Tattwa Kaumudi Waczaspati Misra G Jha Ed., Bombay 1896

ENGLISH TRANSLATION,
WITH THE
SANSKRIT TEXT,
OF THE
TATTVA-KAUMUDI
(SANKHYA)
OF
VACHASPATI MISRA,
BY
GANGlNlTHA
JHl, M. A.;
GOVERNMENT SCHOLAR
F.T.S.
N. W. P. (1888-90)
MEDALLIST OP THE UNIVERSITY OF ALLAHABAD
MITEA MEDALLIST AND VIZIANAGRAM SCHOLAR (QUEEN
COLLEGE,
LIBRARIAN, RAJ DARBHANGA.
Published for the
BOMBAY TEEOSOPHICAL PUBLICATION

"
BY
TOOKABAM TATYA,
F.T.S.
1896.
Price 2 Rupees.
FUND>\
BOMBAY:
PKINTED AT THE
"
TATTVA-VIVECHAKA
5>
PRESg.
PREFACE.
FOR
Is
the
little
we know
of Vachaspati Misra
referred to the Sanskrit Introduction
wherein
the reader
is
it
shown
that he was a Maithila Brahrnana and flourished somewhere
about the 9th Century A. D. For Udayanacharya the author

of the "Parisuddi" on Vachaspati Misra s
Tatparya-Tika,"
"
Lakshinana Sen of Bengal, of

whose era we have just commenced the 8th century and at
least a century must have elapsed before a work could
flourished in the reign of king
deserve
the honor of a
commentary
the
at
hands
of
Udayanacharya.
I take this opportunity to thank my friend Balu Govindadasa of Benares, to whom I owe more than I can express,
who has been
chiefly
instrumental in
my
undertaking and
finishing not only of the present translation, but also of the

Kavyaprakasa and the Nyaya -Muktavali, and some works on
Mimansa.
My
of
for his publication of the
Bombay
thanks are also due to Tookaram Tatya Esq.

work, and also to the
proprietors of the
"
"
Theosophist
reprint of the translation
which
of
first
Madras
for allowing
appeared in the
of that excellent journal.
RAJ LIBRARY, DARBHANGA
V
1st July 1896.
GANGANATHA
columns
JHA.
OF CONTENTS.
LIST
PAG1.
Introduction
KARIKA
1
Senediction
Introduction to Karika I
Necessity of Scientific Enquiry

Threefold Division of Pain
5
6
Reply
Auspiciousness of the beginning
Objection-Inquiry Superfluous
word
II.
Objection- Adequacy
Similarity of the Vedic with the Obvious means
16
Source of discriminative Knowledge...
13
14
KARIKA
17
18
19
20
Vedic means
of
15
12
...
Impurity, Decay and Excessiveness of the Vedic means

...
The Impurity of animal slaughter in Sacrifice
Nonpermanence and Excess of the results of Vedic rites
Immortality from Vedic rites means long-durability
...
Discriminative wisdom the only means
Literal Interpretation of the Karika
...
10
11
xxxii
I.
...
KARIKA
8
xvii
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
8
8
III.
Fourfold Division of Categories

The Productive (1)
The Productive-product (2)

The Products (3)
The non-product non-productive
9
9
10
21
10
(4)
KARIKA
IV.
10
22
The three kinds
23
Proof defined
24
The
three- foldness of proof

Only three kinds of proof
...
25
26
The inclusion
...
of Proof
27
of all other proofs in the above-mentioned

Necessity of enquiry into the different kinds of proof
28
The order
29
Specific definitions of the proofs
of
"
Perception,"
defined
...
12
12
12
Explanation
KARIKA
UO
11
V.
12
...
...
13
VI
PAGE.
31
Insentience of Buddhi
32
13
33
Differentiation of w Perception from the other forms of proof

Inference as a distinct form of proof
...
34
Inference defined
15
35
The three kinds of Inference

The first Division of Inference
The Negative a posteriori Inference
The Affirmative a priori Inference
Valid Testimony based on Inference
15
36
37
38
39
"
"
"
Self -evidence of Sruti
45
46
47
48
49
52
Analogy, included in Valid Testimony

included in Inference
"Apparent Inconsistency
...
"
"
16
...
19
19
...
...
...
20
21
"
"
18
18
18
...
"
included in
"
Negation
Perception
in Inference
22
Probability
Eumour discarded
22
VI.
22
Introduction
Nature
Knowledge
Knowledge
of
Objection
Nature
of others
&c.,
through Inference
by Revelation
KARIKA
53
...
16
18
KARIKA
50
51
...
...
Differentiation of Valid Testimony from Inference

Other kinds of proof set aside or included in above
"
14
17
Srutis and Puranas included in Valid Testimony

Pretended Revelations
44
...
"
"
41
42
14
16
40
43
...
...
...
23
23
...
VII.
&c., being not amenable to the
senses, are
23
...
...
...
...
non-existing ...
54,55 Different causes of non-perception of objects by the Senses
56 Non-perception of an object, no proof of non-existence
KARIKA
24
25
25
VIII.
(
57
Objection-existence of Nature can be denied like that of skyflowers-started, and set aside there are effects bearing testimony
:
to the existence of Nature
68
Such
effects
26
...
mentioned
KIRIKA
26
IX.
59
Different views with regard to the nature of an effect
60
Impossibility of the existence of Nature being proved in accord

ance with the Vedanta and Bauddha tenets
27
61
Effect declared to be a
28
62
Bauddha view refuted

Vedanta view refuted
63
permanent Entity
,
26
...
...
28
28
VII
PAGE?
64
Yoga and Vaiseshika views criticised and the Sankhya view

established the first argument in favour there of
...
The second argument in favour of the effect being an entity
The third argument
...
...
...
...
...
...
The fourth argument ...
The fifth argument
...
...
Proofs of the non -difference of cause and effect
...
The effect only a particular development of the cause
Difference of purpose and action no ground of difference
Objection based on the nature of the manifestation of the effect...
;
65
66
67
68
69
70
J
71
72
73
74
75
76
Objection set aside as being common to both theories

Production of the cloth not identical with the cloth
Necessity of causal operation
Conclusion of the Karika
...
KARIKA
...
...
...
...
...
30
30
31
31
32r
33
33
34
34
34
35
77
Introduction to the consideration of the Manifested
The Manifested-as having a cause

being non-eternal
...
29
X.
78
79
80
...
29
...
...
35
35
...
...
...
non-pervading...
...
...
...
...
35
35
81
active
35
82
multi-form
83
dependent
36
36
36
36
36
84
predicative
85
conjunct
subordinate
86
87
,.
The contrary nature
...
...
...
...
...
...
KAKIKA
XI.
XI
3T
88
Introduction to Karika
89
Similarities
90
...
being indiscriminative ...
Objection based on the Bauddha idealism
(i)
91
92
93
94
37
Unmanifested
of the
between the Manifested and the Unmanifested
having the three constituent attributes
(ii)
(iii)
Insentient
(iv)
Productive
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
37
37
38
38
38
95
Similarity with Nature stated ...

Dissimilarity of these from Spirit
96
Objection based on similarity of the Spirit with the Manifested
...
...
..,
...
38
38
39
KARIKA XH.
97
98
Introduction to the consideration of the Attributes
99
100
Character of the Attributes as love, aversion and stupefaction

The functions of the Attributes
101
The methctf
39
40
Construction of the Karika
of operation of the attributes
...
40
40
42
Vlll
PAGE.
KARIKA
XIII.
102
Introduction to Karika XIII
103
104
Properties of Goodness
Necessity of the properties of
105
Necessity of the properties of
106
Objection based on the impossibility of the co-operation of Attri

butes of contradictory properties
...
Necessity of postulating the three Attributes
107
"
"
"
"
Foulness
Darkness
"
...
...
42
42
43
43
"
43
44
KARIKA XIV.
108
Question of the Indiscreetness and other properties of the Attri

butes
109
Proof of the existence of such properties

Question of the Existence of Nature
110
...
45
45
...
46
KARIKA XV.
112
Why not accept the atomic theory

Proofs of Nature s Existence (1)
113
(2)
114
Objection
,111
union of cause and
Separation and final re
48
effect
due to Energy
...
These two reasons might rest with Buddhi. Eeply
Because Evolution
:
47
...
initial
49
is
from Finiteness
Because of homogenity
50
(3)
115
(4)
50
KARIKA XVI.
116
117
118
Operation through the Attributes

By a blending of the Attributes
Objection
How
diverse effects
119
,..
Keply
...
51
XVII.
Introduction to the Proofs of Spirit s Existence

Because all composite objects are for other
Proofs (1)
123
...
purpose.
124
A different interpretation
125
(4)
126
127
128
Question of the number of the Spirit raised

(1) From allotment of brith, death and the organs
(2) Since Activity is not Simultaneous
129
(3)
52
52
63
54
(2)
55
55
of proof (3)
Because of the tendency of writers and sages towards Beatitude
KARIKA
51
produce
...
...
Objection and reply

Because there must be supervision
(3) Because there must be one to feel
121
122
51
...
can an attribute of uniform nature
KARIKA
120
...
55
XVIII.
Because the modifications of the Attributes are differert
56
57
57
...
58
IX
PAGE*
KARIKA XIX.
130
68
introduction to the consideration of Spirit s Properties

in the Karika
this
58
"
131
Explanation of the force of
132
133
...
Necessity of so many Properties
Absence of the attributes leads to Emancipation
134
Neutrality
"
58
59
59
KARIKA XX.
135
Objection
136
The
and Activity always coexistent

by the objection must be a mistake
59
Intelligence
feeling referred to
...
60
KARIRA XXI.
what
the need of union
137
Objection
138
Force of the Genetive in
139
The need of union explained

The creation of Buddhi &c.,
140
is
"
Pradhanasya
Explained
61
61
KARIKA
XXII.
141
The Process
142
Process of the production of the Elements
of Creation.
61
...
KARIKA
Introduction to the "definition of Buddhi
144
Definition of
146
147
148
Buddhi explained
Properties of Buddhi Virtue &c
Four kinds of Dispassion
Eight kinds of Power
Reverse of the above qualities
62
XXIII.
143
145
60
60
"
62
...
...
63
63
63
64
64
KARIKA XXIV.
149
Definition of Self-consciousness
65
150
Direct effects of Self -consciousness
65
KARIKA XXV.
IB f Production of Senses
152
Objection
65
Purposelessness of Passions
and Reply thereto
...
66
KARIKA XXVI.
153
Sense defined
66
PAOE,
KARIKA XXVH.
154
Double nature of mind
155
Mind
156
157
158
Objection Why make mind a sense? and Reply thereto

Whence the multifarious effects from Egoism ?
.,
Destiny also a modification of the Attributes
159
Functions of the ten sense
160
Reflection
defined
...
...
.,
...
67
67
68
...
68
68
KAEIKA XXVHI.
69
organs
KARIKA XXIX.
of
Self-consciousness
Manas,
Ahankara and
of
Determination of Buddhi
common
161
The
162
163
Function of the organs

(2) Gradual
164
With regard
five vital Airs
70
70
to all
KARIKA XXX.
(1)
71
Instantaneous
71
objects function of the internal or

gans independent of the external ones
to
visible
71
KARIKA XXXI.
165
166
167
Objection
No
Functions permanent or otherwise
71
72
collision of the functions of the organs...
Objection
motives
How
can insentient organs comprehend each others

72
Reply thereto
KARIKA XXXII,
73
169
Division of the organs introduced

The thirteen organs and their functions
170
Objects of these functions
73
171
172
Sub-divisions of the organs introduced

The three external organs
168
73
KARIKA XXXIII.
c
..,.,,.,
74
...
74
173
The ten external organs
174
External organs operating at the present time, and the

at all Times
175
Time not a
176
Objects of external organs introduced

Specific and gross objects of the functions of intellectual organs
74
internal
<
74
75
distinct principle
KARIKA XXXIV.
177
178
explained
do.
Do.
75
75
organs of action
<
75
XI
PAGK.
KARIKA XXXV.
179 ,The importance of the internal organs
76
KARIKA XXXVI.
180
181
Predominance of Buddhi
The external organs as affections
77
77
of Attributes
KARIKA XXXVII.
182
183
Further grounds for the Superiority of Buddhi

Objection: absence of Mukti Reply thereto
78
78,79
KARIKA XXXVIII.
186
The Subtile character of the Tanmatras

The gross Elements produced out of the Tanmatras
These are Specific because soothing terrific and deluding
187
Three sorts of Specific Objects
188
Subtile bodies are permanent
184
185
79
79
...
79
KARIKA XXIX.
80
...
80
...
KARIKA XL.
189
190
Astral body unconfined and permanent

Two bodies unnecessary, and reply
How does the Astral Body migrate ? Reply
191
Objection
Question
192
Astral
at each Pralaya
194
195
82
XLI.
Existence of the Astral Body proved
KARIKA
83
XLII.
Reason and manner of the migration of the Astral Body

Power of the Astral Body due to Nature
KARIKA
82
82
Body Dissolving
KARIKA
193
81
...
...
84
84
XLIII.
Incidental and Essential Dispositions

11V*- Flesh, blood &c., related to the gross
body
196
85
85
KARIKA XLIV.
%
198
199
Consequences of the various means introduced

Virtue leads to higher planes and vice, to lower
85
200
From
86
the reverse, the reverse
the threefold bondage
85
Xll
PAGE.
K A RIKA XLV
202
Absorption into Prakriti from Dispassion

Transmigration from Passionate attachment
203
Non-impediment from Power
201
"87
...
...
...
87
87
KARIKA XL VI.
204
205
Error, Disability, Contentment

Fifty Sub-divisions of
206
The Fifty forms
207
The Sub-divisions
208
Eight forms of Ignorance

Eight forms of Egoism
Ten forms of Attachment
and Perfection
88
88
KARIKA LXVH.
of Error
89
KARIKA
209
210
of Error
XLVIII.
&c introduced
...
89
89
90
90
212
Eighteen forms of Jealously

Eighteen forms of Abhinivesa
90
213
The
91
214
The twenty-eight forms
211
total
90
coming to sixty-two
KARIKA XLIX.
215
of Disability
Eleven forms of disability, those of the sense organs
216
The seventeen forms
of disability of
KARIKA
91
91
Buddhi
91
L.
217
218
Nine forms of Contentment

Four forms of internal Contentment
219
220
(l)Ambha
92
(2)Salila
92
221
222
223
(3)Ogha...
(4) Vrishti
93
Five forms of external Contentment
93
224
(1)
225
226
227
(2)
228
(3)
(4)
(5)
92
92
...
93
93
Para
...
Supara
Parapara
...
...
,94
94
94
&*
Anuttamambha
Uttamambha
KARIKA
LI.
Forms of Power introduced

230 The eight forms of Power
94
231
95
229
(l)Tara
Study...
95
Xlll
PAGE.
252
233
234
235
236
237
238
Word
(2) Sntara
(3) Taratara
"(4)
Ramyaka
95
95
Reasoning
Acquisition of Friends
KARIKA
239
95
...
Sadamudita Purity
The three consequent on the suppression of three kinds of pain
The first five forms otherwise explained
Error &c. are hooks to the Powers
(5)
95
96
96
96
LII.
97
240
Necessity of the Linga (InteHectual creation)

Proofs of the above
97
241
Objection of reciprocality let aside
98
KARIKA
242
243
244
245
LIII.
Forms of the intellectual creation introduced

The eight Divine sorts
Five of the Lower Animals
Mankind single
KARIKA
98
98
98
98
LIV.
246
Threefoldness of the intellectual creation introduced
99
247
Six Heavenly Regions
99
KARIKA
248
LV.
250
Creation productive of pain ...

...
...
Imposition of pleasure and pain on Spirit
due to Spirit s non-discrimination
Do.
249
KARIKA
Maker
251
Question of the
252
Creation due to Nature
253
Creation for another
...
99
100
100
LVI.
100
of the Universe introduced
101
s (Spirit s)
sake
...
101
KARIKA
254
incapacity of insentient
255
Objection
instance oi the flow of milk
LVII.
Nature of creation
...
...
101
102
.Reply
255# View of a personal God overthrown

256 Freedom of the Sankhya theory from faults
1^2
103
*">
KARIKA
257
"
How for
Spirit s purpose
"2
258
Whence
103
Explained
KARIKA
<{
LVIII.
LIX.
the cessation of the operations of Nature
"?
Explained.
103
XIV
PAGE.
KARIKA LX.
259
"
Nature acts for no
KARIKA
260
No reappearance
of
.,.
compensation"...
rr)4
...
LXI.
Nature with regard to an emancipated Spirit
KARIKA
104
LXII.
e
261
Objection: emancipation and bondage
262
Reply:
not possible to unmodi-
fying Spirit
"No
...
Spirit
is
bound, nor migrates
KARIKA
263
"
&c."
105
105
...
LXIII.
Nature binds herself by seven forms
106
&c."
KARIKA LXIV.
264
265
266
267
268
"Truth"
explained
The purity
,.
wisdom explained
Objection based on the eternal tendency
The form of discriminative knowledge
...
107
107
...
107
of
"Completion
"of
to false
knowledge
107
the knowledge
108
KARIKA LXV.
269
Cause of the cessation of Nature
108
operation
KARIKA LXVI.
though one set of objects has been enjoyed, others
remain to be enjoyed"
...
270
Objection
271
Reply: "The Spirit having attained to wisdom, there

to further action
"
is
"
KARIKA
110
LXVII.
272
Objection: The body dissolving on the attainment of wisdom,

could the bodiless Spirit behold Nature ?
273
Body continues in obedience

ous
to the
109
no motive
momentum imparted by
how
110
"
previ-
Karma
Ill
KARIKA LXVIH.
274
Final release of the Spirit
112
KARIKA LXIX.
275
The precedence
of Kapila
...
112
XV
PAGE.
KARIKA LXX.
276
Importance of the Sankhya
113
doctrine
KARIKA LXXI.
277
"Arya"
113
explained
KARIKA LXXII.
278
The Treatise
is
a whole, not a part
...
113
ERRATA.
P. 26
J5
P.
Line
55
56 to the
3 for
1
"
unction
!J
left of line
"
(in rhetoric)
>J
IS
>J
read
"
(126),"
read
W
"taste"
>J
INTRODUCTION.
THE lucid writing of Vachaspati Misra does not stand in
need of much in the shape of an Introduction. But under the
cover of this title, I propose to give a brief synopsis of the
cardinal doctrines of the
Sankhya Philosophy,
the hope
in
that a reading of this resume would prepare the mind of the

student for the
of the abstruse truths, in which the
reception
Tattvakaumudi abounds. Any corrections or suggestions for
most gratefully
alteration &c., will be
received.
To begin with, the Sankhya lays down a fourfold division

of categories based on their respective causal and productive
This division is into (I) Productive (2) Produc
efficiency.
tive
nor
and
Produced
(3)
Produced
(4)
Neither Productive
Produced. This classification includes
all the twenty-five
Prakriti or Nature
Tattwas,
being the
the Sclnkhyas allow of no other purely
productive agency. The Productive and Produced are the
other Principles Buddhi &c.
These partake of the nature
Principles
called
productive,
since
of both
evolves
thus Buddhi
Ahankara and
is
productive in as
it is
in as
much as
much as
out of
it
it
itself
produced
The purely non-productive Princi
sense-organs and the five elements.
evolves out of Prakriti.

ples
are the
eleven
These are purely non-productive because none of these can

give birth to a substance essentially different from them.
The Purusjha
fact
it is
lu
(Spirit) is neither productive nor produced.
All accessories are the effects of
without attributes.
the three Gunas, and the Spirit isby its very nature free from
these înd as such without any accessories.
Having thus classified the various principles, we now turn

to tile consideration of the various principles separately.
First of all then
we must examine the nature of
the all
-powerful creative agent of the Sankhyas or, more properly, the

creative force of the Universe.
Then first of all how is this
force constituted?
It
is
naturally
made up of
the
three
XV111
Sattwa, Rajas, and Tamas and when the Pradh&na is

natural state, lying dormant, these three attributes are
Gnnas
in its
in
an equilibrium.
When occasion
presents jtself
i. e.
when the
Adrishta of the soul acts upon the Pradhana, the equilibrium

is disturbed, and it is this disturbance that gives rise to the
The diversity of created objects

thus rendered quite explicable. As already mentioned, all
accessories are due to the predominance of one or other
various kinds of creations.

is
of the three
Gnnas
the predominance of Sattwa giving rise

in which that attribute predominates,
to the kind of creation
Without proceeding any further, we must stop to

consider the nature and properties and the Modus operandi
of these Gunas.
and
so forth.
The three
attributes
Sattwa, Rajas and
Tamas have
re
spectively the character of Happiness, Unhappiness and Delu

sion; and have their operations characterised respectively by en
lightenment, activity and restraint and are so constituted that

the one always operates in suppression of the other, and at the
;
same time depending upon this latter. To explain this con

The universe would be in an unceasing
trariety of properties
round of
activity,
if
the only operating force were the Rajas
in order to provide against this, Nature provides herself with a

restraining agency in the shape of the Tamoguna which by
its
nature
is
dull
and passive.
The natures of the
different
objects of the universe are thus ascertained in accordance with

the excess of one or the other of these attributes. Again, if
there were no
enlightening agency in the shape of Sattwa,

Nature would be nothing better than a mass of blind force
acting in a haphazard manner. Thus we have established the
necessity of the three Attributes.
Here an objector comes forward and says How can the

endowed as they are with mutually counteracting
properties, cooperate and bring about such a grand and stupen
dous structure as our Universe ? The reply is that it is a very
common fact that two or more substances though mutually con
attributes,
tradictory, do cooperate towards a single end
e.
g. the
wick
XIX
oil
both taken separately are as ranch against the
action of one another as towards fire, but when they are together
and the
In the same manner,

help to brighten the fire.
though the Gauas are mutually counteractive, yet when com
they
act
bined, they
towards a single end, supplying each other
deficiencies.
The necessity of postulating three

supported by another reason.
We
different forces is further
see that in nature there are
three distinct properties

All
of pleasure, pain and dulness.
other properties are reducible to these three heads.
Again we
find that these are properties so much opposed to one another
that all could never be the effect of a single agency. Thus then
we must postulate three different forces or constituent elements

of Nature, to which severally we could trace the three
distinct properties.
To these three constituents of Nature we
We
find in the
Sattwa, Rajas and Tamas.
give the names
universe the above three properties, and as all the properties
of the effect must be a direct resultant of a like property in its
cause, so
the
we
at once arrive at the conclusion that the cause of
Universe
the Pradhana
must be endowed with the
three Attributes.
So much
for the action of the
We
Gunas.
must now turn
our attention towards the all-important Prakriti

stone of the
the
Key
Sankhya Philosophy.
What, then, is this Prakriti ? Does it stand for the Theistjc

Or for the Bauddha Sensations ? Or does it corres
to
theVedantic "Maya" ? To all this we reply It is
pond
all these, and It is neither of these.
It resembles the Vedantic
in
as
asmuch
it
is
the
root
one
of the Universe, which is
Maya
asserted of Maya also though, as of an illussory world. But
God ?
"
"
the fact of
its being the root of the Universe is akin to that of

the Sankhya-Prakriti. It is not the God. Since it is said
to be without intelligence, a mere dead Matter equipped
with certain
potentialities
due to the Gunas.
In short,
the one rootless Root of the Universe (objective as

well as subjective) endowed with the three Guiias and evolvPrakriti
is
XX
ing through these, every kind of existence
Pnrusha
save of course, the
Spirit.
The next point that we have to consider is How do the

Sankhyas prove the existence, the rootlessness, and eternality
of this Prakrit!
?
Is it necessary to postulate such a rootless
root itself nnmanifested and yet manifesting all objective and
subjective existence ? Proofs of this are given at length in
works on the Sankhya Philosophy, and it will not fee al

But
together out of place here to briefly sum them up.
before we take up this, it is necessary to explain the Sankhya
doctrine of causality, the point on which rests the whole fabric
all
then is the cause and how is it related to

Cause is defined as a substance in which the
effect subsists in a latent form.
Thus then the effect must
be said to be eternally existent primarily in a latent con
What
of Prakriti.
the effect
the cause, and latterly manifesting itself and then

commonly recognized as the effect. How to prove that the
effect has been lying latent in the cause and has not been
dition, in
newly produced by the cause
What
Firstly.
That
is
nonentity can never be made an entity

which has never existed can never be
to say
that
into
existence.
brought
is
What
remains to be done by the
operation of the cause is the manifestation of the effect that is

to say, its manifestation as the effect of the particular cause.
And
this
from the
kind of manifestation we find in the production of oil

different oil-seeds wherein it has been hitherto
lying latent.
r
We
Secondly.
always find that the effect is always in one
or
the
other
related to the cause.
way
Now, this relation
would not be possible
if the effect were a nonentity ; for

a
certainly
nonentity can have no relations. If the relation of
the effect with the cause were not necessary then every
effect
would be possible from every cause. Since in that

would be no restrictive qualification which would
case there
confine
the
effects.
Thus then
operation
this
of particular
would lead
to
causes to particular
an absurdity.
XXI
we cannot deny causal efficiency. Now what

.Thirdly.
does this efficiency consist in ? It cannot be anything other
than the existence in the cause of the
For the difference of
condition.
sand, lies merely in the fact that
not in the sand, that the
a latent
from
only in the seeds and
seeds,
it is
effect in
as cause of
oil,
oil subsists.
Fourthly. the effect is non-different from the cause ; and

the latter being a entity, the latter must be so also. To
take an example, the cloth

composing it. Because it
is
is
non-different from
neither
the threads
heavier than the latter,
is any other relation than that of inherence possible

between the two and it is only between two different things
nor
that any other relation as that of conjunction &c., is possible.

Nor can the cloth ever exist apart from the threads. The
difference of properties and actions cannot establish
any
For though a single thread cannot do the action

of cloth, yet this latter is nothing more than a collection
of threads and we see that what a single man cannot do,
difference.
can be done very well by a number of them together

e.
g. a
work
can
be
which
man
cannot
a
single
carry
palanquin,
;
very well performed by a number of men together. Thus

then we see that the effect is nothing more than the developed
cause and the latter again is merely an undeveloped effect.
;
This identity of cause and effect
is declared by Sir William

Hamilton also, who says
when we are aware of something
which begins to be, we are by the necessity of our intelligence,
But what does
constrained* to believe that it has a cause.
the expression, that it has a cause, signify ?
If we analyse
"
our thought, we shall find that it simply means, that as we

eannot^conceive any new existence to commence, therefore,
all that now is seen to arise under a new appearance had
We
are utterly
previously an existence under a prior form.
unable to realise in thought the possibility of the complemeut
of existence either increased or diminished.
are unable
We
on the one hand, to conceive nothing becoming something

or on the other something becoming nothing
XXH
There
effect
is
is
and
thns conceived an absolute tautology between the

its causes.
We think the causes to contain all that
contained in the effect
was not contained
in the
the effect to contain nothing ^ which
causes."
XXXIX.
Lectures on Metaphysics
Having thus proved the existence of the effect in the

the Sankhyas employ the fact in proving the
existence of their Pradhana. The effect being only a develop
cause,
ed cause, in which it has been lying latent, all existence

its unmanifested condition in its cause.
That
must have
is
to
Self-Consciousness, which lies
say, the elements lie in
Now
we go on increasing the series we would

be landed in a regressus ad infinitum.
In order to avoid this
we must postulate the existence of a principle which must
be uncaused and which must be the final substrate of
in Buddhi.
if
the undeveloped state of all other substances. Thus then

we have a causeless cause which must be by its very nature
unmanifested, the final cause of all; and to this the Sankhyas
give the names
"
Pradhana,"
"Prakrit!"
or
"
Avyakta."
Secondly we find that all the substances from Buddhi down

limited and are the
wards are
development of some
and this is Pradhana.
further ultimate Principle
Pradhana we must
and
properties as well as those of its Effects
Having thus proved the Existence

define its
of
see wherein lies the difference.
In order to do this we must

of
the
Manifested
Principles
first
the
consider the properties

Pradhana.
effects of
These are caused and as a necessary consequence of this

transitory, limited, mobile, many, dependent (on the activity
of the Pradhana), made up of parts-, these are the characteris
tics where the Pradhana differs from the Manifested Principles,
Buddhi and the rest.

Pradhana is the uncaused
must be eternal. And as
For,
as
already
explained, the
and as such,
root of the Universe,

all
Universe
is
the result of Its
XXlll
must be all-pervading as a necessary conse

of
this
it is immoveable i. e. Cannot move, in the sense
quence
of goirfg from one place to another. And further, since it is,
evolution, It
It is independent
all-pervading it must be one.
only on the activity of its own constituent Gunas.
depending
These are the points difference. Those of agreement are,

that the Pradhana as well as the manifested principles are the
resultants of the various actions of the three Gnnas.
Second
ly, since without intelligence, both must be without discrimi

nation, since discrimination is the result of intelligence.
Thirdly both these present objects for the enjoyment of the

Fourthly since they are without intelligence, they can
Spirit.
never be the observers, they must always remain the observed,

This is technical and requires some
as such common.
and
explanation. Every object that is observed is so, not differently

by different individuals, but are common objects of observa
tion for all, and are common in that sense.
Fifthly they are
the only Principle endowed with in

without intelligence
the
Spirit.
Sixthly they are prolific i. e.
telligence being
The Spirits are without this.
endowed with evolving energy.
These in brief, are the points of agreement and difference be

tween the Pradhana on one hand and its effects on the other.
Now we must consider the nature of the Spirits and see what
the Sankhyas have to say as to their existence, number and
But before we proceed with this, we must first
properties.
see if it is necessary to have a distinct principle in the shape
of innumerable Spirits. And on this score, the first reason that
presents itself is the fact that we have not yet got any princi
For certainly Intelli
ple that will supply the intelligence.
cannot
to
the
Buddhi
for
it is material, being
gence
belong
which is essentially non-intelligent,

and what is absent in the cause cannot manifest itself in the
effect.
So we must have a distinct Principle of Intelligence.
the effect of Prakriti
Secondly.
we
see in our every day life that all that is

the use of another, as a bed, a chair &A And
before that all the principles from Prakriti
is for
corporeal
we have seen
XXIV
downwards are
bodied.
Though
this sounds a little absurd as
regards Prakriti, Buddhi and Ahanakra, yet we must not

forget that the body of the apparently immaterial principles
is
made up
of the three Gunas-which are as material as
any
such being the case, we must postulate the

thing.
existence of an unbodied or incorporeal principle. And this is
Purusha, the Spirit, and as we have not yet had an Intelligent
And
principle,
And
we
attribute intelligence to this incorporeal
the Spirit
must be unbodied because
three Attributes, for whatever

found to be bodied.
is
affected
it is
Spirit.
devoid of the
by the Gunas
is
We
have come across in daily life with the

general proposition that whatever is naturally connected with
Thirdly.
is supervised over by some

and
that
all the principles from the
we
have
also
seen
thing,
Prakriti downwards are made up of the three Gunas, and as
such necessarily, affected by pleasure, pain or delusion
and
so these must have a supervisor. And in order to escape
a regressus ad infinitum this supervisor must be himself un
touched by pleasure &c.; and as such must be something over
and above Prakriti. And this is Purusha, the Spirit.
either pleasure, pain or delusion,
Prakriti and the rest are objects of enjoyment

Fourthly.
and as such they necessitate the existence of an enjoyer,
who again must not be an object himself. And the enjoyer
must be the intelligent principle.
For a non-intelligent
principle being devoid of consciousness can never be the enjoyer.

And this again must be something not made up of pleasure &c.
Which can never be the case with Buddhi and the rest. These
made up as they are of pleasure, pain and delu
latter being
for that will involve

sion, cannot be the enjoyer of these
the absurdity of self-contradictory actions one made up of
pleasure, pain and delusion, cannot be only pleased or pained ;
;
for each of these is contradictory to the one or other phase

of the constitution of Buddhi. And so we must have an
enjoyer over and above Prakriti and the rest.

Spirit.
And
this is
XXV
Fifthly
men
great
Now
and
lastly.
All systems of philosophy,
and
all
the
we find striving after final Release.

of Prakriti or Buddhi.
For these
of the past
this is not possible
latter ar e constituency made up of pain and as such can never

be released from this. So the object of final Release must be
one who has neither pleasure nor pain nor delusion for its con
stituent element; and such a principle is the Spirit alone.
We
"have
thus shown the necessity of postulating a distinct

shape of Purusha, over and above the Prakriti.
principle in the
The next thing, we have to consider is What is this

Purnsha ? How is it constituted ? What are its properties ?
^
What its aim ? arid finally, how and when does it attain
final Release ?
We must take each of these questions one
by one.
What is Purusha
(1)
It
is
not the thinking principle, since

Nor is it the determining
thinking belongs to the mind.

that
principle since
of the Spirit
still
it
the
The character
alloted to Buddhi.
none of these,
It then is
of these.
It
is
necessary factor in all

agent of all functions, mental
the
is
is
a very unique one.
is
principal
as
well as
organic. It is the agent who feels, thinks and wills. Without

no functions would be possible, specially consciousness.
it
In short Spirit
is
the source of intelligence, and as such, the

every function of the mind feeling,
necessary factor in
intellecting
Ho^v
(2)
and
is
willing.
this Spirit constituted ?
As a matter of
fact the
of intelligence pure and simple, and

Spirit
is free from every other qualification and encumbrance.
is
What
are its properties ? These are thus enunciated :

free from the three attributes, possessed of discriminative
(3)
it is
constituted
faculties, non-objective, singular, intelligent and non-produc

If the Spirit were not naturally free from the action of
tive.
the Attributes, no liberation from metempsychosis would be

Since pain constitutes the very nature of the Attri
possible.
butes and as
such can not possibly be separated from
it.
XXVI
And
thus no liberation being possible, there would be mo

necessity for enquiries to which the various systems of
And again
philosophy are devoted.
equipped with discriminative faculties,
the Spirit were not

could never attain to
if
it
the discriminative wisdom arrived at by the philosophical

systems, which would thus become useless.
Next
as to the aims of the
It has
Spirit,
been laid down
Spirit mistakes the fluctuations of the Attributes

and thus comes to be
constituting Nature, to be His own
that
the
by pleasure, pain &c., which in reality do not affect

him, under the influence of the different kinds of delusions
the modifications of Buddhi. Now the one all-absorbing aim
of every Spirit is the attainment of wisdom that would help
affected
him
to
discriminate
between Himself and the fluctuations of
the Attributes, and thus see the pleasure and pain caused by
these in their true light and be no longer affected by them.
The next question that presents itself to us is how does

Pur usha attain to this wisdom and thence to final emancipation?
This wisdom arises from a constant study of the Sankhya
philosophy, when the Attribute of Goodness is paramount in
one s constitution and the others have almost ceased to exist.
The Purnsha then sees Nature and its constituents in their true
light and finds out His mistake, and so shakes off all mistaken
preconceptions about self, and thus becomes free from the self,
imposed bonds of Bnddhi, and finally retries from metempsycosis and attains final Beatitude.
Having thus said all that we had to say about Prakriti and
Purusha, we must look a little into the details of the process
of creation.
We
the
have already said that Prakriti is the rootless Root of

Universe.
From this Prakriti emanates Buddhi, to
which the technical name of Mahat or the Great Principle is

given. From this Buddhi proceeds Akankara or the princi
From this again emanate the eleven senses
ple of egoism.
and the five subtle elements of sound, smell, taste, colour
XXVll
and touch.
elements
And from these latter five, proceed the five gross

Earth, Water, Fire, Air and Akasa.
Let us now examine the nature of these principles. First

comes Buddhi. This is defined as the principle
in the scale
This term literally means

ascertainment
and in explaining this term, the writers exemplify it as the
determination that this is to be done by me." It would thus
of adhyavasdya.
"
"
"
appear that the functions of this principle are the same as
But
by Western psychologists to will.
is not mere will.
It is Will and In
tellect combined.
For in the opinion of the majority of
Western psychologists specially of those belonging to the
Intellect contemplates the circumstances
Kantian School
and provides the rule of conduct Will
action
for
calling
those attributed
the Sankhya Baddhi
"
controls the disposition

harmony with the dictator of in
The Sankhyas attribute both these functions to
telligence."
That Buddhi resembles will, is further
their Buddhi.
in
made clearer by the properties assigned to it, by the Saukhyas.

These properties are Virtue, Wisdom, Dispassion and Power.
As we have said already will decides the course of action and
such the virtuousness
as
belong to this principle
or
otherwise
alone.
Again we
of
must
wisdom is
actions
find that
described as both restrictive and directive and so to attribute
the property of wisdom to Buddhi is to give it the dual

character of Intellect and Will.
Dispassion and Power again
must belong to the principle that decides on a certain course

of action an$ in this too we find Buddhi cognate with In
tellect and Will combined.
The
It
is
principle that we have to consider next is that of Egoism

I
are due. It
principle to which all notions of the
th
"
"
corresponds with Kant s "apperception" and Hamilton s "selfthat is to say the notion of self in every form
consciousness
of consciousness: The idea that "/have the consciousness,"
"
As immediate effects of this principle of

the eleven sense-organs and the five
we
have
Egoism,
"/
feel
subtle
&c."
elements.
The eleven
sense- organs
consist
of the
XXV111
the
intellectual (subjective) senses
five
the ear, the
eyes,
nose, the tongue, the skin, and the five of action (objective)
the hands, the feet, speech, the
yjZt
excretory organ
The eleventh sense is Manas,
and that of generation.
.
(mind). The five subtle

taste, colour and sound.
elements are those of smell, touch

From these latter again proceed the
gross elements Earth, Air, Water, Fire and Akasa and

Before
these have the subtle elements for their properties.
five
proceeding any further we must consider the nature of the

eleventh sense-organ, the mind or the reflective principle.
Here first of all we must consider why we should call mind
sense
at
The
all ?
answer is not far to seek. The

immediate effect of the princi
define sense as the
Sankhyay
Egoism under the influence of the attribute of Goodness
and this differentia we find in Manas as well as in the ten
organs generally accepted as senses. Next let us consider
ple of
what
functions
the
are
of this
eleventh
sense
Manas
the only faculty that partakes of the nature of both

kinds of senses the objective and the subjective. If it
were not so, none of the senses would act, for it is only when
then
these
is
influenced
are
by
the
mind that
operation of the
towards their various objects.

It would not be
Act they
quite accurate to say that the senses do not act.
do, but these operations are not taken cognizance of by
they act
the agent, and as such having
may
for all intents
they
out action.
called in
The function of
Sankkya
further explained
first
and without
when we
first
principle
or
to be
is
with
technically
This is
"thinking."
look upon an object the
connection therewith are all indefinite
qualifications
is
this
"reflection"
impressions in
actions purposeless,
their
and purposes, be said
(Rff^FT). This indefinite and vague

and this definiteness
very soon rendered definite
impression
and the different qualifications are* imparted to it by the
This process follows so
reflection (or thinking) of the Mind.
that
one
can
instantaneously
scarcely mark the process ard
thinks that the
finite, just
first
impression he has had was
as he latterly comes to perceive
it.
all
along de
XXIX
It need not be repeated that the mnltifariousness of creations
is
due to the diverse actions of the Attributes.
The next question that is started is whence proceeds the

action of the senses ? If their action were eternal then the
creation would never cease.
If not eternal,
what
is
it
that
causes the operations to begin? The reply given is that all these
organs have a certain sort of anxiety for the fulfilment of each
and this anxiety leads to the action of each

is no external impetus save that of the pur
discriminative
wisdom and hence emancipation of the
pose
Purusha. If there were no action of the different emanations
from Prakriti, the Spirit would be at a loss to discriminate
between itself and the inanimate Prakriti. So we see that
the only impetus from without is supplied to the senses by the
purpose of the Spirit, and thenceforward they are led on in
other
actions
of them.
There
their active path
by their own anxiety.
Altogether then
we
see that there
are
thirteen
organs
three internal, Buddhi, Ahankara and Manas, and the ten

external the ten sense-organs.
Of these the latter operate
only in the present time, whereas the former act with regard
to the past, present and future.
Of the external organs, the
five subjective senses operate towards subtle as well as gross
substances, whereas the objective ones only towards gross ones.
Of
the thirteen organs, the
palm of supremacy
is
given
to the internal ones, since these are applicable to all kinds of
substances
and another cause of supremacy we have already
viZn the one with regard to time. Of these internal

organs again, the Buddhi is supreme, since the principles of
noted
Reflection operate towards their objects and then

present these experiences to the Buddhi, which finally presents
them with its own additions and alterations to the discriminat
Egoism and
Thus we find that Buddhi is the chief

and brings about all his worldly enjoyment,
finally leading to His discrimination of self from tbe emana
tions of Prakriti, and thence to final liberation.
Thus of all the
is
organs, Buddhi
supreme.
ing eye of the Spirit.
agent of the Spirit

^
XXX
Having thus described the organs, we turn onr attention
towards the gross substances. These are of three kinds
Of these the
Subtle, Parent-born and the Great Elements.
first is eternal, and the second and third
and
transient.
fading
This
of the Sankhyas resembles to a great

the
"Astral Body
of Theosophical litera
extent,
believe,
It is born before the visible body and lasts till the
ture.
Pralaya and till then it presents the astral body of the
"subtle
body"
"
in all its reincarnations
Ego
were not
during that Kalpa.
If this
the actions of one incarnation could not act upon

the Spirit in the next, for the Spirit itself cannot be affected
by either good or evil, and as such could not be affected by
so,
For the actions

were done by the body and the organs of the former incarna
tion
and these dying with the Body, wherein would the
the actions of one incarnation in another.
traces of the former actions be left
So we must postulate
the existence of a substrate in the form of the
"Linga-Sarira,"
equipped with subtile counterparts of all the sensory and

motor organs. And thus then we shall have the Linga-Sarira
imprinted with all the effects of the actions of one birth. And
body follows the Spirit in all its subsequent in

it is but natural that the fruits of
past actions
should affect the Spirit
though the Spirit cannot be affected,
since
this
carnations,
he has not attained to discriminative wisdom, he

thinks all the affections of Buddhi to be his own. The LingaSa^rira thus must have traces of virtue and vice on itself so
r
et so long as
as to bring out their
effects
in a future
This
incarnation.
the
substrate of the different organs

Linga-Sarira again
which are subtile in their nature, and as such could not subsist
is
without a substratum.
c
Let us now see how the Sankhyas treat of the idea of means
and consequences of actions. By means of virtue the Spirit
ascends to higher regions.
By higher regions here is of
course meant a more highly spiritual life.
Vice leads
the other way.
Emancipation results from discriminative
"
"
wisdom.
This wisdom
consists
of deep
insight
into
the
XXXI
character of the Spirit and Nature, and consequent intelligent
from which
perception of the difference between the two
results the Spirit s perception of
His own true nature, which
is
above the operation of the three Attributes, though so long

He has been labouring under the self-imposed imaginary thral
dom of the Attributes. No sooner has this perception been
gained than the Spirit casts off His self-imposed chains and be
comes
state,
and thereby attains to His proper

one of pure uninterupted and unmixed intelli
mere dispassion is gained a state of absorption into
free of the Attributes,
which
is
gence. By
the subtler elements of Nature.
Spirit thus transformed
a time a state of unintelligent rest, and is bora

enjoys
the same restrictions and with the same bondage
under
again
for
as before the absorption. If on the other hand, the Spirit is

under the influence of attachments proceeding from the attri
it is that it falls into the stingy darkness
of metempsychosis from which it can be freed only by the divine
are all labouring under this category.
ray of wisdom.
bute of Passion, then
We
The Sankhyas have further entered into a very elaborate

enunciation of the various manifestations of Buddhi dividing
them
into no less
than
fifty
forms.
These
are
made up of
kinds of obstruction, twenty-eight of incapacity ( result

from
the disability of the organs), nine of contentment and
ing
of
Of these, again there are 62 forms of
eight
perfection.
five
obstruction alone.
So
muc]?L
for
intellectual
creation.
The elemental
or
material creation comprises the eight kinds of divine celestial

beings, the five of the lower animals, and one, the human
kind.
^
The various grades of creation are attributed to the

Thus the attribute
excess or otherwise of one of the attributes.
of Goodness predominates among the gods, that of Passion

among men, and that of Darkness in all lower creation.
All this elaborate process of creation is began by Nature

solely for the sake of the Spirit s emancipation from the miseries
of metempsychosis miseries inevitable to Him when born in a
^
XXX11
human
Nature is described as a great benefactress, not

of services from the Spirit, and working
return
any
His emancipation ont of her own sweet will, till He
body.
caring for
for
her true character

when She retries
an actress who has played her part, and
never again returns to the same Spirit, the spectator. Thus
then in reality all bonds and pains are only supposed by the
Spirit to be His own.
By His very nature He is free from all
conies
to perceive
from the scene
like
much
internal fluctuations, in as
whose
as
He
effect these fluctuations are.
is
above the Attributes,
After the attainment of
discriminative wisdom, the Spirit steers clear of all notions of

egoism, and attains to His own natural spiritual condition.
But the body continues

previously imparted to
for a time on account of the

it.
And
the attainment of
having put a stop to the operation

virtue &c.
rebirth
the operation of which
the body
character,
and
falls,
attains
is
impulse
wisdom
of all such agents as

a necessary cause of
and the Spirit regains His true

absolute and eternal beatitude,
to
never to return to the cycles of

metempsychosis.
THE TATTWA-KAUMUDI.
[SANKHYA].
AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION*
Bed, White and

and
to the Unborn
also
Black, producing many children;
and
renounce
Her on having
to
Ones Who have recourse
Her,
enjoyed the pleasures afforded by Her.
(1).
KEVERENCE
to the
One Unborn,
To the Great Rishi Kapila, and his disciple Asuri, as also

and Iswara-Kriskna, to these we bow in
to Panchasikha
reverence.
(2).
In this world, that expounder

audience,
K JnSL
UCti0n
t0
who
offers
listened to by the
expositions of facts
is
whose knowledge is desired by them. Those,

on the other hand, who expound undesired
doctrines, are given up by them, as mad men, or as men

unacquainted with science and custom. And that science is
desirable which being known, leads to the attainment of the

final end af man.
Consequently, as the science to be (here
after) explained supplies the
means
to the final goal, therefore,
the author introduces the desirability of the subject-matter
KARIK!
There being
I.
world) an impediment caused by

of pain, (there arises) a desire for
(in this
the three kinds

->
enquiry into the means of alleviating them. And if

(it be urged that) the enquiry is superfluous on account
[34]
[KARIKA
i.]
of (the existence of) obvious means,

(we reply that
because these (latter) are neither absolute
it is) not so
:
nor
final.
(3).
The subject-matter of science would not be enquired

into
(1) if there existed no pain in this
world or ( 2 ) if tnon g h extant its removal
were not desired or (3) even if desired, its
5
>
removal were impossible, such impossibility arising either

from the eternal character of the pain, or from ignorance of
the means of alleviating it or (4) notwithstanding the pos
sibility of removing it, if the subject-matter of science did not
;
afford the adequate means ; or (5) lastly, if there

and easier means elsewhere available.
(4).
were other
is no pain and that its removal is

not universally desired, are opposed to facts.
Now, that there
With
kinds of pain."
this view {i is declared

"There
an
caused
the
three
impediment
being
by
The three kinds of pain constitute (what is
:
>
triad of pain."
ordinarily called) the
The nature-intrinsic (Adhyatmika), (2)
"
And
The
these are:
(1)
naturo-extrinsic
Of
(Adhibhautika), and (3) The super-natural (Adhidaivika).
these the naturo-intrinsic is two-fold, bodily and mental. Bodily
pain is caused by the disorder of the various humours, wind,
and phlegm
and mental pain
due to desire, wrath,

avarice, affection, fear, envy, grief, and the non-preception
of particular objects. All these are called intrinsic on ac
bile,
is
count of their admitting of internal remedies.
Pains submit
extrinsic, and super

ting to external remedies are two-fold
human. The extrinsic are caused by men, beasts, birds rep
tiles and inanimate things and the superhuman ones owe their
:
existence to the evil

class of elementals.
influence
Thus the
of planets and the various

fact that pain,
a specific
modification of the attribute of Foulness (Rajas)
enced
is
experi
by each soul, cannot be gainsaid. "Impediment"

(Abhighata) is the connection of the sentient faculty with the
[5]
[K. i.]
consciousness of disagreeableness caused by the three kinds of

Thus then this idea
pain residing in the internal organs.
of disagreeableness constitutes the cause of the desire for the
alleviation of pain.
Though pain cannot be absolutely
prevented, yet
it is
as will be explained
it
concluded that (enquirey is going
possible to alleviate
Thus
it is
subsequently.
into the
to be made)
"
"
(the three
alleviating it
refers to
tat
the
particle
Tadapaghatake
means of
"
kinds of pain). In
the three kinds of pain; and though this forms the subordi
nate factor in the preceding compound, yet it is mentally the
more proximate (and hence the following pronoun refers to
to the other and primary factor of the
it in
"
preference
compound). The means of alleviation,

and none other,
derivable from science,
"
Objection:
(5).
On
of obvious remedies, suck

That is to say :
superfluous"
is
we grant the existence of the triad

of pain, and also the desirability of its
e flU
of
are only those
account
enquiry
Objection: inquiry
senc i
too,
^bvFS
means.
removal, as also the possibility thereof;

we go farther, and grant that the means
Sastras are adequate to the removal.

however, the present enquiry becomes super
because we have easier obvious means for the removal
derivable from the
With
fluous
all this,
;
of pain, and farther because of the difficult character of the

means prescribed in the Sdstra a full knowledge of abstruse
philosophical principles, attainable only by a long course of
traditional study extending over many lives.
Says a popular
maxim
When
man
can find honey in the house, wherefore
should he go to the mountains ? So, when the object of desire

has been attained, which wise man will make any further
*
Hundreds of easy remedies for bodily pain are
attempts ?
down by eminent physicians for the mental pains also

we have easy remedies in the shape of the attainment of the
laid
such as women, desirable food and drink,

objects of enjoyment
dress and the like.
Similarly of the extrinsic pains we have
such as acquaintance with moral and political
ep.sy remedies
* Vide
the
Nydya-latiM, in
loco.
[6-8]
[K. i.]
In the same manner, of

superhuman troubles we have remedies in the shape of gems
and charms, &c.
science, residence in safe places, &c.
Reply : Not
(6).
so
nor
Obvious
Reply
means are not abso-
"
Because
these
are
neither
absolute
Absoluteness (of the
final"
means)
consists in the certainty oi its eiiect
and
its
the
finality consists in the non-recurrence r of
pain once removed. The absence of these two properties is de

The universal
noted by the expression "Ekdntatyantobhdvah.
The upshot of the whole
affix tasi has a genitive force here.
"
is this
On
account of not observing the unfailing cure of the

on the employment in the pre
different kinds of pain, even
manner of medicines, &c., mentioned before,- we

predicate the want of certainty of the cure effected thereby and
similarly from the recurrence of the pain once cured, we infer
scribed
non-permanence of the cure. Thus, though easily available,

the obvious means do not effect absolute and final removal
Consequently, the present enquiry
of pain.
not super
is
fluous.
(7).
Though the mention of the word pain

beginning
f ^rpatory
worS!
is
priate at the
(8).
auspicious
commencement of a
Objection
We
in the very
inauspicious, yet that of the

means as leading to its removal
is
and
as such quite
appro
treatise.
grant the
inadequacy of obvious
means but we have others prescribed in the

Yedas such as Jyotishtoma, &c. which
;
Vedic
Objection
nieans adequate to
:
removal of pain.
Vedas.
And
these
l as ^
for a
thousand years
.,
a whole host of
these forming the Ritualistic portion of the

means verily will remove the triad of pain
absolutely and finally. Declares the
S ruti
"Desiring
Heaven
one must perform sacrifices

and Heaven is thus describedan
the Bhattavartika
"Pleasure, unmixed and nninterspersfed
with pain, and attainable by pure longing for it, is what îs
:"
19]
expressed by the word
[K. ii.]
Heaven thus
Heaven"
consists
in
pleasure, diametrically opposed to pain, which by its very

existence extirpates all kinds of pain ; nor is this pleasure
drank the Soma
for, declares the Sfruti
short-lived,
"
We
[Atkarvasiras III]. And if the celestial

were
short-lived, how could there be
immortality ?
pleasure
Hence the Vedic means for the removal of pain, which can be
and became
immortal"
gone through in a moment, a few hours, a day, a month, or a

are easier than discriminative knowledge, which can
year,
be attained only by a long course of traditional study extend
many lives. Thus then the proposed enquiry again
ing over
becomes superfluous,
Reply
KARIKA
The revealed
is like
II.
the obvious
since
it is
connect
ed with impurity, decay and excess. A method con

consisting in descriminatrary to both is preferable,
tive
knowledge of the Manifested, the Unmanifested,
and the Knowing

"
(9).
Anusrava
(Spirit).*
"
is
that which
is
heard during
tutorial lectures of a qualified teacher,

is
ifklihe
the
and
not done ( wr itten). Anusravika = relating to

Anusrava or Veda, that which is known
The list of religious rites laid down in the Vedas
obvtaf
therefrom.
both being
equal to the obvious (means, mentioned before)
inefficient
the
in
and
absolute
removal
of the
final
equally
is
triad of pain.
Anusravika
text uses the generic term

Vedic"
to
be
as
taken
ought
implying only
Though the
it
"
yet
the ritualistic portion of it because descriminative knowledge
also forms part of the Veda (which of course is not what the
("
"J,
author means).
This
Says the
S ruti
"
The
Spirit
ought to be
embodies, as Davies rightly remarks, the leading principle

philosophy, according to which final emancipation is attainable not
by religious rites, but by descriminative knowledge as explained by Kapila.
L*Kapila
f
Rui-ika"
[1011]
[K.
known and descriminated from Primordial
Matter"
ii.]
(Brikadd-
ranyaka 2-4-5); (by so doing) "the agent does not return, yfca
does not return (into this world)" (Chhdndogaya 8-15).
he
(10).
Eeason
above assertion is given; "since it is

connected with impurity, decay and excess"
The impurity lies in the fact of the Soma-
for the
im ure
Because
decaying and exces-
sacrifice, &c.,
being accompanied by animal-
slanghter, and the like. Says the revered Panchasikhacharya:

It (the sin attendant upon slaughter) is slightly mixed,
The slight mixture is that of
destructible and bearable."
"
the principal effect (Apurva, i.e. merit) of the Jyotisktoma,

with the minor apurva, the cause of evil, due to
(ftf.,
7
animal-slaughter. The epithet destructible

implies that
the sin is removeable by certain expiatory rites ; but if some
how, these are neglected, then at the time of the fructifica
tion of the principal
Karma
(merit), the evil
element (demerit,
caused by the slaughter) also bears its fruits and as long

as these latter are being experienced, they are borne with
patience hence the epithet bearable.
Experts (in rituals)
;
dangling in the nectar- tanks of Heaven attained to by a

host of virtuous deeds, have to bear the spark of the fire of
pain brought about by the element of evil (in the rituals).
(11).
It cannot be
urged that the generic law "Kill not

an ^ anim
is set aside
by the specific
one, Kill the animal for the Aqnishtorfia,
The impurity
al,"
of animal-slaughter in
a sacrifice.established.
other
and
it
"
"
j
i
because they do not contradict each
only when two laws are mutually con
,
is
,,
In the pre
tradictory, that the stronger sets aside the weaker.
sent instance, however, there is no contradiction, the two laws
treating of two entirely different subjects. For the negative
law "Kill not, &c.," only declares the capability of the slaugh
produce evil, and hence pain but it does not do away

with the fact of its being necessary for the completion of
th^
sacrifice
and in the same manner, the following injunction
Kill the animal, &c.," declares the necessity of animal-
ter to
"
[1214]
[K. ii.]
slaughter in the sacrifice, but does not negative the fact of its
being productive of sin. Nor is there any contradiction between
the productivity of sin and the capability of helping the comple

tion of a sacrifice. Animal-slaughter can produce sin in the
man, and at the same time, quite consistently help a
The
(12).
Non-permanexcess
to apply to
shown
SUltS
belong really to the effect

is
permanence
Heaven
of
whereas the
only,
lead to the attainment of the
one
and
but are
This Non-
constitutes the
magnificence
is
fact
01
Further,
to the
entity.
are the
&c.,
Jyotishtoma,
what
from the
inferred
Heaven bein g a caused
action
attainment
non-permanence
Vedi
here attributed to the means.
and
ence
decay
properties
excess
sacrifice.
means
&c.,
Vdjapeya,
kingdom of Heaven. This is

spoken of. The greatness of
"excess"
a source of pain to another of lesser
magnificence.
In the passage
(13).
Drinking Soma, we became im
"
mortal"
a
of Vedic
as^rTsutt
action
is
only long-
immortality implies long-durabideclared elswhere: "Immortality
lii
is
durability
as
is
elemental
S rutii
till
(or
the final dissolution of all

existence."
finite)
Hence
Neither by deeds, nor by children, nor by wealth,

but by renunciation alone they got immortality" [Makd-
the
"
and again Swarga shines in a

at a distance, which the ascetics alone
narayana Upanishad X.
secluded valley
enter.
ascetics with children, desiring

Therefore those other learned Bishis, who
wealth, get death.
were above
all action,
With
y
deJcr
actions did the
By
(14:).
"
5]
all this
m nTtTve
i
wisdom.
{
removing pain.
got
immortality."
in view,
it is
declared:
"
method
contrary to both is preferable consisting in

descriminative knowledge of the Manifested,
the
Unmanifested,
Tasmdt
refers
method,
to
and
the
Knowing"
the Vedic means
contrary to
the impure
of
Soma-
[1516]
sacrifice, &c.,
[K. ii.J
bringing about excessive and short-lived results,
unmixed with evils due to animal-slaughter,

pure,
and leads to results non-excessive and everlasting as is
clear from the S ruti precluding all return to metempychoThe
sis for people possessing clescriminative knowledge.
cannot
on
caused
based
the
said
a
result being
entity
argument
is
i. e.,
be urged as a ground for its non-permanence because this holds

;
only in the case of the effect being an entity in the present

the removal of pain is a
case, however, the consequence
And such negation putting an end to
negation, a non-entity.
;
causal efficiency, there can be no further effect, in the shape
of more pain. For it is a fact admitted on all hands that

the causal activity lasts only till the attainment of deseriminative knowledge. This will be explained later on. (Kari-
ka LXVI.)
The
(15).
meaning of the Karikd, however, is this:

The means of removing pain, consisting in
literal
eaninS
of
the descriminative knowledge of the Spirit,
ttwrari
as apart
from Matter,
is
different
from the
and hence is preferable. The Scriptural

as
it is authorised by the Veda and as such
inasmuch
good
of
capable
removing pain to a certain extent. The descri
minative knowledge of the Spirit as distinct from Matter is
scriptural means,
is
also good.
(16).
mintive
Of
these two, the latter
Question
^-
ledge.
"Whence
lede
is
superior,
does such descriminative
arise"?
Answer:
"From
knowledge of the Manifested,

fested,
and
tJie
Knowing"
know
descriminative
ike UnmaniKnowledge of
the Manifested precedes that of its cause,

and from the fact of both of these (Mani
fested and Unmanifested) being for another s purpose, we infer
the Unmanifested
the existence of the
Spirit.
Thus then we
find
that these
three are mentioned in the order of precedence of the

ledge thereof. The upshot of the whole then is this
of the
of Spirit
distinction
knowledge
from descriminative knowledge
from Matter
consisting in
know
:
The
ari
.e
meditation
[17
19J
[K.
m.]
and contemplation uninterruptedly and patiently practised

for a long time, of the Manifested, &c., previously heard of in
the S ruti and Purdnas, and then established by scientific
This will be explained in detail in Karika
reasoning.
Having thus decided Philosophy
(17).
Fourfold division of
categories.
LXIV.
to be needful for
the enquirer, the author, with a view to

commence the work, sets down, in brief, the
import of the system, in order to concentrate the attention

of the enquirer.
KAHIKA
III.
Nature or Primordial Matter, the root of all, is

not produced; the Great Principle ( Mahat, i. e., Buddhi)
and the rest are seven, being both producer and pro
"
and the
sixteen are the produced
neither the producer nor the produced."
duced
Briefly, the objects treated of in the
Some
of
system are four-fold.
some merely products,

and
and
others, neither tlie
products,
productive
them
others both
Spirit is
are merely productive,,
one nor the other.

(18).
It being asked
is
-What
is
the productive?
The answer
Nature or Primordial Matter
is
the root
of the Universe, an aggregate of effects of

there is no root, or else we would be landed in
;
Matter
itself
an unwarranted regressus ad
(19).
How many
infinitum.
are the objects that are
and products, and which

""
answer
is
both productive
these ? The
The Great Principle and the
are
rest are both.

As the Great Principle
the
cause
of
Self-consciousness
(Ahankara)
^JBuddhi) being
rs the effect of Nature ( Prakriti
), so is Self-consciousness
10
[2022]
[K. Hi.]
the cause of the five subtle Primary Elements (Tanmatras)

together with the eleven sense-organs, and at the same time,
the effect of the Great Principle; and so are the five- subtle
Primary Elements the cause of the grosser elements, Vril*

(Akasa) and the rest, and at the same time, the effect of Selfconsciousness.
How many
(20).
are the productions, pure
what are they ?
The Products.
said
It is
ctions are sixteen
i.
and simple, and

The produ
"
the
e. t
five
gross
elements (earth, &c.) and the eleven sense-organs, these are

mere products or modifications not productive. Though cow,
and so are curd and

and seed respectively, yet these facts do not
touch our position since trees, &c., do not differ from earth,
in their essence, and it is the productiveness of something
different in essence, for which the term Prakrit? stands and
further, cows, trees, &c., do not differ from each other in their
pot,
trees, &c., are modifications of earth,
sprout, of milk
essence, since they have, in
and
common, the
properties, grossness
perceptibility.
The form of that which
(21).
duct,^ now
is
neither productive nor pro

The spirit is neither
"
stated.
a product nor productive.

be explained later on.
All this will
In order to prove the above statements, the different

kinds of proof ought to be noticed. Nor
s
can there be a specific definition without a
(22).
general one.
Though
ears, as
Hence the
definition of
this translation of the
borrowed from a work on
have put
it in,
word Akasa
since I could not find
"
"
is
is
(Lytton
"
."
sure to
jar upon European

The Coming Kace"), yet
any other word in the English language
connoted by the Sanskrit word Ak^,a.
fiction
expressive enough to denote all that

Astral Light,"
Inane,"
Ether,"
proof in general -follows.
Space,"
the active character of the Sanskrit Akdsa..
&c.,
"
do not sufficiently represent
11
[2325]
[K. iv.]
KARIK! IV.
"
Perception,
Inference,
and Valid Testimony are
admitted to be the three kinds of proof necessary ;

because they include all kinds of proof.
It is by proof
that a fact
(23)
is ascertained."
Here, first of all, we have to explain the word Pramdna,
which explanation would form

Proof defined.
Proof, then,
is
its definition.
defined as that by which

determined it thus becomes
right notion is
the cause or means of all correct
This definitecognition.
a mental condition free from the contact of all
right notion is
that is either doubtful,
self-contradictory or unknown ; this

to the human agent, and the result
too
belongs
comprehension
thereof is right notion; and that which leads to such right
notion
is
Proof.
all that leads to
memory, and the

(24).
Thus the term Proof is differentiated from

wrong notion, viz., doubt, misconception,
like.
The author now

to the
T
of
rejects the different views with regard
number
~that
e three f0ldneSS
ro of
"
neither
is
of proofs
"
Of three
"
kinds,
of P roof there are three
more nor
less.
This
we
kinds
>
shall
explain in detail after the specific definitions of the particular

kinds of proofs.
(25).
Now,
asked, which are the three kinds of proof ?

The answer is
Perception, Inference, and
The above is an ex
Valid Testimony.
is
what
-of
popularly known as
position
it is
"
proof; and a philosophical system is expounded for the

The cognitions
people, since thereto is its province confined.
of the great sages, though realities, do not, in any way, help
t
of the ordinary people, and as such are not treated of
jiose
1/ere.
12
.[2629]
(26).
The
all
We grant
Objection.
inclusion of
other proofs in the
n0 ^
it
that the
îan
^ ess
[K. Y,]
three
number of
proofs
is
but wherefore should
not be more than three?
The
different
schools do lay down others, as Analogy

Since these three include all kinds
Reply
"
(Upamana), &c.
This will be further explained
of proof
"
Now
(27).
an altogether
en
e
quiry into the differ)f
proot
different question is raised

Why
should the philosophic system enquire into
the nature and kinds of proof, when it is
launched forth with the express purpose
of explaining the Prameya,

(.
is
.,
later on.
correct cognition)
ascertained only by
i. e.,
To
the
this it
subject-matter of proof
Since a fact
replied
"
is
proofs"
[Siddhi= determination or ascertainment.]

The order
of
Ex-
planation.
(29).
Now
The
The explanation of the Karika

(28).
follows the sense, not the order of the words.
on the occasion of the definition of the special

kinds of proofs, the author of the Karika,
de*
finitions
specific
of,,
the
first
of
all,
defines
Perception,
since
it
all other Proofs,
Inference, &c.,
precedes
which, therefore, are dependent upon it and further since
there are no two opinions with regard to it.
;
V.
is definite sense
-cognition (/. #., cogni
of particular objects through the senses) ; Infer
ence is declared to be three-fold, and it is preceded
"
Perception
tion
by (based upon) the knowledge
of the major premiss

[asserting the invariable concomitance of the Linga
(the Hetu, i. e., the characteristic mark, the middle
term,) with the Lingi (the Vyapaka or the Sadhya, i. e ,

the major term, in which the characteristic inheres] ani l
r
13
[30-31]
[K. v.]
of the
premiss [asserting the existence
characteristic in the Paksha, or the minor term] ; and
the minor
Valid.
true revelation (S
is
Testimony
ruti)."
"
The mention of Perception is only the statement of the

the remainder being the definition, by
term to be defined
which word is meant the differentiation (of the term defined)
from things of the same class or species, as well as from
"
those of other classes.
The
meaning (of the
cognition of particuiar objects obtain-
definition of Perception)
be
thus
broken
may
up objects (Vishaya)
are those that bind or connect the subject
-^
(Visfiayi) with their own forms, ^. ., they
ed through thesenses.
mark
(30).
literal
dethe definite
"Perception"
fined as
,-,
out tne
belonging to us.
are no objects (of sense) to us,
pleasure, &c.,
and the Gods.

different objects,
The
su bj e ct
subtle
such are earth,
Primary Elements
though they are so to Yogisis that which is

Prativishaya
applied to
i. e.,
the organs of sense.
Application here
is
close proximity, or direct communication,

Prativishaya, thus
meaning, the sense-organ applied to, or in communication
with, the object (perceived)
on
and the
definite cognition
based
"
is
This
Prativishayadhyavasdyah"
which
is the result of an exercise of the
or
knowledge,
cognition
Intellectual Faculty (Buddhi), is defined as consisting in the
this
(proximity)
preponderance therein, of the attribute of Goodness following

on the subjugation of that of Darkness
resulting from the
proximity of the sense-organs to the objects of perception.
This proximate existence (Vritti) is also called cognition.
This is a Proof and right notion results from the apprehen
sions of the sentient faculty by means thereof.
;
(31).
Intellect
JiSctfand
the re flection of
the Spirit therein.
f the Intellect
(Buddhi), being a modification of, oremanation from, Nature (Prakriti, Primordial

Matter),
is
insentient
and
so,
therefore,
And similarly
cognitions, jar, &c.
_
IMS
*
i
the different modifications or productions
are insentient. The Spirit
pleasures, &c.,
are
its
14
[32-33]
however,
(Parusha),
having no
[K. v.]
real
relation
with
these
This Spirit, being reflected

the
Intellect, appears to be actually affected by the cognitions
and pleasures, &c., really belonging to the Intellect which
pleasures, &c.,
is
sentient.
latter, therefore, are said
this
Through
Spirit.
in>
favour an intelligent entity, the

intelligence of the
to
reflection in the
the non-intelligent Buddhi and its cognitions

appear
endued with intelligence. This will be further explained in
Spirit,
Karika
XX.
(32).
In the definition, the mention of
definite cognition!
a ^ doubtful knowledge, because
the latter* is not definitely comprehended
sets as
The above
tion
definidifferentiates
Perception from all

other forms of cog-
ê
or well-defined,
and hence
"
saying
objects,"
is
uncertain.
their contraries, all
By
non
prati* and thereby

implying proximity of the sense-organs to the objects are
excluded Inference," and
Trustworthy Assertion." Thus
*
is a complete
the definite cognition of particular objects
entities,
are
excluded; as by saying
"
"
definition of Perception, since it serves to distinguish

of the same, as well as of different
all other things
The
it
from
classes
"
given by other philosophical

Perception
nor
are
neither
defended, for fear of being
systems
impugned
definition of
too prolix.
(33).
Inference
How
is
can one, denying Inference as a proof,
esta-
Wished as a distinct
Materialist
be
viz.,
the
certain of the
ignorance,
doubt or erroneousness of another man ?
Since, these
ceptible to
our mortal eyes
are not per

ignorance, &c.
nor can any other method of
proof be applied to this case, since no other (than Perception)

accepted as such (by the Materialist). And not knowing
is
the ignorance, &c., of others, and thus going about addressing

people at random, one would be despised by the enquirers as
a mad man. Consequently, (we assert) that the ignorance,
&c., of others are inferred
as difference of
meaning
from such marks or
or speech, &c.
characteristic^,
Thus, however unwilfj-
15
[3435]
[K. v.]
ing, the Materialist is constrained to accept Inference as

distinct method of proof.
And
(34).
finition
Inference following directly from Perception, its

definition must follow close upon that of
f
jJm, Jf
Perce P tion
tnere a g ain
general one, the author gives the latter
on account of the
being based on the
definition
particular
>
first
"
It is
preceded
the middle
by (a notion of) the middle* and major terms;
term being the Vyapya or pervaded, and the major term, the
"
or pervader.
the pervaded ( Vyapya) is that which
to
its
natural
own
sphere, after the removal of all
brought
Vyapaka
is
and
dubious
Vyapya
mention of
be
and that by which the

The
( Vyapaka ).
mark and the marked," both of which must
assumed
conditions
thus brought
is
"the
objects,
indicates
the pervader
in, is
objective or
substantive cognition.
Inference proceeds from the knowledge of smoke as the per

vaded (the mark) and the fire as the pervader (the marked).
Lingi (the marked) must be twice construed in the definition,

in order to imply the minor premiss [in which is stated the
minor term (the PakshcC), with the middle term

Thus the general definition of Inference comes to
-Inference is (a method of cognition) preceded by
relation of the
(Hetti)~\.
be thus:
based on) the knowledge of the relations of the major

minor (Paksha) and the middle (Hetu) terms
with one another." [That is to say, Inference is the know
(i. e.,
(Sdcl/iya), the
ledge derived from the major and the minor premises],

(35).
^he author now sketches the
The three kinds of

(i) The
Inference
The ! posteriori
(Seshavat), and (3)
The inference from
the perception of spe(2)
divisions which have

been laid down by other systems also
"
is of three kinds" i. 0., the spedivisions of Inference are three-fold
Inference
The a r
(A
priori L[Purvavat the inference
v
,,
~.
c
e
of the eflect trom the cause, as or ram from
.
..
the gathering of the clouds], (ii) The a

the inference of the
posteriori [Seshavat
ause, from the effect, as of rain from rise in the river], and
"
Literally
the
mark and the
marked."
[36
16
38]
[K. V.]
Inference from the perception of species or class [Inference

based on relations other than the causal, as of substantiality
(iii)
from earthiness].
First of
(36).
dil
fi
Inference
of two kinds
The
(1)
and
the
Affirmative (Vita)
(2)
Negative
(Avita)* That which is based on| affirma
tive concomitance, is Vita
and that based
all,
of ^nference.
is
on negative concomitance, the Avita.
Of these, Avita
(37).
The
The a
is
Seska
Negative-
is
Inferential
posteriori In-
mainder
As
"
is
Seshavat (a posteriori or
analytic).
thafc which
remains; and the
declaredf:
havino-
knowledge
for its object
The cause
is
called
this
re
Seshavat.
in question
being excluded,
and
(the qualification) not found elsewhere, the idea of the remain
Examples of this Avita
Sutras.]
tion,
is Parisesha."
[Vatsayana Bhashya on the Nyaya

Inference, founded on nega
will be given later on Karika
IX].
ing (object)
(38).
The Vita
The AffirmativeThe a priori and

that from the
two-fold (1) Purvavat (a

priori or syntheand ( 2 ) rom the
perception of species.
Of these Purva is that whose obiect is
J
is
tic
per-
~u
ji
such
as has the characteristics of
i
ception of the
its
spe-
known; and the Inferential knowledge

as from the exis
of which this forms the object i^ Purvavat
6pecies -
cies
tence of smoke
inferred the existance of an individual fire in
is
the characteristics of the species
the mountain,
fire
hav
ing been previously perceived in the culinary hearth. The

second kind of Vita the Inference based on the perception
of the species
is
that
which has
its
object,
such as has
c
The Vita has an
proposition for
its
major premiss
and the Avita, an
proposition, converted, per accidens.
sound has earth for

f As for instance, in a proposed inference of the formthe possibility of sound being in earth being
substrate, since it is a quality
excluded on the ground of its never being concomitant with smell, the quality
its
specific of earth
elsewhere,
and there being no
we have
asPariscsha,
possibility perceived, of sound residing

the notion of sound, being a quality specific of Vril (AkAsd)
<
17
[30]
the characteristics of
of this
kind are
all
[K. v.]
it3
species
(previously)
inferences with regard to
unknown
the
sense-
organs^; because in all inferences of this kind, the existence

of the cause of the perception of colour (i. e* vision) is inferred
being an effect (and as such neces

Though the characteristics of instrumental
from the fact of

sarily caused).
its
cause in general have been perceived in objects like axes,

&c., yet those of the species of the particular kind of such
causes the sense-organs which are inferred to exist as
causing the perception of colour, &c. are nowhere perceived.

Nor are the individuals the particular sense-organs form
4
ing the class Sense, perceptible to our mortal eyes as are

In this lies the difference between
those of the class Fire.
;
the Purvavat (a priori) Inference and the Sdmdnyatodriskta,

though they
(Inference based on the perception of the species)
;
resemble each other, inasmuch as both are Vita (affirmative).
Here (in Sdmdnyatodriskta) driskta = darsd?ia, i. e., perception ;

and SdmdnyatakôfSamanjs^ i. e., species or class; to Sdmanya
is added the universal affix
Tasi.*
Thus then the term
The Inference, consisting in the comprehension by
means
the individual of a species whose general characteristics are
All this has been fully explained by us in the
not known.
and is not repeated here for
Nydyavartika-tdtparyatika
"
;"
fear of being too prolix.
(39).
Since the comprehension of the connection of words

(in a sentence) is preceded by a process of
inference with regard to the cause of action
of the experienced youth directed, on hear
ing the words of the experienced director, and further, since

the comprehension of the meaning of a word is due to the
knowledge of
therefore Valid Testimony, is

denotation,
preceded by, and based upon, Inference. Hence, after having
defined Inference, the author next defines Valid
Testimony.
its
Here, of course, having the force of the Genitive.
18
[4043]
[K. v.]
Valid Testimony is true revelation." Here the mention of

Valid Testimony is merely a statement
The definition of
n
n
the rest terming
01 the term to be defined
Trustworthy Asserin the
turn, given
the definition.
True means proper
explained.
hence
true revelation
means
proper
"
/,
/,
Karika",
S rut?
revelation.
is
the comprehension of the meaning of a
sentence by means of the sentence.
(40).
This
is
self-evident.
It is true
since
all
apparent
discrepancies and doubts with regard
human.
are set
to
aside b ^ the fact of
its proceeding from the Veda, which is super

Thus also the knowledge obtained from Smritis,
ifc
Puranas, &c., which are founded on the Veda, becomes true.
To the primeval Kapila,

Kalpa, we may
Smritis and Puranas included in

*
Anta-Vachana
occurrences
in
the beginning of the
attribute the
of the S ruti studied in his
reminiscence
previous birth,
"
<
previous day. And so did the revered

conversation with Avatta, speak of his
of the
Jaigishavya, in
his
reminiscence of his births extending over such a long time as

ten Mahakalpas
By me, evolving through ten Mahakal"
pas,
&c."
(42).
true revelation, all pretended revelations

such as those of Sakya, Bhikshu,
c.,
have been set aside.
The invalidity of
By saying
these systems is due to their making un

reasonable assertions, to want of sufficient basis, to their mak
ing statements contradictory to proofs, and lastly to their
being accepted only by Mlechchhas or other

(43).
V distinguishes
Differentiation
Valid
of
Testimony
from Inference.
mean
people.
Valid Testimony from Inference.

Tll Caning of a sentence is the
Prameya
sentence
or
(the fact to be proved):
word is not its property and as such cou
-,
"
"
not
be
its
mark
or predicate.
Nor does a
sentence, e
10
[4445]
[K. v.]
pressing a meaning, stand in need of the comprehension of the

connection of the mark and the marked which are the neces
sary conditions of Inference
since the sentence of a
previously unknown, expresses the
meaning
new
poet,
sentences
of
touching unknown regions.*
poIuLedX
ht
systems shown to bo
included in the three
already defined.
thus defined proofs,

as well as specifically, the other
Having
(44).
P
generally
kinds of proofs, Analogy and the rest,

,
T
T
postulated by others, can be shown to be
,
-,
included in the above.
(45).
is exemplified as
The gavaya,
of
ruminants
analogous to the
(a species
Analogy (Upamdnd)
&^
led e
is
like
tlie
P roclllced ty
Cow
tllis
But
kllOW-
tlie
statement
is
nothing
more than that produced by our "Valid

The knowledge that the term gavaya
Testimony."
denotes some object resembling the cow, is also nothing

more than Inference. The object with reference to which
experienced persons use a particular term, comes to be

denoted by that term, in the absence of any other object
(that could be so denoted), e.g., TJT^ (the class
In the same manner experienced
TJT.
ed by
asserted that
sembles the
"the
cow,"
cow
) is
denot
people having
object denoted by the term, gavaya re

the term gavaya comes, to denote some
and this knowledge is purely In

thing resembling the cow
ferential,
.The cognition of similarity of the perceived
gavaya with the cow is the result of mere Perception; hence,
;
the cow being recalled to memory, the cognition of the

gavaytfs* similarity thereto becomes perception, pure and
simple. And it cannot be further urged that the similitudef
*
Whereas Inference can belong only
to objects previously
known.
f This is levelled against the assertion of Mandana Misra in his Mimansa*

mtkramani, that the object of analogy is not either the gavaya or the cow,
Irjit the similarity of the one in the other, which cannot be said to be
ameM:
tale
to perception.
20
[46]
existing in the
cow
is
different
[K. v.]
from that in the gavaya
since
the similarity of one species with another consists in both of

them having a common mode of the conjunction of their
common method of conjunction can be

one only and this being perceived in the gavay
must be
the same in the cow also. Thus (we find) that nothing is left
to be proved where Analogy could be applied to advantage.
Hence Analogy is not a distinct Proof.
various parts; and this
;
Similarly Apparent Inconsistency (Arthapatti) is

not a distinct Proof. For the case of the
(46).
assumptiou of the living Chaitra being

outside, when he is not found at home, is
JSSwrtfiSv
to be included
shown
cited as
tency.
To
us,
A particular
Sankhyas,
an instance of Apparent Inconsis

nothing more than Inference.
this is
non-pervading or finite, when not

found in one place, must be in another. The major premiss
in the form, that a finite object being in one place cannot be
object being
is easily got at, with reference to our own bodies.

Similarly the cognition of the external existence of an existing"
object, is inferred, from the mark of its not being in the house ;
in another
and this process is purely Inferential. Chaitra s existence

somewhere else cannot set aside the fact of his non-existence in
the house and as such, non-existence in the house could, very
;
reasonably, be urged as a reason for his being outside. Nor

does the fact of his non-existence in the house cutoff his exist
ence altogether
and consequently his entity could be said to

For Chaitra s non-existence in the house
retain itself outside.
contradicts either his existence in toto, or merely his existence

in the house. The former alternative cannot stand, the subjects
of the two propositions being different.* If you say that by

the general assertion
"he must be somewhere"
(without any
definite place
*
It
same
is
only
being mentioned), any particular place
when two statements
subject, that they
present instance.
are
contradict each
even
dthe
made, with regard to one and
which is not the case in
other
tfi<
21
[47]
the house
may
be implied
[K. v.]
and as such the non-existence in
becomes uncertain; and thus there being co-objectivity

between the two propositions noticed above, they would con
we reply No: because the non-existence
tradict each other,
of Percep
in the house having been ascertained by evidence
cannot be set aside, on the ground
tion in the present instance
the house
of uncertainty, by the doubtful fact of his existence therein. It

is not .proper to assert that his proved non-existence in the
house, while overthrowing his uncertain existence therein,
would set aside his existence in toto and set aside all doubt
Because Chaitra s existence in the

(of his existence in space).
house, being contradictory to his proved non-existence therein,
is overthrown by this latter ; not so his existence in toto ; since
this latter fact is altogether
ence in the house. Thus it
disconnected with the non-exist
very proper to say that the
is
external existence of an entity

of internal non-existence.
is
inferred from its characteristic
Hence the
assertion
that the
subject of Arthdpatti is the removal of contradiction after due

consideration of the strength of two contradicting proofs is
1
between the parti

; for there is no real contradiction
cular (the proof of non-existence in the house) and the general
(that of mere existence). The other examples of Arthdpatti
set aside
Hence
similarly be shown to be included in Inference.
established that Apparent Inconsistency (Arthapatti) is
not a proof distinct from (Disjunctive) Inference.
may
it is
Negation (AbMva) again is nothing more than

mere Perception. The Negation of a jar
Negation (Abhdva)
js
nothing more than a particular modificashownt^be includf
tion oi the Earth characterised by
ed in Perception.
(its)
absence.
Since all existences, with the
(47).
single exception of Consciousness or Intelligence {Chit

Sakti)^
are momentarily undergoing modifications, all of which are
perceptible to the senses

<
therefore there
is
no ground
left
un-
overed by Perception for which we should postulate a distinct

Iroof in the shape of Negation (Abhdva).
22
[4850]
\
(48).
bhl^lown
included
(Sambham)-e.
"Probability"
of
in
to*
[K. vi.]
the
existence
of
g.,ihz knowledge
weights in
lesser
S reater ones is also an instance of InferThe heavier weight is known as not

ence.
be"
Infer-
capable of existing without the lesser ones;
and
this fact leads to the belief in the existence
of the latter
in the former.
(49).
That
is
Rumour (Aitihya)
discarded, as affording doubtful
testi-
by the Sankhyas
whose lirst speaker is unknown, and
j^ ^ is handed down by
mere tradition3
e. g.,
a Yaksha resides in the Vata tree.
called
"Rumour"
(Aitihya),
This
Rumour is not a proof since it is
doubtful owing to the fact of the first speaker being unknown.
"Valid Testimony,"
however, is that of which the speaker
Thus the three-foldness of proofs
is known to be veracious.
;
is
established.
(50). Thus have been defined severally the different kinds

of proof, with a view to demonstrate the existence of the Ma?iiOf these, the
fested, the Unmanifested and the Knowing.
are perceptible in their true form,
And similarly the a priori
Inference with regard to the existence of fire in the mountain,
could easily be arrived at through the mark of the smoke. Such
Manifested
even to the
earth, &c.,
common ploughman.
being the case, a system of philosophy, propounded for the

sake of these, loses much of its importance and necessary
Hence what is difficult to be got at (by ordinary

should
be explained by philosophy. Consequently
methods)
the cases of application of the different proofs are laid down.
character.
KARIKA VI.
Knowledge
The
j.ne
of app
acases 01
application of the differ-
super sensuous objects

through Inference the
of
Tj
7
toaris/ita.
ent proofs,
is
obtained
1
Sdmanya-
,.
nl
hat is not proved by thi
^ T71
-TTTI
is
proved by revelation.
/-,
23
[5153]
(51).
from
[K. vl.]
t
The
distinguishes the Samanyatodrishta

Inference a priori.
Through the
Inference there arises knowledge of
particle
Perception
and
Samanyatodrishta
Pradhdna* (Primordial Matter or Nature), and the Spirit
both of which transcend the senses, and this knowledge is
of Bucldhi reflected in Consciousness
clue to the
^
operation
The above implies the appli

Chaitanya (belonging to Spirit).
cation of the Seshavat (Negative) Inference also.
Inference alone
Then, does the Samanyatodrishta
?
If so, we shall
the senses
apply to all objects transcending
have to deny the existence of the Great Principle (Mahat),
in heaven, in the
as also of Heaven, Destiny and the Gods
(52).
<fec.,
case of which the inference does not apply.

and as a simple by this
By this,
"
"
"
Hence
it is
would
suffice to
said
<fr.,"
the
give the required meaning,
*to Seshavat (Negative) Inference.!
-Granted
(53). Objection
tion of such objects as
all
must be taken as
this.
referring
But the non-percep-
sky-flowers, &c., leads to their being

in the same way we might infer the
as
non-entities;
accepted
of
Nature, and the rest (which are like skynon-existence
flowers not amenable to perception). This being the case, why
* Henceforth Pradhana, Prakrit! or Avyakta

be translated as Nature.
will, for the
sake of simplicity,
I difference of
opinion among Commentators as to the explanait,
Vachaspati Misra, as we
Karika, especially the first half of
we have a knowledge of supersensuous objects,
have scan, explains it as
i-ghta Inference.
Gaudapada takes it the same way.
the
There
is
tiftn of this
through
Sfaitdnyatodi
But NaruJyana Tirtha explains thus
"In
Siimdmjatali? the
aftix
*tas?
is
substituted for the genitive case-termination. Thus the meaning is that of all
we have a knowledge from Per cation.
objects amenable to the senses,
(generic)
This last
is
the sense accepted by Davies in his
translation.
But the
former interpretation appears to be the more reasonable. Because it cannot be

said that Inference does not apply to objects amenable to the senses. Davies,
in a foot-note in loco, says that Shm&nyaJ "does not mean, &c." But he loses
;
si/Yht of the
fact
that
cilar kiinl of Inference.
"
Saint ft i/atodrishta
is
the technical
name
of a parti-
24
[54]
*
[K. VIL]
have recourse to the various kinds of Inference
for the sake of
these latter?
The reply
is
KARIK! VII.
"(Non-perception
from excessive distance,
arises)
extreme proximity, destruction of the sense-organs,

absence of mind (inattention), subtlety (or minuteness),
intervention (or the existence of some intermediate
predominance (of other

intermixture with with other like
barrier),
objects),
and from
objects."
(54). The non-perception" of the following Karika is to

be construed along with this, in accordance with the maxim
"
of the
"
looking (back) of the
hird soaring
high, though existing, is yet not per

ceived on account of extreme remoteness.
Extreme
of objects, explained.
lion."*
(off)
must
also be taken
with
proximity (somipya) e. g., the non-per-.

ception, through extreme nearness, of the
collyrium (anjana) in the eye.

"
"
Destruction of organs"
From
absence
e. g.,
blindness, deafness, &c.
As
a person, under the

of
influence of (some very strong) desire, &c., does not
perceive
objects, even in bright daylight, though quite within the
,
range of his senses.
"
From
may
may
mind"
Minuteness"
concentrate
&.$ for
our mind
instance,
however,
much we
however attentively we
look) we can never perceive atoms, though under our
(i.
e.,
very eyes.
"From
Intervention"
e.
g.,
one cannot see the
Qneen
behind the walls.

*
The maxim of the lion s (backward)
glance, is generally used to mark
the connection of a
thing with what precedes and follows." [Vide.
Jfyaya-Latika in loco, ]
25
[5556]
V From subjugation or
[K.
suppression"
^-e.
cepticjn of the constellations, suppressed
the
g.,
vm.]
non-per-
by the brighter rays
of the sun.
>
as one does not preceive

intermixture*
drops
of rain-water, disappearing in a tank.
(55). The ^ in the Karika has a collective force, implying
"From
even those not here mentioned; such as
non-production*
of non-perception as one cannot
perceive, in the milk, the curd, not yet produced therefrom.
is
also
among
the causes
The upshot of the whole then is, that the non-exist

(56).
ence of a certain object cannot be inferred merely from the
for there is danger of the
not being perceived
Thus, for
principle being unwarrantably stretched too far.
instance, a certain individual, getting out of his house, can
fact
of
its
never be he said to be assured of the non-existence of the

inmates, simply on the ground of his not seeing them. The
fact is that it is only with reference to objects capable of
being perceived on the occasion, that non-perception leads to
the inference of their non-existence, And this capability of

teing perceived can never belong to Nature &c., (which are by
their nature imperceptible) and as such it is not proper for
;
intelligent
men
to infer their non-existence
merely from their
non-perception or imperceptibility.
Question Which of the above mentioned causes (of nonperception) Applies in the case of Nature, &c. ? The reply is
KiRIKA VIII.
The
The
jion- apprehension of this

non-appre-
subtlety,
since
ii:
effects by
not
similar,
its
is
due
to
its
non -existence
its
apprehended through
These effects are the êat
Principle,
oQ
to
is
its effects.
which are
(Nature)
and the
rest
effects
and (some) dissimilar
(some
to Nature.
26
[5759]
v
(57).
*>
Why
should
we
vm.]
[K.
not, continues the objector, attribute
the non-apprehension of Nature to its non-existence, as

of the seventh kind of unction (in rhetoric)?
we do
The Author
"Not
replies.
due
to its non-existence"
Why ?.
apprehended through its effects" It refers to

Nature. The proofs of the apprehension of the Spirit will be
mentioned later on, in Karika XVII. If we find direct
"Because it is
perception inapplicable in the case of objects, whose existence

ascertained by means of evidence other than that afforded
is
by perception itself, we at once infer the inapplicability to be

due to incapacity* (and not to non-existence of the object
The seventh unction on the other hand, has not
itself). f
its
existence ascertained by any proof, and as such, the incapacity

of perception cannot be urged in its case.
(58).
whose
Granted
all this,
infer that of
existence, you
Great Principle, and
"The
but which are the
Nature
the rest are the
effects
The reply
from
is
effects"
This will be proved later on (Karik& XXII.) Next are

mentioned the similarity and dissimilarity in form, of these
the comprehension of both of which is
effects, with Nature
to
discriminative
auxiliary
dissimilar to Nature"
knowledge:
"Similar
This division will be further treated of in Karika
and
XXIII
et. seq.
Different
views
with regard to the
nature of .the
(i).
effect.
The Bauddha
view of the effect

an
being
entity
arising from non-
From (the existence of) the

*
^ /n
n\ JT
JT
interred (that oi) the cause
on this
there is diversity
of opinion.
Thus
J
(59).
a?
*.
enect
point
is
some philosophers
Bauddhas) assert
of entity from noft-entity.
(the
VedaT?ewof?he
the
whole
Others (the Vedantists) represent the whole-
series
of
effects being a
mere
P^^tion
On
the part of perception.

is with reference to Nature, the existence of which is
proved through its effects the proof being based on the general proposition
The effects, Mahat, &c., are perceptible
"Every effect must have a cause."
f This statement
these must have a cause, and this cause
ia
Nature.
27
[60]
evolution from a sinpie real
The
entity.
non-entity
and
arising
JhTsInkhya view
of the effect
being
an entity arising
from an entity.
(60).
single
The impossibility
?S
first
of
three
,.,
entity,
vm.]
a mere evolution from a
,.."
and
not a real entity in itf P nilos P hers ( the

Set
Nayayikas) hold the production of noneni

from ^^J- The Sankhyas lastly
teach that from entity emanates entity.
Now, we cannot
of the existence
the
series of effects as
(3).
Nyaya
[K.
establish the existence
of Nature,
in accordance with the first three theories.

.
J-he
Universe consists essentially of sound,
&c
which are
"
different
fications of pleasure, pain
and
forms and modi -
and delusion,
as such bears testimony to the charac
ter of Nature, which lies in its being constituted by goodness,

Such being the case, if we assert the
passion and darkness.
from
of
non-entity (the Bauddha view) [we
production
entity
would land ourselves in an absurdity] viz., how could the

cause, an undefinable (unreal) non-entity, consist of sound,
and the rest which are different forms of pleasure, &c.? For,
certainly we cannot, hold the identity of entity and non-entity
(two opposites). Nor could the doctrine of the emanation of
t
entity from entity (the Sankhya view) be upheld in accordance

with the theory that the phenomena of sound, &c., are mere
a single entity (the Vedanta view). Nor

could
attribute
we
again
phenomenality (or changeability) to
the single
in fact the notion of .such phenomenality (changeevolutions from
ableness) with regard to the unphenomenal (unchangeable)

would be a mistake. Even in the theory of Kanada and
Gautama, who maintain the production of non-entity from
entity, $he
according to
existence
of
Nature cannot be proved

is not identical with the
them, the cause
since,
effect,
inasmuch as entity and non-entity are diagonally opposed to

each other.*
*
According to the Nayayikas the cause
is
an entity, the
effect
non
and since an entity and a non-entity cannot be identical, therefore

entity
th 1 cause and the effect cannot be identical.
;
28
[6163]
[K.IX.]
Hence, in order to establish the existence of Nature.,

first declares the effect to be an entity, (even prior
(61).
the author
to causal operation).
KARIKA IX.
The
effect is
an entity
(1) because a non-entity can

never be brought into existence
(2)
?
because oi a (determinate) relation of
;
The five proof a of

the effect being an
the cause
(with the
effect)
(3)
be
cause everything cannot be possible (by any and every

means) ; (4) because a competent (cause) can do (only)
and (5) lastly, because

competent
non- different from the cause.
that for which

the effect
(62).
is
The
it is
effect is
The Bauddha view
an entity
that
is to say, it is
so
even
prior to the operation of the cause. Against

this theory, the Nayayikas cannot urge the
fault of the absurdity of the production of an
already existing object. Because though.the production of the

sprout and the jar is consequent upon the destruction of the
seed and the
of clay respectively, yet causal energy can

only be attributed to an entity in the shape of the seed, and
not to its destruction [a kind of negation, a non-entity].
Further if you assert the production of entity from non-entity,
lump
any time available, would give rise to the

(absurd) possibility of any and every effect being produced at
any and all times. All this has been explained by us in the
this latter, being at
Nydyavdrtikatatparyatikd.
f>
(63).
The
belief in
The Vedfinta view

met..
the
existence
of the
phenomenal
world cannot be said to be illusory unless

we have some proof invalidating its
.
existence.*
* This is
urged against the Veddnta
evolution from a single real entity,
theory of the
effect
beingi an
29*
[6465]
[K. ix.]
t
Now
(64).
remains the theory of Gautama and Kanada,

with reference to which the author asserts
f
In SU PP rt
?** *$* is
vS^JtowSl*
and
ticised;
the
VieW C8ta
"
*>%"
this
assertion,
"
bHsiSr
adduced
"
following proofs are

Since a non-entity can
the
(1)
brought into existence" If the

effect were a non-entity before the operation of the cause, it
could never be brought into existence by anybody. By even a
never be
If you assert
artists blue can never be made yellow.
and
to
be
mere
entity
non-entity
properties belonging to the
then
in
that case, the qualified object (the jar) being non
jar,
thousand
existent, no property could belong to it; and as nuch the entity

the (property) remains in the same condition (L e., cannot be
attributed to the jar).
Nor can non-entity (as a quality) be
attributed to
nor cognate to
too before
it,
For, how can non-entity belong to the jar

when it is neither in any way related to it
it ?
Hence as after the causal operation, so
it.
(as a property)
the effect subsists.
Such being the
case, all that
remains to be done by the
the manifestation or unfolding of the pre-existing

effect [i. #., its emanation from the cause wherein it has been
cause
is-
lying latent] , The manifestation of something existing before

hand is a fact quite compatible with experience ; as of the
oil from sesamum by pressure, of rice from paddy by thumping,
and of milk from cows, by milking. On the other hand, we

have no instance of the manifestation of a non-entity for a
;
non-entity
is
(2)
never seen to be either manifested or produced.
For the following reason
also
does
the
effect
Because of a
That is to
effect."
subsists
of
relation
because
the
the
effect
holding between
say,
That is, the cause produces
itself and its material cause.
and (we all know) that
the effect when in relation with it
subsist before the operation of the cause

(determinate) relation of the cause with the
"
no relation with a non-existing

effect must be an entity.
effect is
possible
hence the
30
[6667]
[K. ix.]
the objector
but, continues
(66). Granted all this
wherefore is the effect not producible by causes unconnected
therewith?
We reply, that under such circumstances,
;
With
only non-entity would be produced.

the author lays down
this reply in
view
"
(3)
everything cannot be
Since
-If
possible."
the effect
unconnected with the cause could be produced (by that cause),

then every effect would arise from every cause (without
restriction), there being no other limitation save that of
unconnectedness (which any cause can have with reference to
any effect.) But such is not the case. Hence a connected
effect
only can be produced by a connected cause, and not an

effect
as
by an unrelated one
say the
unconnected
no relation of the cause, imbued with

entity, with non-entity those holding the production of an un
connected effect will land themselves in a regressus ad
"
Sankhyas
There
is
injinitum"
Objection: Be it so :
will always
produce
But an
though un
which
it is
related,
and
this
too
could
be
inferred
from
competency
competent
the presence of the effect, and as such we sail clear of the
(67).
the
entity,
effect
for
regressus
Reply
is
ad
infinitum.
(4)
"Since
competent"
a competent cause does that for which it

does
this
then, asks our author,
Now
Capability or competency
belonging to the cause imbued
with the causal energy, apply to every effect or only to those
to which the cause is competent? If the former/ then the
same confusion
tion will arise
arises
how
if
the latter,
does
the
then the following ques
energy apply to non-entity ?
On
this point if it be asserted that the (causal) energy itfself is

so constituted as to produce only certain effects, not others ;
then we ask
Is this
peculiarly
connected with the particular
constituted
effect or
not
energy of yours
In the former
no relation being possible with a non-entity, the effect

must be an entity in the latter, you have the same endless
series of causes and effects.
Hence it is reasonably declaredl
case,
31
[6869]
that (the effect
is
only* produce an
an entity)
"
because a competent cause can
tohich
effect Jor
[K.IX.]
it is competent"
For the following reason too is the effect an

(5)
^ Since the
effect is connate (non-different) with the
(68).
entity
cause."
cause
is
and the
The effect is not different from the cause
an entity then how can the effect, non-different from
;
this latter, be a non-entity ?
The
(69).
proofs establishing the non-difference of cause

and effect are the following (a) The cloth
:
Proofs of the nondifference of cause
and
(its
an
..,
effect.
not different from the threads
effect) is
material
.,
cause), since
it is
a property
in the
[i. e.,
latter
characteristically
inhering
since the cloth inheres in the threads constituting it].
An
object differing in its essence from another, can never

inhere in it as the cow in the horse but the cloth is inherent
;
in the threads
(b)
Owing
hence
it is
not different from
differ
not in essence
in its essence.
between the cloth
to the causal relation subsisting
and the thread, they
it
because the causal
between objects essentially different

between jar and cloth. But between
relation can never subsist
from one another

cloth
e.
g.
and threads we do
find the causal
relation
subsisting
hence they can never differ from one another, in essence, (c)
For the following reason also, there is no difference between
cloth and threads because of the absence of junction and non:
contiguity between the two.
We
see junction
taking place
between oHjects differing from one another, as between a pool

and a tree ; the same with regard to non-contiguity, as
between the Himavan and the Vindhya. In the instance
beforeîs, however, there
and as such, no
reason
is
neither junction nor non-contiguity,

(d) For the following
difference in essence,
too, cloth
and thread do not
differ in
essence
because
of the non-inclusion (in the particular effect) of any Bother)

As a matter of
effect different in weight (from the cause).
fact,
an object differing in essence from another always has a
weight different from that of the latter
c.
g.
the lowering of
32
[70]
[K. ix.]
the balance caused by two palas*
a single pala.
effects of the
But we
find
is
more than that caused by
no such difference
weight of the cloth and those
between ^the
the weight of
non-different from
of
the threads constituting it. Hence cloth is

the threads. These are the proofs afforded by a process of
negative inference [Avitdnumdna -see, Kdrika Y] establish
ing the non-difference (of cloth and threads in particular, and

of cause and effect in general).
(70). The non-difference being thus established, (it is

decided that) the cloth is only a particular development of the
threads combining themselves in various ways and that the
;
from each other in essence. No essential

difference can be proved on the ground of self-contradictory
actions in themselves (i. e., the effects), (difference apprehended
two do not
differ
in) language, or the difference in action (of the cause
of the effect).f
and that
Because these differences do not contradict
each other, when we see that they are brought about by the
appearance and disappearance of particular conditions as for
instance, the limbs of the tortoise disappear on entering its
body and appear again on emerging
from it but for this, we

cannot say that the limbs are either produced from, or
destroyed by, the tortoise. In the same manner, jar, crown,
;
fec., which are only particular developments of clay, gold, &c.,

on emanating from these latter, are said to be produced and
;
particular weight.
f Self-contradictory actions in themselves. When the cloth is reduced to

threads, we say the cloth is destroyed, and the threads are produced
now
destruction and production are diagonally opposed
and as sdch cannot be
predicated of the same thing at one and the same time but we do predicate
production of the threads and destruction of the cloth at one and the sam
;
time.
"
So they
differ.
Difference apprehended in language

Cloth is made of threads."
Difference in action
as
when we
use such sentences as
Thus we see that cloth can cover an object which

And .objects differing in their action must differ
certainly the threads cannot.

in essence.
These three are the objections brought forward against the

theory of the
non-difference of cause
and
effect.
separately in the following lines.
Each
of these
is
considered and refuted
33
[71-72]
[K.rx.]
on entering them again (i. e., being changed into

they .disappear and are said to be destroyed.
Nor again can a non-entity ever be produced

destroyed
The Bhagavadgita
supporting the Bankhya view.
as says
clsty, &c.,)
an
or
entity-
Krishna-
the revered
is neither an exists
dvaipayana: "There
...
^
ence of non-entity, nor non-existence or
.
[Bhagavadgitd II 16]. As the

from its own contracting and expand
ing limbs, so also are jar, crown, &c., not different from (their
material cause), clay, gold, &c. The assertion cloth is in (i. e,,
entity"
tortoise is not different
"
made
of) threads," is as consistent

trees in this forest."*
as the assertion
"Tilaka
Nor does difference of psopose and action establish

(71.)
difference in essence since a single substance can have mani
fold functions, as the fire alone can burn, digest and give light.
;
Nor
of purpose and action a ground of diiference

substances, for we see that this fixity varies in the
is fixity
among
substances themselves,
bearer, in
taken singly or collectively as a

bearers, can carry the palanquin
;
company with other
>
which he can never do when alone*
Similarly, the threads

taken singly, yet do cover when
though unable to cover, when

conjoined and thus having their existence as cloth manifested
(i.
.,
having developed into cloth).

Objection
(72).
An
objection,
based on the nature

cstation
of the
^{
*
Granted
all
this.
But,
is
the
mani
festation or appearance itself an entity or a

.,
.,
...
,.
non-entity, prior to the operation of the
.
cause
If the latter, then
you admit the
of
If, however,
non-entity.
production
have
done
with the
then
hold
to
former
the
alternative,
you
the
see
do
not
we
for
causal agency altogether ;
necessity of
As the Tilaka trees, constituting the forest, are nothing besides the
and yet we speak of the" Tilaka trees in the forest," so with
the assertion with regard to the cloth and threads.
*
forest itself;
34
[7375]
[K. ix.j
the causal operation when the effect already exists. If you

assume the manifestation of the manifestation, you will be
landed on a regressus ad infinitum^ Hence the assertion,

that the threads are made to have their existence as cloth
is invalid.
manifested,
To
(73).
eP
set~ asideâs
tion.
common
cause
both
to
if,
we make the following reply. Even on

your own theory of the production of nonwhat is this production* ?
entity, we ask
all this
An
entity or a non-entity ? If an entity,

then have done with the agency of the
however, you assert it to be a non-entity, you will
have to postulate the production of that production and so on

ad infimtum[a,nd. such being the case, the fault of regressus
ad
infinitum you urged

to both of us ;
common
it
against us, loses
and consequently
its force,
since
it is
not fair to urge
it is
against one].*
(74). If, in order to avoid the regressus ad injinitum, you

declare that the production is nothing more or less than the
cloth itself
then the notion of cloth would coincide with
that of production
and as such, on saying cloth, one should
not add is produced (because it would be a useless repetition) ;
nor could he say the cloth is destroyed ; because destruction
;
and production (denoted by

(75).
Consequently,
production of the
cloth
cloth)
can never coexist.
we have only two

must inhere
in its mere
alternatives
either
in
its
the
material
existence (Sattd).
In
cause (the threads), or
either case, the cloth cannot be produced without the operation
of causes. Thus it is proved that the operation of the cause
is
necessary for the manifestation of already existing effects.

causes do
you urge against us the common saying
(If
(produce) the forms of
then we reply that) the causes,
cloth"
because the?e
have no relation with the forms of cloth
and
it
is
with
actions
that causes
are
not
actions,
only
forms
;
are r elated
*
or
els e
they lose their character.
This point has been discussed by S ankarachaTya, in his Bhfishya on the
Yedanta Sutras, under the aphorism
"
Sivapakshadosh&chcha"
35
[7681]
Thus then
(76).
it is
[K. x.]
proved that the
effect is
an
entity.
(77)/ Having thus proved the effect to be an entity, a

fact favourable to the doctrine of the existence of Nature, the
author next states the similarity and dissimilarity between
the Manifested and the Unmanifested, a right comprehension
of which appertains to discriminative knowledge ; and this
is
done in order to show the character of Prakriti, whose

is to be proved.
existence
X.
The Manifested has
nor pervading
Points of dissimibetween the

Manifested and the
,.
larity
"
(78).
AH
is
(i.
it
is
neither eternal
(/. e. 9
universal)
ii
f*
mobile or
*?.,
\.
modifiable),
the reverse.
Hetumat
"
to
tions explained.
i. 0.,
what
having cause.
is
the
cause of
dealt with later on (Karika
"Not
it is
i
multiform, dependent, predicative (or

conjunct and subordinate. The Un
the quaiifica-
(79).
active
characteristic),
manifested
a cause
Eternal"
i.
e.,
The question as
what, will
be
XXII).
destructible, revolving [re
turning to the condition of its material cause*].

"
that is to say, the Manifested

Not pervading
(80).
does not extond over all evolving or developing substances.
"
pervaded by the cause but not vice versa, e. g.,

Consciousness (Buddhi) can never pervade Nature (Prakriti),
and as such is non-pervading.
The
effect
"
(81).
otc.,
is
Active
* Since
substance,
i. e.,
mobile.
Consciousness (Buddhi),
they renounce certain
mobility inasmuch as
they have hitherto occupied, and
have
bodies
"
the
occupy
others;
S&nkhyas do not admit of an utter annihilation of a
36
[8286]
as for the mobility of earth, &c.,
[K. x.]
it is
too well
known
(82).
<
Since
"Multiform"
different individuals
shape of
need
to
an explanation.
Consciousness &c,,
earth, &c.,
too
differ in
are multiform in
the
jars, &c.
On its cause; though the effect is

(83).
"Dependent"
non-different from its cause, yet the assertion of the relation
of subserviency is based upon a difference conventionally
as we say
the Tilakas in the forest."
"
accepted
"
(84).
Characteristic
Consciousness (Buddhi),
which cannot be
its
own
"
or predicative
i.
e., of Nature.
&c., are characteristics of Nature,
characteristic,
though
it
can be so of
the Spirit (Purusha).

"
Bearing in
"
Conjunct
(85).
and
itself the relation of
whole
Conjunction consists in approach preceded
by (i. *?.,
and
connection
with
such
after) non-approach
approach of
the whole to the part is what is connoted by
conjunct
as for instance, earth, &c., conjoin among themselves, and so
do others. On the other hand, there is no conjunction
of Nature (Prakriti) with Consciousness (Buddhi), since
the two are connate (and as such there can be no nonparts.
"
;"
nor is there reciprocal conjunction among

approach);
Goodness, Foulness and Darkness, since there is no non-
approach among them [since they
all
conjointly inhere in
Nature],
"
Subordinate
Consciousness stands in need
(86).
the aid of Nature in the completion of the production of
"
of
its
Without this aid,

Self-consciousness (Ahankara).
being, by itself too weak, it could not be efficient to produce
its effect. Similarly do Self-consciousness and the rest stand in
effect,
need of similar aids in the production of their several effects.

Thus, each and all stand in need of the perfecting hand 61
Hence
the Manifested, though efficient in the

of
its effects, is yet subordinate, inasmuch as it
production
stands in need of the aid of the Supreme Nature (the highest
Nature.
in the scale).
37
[8790]
[K. xi.]
"
The
of the
i. e.,
Unmanifested is the reverse
That is to say the Uumanifested is uncaused,
pervading, and inactive (immobile) though to
"
(87).
Manifested.
eternal,
Prakrit! does belong the action of evolution (or development,)
yet
can have
it
no
mobility
independent
single,
non-predicative, unconjunct, compact

up of parts), and non-subservient (supreme).
sufficient),
made
(self-
(i. e.,
not
(88). Having thus explained the dissimilarities of the

Manifested and the Unmanifested, the author now mentions
the similarities between these, and the dissimilarity of both
of these again from the Spirit:
KlRiKA XI.
The Manifested has the

The
points
similarity
(Gunas),
v
of
three constituent Attributes

it is
>
between
the Manifested and

Unmanifested
the
and those of dissimilarity of these
from the soul
vp
common), non-intelinsentient) and productive.

L
Ine bpirit is the
JNature.
generic
ligent (or
c
oo also is
.
indescrimmatino;, obiectJ
(or
reverse,
and yet also
(in
some
respects)
similar.
"
Having
(89).
the three
constituent
Attributes"
That
is
to say, the Manifested is possessed of the three attributes of

By this assertion are set aside all
pleasure, psin and duluess.
.the theories attributing pleasure
and pain
to the Spirit.
*.
Nature is not desIride&criminatwe"
e., as
(90).
criminated from itself
so too the Great Principle (Mahat or
Bnddhi) being connate with Nature, cannot be descriminated
"
c/rom
it.
tiveness:
efficient
Or indescriminativeness may mean merely co-operanothing singly (among the Manifested) can be a cause
for its effect
it can be so only when in company
with others
and as such no
taken singly by
itself.
effect is possible
from any cause
38
.[9194]
(91).
An
Some
....
Banddhas) assert that it is

Idea (Viinana) alone that is denoted by
.
/
the words pleasure, pain and dulnessv; and
(the Vijnana-Vadi
objection has-
ed onthe idealism
that there exists nothing besides
that could possess these (pleasures, &c.,) as
In opposition to this view

fested
The
idealistic
objection set aside.
"
Common"
persons.
If,
XL]
[K.
js
is
it is
down
laid
"
objective"
sav
J
ft | s
and above)
Vijnana
its attributes.
that the
= perceptible).
(
Mani
That
so outside (and
as such over
N
A
Vijnana,
and as such
it
is
perceived (simultaneously) by many

however, these were nothing more or less than
z.
<?.,
this latter being

uncommon
belonging to particular individuals), all
would be so also
elements
Manifested
for the
Vijnana, then in that case,

(or
specifically
the
Vijnana of one person can never be perceived by another,

owing to the imperceptibility of any intellect other than the
s own.
On the contrary, in the case of a Manifested
substance (such as) the glances of a dancing girl, the attentiveness of many persons to that single object is quite a consistent
agent
which it could not be

to mere Idea or Vijnana.
fact,
"
(92).
if
Non-intelligent or
we were
to reduce
Insentient"
all
existence
Nature (Prakriti),
We
Consciousness (Buddhi), &c., are all non-intelligent.

do
not, like the Vainasikas (a scion of the Bauddhas) attribute
intelligence to Buddhi.
Productive or Prolific" i. e., possessed of the

of
faculty
producing or developing. The particular possessive
affix (Main) is used in order to denote the constant character
"
(93).
of the property of productiveness with regard to the Mani

That is to say, these are ever accompanied by their
several emanations or developments, whether similar or*,
fested.
dissimilar.
So also is Nature
(94).
the Unmanifested Nature.
"
is
"
i. e.,
That
is
as the Manifested
to say,
is,
so
the properties
of the Manifested, just enumerated, belong to Nature also.
<
39
[95-97]
The
(95).
"
from the Spirit
dissimilarity of these
is
stated
is the Spirit.
Reverse
(96),
[K.XI.]
Objection
.-Granted
this
all
But how can you
assert the Spirit to be the reverse
Objection-There
Manifested and the Unmanifested
are points of simi-
we
between
larity also
as the Tjnmanifest-
such as plurality
fested
We
"
reply
Yet also
The objection con8
im
0f
we ii
as
similarity
?
"
that
is
to say,
though there are
are points of dissimilarity

the form of non-possession of the
of attributes (Gunas), and the rest.
&c., yet there
la
also, in
dS
when
points of similarity, such as uncausedness,
ceded to-there are

as
between the s P irit and the Unmanifested

such as Uncausedness, Eternality, &c.,
and also between the Spirit and the Mani
Manifested^ wdi
0i
see that there are points of
of the
similarity.
tn&(\.
The Manifested and the Unmanifested have been
(97).
described as having
three Attributes .* Now the author
names and describes these three Constituent Attributes
:
* This
word Attribute requires some explanation.
It stands for the
Gunas
a term denoting the constituent elements of Nature or

as says Colebrooke
These three qualities are not
Primordial Matter
of the S^nkhyas
"
and enter into its composi

remarks
Nature or Primordial Matter
described, in the system of Kapila as formed by the Gunas, which were
mere accidents
tion."
is
On
of Nature, but are of its essence
this Davies very rightly
"
primarily in equilibrium, and so long as this state existed, there was no
emanation into separate forms of matter." And, as we shall see later on,
the intert condition of Nature is disturbed by the subsequent predominance
of the Attribute of Foulness (Rajas). Davies has rendered this important
word GUIICL by Mode. I am afraid this is apt to mislead. For Mode, as
understood by Western philosophers, is an affection of a substance, a
quality which it may have or not, teitkout affecting its essence or existence."
Now as we have seen the Guna of the Sankhyas is almost the reverse of
"
it belongs to a substance as constituting its very essence.

jnis
I have
perferred to translate Guna as Attribute using the latter term in the sense
imparted to it specifically, by Spinoza, who thus distinguishes between
Mode
By Attribute, I understand, that which the mind
perceives of substance as constituting its essence. By Mode, I understand
the affections of substances, &c.," (the italics are mine). G. J.
Attribute and
"
>
40
[98100]
xn.]
[K.
KARIKA XII.
The Attributes
are of the nature
of. love,
and
They
stupefaction.
.,,...
The character of
the three Attributes
aversion,
are
aclapted
to illumination, activity,
and
restraint;
and they mutually subdue, and sup

and produce each other and consort together (for
port,
one purpose).
These are called Gunas (literally, subsidiary or second
sake of others (the Spirits).
(98).
ary) because they exist for the

The three Attributes will be
Karika.
in the
And
same order
love, &c./ of this
"
u
(as
Goodness,
Thus then,
the attribute of Goodness
in
maxim
according to the
writers, the
among
named
common
of presight,
Karika are
&c.,"
next
the
order in
to be taken
in the next).
"
(love) being (a
form
of) pleasure,
of pleasure ;
form of) pain, the attribute of
Apriti" (aversion) being (a
Foulness (Rajas) is of the nature of pain
and, lastly,.
(99).
<priti"
of the
is
nature
"
"
Vishdda"
Darkness
is
is
is
being (a form of) stupefaction, the attribute of

of the nature of stupefaction. The word
Atmd
inserted in order to guard against the theory that pleasure

nothing more than mere negation of pain, and vice versd.
Pleasure and pain are not negations of one another

on the
Thus
are
entities
another.
of
one
contrary, they
independent
means
one
whose
existence
(not non-existence)
apritydtma"
;
"
consists in love or pleasure
"
viskdd&tma"
and
il
>
pritydtma
The fact of pleasure and pain

being entities by themselves, and not mere negations of one
If they werr mere
another, is one of common experience.
mutual negations, they would be mutually dependent and
thus the non-fulfilment of one would lead to that of tlr?
may
be similarly explained.
other.
(100).
Having thus described the nature of the Attributes,

the author next lays down their several
Their functions.
funct i ns
"
They are adapted
to
illumina-
41
[101]
and
tion, activity ,
the
compound
accordance with
always and everywhere

(Sattva) to action, if
Darkness
at times
Here, too, the three members of

same order as before.
restraint.""
are to be construed in the
(-Rajas), in
Foulness
[K. xii.]
be
its
would
Goodness
active nature,
the
buoyant
urging
were not restrained by the sluggish
by which restraint it operates only
it
(Tamas)
Darkness
thus
becomes
(Tamas)
restraining
agency.
(101).
laid down their functions, the author

the method of their operation
down
lays
Mutually subdue and support, and produce
one another, and consort together"
Vritti"
be construed with each member of the compound.
Having thus
"
their*!? oration**
"
(action) is to
to explain,
The Attributes are

Mutually subduing
so constituted that when one is brought to play, by some
external cause, it subdues the other
e.
g., Goodness attains
Now,
"
"
subdued Foulness and

and
do
Passion
Darkness, in their turn,
Similarly
to its peaceful state only after having
Darkness.
attain to their respective terrible

having subdued the other two.
"Mutually supporting"
and stupid conditions
\_Any onydsrdyavrittaydh~\.
Though
this statement as not applicable here, in the sense of the
tainer
and
the contained,
after
con
support (Asraija) here is

meant something on which depends the action of another as
for instance, Goodness helps by its illuminative character, only
yet
by
when helped by Foulness and Darkness through their respec

tive properties of activity and restraint.
[Or else Goodness
itself, without the touch of Foulness, would remain inert,
and never be moved to action.] In the same manner do
Passion and Darkness help respectively by their activity and
by
restraint only
when supported by
the functions of the
other
That is to say, one can

produce (its effects) only when resting on the other two., By
production here is meant development or modification, which is
always of the same character as the parent Attribute which
latter, therefore, are uncaused there being no possibility of
two.
"Producing
each
other"
42
[102103]
[K.
anything differing in essence therefrom being the cause
xm.]
;
nor
are they transient since they are never resolved into an esfeentially different cause.
Consorting together" Thatisuto say
mutual
are
they
companions, not existing apart from one
"
another.
^ has a
In support of the above, we

ibutes) are mutual consorts ;
collective force.
have the following
"all
(attr
Goodness is the consort of Passion, Passion

omnipresent
of Goodness, both of these again of Darkness, which latter
again of both, Goodness and Passion. The first conjunction
all
or separation of these has never been perceived/
(102).
It has
been said
"
to illumination activity,
Adapted,
Now it is explained what those are that are

restraint"
adapted, and wherefore are they so ?
and
KlEIKA XIII.
Goodness
The
butes
three
named
considered to be buoyant and illuminatAttriing ; Foulness is exciting and versa 1

is
^.i/i
tile
and
TÎ
i\
(mobile)
their nature explain-
enveloping.
is
Darkness, sluggish and

Their action, like a lamp,
for a (single) purpose.
(103).
Goodness alone
is
the masters of
considered, by
be buoyant and
Sankhya philosophy,
illuminating.
Buoyancy as .opposed to
is
the property to which the
sluggishness
to
The properties
of
Goodness (Satwa).
ascension of objects
is clue
it is
rising flame of
to
-,
this
fire is
property that the

In some cases,
due.
this property also brings about

lateral
as
in
the case of air. Thus, generally, buoyancy nây
motion,
be said, to be that property in the cause, which greatly helps
its efficiency to
Illuminativeness.
its
particular effects
sluggishness, on the
other hand, would only dull the efficiency
.,,
,
..
m1
of the cause. The illuminative character
;
,,
,*,
of Goodness has already been explained (Ktirika XII),
43
[104106]
Goodness and Darkness, being by themselves in

active, stand in need of a force, exciting
(104).
irêrU&Xf^Pouiness
[K. xin.]
acti-
(Rajas)
and
ness.
this force is supêir causal operation

excites them and
which
plied by Foulness,
roases them from their natural passivity,
and urges them on to the accomplishment
;
of their respective effects. Hence, Foulness is said to be

This exciting character of Foulness is next account
exciting.
ed
for
This
"
(it
is
versatile"
also)
also
proves the
existence of Foulness as a particular Attribute, being necessary

for the sake of action.
Foulness, in accordance with its versatility, would

keep the triad of Attributes in a continuous
(105).
whirl of activity, but for its being restrained by the

sluggish and enveloping
"
ncss (Tama-s)
"
slug-
Attribute of Darkness, which thus limits

the scope of its actions.
Thus, in order to
be distinguished from the active Foulness, Darkness has been

said to be the restrainer
Darkness is sluggish and envelop
"
ing"
The
particle
"
Darkness"
(106).
Eva
but with
The enquirer
Objection The
Attributes of connatures
tradictory
is
"
to
be construed
Goodness
objects
and
"
not only with
Foulness
"
"
also.
Instead of co-operating for

the Attributes, being
a single purpose,
endued as they are with contradictory properties, would counteract each other, like
cannot co-operate.
opposed wrestlers, (and thus there would
be no effect emanating from them). The author replies
Like a lamp, their action is for a single purpose." We have
"
all
Reply- ^they can,

like wick and
in giving light.
oil,
phlegm
how
the wick and the
oil,
opposed to the action of

co-operate, when in contact with lire,
itself,
fire
for
and the various
observed
eac h by
J
the single purpose

of the body
humours
of giving light
wind,
bile,
though possessed of contradictory properties
and
,
co
operate for the single purpose of sustaining the body. Pre

cisely in the same manner, do the three Attributes, though,
44
[107]
[K. xiii.]
possessed of mutually contradictory properties, co-operate

towards a single end
the purpose (emancipation) of the
will
further
This
be
Spirit.
explained in Karika XXXI.
To
(107).
return to our original
Necessity of
the three
pain
,-,
with
us to three different causes connate
themselves
causes
spec-
respectively,
these
as
(and
we have postulated the
three Attri
These causes too must be multi
butes).
their
form, since, by
Pleasure,
j-//
<pos-
tuiating
and delusion
subject
and delusion, opposed to one another, lead
very nature, they are mutually supof the multiform character of these
As an example
pressive.
various causes of pleasure, pain and delusion, we may have

the following
beautiful,
single girl, young,
gentle
:
a source of delight to her husband, because

and virtuous,
him
she is born with her essence consisting in
to
with regard
She pains her co-wives, because with regard to
pleasure.
is
born with her essence consisting in pain. And,

girl stupefies another man who is unable to
with regard to him, she has her essence in
because
at
her,
get
All the different forms pleasure, &c., have been
delusion.
them, she
is
lastly, the
same
explained by this single instance of a woman. In the above case,

that which is the cause of pleasure, is the
Goodness the cause
7
r ~
.
of pleasure: Foulness
of pain, and Darkness of delusion.
Attribute of Goodness which
made up of
...
pleasure
the cause of delusion
is
essentially
the cause of pain
in
Jboulness, consisting
is
is
pain; and, lastly,
The
Darkness, consisting of delusion.
properties, pleasure, illuminativeness, and buoyancy (belong

said
ing to Goodness) cannot be sifhilarly
J
The properties of
to be mutually opposed, and thus mcapeach of the Attri.
00
trt^tory/ld
they do not neces-
of
of
causes for
able of co-existing in a single Attribute.

As a matter of fact, we find them Actually
dUS
co-existing.
each
tiveness,
of
Hence,
pleasure,
and buoyancy,
illnmina-
being mutually
consistent, do not necessitate
the assump
tion of different causes (for each of them severally) as do

pleasure, pain, and delusion which are mutually opposed, (and
*
as such unable to co-he re
in
single
substratum).
In the
45
[108100]
[K. xiv.]
pain, versatility, and activity (properties of

Foulness), as also delusion, sluggishness, and envelopingness
same manner,
(properties of Darkness), do not lead to the assumption of

Thus the triad of Attributes is established.
various causes.
(108).
As regards earth, &c.,

actually perceive the properties of indiscreetness, &c., as belonging to them.
Objection
Granted
all this.
we
how
But the
Attributes, Goodness, and the

can never come within the range ot
perceptible experience. And under such circumstances, how
can we attribute to these latter, the properties of indiscreetAttributes,
proved
rest,
(enumerated above)
ness, objectivity, &c.,
To
we reply
this objection
KlRIKl
XIV.
Indiscreetness and the rest are proved from the exisTWO reasons for tence of the three Attributes, and from
SSSTJfîtS
the absence of these (the three Attri-
proved
butes) in the reverse (of indiscreetness,
&c.
i.
e.,
And
Purusha).
fested (Nature) too
is
Unmani-
established on the -ground of the
properties of the effect (the Manifested) being consequent
on those of the
(109).
By
aioit$kitijtf*i
amchane"
and
"a
as
vivc&i"
dvi
these,
of
in the Karika, is to be understood
and eka
[Siddh&ntakaumudi
ckatva* respectively
(and not
}/,((
cause.
"dveKayok":).
indiscreetness,
in "dv6kayordvivaekanaik-
iv
or else
It
&c.
it
would be
the reply
That
is
is
"
to say,
dvitva
"
dvckeshu"
(*)
How
being asked
the three Attributes"
denote
22]
do you prove
From the existwe have found
* For if the
Jhe sum
and
compound were analysed into
would be three, and would thus require a plural ending, and not the dual,
which is explained by making
and
stand for
and
ekat-oa making only two nouns, and thus having a dual ending.
"del"
"/Ivi"
"cka"
"/
#,"
"dvitva"
46
[110]
three Attributes.
common
experience, with regard to the

material
existence, that, whatperceptible
ever consists oi pleasure, &c., is qualified
in
First proof: From
[K. xiv.]
by indiscreetness, &c. The affirmative rea

soning, being explicit enough,
is
not stated in the Karika*
which only mentions the negative reasonFrom the absence of these in the
ing
these in the reverse
reverse "that is to say, from the non-existence of the Attributes in the Spirit which
is the reverse of indiscreetness, &c.
Or again, we may have
"
and
Unmanifested (both together) as the

the
of
syllogism, and then we shall have
subject (minor term)
the reasoning "From the existence of the three Attributes"
the Manifested
the
as a purely negative inference* (Avtta), there being no other case
minor term) where we could have the agreement

of the reason (Middle term existence of the Attributes).
(besides the
is again raised
We grant all this
but the existence of the properties in-
(110).
An
Question
How
Nature
objection
is
proved to
exist?
To
we
this
Reply
reply
of
the
the
being due to
those of the cause.
cannot be proved before
discreetness, &c.,
the object possessing these properties (the
Unmanifested) has been proved to exist

From the properties of the effect being due to
"
From
oerties
the properties
may
i
"Q
of the
j i
cause"
The connection
* -n
thus explained
>
All effects are
geen to possess
properties similar to those of
x
their respective causes, as the cloth of the
.
The syllogism has previously been explained
sure, &c., is indiscreet, as the perceptible
as
"
Whatever has plea

and here
material substances
we hand
:"
the agreement (Anwaya) of the reason in the

perceptible sub
stances" whose connotation is
different from that of the subject of the
All things having pleasure, &c." Now what our author proposes
syllogism,
"
"
we might
All things besides the

explain th e reasoning thus
Manifested and the Unmanifested) are indiscreet, since thgy
possess the three Attributes, and whatever is not indiscreet does not possess*
*he three attributes." Thus in the latter syllogism we have for the minor
is
that
"
spirit (the
term Tile Manifested and the Un manifested which comprehend all cases
where the reason (the presence of the three attributes) could be found for
nothing besides the Manifested and the Unmanifested can be said to have
;
the three Attributes.
47
[Ill]
[K. xiv.]
Similarly we must admit that pleasure, &c., being

properties of Consciousness (Mahat), &c., must be the
threads.
outconje of similar properties subsisting in their cause.

[And
And thus we have
this cause is no other than Nature.]
proved the existence of Nature, as possessed of the properties

of pleasure, pain, and delusion.*
"I
(111).
grant
all
this",
followers of
aJU?tt
which discards
manifested
the
Entity?"
manifested.
says the enquirer
Kanada
"but
(the Vaiseshikas)
the
and
Gantama (the Nayfiyikas) assert the production of the Manifested, Earth, and the
rest ^rom tne binary compound downward
from homogeneous atoms, which too are

The various properties in the effects owe their
existence to similar properties in
the primary atoms. t
And
And consequently Nature too is proved to have indiscreetness, &c., in

accordance with the proposition laid down before
whatever has pleasure,
&c. has indiscreetness, &c, also."
The reasoning may be rendered clearer by
"
reducing
[
<
to the form of
two Aristotelian syllogisms
Properties of the effect (Intellect) are properties of the cause (Nature).

Pleasure, &c., are properties of the effect (Intellect).
/. Pleasure, &c., are properties of the cause (Nature.)
And
/
it
again
Whatever has pleasure, &c., has indiscreetness, &c.

Nature has pleasure, &c., (as first proved).
/. Nature has indiscreetness, &c.
f It will, I think, not be out of place here, to indicate, in brief, the atomic
theory of Kan&da and Gautama, which may be thus summed up. In the
beginning the^te existed only atoms of various substances (Earth, Water, Fire
These
.arid Air) besides, of course, Ak&sa, &c., which are in themselves eternal.
various atoms were respectively endued with four different sets of properties,
By some agency or other mainly
latterly perceived in their compounds.
all homogeneous atoms combine, one
Âdrishta," the Unseen (Fate)
with one, into couples and thus form binary compounds, which latter again
combining in the same manner, but three at a time, give rise to tertiary com
that of
pounds, and so on to the various objects of perception. These atoms are de

clared to be without extension in space, or else they could not be permanen^t.
But, as far as I know, no Nay^yika has even yet tried to show how two
things devoid of extension, can combine a point which affords the strongest
handle
to
S ankarachurya
S tiriraka-TiMshya on
in
his
refutation
the Brakma-Svtras II
ii
of the atomic
12/17.
theory.
See
48
[112J
[K. xv.]
thus finding the production of the Manifested from the

Manifested, quite explicable, what is the use of postulating an
Unmanifested, an
Nature)
We
Entity
imperceptible
form
the
(in
of
?"
reply
KiRlKA XV.
From
the
we
Reply
postulate
an
nature of specific objects, from

homogeneity, from evolution being
j
v
n
due to active (causal) energy, from the
finite
must
Un-
manifested Reality
Reasons given.
of
separation
-\
cause and
f^
effect,
-i
and
from the undividedness (resolution) of the whole uni

verse.
(112).
Of
primary cause is the Un

manifested (Nature).
Because (1)
There
v
v
^s separation
of cause and effect, and re-
specific objects, the
"
First proof of the

existence of Prakriti-
solution o
feet, and re-union of
tllewliale
OMwr
form)
Me
It has
Karika
(in
IX) that
subsists (in its unmanifested
tke
Universe."
already been proved
"-"
the effect
in the cause
as the
limbs of the tortoise, coming out
body, are perceived as separate from the body, which

again they enter and thus disappear (from view). In the
same manner, the various objects, jar, &c., are perceived as
of
its
different
these
(i.
from their causes, clay, &c., when they come out of

are produced from them when they have their
.,
existence, as
the jar manifested out of the
wherein they have

with earth, &c., as
all
along inhered.)
effects of the
lump of
The same
is
primary elements,
clay,
the case
witli these
latter again as effects of Self-consciousness (Ahankara) ; with

this latter again as that of Consciousness and lastly, with tfire
last
aâin as the
effect of the
Unmanifested, which
is
the final
cause. This separation, from the final cause (the Unmanifested),

of the various effects either mediately (as with earth, &c.,)
or immediately
(as
with
Consciousness)
related
to
it,
is
49
[113114]
[K. xv.].
what is meant by the separation of the cause and the effect. In

the same manner, at every dissolution, the various grades of
effects
(1) Earth, &c., (2) The Primary Elements, (3) Selfand (4) Intellect lose themselves in their
immediate causes (1) Primary plements (2)
Self-consciousness, (3) Intellect and (4) the Unmanifested
Nature. Thus we see that it is only a certain form of the
cause which becomes imperceptible (at dissolution) as far as a
consciousness
respective
particular effect is concerned.

Ascending in the same order
as before, we find the various effects up to Will disappearing
in their respective immediate causes
up to the Final Un
and thus rendering these latter imperceptible,

form of the cause which concerns each of
them severally.
Of this unmanifested, however there is
no further receptacle and thus it becomes the receptacle
and hence an aggregate of the unmanifested states of all
the effects. This is what is meant by the re-union (in the final
manifested
at least that
In Vaiswarupya t the
Unmanifested) of the whole Universe.

affix
has a reflexive sense.
KZJ
"
(113).
Second proof:
cause Ecolutwn
to
"
It is a
Because Evolution is due to Energy.
well-known fact that the Evolution of the
"B*-
is
due to the active energy of the cause
no other than the existence therein of the
is
for certainly, no effect can arise from an

inefficient cause. This latent energy in the
Energy."
cause
effect is
due
effect in its
unmanifested state since, on the hypothesis of the effect be

ing an entity, there can be no other form of causal energy.
The difference of sand from sesarnum the material cause of
;
oil
only in the fact that
lies
it is
only in the latter that
oil
exists in its unmanifested condition.
(114).
Objection
Objection: These
two reasons might

rest
with
intellect.
Granted
fact
this
But the above two
>
..
assuming a further Unmanifested Reality
We
from the
all
reasons that you have urged might very well

res t with the Will
what is the use of
?
From Jiniteness" i. e. }
reply: (3)
of the effects being, in their very nature
"
50
[115]
(In support of his ground, the author puts forth a
finite.
Beply
[K. xv.]
syllogism). The specific objects

-nr-ii
^
^
^
tion, Will and the rest have an
Third proof
"From finiteness"
(of all manifested

existence.)
"ques-
TT
Unmam-
Entity for their cause (i. e., they

,
,
have a cause in which they exist in their
.
state), since,
&c.,
objects, jar,
fes t e d
unmanifested
in
as
they are
commonly
finite, as jar, &c.
The
their
seen, have, for
finite
cause,
which inhere) the unmanifested (state of the

we have already shown that the cause is no
effects);
than
more
the unmanifested condition of the effect.
thing
And under these circumstances, the cause of Will must
be the Unmanifested which must be the final cause, for
there is no ground for postulating a further Unmanifested
clay,
&c.,
(in
since
Reality.*
(115).
"Because
of
Homogeneity
homogeneity"
in the similarity of different
Fourtbiproof
-Be-
cause of homogeneity."
tellect,
and the
rest
consists
objects.
In-
manifesting them-
selves
as
ascertainment, &c.
are seen to
be similarly related to pleasure, pain and delusion. And

whatever is invariably connected with a certain form must
have, for its cause (wherein it inheres), something which has
that form for
its
constituent element. Thus
the specific objects, the
it is
decided that of
Unmanifested (Nature)
is
the cause. t
Having proved the existence of the Unmanifested, the

author next states the method of its operation
*
*
its
Because the Unmanifested Nature (the cause of Will is not finite, as

Consciousness and the rest are. And further, because, by so
effects,
doing we would have to postulate causes ad infinitum.
we have in the present case: Will and the rest are invariably
f Thus
connected, with pleasure, pain and delusion; and, as such, must have, for
their cause, Nature wherein they all lie unmanifested prior to their
tion;
and
this
Nature has, for
its
Evolu
Constituent Elements, the three Attributes
which respectively consist in pleasure, pain and delusion.
51
[116118]
[K.
KARIKA XVI.
The Unmanifested
is
the cause
it
the three Attributes
ky
modification, as water,
of the
of the
receptacle
operates through
by blending and
difference
from
arising*
they are
as
Attributes,
on account
the
variously
distributed.
At the time of cosmic dissolution,

Operates,
Attributes continue to be of
three
the
"
(116).
<j*c"
similar modifications.
Modified condition
forms a part of the nature of the Attri
and as such they can never, for a moment, remain

inert.
Thus at the time of dissolution, the Attributes operate
through their respective forms of Goodness, Foulness and
butes
Darkness*.
Another method of operation
(117).
blending."
the
This
hoover,
bllfces
Attributes"
is
next stated
"
By
"
"
is
of the Attriblending
not possible without the
relation of subserviency
due to a diversity
this subserviency again is
among them, and

among the Attri
which diversity again
butes
tructibility
(i. e.,
is not possible without desunless the Attributes are so constituted that
Thus the second method

through development into Will &c.|
they suppress one another).

operation
is
The enquirer
(118).
objection- ^How
can an Attribute of
uniform nature bring
diVelSe
aC ~
tnV?
we
*
all
know how
This
evolution
is
is
How
objects
of
can diverse methods of

an Attributes which
to
operation
belong
r
j
j
have been declared
i
We reply
"
By
the water falling
p
i_
f
to be of uniform nature ?
A
modification
asiwter"
from the clouds, though
the state of equilibrium of the Attributes, during which
no
possible.
from Nature are due to the disturbance cf equili

| The various evolutions
brium among the Attributes, which rouses the hitherto dormant, evolving
energy of Nature, whence issue forth the various manifestations Intellect and
the rest.
52
[119120]
naturally of
[K.
xvn.]
having one taste,* becomes sweet, bitter,

into
sonr,
&c., according as it comes
with different modifications of
contact
itself,
such as cocoannt, wood-apple, &c.

earth
In the sam& manner, owing to the blending and the mntnal
suppression of the Attributes, the Attributes occupying
a subordinate position base themselves on the prominent one,
and thus give rise to diverse forms of cosmic manifestations.
Hence
from
it is
down
laid
the receptacle
"
On
account of the difference arising
the various
of
Attributes."
Now the existence of the Spirit (Purusha) is laid

(119).
down, in opposition to those self-contented (Materialists) who
accept as spirit either Nature or Intellect, or Self-conscious
ness, or the sense-organs, or ( lastly
the elements.
KARIKi XVII.
Since
composite (or compound) objects are

another s use ; since the reverse
all
16
exwfnTe
exist)
of
there
since
(abstraction
must be superintendence
there
must be one
there
of
(that which possesses) the three Attributes with other properties (must
spm*!
since
foj*
is
of tbe
to
enjoy (experience
tendency towards final
Spirit
since
or feel)
and
beatitude
from material existence)
;i
therefore Spirit exists.

The
spirit exists:
because
com-
all
pound
objects
for another.
"
(120).
are
<-<,
Spirit
exists,
r>
apart
from
-r>
-,
-i
Primordial
Matter (Nature) :--
Because all compound
objects (objects
made up
of
integral
component parts) are for another s use" This
when
reduced to the syllogistic form, would stand
reason,
*
Sweet
according the Nayayikas.
53
[121]
[K. xvir.]
Nature, Intellect and the rest exist for another s use,

because they are compounds, as chair, bed, &c., and these
thns
compound, inasmuch as they are made up of
latter are all
pleasure, pain and delusion.*

1
But, says the objector, the compound objects chair,

&c., are seen to exist for other objects
(121).
The
Objection:
above reasoning
rMofcompounds not to an Elementary Spirit.
which too are compound, such as men s

todies and not for the sake of Spirit as
apart from Matter (the body). And as
^^
Nature, &c.,
being compounds,
should only lead to the inference of another set of compound
substances (for whose use they exist) and not to that of an
We
"
Elementary Non-compound Spirit (an

"
reply
He ply Since
of that
which
the
possessm ust
three Attributes
the
End-in-itself.")
Since the reverse of that which possesses the three

Attributes and other properties must exist"
,,
exist.
That
reve,
is
to
say,
if
from
,.
the fact
of
Nature, &c., being for another s use, we

were to infer only another compound sub
stance, then in that case we would have to

assume such compounds ad infinitum for
even this latter compound must lead to
another for whose use it will exist and this
so on ad infinitum.
and
And when we
to
another,
again
can escape this regressus ad infinitum by postulating a
V
object or wouid lead

to compounds ad in-
not proper to
the
shape of com
multiply unnecessary assumptions (in
pounds ad infinitum). Nor can it be urged that multiplica
tion of assumptions becomes excusable when supported by
reasonable
resting
ground,
it
is
certainly,
for in the above inference the application of the

proofs
instance ought to be extended only so far as
existing
it can be extended no
for another s use
concerned
is
;
"
"
larther.
*
And we have
This sounds rather absurd.
explained
in
the
Nyayavdrtika-
But we must not forget that
t eie
whole
emanations from Nature, whose constituent

elements are the three Attributes, which latter consist in pleasure, pain and
set of material objects
delusion, respectively.
are mere
54
[122]
[K.
tdtparyatika* that if the complete identification of every

phase of the cited instance were to be looked for in the sub
ject in question, then there could be no reasoning by inference.!
order to escape the regressus ad infinitum,
the
non-compound nature of Spirit, we find our
accept
selves constrained to attribute to it the properties of
being
Thus then,
in
we
if
"
without the three
non-objectivi
discreetness,"
Attributes,"
"
"
ty
"
"
"
uncommonality
(subjectivity),
(i. e.,
specific character),
and
(inability to produce).
unprolificness
intelligence
are
these
For,
invariably accompanied by that of
properties
which
latter
being absent in spirit, must lead
compoundness,
"
"
"
"
to the inference of the absence of the three Attributes, &c., as
when a certain individual is not a Brahmana, he can never be

a Katha (a special class of Brahmans). Hence the author
when he laid down that the reverse of that which possesses
the three Attributes, &c., must exist
implied that this
"
"
must be an in
something which would be the reverse,
an
End-in-itself."
And
dependent Elementary Entity
"
&c."
"
this is Spirit.
For the following reason also there must be a

Because there
Spirit apart from Matter
mustbe superintendence." That is to say,
(122).
because the objects constituted by the three

*
of
This
is
Gautama)
commentary on the Nyayavartika (a gloss on the Nyayasutras

of Udyotakara by Va"chaspati Misra.
This work with the
is generally counted as closing V;he
epoch of
supplanted by the modern system, introduced and
Parisuddhi of udayanacharya
ancient Nyaya,
most
latterly
extensively
expounded
by
Gangesa
in
Upddhyaya,
Tattwa-
his
Chintamani.
f
Because there can scarcely be found any two occurrences in nature,
which could be quite

"
identical.
Even in the stock example
Fiery, because smoking, as the culinary hearth
between/he subject-matter
the culinary hearth the
made by men,
mountain.
&c.,
of the syllogism
fire is
is
of the Naiyayiif-^
we have
and the instance
for cooking food,
&c, whereas such
"
a dissimilarity
cited.
Thus, in
and proceeding from a house
not the case with the
fire
in the
55
[123124]
[K. xvn.]
Attributes are such as necessitate the existence of a superin

For, everything consisting in pleasure, pain and
seen to be superintended over by something else
delusion,
6. g. the chariot by the charioteer ; and Intellect and the
to consist in pleasure, pain and delu
rest have been
tendent.
is
proved
sion
visor
an
and this super

Attributes and independent,
must have a
therefore, they
must be beyond* the three

and this is
supervisor,
"
"
End-in-itself
Again the
(123).
Spirit.
to experience,
Because there must
"
Spirit exists
(or
because there must be one

feel)"
That
to
is
say,
f us nas an id ea of pleasure and

everv
J one O
to be lelt
as agreeable
as
something
pain
be one to feel.
and as such there must be some substance,

the
feelings themselves, to which they (feelings) can
beyond
be agreeable or otherwise. Feelings cannot be pleasurable
to the Intellect (Buddhi), &c., for that would imply self-con
or the reverse
inasmuch as the Intellect and the rest are

Thus,
integrally composed of pleasure, pain and delusion.f
then, something else, independent of pleasure, &c., must be
the agent who feels and this is Spirit.
tradictory actions,
Others, however, interpret the above reasoning of

thus
the Karika
Bhogya (enjoyable)
intermeans visible-, and the visibility of Buddhi
(124).
different
of
pretation
the
..
and the
above reason.
observer, there
beyond, Intellect, &c.,
.,
rest not being possible
and
without an
must be one outside of, and

The visibility of
Spirit.
this is
*
Otherwise the supervisor also will stand in need of another, for the pre
sence of the Attributes in the former will necessarily lead to that of pleasure,
&c., which again will necessitate

itself.
And
so
we
its
superintendence by something beyond
shall be landed in a rcgrcssus
ad infinitum.
f That is to say Intellect, as made up of pleasure, pain and dulness, can

not be properly said to feel pleasure, &c., for that would imply the feeling of
pleasure by pleasure
absurd.
or worse
still
by pain
and
vice versa,
which
is
56
[125]
Intellect
being
and the
made up
rest
[K.
xvm.]
can be inferred from the fact of their
of pleasure, &c., as earlh, &c.

t>
because there is a tendency

Lastly, Spirit exists
towards action for final beatitude" The
fi^l beatitude, treated of in all the systems
"
(125).
O f philosophy, and mentioned by the great

sages of divine insight as the absolute and
can never apply
final alleviation of the three kinds of pain
sages towards beati-
for, these have by their very nature, pain as

one of their integral components, from which, therefore, they
since a substance cannot be absolved
can never be absolved
to Intellect, &c.
of something forming its constituting element. Thus then,

there must be something independent of pleasure, &c., where -
from pain could be expunged. Consequently, as the various

systems of philosophy have all along aimed at beatitude,
therefore, there exists something beyond (pleasure, &c., and
hence) Intellect and the rest and this is Spirit.
Having thus proved the existence of Spirit, the author next

Is this spirit one (*) (manifesting itself)
raises the question
in all bodies, or many, being different in different bodies ?
And
in reply, he lays
down
the theory
of the
plurality
of
Spirits.
KiRIKA XVIII.
t
Prom
ra
-Bt ons!
allotment of birth, death, and the organs ;

(2) from the non-simultaneity of actions
fSpiritS
<
with different individuals); and
(3)
from the different modifications of

cê
Attributes
"
the plurality of Spirits
The plurality of Spirits

*
is
is established"
As the Vedantin
asserts.
established.
How ?
[127128]
ft7
"
(127).
From
the,
the body the sense-organs, Self-conT-rr-n

i
^ T
,
/
^
Will and
sciousness,
Feeling* (veaana)
death and
birth,
allotment of birth, death and the organs"

Birth of the Spirit consists in its relation
w ith
allotment.
<of
xvm.]
[K.
organs.
forming into an aggre

This is what is meant by
all these latter
gate of a particular character.

which does not mean modification
birth
since the
Spirit
is
And death too

essentially unmodifiable (unchangeable).
consists in the departure from the body, of the Spirit, which
cannot be destroyed, since it is eternal. The "organs" are
thirteen,
with
beginning
of these
"allotment"*
the
births, &c.
The
Will.
is
not
(diversified)
explicable on the
the Spirit were one
hypothesis of the unity of Spirit. For, if

(in all bodies), the birth, death, blindness or madness of one
individual would lead to exactly the same
The several allotment, however, becomes
with
the theory
the
Monist
ing
it
the
of
explain the
the Spirit, as
to
For
different bodies, &c.
on another absurdity
in
effects
quite
plurality of Spirits.
above difference by
conditioned
in
others.
consistent
Nor can
attribut
contact
by
with
that case he would laud himself
that of attributing
birth
or
death in
which can
accordance with the different parts of the body
never be. For a woman is not said to be born or dead, by
the mere development or derangement of certain portions of
!
her body.
(128).
For the following reason
also, the Spirit is different
with different individuals

is
"
Since activity
Action, in the form

a function of the internal
not simultaneous"
.
of endeavour,
is
still it is here attributed to the Spirit.

If the Spirit
organs
were one, the activity of one man would lead to similar
;
activity in all other

*
"
Vedana"
passage would
";
&c.
"body,"
In that case the
bodily, sensuous, mental, egoistic and

but the translation given above is preferable: for
no cognition
"
through body,
<fcc.,
possible in the body alone, without the aid

and so on with the rest.
is
<fcc.,
and thus the motion of one would
might b2 takei severally with
intellectual cognitions
mind,
be translated thus
certainly, there can bs
cognition
men
of
taken
(the
singly.
No
sense-organs)
58
[129132]
lead to that of all others
[K. xix.]
a palpable absurdity,
which
is
ex-,
plained away quite reasonably, on the hypothesis of plufality.
(129).
fJS*
Again, the Spirits are
fications of the Attributes
of
the
Attributes are differ-
Some
modi
because the
"
many
are
different"
persons abounding in the attribute

of that
O f Goodness, represent aggregates
the gods
and saints.
0.
g.
such are men, The rest abound
attribute
Others abound in Foulness
and these are the beasts. This diversity in the

Attributes could not be explained if the Spirit
of
distribution
were one. The hypothesis of plurality, however, makes it
in
Darkness
quite explicable.
(130).
Having thus established the plurality of
Spirits the
author now states their properties a knowledge of which

conducive to discriminative knowledge (wisdom)
is
KlRIKA XIX.
And
from that contrast (before

that the Spirit
Pr pertieS
the so ui
And
"
forth)
follows
it
witness, and has final
emancipation, neutrality, and

ceiving and
"
is
set
is
per
inactive.
connects the following properties of the Spirit with
its plurality.
(131).
If
it
And from this contrast," then it

were said
would refer to the various distribution of
In
the three Attributes, of the last Karika.
order to avoid this,
it
is
said
is
"
and from
referred to
immediately preceding,
whereas one not so immediate
subject,
this
"
hence the that here refers to Karika
is
that,
<
C."
by the pronoun
denoted by tfaf
XL
Thus, then, the contrast of "having the three

Attributes, &c.," connotes the Spirit s property of being with
out the three Attributes, and being discriminative, non-
(132).
[133
5H
135J
[K. xix.j
Now,
singular,
intelligent and non-productive.
of being
a
witness and perceptive are
Abjective,
the properties
so
many
accompaniments of intelligence
,.
,.
o
Since an mtellinon-objectivity.
necessary
The necessity of
propertiej.
.,
-,
anc*
g eut being alone can be a spectator,

and one can be a witness only when the
as in daily life we find the
objects have been shown to him
two parties of a dispute showing and explaining their various
objects and reasons to the witness
similarly does the PraTheirinter-depcmd-
which latter, there

becomes the witness. And again no object can be shown
to one, himself an object and non-intelligent; and since the
Spirit is both intelligent and non-objective, it becomes the
loitness.
For the same reasons, the Spirit is perceiving.
kriti exhibit its creations before the Spirit,
fore,
Farther, the absence of the three Attributes leads to

final emancipation
by which is meant the final and absolute
of
and
this property, as belonging to the spirit,
removal
pain
(133).
a necessary deduction from the fact of the soul being

naturally without; the three Attributes, and hence without
is
pleasure, pain or d illness.
From
the absence of Attributes, again, follows

this latter property is such as cannot belong
since
neutrality
either to the happy and satisfied, or to the sad and grumbling,.
(134:).
only one who is devoid of both pleasure and pain, who

can be called neutral also called Uddsina (indifferent).
It
is
Lastly, the property of inactivity is a necessary outcome of

the properties of non-productiveness and discrimiuativeuess-
wisdom). The inactivity of the Spirit

wisdom and non-productive character.
l>
(135).
life
Objection Intelligence and activity

found coalways
exist cut.
We
Objection:
we
think
then,
we
,1
-,
grant
first
,,
is
all this:
decide our
inferred
but in
from
its-
our daily
we
duty and then
n
".
the following strain

I, who am
an intelligent be in i?, wish to act.
Thus,
/>
ly
rind intelligence
and activity co-
60
[136138]
And
existent.
make
[K.
xx
xxi.]
Sankhya tenets which
this goes against the
intelligence devoid of activity and vice versa.
We
reply
KA.RIKA
XX.
Thus, from this union the unintelli-
Keply: The appa

rent activity of the
soul due to union with
Buddhi, and the apparent intelligence of
the latter
due to
union with Purusha.
gent Linga (Buddhi. &c..) appears as

and from the activity
of
J
intelligent
the Attributes, the
indifferent
Spirit
appears as an (active) agent.

Since
(136).
intelligence and activity have been proved to
be differently located, therefore, the feeling referred to by
the objector must be a mistake. The word Linga includes
everything from the Mahat down to the primary elements
to be described later on.
The cause of the mistake is said to
be the union or
proximity of the
Spirit
with
the
Linga,
(Buddhi and the rest).

The rest is clear enough.
Objection
(137).
You
union,
What
Objection
is
the
need
of
$*c.
say that the feeling is due to

But no union is possible with-
ou some need which, again, is not possible

.,.
without the relation of the helper and the
the
union?
How is this possible in accordance

helped.
with your tenets, with regard to the union of the Spirit with
the Linga
In reply, the author lays down the grounds of need
KARIK!
For the
Spirit
XXI.
contemplation of Prakriti, and its

Emancipation, the union of both
final
R e piy_The
is
that
takes place, like that of the halt and

,
IP
,1
the blind
and from this union pro
need
of
ITT
final
Emancipation.
ceeds creation.
(138).
In
"
Pradhdnasya"
objective force, the
by Spirit of
the
"
meaning being
Nature,"
genitive affix has the

for the contemplation
thus implying the fact of Nature being
01
[139141]
an object
something
be
to
XXIL]
[K.
But
enjoyed.
this enjoyalulity
is not possible without an enjoy er, whose

becomes necessary, for that of Nature.
existence
thus
The author next lays down the ground of the

For the Emancipation of
Spirit s need
The need explained.
__ The
while in connection
(139).
7"
^ ^.^
g^
with the enjoyable Nature, believes the three kind of pains

the constituents of Nature to be his own and from this
;
which can result only

from wisdom discriminating between the Spirit and the three
which wisdom thus becomes impossible without
Attributes
the knowledge; and hence the existence, of Nature. Thus
then we find the Spirit standing in need of Nature, for his
self-imposed bond he seeks liberation
Since the relation (of Spirit with Nature) is

eternal, therefore, it is quite proper that the Spirit should be
related to Nature for emancipation, though primarily, the
emancipation.
relation
was
for
enjoyment only.
(140). Granted all this relation
of Buddhi, &c.?
We
The
"
reply
necessity
of
the creation of Bud-
From
this
union proceeds
The
creation"
relation (of Spirit with Nature) cannot by

itself suffice either for en jovment or eman..
cipation, if there
under the
rest
dhi, &c.
But whence the creation
11
j
were no Buddhi
and
the
T>
,1
circumstances the union

about the creation, for the sake primarily of
enjoyment, and finally, of emancipation.
;
itself brings
is now described
KARIK! XXIL
The process of creation
From
Prakriti issues
The process of
E-.iutionfromPraGtriti downwards.
Mahat
(or
Buddhi)
Mahat again
issues
(Aiiankara),
from
the set of sixteen
<fc.
Principle
Mahat
and
from
this
Self-consciousness
which
from
sixteen, proceed the five gross elements.

Prakriti is a
(141). From Prakriti,
Unmanifested
proceeds
five of these
name
Ahankdm
of the
will
be
02
[142143]
[H.
described later on, as also the set of sixteen,
made up
xxm.]
of the
eleven sense-organs and the live primary elements.

Oiit of
these sixteen, from the five primary elements, proceed respect
Akasa, Earth, &c.
ively the five gross ones
(142).
The process
production
of
Thus, from the primary element of sound proceeds

Akasa, having sound as its characteristic
of the
property
similarly from the mixture of
;
the
f,
and sound,
tne primary elements ot touch
elements.
proceeds Air, with sound and touch as its

again, from the mixture of the
characteristic properties
primary elements of sound, touch and colour, proceeds Light,

with sound, touch and colour for its characteristic properties ;
and from the mixture of the primary elements, of sound,

touch, colour and taste, proceeds Water, with sound, touch,
and lastly,
colour, and taste as its characteristic properties
from the mixture of the primary element of smell with
;
that of the last four, proceeds Earth, with all
the five for
its
characteristic properties.
(143). The Unmanifested Principle has been defined in

general terms in Karika X, and specifically in Karika XIII ;
the Manifested also has been generally defined in Karika
;
now
the
the author defines
a particular
Manifested Principle
Baddhi
XXIII.
Buddhi
the
is
determining
Principle u (Will)*
-____
?o;SS
when
-
ItS
affected
Virtue, Wisdom, Dispassion and Power

constitute its form (when afected by
Goodness), and the reverse of "these
by Darkness.
Though there is some difference of opinion on this point, yet I am

inclined to think that Adhyavasaya means * determining, and of all the
faculties will appears to be the only
determining principle in Man. Hence
forth Bnddhi will be translated as Will, and the reader is
requested to mark
the same change in the foregoing pages,
[144140]
K. XXIIT.]
fiS
"
"
(144).
Biiddhi
difference
between
active a enfc
mines that
it is
is
and
no
the
.Everyone,
to be
>-
across
something
deputed to the work and, finally, deter

and thus acts towards its accom
his duty,
This determination of the
plishment.
stic
is
there
action
the
aml cause
( effect
when he comes
done, thinks that he
Since
determination
is
property of Buddhi
duty
which appears
intelligence by contact with
the
is
as
the
charateri-
endited
if
of the
intelligence
with
Spirit.
Buddhi, again, is non-different from determination, which

thus forms its definition, inasmuch as it serves to distinguish
it from similar as well as dissimilar substances.
(145).
Having thus defined Buddhi, the author next

states its properties, in order
e
Buddhi-vFru,e,
wif
Dispassion and
Power, and the reverse of these.
<iom,
attainment of true
to. help
wisdom-"
Virtue,"
the
&c.,
Virtue leads to (worldly) prosperity, as

i_
i
1^1j.i
as ^
we
Super-physical bliss, that
*
"
about
by the performance of
sacrifices &c. leading to the former, and that due to the eight
fold practice of Yoga leading to the latter.
Wisdom consists
in the knowledge of the difference between the Attributes (as
brought
constituting Nature) and the

of passion. 9
(146).
The
This Dispassion
four kinds of
chspassion.
Spirit.
is
Dispassion
of four kinds
jna Vyatireka-Sanjna,
and Vatikara-Sanjnd.
.
absence
Yatamana-SanEkendriyd-Sanjnd
The passion ua-
is
..
,.
residing in the mind, lead

turally impure
the different senses-organs to action. The effort to put a stop
to this action of the senses is named Yatamdna-Sanjnd (li
terally, effort).
When
this process of resistance is once
begun,
then
passions will have been suppressed before others
discrimination of these from those still operating is called
When the senses have been disabled, then
Vyatireka-Sanjna.
so;yie
"the
the passions that have been suppressed reside in the

Cf. Jjhashy.i
uu Yogasutra
15.
mind
in
64
[147148]
the form of mere anxiety
-and this
perceptible objects,
tioned in the Veda,
to the first
tVee
known
is
as
Ekendriyd*
anxiety towards all

the ordinary ones as well as thoso men
The suppression of even
Sanjna.
xxm.]
[K.
is
this
and is superior
called Vasikara-Sanjna
been thus described by the revered
this has
Patanjali: "The dispassion named Vasikam-Sanjnya belongs

to one who has no desire for either visible or Yedic objects.
[Yoga-Sutra
I.
15].
This
(147).
is
Dispassiou, a property of Buddhi.

an
also is a property of Buddhi
j
The eight kinds
of
Power
it
is
to
the *perfections Attenuation and

the rest (Awma,
are due."*
Of these
this that
power.
<fec.)
Animd
(1)
which
(Lit
one
Atomic character) the
can
the densest
enter
is
the
property by
such as
substances,
stones.
(2)
Laghimd (Buoyancy) is that to which is
due the ability to traverse solar regions by means of the
sun s rays.
Garima (Gravity) leads to heaviness
(3)
and (4) Makima (Grandeur) causes supremacy. To (5) Approach
is due the ability to touch the moon with the fingers.
(6)
Fulfilment of desires is such as can enable one to dip into the

earth as in water. (7) Vasitwa leads to the subordination of
Supremacy brings about mastery
all objects to the devotee.
over all objects.
(8) Infallibility
of purpose
is
such that
all
objects follow the course dictated by the will of the devotee.

The decisions of ordinary mortals follow the course of events,
whereas those of a trained devotee precede them and dictate

their course.
These four are the properties of Buddhi, partaking

of Goodness.
Those partaking of the
attribute of Darkness are the reverse of these
Sin
viz.
(148).
of the
attribute
Ignorance, Passion and Weakness or Fallibility.
There
is
some confusion as
merated here, they appear nins

have taken Vasitwa and Isltwa
to the
;
number
of
but they ought
as one.
As enu
these perfections.
to
be eight only
hence
65
[149151]
The author next
defines
[K.
Egoism
or
xxiv
xxv.]
Self-consciousness
(Ahttnkara).
KlniKA XXIV.
The principle of
AhankAra defined,
Egoism
is
self-consciousness
thence
the set
proceeds a two-iold creation,
of eleven and the five primary elements.
and this Self-con

The object I have
but myself has power over this
"
sciousness
self-consciousness
perceptible in snch ideas as
"Egoism is
(149).
is
observed and
and
"none
known,"
"I
that,"
exist,"
All this
&c.
is
"
the characteristic action
of the principle of Egoism, on which the Buddhi depends for

its determinative function in such decisions as
this is to be
"
done by
me"
The different products of this effect are next stated

Thence proceeds a two-fold creation" The forms of these
(150).
"
are stated
creations
"
The
set
of eleven and
the five
primary
"
only these two creations proceed from the principle

of Egoism. The eva
excludes all other possible suppo
elements
sitions.
Objection :
Principle of
kinds
of creation
proceed from a uni-
form Egoism?
We
nature,
how
We grant all
this
But the
Egoism being of one uniform

can two different kinds of
*,
-^
inanimate (the elements) and en

lightening (the senses) proceed therefrom?
creation
/>
reply
KARIKA XXV.
The
Reply
proceeds from the modified principle

and partakes of the attrin r\
t
mi
bute ot (jroodiiess.
ihe primary el e-
set of eleven
The differ-
cnce due to the di1
Ng Attribute?**
of Egoism,
-,
ments are due

ness
to the Attribute of
Dark
from Foulness proceed both.
senses, being light and enlightening,

(151).
are said to partake of Goodness, and as such proceed from
modified Egoism. From Egoism as affected, on the other hand,
The eleven
66
[152153]
[K. xxvi.]
set of the primary elements. How so ?

Because these elements partake of the Attribute of Darkness.
That is to say Though the principle of Egoism is one and
by Darkness, proceed the
uniform, yet from the operation or suppression of various

Attributes, it produces creations of diverse characters.
This
(152).
is
.The
Objection
purposelessness
Passions.
of
When all the necessary effects

objected to
are brought about by the action of the
attributes of Goodness and Darkness only,
.,1,1
-,
have done with the purposeless attribute
,
of Foulness.
We
"
reply
From Foulness proceed
"
both
i.
e.,
the set of eleven as
well as the primary elements.

Though
there is nothing to be done exclusively by
nccesary for urging

the other Attributes
to action.
Foulness, Jyet it is a necessary factor, since

the attributes ol Goodness and Darkness
and as such could not

are both, by their very nature, inert
do their own work unless urged to action by the active and
mobile Rajas. Thus then, the efficacy of the attribute of
Foulness lies in its character of supplying the motive force to
the inert attributes of Goodness and Darkness.
And thus
;
we
see that
it is
not altogether purposeless.
In order to describe the set of eleven the effects of Good

the author first describes the ten external sense-organs.
ness
XXVI.
The
The ten External

Organs
the
Eye, the Ear, the

Nose, the Tongue and the Skin ; those
intellectual organs are,
of action are
>
speech,
hand,
excretory organs, and
fee*,
the
the organ of
generation.
(1^3).
Sense
is
defined as the
immediate
effect
of the
principle of Egoism, as affected by the

attribute of Goodness. These are two-fold
intellectual,
and those of
action.
Both these are called
07
[154155]
[K.
xxvn.]
of the Spirit
(senses) because they are characteristics
The eye,
named
are
senses
The
(Indra).
"
eye is the sense for

ear for perceiving
the
perceiving colour,
the
tongue flor perceiving
sound, the nose for perceiving smell,
These are the
taste, and the skin for experiencing touch.
The action of the organs of speech
intellectual sense-organs.
and the rest will be spoken of later on (Karika XXVII.)
Functions
Of
#."
The eleventh sense-organs
these
is
the
next described
KARIK! XXVII.
Of these
of the
(sense-organs) Mind (Manas) partakes
nature of both (intellectual as well as
The eleventh sense
Mind denned.
t } lose
o f ac tion)
(or thinking)
sense-organ
since
has
it
it
is
principle,
the
reflecting
and
is
called
cognate properties.
Its
multifariousness, as well as its external forms, are due

to the various specific modifications of the Attributes.
"
uble natUre
of
Among the eleven organs, Mind

$*c"
partakes of the nature of both i. e., it is
an infcellectual or an of sensation, as well
Partakes,
(154).
mhid
as one of action, since the eye
and speech,
&c., operate on their respective objects only when influenced by
the principle of Manas.

9
(155).
The author next gives the
specific definition of
It is the reflecting principle
ig to sajs
ig defined by reflection
Manas
Mind
The
defined.
That
thereof.
Mnd
It is the principle which

supplies forms and qualifications to the
abstract cognition of a certain object, which
precedes the concrete and well-defined knowledge
reflecting cha-
invariably
"
"
As
(or
is laid
thought).
down by an ancient
writer
"
At
first,
one observes a certain object without qualifications, and latter

ly intelligent people think of the object as belonging to a certain
G8
[156158]
[K.
XXVIL]
and having certain properties." It is a well-known fact

that on first seeing* an object, the first cognition that one has
class
of
it,
resembles to a great degree the
Soon
and unqualified.
indefinite
cognition of a child
after this one learns to con
nect the object so observed, with its genus, property, &c.

This latter cognition is said to be perception, which is a func
Manas (Mind), and as such serves to

from similar and dissimilar objects, and thus
tion characteristic of
it
distinguish
serves as its definition.
Objection .-Granted all this:
(156).
Oljection
make Mind
when it has
function of
Why
But we have seen that

Egosim and Buddhi, having distinct func,.
own
a sense
tions ot their
distinct
same manner, we
sense-organs
not class Manas among
o them either.
its
own?
The author
"
It
replies
is
are
not classed
among
in the
Why ?
sense-organ"
shall
Be
"
cause of its having cognate properties" This

P r P erfc y mainly is the fact of its being
an immediate
effect
^,^1^1
by Goodness
is
which
the immediate effect of Egoism as affected

by
Goodness, and not that of being a characteristic of the Spirit
for this latter pro*
;
the definition of a
and as such
would also have to be classed
perty belongs to Egoism also
sense.
this latter
among sense-organs. Thus then "being the characteristic of

the Spirit is only an explanation of the derivation of the term
Indriya it cannot be said to form its denotation.
;
(157).
Whence
It is
the multi.
fanous effects from

Egoism.
asked
Whence such
Attributes"
(158).
effects
"It
The
difference in the effects
due to the diversity of auxiliaries in the

tive principles of sound, &c.
Attributes.
multifarious
from the single principle of Egoism as

affected by Goodness ? We reply
is
due to the specific modifications of the
is
form of the opera
Destiny (adrishta) is also a modification of the

We have the qualifying term External as
"
presenting a comprehensible example, the sense of the
"
sen~
69
[159]
[K.
xxvin
xxix.j:
tence being As the external forms are the effects of the

modifications of the Attributes, so are also the internal and
imperceptible ones.
Having thus described the forms 6f the eleven
(159).
sense-organs, the particular functions of the first ten are next

stated.
KARIKA XXVIII.
The
function of the five senses, in respect to colour,

&c., is mere observation or feeling ;
The functions of
the external organs.
By
walking, excretion
gratification are (the functions of)
the other five.
speech,
"observation"
here
stract
Otserration-.-the
function of the five
intellectual senses.
is
meant
perception
/
intellectual
the
primary ab
Nirvikalpa ) through
the
ar&
Speeeh, handling,
walking, excretions
thesenses
handling,
Qf
senses.
Mer
fa e
"
Speech
L
,
organs
The
action.
ot
vocal
yc.,
of
organ
the
is
located in the throat, the palate, &c., whose

function is speech. The functions of the
cognitive (intellectual organs) are clear enough.*
The
functions of the three internal organs are next
stated.
XXIX.
Of^he three
Function
of
the
ijrtemai organs.
That
tions
P. ff.
sound
is
to say
the ear
and
the others,
(the
internal
organs) the functions are
constituted
by
cte ristics
these
their
respective
chara-
are peculiar to each.
they are denoted by their very names or by their defini
defined as the sense for perceiving (or comprehending)

thus the function of the ear is perception of sound, and so with
is
70
[160161]
The
common
function
xxx. j
to the organs consists in the five
Prana and the
vital airs
[K.
rest.
c
"
(160).
The functions of the three are constituted by their

That is to say*
respective characteristics"
Reflection of Manas.
Self-consciousness of
,.
.,
,.
Ahankara and
\<if*rmifiat ion of Buddhi.
the property which serves as the distinguisliin? feature of each of the internal
tions
organs, also denotes their respective func

of Buddhi, self-consciousness
determination
thus,
of Ahankdra and reflection of Manas.
The double character of the functions hased on the
(161).
common
fact of their heing specific or
are peculiar
function"
The
"
The jive
"
fyc.
five vital airs,
vital airs, constitute
former j
"
These
common
an(| cease
Of
these
Apana
resides at the back, &c.,
Uddna
resides in the
Vydna
in
when the
to exist when these
the air called Prana
resides in the heart, the navel
the navel and the joints

lastly,
the
since the latter
are absent.
(Breath or Life
vital airs
ternal organs.
and
next stated
The function of the three internal organs is the

substance (of life, and hence) of the five
the common function of the three in-
that called
is
exist
and the
Samdna
toes ;
in the heart,
the throat, heart, &c. ;

These are the five
skin.
airs.
The author now

fourfold organs
(the
states the order of the functions of these
external organs and the three
internal
organs).
With regard
The instantaneous
ofSso
functions.
to visible
ÔUr are
objects, the functions
sa id to
obj ectS)
^ e instantaneous, as
with regard to inthe func tions of the three
well a. gradual
vigible
of the
71
[162165]
[K. xxx.]
(internal organs) are preceded
by that
(/. e.
the cognition
of some visible object.)

"Instantaneous"
(162*).
Instantaneous with
regard to visible ob-
"with
when one
e
9"
regard
to visible
sees in the
da*
objects"
means
by
of a flash of lightning, a tiger facing him,
and determination
away from the place
his observation, reflection
are instantaneous and accordingly he runs

at once.
(163).
With regard
to in-
the
objects,
ti0
4at
th e
i
pendent of the
n,!::
ex-
then the conscious
me";
and he
on the other hand,

organs operate without the
to invisible objects,
Denial
aid ot the external organs

The function
the
three
is
preceded by that,i. e., the inof
stantaneoiis as well as the gradual func
tions
The functions of
internal organs preceded by those of the
external ones.
him
at
is
th
visible
a person has
levelled
thief
With regard
(164).
11
advancing against
run away from the place.
"the
finally decides to
light,
a faint cognition of a certain

object; then he looks at it more steadily
and ascertains that it is a thief with
bow and arrow
ness follows
dim
in
g.,
at first
Gradual with regard to visible ob-
his
e.
"Gradual"
of the
"
three
internal
organs
are
preceded by some perception of a visible

T
rn
obJ ect smce Inference, lestiniony and the
O ther methods of rproof operate
orilv
W!IPI
UA
r
.
,.
>
they have lor their back ground some sort

of external perception.
(165).
Granted
Objection:
Option: Func-
all
this:
But the functions
either of the four or of the
three
(organs)
cannot depend on themselves alone ; for in
th
?
that case (these organs) must be either
if permanent, then their funcions also
or
transient
permanent
would be permanent if transient, then the various functions
lion.-*
permanent or
would combine most absurdly, there

agency.
being no restrictive
72
[166167]
[K.
XXXI.
We
reply
They*
thp
Reply Functions
of the organs dufe to
mutual impulse. Soul
proposes the incen
tive.
(the organs)
of their
performation
towards
operate
respective
functions.
due to mutual impulse.
purpos e
of
the
supplies
Spirit
motive; by nothing (else)

caused to act.
is
The
the
an organ
The subject of the first sentence is "organs."

(166). A number of persons wielding different weapons,
unite for suppressing a common enemy, the one holding a
lance uses that alone, and so on, each using his own particular
weapon. In the same manner one organ operates towards
the fulfilment of another s purpose, which tends to help ita
own. And since this movement towards action is the cause
(and hence the regulating motive power) of the action of the
organs, there cannot arise any absurd collision of the func
tions.
(167).
Another objection
beings,
The
can
lancers, &c., being sentient
each
comprehend
other
motives and can act towards the fulfilment

gent organs understand each other s
motives?
thereof.
The organs on the contrary, are

i
and as such can never act in
,
all m-sentient,
the same way as the lancers, &c., do (and

hence your analogy does not apply to the case in question),
Consequently the in-sentient organs must have an animate and
intelligent supervisor over them, who is to understand their
end and urge them to action accordingly.

The Spirit s purpose is the motive, by nothing
We reply
(else) can the organs be brought to aciT
"
Kepiy-Soui spurpose urging them to

action.
Since the purpose of the Spirit
is to urge
.
,
\
organs to action, what is the need
of postulating a supervisor ab extra ? This
.
the
point will be further elucidated in Karika LVII.

*
Davies restricts this to the internal organs

the Karika should not apply to organs in general
but there
as
the
is
no reason
Kaumudi
why
takes
it,
73
168170]
(168).
It has
"
to act
brought
organs
[K.
been declared that
The author next
"by
an organ
is
nothing
xxxn.j
states the division
of these
XXXII.
;
they have variously
the functions of seizing, retaining and
The objects of these are
manifesting.
Organs are of thirteen kinds
that which
tenfold,
is
be
to
seized,
retained or manifested.
The thirteen organs consist of the eleven senseorgans, Ahankara and Buddhi. An organ
,
The thirteen orls a particular kind of agent, and no
agency
gans the ten exter(169).
nai organs,
Manas,
js
possible
Ahank&ra and Bua-
without a function
hence the
author next states the various functions.
dhi*
They have the functions fa" The senses

of action have the function of seizing that
"
tionT/the semes^f
action.
*oT jfaddhi^
and Ma"Manifestation
the
intellectual
of
or-
to say, they extend their action to their
is
respective objects.
Buddhi, Ahankdra and
Manas retain impressions by their respective

func ti ns
the life-breath, &c. (mentioned

lastly, the intellectual (per
and
before)
ceptive) organs manifest their respective objects.
;
(170).
Since every action must have an object, the objects

of the above-mentioned functions are next
The objects of
these functions, tenfold.
stated
i
The
"
That which
*"
is to
be
seized"
frc.
objects to be acted upon by the thir

teen organs are those that are to be seized,
retained and manifested.
By
seizure here
is
meant pervasion
The five senses of action extend over speech

(or extension).
and the rest and each of these being both human and super
;
human
these objects become tenfold. Similarly the object to

be retained by the three internal organs is the body, which is
an aggregate of the five great elements, of

sound, touch, colour, taste and odour. Each of these five
being both human and superhuman, these objects also become
10
fivefold being
74
[171-174]
tenfold.
human and superhuman,
the objects also
ttie sub-divisions of the thirteen
organs are next
these being both

tenfold.
(171).
stated
XXXIIL]
Similarly the objects of the five intellectual senses

and each of
sound, touch, colour, taste and odour
are five
become
[K.
KiKiKl XXXIII.
Internal organs are three
The organs numbered and the differbetween the
making
.,
and the external
known
objects
rm
organs act at
and the internal at the
Sun poinTo^
ti
notedt
three divisions of time.
present
to the former
Ine external
tnree,
ten,
Manas, Akankara
(172). The internal organs are three
and Biiddhi, called internal because located inside the body.
:
(173).
These
The external organs are ten
the ten sense-organs.
latter exhibit objects to the three internal
organs,
i. e.,
they supply the means for reflection, consciousness and

determination of objects the intellectual senses functioning
by means of observation, and the senses of action by means of
their respective functions.
(174).
The author next
states a further point of difference
organs internal and external

The external organs act at time present"
/
,,
is meant here the
time
By
present
and
the
imclosely
following
J [preceding
ir
between
The
external
senses acting at time

the interpresent
nai with reference
to all three divisions
of time.
;
"
"
mediate present
thus then,
speech* also
The internal or
belongs to the present.
three
divisions
time" e.
the
idea
that "there
at
the
g.,
of
gans
has been rain," since the river has risen (for the past) ;
"
"
there
is fire
in the mountain, since there

.
..
is smoke"
(for the
/
necessary for the case of speech, because no

two letters can be pronounced at the same moment, and, as such, no word
could be uttered at the time present if by this word were meant the present
The
special qualification
is
moment only. This absurdity, however, is avoided by counting a few

moments before and after the present moment as included in it.
75
[175178]
present)
cc
and
carrying their
lastly,
eggs"
we
[K. xxxiv.]
we
shall have rain, since
see ants
(for the futnre).
Time, according to the Vaiseshikas, being one,

cann t allow such divisions as past, present
Time-not a distinct
and future. Hence we must Jiave for the
principle according
(175).
ant
yas.
specifications
and
future.
various
units, the
various
conditions
which we give the names, past,

So the Stinkhyas do not admit of a
to
or
present
distinct
principle in the shape of Time.
The
(176).
author next
considers
of
the objects
the
external senses operating at time present
KABIKA XXXIV.
The
Of jfchese,
intellectual
(those
the five intellectual senses
of sensation)
concern
objects
"
s P ecin c
sound the
garding the
;
rest
re-
five
ob
jects of sense.
t i ve ).
YQ
as well as non-specific
spe ech
concerns
(collec-
sound
regard the five objects
the
(of sense,)
Of the
ten external senses, the five intellectual

(177).
ones concern specific as well as non-specific objects
by
:
and such objects are sound and

specific here is meant gross
the rest (the Tanmdtras), manifesting themselves as Earth,
&c.,
(the elements) having the properties of calmness, turbu
and dulness. The non-specific objects are the primary

elements. The particle Mdtra, in the word Tanmdtra, serves
The senses of
to distinguish these from the gross objects.
lence
Yogis concern sound, &c., in their subtle as well as gross

whereas the senses of ordinary men relate to sound,
states,
&c., in their gross
(1*?8).
forms only.
Similarly of the senses

Speech concerns sound, in
of
action
(the
Motor
Senses).
gross form, because
is the cause of sound.
Speech, however, can not be the
Speech
cause of the primary element of sound, which is the direct
and as such has the
effect of Self-consciousness
its
(Ahankara)
as speech itself (which also being one of senses,

proceeds directly from the principle of Self-consciousness.
same cause
76
[179]
"
The
"
i.
rest,
e.,
excretory organs,
senses, are all
&c.,
e.
xxxv
concern Jive
g. jar &c.,
made up
xxxvi.]
of action
the fonr other senses

"
different objects,
[K.
the
because the
objects"
which are the objects
(tf
these
of the five primary elements of sound,
colour, &c.
the thirteen organs, some are said to be superior to

for which are given
reasons
others,
Among
KiniKA
XXXV.
Since Buddhi with the other internal organs adverts

to (comprehends) all objects (of sense),
these three are said to be
The superiority
of
over exter-
intern il
nai organs.
(principal ones),
the warders
and the
others
the
gates (secondary).
(179).
Gates
Warders,
i. e.,
i. e.,
chief ones.
such as are the external organs.
Since Buddhi, with Ahankara and Manas, apprehends (i. .,

determines) all objects exhibited by the
external organs, these latter are said to be
gates (secondary organs), and Buddhi, with
the other internal organs, the warders (chiefs).
Buddhi
the chief, not only in comparison with the

external organs, but also with regard to the other external or
gans,
is
Manas and Ahankdra.
To
this effect it is said:
KlRiKi XXXVI.
These (the external organs together with Manas
and
AhanJcdra),
characteristically
Bering from
others
accounted
different
one another and being
modifications
of Attributes
resemble a lamp in action

such) having
present
first
it in its
enlightened the Spirit
entirety to Buddhi.
(and as
purpose,
77
[180181]
As the
(180).
treasur ^r,
who
who
finally
officer collects
village
and
different heads of families
[K.
delivers
xxxvu.]
the rent from the
the collection to the
again, in his turn, carries it to the head-officer,

it over to the king : so, in the same
makes
manner, the external organs, having operated ofi (observed)

an object, present the observation to Manas, which reflects on
(and thereby imparts thereto its qualifications) presenting
these qualified observations in turn to Ahankdra, which takes
it
specific cognizance of them, and finally delivers such personal

Hence it is said:
cognition to the head-officer, Buddhi.
"
These having enlightened the Spirit s purpose present
it
to
Buddhi."
The external organs together with Manas and

In spite of diverse
Ahankdra, are various affections of Attrin
modifications of
butes L e
Goodness,
A tTributel yet thl
internal organs coFoulness and Dulness, which though
(181).
"
plrposflike
Sngto
a lamp.
Essentially opposed to one another, are yet

brought to co-operate for the supreme
as the wick, oil and fire, though

purpose of the Spirit just
the
action
of one another, yet join, under
to
variously opposed
the form of a lamp, in removing darkness, and thus illumine
;
(manifest) the different colours. The same

the Attributes such is the connection.
is
the
case
with
An
objection
is
why
Objection
Buddhi
not make
subordinate to the
others
should
it
be said that the
other organs present their impressions to

,
7 77
TTT1
Buddhi? Why should not we make it
,
-,-,
qu ê the other way
Buddhi subordinate
to
We
Why
raised.
reply
Ahankara
KiRIKA XXXVII.
R
Since
The
superiority of Buddhi
accounted for, be-
the
it is
it is
01
,1
and Matter.
Buddhi
Spirit
Bucldlii that accomplishes
enjoyment, and
again
the
stibtle
Nature
and
-\
bpirit S
di^rence
Spirit
-?
that
exposes
between
78
[182183]
[K.
xxxvu.]
Since the purpose of the Spirit is the only in

centive to the action of the organs, that organ is supreme
over others which accomplishes that purpose direct}^ and
(182).
since
it is
Buddhi alone that does
it
this,
is
supreme.
Just
as the chief minister, being the direct agent of the king, is

supreme over other officials. Buddhi assumes the form of
the Spirit through its proximity to it, and as such leads to the
accomplishment of its purpose. Sensation consisting either
of pleasure or pain, resides in Buddhi, which is (reflected) in
the
and
Spirit
observation,
thus
leads
and
reflection
transferred to
to
its
Buddki through
of
the
are
their various modifications
same manner, the functions of the senses
in the
As
objects
enjoyment.
consciousness
also coalesce
with the functional determination of Buddhi, as the forces of

officials do with that of the master.
the subordinate
The objector asks:
(183).
If
Buddhi only
accomplish the Spirit
lT?f;
the soul with pleasure, no Mukti, is
possible.
it latterly
Reply
shows to the soul
its distinction from
:
Matter.
The
The
objector
difference
will
being
caused,
end and thus would

emancipation
with ifc
cease
emancipation
is
We
possible
ft
afterwards
.
.
,
between Spirit
serves
to
enjoyment, then no
the
exposes
:-
reply
difference
nr *
and Nature.
By exis meant
here
bringing about
position
Visinashti.
the construction of Antaram
...
*
^
*i
of
to
that
Odanapakam
being similar
i
T>
>>
retorts
Natm e
saying,
,.
ln time
the difference between Spirit and
being thus, according to your

a caused one, must have an
,
.,
and thus
/,-.
.,
own
end
-,-,
(the Spirit could never
attain to eternal Beatitude).
For Buddhi would continue help the Spirit to its enjoyment qf

pleasure, and hence this latter could never attain to final beatitude which
consist! in the total extinction of both pleasure and pain.
Visinasliti itself has been explained as
f
expresses the difference," then
the mention of Antaram would seem superfluous. But. it is not so ; it helps
"
to intensify the
meaning
of the sentence.
79
[184-186]
We
reply
The
^
the
Buddhi
and the
only in exhibiting
difference to the full view of the Spirit
who then
Buddhi only serving
has been everlasting
difference
function of
xxxvm.]
[K.
^lf
lies
recognises the fact that he him-
the con
something distinct
mobile
and
modifiable Nature.
stitutionally
loul^vlew!
is
fy>m
(The distinction is not caused by Buddhi it

the Spirit and Nature themselves). By this
;
as eternal as
is
also implied
that emancipation is the sole purpose of the Spirit. The
distinction of Spirit and Nature, however, is extremely subtle
it is
and hard to be perceived.
The organs having been described, the author next descri

bes objects, specific and non-specific
:
KAKIKA XXXVIII.
The
primary elements are non-specific
five
these five
The division of
objects into specific
and
ments
non-specific.
proceed the five gross
these
specific
from
are
said
they
are
latter
because
ele-
to
be
calm
(soothing), turbulent (terrific) and deluding.

(184). The Tanmdtras sound and the rest are subtle
and the character of calmness, &c., do not belong to these.
The word Matra denotes the capability of these elements of
being enjoyed.
Having thus stated the
(185).
objects
aro
described:
non-specific, the
these
"From
c."
From
specific
the five
<f
Tanmdtras, of sound, touch, colour, taste and odour proceed

the five gross Elements Akasa,
Air, Fire,
respectively
Waterand
(186).
Earth.
we grant that these are thus produced

but what about their specific character
Objection:
Specific
because
soothing, tern fie

deluding.
and
^y e rep
L ty
J
Tj
specific^
Why because"^?/ are calm, turbulent

and deluding.
The first ^ has a causal
?
"
and the second a
collective signification.
80
[187188]
xxxix.]
[K.
elements, A kasa, &c., some have the

Goodness predominating in them and these
others
accordingly are pleasing, enlightening and buoyant
in
and
are
aricl
fickle
Foulness,
turbulent, painful
predominate
;
Among
the gross
of
attribute
the rest predominating in Darkness are dull, confounded and

These elements, thus visibly discriminated, are
sluggish.
The primary elements on the contrary

gross.
cannot be similarly discriminated by ordinary people
and as
such they are said to be non-specific, i. e., subtle.
specific
i. e.,
The
sub-divisions of the specific objects are stated
KiKIKA XXXIX.
Subtle
and such
(astral) bodies
parents,
Je
d into:
elements,
(i)
(
produced
form
the
Of
the
three
these
gross
of
sorts
the
subtle
Bodies are everlasting, and those

duced of parents are perishable.
ents?
(187).
with
together
specific objects.
the
produced of
as are
"The
are
specific objects
of three
sorts";
pro
thes e
(1) Subtile bodies (which are not

but
are
visible,
only postulated in order to explain certain
phenomena) (2) Those produced of parents, comprising the
three sorts are mentioned
and
and
Thus
sixfold Sheaths (Kosas).

Among these latter, hair, blood
flesh are produced from the mother and the veins, bones
;
marrow from the father

then we have seen that
these six are the six
the subtile bodies
Kos as.
form the
first
kind
of specific objects bodies produced of parents, the second ;

and the gross elements the third, objects like the jar, &c.,
;
being included in the
(188).
The
The
subtile bodies
arc permanent, those
produ&d
of parents
perishable.
last.
difference
between a subtile body and a body
produced of parents
is
bodies are permanent
and
OJ
parents
\.
ending
ash or
in
dirt.
perishable"
f,.
(dissolving
stated
"
Sufctile
those
that
...
produced
is
.,,
to
,.
sav
.
,"
into) either liquid,
[189190]
si
The Astral body
[K. XL.]
is
described.
KiuiKA XL.
The mergent,
The Astral Body
unconfined
formed primepemknent, com-
subtle (astral) body,

T
vall
^confined,
posed of Buddlli and the rest
>
>
is
pernia-
nent, and migrating,

invested with dispo-
the primary
*
sitions.
elements.
down
tO
is
migrates,
enjoyment, and
without
is
invested
with dispositions.
When
(189).
the emanations
first
Unconfined
Permanent.
from Nature began, the
object to evolve
therefrom,
for
each
AJ
-r
Spirit individually, was the Astral Body.
This body is unconfirmed^ inasmuch as it can
and
-j
i_-\
enter even a solid piece of stone.

It is again
permanent
since it exists all along, from the first creation to the final
"*
"
dissolution.
composed of Buddhi and the rest,

That is to say, it is an
of Buddhi, Ahankara, the eleven senses and the
aggregate
and as such it is specific, being
five primary elements
The Astral Body is

down to the primary
"
elements"
endowed with the properties of calmness,
restlessness
and
dnlness.
(190).
Objection
TTn-
necessariness of postainting two bodies,

astral and gross.
,-111
*,
The word niyata
astral
body
is
astral bodies
is
Let this astral body
differently interpreted by Narayana Tirtba (in his

takes it in the sense of "restricted,"/.^, an
He
and so there are distinct

restricted to one particular Spirit
to each Spirit. The interpretation of Gaudap:".ds closoly
resembles that of the Kaumudi.
There does not seem to be an;- special

the
though I am more indiael
ground for preferring either of the two,

interpretation of the Kauttiudl-
11
sheaths
vS&nkhya-Chandrika)
Objection
be the only body the seat of enjoyment for

th e spirit
What is the need of the gross
i
,1
the six
comprised oi
physical body
82
[191-192]
We
"
reply
Necessity of the
physical body, be-
XL,]
It
migrates" i. e., the astral body invariably

deserts the body
and
J it has lately
* occupied,*
r
.
..
another.
again occupies
(If it be asked)
.
why
"
is)
Jt do so ? ( we
reply)
(because it
without enjoyment, that is to say,
does
"
because the astral body by itself without a corresponding

gross physical body of six sheaths to afford the seat of enjoy
ments, would be without any enjoyments, and therefore it
migrates.
(191).
Transmigration is due to merit and

demerit; and these have no connection with
A
i
i
/
r
tne Astral Body ( referring as they do
Objection
Objection:
How
can the Astral Body

imgrate,bemg without dispositions
r>
reflecprimarily to Buddhi, and then by

J
to
the
tion,
Spirit) then how can this
.
latter migrate ?
We
"
reply
(because)
is
it
invested with
dispositions
The dispositions are merit and demerit,

wisdom
and ignorance, passion and
endowed
dispassion, power and weakness
;
with these primarily is the Buddhi, with which latter again

the Astral Body is connected and as such the Astral Body
;
becomes mediately connected with the various dispositions,

just as a piece of cloth is perfumed by contact with champaka,
Thus then, being invested with dispositions, it
flowers.
becomes quite natural that the Astral Body should
migrate.
(If it is asked) why should not the Astral Bodylike Nature
last
even after the final
(192).
The Astral Body

dissolving
praiaya.
at
dissolution
each
We
reply
.
mergent,
solves (into
that
is
to say,
Nature
its
The mergent character of the Astral Body

from the
c
such,
also).
fact of its being caused,
having
(i. e.,
(because
because
it
.
iu
is)
..
dis
immediate cause).
is to be inferred
being caused, and, as

must have an end
beginning in time, it
83
[103]
Objection
We
Objections :~Why
not attribute migration to hAiddhi, &c.
We
reply
all
grant
senses
,
-,
XLL]
Bat why not attribute

Bucldhi, Ahankara and the
this.
migration to
Have done with
,.
t>
the
unwarranted
postulation 01 an Astral Body.

T>
XLL
KARIKA
As a
[K.
painting stands not without a ground, nor a

shadow without a stake, so neither does
Reply the Buddhi

cannot rest without
the
LlHQa
(Buddlli,
&C.,)
supportless, without a
specific
substrate.
(193).
Subsist
(body).
Buddhi, &c., are called Lingd, because they are the
means of
In
cognition (Linganat, Jndpakdt, lingam)*
between
support of this the author puts forth a syllogism
the ordinary physical death and re-birth, Buddhi and the rest
:
have some sort of evolved body

are
they
aggregates of the
their
for
receptacle, because
like
primary elements
five
their prototypes in the ordinary physical body.

"
Without specific
bodies"
bodies.
the Astral Body corthe
roborated by
MahabhaTata.
i.
without subtle (astral)
.,
Testifying to this assertion,
we have
the
following (from the Mahabharata) :

"Then
Yama extracted from Satyavan
s
]
.
body, the thumb-sized body, which he had

thus
Here the mention of the
subjugated."
entrapped andj
as
"thumb-sized"
extracted body
implies the fact of its
having been the Astral Body, since

Spirit could have been extracted.
extract,
is
meant the Astral Body,
derivatively as
that
impossible that the

in the above
it is
By Purusha,
which sleeps
explaining the word

s&te) in the body
(lies
(puri).
Having thus proved the existence of the Astral Body, the

author states the reason and method of its migration:
*
The PaneJiikarana-cirarana
explanation of the word is given.
Cf.
Tatttoaek**driM-r-vr\xm a similar
84
[194-195]
XLII-XLIII.]
[K.
KARIKA XLII.
Formed
the
for
sake of the
Astral
Keasons and man
ner of the migration
of the Astral Bod}.
Body
dramatic
Spirit
plays
its
purpose the
parts
Kke
on account of the
actor,
connection of means and consequences,

and by union with the predominant power of Nature.
Formed
(194).
for the Spirit s purpose
dramatic actor
plays like a
"by
the Astral
Body
connection with the means
merit, &c., and consequences, the occupation of different kinds

of gross hodies, the effects of merit, &c. That is to say, as a
dramatic actor, occpuying different stages, plays severally the
parts of Parasurama,
Yudhishthira, Vatsaraja so does the

astral body, occupying various gross bodies, play the part of
man, brute or
(195).
plant.
(If it
The capacity of
the Astral Body is
due to the power of
Nature.
.
asked) Whence this

Astral Body ? We reply,
is
"
capability of the
by union with the
predominant power of Nature" As is

The various
declared by the Puranas
.
due
are
to Nature s
strange developments
"
"
omnipotence."
by connection with means and conse

the author therefore next describes these means and
It has just
"
quences
consequences
been
"
said,
KARIRA XLI1I.
The
essential dispositions are innate ; the incidental

such as merit, &c., are seen
ones,
The means and conDharma,
(considered) to be appurtenant
.,
sequences
& c.
organs
to the
.
-,
the uterine germ, &c., belong
to the effect.*
* It
In the
pointed out that Davies has quite misunderstood this Ka rika

place, he renders S&m-siddkikdk by
transcendental", the very
may be
firlt
reverse of
"
what
it
does mean.
Secondly
he renders
though in reality the compound means

as explained by the J&inmudi as well as the Chandrikd.
"
including
cause",
Karanasrayinak by
<;
located in
organs"
85
[196199]
[K. XLIV.]
(196). Incidental = consequent

brou g ht about affcer the mau s birth
i.
lcntal
dis
"
>
e. y
by
propitiating the gods, &c.
"
Essential dispositions are innate" e. g., it is declared that

at the boo;! lining of the creation the revered
1
primeval sage Kapila emerged into exist

ence, fully equipped with merit, wisdom,
and
power. Incidental dispositions, on the other
dispassion
that is to say, they are brought about by
not
are
innate,
hand,
such
effort
merit, &c., are those belonging to
personal
;
Valmiki and other Great Eishis.

The
o posites of
&c., simi-
ly explained.
same
to
*s
be nn ^ er stood with regard
demerit, ignorance, passion and
weak
The agrregate formed of the uterine germ, flesh,

blood, &c., of the child in the mother s
(197).
Flesh, blood, &c.,

related to the gross
W0 mb,
body
related
is
to
the gross physical

f
that
is
to
say,
states of the latter
they are particular

as are also the child
hood, youth, &c., of the born man.
The
means and the consequences have been

the respective consequences of the various
are described.
(198).
explained
means
now
KARIK! XLIV.
By
C
the
*
virtue
(is
vTiS means.
obtained) ascent to higher

vice, descent to the lower
dom
(results) beatitude
by
from wis-
planes
;
and bondage
from the reverse.

"
(199).
various
stai>
to
the
spheres (the ,Brahma,
the
By
ry
virtue,
Prajapatya and so
fa."
forth.)
i.
e.,
86
[200]
"
Vice to lower.
"
By
vice,
[K. XLIV.]
#c." i.
to the lower planes
e.,
known
From wisdom,
as sutala, &c.
however, this
when,
finds its
fulfilled,
"
The workings of Nature continue only
from
false
"
knowledge."
is
till
attained,
Nature
particular
As
is
Spirit
declared,
the attainment of
the reverse,
$*c."
i. e*
knowledge, results bondage.

This bondage
(200).
From
ex
only so long as
is
not attained ;
work in connection with that

and accordingly retires from him.
discriminative
&e
Nature ministers to
beatitude."
perience of the Spirit

discriminative wisdom
is
and
Incidental
6
bouda g e
oflhe^bove, reTp^-
Personal.
that of those
The
Natural,
natural
Materialists
who
contemplate on Nature as the Spirit with

reference to such men, it is laid down in
tiveiy, contradictory
S
is
of three kinds
also
11*
kinds Q f bondage*
The contemplators of the

nnmanifested (Nature) continue (in the chain of metempsy
end of
chosis) till a hundred thousand years" [at the
the Puranas
wisdom]. The incidental bondage

who contemplate on the. various products of Nature
the elements, the senses, Ahankdra and Buddhi.
which they attain

is
of those
as Spirit,
"
With regard
to true
to these
the senses continue
it is
till
laid
down
"
Th e
ten Manvantaras
contemplators of
those of the ele
ments, till a hundred Manvantaras those of Ahankara, till a

thousand and lastly, those of the Buddhi havin g done away
with all feverish excitement, continue till ten thousand
;
Manvantaras.
Those labouring under the incidental bondage
are (conventionally called) Videkas?

is due to Ishtdpurta (actions done
such as the digging of tanks, &c., cbne
with the sole motive of personal gains hereafter). Thos6
The personal bondage
with
selfish motives,
performing such actions, having their minds influenced by

desire, are ignorant of the true nature of the Spirit, and as
such undergo bondage.
87
[201203]
[K. XLV.]
IURIKA XLV.
From
dispassion results
absorption* into Prakriti ;

from passionate attachment, transmi-
vaSf
gration
ment
from
power,
desires
(of
and
;)
non-impedifrom the
reverse, the contrary.

"
(201).
From dispassion
L Absorption into
Prakriti frdnidispas-
meant
results absorption into
Those wll
Prakriti"
from passion, but are
are free
ignorant of the true nature of spirit, are

absorbed into Nature. By Prakriti here are
Prakriti, Buddhi, AJiankdra, the
Elements, and the
senses. Those who meditate upon these as Spirit are absorbed

into these (i. e. those mis taking the senses for the Spirit
become absorbed
they rest there
(202).
,
II.
tion
the senses, and so on), that is to .say,

in the course of time, they are born again.
in
till,
"From
Transrmgra-
from passionate
passionate attachment results
The epithet
(as
is
migration"
the painimplies
r
because
fnl character of metempsychosis
"passionate"
has been previously described) passion
the source of pain.
(203).
"From
power,
III.
Non-impcdi-
ment from power.
/T
i.
non-impediment"
obstruction of desires.
\
(Iswara)
"
non-
man
e.,
one who can do whatever he

-\
-\
is
the
powerful
-\
wishes."
1
* Davies takes the Hindu commentators to

task, here, and remarks
(the Sankhya) does not recognise any absorption of the subtle body into
Hence the meaning is that by
Nature, until the soul is entirely free
:
the destruction of passion, the influence of the material world
is
"It
destroyed,
and the soul is independent, though not yet finally liberated." All this is
quit * true but I don t see how this affects the position of the Hindu
cpmmentators, who, at least Vachaspati Misra among them, do not assert
the final absorption of the bodies into Nature all that they mean is that by
dispassion, the soul or more properly, its seat, the astral body is absorbed
into Nature and rests there till it is born again. It may be remarked that
;
this resting
is what, in theosophic parlance,

enjoyed by the Individuality in Devachaiv
is
called
<;
tjhe
peaceful rest
88
[204-205]
"
IV. Obstruction of
desires
from weak-
From
"the
ness.
ê
[K. XLVI.]
reverse" i. e.
i.
contrary"
,.
r.
form weakness,
the frequent obstruc-
e.,
-i
tion of desires.
With a view to describe collectively as well as individually,

the eight properties of Buddhi virtue, vice, &c., in order to
show which of these are to be practised, and which relinquish
the author first describes
ed, by those desiring emancipation
them
collectively
KlMKl XLVI.
This
is
an
intellectual
creation,
distinguished by
Error, Disablity, Contentment and Per-
cr^n^lST
1
***<>*.
the
the hostile influence of
By
inequalities
different forms of this creation
of
the
become
attributes,
fifty.
Pratyaya == That by which anything is known, i. e. y

Buddhi. "Error" i. e., ignorance, is a proli.
perty of Buddhi; so is also "disabUty" which
Disability.
in. Contentment,
results from the incapacity
J of the senseIV. Perfection.
and
Contentment
organs.
Perfection also
(204).
are properties of
Of these,
Buddhi
as will be described later on.
the three former,

error, disability and content
ment include Virtue and the other six in-
edTu rotbovefout
(205).
leaving aside Wisincluded in Perfection.
tellectnal properties
dom which
is
These properties are next considered individually.

The forms of these are fifty" If it is
0fthe
asked: Whence these fifty forms? We
"
above
IS fi%
reply
inequalities
of
the
"from
attributes"
the
hostile
influence
of the
(
The inequality may consist
strength of the one in comparison

with the other two, or of two conjointly with that of the third.
This inquality is assumed to be more or less in accordance
with the requirements of particular cases ; and it leads to the
either in the individual
89
[206208]
[K. XLVII.-- XLVIII.]
suppression of Attributes by one another

the fifty forms of intellectual creation.
The
tifty
forms are next enumerated
thus giving rise to
KARIKA XLVII.
There are
twenty-eight of
Disability,
arising from the imperfecJ
tion of the organs

3
(206).
Contentment has
nine forms
so"
Error
forms of
five
5 forms of Error.
28 of Disability.
9 of Contentment,
8 of Perfection.
The forms*
passion, hatred and
of
and reriection
Error
attachment
are
to
eight.
ignorance,
egotism,
the
body: respectively
called, obscurity (Tamos), delusion (Moha). extreme delusion
(Mahamoha), gloom ( Tamisra), and utter darkness (Andha-
Egotism, &c., partake of the nature of Error ;

tamisra).
as
a
matter of fact, they are its products.
certain
though,
object being erroneously determined by Ignorance, Egotism
and the
rest,
attached to
partaking of the nature of Ignorance, become

It is for this reason that the revered Varsha-
it.
ganya (Vytisa ?) declares Ignorance

component parts.
to be
made up
of the five
(207). Now the author states the sub-divisions of the

forms of error
five
KARIKA XLVIII.
Of Error
there are eight forms, as also of Delusion
sixty-two subdivisions
ofÊrror.
extreme Delusion
e ighteen-fold,
ten-fold
is
and so
is
Gloom
also utter
Darkness.
"
>
Of
ignorance-
eight forms.
* Abkinivcsa
(208).
t jiere
Of Error
"
i. e.,
of Ignorance,
are eight forms"
is a technicality of Yoga Philosophy.

It is defined by
Patanjali {Yoga Sutra 11-9) as the "tenacity of life an attachment to the
bqdy which relates the residue of one s former life,"
12
90
[209212]
[K. XLVIIL]
Ignorance of the form of Error consists in mistaking nonNature, Buddhi, Akankdm and.
.
,
f
the subtle elements, for Spirit ; and these
spiritual things are eight in number, Error is said
spiritual
Eight of Delusion.
non
to be eight-fold.
^ refers
The
(209).
the eight forms to Delusion.
The
gods having attained the eight occult powers, consider them

selves to be immortal, and their powers also to be everlasting
of Egotism, and since this has the eight

object, it is said to be eight-fold.
this is the error
Siddkis for
its
is ten-fold"
By Extreme
meant the attachment to the
f Extreme
objects of sense, sound, odour and the rest
DehSon.
which are ten-fold, each of the five being
and hence having these for its
either divine or otherwise
is
Extreme
Delusion
said to be ten-fold.
object,
(210).
"Extreme
Delusion
Delusion
is
"
Gloom"
(211).
i. e. 9
"
Hatred,
objects of sense,
fc (
Gloom
is
eighteen-fold."
The
sound, &c., are ten by
themselves the eight occult powers how-^

ever are not objects of sense by themselves,
to the attainment of the various sensuous
;
but only as means
And the objects of sense, being mutually suppressive,

objects.
their means
the Powers too are retarded. The Powers,
together with the objects of sense, make up eighteen, and
these being the objects of Gloom or Hatred, make it eighteenfold.
(212).
"So
is
Utter
Darkness"
Attachment
*****
to
life].
[Utter
Darkness =
The word
refers eighteen-fold-ness to Utter
"tathd"
Darkness.
The gods having attained the eight occult

powers and enjoying their consequences
objects
by
th/}
live in continual fear of these
the
ten
sensuous
being wrested from them
Kakshasas and this fear constitutes Abkinivesa, or

and this latter having for its object the aforesaid
attachment
eighteen things the eight powers

said to be eighteeu-fold.
and the ten objects
is
91
[213216]
[K. XLIX.]
Thus the five forms of Error, with their sub-divibecome sixty-two.
(213).
siond
(214). Having thus described the five forms of Error, the

author next states the twenty eight forms of Disability :
KARIK! XLIX.
The
eleven organs,* together with

those of Buddhi, are pronounced to be
injuries of the
tadti&X.*
Disability; the injuries of Buddhi

( itself) are seventeen
brought about
by the reversion of contentment and

(215).
The
The Eleven
perfection.
injuries of the organs are mentioned as causes

f so many injuries of Buddhi, and not
caused by injuries to
by themselves, independent forms of

These
Disability.
injuries-" Deafness,
as,
leprosy, blindness, paralysis, paralysis of the hands, lameness,
dumbness, ajighratd
(failure of the sensibility of the olfactory
nerves), impotency, failure of the action of the bowels, and

idiocy,"
consequent on the failure of the various sense-
organs, are the eleven kinds of intellectual disability, and these

are mentioned together with those of Buddhi (itself) in
accordance with the theory of the non-difference of cause and

effect.
(216).
Having thus described the
Seventeen caused
by the reversion
of
contentment of perfection.
,
disabilities of Buddhi,
from those of the sense-organs, the
,.
.,.,.
,
^ , 7I .,
disabilities of Buddhi itself are next stated
With the injuries of Buddhi" If it be
arising
,
,,
111how
asked
J.-L
many
are these?
we
reply,
seventeen are the injuries of Buddhi" Wherefore ? by the

reversion of contentment and perfection"
Contentment being
the
disabilities caused by its reversion are nine-fold
nine-fold,
"
"
and similarly perfection being eight-fold, the disability

caused by its reversion is eight-fold, thus making the
also
seventeen intellectual disabilities proper.
92
[217220]
[K. L.]
The author next enumerates the nine forms of

Contentment
(217).
Nine forms of Contentment

Nine forms
Ac-
of
ternal
relating
means ^
quiescence.
tf
The
five internal
intemal
luck
to
and
four in-
nature,
five
ex
from objects of sense.
forms of Contentment belong to
who have
those
severally
me and
ternal, relating to abstinence
(218).
are set forth
ascertained that Spirit
is
form Nature, but still being illfor ms

not make further attempts in
do
advised,
the direction of meditation, &c., which are the means of
discriminative wisdom and these forms are called internal^
differ ent
because they pre-suppose the difference of Atman and Prakriti.

which are these? the reply is "relating
It being asked
and
severally to nature^ means, time

are nature &c.
The contentment called
(219).
luck" i.
whose names
.,
"prakriti"
consists in
the
on being told
that discriminative wisdom is only a
modification of Prakriti and, as such, would come to every
one in the natural course of events, and there is no need of
satisfaction of the
hankering after
also called
(220).
it by meditation,
Ambha.
&c.,
disciple
and
this
contentment
is
The second form of contentment arises from the

wisdom could not
following instruction
:
II.
Salila.
because,
if it
,.
,.
be attained in the ordinary course of nuture;

were so, then everybody would attain to wisdom,
because the course of nature for the forms of nature affects
alj,
Such wisdom could only be attained

through asceticism and so thou must follow an ascetic life
and give up all meditation, &c. The satisfaction arising from
individuals
equally.
;
the above instruction
is
called Salila.
93
[221224]
The
(221).
third
form, called
[K..L.]
"Time,"
or Og/ta,
is
the
arising from the instruction

that asceticism too cannot bring about
Emancipation for all means await the proper Time for bring
ing about their various consequences, and so when the Time
satisfaction
has arrived, one s ends will be gained without undergoing the

troubles of asceticism.
The fourth form
(222).
called
satisfaction
"Luck,"
arising
or
Vriskti, is the
from the following
Discriminative wisdom proceeds neither

from nature, nor from any other means (such as asceticism,
&c.), nor does it depend solely upon time, but it comes only by
"
Thus it was through mere luck that the children of

Madalasa when quite infants, obtained wisdom by their
mother s instructions and thereby attained beatitude.
luck.
The external forms of Contentment are
(223).
five,
arising
fromfabstinence from sound, odour, &c.

the five bJ ects f Sense
These belon g to
eXtCrnal
foras.
those who are free from all attachment,

but take the non-spirits Nature, &c,, to be Spirit. These
forms are called external, because they pre-suppose the
and these
existence of Spirit, without knowing what it is
;
freedom from attachment.
The causes of this nonattachment being five, it is five-fold, and consequently so is

the contentment resulting therefrom. The objects of sense
being five,,the abstinence from these must also be five-fold.
come
after
Abstinence too
is
due to the preception of discrepancies in the
consisting mainly of earning,

lives and so on.
wasting,
enjoying,
killing
saving,
process of sensuous enjoyment
To
^224).
explain
The means of acquiring wealth,
are invarably the sources of

pain to the servants as is declared in the
Who would ever be attracted towards service,
service, &c.,
"
following
considering the pain caused by the insults to^ be suffered at

the contentthe hands of the wardens of a vain monarch ?
"
94
[225229]
[K. LI.]
ment
due
resulting from abstinence from objects of sense

to the consideration of such troubles, is called Para.
(225).
And
then, the wealth being obtained, brings with

it the further trouble of protecting it from
the
thieves,
king,
floods
and
the
fire
contentment due to abstience arising from such considerations

is the second called Supdra.
(226).
having been obtained and
the wealth
Thirdly,
safely hoarded, there arises the fear of its

being spent this consideration gives rise
to the third form of abstinence leading to contentment called
Pdrdpdra.
(227). Fourthly,
IV. AnuUam&mbtia.
when
becomes
one
accustomed
to
sensuous objects, his desires increase ; the

.1
r
i
ini
j.i
about the
/
i>
non-fulfilment of these brings
fourth, called Anuttamambha.
Lastly, there arises the notion that there can be no

enjoyment (either in this world or the
Uttam&mbha.
n n 1V
,,
i
-,,
other), without the cruel process of killing
(228).
V.
*\
animals, and contentment due to the abstinence arising from

the perception of the cruelty of the process, is the fifth
called Uttamambha.
Thus the four external froms of contentment, together with

make up the nine froms mentioned
the five internal ones,

above.
(229). The author next

secondary divisions of Power
describes
the
primary
and
KlRiKA
The
-
eight Powers
The eight powers.
(i. e.,
LI.
means of acquiring them) are
reasoning,
oral
instruction,
.
study,
three-fold suppression of pain, acquisi

The three before mentioned
tion of friends, and purity.
(Error, &c.) are checks to these (Powers).
95
[230-235]
[K. LI.]
(230). The chief among those enumerated above is the

threefold suppression of pain three-fold on account of the
three-fojdness of the pains to be suppressed.
The o^her means mentioned, being means
to power only
through the three-fold suppression of pain, are culled seconda

And these five are both causes and effects. Of these
ry.
study is only a cause. The three principal ones (suppression
of pain) being only effects the rest are both cause and effect.
The first, study, named Tdra, consists in compre
(231).
;
hending the sense

sciences
of the
psychological
by listening to the teachings of a
qualified teacher.
(232).
effect of this last, oral instruction, implies the
The
comprehension of the meaning

* of instruc,.
.^
a useful habit with writers,
(2) Sutara.
tions, it being
to imply the effect by the cause

Siddhi called Sutara.
(233).
this constitutes the second
Reasoning consists in the investigatin of the meaning

of scripture by a process of dialetics not
tara
contrary to the scriptures themselves. This
strengthening the portion of the
consists in
investigation
all doubts and objections with
scripture by setting aside
regard
to it; this process is also called meditation by writers on the
Vedas, and the Power due to this

(234).
(4)
The fourth
Eamyaka
is
called Tdrdtara.
the acquisition of friends. Even

though one has arrived at truth by the
right process of reasoning yet he has no
is
them over with

Hence the acquisition of
faith in his conclusions until he has talked
his
teacher and follow-students.
qualified teacher
and follow-studeuts
Siddhi called Ramya/ta.

(235). By dana here
(5) Sadamudita.
is
meant purity
dom)-deriving the
*
is
= to
purify.
said to be the fourth
(of discriminative wis-
word from the root
As
is
declared .by the
Davies remarks that the root is

coined for the occasion." But
I may refer the reader to the
8iddMnt-a-auiiiudf, Under the Sutra
S&nyojaiUh (VI/4/68).
"
96
[236238]
[K. LI.]
An unimpeded discriminatve knowledgePatanjali

is the means to the suppression of pain." (Yoga-Sutra 1126).
By unimpededness in the Sutra is meant purity, by which
again is meant the process of placing discriminative wisdom on
revered
"
a clear basis, 4 after having destroyed all doubts and mistaken

notions mixed with different kinds of cravings or desires] This
purity is not obtainable without the refinement arising from a
.
long and uninterrupted course of practice (of the wisdom

Thus the word dana includes (as a means to power)
attained).
Practice also.
This
is
the
fifth,
called Sadd-Mudita.
(236). The three primary means to Power are called, Pramoda Mudita and Modamdna. And these three with the
last five are the eight
(237).
(means
to)
Power.
Others explain the distich thus The perception of

truth without the instruction of others,
:
t>>gW;
about purely by means of instruc-
tions received in past births
And
meant by uka.
the tenets of the
that which
is
is
what
is
obtained by listening to
Sankhya Philosophy
as learnt
by
others, is
the second called Sdbda, because it follows merely from the

study of the text. When the truth is learnt at a teacher s, in
the
company of folio w-students, it is said to be the

known as study, because it is brought about by study.
third,
The
fourth consists in the attainment of wisdom by coming in

contact with a friend who has already got it. Fifthly, gene
rosity is said to be a
is
means
to
wisdom, because true wisdom
imparted by the teacher, duly propitiated with gifts.
The propriety of either interpretation we leave to the

learned to judge
and we desist from pointing out the faults
of others, because our duty lies only in elucidating the cardi
;
nal doctrines of the Sankhya Philosophy.
(238).
The
Buddhi arising from the reversion

Power thus become seventeen in number.
Disabilities of
of Cootentment and
Of the different poritions

known that Power is most
of intellectual creation, it is wellall.

So the author next
desired by
mentions Error, Disability and Contentment as impediments
97
[239240]
to
Power
The aforesaid
"
[K. LIL]
three are checks to
Power.
The
aforesaid three refers to Error, Disability and Contentment.

And these are curbs to the different means of attaining Power,
because they retard their progress and thus being opposed

to Power, the latter three are ever undesirable.
;
(239).
Objection:
Granted
But
all this.
it
has been laid
This pur
the
intellectual
creation
either
fulfilled
alone ;
can
be
by
pose
?
have
both
or by the elemental alone.
Why
clown that the creation
The reply
is
is
for the Spirit s purpose.
KARIKA LIL
Without dispositions there would be no Linga (Element), and without the Linga there
Necessity of twofold creation.
would be no development of
Wherefore proceeds a
tions.
disposi
two-fold creation, the
personal (belonging to the body, astral and gross) and

Intellectual.
(240).
elements-;
Linga denotes the creation composed of the primary

and disposition, the intellectual.
The meaning
cannot manifest
of the Karika
is
that the elemental creation
itself for the fulfilment of the
without the intellectual creation
purpose of the
nor conversely is
the latter capable of having its complete manifestation with
out the elements. Hence the necessity of a two-fold creation.
Spirit,
Again experience, the purpose of the

in the absence of the
Jt
ob
of sense.
Necessity of
intellectual
the
ere a-
Spirit, is not -possible
two bodies and the
Hence the
elemental creation.
*
necessity of the
And
conversely ,the
the sense-organscould never be complete without the three
meaus of experience
internal
organs Manas Ahankara and
Buddhi. Nor would these latter be what they are, if there
were no dispositions, virtue, &c. And lastly, discriminative
13
98
[241245]
[K. LIII.]
the only means to emancipation, would not be

without
the above two kinds of creation. Whence
possible
the necessity of the double creation.
wisdom
The possible objection of reciprocal causality is

explained away as being similar to that
of the seed and the s P rout due to the fact
due to
of the creation having had no beginning
f
7
in time ( bein
eternal), and the creation
of bodies and dispositions at the beginning
(241).
^"
plained as
11
creationT
of the present cycle is said to be due to the impulse of

residual tendencies left by the bodies and (dispositions related
to particular Spirits), in the previous cycle.
(242). The various forms of the intellectual creation hav

ing been mentioned, the author next mentions those of the
elemental creation :
KlRiKl LIU.
The divine
The force
has
class
of eie-
mental creation.
eight
animals, five
the
varieties,
mankind
dags; thus briefly
is
ig
lower
single
the
in
worl( j
of living beings.
(243).
The
The eight divine
varieties
Pajapatya,
eight
Gandharva,
go
are the
Brahma, the
the
Aindra, the Paitra, the

Yaksha, the Rakshasa and
the Paisacha.
(244)1
five of
The
the lower
animals.
(245).
Mankind
lower animals are quadrupeds

than
(other
deer), deer, birds, creeping
things and the immovable (trees, &c.)
five varieties of
Mankind is single, not counting its sub-divisions

Brahmanas &c., as separate, as the bodily
singta.
formation
men.
is
the
same
in all
classes
of
The author
(246).
of
tlife
[K. LIV
99
[246248]
next
lays
down
the
LV.]
three-foldness
elemental creation based on the excess or
otherwise
of intelligence in the form of the higher, the middle

the lower
and
KAIUKA LIV.
Among
the beings of the
plane Goodness
among those of the
higher
predominates
lower predominates Dulness; in the
of the Attributes.
middle reside those predominating in
Foulness these constituting the whole Universe, from
The
different divi-
WjbS
Brahma
to the tuft of grass.
The Heavenly
(247).
Swah, Mahah,
Bhnvah,
regions
Jana, Tapas and Satya predominate in

Goodness. Those consisting of the lower
Heavcnly
animals and trees, &c., are characterised by

The regions of the earth consisting of the seven
Dvipas (or continents,) and Oceans predominate in Foulness,
inasmuch as they abound in pain and are given to actions,
Dnlness.
or otherwise.
righteous
o
The whole
"from
of the Universe
Brahma
to the tuft
is
summed up
the pharse
of grass."
Having thus described the
(248).
in
creation, the author
productiveness of pain, that would lead to

means to Emancipation
of
the
dispassion,*one
next describes
its
KARIKA LY.
There
Ttie
^ am
(in the
sources
"
of
world) does the Sentient Spirit experience pain, arising from decay and
death, due to the non-discrimination
of the Spirit from the body, until it is released from its

person (until the dissolution of the astral hody) where
;
fore pain
is
natural.
100
[249251]
corporeal beings there are many varieties of experi

ence interspersed with pleasure and pain
Among
Pain of decay and
common
death, the
lot of all creatures.

1
be
"
&c.
insect,
LVL]
[K.
P.I
"
may
common
being
ye t the pain of decay

* and death is the
common lot of all. The fear of cteath,
I not cease to be
to
man
may
I continue to
well as to the smallest
as
and the cause of fear constituting pain, death
is
source of pain.*
of
(249).
Buddhi
Pleasure and pain are the properties

Objection:
and as such how can these be said to belong to
the Spirit?
Reply
meaning One
who sleeps in the astral body" and this
latter bein S connected with Buddki and
name)
(the
"
"
Puruska"
literally
its properties,
leads to the idea of the Spirit
being connected with them.
(250).
Question
How
said to belong to the Spirit

"
"
Reply
Due
non-discrimination of Spirit from

The Spirit, not alive to its dis
body."
to the
the
tinction
ations of the
can pain related to the body be
latter for its
from the body, mistakes the fluctu

The srr in sflftRf^** may be
own.
taken as pointing to the limit of the Spirit s pain the mean

Until the body has ceased to be, the Spirit suffers
ing being,
"
pain."
(251).
The author next decides the question ofthe Maker
of the Universe
lUniKl
LV.I.
^
down
This creation from Buddhi

The question as to
the Maker oft he Uni-
ments,
is
verse decided.
T
Fraknti.
i
of
,
n^^
I he
.
work
/.
done
for
ele
specific
brought about by the m6din
fications
to the
the
emancipation
ol
is
-.
each
*
It may be worth noting here that Death in itself is not pain, it is only
the fear (the fear of the unknown) that makes the thought of death so painful*
101
[252-254]
and thus
.Spirit,
ing ds
were
if it
for
is
another
for the sake of
sake,
LVI.]
though appear
Nature
herself.
The creation
(252).
brought about by Nature
neither produced by a God, jnor

evolution from Brahman
nor can
The different views

of the cause of creation set aside.
is
TT
is
it
it is
it
an
be said
Uncaused since, in this latter case,

the Universe would be either an eternal
to be
It cannot be said
entity or eternal non-entity (an absurdity).
to be evolved from Brahman (the Vedanta view), for there can
be no (material) modification of pure intelligence, Brahman, as

postulated by Vedanta. Nor, again can creation be said to be
brought about by Nature under the guiding hand of a God

for a God is naturally without action and, as such, cannot be
the supervisor, just as an inactive carpenter cannot be said to
;
manipulate his
Granted that the creation is due to

Objection
Nature alone. But Nature is eternally
Nature
(253).
Objection:
activl,
tools.
noêmanc^
active
and aS SUch her Operations should

and hence there would be no
>
never cease
pation possible.
emancipation of any Spirit.
The creation appearing as if it were for Nature s

own saê is really for the sake of anThe creation is for the spirit s
the cookother
A cook, having finished
end and ceases with
,
.,
,
from the work
the purification of
similarly
ing,- retires
"
Reply
thcsc
Nature being urged to action
for the
eman
and
cipation of the Spirit, brings about this emancipation
thenceforth cease her operations with regard to the Spirits
already liberated (and, thus emancipation is not impossible).
;
(254).
But it is only
act towards
can
something sentient that
Objection
.-Granted
all
this.
"
N^
insentient*
cannot act towards
a definite end.
the fulfilment of
its
own
or of another
purpose and Nature being insentient cannot

;
act
m the
manner
she requires a sentient supervisor
described,; and, as such,
(over
her blind
force)
[255
102
255a]
[K. LVIT.]
the Spirit residing in the body cannot be snch a supervisor,

because snch conditioned Spirits are ignorant of the
character of Nature
consequently there must be somfl other
""true
sentient
agent,
Nature
and
We
reply
superintending ab extra the operations of

this we giv.e the name God.
*.o
KARIKA LVII.
As
the insentient
instance of an in-
$*$&&
milk flows out
for the
tne ca ^fj so ^ oes Nature
towards
the
emancipation
growth
operate
of the
nitc end.
Spirit.
(255).
It is a fact of observation that insentient
also act towards definite ends,
the nourishment
of
the
e.g.,
calf.
objects
the action of milk towards

Similarly
Nature,
though
insentient, could act towards the emancipation of the Spirit.
(255a).
Tne
view
It
,
ot
would not be right to urge that the production

of the milk being due to the superintenda
Universal
Personal
ing car e of God, its action cannot afford

a case parallel to the action of insentient
because all actions of an intelligent agent are due

;
either to selfishness, or benevolence, neither of which can be
Nature
said to be the cause of the creation of the Universe, which,

therefore, cannot be said to be due to the action of
an intel
For
the
Lord
of
the
God,
ligent agent.
being
Universe, has
all that he requires and, as such, He can have no selfish
motive nor can His action be said to be due solely to pity for
pity consists in a desire for the removal of others pains
but before creation, Spirits were without bodies, and, as such,
without pain, for the removal of which God s compassion
And if the pain subsequent to crea^
would be moved.
the cause of creation, then we should
said
to
be
tion were
;
be in the inextricable nooze of reciprocality

the creation
due to pity, and pity due to the creation. And again if God
were moved to creation by pity, then he would create none
:
103
[256258]
[K. LVIII..]
happy mortals. And if the diversity of pleasures be

attributed to the past deeds of the individual Spirit, then
what isi the necessity of postulating a supervisor ? And if
you urge the incapability of mere Karma an unintelligent
,but
agent without a supervisor, towards creation, then we reply,

that the creation of bodies, &c., being incapable of being
produced by Karma, we may very easily say the same with
regard to pleasure, &c., as well (and, pleasure, &C M will have
to be attributed to God also).
The action of the non-intelligent Prakriti is due

neither to selfishness nor to mere pity;
None of the above
to
and thus in this case, none of the above
objections apply
the case of Nature.
faults afe applicable>
The ou]y motive of
(256).
Nature
is
the purpose of
the
instance cited in the Karika
(257). It has been

The author explains this
is
said
Thus therefore the
Spirit.
quite appropriate.
"as
if
for
own
its
purpose"
LVIII.
As
people engage in acts to satisfy desires, so does
Unmamfested
the
The
Spirit s
end
the motive of Nature.
ture)
,
c
act
.
for
the
Principle
(Nav
emancipation of
the opirit.
Desire
which
is
is.
satisfied
on the attainment of the desired object

because an end of action
the purpose of the agent

only that which is desired.
is
Th3 similarity
Principle act for
is
pointed out
"So
does the Unmanifested

1
the
Emancipation of Spirit.
We grant that the purpose of the

motive
the
to the action of Nature, but whence
Spirit
the cessation of her operations ?
(258).
Objection
is
We
reply
104
[259260]
[K. LIX
LX.]
KARIKA LIX.
As
a dancing girl, having exhibited herself to the

spectators of the stage, ceases to
The cause of the

cessation of Natiti-e s
dance, so does Nature cease to operate

when she has made herself mani
fest to the Spirit.
The word
the place implies the spectators,?

stage,"
the occupiers of the place.
Having manifested herself i. e.,
her different modifications, sound, &c., as different from
"
the Spirit.
(259).
Objection:
We
grant the action of Nature for
the Spirit s purpose. But she is sure to get some compensa

tion for her pains from the
Spirit just as a servant does
from his gratified master and as such the motive of Nature
;
cannot be said to be purely
We
reply
altruistic.
KARIK! LX.
Generous Nature, endowed with attributes, causes
^J manifold means, without benefit to
Nature expects no
compensation.
herself, the
good of the
Spirit,
devoid of attributes, and as such ungrateful.
who
is
As a
qualified servant accomplishes the good of his un*

qualified master, through purely unselfish motives, without
benefit to himself; so does generous Nature, endowed
with the three Attributes, benefit the Spirit without any good
any
in return to herself.
motives
is
Thus the pure unselfishness of Nature^
established.
(260). Objection: We grant all this But a dancing girl

having retired from the stage after her exhibition, returns to it
:
[K. LXI
105
2G2]
[261
would
.again, if so desired by the spectators ; similarly
act eVen after having manifested herself to Spirit.
We
%eply
LXIL]
Nature
IURIKA LXI.
Nothing
more modest than Nature
is
such
my
is
Once aware of having been

opinion.
_
seen, she does not again expose herselt
The reason why

Nature does not re-
vert to her actions.
to the
view
ot the spirit.
modesty here is meant delicacy (of manners), the

to the Purusha s view.
As a wellinability to suffer exposure
with
her
cast
the
to
tmvisible
bred lady
Sun,
down, having
eyes
her body uncovered by chance, happening to be seen by a
stranger, tries to hide herself in such a way as not to be seen
By
even more modest than such a lady

so Nature
again
having once been seen by the Purusha, will is no case show
;
herself again.
But Purusha, being

Let-this be so.
(261).
Objection:
devoid of Attributes and Modifications, how is his emancipa
For emancipation consists in the removal of
bondage and bondage being only another name for the karmic
residua imbued with dispositions and troubles, it is not possible
And as the Purusha is devoid
to the unmodifying Purusha.
which latter is only another
of action it can have no migration
tion possible
name
for
death.
the creation
is
Hence
a meaningless assertion that
it is
for the purpose of
Purusha.
The author meets the above objection by accepting
it
KARIK! LXII.
Verily no Spirit
*
I
Bondage
and
lease in reality
ply to Nature.
(262).
14
or
bound,
it
is
emancipated, or
Nature alone which
is
migrates
has many receptacles, that
or is released, or migrates.
;
re*
ap-
No
emancipated.
is
is
bound,
Spirit is bound not any migrates nor is any

Nature alone, having many receptacles (bodily
;
106
[263]
[K. LXIII
forms of being), is bound, migrates and is released.

migration and release are ascribed to the Spirit, in
manner
though
and victory are attributed
as defeat
actually occurring to his soldiers
Bondage,
the same
the king,
it is the
to
because
LXIV.]
part in the undertaking, the effects of

In the same
accrue to the king.
or loss
servants that take
which
gain
manner, experience and
release, though really belonging to

are
attributed
to
the Spirit, on account of the nonNature,
discrimination of Spirit from Nature. Thus the objection
above urged loses
all its force.
(263). Objection: We understand that bondage, migra

and release, are ascribed to the Spirit but of what good
are these to Nature ?
tion
We
reply
LXIII.
Nature by herself binds herself by means of seven

forms
sne causes deliverance for the
Nature binds and
5
" S h
S elf
ow^
of he r
developments.
êfit
of thb
Spirit,
by
means of
Qne f
orm>
Nature binds herself by means of seven forms

( i. e.
dispositions) all the properties of Buddhi, save discriminative
wisdom. For the benefit of the Spirit she releases herself by
herself, by means of one form, viz., discriminative wisdom.
That is to say, she does not again bring about the experience
"
"
or emancipation of the
Objection
Thus
it is
We
that
The form and characterofdiscriminative
wisdom.
same Spirit.
__ ____
all this.
by the
practice
attained,
which
,,.-,,
is
do not
obtained that)
exist."
"
then
of truth,
is
wisdom
complete,
is
inconT
ana
hence) pure,
means of wnicn the
(and
trovertible,
absolute
idea
What
KABIK! LXIV.
grant
(by
am
not,
naught
is
mine, and
[2G4
,
107
267]
The word
(264).
cc
"
trnth
[K. LXIV.]
indicates the
knowledge thereof.
of practice of truth, in the manner described above,

a
through long course of repeated, uninterrupted and respectful
exercise of true knowledge, the wisdom manifesting the dis
By means
*
of Spirit from Matter, is attained. All exercise
brings about the knowledge of its object, so in the present
case the exercise being one of truth results in the cognition
tinction
that
It is for this reason of its leading to truth
thereof.
knowledge
(265).
is
the
called pure.
"
incontrovertible
Doubt and
taken).
unmistwo im-
"
Why pure ? Because
(or
error are the
P urities of knowledge and the above

knowledge being free from these is said to
;
be pure. Doubt consists in thinking a decided fact to be

undecided ; and as such it is only a form of error. Thus by
hence incontrovertible" the absence of both doubt and
saying,
"
contradiction
is
implied
absence being due also to the
this
fact of the exercise belonging to truth.

.
We grant all this, but the eternal

Objection :
(266).
tendency towards false knowledge is sure to bring about its
results in the shape of false knowledge, which will lead to its
inevitable effect, the
miseries
of metempsychosis,
of which
thus there would be no end.
In reply to the above,

with
it is
declared
"
Absolute" i.e.,
unmixed
Though tendency towards
error.
error
ca P ab] e of removal by
means of true wisdom, though this has a
is
eternal
vefc
ifc
is
>
beginning in time. For partiality towards truth is natural to

No
Buddhi, as declare also outsiders (here, the Bauddhas)
amount of contradiction can set aside the flawless (knowledge
"
of) the
character of objects,
(287).
for
such
is
the
The form of the cognition is stated

naught is mine, and I do not
f
thG
not
action
partiality
/ am
exist.
of
not,
I am
merel y precludes the. possibility of

from the Spirit. As is declared
108
[268269]
(by grammarians),
"The
root
As
[K. LXV.]
together with
Bku and
Kri,
signify action in general." Hence all actions, external as well

as
determination, self-consciousness, refection,
internal,
observation, &c., are
all
And
precluded from the Spirit.
since there is^no action of the Spirit, there arises the idea that
here implies agency, such as in
am not."
give,"
"I
"I"
"I
and no such agency can belong to the Spirit,

And from this follows the idea
that "naught is mine" For it is only an agent that can have
any possession and hence the preclusion of action implies
"
&c. ;
eat,"
who
is
without any action.
that of possession as well.
Or we may
The
interpret the three forms in another way.
I am the Spirit, not
I do not exist," means that
and because non-productive I have no action
productive
and since without action,
I am not
I can have no
sentence
"
"
"
"
;"
"
"
possessions,
(268).
might be
hence
"
naught
mine.
is
"
:
Even after such a knowledge, there
something yet unknown, which would lead to re
Objection
left
birth.
We
It is complete" i. e., there is nothing left un

the attainment of such knowledge as the above.
"
reply
known after
Hence there
is
no re-birth.
Question
(269).
ledge of truth ?
We
reply
What
is
accomplished
by
this
know
KARIKA LXV.
Possessed of this knowledge,
The cause
cessation of
operation.
of
the
Nature
pure, at leisure
Spirit, as
and
at
spectator,
ease,
beholds
.
JNature,
which has now reverted from
..
the seven
,,
torms
her primitive
state) after her prolific fruition has ceased, under the
force of true wisdom.
(to
The two things for the production of which Nature had

begun action were experience and the perception of truth ; and
109
[270]
when
[K. LXVI.]
these two have been accomplished there is nothing left

and hence Nature ceases from prolfic activity.
to be done,
"
Undfer the force (of true ivisdom)" The seven forms

are all due to erroneous knowledge.
Dispassion,
Virtue, &c.
who have
through mere contentment, is due to

knowledge. And this erroneous knowledge is
removed by its contradictory true knowledge. And thus
too, of those
it
erroneous
the cause, erroneous knowledge, being removed, its effects,

the seven forms are also removed, and hence from these
Nature
k<
At
desists.
"
ease,
i.
e. 9
Inactive
"
Pure
"
i. e.,
Unmixed with
the
impurities of Buddhi, due to the Attributes,

though to the
last moment the Spirit continues to be in contact with the
Attribute of Goodness
wisdom would be
(270).
or else no (perception,
and hence no)
possible.
Objection
Let this be
so.
We
have nothing to
say against your statement as to Nature desisting from pro

But the production has been said to be due to the
ductions.
connection (of Spirit and Matter) and this connection is only
and the capability to experience con
;
a form of capability
stitutes the intelligence of the Spirit, as the capacity of being

the object of experience constitutes the non-intelligence and
objectivity of Nature and these two capabilities can never be
;
and you cannot urge that they cease, because

there is nothing left to be done, for though one set of objects
has been experienced by the Spirit, there are others of the same
kind still to be experienced. (Thus no emancipation is
said to
cease
possible).
We
reply
LXVI.
"She
NO
has been seen
birth
attainment
dom,
for
of
after
wis-
want
of
by
retires
n fh pr
er
"
says the one and so

I have been seen," says the
me,"
ni1rq
ancl
though there
it
affords
fn
ppncpc
cease
act or>t
T1*pnpf
>
is still
no motive towards further
their conjunction,
creation.
110
[271272]
[K. LXVI.]
So long as nature has not manifested truth, she

bring about the enjoyment of the various objects of
sense but she cannot do this after she has once ^brought
(271).
may
For experience is due to

wisdom.
erroneous knowledge, and when this latter, the cause, has
ceased under the force of wisdom, there can be no enjoyment
about discriminative
not possible in the absence of the seed.

The Spirit mistakes the various objects of sense the modifica
tions of Nature
to belong to himself.
And discriminative
just as the sprout
is
wisdom
also is a modification of Nature, and as such is taken

the
When however such
by
Spirit to belong to himself.
wisdom has been brought about, the connection of the Spirit
with Nature ceases, and so he ceases to feel. Nor is the Spirit

by himself capable of bringing about discriminative wisdom,
which is a development* of Nature. And the Spirit who has
cannot accept any purpose as his own.
attained to wisdom,
And
and emancipation being the purpose

of the Spirit, supply the motive to the operations of Nature ;
but when these two have ceased to be the purpose of the
further, experience
With this view it is

Spirit, they cease to be motives also.
motive is that which
declared
There is no motive, &c."
and this is not
moves Nature to act towards creation
"
possible,
when
there
is
no purpose of the
Spirit.
We grant all this. But no sooner

(272). Objection
would wisdom be attained than the body would dissolve and
then how could the bodiless Spirit behold Nature (as distinct
:
from, himself) ?
If
it
be asserted that emancipation does not
follow immediately on the attainment of wisdom, on account

of the unspent residuum of Karma then we ask, how is
residuum destroyed ? If by mere fruition (i 6., by experi

ence), then you tacitly imply the inability of wisdom alone to
this
bring about emancipation.
And
hence the assertion
thît
emancipation follows from a knowledge of the distinction

between the Manifested, the Un manifested, and the Spirit
"
"
* Because
N.atnre.
wisdom
is
a property of Bucldhi
which
is
an emanation from
111*
[>73]
[K.LXVIL]
becomes meaningless. And the hope too that emancipation

would be obtained on the destruction of the residua of Karma,
1
by
meai>$
is
of experience extending to a limitless period of time
too sanguine ever to be realised.
To
this
we reply
LXVII.
By
the attainment of perfect wisdom,

the
Reason why the

body does not dissolve
immediately
on the attainment
of wisdom.
rest
energy
become
Virtue and
devoid of causal
yet the Spirit remains awhile
s wheel
invested with body, as a potter
r
continues to revolve by the force of
the impulse previously imparted to
it.
The unlimited residua of Karma
(273).
prolificness destroyed
also having their

by the force of true knowledge, they do
not lead to any further experience. The seeds of action produce

sprouts only on the ground of Buddki, damp with the waters
The ground, however, becomes barren by having its

dampness of pain dried up by the extreme heat of true wisdom,
and hence the Karmic seeds cease to sprout forth into experi
ence.
With this view it is said
Virtue and the rest become
devoid of causal energy"
Even when wisdom has been
of pain.
"
body continues for a while, on account of the

previous impulse just as even after the action of the potter
has ceased, the wheel continues to revolve on account of the
attained, the
momentum imparted
having exhausted
to
it.
In due time, however, the impulse

In the continuance of the
itself it stops.
body, the impulse is supplied by virtue and vice whose fruition

has already commenced, as is declared by S ruti
Other
"
(actions) having been destroyed by -itself experience, the soul

and "The delay is only so long as beatitude
attains beatitude
"
is*
not
[Chhandogya VI, i, 2]. This impulse (or

a peculiar one, in which all illusion ha* been
and in consequence of this impulse, the Spirit re
attained"
impression)
is
destroyed
mains awhile invested with the body.
;
[K. LXVIII
112
[274275]
LXTX.]
the Spirit remains*

invested with body by some sort of impulse, when will be his
final release?
(274).
We
Question
reply
.-Let
this be so
if
LXVIII.
When
the separation of the informed Spirit from his

corporeal frame f-at length takes place.
f\T
Final beatitude.
and Nature ceases

it,
then
is final
to act in respect to
and absolute emancipation accomplished.
The prolificness of those actions, whose fruition has not

commenced, being destroyed, and those also whose fruition
has commenced, having been spent by experience, Nature has
her purpose fulfilled, and hence ceases with respect to that
particular Spirit, who thus obtains absolute
tion of the triad of pain.
.
(275).
and eternal cessa
doctrine has been proved by reasoning,

the precedence of
it,
Though the
yet in order to inspire respect towards

the great Eishi is stated :
KARIKA LXIX.
This abstruse knowledge adapted to the
emancipa
tion of the Spirit, wherein the
origin
Duration, and dissolution of beings are
pounded by
"
"
considered, has been thoroughly

the great Rishi.
Abstruse" i. e.,
By
ex
hard to be grasped by dull-brained

people.
the great Rishi
"
i. e.,
by Kapila.
The feeling of reverence thus roused is

strengthened by
Wherein are considered,
basing the doctrines on the Veda:
i. e., in which
fc.,"
knowledge (i. e., for the sake of which
"
knowledge).*
Veda.
These, origin &c.,
As
in
are also considered in the
Charmani dvipinam
hanti.
113
[276278]
LXX
[K.
LXXII.
We
Let this be so:

shall respect the direct sayings
(275).
of the great Rishi (Kapila) wherefore should we pay attention
to the assertions made by Isvarakrislma ?
;
We reply
-LXX
LXXI.
This supreme, purifying (doctrine) the sage imparted

to Asuri, who taught it to Panchasikha,
rtanCe f the
ky
ce.
whom
was extensively
the science
propagated.
Handed down by
tradition
of pupils,
it
has been
compendiously written in Arya metre by the noble-
minded
I svarakrishiia
who
has thoroughly investigated
the truth.
Purifying, purifying
of the triad of pain.
Supreme,
"
(277).
i. e.,
chief
the Spirit from all sins, the
among
all
cause
purifying doctrines.
Arya = that which has arrived
at truth
one whose
intellect is such is called Aryamati."
This
(278).
because
section
science
it
is
whole in
itself,
treats of all branches of
not a
knowledge
mere
KARIKA LXXII.
The
subjects that are treated of in the seventy distiches

are those of the
complete science
offence*
t0pics
comprising sixty topics,

illustrative
tales,
exclusive
and omitting
of
con-
troversies.
The sixty topics are thus laid down in the

Rdja-Vdrtika
The existence of Prakriti (Karika XIV) 2 its
singleness
Distinctiveness (of Spirit from
;
(XIV) 3 Objectiveness (XI) ;4

;
Matter) (XI)
5 Subserviency (of Matter
to
Spirit)
(XVII)
114
6 Plurality (of spirits) (XVIII) 7 Disjunction (of Spirit, from
Matter in the end) (XX) 8 Conjunction (of Spirit and Matter
in the beginning) (XXI) 9 Relation of subserviency (of
;
Matter with Spirit) (XIX)
10 Inactivity (of the Spirit) (XIX) ;

these are the ten radical categories.. ( In addition to these) are
;
(XL VII), nine of contentment (L), and

these,
twenty-eight of disability of the organs (XLIX)
the
the
with
make
sorts
of
sixty
eight
power
up
(LI),
together
the five kinds of error
"
topics."
All these sixty topics are treated of in the above

which therefore form a complete science and
seventy distiches,
cannot be said to
Of the above
be only a portion thereof.
(ten radical categories)
and subordination relate to Nature
singleness, objectivity,
distinctness, inactivity
and
and
existence, disjunction, and conjunction

plurality to Spirit
to both and existence of the relation of subserviency relates
;
to gross bodies also
May
this
work of Vachaspati Misra, the Tattva-Kaumudt
(the Moonlight of Truth), continue to please (cause to bloom)

the clear (lily-like) hearts of good men
!
Thus ends the Tattva-Kaumudi of Vachaspati Misra.
ALPHABETICAL INDEX.
PAGE.
Abhinivesa
(Tenacity
of
Life)
90
[212]
Ahankara
Self -Consciousness )
Asmita (Egoism) [209]
90
Astral
81
Body [189]
Attachment (Raga)
Avidya (Ignorance)
Avisesha
Proofs
modus operandi of
[208]
89
Prakriti
operation of the insen
79
Prakriti s
46
Proofs
or Pra-
of, [200] ...
Relations of [60]
...
Creation-author of [241]
Purusha
of
60
consideration of [30]
10
62
Enunciated
11
27
Purusha
(Spirit)
[25]
consideration of
52
[119-125]
Purusha
98
Intellectual [206]
89
Sense
Production of pain [248].
99
Senses
Process of [141]
61
characteristics
58
organs [153]
object of the [176]
relative
75
predominance [179]
76
91
Siddhis (Powers) [229]
23
Time
Gunas
40
Visesha (specific) [185]
42
Vyaktaand Avyakta
92
Jealousy [217]
Manas (mind}
consideration
[155]
Means and Consequences
[196]
94
75
[175]
between
79
differences
35
[77]
67
Vyakta and Avyakta

agreement between,
84
Wisdom
of
66
...
Effect an Entity [62-76]
...
of [130-
134]
Disability [214]
Character of the [103]
13
defined [22-23]
Elemental [242]
(attributes) [97-101]
...
86
98
...
51
101
want
[138]
92
[217]
[116].
tient, [254]
gross )
of, [110]
Bondage three kinds

Buddhi (will) [143]
Contentment
103
ties of [258]
[210]
Avyakta (Unmanifested)
kriti
cessation of the activi
Prakriti
[184]
24
of [54-56]
Prakriti
90
( Non-specific,
70
causes of incapacity
Perception
65
[149]
PAGE,
Organs the three internal [160]

Pain three kinds of [4]
points of
[88]
production of [264]
...
37
...
107
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Tattwa Kaumudi Waczaspati Misra G Jha Ed., Bombay 1896

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ENGLISH TRANSLATION,

MEDALLIST OP THE UNIVERSITY OF ALLAHABAD

MITEA MEDALLIST AND VIZIANAGRAM SCHOLAR (QUEEN

LIBRARIAN, RAJ DARBHANGA.

Published for the

BOMBAY TEEOSOPHICAL PUBLICATION

referred to the Sanskrit Introduction

that he was a Maithila Brahrnana and flourished somewhere

about the 9th Century A. D. For Udayanacharya the author

Lakshinana Sen of Bengal, of

who has been

finishing not only of the present translation, but also of the

for his publication of the

thanks are also due to Tookaram Tatya Esq.

reprint of the translation

of that excellent journal.

RAJ LIBRARY, DARBHANGA

Necessity of Scientific Enquiry

Auspiciousness of the beginning

Source of discriminative Knowledge...

Impurity, Decay and Excessiveness of the Vedic means

Fourfold Division of Categories

The Productive-product (2)

The three kinds

three- foldness of proof

of all other proofs in the above-mentioned

Specific definitions of the proofs

Differentiation of w Perception from the other forms of proof

The three kinds of Inference

Self -evidence of Sruti

Analogy, included in Valid Testimony

Differentiation of Valid Testimony from Inference

Srutis and Puranas included in Valid Testimony

&c., being not amenable to the

to the existence of Nature

Different views with regard to the nature of an effect

Impossibility of the existence of Nature being proved in accord

Bauddha view refuted

Yoga and Vaiseshika views criticised and the Sankhya view

Objection set aside as being common to both theories

Introduction to the consideration of the Manifested

The Manifested-as having a cause

The contrary nature

between the Manifested and the Unmanifested

having the three constituent attributes

Similarity with Nature stated ...

Objection based on similarity of the Spirit with the Manifested

Introduction to the consideration of the Attributes

Character of the Attributes as love, aversion and stupefaction

Construction of the Karika

of operation of the attributes

Introduction to Karika XIII

Necessity of the properties of

Objection based on the impossibility of the co-operation of Attri

Question of the Indiscreetness and other properties of the Attri

Proof of the existence of such properties

Why not accept the atomic theory

union of cause and

Separation and final re

Operation through the Attributes

Introduction to the Proofs of Spirit s Existence

Question of the number of the Spirit raised

Because of the tendency of writers and sages towards Beatitude

Objection and reply

Introduction to the "definition of Buddhi

Reply: "The Spirit having attained to wisdom, there