EMINENTDOMAIN

Week9Atty.OuanosClass
LawonPublicCorporation
Can be exercised by local governments under section 19 of the Local
Government Code through:
1. through its chief executive acting pursuant to an ordinance
2. Provided that it is for public use or purspose or welfare for the benefit
of the poor and the landless
3. Payment of just compensation is needed. 15% of the fair market value
of the property at the time of the taking
4. A valid definite offer has been previously made to which the owner did
not accept.
Exercised through its chief executive acting pursuant to an
Ordinance
Cases:
Municipality of Paranque vs VM Realty Corporation
Principle:
The court held in this case that a mere resolution is not enough to initiate an
expropriation proceeding which requires and ordinance. An ordinance has a
force and effect of law while a resolution is merely an expression of the
sentiment of the local legislative body.
Facts:
Under a city council resolution, the Municipality of Paraaque filed on
September 20, 1993, a Complaint for expropriation against Private
Respondent V.M. Realty Corporation over two parcels of land of 10,000
square meters. The city previously negotiated for the sale of the property but
VM didnt accept.
The trial court issued an Order dated February 4, 1994, authorizing petitioner
to take possession of the subject property upon deposit with its clerk of court
of an amount equivalent to 15 percent of its fair market value based on its
current tax declaration.
According to the respondent, the complaint failed to state a cause of action
because it was filed pursuant to a resolution and not to an ordinance as
required by RA 7160 (the Local Government Code); and (b) the cause of
action, if any, was barred by a prior judgment or res judicata.
Petitioner claimed that res judicata was not applicable.
The trial court dismissed the case. The petitioners MFR was denied. The CA
affirmed.

Issue
WON a resolution duly approved by the municipal council has the same
force and effect of an ordinance and will not deprive an expropriation
case of a valid cause of action.
Held:
NO A RESOLUTION DOES NOT HAVE A FORCE AND EFFECT OF LAW
1. Petitioner contends that a resolution approved by the municipal council for
the purpose of initiating an expropriation case substantially complies with
the requirements of the law because the terms ordinance and resolution
are synonymous for the purpose of bestowing authority [on] the local
government unit through its chief executive to initiate the expropriation
proceedings in court in the exercise of the power of eminent domain.
To strengthen this point, the petitioner cited Article 36, Rule VI of the Rules
and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code, which provides:
If the LGU fails to acquire a private property for public use, purpose, or
welfare through purchase, the LGU may expropriate said property through a
resolution of the Sanggunian authorizing its chief executive to initiate
expropriation proceedings.
Court-No. The power of eminent domain is lodged in the legislative branch of
government, which may delegate the exercise thereof to LGUs, other public
entities and public utilities. An LGU may therefore exercise the power to
expropriate private property only when authorized by Congress and subject
to the latters control and restraints, imposed through the law conferring the
power or in other legislations.
Sec 19, RA 7160
A local government unit may, through its chief executive and acting pursuant
to an ordinance, exercise the power of eminent domain for public use, or
purpose, or welfare for the benefit of the poor and the landless, upon
payment of just compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution
and pertinent laws.
Thus, the following essential requisites must concur before an LGU can
exercise the power of eminent domain:
1. An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the
local chief executive, in behalf of the LGU, to exercise the power of eminent
domain or pursue expropriation proceedings over a particular private
property.
2. The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose or
welfare, or for the benefit of the poor and the landless.
3. There is payment of just compensation, as required under Section 9,
Article III of the Constitution, and other pertinent laws.

4. A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of the
property sought to be expropriated, but said offer was not accepted.
In the case at bar, the local chief executive sought to exercise the power of
eminent domain pursuant to a resolution of the municipal council. Thus,
there was no compliance with the first requisite that the mayor be authorized
through an ordinance.
We are not convinced by petitioners insistence that the terms resolution
and ordinance are synonymous. A municipal ordinance is different from a
resolution. An ordinance is a law, but a resolution is merely a declaration of
the sentiment or opinion of a lawmaking body on a specific matter. An
ordinance possesses a general and permanent character, but a resolution is
temporary in nature.
If Congress intended to allow LGUs to exercise eminent domain through a
mere resolution, it would have simply adopted the language of the previous
Local Government Code. But Congress did not. In a clear divergence from
the previous Local Government Code, Section 19 of RA 7160 categorically
requires that the local chief executive act pursuant to an ordinance.
Moreover, the power of eminent domain necessarily involves a derogation of
a fundamental or private right of the people.[35] Accordingly,
the manifest change in the legislative language -- from resolution under BP
337 to ordinance under RA 7160 -- demands a strict construction.
When the legislature interferes with that right and, for greater public
purposes, appropriates the land of an individual without his consent, the plain
meaning of the law should not be enlarged by doubtful interpretation.
Petitioner relies on Article 36, Rule VI of the Implementing Rules, which
requires only a resolution to authorize an LGU to exercise eminent domain. It
is axiomatic that the clear letter of the law is controlling and cannot be
amended by a mere administrative rule issued for its implementation.
Strictly speaking, the power of eminent domain delegated to an LGU is in
reality not eminent but inferior domain, since it must conform to the limits
imposed by the delegation, and thus partakes only of a share in eminent
domain.
Moday vs Court of Appeals

Facts:
Percival Moday is a landowner in Bunawan, Agusan del Sur. In 1989, the
Sangguniang Bayan of Bunawan passed a resolution authorizing the mayor
to initiate an expropriation case against a 1 hectare portion of Modays land.
Purpose of which was to erect a gymnasium and other public buildings. The

mayor approved the resolution and the resolution was transmitted to the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan which disapproved the said resolution ruling that
the expropriation is not necessary because there are other lots owned by
Bunawan that can be used for such purpose. The mayor pushed through with
the expropriation nonetheless.
ISSUE:

Whether or not a municipality may expropriate private property by

virtue of a municipal resolution which was disapproved by the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan.

HELD:
Yes. Eminent domain, the power which the Municipality of Bunawan
exercised in the instant case, is a fundamental State power that is
inseparable from sovereignty.

It is governments right to appropriate, in the

nature of a compulsory sale to the State, private property for public use or
purpose.

Inherently possessed by the national legislature, the power of

eminent domain may be validly delegated to local governments, other public

entities and public utilities.

For the taking of private property by the

government to be valid, the taking must be for public use and there must be
just compensation. The only ground upon which a provincial board may
declare any municipal resolution, ordinance, or order invalid is when such
resolution, ordinance, or order is beyond the powers conferred upon the
council or president making the same . This was not the case in the case at
bar as the SP merely stated that there are other available lands for the
purpose sought, the SP did not even bother to declare the SB resolution as
invalid. Hence, the expropriation case is valid.

For Public Use or purpose or welfare for the benefit of the poor and the
landless
The concept of public use was limited to uses that are readily available to
any member of the community like the case of a public road bridge or plaza.

However the concept of public use has already been expanded to mean
promotion of a general welfare.
Under the implementing rules of the Local Government Code of 1991 the
following shall be considered public use, purpose or welfare
a. socialized housing
b. Construction of extension of roads, streets, side walks, viaducts,
bridges,ferries, levees, wharves or piers,
c. Construction and improvement of public buildings
d. Establishment of parks playgrounds and plazas.
e. Establishment of a market place
f.

Construction of artesian wells or water supply system

g. Establishment of cemeteries or crematories

h. Establishment of drainage system cesspools or sewerage systems
i.

Construction of canals irregation and dams

j.

Establishment of Nurseries

k. Establishment of Abattoirs
l.

Building of research, breeding, or dispersal centers for animals

Cases:
Masikip vs City of Pasig
Principle
- the power of eminent domain is not inherent in LGU and must be expressly
provided for by statute
FACTS:

Lourdes Dela Paz Masikip is the registered owner of a parcel of land, which
the City of Pasig sought to expropriate a portion thereof for the sports
development and recreational activities of the residents of Barangay
Caniogan. This was in January 1994. Masikip refused.
On March 23, 1994, City of Pasig sought again to expropriate said portion of
land for the alleged purpose that it was in line with the program of the
Municipal Government to provide land opportunities to deserving poor sectors
of our community.
Petitioner protested, so City of Pasig filed with the trial court a complaint for
expropriation. The Motion to Dismiss filed by Masikip was dismissed by the
Trial court on the ground that there was genuine necessity to expropriate the
property. Case was elevated to the Court of Appeals, which dismissed petition
for lack of merit.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
- W/N there was genuine necessity to expropriate the property
HELD:
Eminent domain is the right of a government to take and appropriate private
property to the public use, whenever the public exigency requires it, which
can be done only on condition of providing a reasonably compensation
therefor. It is the power of the State or its instrumentalities to take private
property for public use and is inseparable from sovereignty and inherent in
government.
This power is lodged in the legislative branch of government. It delegates the
power thereof to the LGUs, other public entities and public utility
corporations, subject only to constitutional limitations. LGUs have no inherent
power of eminent domain and may exercise it only when expressly authorized
by statute.
Sec. 19, LGC: LGU may, through its chief executive and acting pursuant to an
ordinance, exercise the power of eminent domain for public use, purpose or
welfare for the benefit of the poor and landless, upon payment of just
compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent
laws.
Provided:
(1) power of eminent domain may not be exercised unless a valid and definite
offer has been previously made to the owner and such offer was not
accepted;
(2) LGU may immediately take possession of the property upon the filing of
expropriation proceedings and upon making a deposit with the proper court

of at least 15% fair market value of the property based on the current tax
declaration; and
(3) amount to be paid for expropriated property shall be determined by the
proper court, based on the fair market value at the time of the taking of the
property
There is already an established sports development and recreational activity
center at Rainforest Park in Pasig City. Evidently, there is no genuine
necessity to justify the expropriation. The records show that the Certification
issued by the Caniogan Barangay Council which became the basis for the
passage of Ordinance No. 4, authorizing the expropriation, indicates that the
intended beneficiary is the Melendres Compound Homeowners Association, a
private, non-profit organization, not the residents of Caniogan.
PAYMENT OF JUST COMPENSATION
Sec. 8 Art. II of the 1987 Constitution provides that no private property shall
be taken for public use without the payment of just compensation.
Just compensation is described as the full and fair equivalent of the property
taken from the privtae owner by the expropriator.
Note: The value of just compensation is determined at the time of the taking.
A VALID DEFINITE OFFER WAS PREVIOUSLY MADE TO THE OWNER
SUCH WAS NOT ACCEPTED
As required by the Local Government Code, the LGU must first make an offer
to buy the private property before it can legally initiate an expropriation
proceeding so that if the owner of the property agree to sell it the local
government unit need not expropriate the property.
If the owner or owners are willing to sell their property to a higher price than
that was offered the local chief executive shall call them to a conference for
the purpose of reaching an agreement on the selling price
It is encumbent upon the condemnor to exhaust all reasonable efforts to
obtain the land it desires by agreement. Failure to prove compliance with the
mandatory requirement will result to the dismissal of the complaint for
expropriation.
In expropriation for Urban Land reform and housing additional requirements
must be observe pursuant to RA 7279.
SEC. 9. Priorities in the Acquisition of Land. Lands for socialized housing shall be acquired in
the following order:
(a) Those owned by the government or any of its subdivisions, instrumentalities, or agencies,
including government-owned or -controlled corporations and their subsidiaries;

(b) Alienable lands of the public domain;

(c) Unregistered or abandoned and idle lands;
(d) Those within the declared Areas for Priority Development, Zonal Improvement Program
sites, and Slum Improvement and Resettlement Program sites which have not yet been
acquired;
(e) Bagong Lipunan Improvement of Sites and Services or BLISS sites which have not yet been
acquired; and
(f) Privately-owned lands.
Where on-site development is found more practicable and advantageous to the beneficiaries,
the priorities mentioned in this section shall not apply. The local government units shall give
budgetary priority to on-site development of government lands.
SEC. 10. Modes of Land Acquisition. The modes of acquiring lands for purposes of this Act
shall include, among others, community mortgage, land swapping, land assembly or
consolidation, land banking, donation to the government, joint-venture agreement, negotiated
purchase, and expropriation: Provided, however, That expropriation shall be resorted to only
when other modes of acquisition have been exhausted: Provided, further, That where
expropriation is resorted to, parcels of land owned by small property owners shall be
exempted for purposes of this Act: Provided, finally, That abandoned property, as herein
defined, shall be reverted and escheated to the State in a proceeding analogous to the
procedure laid down in Rule 91 of the Rules of Court.
For the purpose of socialized housing, government-owned and foreclosed properties shall be
acquired by the local government units, or by the National Housing Authority primary through
negotiated purchase: Provided, That qualified beneficiaries who are actual occupants of the
land shall be given the right of first refusal.

Cases:
G.R. No. 152230
Petitioner : Jesus is Lord Christian School Foundation
Respondents: Municipality of Pasig
Facts
Compliance For Public Use
The Municipality of Pasig needed an access road from E. R. Santos
Street, a municipal road to Barangay Sto. Tomas Bukid, Pasig.
The Fire Code required that the road had to be at least 3 meters in
width so that fire trucks could pass in case of fire. The residents
likewise needed the road for water and electrical outlets.
The municipality then decided to acquire 51 square meters out of the
1,791 sq/meter property of Lorenzo Ching Cuanco, Victor Ching Cuanco
and Ernesto Ching Cuanco adjacent of E.R. Santos Street.
Compliance of Valid Ordinance
On April 19, 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan of Pasig approved an
Ordinance authorizing the Mayor to initiate expropriation proceedings
and appropriate the funds therefore. The Ordinance state that the

owners were notified of the intent to purchase and they rejected the
offer.
Compliance of Just Compensation
On July 21, 1993, the Municipality filed a complaint, amended on Aug 6, 1993
against the Ching Cuancos for refusing to sell the land. The Municipality
deposited with the RTC 15% of the market value and the RTC subsequently
issued a writ of possession over the property.
On Nov 26, 1993, the plaintiff caused the annotation of a notice of lis
pendens under the name of Jesus Is Lord Christian School Foundation,
Incorporated (JILCSFI) which had purchased the property.
The Municipality then constructed a cemented road with a width of three
meters and was called Damayan Street.
NB: A notice of lis pendens is an announcement to the whole world
that a particular real property is in litigation, serving as a warning that
one who acquires an interest over said property does so at his own
risk, or that he gambles on the result of the litigation over the said
property
Contention of JILCSFI
JILCSFI answered that the exercise of eminent domain was only for a
particular class and not for the benefit of the poor and landless. It alleged
that the property is not the best portion for the road. It also averred that it
had been denied the use and enjoyment of its property.
Eduardo Villanueva, Chairman of the Board of Trustees and President of
JILCSFI, testified that the parcel of land was purchased for purposes of
constructing a school building and a church as worship center. He averred
that the realization of these projects was delayed due to the passing of the
ordinance for expropriation.
During trial, Rolando Togonon, the plaintiffs messenger, testified that on
February 23, 1993, he served a letter of Engr. Jose Reyes, the Technical
Assistant to the Mayor on Infrastructure, to Lorenzo Ching Cuanco. A lady
received the same and brought it inside the store. When she returned the
letter to him, it already bore the signature of Luz Bernarte. He identified a
photocopy of the letter as similar to the one he served at the store. On crossexamination, he admitted that he never met Luz Bernarte.
A fire marshall testified that he had seen the new road and averred that a
firetruck could pass through it. He estimated that houses in area ranged from
300 to 400. He also testified that Damayan Street is the only road in the
area.
Finally, Bonifacio Maceda, Jr., Tax Mapper IV, testified that, according to their
records, JILCSFI became the owner of the property only on January 13, 1994

The plaintiff offered in evidence a photocopy of the letter of Engr. Jose Reyes
addressed to Lorenzo Ching Cuanco to prove that the plaintiff made a definite
and valid offer to acquire the property to the co-owners. However, the RTC
rejected the same letter for being a mere photocopy.
Danilo Caballero averred that he had been a resident of Sto. Tomas Bukid for
seven years. From his house, he could use three streets to go to E. R. Santos
Street, namely, Catalina Street, Damayan Street and Bagong Taon Street. On
cross-examination, he admitted that no vehicle could enter Sto. Tomas Bukid
except through the newly constructed Damayan Street.
RTC Ruling
On September 3, 1997, the RTC issued an Order in favor of the plaintiff, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing and in accordance with Section 4, Rule
67 of the Revised Rules of Court, the Court Resolves to DECLARE the plaintif
as having a lawful right to take the property in question for purposes for
which the same is expropriated.
The RTC held that, as gleaned from the declaration in Ordinance No. 21, there
was substantial compliance with the definite and valid offer requirement of
Section 19 of R.A. No. 7160, and that the expropriated portion is the most
convenient access to the interior of Sto. Tomas Bukid.
The Court of Appeals Decision
In a Decision dated March 13, 2001, the CA affirmed the order of the RTC.
[28] The CA agreed with the trial court that the plaintiff substantially
complied with Section 19 of R.A. No. 7160, particularly the requirement that a
valid and definite offer must be made to the owner.
The CA declared that the letter of Engr. Reyes, inviting Lorenzo Ching Cuanco
to a conference to discuss with him the road project and the price of the lot,
was a substantial compliance with the valid and definite offer requirement
under said Section 19.
In addition, the CA noted that there was also constructive notice to the
defendants of the expropriation proceedings since a notice of lis
pendens was annotated at the dorsal portion of TCT No. PT-92579 on
November 26, 1993
Finally, the CA upheld the public necessity for the subject property
based on the findings of the trial court that the portion of the property
sought to be expropriated appears to be, not only the most convenient
access to the interior of Sto. Tomas Bukid, but also an easy path for
vehicles entering the area, particularly fire trucks.
Moreover, the CA took into consideration the provision of Article 33 of
the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code,
which regards the construction or extension of roads, streets,
sidewalks as public use, purpose or welfare.
Motion for Reconsideration of JILCSFI

10

On April 6, 2001, JILCSFI filed a motion for reconsideration of the said decision
alleging that the CA erred in relying on the photocopy of Engr. Reyes letter to
Lorenzo Ching Cuanco because the same was not admitted in evidence by
the trial court for being a mere photocopy.
It also contended that the CA erred in concluding that constructive
notice of the expropriation proceeding, in the form of annotation of the
notice of lis pendens, could be considered as a substantial compliance
with the requirement under Section 19 of the Local Government Code
for a valid and definite offer. JILCSFI also averred that no inspection
was ever ordered by the trial court to be conducted on the property,
and, if there was one, it had the right to be present thereat since an
inspection is considered to be part of the trial of the case.
The CA denied the motion for reconsideration for lack of merit. It held that it
was not precluded from considering the photocopyof the letter,
notwithstanding that the same was excluded by the trial court, since the fact
of its existence was duly established by corroborative evidence.
This corroborative evidence consisted of the testimony of the plaintiffs
messenger that he personally served the letter to Lorenzo Ching Cuanco, and
Municipal Ordinance No. 21 which expressly stated that the property owners
were already notified of the expropriation proceeding.
The CA noted that JILCSFI failed to adduce controverting evidence, thus the
presumption of regularity was not overcome
Issue
(1) whether the respondent complied with the requirement, under Section 19
of the Local Government Code, of a valid and definite offer to acquire the
property prior to the filing of the complaint;

The petitioner stresses that the law explicitly requires that a valid and
definite offer be made to the owner of the property and that such offer
was not accepted. It argues that, in this case, there was no evidence to
show that such offer has been made either to the previous owner or
the petitioner, the present owner.
The petitioner contends that the photocopy of the letter of Engr. Reyes,
notifying Lorenzo Ching Cuanco of the respondents intention to
construct a road on its property, cannot be considered because the
trial court did not admit it in evidence.
And assuming that such letter is admissible in evidence, it would not
prove that the offer has been made to the previous owner because
mere notice of intent to purchase is not equivalent to an offer to
purchase.
Ruling

The exercise of the right of eminent domain, whether directly by the State or
by its authorized agents, is necessarily in derogation of private rights. It is

11

one of the harshest proceedings known to the law. Consequently, when the
sovereign delegates the power to a political unit or agency, a strict
construction will be given against the agency asserting the power.
Corollarily, the respondent, which is the condemnor, has the burden of
proving all the essentials necessary to show the right of condemnation. It has
the burden of proof to establish that it has complied with all the requirements
provided by law for the valid exercise of the power of eminent domain.
Valid and Definite Offer
Article 35 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government
Code provides:
ARTICLE 35. Ofer to Buy and Contract of Sale.
1. The ofer to buy private property for public use or purpose shall be in
writing. It shall specify the property sought to be acquired, the
reasons for its acquisition, and the price ofered.
2. If the owner or owners accept the ofer in its entirety, a contract of
sale shall be executed and payment forthwith made.
3. If the owner or owners are willing to sell their property but at a price
higher than that ofered to them, the local chief executive shall call
them to a conference for the purpose of reaching an agreement on the
selling price. The chairman of the appropriation or finance committee
of the sanggunian, or in his absence, any member of the sanggunian
duly chosen as its representative, shall participate in the conference.
When an agreement is reached by the parties, a contract of sale shall
be drawn and executed.
4. The contract of sale shall be supported by the following documents:
(1) Resolution of the sanggunian authorizing the local chief
executive to enter into a contract of sale. The resolution shall
specify the terms and conditions to be embodied in the
contract;
(2) Ordinance appropriating the amount specified in the contract;
and
(3) Certification of the local treasurer as to availability of funds
together with a statement that such fund shall not be disbursed
or spent for any purpose other than to pay for the purchase of
the property involved.
The respondent was burdened to prove the mandatory requirement of a valid
and definite offer to the owner of the property before filing its complaint and
the rejection thereof by the latter.
An offer is a unilateral proposition which one party makes to the other
for the celebration of a contract. It creates a power of acceptance
permitting the offeree, by accepting the offer, to transform the offerors
promise into a contractual obligation
Corollarily, the offer must be complete, indicating with sufficient
clearness the kind of contract intended and definitely stating the

12

essential conditions of the proposed contract.[53] An offer would

require, among other things, a clear certainty on both the object and
the cause or consideration of the envisioned contract
The purpose of the requirement of a valid and definite offer to be first made
to the owner is to encourage settlements and voluntary acquisition of
property needed for public purposes in order to avoid the expense and delay
of a court action.
The law is designed to give to the owner the opportunity to sell his land
without the expense and inconvenience of a protracted and expensive
litigation. This is a substantial right which should be protected in every
instance.
It encourages acquisition without litigation and spares not only the
landowner but also the condemnor, the expenses and delays of litigation. It
permits the landowner to receive full compensation, and the entity acquiring
the property, immediate use and enjoyment of the property.
A reasonable offer in good faith, not merely perfunctory or pro forma offer, to
acquire the property for a reasonable price must be made to the owner or his
privy. A single bona fide offer that is rejected by the owner will suffice.
In the present case, the respondent failed to prove that before it filed its
complaint, it made a written definite and valid offer to acquire the property
for public use as an access road. The only evidence adduced by the
respondent to prove its compliance with Section 19 of the Local Government
Code is the photocopy of the letter purportedly bearing the signature of Engr.
Jose Reyes, to only one of the co-owners, Lorenzo Ching Cuanco.
MR. LORENZO CHING CUANCO
18 Alcalde Jose Street
Capasigan, Pasig
Metro Manila
Dear Mr. Cuanco:
This refers to your parcel of land located along E. Santos Street,
Barangay Palatiw, Pasig, Metro Manila embraced in and covered by
TCT No. 66585, a portion of which with an area of fifty-one (51) square
meters is needed by the Municipal Government of Pasig for conversion
into a road-right of way for the benefit of several residents living in the
vicinity of your property. Attached herewith is the sketch plan for your
information.
In this connection, may we respectfully request your presence in our
office to discuss this project and the price that may be mutually
agreed upon by you and the Municipality of Pasig.
Thank you.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.)
ENGR. JOSE L. REYES Technical Asst. to the Mayoron Infrastructure[59]
It bears stressing, however, that the respondent offered the letter only to
prove its desire or intent to acquire the property for a right-of-way. The
document was not offered to prove that the respondent made a definite and
valid offer to acquire the property. Moreover, the RTC rejected the document

13

because the respondent failed to adduce in evidence the original copy

thereof.
The respondent, likewise, failed to adduce evidence that copies of the letter
were sent to and received by all the co-owners of the property, namely,
Lorenzo Ching Cuanco, Victor Ching Cuanco and Ernesto Kho.
The respondent sought to prove, through the testimony of its messenger,
Rolando Togonon, that Lorenzo Ching Cuanco received the original of the said
letter. But Togonon testified that he merely gave the letter to a lady, whom he
failed to identify. He stated that the lady went inside the store of Lorenzo
Ching Cuanco, and later gave the letter back to him bearing the signature
purportedly of one Luz Bernarte. However, Togonon admitted, on crossexamination, that he did not see Bernarte affixing her signature on the letter.
Togonon also declared that he did not know and had never met Lorenzo Ching
Cuanco and Bernarte.
Even if the letter was, indeed, received by the co-owners, the letter is not a
valid and definite offer to purchase a specific portion of the property for a
price certain. It is merely an invitation for only one of the co-owners, Lorenzo
Ching Cuanco, to a conference to discuss the project and the price that may
be mutually acceptable to both parties.
Neither is the declaration in one of the whereas clauses of the ordinance that
the property owners were already notified by the municipality of the intent to
purchase the same for public use as a municipal road, a substantial
compliance with the requirement of a valid and definite offer under Section
19 of R.A. No. 7160.
Ruling: IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED.
The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED
AND SET ASIDE. The RTC is ordered to dismiss the complaint of the
respondent without prejudice to the refiling thereof.
32MunicipalityofMeycauayanvs.IntermediateAppellateCourt[GRL72126,29January1988]
ThirdDivision,GutierrezJr.(J):4concur
Facts:
In 1975, the Philippine Pipes and Merchandising Corporation (PPMC) filed with the Office of the
MunicipalMayorofMeycauayan,Bulacan,anapplicationforapermittofenceaparceloflandwitha
widthof26.8metersandalengthof184.37meterscoveredbyTCTs215165and37879.Thefencingof
saidpropertywasallegedlytoenablethestorageofPMC'sheavyequipmentandvariousfinishedproducts
suchaslargediametersteelpipes,pontoonpipesforports,wharves,andharbors,bridgecomponents,pre
stressedgirdersandpiles,largediameterconcretepipes,andpartsforlowcosthousing.Inthesameyear,
the MunicipalCouncilofMeycauayan,headedbythenMayorCelsoR.Legaspi,passedResolution258,
Seriesof1975,manifestingtheintentiontoexpropriatetherespondent'sparceloflandcoveredbyTCT
37879.AnoppositiontotheresolutionwasfiledbythePPMCwiththeOfficeoftheProvincialGovernor,
which,inturn,createdaspecialcommitteeoffourmemberstoinvestigatethematter.On10March1976,
the Special Committee recommended that the Provincial Board of Bulacan disapprove or annul the
resolutioninquestionbecausetherewasnogenuinenecessityfortheMunicipalityofMeycauayanto
expropriatetherespondent'spropertyforuseasapublicroad.Onthebasisofthisreport,theProvincial
BoardofBulacanpassedResolution238,Seriesof1976,disapprovingandannullingResolution258,
Seriesof1975,oftheMunicipalCouncilofMeycauayan.ThePPMC,then,reiteratedtotheOfficeofthe
Mayoritspetitionfortheapprovalofthepermittofencetheaforesaidparcelsofland.On21October1983,

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however, the Municipal Council of Meycauayan, now headed by Mayor Adriano D. Daez, passed
Resolution21,Seriesof1983,forthepurposeofexpropriatinganewPPMC'sland.TheProvincialBoardof
Bulacan approved the aforesaid resolution on 25 January 1984. Thereafter, the Municipality of
Meycauayan,on14February1984,filedwiththeRegionalTrialCourtofMalolos,Bulacan,BranchVI,a
specialcivilactionforexpropriation.UpondepositoftheamountofP24,025.00,whichisthemarketvalue
oftheland,withthePhilippineNationalBank,thetrialcourton1March1984issuedawritofpossession
infavorofthemunicipality.On27August1984,thetrialcourtissuedanorderdeclaringthetakingofthe
propertyaslawfulandappointingtheProvincialAssessorofBulacanascourtcommissionerwhoshallhold
thehearingtoascertainthejustcompensationfortheproperty.PPMCwenttotheIntermediateAppellate
Courtonpetitionforreview.On10January1985,theappellatecourtaffirmedthetrialcourt'sdecision.
However,uponmotionforreconsiderationbyPPMC,thedecisionwasreexaminedandreversed.The
appellatecourtheldthatthereisnogenuinenecessitytoexpropriatethelandforuseasapublicroadas
therewereseveralotherroadsforthesamepurposeandanothermoreappropriatelotfortheproposed
publicroad.Thecourt,takingintoconsiderationthelocationandsizeoftheland,alsoopinedthattheland
ismoreidealforuseasstorageareaforrespondent'sheavyequipmentandfinishedproducts.Afterits
motionforreconsiderationwasdenied,themunicipalitywenttotheSupremeCourtonpetitionforreview
oncertiorarion25October1985.
Issue:

WhetherthereisgenuinenecessitytoexpropriatePPMCspropertyforthepurposeofa
connectingroad,inlightofotherappropriatelotsforthepurpose.

Held:
ThereisnoquestionhereastotherightoftheStatetotakeprivatepropertyforpublicuseuponpaymentof
justcompensation.Whatisquestionedistheexistenceofagenuinenecessitytherefor.
Thefoundationoftherighttoexercisethepowerofeminentdomainisgenuinenecessityandthatnecessity
mustbeofapubliccharacter.Condemnationofprivatepropertyisjustifiedonlyifitisforthepublicgood
andthereisagenuinenecessityofapubliccharacter.Consequently,thecourtshavethepowertorequire
intothelegalityoftheexerciseoftherightofeminentdomainandtodeterminewhetherthereisagenuine
necessitytherefor.Thegovernmentmaynotcapriciouslychoosewhatprivatepropertyshouldbetaken.
WithduerecognitionthenofthepowerofCongresstodesignatetheparticularpropertytobetakenand
howmuchConstitutionalLawII,2005(22)Narratives(BerneGuerrero)thereofmaybecondemnedinthe
exercise of the power of expropriation, it is still a judicial question whether in the exercise of such
competence,thepartyadverselyaffectedisthevictimofpartialityandprejudice.Thattheequalprotection
clausewillnotallow. TheSpecial Committee'sReport,dated10March1976,statedthat"thereisno
genuine necessity for the Municipality of Meycauayan to expropriate the aforesaid property of the
PhilippinePipesandMerchandizingCorporationforuseasapublicroad.Consideringthatinthevicinity
thereareotheravailableroadandvacantlotofferedforsalesituatedsimilarlyasthelotinquestionand
lyingidle,unlikethelotsoughttobeexpropriatedwhichwasfoundbytheCommitteetobebadlyneeded
bythecompanyasasiteforitsheavyequipmentafteritisfencedtogetherwiththeadjoiningvacantlot,
thejustificationtocondemnthesamedoesnotappeartobeveryimperativeandnecessaryandwouldonly
causeunjustifieddamagetothefirm.ThedesireoftheMunicipalityofMeycauayantobuildapublicroad
todecongestthevolumeoftrafficcanbefullyandbetterattainedbyacquiringtheotheravailableroadsin
thevicinitymaybeat lessercostswithoutcausingharmtoanestablishment doinglegitimatebusiness
therein.Or,themunicipalitymayseektoexpropriateaportionofthevacantlotalsointhevicinityoffered
forsaleforawiderpublicroadtoattaindecongestionoftrafficbecauseasobservedbytheCommittee,the
lotoftheCorporationsoughttobetakenwillonlyaccommodateaonewaytrafficlaneandtherefore,will
notsufficetoimproveanddecongesttheflowoftrafficandpedestriansintheMalhacanarea."Thereis
absolutelynoshowinginthepetitionwhythemoreappropriatelotfortheproposedroadwhichwasoffered

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forsalehasnotbeenthesubjectofthemunicipalities'sattempttoexpropriateassumingthereisarealneed
foranotherconnectingroad.

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