1 ‘On June 16, 1967, a young African-American man named Alfred Parks threw a Molotov cocktail at the District 5 police headquarters in Denver, Colorado‘. Quickly apprehended by police officers, Parks predicted ominously that it was going to be a ‘long, hot summer.’ Indeed, this is a phrase that appears continuously in the documents of Denver Mayor Thomas G. Currigan (1963-1968) in the final years of his service as his administration prepared for the possibility of widespread urban violence inspired by the racial upheavals occurring around the country. While Currigan and many residents of Denver feared the wholesale rioting of the city’s African American community, as was demonstrated in Watts in 1966, incidents of violence were largely confined to minor vandalism and isolated gun violence. The final years of Thomas Currigan's administration, 1966-1968, would be marred by flashes of violence exhibited by youths such as Parks and an increasing fear by the white majority of Denver that the widespread destruction witnessed in Detroit and Los Angeles would soon be seen in their city. Through the growth of the suburbs and rise in inner city populations aeross the country, Denver would experience the phenomena of white flight like many other American cities during the mid-20" century. The result was an influx of Aftican Americans into the middle class neighborhood of Park Hill; this neighborhood would be of particular concern to the Currigan administration in combating racial violence. Though the efforts of the Currigan Administration to curb the potential for violence can be seen as relatively successful, it would be Denver's lack of a demographically significant black population along with internal efforts by the African American community that would ensure there would be no race riots in Denver. While there are very few, if any, extensive accounts of the racial history and conflicts of Denver in the 1960s, there is quite a bit of literature on the riots in Watts, Detroit, and Chicago in * 4 Molotov cocktail is a homemade incendiary device made with gasoline.2 that decade. These riots are often framed in the demographical realities of each environment, as is the case with the thorough history on the subject, Revolts, Protests, Demonstrations, and Rebellions in American History, by Steven L. Danver. The Watts neighborhood of Los Angeles in the 1960s was 99% black with poverty and unemployment rates being the highest of any Los Angeles neighborhoods, the latter being at 30% at the time of the riots in 1965*. This longtime economic inequality is often pointed to as an important factor in race riots; the violence occurring in cities across the country during this time period was the destructive release of generation’ worth of frustration at the chronically lesser state of African Americans in the United States. The outsourcing of manufacturing jobs in the automotive industry in Detroit, the strous for the city’s black residents, economic lifeblood of the city, proved to be particularly dis who were far more likely to hold lower end jobs with little to no education or other skill sets. The result was a large number of unemployment black men who were growing increasingly resentful towards the white majority and the perceived lack of any true racial progress*. Disillusionment with the mainstream civil rights movement led by Dr. Martin Luther King is another topic frequently addressed within the literature of the 1960s race rioting. While Dr. King abhorred violence and sought any other possible recourse, many African Americans began to feel that peaceful marches and protests were ineffective at best, particularly when countered with government forces that were oftentimes al} too willing to react violently, particularly in areas where the white population was distinetly in the minority. Even local efforts in acity like Detroit, with a liberal Caucasian mayor who sought alliances with the mainstream Civil Rights movement and appointed various African Americans to government positions, were not substantial enough to give the impression of legitimate progress, which Danver believes Danver, Revalis, Protests, Demonstrations, and Rebellions in American History: An Encyclopedia, 966 * Tid, 988.3 ‘tumed many young black men towards more radical and militant figures such as Malcolm X and Stokely Carmichael. There is one other facet to the urban racial violence of the 1960s to which historians devote substantial attention, and that is the issue of both the excessive force used by government forces and the failure of many police departments to adequately contain rioting at its first appearance, The Los Angeles Police Department, for instance, had one of the most horrific reputations among citizens for racism and brutality. The riot in Watts began when a crowd witnessed an LAPD officer, Wayne Wilson, strike an African American man with his baton after ‘a routine traffic stop. A fellow officer had pulled over Marquette Frye and his brother for driving erratically, and the scene quickly got out of hand as a crowd gathered and more officers arrived, ‘The Frye brothers, frustrated at the officer’s insistence on towing their vehicle, became agitated to the point that Wilson feared they would become violent. The crowd witnessed Wilson beat one of the Frye brothers, arrest them, and depart. The rowdy crowd remained, and the police would repeatedly arrive, briefly restore order, and then leave again. The inability of the police to cope with the tense situation ultimately allowed it to escalate to the rampant violence and destruction that characterized the Watts riot. The Detroit riot of 1967 is perhaps the most famous in terms of the violence exhibited by police and National Guard forces. Much like the LAPD officers, Detroit police, who likewise hhad a reputation for excessive force against blacks, were similarly caught in stages of inaction and then brutalization’, In Debating the 1960s: Liberal, Conservative, and Radical Perspectives by Michael President Johnson's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration had found that around 45% of Detroit, police officers in African American neighborhoods could be classified as “extremely antiNegro. Ibid, 9944 Flamm and David Steigerwald’, the clash between police and protesters of the 1968 Democratic Convention in Chicago is discussed from the perspectives of the protestors. While distinet from the riots in Watts and Detroit because of its political rather than racial nature, witnesses reported a complete lack of discipline by police and a seeming outpouring of their own frustrations towards the mob. From Debating the 1960s: “The police were angry. Their anger was neither disinterested nor instrumental. It was deep, expressive and personal. 'Get out of here you cock suckers’ seemed to be their most common ery. One demonstrator said that several policemen ‘were coming toward a group in which he was standing when one of the officers yelled, ‘Hey, there's a nigger over there we can get.’ [The police were] then said to have veered off and grabbed a middle-aged Negro man, whom they beat...” It is important to note that prior to this incident, which took place in August, 1968, there had been race riots in Chicago four months earlier following the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King®. These accounts from protesters suggest that police brutality in these riots, at least in some instances, might have stemmed from a similar, if fundamentally opposed, emotion of the white police in relation to black rioters; the racist officers would have been frustrated and angered at the destruction by the rioters and would use the camival atmosphere of the riots to dispel their impotency in re-establishing order. Other authors have tied in this frustration on all sides with a fear of the new and unknown. In his work The Sixties: Years of Hope, Days of Rage’, author Todd Gitlin asserts that the racial uprisings in Watts, Detroit, Newark, and countless other cities, coupled with the emergence of the hippie drug culture created an atmosphere of fear and a sense of change amongst the established order. This fear of organized black resistance and concern over frightening new substances such as LSD and heroin would have acted as a motivator for the 5 Glamm and Steigerwald, Debating the 1960s: Liberal, Conservative, and Radical Perspectives © Ibid, 97 Gitlin, The Sixties: Years of Hope, Days of Rage5 conservative white majority, including police officers, to react more harshly so as to preserve the established order. While it is difficult to find any case studies, statistics, or even anecdotes regarding Denver in the vast literature on the time period, the portrait painted is vivid enough to actualize the fear felt by many Denverites. While the United States had emerged triumphant and immensely powerful from World War II only two decades prior, many people’s views (particularly the white middle and upper classes) of a harmonious and stable America was being challenged by the seemingly mindless destruction occurring around the country. The push for civil rights and the emergence of strange new subcultures clashed tremendously with the copacetic optimism of the 1950s. Denver As the national crime rate skyrocketed through the 1960s, the murder rate alone nearly doubling between 1963 and 1968, more and more citizens of the United States felt that the country was in danger of descending into unprecedented levels of violence‘, In 1967 more than 100 cities had riots’; polls that year showed that not only had the racial crisis supplanted even the ‘Vietnam War as the chief national concern, with two times as many whites as blacks viewed the riots as organized rather than random acts of violence". White America was terrified of an organized racial rebellion and this was reflected in their survey answers and in their evacuation of cities towards the suburbs. That the sensationalism of the media, and the now widespread advent of color television, was bringing the images of Watts burning and Detroit under siege to the living rooms of the average American makes these concerns understandable if overstated. This fear can be seen in the correspondence to Mayor Currigan from local citizens, A Denver Flamm, Law and Order: Street Crime, Civil Unrest, and the Crisis of Liberalism in the 1960s, 2 ° Ibid, 83 % Tpid, 84resident named Ellen McElheny wrote to Mayor Currigan on July 5, 1967 stating her concern after hearing a radio broadcast that was calling for race riots in the city as a way to satisfy the urban poor. The broadcast had cited Stokely Carmichael, the radical former leader of SNC, as the instigator of this objective and claimed that he would be making an appearance in Denver’. Other Denverites were more virulent; a letter from a man named Leonard Davis called for a harsh crackdown by police forces on “these negro animals”. Notably, this was during a tine when many citizens were accusing the Police Department of abuses. Davis ended his letter by writing “In conclusion I would like to re-state my conviction that the police department must be very strict, and tough, to lay down anyone who even looks like he would like to get out of line during these troublesome days.”"* Tn the midst of the increasingly violent racial situation that the United States found itself in in the mid-1960s, many observers, typically white, would marvel at Denver's seemingly unique situation as being a city without a race problem, While tensions ran high through the decade, with incidents of vandalism, violence, and even death occurring, levels of discontent among African Americans would never approach the levels seen in other major metropolitan areas around the country. One of the most apparent reasons Denver's demographics, as a city that has historically had a disproportionately high number of white residents when compared with other urban centers. According to the 1970 census, the African-American population of Denver was 47,011, or 9.1% of the total population of the city. The census indicated that was an increase from the 1960 numbers, which read 30,251, coming in at 6.1% of the total population. The numbers from the 1960 and 1970 censuses for three other major urban centers that saw “Letter fiom Ellen McEtheny to Mayor Thomas Curtigan, 7/5/67, The Thomas Currigan Papers, Box 13, Folder 103.01 FIO "Letter from Leonard Davis to Mayor Thomas Currigan, 8/3/67, The Thomas Currigan Papers, Box 13, Folder 103.01 FIOsignificant racial violence in the 1960s are as follows"”: City Black Population | Percentage of Total Percentage of Total (1960) Population | Population [Dewoit, MI |e “29 660,428 43.7 ‘Newark, NJ 138,035 34.1 207,458 34.2 Los Angeles, CA |334,916 13.5 (508,606 179 ‘The numbers from the 1960 census must be accepted cautiously, as the government admitted in 1967 to missing up to 10% of the total black population of the entire country, attributing the failure to the difficulty of conducting surveys in the crowded black ghettos of major cities, On the surface, the statistics highlight the obvious truth that the Aftican American community of Denver was quite small given the overall size of the city. The 1970 population of Newark, for instance, would be significantly less than that of Denver yet the black community of Newark was more than four times that of Denver. Evidence can also be seen of the phenomena of "white flight’ in Detroit and Newark; the black populations of both cities grew in the 1960s, but both ‘Newark and Detroit experienced an overall population decline of 9.5% and 5.6% respectively. The result is a growth in the overall population of the city with a decline of white residents. ‘The most glaring statistic is the percentage of total population, particularly in the cases of Detroit and Newark. The African American population of Denver had not yet cracked 10% in 1970 while in Newark it was over half and close to that in Detroit. However, Los Angeles merits ‘United States Census of Population, 1970, US Department of Commerce/Bureau of the Census: Distribution of the Negro Population by County * “Census Missed About Ten Percent of US Negroes." The Denver Post, 1967more consideration, given the fact that black population of the city was less than a fifth of the total in 1970, still substantial but much closer to Denver's percentage than Detroit or Newark. Economic inequality would force African Americans in Los Angeles into dense neighborhoods such as Watts and the bordering Compton, and these were the hot zones for racial tension. Denver also had a neighborhood that had seen an influx of African Americans and the flight of white Denverites through the 1960s; that neighborhood was Park Hill. Park Hill An approximately 100 city block area in northeastern Denver, Park Hill was developed into a residential neighborhood in the 1940s. Geographically, it the site offered easy access to both downtown Denver as well as Stapleton airport while being close to such amenities as City Park and the Denver Zoo. A city government report written in 1966 to assess the population shift in the neighborhood concludes its introduction on the geography of Park Hill by stating “It is by any standard a desirable place to live."'* While downtown had traditionally been the focal point of Denver's black populace, a steady shift would occur after World War Il to the point that by 1960 over half of the population of the Park Hill neighborhood was African American. This was far from the urban ghettos of Watts and Newark which proved to be so intimidating to white suburbanites and census takers alike. Park Hill was a decidedly middle and working class neighborhood; so then where did the trouble stem from? While the Park Hill neighborhood was certainly better off economically than other primarily black neighborhoods around the country, there still existed a disparate level of unemployment and underemployment. The unemployment rate for Denver African Americans 15 Bardwell, Characteristics of Negro Residences in Park Hill Area of Denver, Colorado, 1966. The Thomas Currigan Papers, Box 13, Folder 103.01 FF10, 39 was twice as high as their white counterparts'®. Additionally, most blacks that were employed worked in lower paying and less skilled positions than their white neighbors. A report by Denver's Commission on Community Relations (CCR), a body that had existed to address domestic matters since the 1940s, remarked that Park Hill was also notable for its relatively high population of young adults who typically have higher rates of unemployment than their parents. These African American youths experienced an unemployment rate twice as high as their white counterparts. The report speculated on the general frustration felt by the youths of Park Hill: “Aware of the covert discrimination in job placement, the aspirations of the young adults are probably ambivalent. They believe they have the capacity for better employment, but realize that the opportunities for such employment are not available to them.””” The report cited this chronic and institutionalized failure for blacks to advance into the upper echelons of the job market as, being a factor in the discontent of the Park Hill neighborhood’s population. ‘A seemingly common belief amongst the members of the Commission on Community Relations was the uniqueness, not the absence, of the racism found in Denver. In the Summer of 1967 report on Park Hill, CCR member Jules Mondschein echoes a sentiment made by former CCR director and then-member Helen Peterson in a similar evaluation of the city for Currigan. Mondschein and Peterson alleged that Denver had traditionally been a 'good' city for minority populations in comparison with the rest of the country, but that racism had a more subtle and covert appearance. These conditions of subtle racism are what propelled many blacks into menial jobs and the bittemess that ensued undermined the apparent stability of the Park Hill “Mondschein, Jules. Commission on Community Relations "The Summer of 1967-Northeast Park Hill", Denver Colorado. The Rachel Noe! Papers, Wester History Archive of the Denver Public Library, 5 ” bid, 510 community"®, ‘Afier World War I and into the 1960s, many Americans became increasingly concerned with the problem of juvenile delinquency that was statistically on the rise"”. The threat of a generational showdown was becoming worrisome and by the late sixties this fear had taken a distinctly racial tone that can be exhibited quite clearly in the case of Park Hill. The neighborhood at this time was serviced by two shopping centers, one located at 38" and Dahlia and one at 38" and Holly. These shopping centers became local gathering places for young ‘African Americans from all over the city, particularly in the summertime. High unemployment anda lack of any kind of community center (Park Hill, being a middle class neighborhood, would not be deigned sufficiently impoverished to merit a local facility for some time) for kids to congregate ensured a high tumout at these informal gatherings. Youths would drink, dance, and drag race on the streets near the shopping centers and the local business, many of which were operated by African Americans, began to appeal to the government to maintain order for fear that the kids were driving off business and creating a potential for property destruction. The Dahlia shopping center in particular was cited by the city government as a trouble spot as early as 1963 with a government evaluation coming in December of 1966 to assess further measures to be taken”, With the destructive riots in Los Angeles having occurred the year before, the Dahlia report mentions the very tangible, if not realistic, fear of a 'Watts in Denver". Interestingly, however, most of the calls for a restoration of order would come from the primarily black residents and business owners around the Dahlia and Holly shopping centers rather than white ™ Mondschein, 6 © Flamm, 13 ® Noel, Rachel. Commi Noel Papers ™ Ibid, 3 jon on Community Relations: Dahlia Center, Memos and Reports, 1966. The Rachelul residents. Beginning in 1963, the CCR began holding local meetings with business leaders, police, social institutions, and schools in order to address a potentially explosive situation, From. these meetings came several steps that would alleviate the pressure for the time being and lay a groundwork for future efforts, starting with the re-establishment of the Northeast Park Hill Civie Association, a local community group, as well as the construction of the Smiley Recreation Center and a swimming pool at Skyline Park. Yet even as progress was initiated, there were also setbacks from both citizens and police forces. With riots starting to visibly spark up around the country and the rhetoric of many nationalist black leaders becoming more militant, rumors began to spread through Denver that an outside element had infiltrated the ranks of the local youth and ‘were determined to spark race riots’. The Commission specifically noted that there was little evidence of such a conspiracy and it was difficult to prove if any group or individuals existed in Denver at the time. Reports began reaching government officials in July of 1966 about disturbingly large groups of young blacks congregating at the Dahiia shopping center on the weekends, the kids themselves alleging that they had “nowhere else to go.””? Many youths alleged that police would strike their vehicles with their nightsticks and make disparaging remarks towards them, creating even more of a sense of resistance against the authorities, That summer somebody threw a homemade bomb into a business at the Dahlia shopping center; an act that many feared would spark other more destructive violence. However, violence would be largely averted with other potentially incendiary acts amounting to little more than window breakage at the Holly shopping center. A government investigation in 1967 found that those responsible were primarily boys 2 pid, ® Tid, 212 aged 9-15 with a history of juvenile delinquency”. ‘After interviewing several young people and making personal observations beginning in early August 1966, CCR member Shelly Rhym concluded that the chaotic environment of the crowd created a state of panic for local residents and business owners that led to an exaggeration of the potential for rioting and the additional presence of police officers’. Rhym states that the young people she interviewed were all greatly resentful towards the police for striking their vehicles with their batons and ordering them to move along regardless of whether they were ‘going about legitimate business or not. Rhym concluded that if not for the intervention of community leaders, these actions by police could have presented “serious complications.””* This escalation of tensions in 1966 did not go unnoticed by either federal or local authorities. The Denver Opportunity (DO), a government body that was part of Currigan's measures for the War on Poverty, received $35,000 from the federal government due to Denver's status as a potential hotspot for discontent. The DO hastily put together a rash’ program for August 1966 called Cool It that organized dances and parties in an attempt to divert the crowds to amore feasible area than the local shopping centers. One of the first actions taken almost immediately by the Currigan administration was to contact local radio and television stations and implore them to refrain from publishing rumors or other unsubstantiated news. In a list of recommendations made to Currigan by the CCR in 1966 as to how to relieve future tensions, further communication and cooperation with the media was first on the list, stating that the 2 Mondschein, & 25 «Wednesday, August 3, 1966, at 9:00 pm, there were 100 automobiles and approximately 400 young people from 10, to 25 years of age congregated in the McDonalds section of the Dahlia Shopping lot. Some were engaged in loud conversation, some were in small groups dancing to auto radios and auto tape stereos. Many autos driving through the lot added to the confusion.” Rhy, Shelley. Commission on Community Relations: Dahlia Center, Memos and Reports, 1966. 2 Thi, “Recommendations”B public has a right to objective facts but need not be “agitated by speculations or rumors..."2” Also chief among concerns amongst members of the CCR was an improvement in the relations between police officers and citizens, stressing the need for better communication and cooperation on both sides. Currigan responded with the establishment of the Police-Community Relations Bureau, which would meet a much greater test the following summer. 1967 On June 13, 1967 Roger Cisneros, chairman of the Commission on Community Relations, sent Mayor Thomas Currigan a report that outlined what had been accomplished over the fall and winter of the previous year to prepare for the summer of 1967. Again, Cisneros emphasized the need for employment as well as the establishment of a more readily accessible system for complaints by citizens, Federal funding had been “vigorously sought for and supported by” Currigan to gauge employment training needs as well as special funds for fair housing”. Given Currigan’s past enthusiasm and support for the War on Poverty and the general fear at this time of the idle youth, it is clear that employment and recreation would be his main weapon against violence in Denver. This letter also contained a report written by Helen Peterson that speculated on the state of race in Denver and what can be done to aid the relieving of tensions. Currigan would draw heavily on this report in a speech he gave that same day before the Anti-Defamation League, proclaiming that the citizens of Denver could not afford to pretend that a destructive race riot could not occur in their city. Echoing Peterson's evaluation, Currigan stated that the problem was the inability or refuusal of Denver's white majority to acknowledge the socio-economic disparity between black and white. Currigan, who had been re-elected overwhelmingly that year, emphasized the need for year round solutions, not just summer ‘crash’ ® Ibid, Recommendations * Letter from Roger Cisneros to Thomas Currigan, June 13, 1967, The Thomas Currigan Papers, Box 13, Folder 103.01 FFIO4 programs, One of the main actions taken by city government for 1967 was the Youth, Education, and Activities (YEA) of summer 1967 Program that aimed to aid youths in finding summer or permanent work while also organizing local summertime activities. The YEA opened five Adult Centers throughout the city in impoverished areas for recreation and employment assistance as ‘well as running athletic programs, excursions, and summer camps. While finding employment for so many who had been chronically jobless or lacked skills or training was a daunting enough task (the government would find that there would be eight applicants for every low level job opening), it was becoming increasingly apparent around the country that more and more businesses and employment opportunities were fleeing the cities and setting up shop in the outlying suburbs”, A article from spring of 1967 entitled “Negro Skills Go Begging” remarked that the last decade had seen public transit fares rise twice as quickly as the cost of purchasing a cor, a luxury that most inner-city residents could ill afford. The article states: “Public transportation to the suburbs is usually expensive, often circuitous, or simply not available.” ‘Adding to the frustration, notes the article, is that most of the jobs provided were of the semiskilled variety most suitable for those seeking general labor”. Undeterred, the YEA and other groups held various youth employment drives and as well as general job finding aid through the year to help stem the flow of the unemployed. The Denver Opportunity as well as Youth Employment Centers throughout the city would provide the YEA with a list of approximately 14,000 employers to aid in job searches. According to the city government, between May 15 and June 21 of 1967 just over 6,000 youths applied for work at the city’s twelve opportunity offices. However, employment could be found for only 891, with 396 of them being ® Mondschein, 8 > Littlewood, Tom. “Negro Skills Go Begging.” The Denver Post, May 7, 196715 summertime only. While the numbers of applicants is skewed slightly higher than it would have been in actuality (with people occasionally applying at multiple offices), it is clear how high the need for employment among Denver's youth was in the late 1960s. As a result of these efforts, the employment rate would climb just over 2% from May 1966-1967 In addition to finding part-and full-time jobs for the young and unemployed, the Parks and Recreation Department also began sponsoring weekend dances at Skyland Park in Park Hill in an attempt to divert crowds from the Park Hill shopping centers. With attendance coming in as high as 1,400 youths on one particular Saturday night and an average of over 500 attendees per dance, the government would cite the lack of trouble at these gatherings, despite the copious amount of alcoho! being brought in and consumed by the youths, as proof that the youth in Denver had little desire for riot or disorder. Skyland Park would act as a sort of makeshift youth center during 1967, with DO representatives setting up basketball tournaments and providing basic entertainment such as ping-pong tables. The local swimming pool was provided with anew lighting system so as to stay open into the evening. These additional efforts were described as being met with only “moderate success” by the CCR for unspecified reasons*_ Despite this ramped-up preparedness for the possibility of violence in 1967, the situation deteriorated from years previous in terms of the violence sustained, Three days after Currigan appeared before the Anti-Defamation League Alfred Parks threw his Molotov cocktail and made his ominous prediction. Tensions were visibly growing. Currigan began organizing meetings in his office with representatives of the Denver community; Currigan met with the media to again discuss further cooperation, members of the business and industrial sectors, African American community leaders, Hispanic community leaders, and union representatives. Despite the gains °° Mondschein, 10, 1116 made in employment from 1966, Currigan implored members of the professional and industrial communities to open their ranks to applicants from the Colorado Department of Employment. ‘The mayor would also make joint statements with diverse community members restating the need to refrain from repeating unsavory rumors and reiterating that police would maintain a respectful demeanor to all citizens regardless of race or national origin. It is during this time that several documents appear in the Currigan files that speak of growing discontent with the situat . Lyries to a song signed by ‘Black Panther’ echo the anger at policemen in particular: “We once meant you no harm/We now mean to kill/Hey Mr. Policeman/Our flowers are gone.” ‘While the song contains a similar sentiment throughout, by the end it redacts this desire for revenge and says simply “Judge by ability, not by race.” The bottom of the page contains the crudely etched word ‘Revolucion’ with two peace symbols beside it. While such a document, with no notes as to where or how it was retrieved, seems more like the work of an earnest, romantically minded youth than an actual Black Panther, it does illustrate how the militant message of the Black Panthers resounded with the frustrated black youth around the country. A ‘memo from Currigan’s assistant dated July 20 recounts a phone cali with one Leon Davis who lived and operated a business out of the mostly African American Five Points neighborhood. Davis noticed a kind of ‘club’ on 31® Strect that was stockpiling weapons and patrolling the neighborhood hoping for an incident that might spark a riot. Davis noted that it was not, however, a strictly black power organization. Mention of such a club never again resurfaced and it is not apparent how Davis found out what he did about it; such tips illustrate the chaotic nature of the times and Currigan's repeated stress on not spreading unsubstantiated rumors, Tensions came to a head in dramatic Shion at the end of July and beginning of August © ‘The Thomas Currigan Papers, Box 13, Folder 103.01 FF107 in 1967. On Saturday, July 29, a police officer issued a jaywalking ticket to an Aftican American youth who was attending a dance at the YMCA in Park Hill. News of the affront spread rapidly 4nd youth began to congregate in the Dablia and Holly shopping centers for the next three days, ‘with incidents of window breakage at theft atthe latter Things escalated the following Monday when police in riot gear used their nightsticks liberally to disperse the crowd at the Holly shopping center, arresting three youths. The group was estimated to be “more than 50 Negro youths armed with rocks and bottles...” An article from the Rocky Mountain News identified {he crowd at being at around one hundred strong; they damaged four police ears while attacking businesses in the area with rocks and crude firebombs**. |i was the first clash of its kind in Denver between police and an unruly mob, but the latter would not be the only group to use excessive force. Several members of the Park Hill community decried acts of abuse by police officers against rioters and bystanders alike, and a Petition would be sent to Currigan on August 1 protesting the actions of police in the neighborhood following the outbreak in violence. “Children and adult citizens with the Predominately Negro arca of this city have been subjected to police directives approximating a state of martial law and a suspension of civil liberties,” according to the press release’®, Signed by fourteen citizens total, including four neighborhood ministers, the undersigned accused officers of restricting the free movement of citizens beginning the night of July 31. One of these men, Reverend JR Wagner, wrote Currigan personally on August 4 to report an incident of brutality he personally witnessed. Wagner alleged that he saw four or five police officers viciously beat a man with their nightsticks; the man had been walking slowly and not near the 3 Green and Huigen, “Police Disperse Rock-and-Bottle Hurlers." The Demver Post, August 1, 1967 * Rounds, “Shopping Center Hit by Denver Vandals.” The Rocky Mountain News, 1965, The Themas Currigan Papers, Box 13, Folder 103.01 FIO Press Release sent to Thomas Curignn, August 1, 1967, Thomas Currigan Papers, Box 13, older 103.01 FF1018 nob that was throwing bottles at officers”. Similar reports would trickle into government offices throughout the summer. An internal correspondence between two officers of the Denver Police jn summer of 1967 recounts how a businessman witnessed officers using their clubs t0 beat back predominately African American crowd, with one even striking a ten-year-old boy on the head and then leave the scene. The unknown author of the memo admits to being ‘unsure! of how to handle the situation and recommends a phone call to the businessman who filed the complaint ‘at minimum’ Even a member of the CCR would witness a brutality incident against a man named Nathan Clark. Clearly the Denver police were placed in a position that they were poorly trained for and uncertain on how to proceed with after incidents of alleged brutality, Given the Denver Police Department's poor reputation for self-monitoring, particularly inthe infamous burglars in ‘blue case in the early 1960s, perhaps this is unsurprising”. “The incident on the weekend of July 29 would be the most severe outbreak of violence in Denver to that point and would inspire a response from police similar to other departments around the country that would serve, as in the case of Watts, to further enflame the situation. However, the situation would largely be alleviated by the older members of the Park Hill community; these citizens were even being credited by the government investigation as being particularly effective in easing the situation, On Tuesday, August 1, after @ weekend of vandalism and minor destruction, approximately fifteen black citizens of Park Hill took it upon themselves to form a eitizen’s patrol that would continue throughout the summer, Recruiting parents and even young adalts, the government investigation concluded thatthe patrols were successful because the patrol members were able to express sympathy and anger over the actions __ % Letter to Thomas Currigan from Reverend JR Wagner, August 4, 1967, the Thomas Currigan Papers, Box 13, Folder 103.01 FF1O 57 4 geandal in the early 1960s where Denver police officers would rob businesses and then investigate the matters themselves.19 of police while still persuasively arguing against violence as a means of expression, Currigan himself would hold an emergency meeting with these members of the Northeast Park Hill Civic ‘Association (NEPHA) in the days following the violence and credit them with helping restore order in the neighborhood. Interestingly, despite these member's opposition to violence, they are still described in Mondschein’s report as being ‘militant’, Hlaving avoided the disaster ofa full-scale riot but also coming closer than had been Previously encountered, the Currigan administration continued in its efforts in ‘employment and recreation the next year. Work would begin in March of 1968 on a new recreation center in Park Hill that the government hoped would be a more permanent addition to draw crowds away from the Park Hill shopping centers™. ‘The government would even allow a young people's planning ‘committee that would eventually become the center's youth council to allow the local kids a Tmeasure of Voice in the proceedings. Currigan seemed unwilling, however, to take more drastic ‘measures beyond those of employment. A report from the CCR in January of 1968 made further ‘ecommendations of an increase in the hiring of minorities by the police department and the Sstablishment ofa youth program of approximately 200 minority kids to be used as ‘community ‘ides. Carrigan would be dismissive ofthe findings of the CCR; his handwritten notes on the report indicate that he believed that the situation was not as dire as the CCR felt, and that Concems over deteriorating police relations and the increasing militancy of minorities was opinion rather than fact", 1968 would not sce another outbreak in violence on the scale as the previous year, though discontent seemed to remain. A copy of a newsletter being circulated by a black power group called the Sundiata can be found in the Currigan papers dated 1968, The group, located just ee ts Mondschein, 15; Pinney, Greg. “Negro Leaders See Mayor, Report Gains.” The Denver Post, August 11, 1967 ‘> Thomas, “Work Slated to Bogin on Recreation Center” The Benes Post, March 24, 1968, * Polarization of Community Tensions, 1968. The Thomas Currigan Papers, Box 13, Folder 103.01 FE1020 outside Park Hill, accuses police of the murder of a man named Eugene 'Ski Jump’ Cook by @ police officer named Pinder, neither of who's names can Be found in newspaper databases. The peper also references an incident the previous night, June 22, where a man named Nathan Jones ‘was shot by police with a“unidentified brother also shot. Your brothers and sisters gassed, beat swith nightsticks, and arrested by the pigs.” Nathan Parl Jones, aged 19, was indicted in early July 9f 1968 for assault with a deadly weapon and assault with a deadly weapon on & police officer. ‘According to the Denver Post, a patrolman shot Jones on June 22 after the officer had watched Jones reach for a gun and fire, narrowly missing the officer", While no riots or significant destruction occurred at this point, tensions remained palpable in Denver. riven among more moderate institutions was there cause for concern. Pr. George King, a professor of history ata college in Augusta, Georgia, wrote an ess evaluating the situation in Denver in 1968. King would echo the sentiment of the CCR, stating that despite the fact that the black population of Denver resided in middle class neighborhoods far superior to any urban afheto, the continaing belief of supposed white superiority bred a strong resentment in the community. King cited a recent, undated rally atthe Civie Center by black moderates seeking peacefil resolution as proof of the socially inaposed ‘esses’ status of blacks in Denver. King would attribute the low numbers of attendance not to the strength of the miftant element nor to dissatisfaction of blacks with the moderates; King betieved that the cities social 'power structure’ had effectively ereated enough confusion as to whether the rally would take place or not that many people simply did not see the need to attend. The result was a perception of a lack of solidarity inthe black community and therefore a sense of unimportance by the white majority. Despite the apparent presence of a militant element and the ever-present rumors of rs 1F athan Jones Indicted in Shooting of Policeman.” The Denver Post uly 2, 196821 inflammatory visits by such radicals as Stokely Carmichael and H. Rap Brown, there seems to have been litle desire among even the radical elements of Denver's black community to incite violence. The effectiveness of the community patrols, the strengthening of Northeast Park Hill Civic Association, and Currigan's frequent meetings with black leaders highlights the fact that most blacks in the city simply did not condone violence. In an interview in 1970, a Denver resident and former Black Panther named James Young stated his belief that the people of Denver simply were not prepared for violence. Though he would deny the charges, Young had been ejected from the local Black Panther chapter for “[engaging] in unauthorized renegade-type acts of sabotage against community facilities,” and that he had attempted to organize other such acts of violence. If the Black Panthers had indeed been attempting to stir up trouble in Denver at this time, it is contradictory that they would expel a member so clearly willing to use violence to further the Panther cause". While Thomas Currigan proved to be unwilling to take more extreme measures against the possibility of racial violence beyond what could be seen as a continuation of his War on Poverty efforts, he seems to have been vindicated by the eventual disappearance of the fear of racial violence in Denver and around the country. Michael Flamm asserts that with the rise of urban violence in the late 1960s came an ascendency in government of more conservative measures of law and order that helped dispel the fear of an organized racial revolt”. The fear had evolved from that of a generational clash by disgruntled juveniles against their parents to the fear of organized rebellion and finally to a more personalized fear of individual crime. In Denver, however, much credit can be attributed both to the unique situation and efforts of Denver's black residents as well as to the Currigan administration for recognizing the perils of high % OReilly, “People Aren't Ready For Violence—Young.” The Denver Post, July 27, 1970 © Flamm, 17922 unemployment and idleness in a time wracked by social disorder. ‘The African Americans of Denver may have lived concentrated areas but they were far from ghettos; they may have experienced incidents of youthful frustration and anger but what they did could hardly be called rioting. And while the Currigan administration can be credited, the black community itself deserves most of the accolades in showing an unprecedented degree of solidarity and wor! 1g with cach other to maintain the position that they had achieved together. Equality was far from the reality in Denver in the 1960s, but the residents of Park Hill proved that they were capable of recognizing their situation and working to maintain and improve upon it. An opinion piece from a white resident of Denver, that ran in the Denver Post in 1970 remarked that Park Hill was undoubtedly the most interesting neighborhood in the city: “The community spirit is the kind of thing you can feel when you visit there. It is all the more impressive and intriguing because of the widespread desire to show that families from different races can live together...not just in tolerance, but in friendship and true neighborliness. That's exciting and unusual.”** Ditmer, "Spirit! Seeret to Park Hill.” The Denver Post, May 8, 1970