Just in Case the Atom Bombs Fall: Denver Civil Defense and Self-Help Ideology in the 1950s “Scared, Many Admit, After Longmont Raid.” This was the headline for a special report in the Denver Post on March 3, 1952. “I didn’t know what was coming off," resident LeRoy Johnston exclaimed “! was coming into town and I saw the patrol car. lasked what it was all about, but nobody knew. I didn’t think it was the real thing, but I couldn't be sure.” The confusion amidst wailing police sirens was matched by other Longmont residents. One ‘man admitted, “[W]ell, I didn’t now what had turned loose. | just figured about everything, and I couldn’t think about anything that would cause that much excitement.” A housewife seconded the notion, stating “[W]e weren't quite sure what was going on. 1 wouldn't say that we were exactly frightened, but we sure were puzzled.” “I knew it was something serious,” another said, “maybe a fire or an accident. We didn’t know until somebody told us." The scene of confusion in Longmont does not appear to show a community prepared for post-nuclear-attack survival and leadership. Luckily, the “serious” event in question was not an actual air raid, but rather a drill set in place by the Colorado state civil defense office to test communities’ efficiency in defense preparedness. The exercise was termed a “very nice demonstration” by one official, and generally considered a fruitful and exemplary test run. Ignorance as shown by Longmont citizens, however, was not welcomed by officials when later applied to major cities like Denver. ‘Throughout the 1950s the civil defense offices of Denver and other areas of Colorado advocated for civilians to protect themselves in the event of atomic attack. The | Bernard Kelly, “‘Scared,’ Many Admit, After Longmont ‘Raid,”” The Denver Past (3 Match 1952), back page. * Bemard Kelly, “Scared,” Many Admit, After Longmont ‘Raid,”” back page. 1“self-help” strategy, as planners called it, relied upon citizens to take charge of their own affairs in civil defense and influence their communities in doing the same. The Denver Civil Defense Office mostly acted as a guide to show Denverites how to protect themselves from attack in a heating Cold War. The strategy of self-help possessed its own distinct ideology, employing terms such as “individual,” “responsibility,” and “self-sufficiency” in recruiting everyday people to defend the lives of themselves, their families, their neighbors, and even thenation asawhole, By the end of the decade, self-help was undoubtedly the centerpiece ofall civil defense strategy as expressed in home fallout shelters and duck-and-cover drills, Denver officials also planned large-scale civil defense projects around the framework of self-help and individualist ideology. Similar to federal civil defense plans, Denver first tried to establish public shelters in conjunction with vast air raid systems to warn and protect citizens from attack. By the mid-1950s, problems of funding and changes in nuclear weapons technology cast officials’ focus toward large-scale evacuations from Denver to escape nuclear fire. With the advent of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs} evacuation strategies, too, disappeared from civil defense discussion. Both of these strategies eventually lost ground by the late 1950s, as planners fell back almost exclusively on self-help ideology by encouraging citizens to build their own home shelters. ‘While public and official discussions over public shelters reemerged sporadically off and on at the end of the decade and into the early 1960s, the individuality aspect of civil defense remained glaringly consistent. Self-help did not gain prestige only after the decline of sheltering and evacuation strategies, however. The ideology of the early 1950s served as a common thread throughout all civil defense strategies in the decade.Many scholars have discussed the importance of self-help and other civil defense strategies of the 1950s. Life Under A Cloud by Allan M, Winkler focuses on popular perceptions of the atomic bomb from World War II through the 1980s. Winkier portrays federal civil defense in the 1950s as a way of stifling public anxiety over nuclear war, a thesis which is representative of many scholarly works on civil defense? One of the most interesting parts of Winkder’s study, however, is its attention to the practical reasons civil defense failed to catch on at the overarching national level. Lack of funds, the diplomatic strategies of the Bisenhower administration, and changes in weapons technology eventually caused a decline in civil defense strategy in the 1950s. Regardless of federal civil defense officials’ attempts to reassure Americans that they were safe, global, technological, and financial constraints caused officials to fail in their attempts. Laura McEnaney’s Civil Defense Begins At Home focuses more on the institutional and cultural aspects of federal civil defense programs. McEnany specifically looks at civil defense in the 1950s and argues that self-help ideology caused a “militarization” of American life; this militarization caused many Americans to accept civil defense ona national Ievel but also expect the federal government to assist them directly in the event of attack5 In regards to self-help, McEnaney observes that politicians in Congress publicly advocated personal initiative in civil defense to gain support from constituents, foster domestic support for the Cold War, and get around lack of funding for civil defense.* * Allan M. Winkler, Life Under A Cloud: American Anxiety About the Atom (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 117, 121-1 £ Winkler, Life Under A Cloud, pp. 114-120. * Laura McEnaney, Civil Defense Begins At Home: Militarization Meets Everyday Life in the Fifties (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2000), pp. 4-6, 30, 63 © McEnaney, Civil Defense Begins dt Home, pp. 25, 28.Other broad historical studies of 1950s culture also shed light on self-help and civil defense. Elaine Tyler May's Homeward Bound, which discusses American private life and family roles in the context of the political culture of containment and security, addresses civil defense in light of familial roles like housewife domesticity.” May shows that civil defense measures for women served to express their role in the home and structure households as places of security in the Cold War In this sense, civil defense served an ideological function as much as a practical one. James Gilbert’s Men in the Middle, a 1950s gender study of dialogue over men’s role in the Cold War, discusses broad themes of individuality in American society which are very similar to self-help ideology. Gilbert devotes an essay to the bestselling book The Lonely Crowd (1950) which mapped the history of changing human (mainly male) character in America. David Riesman, the book's author, argued that nineteenth century America was “inner-directed,” always paying attention to the individual in entrepreneurial spirit. The decade of the 1950s, however, was marked by an “other-directed” approach, which Riesman thought was socially determined by institutions and mass media, Gilbert shows that American society largely misinterpreted Riesman’s study, as many people called more attention to a perceived danger of slipping individuality and self-sufficiency (particularly among men). These notions reflected a deep concern in the 1950s over “mass society,” specters of authoritarianism, and a perceptually feminized weakness towards fighting them. While Gilbert does not touch on civil defense specifically, his study on individuality through The "Blaine Tyler May, Homeward Bound: American Families in the Cold War Era (New York: Basic Books, 1988), pp. 10, 13. ! May, Homeward Bound, p. 105. * James Gilbert, “Lonely Men: David Riesman and Character,” Mon in the Middle: Searching for Masculinity in ‘the 1950s (Chicago and London: ‘The University of Chicago Press, 2005), pp. 6, 35-36, 48, 61 4Lonely Crowd bares relevance to individuality in self-help. Just as public reaction to Riesman’s study reflected deep anxiety over self-sufficiency in Americans’ lives, self-help strategy reflected anxiety over self-sufficiency in Americans’ survival in a nuclear war. This study seeks to view civil defense on a local level by focusing on Denver in the 1950s. Both broad, national factors and local peculiarities shaped and affected Denver civil defense strategy, as well as practical and ideological considerations by civil defense planners. The concept of individuality and self-help was the most influential determinant of Denver civil defense planning, and officials defined this concept in several different ways. Although not as explicit, certain Colorado citizens around Denver also held various views of self-help, sometimes holding their own unique views on civil defense. Between the perceptions of Denver planners and those of everyday people, self-help and individuality became a central, multifaceted theme to civil defense. This paper will first discuss how the Denver Civil Defense Office came into being in the early 1950s and the practical considerations planners had for civil defense and self- help strategy. The next section will focus primarily on ideological considerations and examples of self-help. The third section will discuss the two large-scale civil defense programs planned for Denver in the 1950s, public sheltering and evacuation, and discuss how they fi i to both the practical and ideological elements of civil defense. The last section will discuss how some individual citizens added new characteristics to the concept of self-help. Denver took on many of the national features of federal civil defense strategy in its early years of development. The establishment of a formal Civil Defense Agency for Denver occurred in the summer of 1950 amid an escalating Cold War. Governor Walter JohnsonProposed the founding of a program directly in response to international tensions, citing that “the increasing intensity of the war in Korea, of the ever present danger of it spreading to every corner of the world, makes it imperative for us to take action now."!0 Both parties in the state senate proposed the Civil Defense Act that year, with sixteen Republicans and thirteen Democrats proposing the new law.!! Unfortunately records of senate session minutes were not recorded, so the particular views of the Act’s architects are not entirely clear. It appears, however, that civil defense was an issue that crossed party lines when first being established. By January 1951 Colorado had its own civil defense program under director and former soldier Henry L. Larsen. That same month governor Dan Thornton described in his first press conference the urgency of civil defense, declaring it “the most serious problem” facing his administration.2 The rising intensity of the Cold War served as a fitting context to bring civil defense in Denver into being, Almost immediately after Colorado legislators created the state civil defense office, its planners began to focus on everyday Coloradans as the backbone of the state's. protection. Practical considerations guided much of this thinking. Lessons from World War Il inspired top civil defense planners in Colorado to frame civil defense as a full mobilization of Colorado's citizenry in case Soviet bombs started dropping, which would inevitably involve civilian targets. Planners within the Federal Civil Defense Administration (FCDA) also held this view. James J. Wadsworth, the national administrator of civil defense, described civilians’ role in atomic war as being even more vital than the military, “to maintain production and keep open the lines of transportation and "Colorado Revised Statutes 1953, Volume 2 (Chicago: Callaghan & Company, 1954), p. 12 ° Senate Journal of the First Extraordinary Session of the Thirty-Seventh Legislature ofthe State of Colorado at Denver, the State Capital (Denver, 1951). State's Civilian Defense Chief Outlines Plans,” The Denver Post, (10 January 1951), p.3. 6communication.""# Larsen, as a World War Il veteran, voiced a great deal of concern over civilian targeting, “More and more civilian populations,” Larsen expressed to the Denver Post in 1951, “are becoming a part of war. In the past, weapons were designed for use against opposing armies. Today, modern weapons also are aimed against transportation and industrial centers ~ and against civilian populations. That's why preparedness is so important." Larsen believed that the kind of strategic bombing which belligerents implemented against Britain, Germany, and Japan in World War II would be a definite strategy for any aggressor in a third world war. The only difference in the atomic age was much bigger bombs. Hence Larsen looked to Coloradans in cities like Denver to practice “preparedness.” Larsen was not the only local civil defense official to voice concern over civilian preparedness; Denver civil defense director George B. Berger articulated the preparing role of Denverites in a 1951 Interim Report. The report served as a blueprint for the development of an organized civil defense establishment and outlined the importance of civilians in war. “Civil Defense,” Berger stated, “becomes a definite contribution toward winning the war, and not just a means keeping civilians safe from death, injury, or loss of property while the battles are fought elsewhere.” For Berger the emphasis was not simply on civilian protection, but rather mobilization and involvement on the home front. Charles Bowman, the director of personnel and training, also described Denverites in the report as “a reserve army of civilians to act in co-ordination and by plan..when a disaster should ® ALNakkula, “Publie’s War Role Vital, Defense Chief Says,” Rocky Mountain News (16 December 1952), p. 16. “Lee Olson, "General Larsen Strives to Perfect Defense Plan,” The Denver Post (1 March 1951), p. 3AA. '* Civil Defense Interim Report (Denver: Civil Defense Office, August 1951), pp. 2-4 7strike Denver or Colorado.”1® The imagery of everyday Denverites as members of an army connoted a direct level of involvement in civil defense. Industrial and commercial strength rested with the civilian population who worked in cities, which led planners to place Denver citizens in a defensive role. The Denver Civil Defense Office assumed in the carly 1950s that US military forces belonged on the front line overseas, while civilians had to defend the homeland. ‘As much as memories of World War II framed official discussion of civilian-driven civil defense, they did not solely cause early strategic emphasis on self-help. An immediate issue of practicality linked civil defense to civilian initiative: funding, Shortage of funds for civil defense programs was not exclusive to Denver. The FCDA encountered several problems regarding finance, as more and more state-level offices requested federal money to build massive public shelters and warning systems. In 1951 civil defense advocates across the country asked for $535 million dollars for civil defense funding; Congress only appropriated $75 million.” Likewise, when the Eisenhower Administration considered construction of large multi-billion dollar public shelters later in the 1950s, the President's money-saving New Look strategy of deterrence and “massive retaliation” took precedent:%? For the federal government, fiscal considerations trumped notions of civil defense. In Denver civil defense funding also reached meager proportions. In 1951 the Colorado state legislator appropriated $40,000 through June 30, then $60,000 through February 1 of the following year. Both Governor Thornton and Larsen, the two men who helped form the state civil defense structure, wanted far more. Thornton tried to use the "Civil Defense Interim Report, p. 16. ° Winker, Life Under A Cloud, pV. Winkler, Life Under A Cloud, p. 120.prospect of the atomic energy plant to be built near Arvada as a wedge to receive increased federal funding, while Larsen proposed that an incredible $5 million reserve fund be established by the state legislator for civil defense." Regardless of planners’ pleas, however, the state legislator consistently kept civil defense funding at a low point throughout the 1950s; by 1955, statewide civil defense programs received a standard $40,000 a year from the state, yet their expenditures totaled $750,000 since Colorado's civil defense agency was established.2° The FCDA was paying a large sum of the expenditures. Regardless of the assistance the FCDA gave, officials accomplished relatively little. A two-way radio system, Denver's siren warning system, and a fire truck for Evergreen were the most significant federally-funded expenditures cited in a Rocky Mountain News article for 1955.2! Brigadier General Omar H. Quade, deputy director of health and hospital services for Denver civil defense in 1952, complained of serious lack of available hospital space and supplies in the event of attack. He estimated that doctors could only treat one third of seriously injured Denverites immediately, which would have left roughly 27,000 Denver citizens to succumb to injury. Planners were always in want of more money, and yet civil defense programs for the supply, training, sheltering, and evacuation of Coloradans and Denverites throughout the 1950s seemed hopelessly expensive on both the federal and state levels. ° “Governor Hits Small Civilian Defense Fund,” The Denver Post (25 March 1951), p. 6 AA. ® Bill Brenneman, “$750,000 Still Buys No Civil Defense,” Rocky Mountain News (29 May 1953), p.2. > Brenneman, “$750,000 Still Buys No Civil Defense,” p. 2. ® Robert L. Perkin, “City Told 60,000 Doomed in Atomie Attack,” Rocky Mountain News (7 November 1952), p. V7.As vital a problem as funding was for civil defense officials, it was not their only perceived dilemma. Underlying official criticism of legisl: n and finances was a peculiar and seemingly wonton undercurrent of blame on the general public. Common words Larsen used to describe Coloradans’ supposed indifference included “Apathetic,” “lackadaisical,” and “asleep.” Civil defense officials essentially elevated what they perceived as public failure to support their plans to the same level as lack of finances when weighing problems. For example, general Quade, the health and hospital deputy, stressed the need for small communities to “be prepared to accept large number of evacuated casualties” due to the lack of adequate medical equipment? The responsibility fell to Coloradans outside of Denver to shelter and treat victims of an atomic attack since medical equipment was in short supply. As state civil defense director, Larsen most vehemently judged public apathy alongside lack of funds. In 1955 Larsen publicly outlined to the Rocky Mountain News what he saw as four major reasons for the slow development of civil defense in Colorado. Failure of government agencies to handle “their share of the load;” lack of funds from the federal government, state, and local communities; conflicting statements by high government officials about issues of civil defense; and public confusion, influenced by confusion in Washington and changes in weapons technology, were all reasons for civil defense's deterioration# Although Larsen put clear blame on lack of funds and legislative priorities on the federal level, between the lines he also factored a public role in civil defense into its problems. © Perkin, “City Told 60,000 Doomed in Atomic Attack,” p. 17, * Brenneman, “$750,000 Still Buys No Civil Defense,” p. 2. 10Larsen also specifically stressed, “[O]ur greatest problem is getting the message to the individual citizen so he can take over his responsi ility for civil defense.” He went on to say that civil defense rested “with the people” and that it was “a democratic thing by its very nature, and Washington should have no more to do with it than necessary." 25 Larsen linked the problem of public apathy and indifference directly to that of funding and legislation by discussing the two issues alongside one another; both issues carried equal perceptual weight in maintaining civil defense. Furthermore Larsen specifically attributed civilian responsibility to democratic principles, stressing the importance of “the people” in practicing civil defense in contrast to the federal government. For Larsen, citizens’ responsibility in part entailed both a fallback solution to the problem of funding from the federal and state governments, as well as an ideological framework for action. This ideology took shape almost immediately after Colorado's civil defense establishment started. ‘The reason self-help became the solution to practical problems of modern defense and funding lies in the cultural milieu of the 1950s. This context was centered specifically on individuality, self identity, and familial roles. These cultural ideals pervaded much of the Denver civil defense literature of the early 1950s and played a key role in defining official defense ideology of self-help. When the Denver Civil Defense Office planned its programs for air raid sheltering and city-wide evacuation, the ideology of individuality in large measure determined how these programs took shape and operated. Everyday Denverites sometimes adhered to self-help ideology as well, serving as ideal examples of © Brenneman, “$750,000 Still Buys No Civil Defense,” p. 2. iindividuality and self-sufficiency. The Denver Civil Defense Office explicitly rationalized its programs around these self-help concepts. By 1952 officials had released various forms of literature that used self-help rationale, including training manuals for civil defense wardens, ideological tracts, and basic survival booklets, Most all of the iiterature organized civil defense responsibility in concentric circles that started and focused on individual initiative then spread outward to family, local community, city, state, and finally nation. “The basic concept of the national plan for civil defense,” stated one training course manual, “is self-reliance and mutual aid. Under this concept every responsible person in this country has a duty to perform; he must himself and his family in self-protection and self-help. As he extends this concept of self-protection and self-help to his neighbor and his co-worker, the mutual advantages are obvious...he must...contribute to a larger insurance policy for himself, his family, and his community by volunteering for work in his local civil defense organization.’?6 The “mutual advantages” pertained to the good of the whole, a “new concept of citizenship” which equated to “self-discipline in the interest of the common welfare.”2” Another civil defense manual explained individuality as “self-preservation,” “eventually extending to include self protection of family, neighborhood, city, state, and nation.”2* Literature explained civil defense as a system of individual initiative that was capable of protecting whole communities from complete devastation. The stronger individuals were in preparing civil defense, the stronger whole communities of individuals would be in the long-run. > Department of Westem History and Genealogy, Denver Public Library, Basic Course in Civil Defense for Colorado (Denver: publisher unnamed, 1952), p. 1 ® Basie Course in Civil Defense for Colorado, p | > Department of Westem History and Genealogy, Denver Public Library, Basic Principles of Civil Defense (Denver: Denver Civil Defense Office, 1952), p. 2. 12While civil defense literature stressed the need for individual responsibility in civil defense, it elaborated on specific duties on the part of Denverites. Fire prevention and fighting, supply rationing, and even surveillance of suspicious activity became key roles for everyday citizens. Even mundane activities, like maintaining clean homes was described in literature as being of paramount importance. One volunteer manual taught Denverites *[T}he most important of all precautions is cleanliness - - and this is a precaution against. fire that should be taken by every resident of Denver.” “{Ajttics, basements and garages,” the manual continued, “must be cleaned of all debris and accumulations.””? Still other duties demanded citizens to take martial action with civil defense. A manual for the defense of public buildings stressed the need for office employees to serve as “watchers,” Jooking out for “trained [communist] agents who are masters in the art of infiltration and sabotage, and who will take full advantage of every opportunity to accomplish and [sic] enemy's aims in hampering and detering [sic] our defense efforts, weakening our morale, and slackening our vigilance and preparedness."®© Civil defense responsibilities encompassed both the private sphere of the home and the public sphere of work, each area demanding its own form of “vigilance” on the part of everyday Denverites. Many of the duties for Denver citizens focused on perceived gender and familial roles, For example, civil defense literature almost always mentioned women as housewives. The early 1951 Interim Report which structured Denver's civil defense organization recommended training housewives to be “home guards” capable of organizing ® Department of Wester History and Genealogy, Denver Public Library, “Fire Fighting for Householders," Warden Service Training Manual (Denver: Civil Defense Office, circa 1952), p.7. © Department of Wester History and Genealogy, Denver Public Library, Civil Defense in Office and Store Buildings (Denver: Denver Civil Defense Office, 1952), p. 19. 13their families in the event of disaster. Later documents complimented this framework, framing housewives as ideal volunteers for civil defense work in neighborhoods. One handbook expiained that women and “especially housewives” were exemplar, since they were “at their home posts day and night” and supposedly knew their neighborhoods better than men.* In this sense Denver planners perceived the home and neighborhood as spaces where women served as responsible community organizers; women’s roles were usually restricted to the home and immediate neighborhood. Some Denver women mirrored the expectations civil defense planners had for them in regards to the home. A 1956 Rocky Mountain News article contained a sterling example of one Denver housewife acting as a vigilant “home guard’ for her family. The story covers the home civil defense drills of Mr. and Mrs. Lusby and their seven-year-old son, which included drawing extra water, shutting off all electricity and gas in the home, and heading promptly to the family’s personal basement shelter in the event of attack. As an example of civil defense preparedness, Mrs, Lusby receives a lion share of attention in the article. In addition to assisting her husband with organizing food, supplies, and home utilities before taking shelter, Mrs. Lusby also served as the literal “siren” for the family drills. Mrs. Lusby would basically announce either a possible nuclear attack (yellow alert) or a highly probable one (red alert) at random times throughout the week for family drills.2 Mrs. Lusby played a central role in keeping her family alert and prepared at all times. Women’s groups such as the Daughters of the American Revolution (DAR) Denver chapter also took home-centered familial roles seriously. The DAR had its own civil 2 Civil Defense interim Report p.21. ® Basic Principles of Civil Defense, p. 26. ® Reva Cullen, “Basement Shelter Equipped: Denver Family Drills for Atom-Bomb Attack,” Rocky Mountain News (1 January 1956). 14defense committee headed by Anne C. Carison which paid close attention to official defense strategies and ways to implement them in the home. In the mid-1950s, Carlson and the DAR encouraged members to write to congressmen for more civil defense funding, held meetings with special guests (including on one occasion two British women who survived the Blitz in World War I1), and spread word about what housewives could do to protect their families, One letter from Carlson to another DAR member concerning civil defense evacuation maps also stressed the importance of being informed for family preparedness, telling the fellow member to “[S}tudy this map and be sure you and your family know the nearest street to your home or place of business for evacuation.”+ The DAR in Denver encouraged women always to be ready and responsible in terms of education and protection of the family. Most often literature mentioned men either by default or specifically as leaders of. family and volunteer groups. Usually “he” was used as the standard pronoun for a given subject, and most references to workplace civil defense implied predominantly male participation. The civil defense manual on office and store preparedness for 1952 even singled out “men in the habit of assuming responsibility” as being ideal volunteers for organizing employees in the event of an air raid. This implied that male leaders could keep a cool head under extraordinary circumstances. In regards to familial roles, mention of men was more subtle, showing through only in vague and universalized notions of self- help. In this sense, there existed universal ideas of civil defense ideology that could allude to both men and women, while other ideals applied only to women; men were free to take * Department of Western History and Genealogy, Denver Publie Library, “Reports of the Civil Defense Chairman Board Meeting - - Denver Chapter,” located in DAR Deaver Chapter, WH934 Box 4, File Folder 34 — DAR — Denver Civil Defense Chairman: Reports * Civil Defense in Office and Store Buildings, p.25. 15more flexible roles in civil defense, while women were largely restricted to either the home or surrounding neighborhood. Officials did not leave the kind of individuals necessary for successful civil defense to readers’ imaginations. Literature sometimes used nostalgic, patriotic, and stereotypical imagery to rally Denverites toward responsibility in civil defense. One example appeared in Basic Principles of Civil Defense (1952), where officials compared civil defense participants to trailblazing pioneers. Under the section heading "Civil Defense is not New," the booklet compared the Cold War environment of the early 1950s to Colorado settlement: How similar was the situation of our own parents and grandparents here in Colorado! Here, less than one-hundred years ago, was a raw frontier offering a rugged, dangerous struggle for existence and opportunity for a better way of life, both about in the same proportions. Here was required perseverance to make the arduous journey across a hostile prairie land; resourcefulness to mend a broken wagon wheel with leather thongs; adaptability to match canny wisdom with the Indians; frugality to carve a future out of pine forest or a bend in a prairie stream - - and again the ability to use a gun and a plow anda hammer.3® This passage connotes several different aspects of self-help. The foresight to prepare with meager supplies, the fortitude to “persevere” on one’s own, and the ability to protect oneself were all themes expressed in basic self-help doctrine. Furthermore, the vast frontier image served as an apt comparison to a dangerous Cold War atmosphere. Just as the Colorado prairies had to be conquered to achieve “a better way of life” and win a “struggle for existence,” so too did a Cold War arena rampant with communist infiltration, changing attitudes of self-sufficiency, and the looming threat of nuclear annihilation. Cultural currents of individuality on the national level, as expressed and perceived from * Basic Principles of Civil Defense, pp. 2-3. 16works such as The Lonely Crowd, received some attention from local civil defense programs, Denver included. Perhaps the most common image in civil defense literature was the white, middle- class, suburban family. As part of the concentric circle illustration, self-help ideology in brochures and manuals paid careful attention to organizing families as opposed to just the broad category of individual citizens; the family was part of a hierarchy which existed between individuals and larger communities. Literature also used many images of white middle-class Americans in brochures, including suit-clad businessmen, home-cleaning housewives, and their children, with no minorities included.2” When Denver officials envisioned civil defense, they viewed it as an activity that pertained almost exclusively for the growing middle-class that accompanied post-war economic expansion. Any individual that fell outside the ideal image of a white, nuclear family received virtually no official attention. The Denver Civil Defense Office also alluded to real-life examples for citizens to follow in the form of Civil Defense Wardens. With iconic white helmets appearing in multiple cities across the United States, wardens were the ideal civilian volunteers both on a practical and an ideological level. Wardens, who could be either men or women, served as local leaders and activists in neighborhoods regarding civil defense, and could serve on either a small block level or city division level. At the start of the Denver civil defense program, officials wanted to recruit a total of 23,328 block wardens, one for each Department of Western History and Genealogy, Denver Public Library, Civil Defense Clippings File, Just in Case Atom Bombs Fall: Handbook for Civilians (Denver: Bradford-Robinson, 1951); this source serves as one example of llustrated middle-class imagery, W7neighborhood block in the Denver area.** In regards to self-help wardens had a primary responsibility to not only defend their own communities from enemy attack, but also inform their neighbors and friends of the need to volunteer. Civil defense implemented on the neighborhood level became more than just. list of expectations and action for preparedness; it was a virtual gospel which officials intended to be spread to Denverites by Denverites. No document better shows the wardens’ role in civil defense propaganda than the Denver warden training manual, first published around 1952. The manual designated wardens who oversaw neighborhood blocks (called block wardens) to “set an example in preparedness to those under his or her charge” and “strive to persuade them [their neighbors] to take elementary precautions.” These precautions included prevention measures, the purchase of first-aid kits, and first aid training? In the document's overview of block wardens’ duties, their most prevalent assignments included leadership organization in the protection of life and property; recruiting organization; training organization for volunteers; educational organization to the public; and confidence- building, panic-dispelling organization.” Most of these roles clearly entailed informing Denverites of civil defense responsibilities. Just as the image of the Colorado pioneer showed expectations of leadership and individual confidence, so too did that of the civil defense warden. The Denver Civil Defense Office expected wardens to be both active volunteers for preparedness and a shining example to people in their own communities. ™ Departmnent of Westem History and Genealogy, Denver Public Library, “Organization and General Duties,” Warden Service Training Manual (Denver: Denver Civil Defense Office, cirea 1952), p. 5. ® “Organization and General Duties,” Warden Service Training Manual, p.2. “Organization and General Duties,” Warden Service Training Manual, p. 11. 18The block warden also guided Denverites to self-help and responsibility in lieu of direct supervision by civil defense officials, In the event of an attack wardens were to cooperate with rescue authorities, such as police and firemen, and guide them to areas in their communities in need of help. Training manuals told wardens that official help may not be immediately available after an attack, however. Literature told wardens to find other avenues of assistance within the community itself. “Who can help you until then?’ thé manual asked about trapped victims in buildings. “People in your block who have had experience with building. A carpenter, a mason, stee! worker, former fireman, etc...This is where self-help -- the basic premise of civil defense - - must function or people will perish needlessly.”** Civil defense officials expected wardens to not only recruit their neighbors as volunteers, but to bring out the best in any situation by making communities, as a whole, self-sufficient. The block warden essentially guided Denverites to self-help and responsibility in lieu of direct supervision by civil defense officials, As examples of civil defense responsibility, wardens played a role in bringing individuality out of their neighbors. In addition to recruiting wardens to instill confidence and self-sufficiency in Denverites, civil defense officials also endorsed a sort of “can-do” attitude in brochures and leaflets. Officials often circulated literature either by mail or warden handout, and people could pick up pamphlets from civil defense offices in Denver. Many scholars have paid close attention to the calming and psychologically soothing aspects of civil defense propaganda; it often downplayed nuclear threats such as radioactive fallout and enormous explosive force. At the local level Denver officials also downplayed these dangers. Department of Wester History and Genealogy, Denver Public Library, “Blast Effects and Personal Protection,” Warden Service Training Manual (Denver: Denver Civil Defense Office, circa 1952), p. 3 19Propaganda did more than just allay Denverites’ fears; it tried to convince citizens that they were fully capable of defending themselves from nuclear attack. In the tract Basic Principles of Civil Defense, officials told Denver citizens that to prepare effectively for disaster they must rid themselves of the feeling that they could do nothing. The book stated “[Wjhile advances in modern weapons have greatly increased their destructive power, we are still a long way from the era of total destruction. There are defenses against even the latest weapons.”#? A 1952 civil defense brochure titled Just in Case Atom Bombs Fall made similar assurances. “IF AN ATOM BOMB HIT DENVER,” the brochure promised, “MOST CITIZENS WOULD SURVIVE - IF they knew the bomb's true dangers and limitations, ‘THEN KNEW HOW TO CONTEND WITH OR MINIMIZE THOSE DANGERS."#3 Such discussion obviously set out to comfort civilians in the atomic age, but there was a reason why planners thought this comfort was necessary. The advent of self-help ideology was one reason, as many reassurances came with further assurance that Denverites could survive atomic attacks solely by their own initiative and knowledge. The Denver Civil Defense Office had a clear image of what self-help entailed in wardens and other volunteers. Planners also, however, discussed what they saw asa contradictory force to self-sufficiency, calmness, and responsibility: panic. In fact, warden literature reserved entire sections for averting panic, the greatest enemy to self-help. “The control of panic does not start after the air raid alert has sounded,” the 1952 warden manual explained, “or after these people [neighbors] have congregated in congested places [like shelters}. It starts long before that. It starts when you, as a warden, go from home to © Basie Principles of Civil Defense, p. 25, © Just in Case Atom Bombs Fall, pp. 5-6. 20home and tell these people what they can do to help themselves.”** Officials perceived panic among survivors of a nuclear attack as something that could totally hamper emergency efforts, as well break down the catch-all solution of self-help. Officials instructed wardens to prepare Denver citizens for attack in order to help ‘them overcome the antithesis to self-sufficiency. The training manuals identified two types of panic for wardens to address: the raging madness of “hungry mobs" after an attack and “complete inaction” that came from discouragement and doubt-#5 The latter category connoted a lack of vigor and strength which ran counter to formal self-help doctrine. This was why wardens built confidence among their assigned blocks; any lack of individual initiative would deter the whole premise of self-sufficiency and individual responsibility. Manuals also designated the madness category, though related more to post-attack behavior of survivors, as the opposite of self-help. The solution to both modes of panic rested with warden confidence-building measures. “After all,” the training manual reasoned, “panic control is self-control of the individual on a large scale....1f each person can be made to realize this one important fact, and accept the responsibility, if each knows what he does and how he acts can save or take a life, you [wardens] will have accomplished the biggest part of your task.” Officials essentially saw panic as the absence of individuality and self-sufficiency, and so set out to instill those attributes in wardens and other Denverites in the event of atomic attack. Anyone who was not trained in self-help for civil defense was, as one training course manual concluded, “an intellectual parasite Department of Western History and Genealogy, Denver Public Library, “Panic and Evacuation Control,” Warden Service Training Manual (Denver: Denver Civil Defense Office, cirea 1952), pp. 1-2. © The description of dangerous “hungry mobs" eame from the source: Basic Course in Civil Defense for Colorado, pp. 8-9. The categorization of panic into madness and inaction came ftom: “Pani and Evacuation Control,” Warden Service Training Manual, p. |. “Panic and Evacuation Control,” Warden Service Training Manual, p.2. 2convinced that society owes him a living and protection.”*7 If citizens were not self- sufficient, officials perceived them as a threat to the civil defense ideal of individuality, Sometimes everyday Denverites spoke out about the dangers of self-help antithesis. Ina special story of the Denver Post in 1954 by high school students Estie Swearingen and Jim Sundine, they highlighted panic as one of the key problems facing Denverites in the event of attack. The article was a research project the students did on civil defense involvement, arguing that Denver had a serious problem of apathy toward preparedness. “In this age of mass destruction, fear and pessimism can become just as deadly as any bomb,” the students wrote. ‘What would happen if Denver were hit by any kind of a bomb right now? Just how soon could Denver business and government function again? How would Denver citizens react?” The young writers had a grim answer to these questions, one that rang out “like a bell of doom.” The only way to make Denver safe from attack was for every citizen to be “civil defense conscious,” as participation in civil defense gave people the ability to “fight back” with the “power to survive.”*® Just as civil defense officials, stressed the need for individuals to be prepared in keeping themselves safe, so too did these two teenaged Denverites, literally mirroring the apathy rhetoric of civil defense planners. Panicked Denverites were the major threat to civil defense efforts, while active Participation gave citizens the “power” to make a difference and survive ‘The Denver Civil Defense Office implemented self-help ideology on a large-scale through strategies of public sheltering and city-wide evacuation. Looking first at the public sheltering program, the 1951 interim report on Denver civil defense immediately identified “© Basic Course in Civil Defense for Colorado, p. 12. “ Estic Swearingen and Jim Sundine, “Voice of Youth: More Civil Defense: Cooperation Urged,” The Denver Past (16 April 1954), p. 12 2the construction of large public bomb shelters as a relevant issue for planning, “Many people may ask,” the report said, “[W]hat is being done about constructing bomb shelters?” The reply from officials was uncertain. Planners stated that shelter construction would burden taxpayers with “exceedingly large costs” and that either FCDA funds or an alternative city planning strategy of population dispersal was the solution to lack of shelter? The latter solution involved the structuring of cities in such a way that population centers would be scattered far away from each other to minimize casualties ina nuclear strike, an ambitious national strategy that never caught on in planning efforts. The construction of multiple, large public shelters, therefore, never occurred in Denver in the 1950s. ‘The idea of public shelters as a defense against nuclear attack, however, did not altogether disappear. Parking garages, office buildings, and department stores became the ideal public shelters for the 1950s. Civil defense officials reasoned some shelter was better than no shelter at all, and the dual purpose of buildings as shelters would also solve financial problems. Denver civil defense director George Berger recruited several geologists, engineers, and business leaders to scout out possible bomb shelters within building basements, and to study their ability to protect Denver citizens.5° These surveys fell in line perfectly with the ideology of individual responsibility. Local Denver businesses became ideal locations for make-shift shelters, and officials often encouraged office building and store tenants to look out for the safety of their employees and customers. The handbook Civil Defense in Office and Store Buildings (1952) gave tenants a detailed overview of what they could do to keep occupants © Civil Defense Interim Report, pp. 45-47. “John W. Buchanan, “Basement Survey to Learn Possible Bomb Shelters,” The Denver Post (16 March 1951), p. 2. 23safe from disaster, including where to go for shelter in an air raid and how to do it! In 1953 Daniels & Fisher Stores Co. became one of the first downtown businesses in Denver to create a shelter, and even included street signs labeled “Shelter Area Inside” with giant “S” lettering to guide pedestrians to a shelter in the event of attack? Public buildings became perfect locations for saving civilians just about anywhere, whether at work, shopping, centers, or public streets. ‘The hydrogen bomb, however, obliterated any hope for dual shelters. By 1954, only a year after Daniels & Fisher opened its own shelter, one FCDA official wrote “[T]he advent of the H-bomb has necessitated a modification in earlier civil defense planning. The only 100% defense against it is not to be there when it goes off."5* Denver mayor Quigg Newton reflected this sentiment in 1955, declaring “duck and cover” obsolete to strategies of evacuation. Throughout the country, shelters appeared to be helpless in the face of new weapons which dwarfed the power of the bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, The concept of self-sufficiency survived, though. City-wide evacuation became the new official strategy to escape the enormous power of new “super bombs,” and Denver citizens played avital role in officials’ plans. The Denver Civil Defense Office planned several different avenues by which residents could evacuate a city after hearing warning of an air raid. With radar technology, officials assumed that they could give Denverites a few hours warning in advance of an attack, The Denver Civil Defense Office printed hundreds of evacuation maps in newspapers and pamphlets to show the best routes to take out of the city. The most 5! Civil Defense in Office and Store Buildings, p. 25. 3 Bemard Kelly, “D. & F. Ready: Store Completes Bomb Defense,” The Denver Past (1 October 1953), p. 36. © Winkler, Life Under A Cloud, p. 117. “Mayor Gives Priority to Mass Evacuation,” Rocky Mountain News (3 Apri 1955), 24prevalent aspect of the evacuation program, however, was the preparedness officials stressed for adequate evacuation. Planners instructed Denverites to stock food, drinks, gasoline, flashlights, first aid kits, soaps, radios, and other household items. The official Evacuation Map and Instruction from the Denver office even suggested preparing a “grandma's pantry” set up of canned and dry goods to take out of city in case of disaster.55 The grandma's pantry idea was actually a federal civil defense icon; the FCDA said a well- stocked supply of food could make evacuees “just as self-sufficient as grandma was” in family preparedness. Historian Elaine Tyler May also discusses how the pantry imagery served to make the home fee! like a secure location in the event of attack with nostalgic, traditional imagery.S6 The picture of grandma's pantry specifically articulated a role for housewives to stock food for the family and gave citizens a sense of warm, home-centered security to calm them over the issue of nuclear attack. The image of older generations, like the pioneer imagery of civil defense literature, connoted preparedness to meet the challenges of defense, ‘The grandma’s pantry idea also applied to homeowners who were supposed to take in refugees. Following an attack, officials expected rural Coloradans outside of Denver to provide temporary welfare for victims fleeing the city. An evacuation test held at the end of 1954 best illustrates officials’ vision of the individual homeowners’ role for refugee assistance. The test took place in Weld County, where 470 volunteer Denverites drove in 127 cars to escape a fictional atomic explosion. The Rocky Mountain News covered the test, highlighting a typical Denver family, the Swallows, as ideal examples of preparedness. * Department of Western History and Genealogy, Denver Public Library, Civil Defense Clippings File, Evacuation ‘Map and Instructions (Denver: Denver Civil Defense Office, undated). * Elaine Tyler May, Homeward Bound, p. 105, 25What was more interesting, though, was the article’s coverage of Minerva Abrams, an elderly woman assigned by civil defense officials to feed and house the Swallows after their arduous escape. “There was a typical farm dinner,” the article relished, “chicken from the Abrams farm, salad, two kinds of potatoes, gravy, homemade cake, and cream, milk and butter from the Abrams cows.” “Operation Welcome,” as officials called it, showed through ividuals like Minerva Abrams the ideal picture of grandma’s pantry-style hospitality in civil defense.s” Planners expected Coloradans to take in refugees on their own initiative and to offer home-like comfort in the process. Grandma's pantry was more than just a metaphor for domestic hospitality and security in the home; it was a picture of self-help, of everyday Coloradans taking care of each other in the event of atomic attack. Although everyday Denverites never specifically contemplated or defined self-help as officials did through pamphlets, dual shelters, and evacuation strategy, newspaper stories offer various glimpses of how some citizens added to the concept. Of course such contributions are probably not representative of how a majority of Denverites viewed civil defense; most probably did not pay particular attention to civil defense matters, and if they did it was only in passing. The instances of citizen involvement in civil defense strategies do, however, reveal certain characteristics of self-help that are slightly different from how officials envisioned the strategy. Some citizens became directly involved in civil defense as wardens, volunteer firefighters, or auxiliary police, falling in line with official strategy. Others, however, tried to assist in civil defense through creative avenues that fell outside of the more official roles of volunteerism and warden service. These personal initiatives in civil defense broaden the scope of self-help ideology in the 1950s, * Reva Cullen, “Denver Evacuation Test Called Complete Success,” Rocky Mountain News (6 December 1954), 26The few Denverites who tried to contribute to civil defense efforts independently did so in very original ways. These efforts from civil defense “entrepreneurs” were somewhat different from the vision of self-help created by the Denver Civil Defense Office. Certain individuals not only thought they should play a role in civil defense, but that they themselves should contribute to the creation of effective strategies; they saw themselves as fitting into the planning process. One example of civil defense entrepreneurism was C.M. Dobbs, the head of Western Fireworks Company. In 1952 Dobb proposed to civil defense officials that fireworks, or “sky bombs,” be used to warn people of impending attacks instead of air raid sirens, Of course Dobbs had a self-interested reason for pushing his company’s fireworks for civil defense efforts; there was some potential for profit, and recent state legislation had made the use of fireworks in Colorado illegal. Dobbs’ gesture could have been meant to bypass restrictions on his company's product. Officials also had difficulties with expensive and low-volume sirens in 1952, however, which meant that Dobbs’ idea served as a solution to problems in warning the public of attack. Unfortunately for Dobbs, the Denver office never accepted his plans.5* Other citizens also introduced their own plans for civil defense. In 1957,Wheat Ridge contractor Jack Hoerner first suggested that all houses in the United States be built standard, by law, with bomb shelters under their garages. As Hoerner put it, “They [the shelters] weren't options; if you bought the house, you got the shelter.” Hoerner built over forty homes and a forty-unit apartment house in the late 1950s which included these shelters, though only six homes were sold specifically because of them. Hoerner still advocated his ideas up through the 1960s, however, even after civil defense officials % Gene Lindberg, “Ci p.2. Defense Official Backs Sky Bombs as Raid Warnings,” The Denver Post (24 April 1952), 27rejected many of his letters and meetings concerning the idea. Quoted by The Denver Post ina 1966 civil defense report, Hoerner stated “I suppose I'm a nut, but I challenge anyone to prove me wrong"? Hoerner saw civil defense as more than just an obligation to society as stipulated by state officials. ‘To Hoerner it was something everyday citizens could plan in alongside officials. One last example of civil defense entrepreneurism was the work of Denver architect Stephen Arthur Axtens. Axtens believed that the design of buildings should contribute to keeping occupants safe from the force of a nuclear explosion, giving them a chance to survive an enemy attack. This notion was summarized in his architectural portfolio and history book, Thirty Years of Architecture and Engineering (1957). "Due to the development of aeroplanes [sic], atomic and hydrogen bombs, guided missiles and other powerful destructive forces,” the foreword explains, “building design except where the calculated risk is warranted in isolated locations must now be provided to resist these forces.”6? Axtens believed that the atomic age warranted a change in how architects designed buildings, for defensive purposes. ‘The Farmers Union Building constructed in Denver was a shining example of this concern. Built in 1955, Axtens designed the building thinking of explosive force and heat caused by atomic bombs, with a rigid frame surrounding the building to keep the number of fragile glass windows to a minimum, Axtens described the building as being “bomb-resistant” and able to “withstand, without important structural damage, blasts which would collapse conventional buildings." The Farmer’s Union Building served for Axtens as a structure that would not merely act as a shelter, but » Mark Bearwald, “Civil Defense: why it isn't working.” Post Empire Magazine 1 September 1966), p. 25. © Department of Western History and Genealogy, Denver Public Library, Stephen Arthur Axtens, Thirty Years of Architecture and Engineering: 1927-1957 (Denver: S.A. Axtens, 1957), foreword L* page ® Stephen Arthur Axtens, Thirty Years of Architecture and Engineering, p 4. 28actually was a shelter itself. The bomb-resistant building was an idea that Axtens developed on his own, and the Farmer’s Union Building was a project that fell outside of official civil defense efforts. All three examples of civil defense entrepreneurism show a peculiar aspect of self- help. Individuals like Dobbs saw a basic need for his sky bombs in warning the public of attack, which put him in the role of helping civil defense officials with their own technical problems. Hoerner took a role of helping Wheat Ridge residents protect themselves, building and selling homes with shelters. Axtens conceived civil defense roles for architects, seeing bomb-resistant buildings as the design for a new age of nuclear threat. Is advocated for civilians to do for These examples went beyond what civil defense offi preparedness and individual initiative. The Denver Civil Defense Office and state office viewed self-help as a concept that would motivate everyday citizens to protect themselves through what amounted to everyday activities. Anything that citizens could not do on their own, like detect an incoming nuclear attack, was left to officials in a sphere outside the control of everyday people. Civil defense entrepreneurs, however, took the concept of self- help and changed it to include citizen leadership as well as involvement. Individualism as democratic responsibility, as sometimes defined by officials, thus underwent a unique change when actually put in the hands of certain individuals. Some Denverites conformed to self-help imagery; Dobbs, Hoerner, and Axtens molded it. “Operation Alert,” a large-scale, nationwide drill conducted in 1955, served as a symbolic death-knell for official civil defense strategies. Although civil defense measures survived in earnest well into the 1960s, officials viewed Operation Alert as evidence of a 29failure in public initiative, quite contrary to the 1952 Longmont test. This test received considerable attention from the press, and civil defense officials voiced heated opinions about what the public’s role as individual citizens entailed. In a nationwide evacuation, planners expected large numbers of Denverites to participate. The estimate was that two thousand residents from the southwest portion of Denver would be involved in the exercise; extensive door-knocking campaigns reetuied this same number to participate.®? Officials meant for the June 15 Operation Alert to be an informative yet casual drill, asking residents to pack baskets of food for expected traffic jams and long trips.®8 One Denver official noted how participants were “making a picnic outfit" ‘The day after the test, impressions in newspapers went from picnic to livid frustration. 3,500 Denverites in 983 cars participated in the exercise, more than the official estimate; however most of these volunteers were employees of the Federal Civil Defense center in Lakewood. The “volunteers” employer required them to bring their families and participate. Whether officials were expecting two-thousand participants aside from the employees is uncertain, but planners were aghast nonetheless; several Denver officials perceived these numbers as flagrant display of “public apathy.” One traffic engineer for the exercise, Jack Bruce, called the whole test a “big flop.” “Everything was fine as far as it went,” he clarified, “but not enough people participated to give officials a good enough idea of the traffic the westbound highway could carry in case of emergency.” Bruce went on to call the test “just like Sunday morning traffic up the Mount Vernon Canon road,” and +2000 to flee Denver in Defense Exercise,” Rocky Mountain News (15 June 1955); for door knocking, see: Robert Byers, “'Raid’ Here Shows Flaws in Defense,” The Denver Post (16 June 1955), p. | ©3000 to flee Denver in Defense Exercise.” & Robert Byers, “Hundreds Flee Denver in ‘Bomb’ Test,” The Denver Post (15 June 1955). © Byers, ““Raid’ Here Shows Flaws in Defense” 30expected 500 cars per lane, per hour to participate in the test. Paul Forsyth, George Berger's replacement as Denver civil defense director in 1955 was also furious, furning “[R]ight now, we are not sure our plans will work in a real mass evacuation, and I don’t know how the public expects us to find out."*? ‘The main reason officials perceived Operation Alert in 1955 as such a failure rested in the perception that everyday Denverites had shirked their responsibilities in civil defense. Planners saw a need for detailed logistics in evacuation drills, and Denver citizens were supposed to engage in these tests not only to prepare themselves, but give feedback for a better civil defense system. Officials perceived Denver civil defense as a failure on display for the whole country to see, Colorado citizens, the backbone of self-help, had broken under pressure. A number of different factors shaped civil defense in its early years in 1950s Denver. ‘An intimidating Cold War context, changing weapons technology, and federal funding for civil defense all practically influenced how the Denver Civil Defense Office formed and operated, Local factors such as state funding also contributed to how civil defense developed. The ideology of self-help was a common undercurrent to all these factors, as evidenced by early formulations of citizens’ civil defense roles and perceptions of public apathy. This ideology took on many different forms which alluded to familial roles, heroic imagery, the exemplary block warden, and even negative images of panic and discouragement. Individual Coloradans either conformed to or attempted to take control of this ideology, showing characteristics of self-help which both exemplified and broadened the definition of self-help. Whatever the definition of the concept, official or otherwise, © «operation Alert is Big Flop As Test of Traffic Problems,” Rocky Mountain News (16 June 1955), © Byers, “'Raid Here Shows Flaws in Defense.” 31self-help reflected both the practical considerations and broader cultural context of Denver civil defense in the 1950s. Without the concept of self-help, civil defense in Denver would probably not have lasted as long as it did in the face of inadequate funding, On the other hand, a perceived lack of participation in civil defense on the part of Denver residents seemed to show that self-help was not working. The fact that civil defense relied so much on cultural and ideological concepts to begin with made any extensive civil defense efforts difficult to organize and measure in any direct, concrete way. Luckily, as the title of one preparedness brochure put it, it was all just in case” anyway. Denverites’ preparedness, or lack of it, was never truly tested. * Just in Case the Atom Bombs Fall. 32