DE CASTRO VS.

JBC
MARCH 28, 2013 ~ VBDIAZ
ARTURO M. DE CASTRO vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC) and
PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO
G.R. No. 191002, March 17, 2010
FACTS: The compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by May
17, 2010 occurs just days after the coming presidential elections on May 10,
2010.
These cases trace their genesis to the controversy that has arisen from the
forthcoming compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Puno on May 17, 2010, or
seven days after the presidential election. Under Section 4(1), in relation to
Section 9, Article VIII, that vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from
the occurrence thereof from a list of at least three nominees prepared by
the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy. Also considering that Section
15, Article VII (Executive Department) of the Constitution prohibits the
President or Acting President from making appointments within two months
immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his
term, except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued
vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.
The JBC, in its en banc meeting of January 18, 2010, unanimously agreed to
start the process of filling up the position of Chief Justice.
Conformably with its existing practice, the JBC automatically considered for
the position of Chief Justice the five most senior of the Associate Justices of
the Court, namely: Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio; Associate Justice
Renato C. Corona; Associate Justice Conchita Carpio Morales; Associate
Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.; and Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B.
Nachura. However, the last two declined their nomination through letters
dated January 18, 2010 and January 25, 2010, respectively.

The OSG contends that the incumbent President may appoint the next Chief
Justice, because the prohibition under Section 15, Article VII of the
Constitution does not apply to appointments in the Supreme Court. It argues
that any vacancy in the Supreme Court must be filled within 90 days from its
occurrence, pursuant to Section 4(1), Article VIII of the Constitution; that had
the framers intended the prohibition to apply to Supreme Court
appointments, they could have easily expressly stated so in the Constitution,
which explains why the prohibition found in Article VII (Executive
Department) was not written in Article VIII (Judicial Department); and that
the framers also incorporated in Article VIII ample restrictions or limitations
on the Presidents power to appoint members of the Supreme Court to
ensure its independence from political vicissitudes and its insulation from
political pressures, such as stringent qualifications for the positions, the
establishment of the JBC, the specified period within which the President
shall appoint a Supreme Court Justice.
A part of the question to be reviewed by the Court is whether the JBC
properly initiated the process, there being an insistence from some of the
oppositors-intervenors that the JBC could only do so once the vacancy has
occurred (that is, after May 17, 2010). Another part is, of course, whether the
JBC may resume its process until the short list is prepared, in view of the
provision of Section 4(1), Article VIII, which unqualifiedly requires the
President to appoint one from the short list to fill the vacancy in the Supreme
Court (be it the Chief Justice or an Associate Justice) within 90 days from the
occurrence of the vacancy.
ISSUE: Whether the incumbent President can appoint the successor of Chief
Justice Puno upon his retirement.
HELD:
Prohibition under Section 15, Article VII does not apply to appointments to fill
a vacancy in the Supreme Court or to other appointments to the Judiciary.

Two constitutional provisions are seemingly in conflict.

The first, Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department), provides: Section
15. Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to
the end of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make
appointments, except temporary appointments to executive positions when
continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public
safety.
The other, Section 4 (1), Article VIII (Judicial Department), states: Section 4.
(1). The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen
Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or in its discretion, in division of three,
five, or seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from
the occurrence thereof.
Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15,
Article VII to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could
have explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering
of the provisions. They would have easily and surely written the prohibition
made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the
appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most
likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such specification was not done only
reveals that the prohibition against the President or Acting President making
appointments within two months before the next presidential elections and
up to the end of the Presidents or Acting Presidents term does not refer to
the Members of the Supreme Court.
Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15,
Article VII to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could
have explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering
of the provisions. They would have easily and surely written the prohibition
made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the
appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most

likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such specification was not done only
reveals that the prohibition against the President or Acting President making
appointments within two months before the next presidential elections and
up to the end of the Presidents or Acting Presidents term does not refer to
the Members of the Supreme Court.
Section 14, Section 15, and Section 16 are obviously of the same character,
in that they affect the power of the President to appoint. The fact that
Section 14 and Section 16 refer only to appointments within the Executive
Department renders conclusive that Section 15 also applies only to the
Executive Department. This conclusion is consistent with the rule that every
part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e. that
every part must be considered together with the other parts, and kept
subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment. It is absurd to
assume that the framers deliberately situated Section 15 between Section 14
and Section 16, if they intended Section 15 to cover all kinds of presidential
appointments. If that was their intention in respect of appointments to the
Judiciary, the framers, if only to be clear, would have easily and surely
inserted a similar prohibition in Article VIII, most likely within Section 4 (1)
thereof.