Mine Reclamation Legislation in Colorado during the 1970s: a Culmination of National Energy Shortages, National Environmental Legislation, and Colorado's Conservational Legislators The coal industry in Colorado is like a team of old fire horses stamping and snorting at the closed gate, anxious to get into action. Energy problems in recent months have caused most people to reassess their individual, or their group's Position and obligations in reference to the State, nation, and the world.* This statement was made by Raymond C. in the article “Colorado: Energy Shortages Prompt New Look at the Potential Coal Markets” which appeared in the May 1974 edition of Coal Age. Roebuck was a geologist in Denver, Colorado. Roebuck’s statement shows that the estimated increase of the coal industry in Colorado during the 1970s was not just an assumption made from events occurring locally, but a calculation derived from the fallout of events on a global scale. The need for Colorado to pass mine reclamation laws in the 1970s came from a complex mix of national energy shortages, national environmental legislation, and Colorado's conservational legislators.” According to the Colorado Geologic Survey of 1973, the state of Colorado contained about ten percent of the coal located in the United States.* The large amount of coal estimated to be found in Colorado in the 1970s was made even more desirable by the close proximity to the surface of much of this coal." A technique used to mine substances closer to the surface is termed surface mining, which is also synonymous with the term strip mining. Legally defined “{s]urface mining is a type of mining in which soil and rock overlying the mineral deposit (the * Coal Age (May 1974}, pp. 79. * Coal Age (May 1974), pp. 79. * coat Age (May 1974), pp. 79. Governor Richard D. Lamm and Michael McCarthy, The Angry West: Vulnerable Land and its Future (Boston: Houghton Miffin Company, 1982), pp. 57. 1overburden) are removed.”* The problem with surface mining is that it leaves large open pits, which not only effect the astetic beauty of the natural environment by preventing revegetation, but can also cause ground water contamination.° The process devised to combat the negative effects of surface mining is termed mine reclamation. Mine reclamation is the process of “recontouring and grading” of the land along with “topsoil removal and replacement; and revegetation.” In their article, “ The Struggle to Implement a National Surface Mining Policy,” authors Donald C. Menzel and Terry D. Edgmon focus solely on the Surface Mining Control and. Reclamation Act of 1977 (SMCRA).* In contrast to this article, “From Coercion to Partnership in Federal Partial Preemption: SMCRA, RCRA and OSH Act” by Michael J. Scicchitano and David M. Hedge tackles a broader scope of legislation including SMCRA.’ There is a significant time gap between when the two articles were published. Menzel and Edgmon published their articles in the winter of 1980, whereas Scicchitano and Hedge published in the fall of 1993.” Despite these differences both articles discuss important points. The structure of the SMCRA and the * “Surface Mining Law & Legal Definition,” , 2001-2010; USLegal, Inc., accessed April 20, 2010. “ Richard A. Woodley and Samuel L. Moore, “Pollution Control in Mining and Processing of Indiana Coal,” Journal (Water Pollution Control Federation) 39 (Jan., 1967), pp. 41; Philip R. Ogle and Edward F. Redente, “Plant ‘Succession on Surfaced Mined Lands in the West,” Rangelands 10 (Feb., 1988), pp. 37. Walter. Misiolek and Thomas C. Noser, “Coal Surface Mine Land Reclamiation Costs,” Land Economics 58 (Feb., 1982), pp. 69. “Donald C. Menzel and Terry D. Edgmon, “The Struggle to Implement a National Surface Mining Policy,” Publius 10 (Winter, 1980), pp. 82-91. * Michael. Sciechitano and David M. Hedge, “From Coercion to Partnership in Federal Partial Preemption: SMCRA, RCRA and OSH Act,” Publius 23(Autumn, 1993), pp. 107-121. “Donald C. Menzel and Terry D. Edgmon, “The Strugale to implement a National Surface Mining Policy,” Publius 10 (Winter, 1980), pp. 81; Michael. Scicchitano and David M. Hedge, “From Coercion to Partnership in Federal Partial Preemption: SMCRA, RCRA and OSH Act,” Publius 23(Autumn, 1993), pp. 107. 2tensions that arose between the federal government and the states over legislation regarding mine reclamation during the 1970s.’* Scicchitano and Hedge talk about the SMCRA as being categorized as a partial preemption program and within that category a minimum standard partial preemption. What Is meant by this is that the SMCRA requires the states to meet a minimum standard of mine reclamation, which is set forth by the federal government.” If the states meet this requirement then potentially they can be in charge of overseeing the program and possibly better modify it to fit their particular situation.” The idea that is the basis for this is to give the states “an important administrative role, limit federal involvement, and enforce the program in a manner sensitive to their needs and conditions,” while at the same time “achieve national regulatory goals.”"* Menzel and Edgmon’s discussion of the SMCRA is in much the same tone as Scicchitano and Hedge, but with more focus and detail on the SMCRA directly. Menzel and Edgmon do not talk about the SMCRA in terms of fitting into the category of partial preemption programs. Instead, they simply discuss it as being a federal regulatory program, which makes sense given * Donald C. Menzel and Terry D. Edgmon, “The Struggle to implement a National Surface Mining Policy,” Publlus 10 (Winter, 1980), pp. 81-91; Michael J. Scicchitano and David M. Hedge, “From Coercion to Partnership in Federal Partial Preemption: SMCCRA, RCRA and OSH Act,” Publius 23{Autumn, 1993), pp. 107-121. “Michael J. Scicchitano and David M. Hedge, “From Coercion to Partnership in Federal Partial Preemption: SCRA, RCRA and OSH Act,” Publius 23(Auturnn, 1993),, pp. 107. "© Michael. Scicchitano and David M. Hedge, "From Coercion to Partnership in Federal Partial Preemption: 'SMCRA, RCRA and OSH Act,” Publius 23(Autumn, 1993), pp. 107-8, * Michael. Scicchitano and David M. Hedge, “From Coercion to Partnership in Federal Partial Preemption: SSMCRA, RCRA and OSH Act,” Publius 23(Autumn, 1993), pp. 108. 3the scope of their article.” The SMCRA “as a regulatory measure” places the main job of controlling mine reclamation under state jurisdiction."* Then counter to this the SMCRA also calls for the formation of the Office of Surface Mining (OSM). The job of the OSM is to evaluate and give approval to the programs that the states are charged with formulating.” The ultimate g0al for the OSM being that these individual state programs “collectively, constitute a national regulatory program” for mine reclamation.” Both sets of authors, Menzel and Edgmon and Scicchitano and Hedge, do generally agree on the legislative framework comprising the SMCRA, and the minor differences in their interpretations can be explained by the differences in the angle and scope of the two articles.” The substantial difference between the articles comes on the degree to which the federal government was trying to control state policy with the SMCRA.”” Menzel and Edgmon conclude that there was a struggle that occurred between the states and federal government over the implementation of the SMCRA, but their article fails to * ponald C. Menzel and Terry D. Edgmon, “The Struggle to Implement a National Surface Mining Policy,” Publius 10 (Winter, 1980), pp. 82-3; Michael |. Scichitano and David M. Hedge, “From Coercion to Partnership in Federal Partial Preemption: SMCRA, RCRA and OSH Act,” Publius 23(Auturmn, 1993), pp. 207-8. “Donald C. Menzel and Terry D. Edgmon, "The Struggle to Implement a National Surface Mining Policy,” Publius 19 (Winter, 1980), pp. 82. ¥ ponald C. Menzel and Terry D. Edgmon, “The Struggle to Implement a National Surface Mining Policy,” Publlus 10 (Winter, 1980}, pp. 82. Donald C. Menzel and Terry D. Edgmon, “The Struggle to implement a National Surface Mining Policy,” Pubs 20 (Winter, 1980),. 83. * Donald C. Menzel and Terry D. Edgmon, “The Struggle to Implement @ National Surface Mining Policy,” Publius 410 (Winter, 1980), pp. 82-3; Michael J. Scicchitano and David M. Hedge, “From Coercion to Partnership in Federal Partial Preemption: SMCRA, RCRA and OSH Act,” Pubus 23(Autumn, 1993), pp. 107-8. ® Donald C. Menzel and Terry D. Edgmon, “The Struggle to Implement @ National Surface Mining Policy,” Publius 410 (Winter, 2980), pp. 82-3; Michael J. Scicchitano and David M. Hedge, “From Coercion to Partnership in Federal Partial Preemption: SMCRA, RCRA and OSH Act,” Publius 23(Autummn, 1993), pp. 107-8 81-82, 91. 4discuss who gained the upper hand in this struggle.”! This gap can be contributed to the date that the article was published which was in the winter of 1980; a little more than three years after the SMCA was signed into law which was in August of 1977.7 Scicchitano and Hedge demonstrate that the federal government in the case of SMCRA did not allow for enough elasticity in the legislation for states to have much “flexibility in implementation” of the regulations. in other words for Scicchitano and Hedge the states were the clear losers in the implementation of the SMCRA.”* This deeper analysis can be contributed to the later date of publication of this article in 1993 a decade and a half after the SMCA was signed into law.* ‘The passage of the SMCRA in 1977 placed pressure on the states to implement their ‘own mining reclamation programs or risk intervention by the federal government, but it was not the only factor that was pushing the states to do so. What the scope of both articles fail to show is that there was also complex mix of energy shortages, further national environmental legislation, and concerned conservationists that put pressure on the states, specifically Colorado, to pass stricter surface mine reclamation legislation.”* * Donald C. Menzel and Terry D. Edgmon, “The Struggle to implement a National Surface Mini 10 (Winter, 1980), pp. 91. Donald C. Menzel and Terry D. Edgmon, “The Struggle to Implement a National Surface Mining Policy,” Publius 20 (Winter, 1980), pp. 81-2 nichael. Scicchitano and David M. Hedge, “From Coercion to Partnership in Federal Partial Preemption: SMCRA, RCRA and OSH Act,” Publius 23{Autumn, 1993), pp. 108. ** Donald C. Menzel and Terry D. Edgmon, “The Struggle to implement a National Surface Mining Policy,” Publius 20 (Winter, 1980), pp. 81-2; Michael .Sccchitano and David M. Hedge, “From Coercion to Partnership in Federal Partial Preemption: SMCRA, RCRA and OSH Ac,” Publius 23(Autumn, 1993), pp. 107. ® Donald C. Menzel and Terry. Edgmon, “The Struggle to Implement a National Surface Mining Policy,” Publius 10 (Winter, 1980), pp. 82-3; Michael. Scicchitano and David M. Hedge, “From Coercion to Partnership in Federal Partial Preemption: SMCRA, RCRA and OSH Act,” Publius 23(Autumn, 1993), pp. 107-8. 5 icy,” PubliusAfter several years of rising tensions over oil prices, the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) formed in 1960; OPEC was initiated by Venezuela, and at the outset included Venezuela as well as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iran, and iraq. The primary objective of PEC was to gain better prices for oil from the major oil companies through collective actions in regard to petroleum policy. This was in response to the major oil companies practices of lowering the price of oil during a time of increased demand. OPEC members wanted to have more direct control over the marketing of the oll which they produced and members eventually gained control through joint action affecting pricing and production.”° During its first ten years of operation, OPEC had littie success in influencing the price of oll. In 1967 OPEC's first attempt to use oil “as a political weapon” against nations that supported Israel was unsuccessful.”” This attempt failed because the collective trade embargo of oil did not hold up in many of OPEC's non-Arab members, which did not share the same Political concerns as the Arabs countries. in response, the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) was formed in 1968 with the express purpose of using oil in a Political manner against any country that was supportive of Israel. This strengthened the alliance of the Arab oil countries and established a platform for future oil embargos.”* Conditions changed in OPEC's favor during the early 1970s. In 1970 oil prices remained low at approximately $1.35 per barrel. Several factors changed this during the next two years. * Euclid A. Rose, “OPEC's Dominance of the Global Oil Market: The Rise of the World's Dependency on Gil,” Middle East Journal 58 (Summer, 2004), pp. 431. *” Euclid A. Rose, “OPEC's Dominance of the Global Oil Market: The Rise of the World's Dependency on Oil” Middle ast Journal 58 (Summer, 2004), pp. 432. * Euclid A. Rose, “OPEC's Dominance ofthe Global Oil Market: The Rise of the World's Dependency on East Journal 58 (Summer, 2004), pp. 432. |" Middle 6The global economy grew faster than it had in over a decade while at the same time the United States’ oil production decreased.” These two trends, combined with an increase in nationalism in the idle East, brought about the 1973 oil crisis.” Members of OPEC caused the 1973 oil crisis in reaction to the Arab-Israeli War of 1973 {also known as the Yom Kippur War). The result of the crisis was that the price of a barrel of oil increased by four times.” In 1973 OPEC cut its oil production and decreased the global oil supply by five percent.” On top of this, OPEC placed an oil embargo on the countries that it viewed as pro-Israel, which included the United States.” Due to OPEC's actions the price of oil in the United States increased from $1.35 per barrel in 1970 to $5.11 per barrel in October of 1973. When no decisive action was taken to stop OPEC, the organization agai increased prices to $11.65 per barrel in January of 1974.*° This increas oil prices created a recession in members of OPEC the global economy during the mid 1970s.” * Euclid A. Rose, “OPEC's Dominance of the Global Oil Market: The Rise of the World's Dependency on Oil,” Middle East Journal 58 (Summer, 2004), pp. 432. * Euclid A. Rose, “OPEC's Dominance of the Global Oil Market: The Rise of the World's Dependency on Oil,” Middle ast Journal 58 (Summer, 2004), pp. 432-33. * Euclid A. Rose, “OPEC's Dominance of the Global Oil Market: The Rise of the World's Dependency on Oil,” Middle East Journal 58 (Summer, 2004), pp. 424, * Euclid A. Rose, “OPEC's Dominance of the Global Oil Market: The Rise of the World's Dependency on Oil,” Middle Eost Journal 58 (Summer, 2004), pp. 424. * Euclid A. Rose, “OPEC's Dominance of the Global Oil Market: The Rise of the World's Dependency on Oil,” Middle East Journal 58 (Summer, 2004), pp. 434. * Euclid A. Rose, “OPEC's Dominance of the Global Oil Market: The Rise of the World's Dependency on Oil,” Middle East Journal 58 (Summer, 2004), pp. 434, * Euclid A. Rose, “OPEC's Dominance of the Global Oil Market: The Rise of the World's Dependency on Oi,” Middle East Journal 58 (Summer, 2004), pp. 434. Euclid A. Rose, “OPEC's Dominance of the Global Oil Market: The Rise of the World's Dependency on Oil” Middle East Journal 58 (Summer, 2004), pp. 434. * Eucid A. Rose, “OPEC's Dominance of the Global Cit Market: The Rise of the World's Dependency on Oil,” Middle East Journal 58 (Summer, 2004), pp. 334. 7Even before the 1973 oil crisis and as early as 1972 the United States federal government was calling for more energy autonomy.** That year the United States House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Subcommittee issued a report calling for the United States to decrease its dependence on Middle Eastern oil by substituting coal and oil shale.** President Nixon also made statements to Congress late in 1972 concerning a decrease in the importation of oil and liquefied natural gas.° The coal industry quickly got the message from Congress. Carl E. Bagge, the president of the National Coal Association (NCA), made the following statement in a guest editorial of the periodical Coal Age in February of 1973; Our growing dependence on imported oll and gas has been the subject of hearings before the Senate Interior Committee where coal was explicitly pointed to by the Secretary of the Interior, the Director of the Office of Emergency Preparedness, the Secretary of the State, and other government energy planners as the principal alternative to fuel imports. ‘The situation was made even clearer with a report from the Office of Emergency Preparedness showing that if the electric utility switched exclusively to coal for energy production, there ‘would need to be an increase in coal production by 725 million tons in 1980 and by 921 million tons in 1985.7 ** Coal Age (November 1972), pp. 34 * Coal Age (November 1972), pp. 34. * Coal Age (January 1973), pp. 11. * Coal Age (February 1973), pp. 89. * Coal Age (February 1973}, pp.By April 1973 the increase in oil prices was being examined in the United States."? A study by the National Petroleum Council’s Committee on US Energy Outlook determined the possibility of the cost of foreign oil bankrupting Americans by 1985." The study also determined that dependence on foreign oil and gas was affecting the political stability of the United States.“° In reaction to the energy crisis, the Nixon administration put in place temporary emergency regulations that would prevent electric companies from changing any power being generated by coal over to oil.** These regulations trumped any state laws that required burning lower-sulfur fuels such as oll and relaxed the federal air quality standards for one year.’” One reason for these emergency measures was a growing trend of electricity utilities changing from coal to l, because oil had become more cost effective due to laws regulating sulfur emissions."* This increased cost attributed to coal at the time came mostly from the cost of modifying energy producing plants to cut down on sulfur emissions.’? ‘Within the coal industry, the expectations were for the demand of coal to rise.” The fastest way to meet the expected demand was to use a ‘technique of surface mining referred to as strip mining.** Logically, a desperate need for more surface-mined coal was expected. * Coal Age (Mid-April 1973), pp. 57. * Coal Age (Mid-April 1973), pp. 57. Coal Age (Mid-April 1973), pp. 57. “ Coal Age (October 1973}, pp. 13. * Coal Age (October 3973), pp. 13 “ Coal Age (October 1973), pp. 13. * Coal Age (October 1973), pp. 13. © Coal age (November 1973), pp. 51. * Coal Age (November 1973), pp. 51. * Coal Age (November 1973), pp. 51.While the coal industry could not have been happier about the trend, the electric utilities largely viewed the call to switch to coal negatively.” The Chairperson of American Electric Power, Donald C. Cook blamed the energy crisis gripping the country on the policies being enacted by the federal government.** The evidence that Cook pointed to was the federal government's lack of support for coal companies’ development of western coal and the strict rules on sulfur emissions from the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).*° In an effort to avoid a further energy crisis steps were taken at the federal level. In the latter part of 1973, Nixon banned Sunday gasoline sales and spoke of further banning gasoline sales from 9 p.m. Saturday to 12:01 a.m. Monday. Nixon also mentioned the possibility of having the United States refineries cut production by fifteen percent.*° The Energy Supply and Environmental Coordination Act of 1974, which called for “suspension of some emission limitations until January 1979,” was signed into law by President Nixon.”’ The act also provided for a conversion of some power plants from oil and gas to coal, although the Federal Energy Administration predicted that the act would convert only ten power plants, at most, to coal.°* One coal industry spokesman was quoted as saying, “It’s not as good a bill as we would have gotten in November when the Arabs were putting the squeeze on us, but it is a good » Coal Age (December 1973), pp. 11. ** Coat Age (December 1973), pp. 11. * Coat Age (December 1973), pp. 11. * Coal Age (December 1973), pp. 11. *" Coat Age (July 1974), pp. 9. * Coal Age (July 1974), pp. 9. 10beginning”.” The atmosphere within the coal industry was that given the caliber of the energy crisis the government should do more to promote the use of coal as a substitute for oil. Concerns over environmental protections limiting coal production were being voiced from within the coal industry. At a National Coal association meeting in Washington, Senator Henry M. Jackson (Democrat, Washington) called for a maximum limit to be placed on the usage of foreign oil in order to promote the development of domestic resources. But in order to obtain these lofty goals, the environmental restrictions needed to be relaxed. Federal Power Commission Chairman, John N. Nassikas stated, “[I]f environmental constraints preclude the lization of our coal resources, the national goal of attaining a capacity for self-sufficiency in the 1980's becomes illusory, even with extraordinary dedication to conservation practices to reduce demand for all forms of energy consistent with the maintenance of a wealthy economy.”** Nassikas concluded that of the available options, (coal, oil, hydro-electic, natural gas, nuclear power), which could produce electricity domestically, coal was the best possible * Nassikas recommended ‘option to meet the goal of energy independence in the United State: a relaxation of the emission standards for a period of time to allow for the United States to become energy independent. ‘The change in the political attitude towards coal in the face of the energy crisis, continued. Clark E. Grover, the Director of the Office of Coal and Utilities for the Federal Energy Administration (FEA), gave a keynote address during the Rocky Mountain Coal Mining * Coal age (uly 1974), pp. 9. © Coal Age (September 1974), pp. 110. © Coal Age (September 1974), pp. 110. ® Coal Age (September 1974), pp. 110. © Coal Age (September 1974), pp. 110. aInstitute’s annual meeting in July 1974 in Colorado Springs. In that address Grover stated that increased coal production was a pivotal first step for energy independence.” In Grover’s opinion energy utilities were open to converting from oil to coal and the coal industry was willing to expand production, but changes were needed to both the Clean Air Act and to surface mining legislation to allow this to happen.” With the push for coal to be the solution to the energy crisis coming from within the coal industry and Washington, it was not a coincident when later in 1974 newly inducted President Gerald Ford proposed legislation which would push all electric utilities to convert strictly to coal or nuclear energy to produce power by 1980. Legistation setting air quality standards was debated in the discussions over coal as previously shown, but it also played another role that made western coal more desirable for many electric utility companies. With no real solution to the battle over relaxing air quality standards, low sulfur content coal became a possible solution to the tension over environmental protection versus coal's use as a domestic energy source. The progression of air quality laws at the federal level played out previous to the energy concerns that faced the nation in the 1970s. The first federal legislation regulating air pollution passed in 1955.” It solidified the responsibility of air pollution contro} to the states and * coal age (September 1974), pp. 12. * Coal Age (September 1974), pp. 12. * Coal age (September 1974), pp. 9. ” Richard N. L. Andrews, Managing the Environment, Managing Ourselves: A History of American Environmental Policy (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 2006), pp. 208. 12designated a five-million dollar budget for federal research and assistance." The Clean Air Act, of 1963 provided federal grants to pay for two thirds of the state-run air pollution reduction programs. The Air Quality Act of 1967 further expanded the federal government's role and allowed for federal standards for clean air to be put in place where states failed to enact tough enough air quality standards.”° The Clean Air Act of 1970 assigned the federal government the leading role in setting clean air standards and issuing emission permits for industries.” According to Richard N. L. Andrews, author of Managing the Environment, Managing Ourselves: A History of American Environmental Policy, the major force that is pushed for national air quality standards came, surprisingly, from key industries and not from environmental groups.’ One of these key industries was the eastern coal industry, which was attempting to require the modification of Power plants rather than the passing of local regulations that favored low-sulfur western coal over the higher-sulfur-content eastern coal.’ The Clean Air Act of 1970 also established “ Richard N. L Andrews, Managing the Environment, Managing Ourselves: A History of American Environmental Policy (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 2006), pp. 208. " Richard N. L Andrews, Managing the Environment, Managing Ourselves: A History of American Environmental Policy (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 2006}, pp. 208. Richard NL. Andrews, Managing the Environment, Managing Ourselves: A History of American Environmental Policy (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 2006), pp. 208-209. Richard N. L. Andrews, Managing the Environment, Managing Ourselves: A History of American Environmental Policy (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 2006}, pp. 209. " Richard N. L. Andrews, Managing the Environment, Managing Ourselves: A History of American Environmental Policy {New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 2006), pp. 209. Richard N. L Andrews, Managing the Environment, Managing Ourselves: A History of American Environmental Policy (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 2006), pp. 209. 1Bnational minimum standards for air quality based entirely on risks to human health and with no thought to the costs it would impose.”* The struggle between eastern and western coal had its roots in government action and legisiation. in 1969, $330,000 in federal grants were issued to estimate the amount of low- sulfur coal in known deposits and to search for new deposits.”° Tough sulfur emission standards imposed in 1970 meant that almost none of the coal depasits on the eastern side of the Mississippi River met the sulfur requirements.”° With coal making up the majority of the United States’ domestic energy resources, and the largest sources of low-sutfur coal are within the western states; it was only a matter of time before the coal industry would be moving west.” There were problems implementing the air quality standards being legislated. President Nixon and Joe! Segall, a Deputy Assistant Secretary at the Department of the Treasury, suggested the implementation of a tax on sulfur emissions. But at the time there was no way to measure the precise amount of sulfur being emitted by any power plant.” Sulfur emissions could only be estimated based on the amount of sulfur that was caught by the sulfur cleaners in the smoke stacks.”® ‘Another problem facing the standards set for air quality was if there was enough low- sulfur coal available. Michael Rieber, a research analyst at Illinois University, warned that the Richard N. L Andrews, Managing the Environment, Managing Ourselves: History of American Environmental Policy (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 2006), pp. 233-234. * coal Age (October 1965), pp. 54. ® coal Age (April 1970), pp. 8. ” Coal Age (April 1970), pp. 85; Coal Age (iuly 1870), pp. 57 ™ Coal Age (August 1972), pp. 7. ” coal Age (August 1971), pp. 7. 14amount of low-sulfur coal in the United States had been overestimated.” The accepted estimate previous to Rieber’s work was around 68.2 billion tons of low-sulfur coal.*' Rieber put his estimate at 16.4 billion tons of low-sulfur coal. Rieber attributed this overestimation of low-sulfur coal to a lack of adjustment for the energy potential of low-sulfur coal. Low-sulfur coal burns at a lower temperature and therefore requires a larger amount of coal to be burned to produce the same amount of energy in relation to coal with higher sulfur content." Despite the problems the western coal industry was optimistic. “The Coal Industry Moves West” was the theme of the annual meeting of the Rocky Mountain Coal institute in 1970." The keynote address of the meeting was given by C.G. Herrington, the vice president of Humble Oil and Refining Company based in Houston, Texas. in this address Herrington stated that the benefits of western coal were that it could be surface mined and that the low-sulfur content in the coal was in demand with a growing electric utility market. ®° The problems that Herrington saw facing western coal were transportation and “lower heating values”.*” By 1972, the majority of government regulatory agencies, given the air quality standards that had been set, had the objective of using one-percent sulfur coals to produce electricity. There existed at the time was no known one percent sulfur coal outside of western states.** In the edition of coal age that dealt solely with western state coal, the assessment for Colorado Coal Age (Iuly 1974), pp. 250. "Coal Age (July 1974), pp. 250. ® Coal Age uly 1974), pp. 250. © Coal Age (July 1974), pp. 250, ™ coal Age (August 1970), pp. 83. * Coal Age (August 1970), pp. 83 * Coal Age (August 1970), pp. 83. © Coal Age (August 1970), pp. 83 * Goal Age (March 1972), pp. 83. 15was: “Colorado contains the highest quality coals found in the western states. They are convenient to water to support both gasification-coal synthetic fuel-and oil shale plants. And some coal deposits can be surface mined. Substantial increases in coal field steam generating plants are predicted for Western Colorado before the turn of the century.” Low-sulfur coal was anticipated by the coal industry to expand its future market in 1973 due to the increasing demands of government regulatory agencies.” Colorado coal production jumped from 5.3 million tons in 1971 to 6.2 million tons by 1973.”" At an investment seminar at the New York Hilton Hotel on December 11, 1974, Robert E, Murray, the president of the North American Coal Corporation's Western Division, described how low-sulfur coal and the “capital intensive nature” attributed to western coal surface mining was “contributing to the coming of age of the western coal energy.” The other national legislation that played a part in pushing mine reclamation legislation for Colorado was the threat of a national mine reclamation standard being imposed. As early as 1969, the United States Congress was trying to pass a bill that would require states to create programs that regulated surface mining.” Furthermore, the regulations had to include mine reclamation in their content. Also, if the state failed to establish the regulation in a given period of 1e then the federal government could step in and enforce standards for surface * Coal Age (Mid-April 1973}, pp. 80. * Coal Age (Mid-April 1973), pp. 80. * Coal Age (May 1974), pp. 80. * coal Age Uanuary 1975), pp. 63. coal Age (March 1963), pp. 20. * coal Age (March 1963), pp. 30. 16mining. The national mine standards would not be fully realized until 1977 with the passage of the SMCRA, but the looming effect of the possibility of passage prompted a sense of urgency ‘among states to pass their own legislation in the coming years.° The mining industry's reaction to a nationally mandated reclamation program was less than welcoming. In 1970, Rodney R. Krause, a field representative at the Mined Land Conservation Conference in Washington D.C., argued against any legislation controlling strip mining at a federal level.°” The reasons Krause gave were that of the 22 states that were involved in strip mining, 18 states already had laws in place which regulated strip mining.” By his estimation, 99 percent of all surface-mined coal in the United States was mined under programs that required reclamation.” But even given all of this in 1970 Congress was attempting to pass another strip mining bill." In 1971 Colorado state legislature representative Don Friedman explained that Colorado had no law that regulated surface mining.’ The only legislation in place at the time was a “voluntary agreement” for mining companies to perform mine reclamation.” Meanwhile, yet another strip mining bill was being reviewed in Congress.’ The House version of the bill was * coal Age (March 1968), pp. 30. * Donald C. Menzel and Terry D. Edgmon, “The Struggle to Implement a National Surface Mining Policy,” Publius 10 (Winter, 1980), pp. 81 °” Coal Age (August 1970), pp. 86 ** Goal Age (August 1970), pp. 86. ® Cool Age (August 1970}, pp. 86. * Coal age (August 1970), pp. 86. * Cool Age (September 1971), pp. 90. * Coal Age (September 1971), pp. 90. °* Coal Age (August 1972), pp. 28. v7now calling for direct federal regulation of surface mining. The Senate version of the bill at the time still called for states to create their own programs for the regulation of strip mining.“ Congress, however, adjourned in 1972 without coming to a consensus over the strip mi bill." ‘Congress again tried to pass surface mining legislation in 1973.” The Senate bill S.425 established a minimum set of standards would be set for mine reclamation by a federal program." The states would then be charged to establish a program that would meet these minimum standards for mine reclamation.” The minimum standards being proposed by the Senate bill S.425 were seen as unobtainable by Harold Davis, the Chief Editor of Coal Age." H.R, 1000 and H.R. 3, two other bills dealing with surface mining, were being considered in the United States House of Representatives during 1973." In 1974 the House of nal Coai Association came out Representatives ultimately passed H.R. 3, a bill that the Ni against as practically ending the practice of surface mining.’ By the end of 1974, Congress appeared to have come to an agreement over the issue of surface mining, but now President Ford was threatening to veto it.“? * coal Age (August 1972), pp. 28. ** Coal Age (November 1972], pp. 8. ° Coal Age (August 1972), pp. 28. * Coal Age (March 1973), pp. 58. * Coal Age (March 1973}, pp. 59. "Coal age (March 1973), pp. 59. *© Coal Age (March 1973), pp. 59. * Coal Age (August 1973), pp.9. * Coal Age (August 1974), pp. 9 and Coa! Age (September 1973), pp. 13. *° Coal Age (December 1974), pp. 9 18President Ford made good on his threat and vetoed the congress passed legislation in 1975."" President Ford’s veto, however, did not end the congressional quest for national surface mining legislation, but did push its realization forward two years to 1977 when President Carter signed into law the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977. In the 1970s Colorado was a state in the path of the growing storm created by the combination of events. The increased demand for coal due to the oil crisis, the increased demand for low-sulfur coal due to the Clean Air Act of 1970, and the necessity for state mine reclamation reform due to pressure from the threat of national reclamation standards were all pressuring Colorado to pass mine reclamation legislation. The response to these pressures came in the form of conservationist legislators headed by Colorado State Governor Richard Lamm. In 1972 the Colorado State Land Reclamation Board was established.'"* Colorado had mine reclamation laws in place since 1969, but due to a lack of rules governing the Land Reclamation Board these laws were difficult to enforce.'"” Twenty-two pages of legislation were adopted in December of 1975 that allowed the board to better control mine reclamation in Colorado.’ Members of the Mine Reclamation Board included Harris Sherman, the State Director of Natural Resources, John Reid, the state geologist, Norman Blake from the Deputy ** Coal Age (uly 1975), po. 9. * coal Age (February 1978), pp. 139. 5 Rocky Mountain News (December 23, 1975), pp. 8 * Rocky Mountain News (December 23, 1975), pp. 8. ** Rocky Mountain News (December 23, 1975), 9p. 8. 19Commission of Mines, Andrew Deborsk, the Chief Coal Mine Inspector, and Ross Chambers, a member of the Soils Conservation Board." Colorado State Governor Richard Lamm spoke to the Colorado Land Reclamation Board and the Land Use Commission during the first day of oversight hearings dealing with mined land reclamation.° Lamm made it clear that his stand was to find “a sensible middle ground” for the regulation of strip mining in Colorado. Strip mining should not be stopped in Colorado, Lamm argued, but there needed to be more emphasis on better mine reclamation and protection for areas that would be problematic for any reciamation.’”” Lamm further pointed to federal policies, which were pushing for a fivefold increase in the amount of coal production in western states as a reason why an increase in reclamation regulation was needed.” Lamm concluded by stressing his apprehension “about Colorado shaping its own destiny” and added that it would not be fitting for Colorado to dispute “the federal encroachment” when the state passed no laws to prevent the situation. “* Mine reclamation efforts were seen as inconsistent in 1975.” This was attributed to the Land Reclamation Board's failure to implement the regulations specified by the law regarding mine reclamation.” in efforts to correct the problem, the chairman of the board, Harris Sherman, pushed for better standards requiring mine reclamation and as a temporary ©° rocky Mountain News (December 23, 1975), pp. 8. 9 Greeley Tribune (May 14, 1975), pp. 12. © Greeley Tribune (May 14, 1975), pp. 12, *2 Greeley Tribune (May 14, 1975), pp. 12. © Greeley Tribune (May 14, 1975), pp. 12 © Greeley Tribune (May 14, 1975), pp. 12. ™5 rocky Mountain News (October 5, 1975}, pp. 5. rocky Mountain News (October 5, 1975}, pp. 5. 20solution."”” While the board worked on drafting legislation, it also enacted emergency regulator powers which were along the same lines as the federal strip mining bill vetoed by President Ford."%8 James Monaghan, the top environmental advisor to Governor Richard Lamm, stressed is fear that increased coal mining would engulf the state of Colorado before improved mine reclamation laws could be enacted.” in Monaghan’s opinion Colorado had the weakest mine reclamation regulations of any western state at the time."*” Monaghan said, “If that isn’t a ‘temptation for an unbalanced and inequitable extraction situation in the West, | don’t know what is.” Yet despite the efforts of Lamm and Monaghan, a strong reclamation bill was “scrapped” by the state legistature in 1974 because the Colorado State Legislature assumed that the federal strip mining bill was going to pass." The Colorado Land Reclamation Board proposed new regulations that would better standardize mine reclamation." These were the first enduring rules to cover reclamation." Previous to this, mine reclamation was enacted on a case-by-case basis through agreements between the Colorado Land Reclamation Board and individual mining companies.™> Harris Sherman asked members of the Colorado Joint Budget Committee to increase the staff working "Rocky Mountain News (October 5, 1975), pp. 5. * Rocky Mountain News (October 5, 1975), pp. 5,32. * Gazette Telegraph (October 6, 1975), pp. 6F. “° Gazette Telegraph (October 6, 1975), pp. 6F. + Gazette Telegraph (October 6, 1975), pp. 6F. * Gazette Telegraph (October 6, 1975), pp. 6F. * Greeley Tribune (November 3, 1975), pp. 11. ™ Greeley Tribune (November 3, 1975), pp. 11. * Greeley Tribune (November 3, 1975), pp. 11. 2‘on enforcement of mine reclamation laws from three to eight people.” The reason this was needed was that the staff was so overburdened that enforcement of reclamation laws were nearly impossible?” Charges that the Colorado Land Reclamation Board was not doing its job enforcing mine. reclamation came from the Colorado Open Space Council in 1975.'* The council claimed that Peabody Coal Company and Canon Coal Company had both failed to obtain the proper mining permits for their operations in Colorado. A spokesman for Peabody Coal Company denied the allegations.“ Harris Sherman agreed that the Colorado Open Spaces Council’s assessment of the situation was correct.“ Sherman gave the reason for the failure to enforce the reclamation laws as underfunding of the board by the Colorado state legislature.” Harris Sherman suggested three amendments to the mine reclamation bill being reviewed by the Colorado House of Representatives. ’*? Sherman requested an increase of the budget for mine reclamation enforcement from sixty thousand dollars to three hundred thousand. Sherman also requested an increase of the mining application fees to help pay for the state reclamation budget, and to bring mine milling procedures under the reclamation laws." Sherman argued that mine milling was potentially as harmful to the land as work done “© Greeley Tribune (November 15, 1975), pp. 12. ireeley Tribune (November 15, 1975}, pp. 12. °* Denver Post (November 25, 1975), pp. 3. * Denver Post (November 25, 1975), pp. 3. “° Denver Post (November 25, 1975), pp. 3. * Denver Post (November 25, 1975), pp. 3. ‘© Denver Post (November 25, 1975), pp. 3. *© Rocky Mountain News (January 20, 1976), pp. 6. ** Rocky Mountain News (January 20, 1976), pp. 6. 22at the mine site itself, but mine milling was not included in the current law, because mine milling was usually done offsite. Areclamation bill passed in the Colorado House of Representatives on March 16, 1976." The bill went on to the State Senate with a proposed increase in the Colorado Land Reclamation Board staff to seven people and the requirement of a reclamation plan for all mining operations in Colorado.’”’ The Senate reworked the mine reclamation bill and approved their own version of the bill on April 14, 1976, which was sent back to the state House of Representatives.’ The mine reclamation bill did eventually get approval from the Colorado House of Representatives and was signed into law as the Mine Reclamation Act of 1976." But as a Denver Post staff writer put it; the legislation was “like a kit for a complex model ship that comes without a set of instructions.”** it was ultimately the job of the Colorado Land Reclamation Board to create rules and regulations in order to make the new act function.’** Governor Richard Lamm appointed five new members to the Colorado Land Reclamation Board on July 7, 1976." This switch of the board’s membership was done to better represent the interests of mining, conservation, and agriculture in Colorado.** The change was made possible because of a newly passed statute that went into effect July 1, 1976, * Rocky Mountain News (January 20, 1976), pp. 6 + Greeley Tribune (March 17, 1976), pp. 11. *” Greeley Tribune (March 17, 1976), pp. 11. *S Greeley Tribune (April 15, 1976), pp. 7. © Denver Post (uly 21, 1976), pp. 4. * Denver Post (uly 21, 1976), pp. 4 * Denver Post (July 21, 1976), pp. 4. °* Rocky Mountain News Uuly 9, 1976), pp. 19. " Rocky Mountain News (July 9, 1976), pp. 19. 23which specified that a majority of the board members had to be private citizens." The previous makeup of the board consisted entirely of employees from the State Department of ‘Natural Resources.’** Lamm appointed Joe Sullivan, a farmer from Meeker, Colorado to represent agricultural interests; Larry F. Brown, an environmental control engineer at the Climax Molybdenum Company's Henderson Mine, and John D. Ward, a manager of the employer and government relations at the Colowyo Coal Company, to represent mining interests; and Robert K. Turner, the regional representative of the National Audubon Society, and Richard T. Ward, a professor in the plant ecology department at Colorado State University to represent conservation interests. °° In the end, the legislative efforts for mine reclamation during the 1970's proved ineffective in curbing surface mining in Colorado and in other western states.**” By the early 1980's, strip mining had been present in Colorado for approximately 50 years and the passage of mine reclamation legislation had not challenged its position." In 1980 the western states region produced 187.6 million tons of coal and approximately 89 percent of this was from surface mining.®° That number was up more than one hundred million tons from the approximately 87 million tons of coal produced in the western states in 1975." Rocky Mountain News (July 9, 1976), pp. 19. * Rocky Mountain News July 9, 1976), pp. 19. * Rocky Mountain News (July 9, 1976}, pp. 19. 7 Governor Richard D. Lamm and Michael McCarthy, The Angry West: Vulnerable Land ond its Future (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1982), pp. 59. * Governor Richard D. Lamm and Michael McCarthy, The Angry West: Vulnerable Land and its Future (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1982), pp. 57. * Governor Richard D. Lamm and Michael McCarthy, The Angry West: Vulnerable Land and its Future (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1982), pp. 59. * Coal Age (February 1975}, pp. 117. 24Governor Lamm in 1982 stated in his book, The Angry West: Vulnerable Land and its Future, “From an environmental viewpoint, one of the great tragedies of the West is the fact that most of its coal is strippable.”"™ Lamm also stated, “The destruction of the land in the process of stripping almost defies description.” Lamm clearly change his stance on strip mining from his earlier days of preaching “a sensible middle ground” for strip mining in Colorado." Because Colorado was the home of some of the most scenic landscapes and of some of the largest low-sulfur coal deposits in the United States, eventual mine reclamation laws were inevitable. However, mine reclamation in Colorado was spurred on by a national energy crisis, national air quality standards, national mine reclamation regulation trends, and conservational legislators. * Governor Richard D. Lamm and Michael McCarthy, The Angry West: Vulnerable Land and its Future (Boston: Houghton Miffin Company, 1982), pp. 57. Governor Richard D. Lamm and Michael McCarthy, The Angry West: Vulnerable Lond and its Future (Boston: Houghton Miffin Company, 1982), pp. 59. © Greeley Tribune (May 14, 1975), pp. 12. 25