentially deadly effects of
incompetence and ignorance in those who would undertake to treat our bodies and
minds for disease or trauma.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED and the Order of the
respondent trial court denying the petition for a writ of preliminary injunction is
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
Pelaez vs Auditor General
Political Law Sufficient Standard Test and Completeness Test
From Sept 04 to Oct 29, 1964, the President (Marcos) issued executive orders
creating 33 municipalities this is purportedly in pursuant to Sec 68 of the Revised
Administrative Code which provides that the President of the Philippines may by
executive order define the boundary, or boundaries, of any province, sub-province,
municipality, [township] municipal district or other political subdivision, and
increase or diminish the territory comprised therein, may divide any province into
one or more subprovincesThe VP Emmanuel Pelaez and a taxpayer filed a special
civil action to prohibit the auditor general from disbursing funds to be appropriated
for the said municipalities. Pelaez claims that the EOs are unconstitutional. He said
that Sec 68 of the RAC has been impliedly repealed by Sec 3 of RA 2370 which
provides that barrios may not be created or their boundaries altered nor their names
changed except by Act of Congress or of the corresponding provincial board upon

petition of a majority of the voters in the areas affected and the recommendation of
the council of the municipality or municipalities in which the proposed barrio is
situated. Pelaez argues, accordingly: If the President, under this new law, cannot
even create a barrio, can he create a municipality which is composed of several
barrios, since barrios are units of municipalities? The Auditor General countered
that only barrios are barred from being created by the President. Municipalities are
exempt from the bar and that t a municipality can be created without creating barrios.
Existing barrios can just be placed into the new municipality. This theory overlooks,
however, the main import of Pelaez argument, which is that the statutory denial of
the presidential authority to create a new barrio implies a negation of the bigger
power to create municipalities, each of which consists of several barrios.
ISSUE: Whether or not Congress has delegated the power to create barrios to the
President by virtue of Sec 68 of the RAC.
HELD: Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the government the
power to fill in the details in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it
is essential, to forestall a violation of the principle of separation of powers, that said
law: (a) be complete in itself it must set forth therein the policy to be executed,
carried out or implemented by the delegate and (b) fix a standard the limits of
which are sufficiently determinate or determinable to which the delegate must
conform in the performance of his functions. Indeed, without a statutory declaration
of policy, the delegate would, in effect, make or formulate such policy, which is the
essence of every law; and, without the aforementioned standard, there would be no
means to determine, with reasonable certainty, whether the delegate has acted within
or beyond the scope of his authority.
In the case at bar, the power to create municipalities is eminently legislative in
character not administrative.