Rem Rev Cases

A.
JURISDICTION
1.a. RUSSELL vs. VESTIL
In Singsong vs. Isabela Sawmill, we had the occasion to rule that:
Remedial Law Review 1 (Dean Riano)
[I]n determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation
this Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If
it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation,
and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in instance would depend on the amount of the claim.
However, where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money, where the
money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, this Court has considered
such where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and are cognizable
exclusively by courts of first instance (now Regional Trial Courts).
Examples of actions incapable of pecuniary estimation are those for specific performance, support, or
foreclosure of mortgage or annulment of judgment; also actions questioning the validity of a mortgage,
annulling a deed of sale or conveyance and to recover the price paid and for rescission, which is a
counterpart of specific performance.
While actions under Sec. 33(3) of B.P. 129 are also incapable of pecuniary estimation, the law
specifically mandates that they are cognizable by the MTC, METC, or MCTC where the assessed
value of the real property involved does exceed P20,000.00 in Metro Manila, or P50,000.00, if
located elsewhere. If the value exceeds P20,000.00 or P50,000.00 as the case may be, it is the
Regional Trial Courts which have jurisdiction under Sec. 19(2). However, the subject matter of
the complaint in this case is annulment of a document denominated as "DECLARATION OF HEIRS
AND DEED OF CONFIRMATION OF PREVIOUS ORAL PARTITION.
The main purpose of petitioners in filing the complaint is to declare null and void the document in which
private respondents declared themselves as the only heirs of the late spouses Casimero Tautho and Cesaria
Tautho and divided his property among themselves to the exclusion of petitioners who also claim to be legal
heirs and entitled to the property. While the complaint also prays for the partition of the property, this is just
incidental to the main action, which is the declaration of nullity of the document above-described. It is
axiomatic that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and is determined by the
allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief sought, irrespective of whether the plaintiff is
entitled to all or some of the claims asserted therein.
1.b. HEIRS SEBE vs. HEIRS SEVILLA

Whether a court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of a particular action is determined by the plaintiffs
allegations in the complaint and the principal relief he seeks in the light of the law that apportions the
jurisdiction of courts.
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Based on the above allegations and prayers of the Sebess complaint, the law that applies to the action is
Batas Pambansa 129, as amended. If this case were decided under the original text of Batas Pambansa 129
or even under its predecessor, Republic Act 296, determination of the nature of the case as a real action
would have ended the controversy. Both real actions and actions incapable of pecuniary estimation fell within
the exclusive original jurisdiction of the RTC.
But, with the amendment of Batas Pambansa 129 by Republic Act 7601, the distinction between these two
kinds of actions has become pivotal. The amendment expanded the exclusive original jurisdiction of the first
level courts to include real actions involving property with an assessed value of less than P20,000.00.
The power of the RTC under Section 19 of Batas Pambansa 129, as amended, to hear actions involving title
to, or possession of, real property or any interest in it now covers only real properties with assessed value in
excess of P20,000.00. But the RTC retained the exclusive power to hear actions the subject matter of which is
not capable of pecuniary estimation.
Section 33, on the other hand provides that, if the assessed value of the real property outside Metro Manila
involved in the suit is P20,000.00 and below, as in this case, jurisdiction over the action lies in the first level
courts.
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An action "involving title to real property" means that the plaintiffs cause of action is based on a claim that
he owns such property or that he has the legal rights to have exclusive control, possession, enjoyment, or
disposition of the same. Title is the "legal link between (1) a person who owns property and (2) the property
itself."
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The present action is, therefore, not about the declaration of the nullity of the documents or the
reconveyance to the Sebes of the certificates of title covering the two lots. These would merely follow after
the trial court shall have first resolved the issue of which between the contending parties is the lawful owner
of such lots, the one also entitled to their possession. Based on the pleadings, the ultimate issue is whether or
not defendant Sevilla defrauded the Sebes of their property by making them sign documents of conveyance
rather than just a deed of real mortgage to secure their debt to him. The action is, therefore, about
ascertaining which of these parties is the lawful owner of the subject lots, jurisdiction over which is
determined by the assessed value of such lots.
Here, the total assessed value of the two lots subject of the suit is P9,910.00. Clearly, this amount does not
exceed the jurisdictional threshold value of P20,000.00 fixed by law. The other damages that the Sebes claim
are merely incidental to their main action and, therefore, are excluded in the computation of the jurisdictional
amount.
2. GOMEZ vs. MONTALBAN
The Court gleans from the foregoing that petitioners cause of action is the respondents violation of their
loan agreement. In that loan agreement, respondent expressly agreed to pay the principal amount of the
loan, plus 15% monthly interest. Consequently, petitioner is claiming and praying for in his Complaint the
total amount of P238,000.00, already inclusive of the interest on the loan which had accrued from 1998.
Since the interest on the loan is a primary and inseparable component of the cause of action, not merely
incidental thereto, and already determinable at the time of filing of the Complaint, it must be included in the
determination of which court has the jurisdiction over petitioners case. Using as basis the P238,000.00
amount being claimed by petitioner from respondent for payment of the principal loan and interest, this Court
finds that it is well within the jurisdictional amount fixed by law for RTCs.
There can be no doubt that the RTC in this case has jurisdiction to entertain, try, and decide the petitioners
Complaint.
To this Court, it is irrelevant that during the course of the trial, it was proven that respondent is only liable to
petitioner for the amount of P40,000.00 representing the principal amount of the loan; P57,000.00 as interest
thereon at the rate of 24% per annum reckoned from 26 August 1998 until the present; and P15,000.00 as
attorneys fees. Contrary to respondents contention, jurisdiction can neither be made to depend on the
amount ultimately substantiated in the course of the trial or proceedings nor be affected by
proof showing that the claimant is entitled to recover a sum in excess of the jurisdictional
amount fixed by law. Jurisdiction is determined by the cause of action as alleged in the complaint
and not by the amount ultimately substantiated and awarded.
Basic as a hornbook principle is that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and
determined by the allegations in the complaint which comprise a concise statement of the ultimate facts
constituting the plaintiffs cause of action. The nature of an action, as well as which court or body has
jurisdiction over it, is determined based on the allegations contained in the complaint of the
plaintiff, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the
claims asserted therein. The averments in the complaint and the character of the relief sought are the
ones to be consulted. Once vested by the allegations in the complaint, jurisdiction also remains vested
irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted
therein.
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3. QUINAGORAN vs. CA
Does the RTC have jurisdiction over all cases of recovery of possession regardless of the value of the
property involved?
The doctrine on which the RTC anchored its denial of petitioner's Motion to Dismiss, as affirmed by the CA -that all cases of recovery of possession or accion publiciana lies with the regional trial courts regardless of the
value of the property -- no longer holds true. As things now stand, a distinction must be made between those
properties the assessed value of which is below P20,000.00, if outside Metro Manila; and P50,000.00, if
within.
11
Republic Act No. 7691 which amended Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 and which was already in effect when
respondents filed their complaint with the RTC on October 27, 1994
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The Court has also declared that all cases involving title to or possession of real property with an assessed
value of less than P20,000.00 if outside Metro Manila, falls under the original jurisdiction of the municipal trial
court
In Atuel v. Valdez the Court likewise expressly stated that:
12
Jurisdiction over an accion publiciana is vested in a court of general jurisdiction. Specifically, the
regional trial court exercises exclusive original jurisdiction "in all civil actions which involve x x x
possession of real property." However, if the assessed value of the real property involved does
not exceed P50,000.00 in Metro Manila, and P20,000.00 outside of Metro Manila, the municipal
trial court exercises jurisdiction over actions to recover possession of real property.
Whether the complaint must allege the assessed value of the property involved
In no uncertain terms, the Court has already held that a complaint must allege the assessed value of the real
property subject of the complaint or the interest thereon to determine which court has jurisdiction over the
action. This is because the nature of the action and which court has original and exclusive jurisdiction over
the same is determined by the material allegations of the complaint, the type of relief prayed for by the
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plaintiff and the law in effect when the action is filed, irrespective of whether the plaintiffs are entitled to
some or all of the claims asserted therein.
In this case, the complaint denominated as "Recovery of Portion of Registered Land with Compensation and
Damages,
Nowhere in said complaint was the assessed value of the subject property ever mentioned. There is therefore
no showing on the face of the complaint that the RTC has exclusive jurisdiction over the action of the
respondents. Indeed, absent any allegation in the complaint of the assessed value of the property,
it cannot be determined whether the RTC or the MTC has original and exclusive jurisdiction over
the petitioner's action. The courts cannot take judicial notice of the assessed or market value of
the land.
14
Jurisdiction of the court does not depend upon the answer of the defendant or even upon
agreement, waiver or acquiescence of the parties. Indeed, the jurisdiction of the court over the
nature of the action and the subject matter thereof cannot be made to depend upon the
defenses set up in the court or upon a motion to dismiss for, otherwise, the question of
jurisdiction would depend almost entirely on the defendant.
Considering that the respondents failed to allege in their complaint the assessed value of the subject
property, the RTC seriously erred in denying the motion to dismiss. Consequently, all proceedings in the RTC
are null and void, and the CA erred in affirming the RTC.
4. SUPAPO vs. SPS. DE JESUS
15
Accion publiciana is an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right of possession of realty
independent of title. It refers to an ejectment suit filed after the expiration of one year from the accrual of the
cause of action or from the unlawful withholding of possession of the realty.
In the present case, the Spouses Supapo filed an action for the recovery of possession of the subject lot but
they based their better right of possession on a claim of ownership.
This Court has held that the objective of the plaintiffs in accion publiciana is to recover possession only, not
ownership. However, where the parties raise the issue of ownership, the courts may pass upon the issue to
determine who between the parties has the right to possess the property.
16
This adjudication is not a final determination of the issue of ownership; it is only for the purpose of resolving
the issue of possession, where the issue of ownership is inseparably linked to the issue of possession. The
adjudication of the issue of ownership, being provisional, is not a bar to an action between the same parties
involving title to the property. The adjudication, in short, is not conclusive on the issue of ownership.
Thus, while we will dissect the Spouses Supapos claim of ownership over the subject property, we will only
do so to determine if they or the respondents should have the right of possession. Having thus determined
that the dispute involves possession over a real property, we now resolve which court has the jurisdiction to
hear the case.
Under Batas Pambansa Bilang 129, the jurisdiction of the RTC over actions involving title to or possession of
real property is plenary.
17
RA No. 7691, however, divested the RTC of a portion of its jurisdiction and granted the Metropolitan Trial
Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts the exclusive and original jurisdiction to hear
actions where the assessed value of the property does not exceed Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00), or
Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00), if the property is located in Metro Manila.
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In view of these amendments, jurisdiction over actions involving title to or possession of real
property is now determined by its assessed value. The assessed value of real property is its fair
market value multiplied by the assessment level. It is synonymous to taxable value.
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18
In this regard, the complaint must allege the assessed value of the real property subject of the complaint or
the interest thereon to determine which court has jurisdiction over the action. This is required because the
nature of the action and the court with original and exclusive jurisdiction over the same is determined by the
material allegations of the complaint, the type of relief prayed for by the plaintiff, and the law in effect when
the action is filed, irrespective of whether the plaintiffs are entitled to some or all of the claims asserted
therein.
In the present case, the Spouses Supapo alleged that the assessed value of the subject lot, located in Metro
Manila, is P39,980.00. This is proven by the tax declaration issued by the Office of the City Assessor of
Caloocan. The respondents do not deny the genuineness and authenticity of this tax declaration.
19
Given that the Spouses Supapo duly complied with the jurisdictional requirements, we hold that the MeTC of
Caloocan properly acquired jurisdiction over the complaint for accion publiciana. The cause of action has not
prescribed
5. HEIRS CONCHA, SR. vs. SPS. LUMOCSO and GUYA, et al.
Jurisdiction over the subject matter is the power to hear and determine cases of the general class to which
the proceedings in question belong. It is conferred by law and an objection based on this ground cannot be
waived by the parties. To determine whether a court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case, it is
important to determine the nature of the cause of action and of the relief sought.
20
The trial court correctly held that the instant cases involve actions for reconveyance. An action for
reconveyance respects the decree of registration as incontrovertible but seeks the transfer of property, which
has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in other persons' names, to its rightful and legal owners, or to
those who claim to have a better right. There is no special ground for an action for reconveyance. It is enough
that the aggrieved party has a legal claim on the property superior to that of the registered owner and that
the property has not yet passed to the hands of an innocent purchaser for value.
The reliefs sought by the petitioners in the instant cases typify an action for reconveyance.
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21
These cases may also be considered as actions to remove cloud on one's title as they are intended to procure
the cancellation of an instrument constituting a claim on petitioners' alleged title which was used to injure or
vex them in the enjoyment of their alleged title.
Being in the nature of actions for reconveyance or actions to remove cloud on one's title, the applicable law
to determine which court has jurisdiction is Section 19(2) of B.P. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691
x x x.
In the cases at bar, it is undisputed that the subject lots are situated in Cogon, Dipolog City and their
assessed values are less than P20,000.00.
22
Hence, the MTC clearly has jurisdiction over the instant cases.
Petitioners' contention that this case is one that is incapable of pecuniary estimation under the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the RTC pursuant to Section 19(1) of B.P. 129 is erroneous.
In a number of cases, we have held that actions for reconveyance of or for cancellation of title to
or to quiet title over real property are actions that fall under the classification of cases that
involve "title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein."
Petitioners' contention that the value of the trees cut in the subject properties constitutes "any interest
therein (in the subject properties)" that should be computed in addition to the respective assessed values of
the subject properties is unavailing. Section 19(2) of B.P. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691, is clear that the
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RTC shall exercise jurisdiction "in all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or
any interest therein, where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos
(P20,000.00) or for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value exceeds Fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00)." It is true that the recovery of the value of the trees cut from the subject properties may be
included in the term "any interest therein." However, the law is emphatic that in determining which
court has jurisdiction, it is only the assessed value of the realty involved that should be
computed. In this case, there is no dispute that the assessed values of the subject properties as shown by
their tax declarations are less than P20,000.00. Clearly, jurisdiction over the instant cases belongs not to the
RTC but to the MTC.
6. SAN PEDRO vs. JUDGE ASDALA
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In a number of cases, we have held that actions for reconveyance of or for cancellation of title to or to quiet
title over real property are actions that fall under the classification of cases that involve "title to, or
possession of, real property, or any interest therein."
x x x Thus, under the old law, there was no substantial effect on jurisdiction whether a case is one, the
subject matter of which was incapable of pecuniary estimation, under Section 19(1) of B.P. 129, or one
involving title to property under Section 19(2). The distinction between the two classes became crucial with
the amendment introduced by R.A. No. 7691 in 1994, which expanded the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
first level courts to include "all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any
interest therein where the assessed value of the property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty
thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed
Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation
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expenses and costs." Thus, under the present law, original jurisdiction over cases the subject matter
of which involves "title to, possession of, real property or any interest therein" under Section
19(2) of B.P. 129 is divided between the first and second level courts, with the assessed value of
the real property involved as the benchmark. This amendment was introduced to "unclog the
overloaded dockets of the RTCs which would result in the speedier administration of justice.
Clearly, the RTC and the CA ruled correctly that the MeTC had jurisdiction over private respondents' complaint
for Accion Reivindicatoria (quieting of title).
7. BANK OF COMMERCE vs. SPS. SAN PABLO
26
In questioning the adverse ruling of the appellate court, the Bank of Commerce, for the first time in more
than 10 years of pendency of the instant case, raises the issue of jurisdiction.
Upon cursory reading of the records, we gathered that the case filed by the spouses San Pablo before the MTC
was an action for quieting of title, and nullification of the SPA, Deed of Real Estate Mortgage, and foreclosure
proceedings. While the body of the complaint consists mainly of allegations of forgery, however, the primary
object of the spouses San Pablo in filing the same was to effectively free the title from any unauthorized lien
imposed upon it.
The mortgage of the subject property to the Bank of Commerce, annotated on the Spouses San Pablos TCT,
constitutes a cloud on their title to the subject property, which may, at first, appear valid and effective, but is
allegedly invalid or voidable for having been made without their knowledge and authority as registered
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owners. We thus have established that the case filed by the spouses San Pablo before the MTC is
actually an action for quieting of title, a real action, the jurisdiction over which is determined by
the assessed value of the property. The assessed value of the subject property located in
Mandaue City, as alleged in the complaint, is P4,900.00, which aptly falls within the jurisdiction
of the MTC.
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Even granting for the sake of argument that the MTC did not have jurisdiction over the case, the
Bank of Commerce is nevertheless estopped from repudiating the authority of the court to try
and decide the case after having actively participated in the proceedings before it and invoking
its jurisdiction by seeking an affirmative relief therefrom.
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8. HEIRS OF SPOUSES RETERTA vs. SPS. MORES and LOPEZ

The original and exclusive jurisdiction over a complaint for quieting of title and reconveyance involving friar
land belongs to either the Regional Trial Court (RTC) or the Municipal Trial Court (MTC). Hence, the dismissal
of such a complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction due to the land in litis being friar land under the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Land Management Bureau (LMB) amounts to manifest grave abuse of discretion
that can be corrected through certiorari.
The petitioners complaint made out a good case for reconveyance or reversion, and its allegations, if duly
established, might well warrant the reconveyance of the land from the respondents to the petitioners. It did
not matter that the respondents already held a certificate of title in their names. In essence, an action for
reconveyance respects the incontrovertibility of the decree of registration but seeks the transfer of the
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property to its rightful and legal owner on the ground of its having been fraudulently or mistakenly registered
in another persons name. There is no special ground for an action for reconveyance, for it is enough that the
aggrieved party asserts a legal claim in the property superior to the claim of the registered owner, and that
the property has not yet passed to the hands of an innocent purchaser for value. On this score, it is also
worthy to stress that the title of a piece of a friar land obtained by a grantee from the Government without
conforming with the requirements set by the law may be assailed and nullified.
The law governing jurisdiction is Section 19 (2) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 x x x
Conformably with the provision, because an action for reconveyance or to remove a cloud on ones title
involves the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein, exclusive original jurisdiction over
such action pertained to the RTC, unless the assessed value of the property did not exceed P20,000.00 (in
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which instance the MTC having territorial jurisdiction would have exclusive original jurisdiction).
Determinative of which regular court had jurisdiction would be the allegations of the complaint (on the
assessed value of the property) and the principal relief thereby sought.
The respondents reliance on Section 12 and Section 18 of Act No. 1120 to sustain their position that the
Bureau of Public Lands (now LMB) instead had exclusive jurisdiction was without basis. x x x
As the provisions indicate, the authority of LMB under Act No. 1120, being limited to the administration and
disposition of friar lands, did not include the petitioners action for reconveyance. LMB ceases to have
jurisdiction once the friar land is disposed of in favor of a private person and title duly issues in the latters
name. By ignoring the petitioners showing of its plain error in dismissing Civil Case No. TM-983, and by
disregarding the allegations of the complaint, the RTC acted whimsically and capriciously.
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9. SPS. SABITSANA vs. MUERTEGUI

The Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the suit for quieting of title.
On the question of jurisdiction, it is clear under the Rules that an action for quieting of title may be instituted
in the RTCs, regardless of the assessed value of the real property in dispute. Under Rule 63 of the Rules of
Court, an action to quiet title to real property or remove clouds therefrom may be brought in the appropriate
RTC.
It must be remembered that the suit for quieting of title was prompted by petitioners August 24, 1998 letteropposition to respondents application for registration. Thus, in order to prevent a cloud from being cast upon
his application for a title, respondent filed Civil Case No. B-1097 to obtain a declaration of his rights. In this
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sense, the action is one for declaratory relief, which properly falls within the jurisdiction of the
RTC pursuant to Rule 63 of the Rules.
10. MANALANG, et al. vs. BACANI
*Boundary dispute
In the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) shall decide the appeal of the
judgment of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) in unlawful detainer or forcible entry cases on the basis of the
entire record of the proceedings had in the court of origin and such memoranda and/or briefs as may be
required by the RTC. There is no trial de novo of the case.
33
From the allegations, the case should be dismissed without prejudice to the filing of a non-summary action
like accion reivindicatoria. In our view, the CA correctly held that a boundary dispute must be
resolved in the context of accion reivindicatoria, not an ejectment case. The boundary dispute is
not about possession, but encroachment, that is, whether the property claimed by the defendant
formed part of the plaintiffs property. A boundary dispute cannot be settled summarily under
Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, the proceedings under which are limited to unlawful detainer and
forcible entry. In unlawful detainer, the defendant unlawfully withholds the possession of the premises upon
the expiration or termination of his right to hold such possession under any contract, express or implied. The
defendants possession was lawful at the beginning, becoming unlawful only because of the expiration or
termination of his right of possession. In forcible entry, the possession of the defendant is illegal from the
very beginning, and the issue centers on which between the plaintiff and the defendant had the prior
possession de facto.
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x x x the MTC dismissed the action because it did not have jurisdiction over the case. The dismissal was
correct. It is fundamental that the allegations of the complaint and the character of the relief sought by the
complaint determine the nature of the action and the court that has jurisdiction over the action. To be clear,
unlawful detainer is an action filed by a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the possession
of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession
by virtue of any contract, express or implied. To vest in the MTC the jurisdiction to effect the
ejectment from the land of the respondents as the occupants in unlawful detainer, therefore, the
complaint should embody such a statement of facts clearly showing the attributes of unlawful
detainer. However, the allegations of the petitioners complaint did not show that they had permitted or
tolerated the occupation of the portion of their property by the respondents; or how the respondents entry
had been effected, or how and when the dispossession by the respondents had started. All that the
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petitioners alleged was the respondents illegal use and occupation of the property. As such, the action was
not unlawful detainer.
11. BARRIDO vs. NONATO
*Partition of property after their marriage was declared null and void on the ground of psychological
incapacity
Contrary to Barridos contention, the MTCC has jurisdiction to take cognizance of real actions or
those affecting title to real property, or for the recovery of possession, or for the partition or
condemnation of, or foreclosure of a mortgage on real property. Section 33 of Batas Pambansa Bilang
1298 provides x x x
36
Here, the subject propertys assessed value was merely P8,080.00, an amount which certainly does not
exceed the required limit of P20,000.00 for civil actions outside Metro Manila to fall within the jurisdiction of
the MTCC. Therefore, the lower court correctly took cognizance of the instant case.
12. VDA. DE BARRERA vs. HEIRS OF LEGASPI
Before the amendments introduced by Republic Act No. 7691, the plenary action of accion publiciana was to
be brought before the regional trial court. With the modifications introduced by R.A. No. 7691 in 1994, the
jurisdiction of the first level courts has been expanded to include jurisdiction over other real actions where
the assessed value does not exceed P20,000, P50,000 where the action is filed in Metro Manila. The first
level courts thus have exclusive original jurisdiction over accion publiciana and accion
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reivindicatoria where the assessed value of the real property does not exceed the aforestated
amounts. Accordingly, the jurisdictional element is the assessed value of the property.
Assessed value is understood to be the worth or value of property established by taxing
authorities on the basis of which the tax rate is applied. Commonly, however, it does not
represent the true or market value of the property.
The subject land has an assessed value of P11,160 as reflected in Tax Declaration No. 7565, a common
exhibit of the parties. The bare claim of respondents that it has a value of P50,000 thus fails. The case,
therefore, falls within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the municipal trial court.
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It was error then for the RTC to take cognizance of the complaint based on the allegation that the present
estimated value [of the land is] P50,000, which allegation is, oddly, handwritten on the printed pleading. The
estimated value, commonly referred to as fair market value, is entirely different from the
assessed value of the property.
Lack of jurisdiction is one of those excepted grounds where the court may dismiss a claim or a
case at any time when it appears from the pleadings or the evidence on record that any of those
grounds exists, even if they were not raised in the answer or in a motion to dismiss. That the
issue of lack of jurisdiction was raised by petitioners only in their Memorandum filed before the trial court did
not thus render them in estoppel.
39
En passant, the Court notes that respondents cause of action accion publiciana is a wrong mode. The
dispossession took place on October 1, 1996 and the complaint was filed four months thereafter or on
February 7, 1997. Respondents exclusion from the property had thus not lasted for more than one year to call
for the remedy of accion publiciana.
In fine, since the RTC has no jurisdiction over the complaint filed by respondents, all the proceedings therein
as well as the Decision of November 27, 1998, are null and void. The complaint should perforce be dismissed.
13. BARANGAY SAN ROQUE, TALISAY, CEBU vs. Heirs of PASTOR
An expropriation suit is incapable of pecuniary estimation. Accordingly, it falls within the jurisdiction of the
regional trial courts, regardless of the value of the subject property.
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SC agreed with the petitioner that an expropriation suit is incapable of pecuniary estimation.
In the present case, an expropriation suit does not involve the recovery of a sum of money. Rather, it deals
with the exercise by the government of its authority and right to take private property for public use. In
National Power Corporation v. Jocson, the Court ruled that expropriation proceedings have two phases:
"The first is concerned with the determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the
power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts involved
in the suit. It ends with an order, if not of dismissal of the action, of condemnation declaring that the
plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to be condemned, for the public use or purpose
described in the complaint, upon the payment of just compensation to be determined as of the date of
the filing of the complaint. An order of dismissal, if this be ordained, would be a final one, of course, since
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it finally disposes of the action and leaves nothing more to be done by the Court on the merits. So, too,
would an order of condemnation be a final one, for thereafter as the Rules expressly state, in the
proceedings before the Trial Court, no objection to the exercise of the right of condemnation (or the
propriety thereof) shall be filed or heard.
"The second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned with the determination by the
court of the just compensation for the property sought to be taken. This is done by the Court
with the assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners. The order fixing the just compensation on
the basis of the evidence before, and findings of, the commissioners would be final, too. It would finally
dispose of the second stage of the suit, and leave nothing more to be done by the Court regarding the
issue. x x x"
42
It should be stressed that the primary consideration in an expropriation suit is whether the government or
any of its instrumentalities has complied with the requisites for the taking of private property. Hence, the
courts determine the authority of the government entity, the necessity of the expropriation, and the
observance of due process. In the main, the subject of an expropriation suit is the governments
exercise of eminent domain, a matter that is incapable of pecuniary estimation.
True, the value of the property to be expropriated is estimated in monetary terms, for the court is duty-bound
to determine the just compensation for it. This, however, is merely incidental to the expropriation suit.
Indeed, that amount is determined only after the court is satisfied with the propriety of the expropriation.
xxx
43
To emphasize, the question in the present suit is whether the government may expropriate private property
under the given set of circumstances. The government does not dispute respondents title to or possession of
the same. Indeed, it is not a question of who has a better title or right, for the government does not even
claim that it has a title to the property. It merely asserts its inherent sovereign power to "appropriate and
control individual property for the public benefit, as the public necessity, convenience or welfare may
demand."
14. HEIRS OF ARRIENDA vs. KALAW
SECTION 22. Appellate jurisdiction. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise appellate jurisdiction
over all cases decided by Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts in their respective territorial jurisdictions. Such cases shall be decided on the
44
basis of the entire record of the proceedings had in the court of origin such memoranda and/or briefs as
may be submitted by the parties or required by the Regional Trial Courts.
From the above-quoted provision, it is clear that the RTC exercises appellate jurisdiction over all
cases decided by first level courts in their respective territorial jurisdictions. Thus, in the present
case, when the RTC took cognizance of Arrienda's appeal from the adverse decision of the MTC in the
ejectment suit, it (RTC) was unquestionably exercising its appellate jurisdiction as mandated by law. Perforce,
its decision may not be annulled on the basis of lack of jurisdiction as the RTC has, beyond question,
jurisdiction to decide the appeal and its decision should be deemed promulgated in the exercise of that
jurisdiction
45
The Court does not agree with the ruling of the CA that the RTC lacks jurisdiction over the case on the ground
that Arrienda failed to allege the assessed value of the subject land in his Complaint. It is true that under the
prevailing law, as discussed above, in actions involving title to or possession of real property or any interest
therein, there is a need to allege the assessed value of the real property subject of the action, or the interest
therein, for purposes of determining which court (MeTC/MTC/MCTC or RTC) has jurisdiction over the action.
However, it must be clarified that this requirement applies only if these courts are in the exercise
of their original jurisdiction. In the present case, the RTC was exercising its appellate, not original,
jurisdiction when it took cognizance of Arrienda's appeal and Section 22 of B.P. Blg. 129 does not provide any
amount or value of the subject property which would limit the RTC's exercise of its appellate jurisdiction over
cases decided by first level courts. Clearly then, in the instant case, contrary to the ruling of the CA, the
assessed value of the disputed lot is immaterial for purposes of the RTCs appellate jurisdiction. Indeed, all
cases decided by the MTC are generally appealable to the RTC irrespective of the amount involved.
46
15. SPS. ERORITA vs. SPOUSES DUMLAO

Whether the RTC had jurisdiction
The allegations in the complaint determine the nature of an action and jurisdiction over the case. Jurisdiction
does not depend on the complaints caption. Although the complaint bears the caption recovery of
possession, its allegations contain the jurisdictional facts for an unlawful detainer case. Under RA 7691, an
action for unlawful detainer is within the MTCs exclusive jurisdiction regardless of the
propertys assessed value. To make a case for unlawful detainer, the complaint must allege that: (a)
initially, the defendant lawfully possessed the property, either by contract or by plaintiffs tolerance; (b) the
plaintiff notified the defendant that his right of possession is terminated; (c) the defendant remained in
possession and deprived plaintiff of its enjoyment; and (d) the plaintiff filed a complaint within one year from
47
the last demand on defendant to vacate the property. In the present case, however, the complaint clearly
contained the elements of an unlawful detainer case. Thus, the case should have been filed with the MTC. The
RTC had no jurisdiction over this case. Since a decision rendered by a court without jurisdiction is void, the
RTCs decision is void.
Whether the petitioners timely raised the issue on jurisdiction
As a general rule, lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter may be raised at any time, or even
for the first time on appeal. An exception to this rule is the principle of estoppel by laches.
Estoppel by laches may only be invoked to bar the defense of lack of jurisdiction if the factual
milieu is analogous to Tijam v. Sibonghanoy. In that case, lack of jurisdiction was raised for the first
time after almost fifteen (15) years after the questioned ruling had been rendered and after the movant
48
actively participated in several stages of the proceedings. It was only invoked, too, after the CA rendered a
decision adverse to the movant. The factual setting of this present case is not similar to Tijam so as to trigger
the application of the estoppel by laches doctrine. As in Figueroa, the present petitioners assailed the RTCs
jurisdiction in their appeal before the CA. Asserting lack of jurisdiction on appeal before the CA does
not constitute laches. Furthermore, the filing of an answer and the failure to attend the pre-trial do not
constitute the active participation in judicial proceedings contemplated in Tijam. Thus, the general rule should
apply. The petitioners timely questioned the RTC's jurisdiction.
16. HEIRS OF JULAO vs. SPS. DE JESUS
49
Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law and is determined by the material allegations of the
complaint. Thus, it cannot be acquired through, or waived by, any act or omission of the parties; nor can it
be cured by their silence, acquiescence, or even express consent.
The assessed value must be alleged

in the complaint to determine which
court has jurisdiction over the action.
Jurisdiction as we have said is conferred by law and is determined by the allegations in the complaint, which
contains the concise statement of the ultimate facts of a plaintiff's cause of action.
50
Section 19(2) and Section 33(3) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7691, provide:
xxx
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that in an action for recovery of possession, the assessed value of the
property
sought
to
be
recovered
determines
the
courts
jurisdiction.
In this case, for the RTC to exercise jurisdiction, the assessed value of the subject property must
exceed P20,000.00. Since petitioners failed to allege in their Complaint the assessed value of
the subject property, the CA correctly dismissed the Complaint as petitioners failed to establish
that the RTC had jurisdiction over it. In fact, since the assessed value of the property was not
51
alleged, it cannot be determined which trial court had original and exclusive jurisdiction over the
case.
Furthermore, contrary to the claim of petitioners, the issue of lack of jurisdiction was raised by respondents in
their Appellants Brief. And the fact that it was raised for the first time on appeal is of no moment.
Under Section 1, Rule 9 of the Revised Rules of Court, defenses not pleaded either in a motion to
dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived, except for lack of jurisdiction, litis pendentia, res
judicata, and prescription, which must be apparent from the pleadings or the evidence on
record. In other words, the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter may be raised at
any stage of the proceedings, even for the first time on appeal. In fact, the court may motu
proprio dismiss a complaint at any time when it appears from the pleadings or the evidence on record that
lack of jurisdiction exists.
52
17. MONSANTO, et al. VS. LIM

Filing the appropriate initiatory pleading and the payment of the prescribed docket fees vest a trial court
with jurisdiction over the subject matter.
Filing the appropriate initiatory pleading and the payment of the prescribed docket fees vest a
trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter. Section 5, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court
specifically provides that [a] civil action is commenced by the filing of the original complaint in
court. Moreover, [e]very ordinary civil action must be based on a cause of action.
No proper initiatory pleading was

filed before the trial court.
53
In this case, records show that no formal complaint or petition was filed in court. The case was supposedly
commenced through a letter of Pag-IBIG asking the intervention of Executive Judge Monsanto on the
alleged anomalous foreclosure sale conducted by De Guzman. However, said letter could not in any way be
considered as a pleading. Section 1, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court defines pleadings as written statements of
the respective claims and defenses of the parties submitted to the court for appropriate judgment. To stress,
Pag-IBIGs letter could not be considered as a formal complaint or petition. First, the parties to the case were
not identified pursuant to Section 1, Rule 3 and Section 1, Rule 7. Second, the so-called claim or cause of
action was not properly mentioned or specified. Third, the letter miserably failed to comply with the
requirements of Rule 7, Rules of Court. The letter bore no caption; it was not even assigned a docket number;
the parties were not properly identified; the allegations were not properly set forth; no particular relief is
sought; in fact, only the intervention of Executive Judge Monsanto is requested; it was not signed by a
counsel; and most of all, there is no verification or certification against forum-shopping.
54
xxx
In addition, it is quite unfortunate that Judge Usman proceeded to take cognizance of the case
notwithstanding his prior observation as stated in the May 3, 2004 Order that no formal petition or complaint
was actually filed and which presents a judicial issue. In fact, Judge Usman even opined that the acts
complained of partake of administrative matter and thus referred the same to the OCA for further action. The
May 9, 2005 letter of OCA directing Judge Usman to take action on the Motion to Lift Writ of Execution and
Notice to Vacate could not be interpreted as vesting Judge Usman with the authority and jurisdiction to take
cognizance of the matter. Nothing to that effect could be inferred from the tenor of the May 9, 2005 letter of
OCA. Jurisdiction is vested by law. When OCA directed Judge Usman to take action on the Motion to Lift Writ
of Execution and Notice to Vacate, it did not deprive the latter of his discretion to dismiss the matter/case for
lack of jurisdiction, if the matter/case so warrants.
55
In fine, there being no proper initiatory pleading filed, then the RTC Branch 28 did not acquire
jurisdiction over the matter/case.
No payment of docket fees.
We have also noted that no docket fees were paid before the trial court. Section 1, Rule 141 of the Rules of
Court mandates that [u]pon the filing of the pleading or other application which initiates an action or
proceeding, the fees prescribed therefor shall be paid in full. It is hornbook law that courts acquire
jurisdiction over a case only upon payment of the prescribed docket fee.
In Far East Bank and Trust Company v. Shemberg Marketing Corporation, we ruled thus:
56
A court acquires jurisdiction over a case only upon the payment of the prescribed fees. The
importance of filing fees cannot be gainsaid for these are intended to take care of court expenses in the
handling of cases in terms of costs of supplies, use of equipment, salaries and fringe benefits of personnel,
and others, computed as to man-hours used in the handling of each case. Hence, the non-payment or
insufficient payment of docket fees can entail tremendous losses to government in general and to the
judiciary in particular.
In fine, since no docket or filing fees were paid, then the RTC Branch 28 did not acquire
jurisdiction over the matter/case. It therefore erred in taking cognizance of the same.
Consequently, all the proceedings undertaken by the trial court are null and void, and without
force and effect. Orders of the RTC are null and void.
57
It is settled jurisprudence that [a]ny decision rendered without jurisdiction is a total nullity and may be
struck down at any time, even on appeal before this Court. Prescinding from the foregoing, we hold that the
RTC-Branch 28 did not acquire jurisdiction over the instant matter/case there being no formal initiatory
pleading filed as well as non-payment of docket fees. Consequently, all proceedings had before the RTC
Branch 28 were null and void for lack of jurisdiction.
18. TUMPAG vs. TUMPAG
The CAs dismissal of the petitioners complaint for recovery of possession is erroneous and unwarranted.
It is well-settled that jurisdiction over a subject matter is conferred by law, not by the parties action or
conduct, and is, likewise, determined from the allegations in the complaint.
58
Under Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7691, the jurisdiction of Regional Trial
Courts over civil actions involving title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein, is limited to
cases where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, for
civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00), except actions for
forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings.
Here, the petitioner filed a complaint for recovery of possession of real property before the RTC but failed to
allege in her complaint the propertys assessed value. Attached, however, to the petitioners complaint was a
copy of a Declaration of Real Property showing that the subject property has a market value of P51,965.00
and assessed value of P20,790.00. The CA was fully aware of this attachment but still proceeded to
dismiss the petitioners complaint:
59
Record shows that the complaint was filed with the Regional Trial Court on December 13, 1995. There is no
allegation whatsoever in the complaint for accion publiciana concerning the assessed value of the property
involved. Attached however to the complaint is a copy of the Declaration of Real Property of
subject land which was signed by the owner stating that its market value is P51,965 and its
assessed value is P20,790.00.(Emphasis ours)
Generally, the court should only look into the facts alleged in the complaint to determine whether a suit is
within its jurisdiction. There may be instances, however, when a rigid application of this rule may result in
defeating substantial justice or in prejudice to a partys substantial right. In Marcopper Mining Corp. v.
Garcia, we allowed the RTC to consider, in addition to the complaint, other pleadings submitted by the parties
in deciding whether or not the complaint should be dismissed for lack of cause of action . In Guaranteed
60
Homes, Inc. v. Heirs of Valdez, et al., we held that the factual allegations in a complaint should be considered
in tandem with the statements and inscriptions on the documents attached to it as annexes or integral parts.
In the present case, we find reason not to strictly apply the above-mentioned general rule, and to consider
the facts contained in the Declaration of Real Property attached to the complaint in determining whether the
RTC had jurisdiction over the petitioners case. A mere reference to the attached document could
facially resolve the question on jurisdiction and would have rendered lengthy litigation on this
point unnecessary.
In his comment to the present petition, the respondent contends that the assessed value of the property
subject of the case is actually much below than the value stated in the attached Declaration of Real Property.
However, the test of the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint is whether, admitting the facts
61
alleged, the court can render a valid judgment upon the complaint in accordance with the plaintiffs
prayer The defendant, in filing a motion to dismiss, hypothetically admits the truth of the factual and material
allegations in the complaint, as well as the documents attached to a complaint whose due execution and
genuineness are not denied under oath by the defendant; these attachments must be considered as part of
the complaint without need of introducing evidence thereon.
Lastly, we note that the present petitioner's situation comes close with those of the respondents in Honorio
Bernardo v. Heirs of Eusebio Villegas, where the Villegas heirs, in filing their complaint for accion publiciana
before the RTC, failed to allege the assessed value of the subject property. On the complaints omission, the
defendant questioned the RTCs jurisdiction in his answer to the complaint and, again, in his appeal before the
CA.
62
In Bernardo v. Heirs of Villegas, we affirmed the CA ruling that upheld the RTCs jurisdiction over the case
despite the complaints failure to allege the assessed value of the property because the defendant-petitioner
was found to have actively participated in the proceedings before the trial court and was already estopped
from assailing the jurisdiction of the RTC. While we mention this case and its result, we cannot,
however, apply the principle of estoppel (on the question of jurisdiction) to the present respondent.
We rule that the respondent is not estopped from assailing the RTCs jurisdiction over the subject civil
case. Records show that the respondent has consistently brought the issue of the courts lack of
jurisdiction in his motions, pleadings and submissions throughout the proceedings, until the CA
dismissed the petitioners complaint, not on the basis of a finding of lack of jurisdiction, but due to the
63
insufficiency of the petitioners complaint, i.e. failure to allege the assessed value of the subject property.
Even in his comment filed before this Court, the respondent maintains that the RTC has no jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the case.
Lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case can always be raised anytime, even for
the first time on appeal, since jurisdictional issues, as a rule, cannot be acquired through a
waiver or enlarged by the omission of the parties or conferred by the acquiescence of the
court. Thus, the respondent is not prevented from raising the question on the courts jurisdiction in his
appeal, if any, to the June 3, 2002 decision of the RTC in Civil Case No. 666.
B. CAUSE OF ACTION
64
1. CLUB FILIPINO, INC. vs. BAUTISTA, et al.

The NLRCs Decision on the illegal dismissal case was not res judicata on the illegal strike case.
Res judicata literally means a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon or decided; [or] a thing or
matter settled by judgment. Res judicata lays the rule that an existing final judgment or decree rendered
on the merits, and without fraud or collusion, by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon any matter within its
jurisdiction, is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies, in all other actions or suits in the same or
any other judicial tribunal of concurrent jurisdiction on the points and matters in issue in the first suit.
Res judicata has two (2) aspects. The first is bar by prior judgment that precludes the prosecution of a
second action upon the same claim, demand or cause of action. [84] The second aspect is conclusiveness of
65
judgment, which states that issues actually and directly resolved in a former suit cannot again be raised in
any future case between the same parties involving a different cause of action.
The elements of res judicata are:
(1)
the
judgment
sought
to
bar
the
new
action
must
be
final;
(2) the decision must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the
parties;
(3)
66
the
disposition
of
the
case
must
be
judgment
on
the
merits;
and
(4) there must be as between the first and second action identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of
action.[86]
The
first
three
(3)
elements
of res
judicata are
present
in
this
case.
The NLRCs judgment on the illegal dismissal case is already final with respondents not having appealed the
Decision within the reglementary period.
The Labor Arbiter, who has the exclusive original jurisdiction to hear, try, and decide illegal dismissal
cases, decided the case. The Labor Arbiters Decision was heard on appeal by the NLRC, which has exclusive
appellate
jurisdiction
over
all
cases
decided
by
Labor
Arbiters.
67
The Labor Arbiters judgment was on the merits. Based on the facts presented by the parties, the Labor
Arbiter
ruled
that
petitioner
Club
Filipino,
Inc.s
retrenchment
program
was
valid.
The fourth element of res judicata, however, is absent. Although the cases have substantially identical
parties and subject matter of the dismissal of respondents, the cause of action for declaration of illegal strike
and
the
cause
of
action
for
illegal
dismissal
are
different.
A cause of action is the act or omission by which a party violates the rights of another. Its
elements are:
1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created;
68
2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and
3) act or omission on the part of such defendant in violation of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a
breach of the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for
recovery of damages or other appropriate relief.
In an action for declaration of illegal strike, the cause of action is premised on a union or a labor
organizations
conduct
of
a
strike
without
compliance
with
the
statutory
requirements.
On the other hand, in an action for illegal dismissal, the cause of action is premised on an employers alleged
dismissal of an employee without a just or authorized cause as provided under Articles 282, 283, and 284 of
the
Labor
Code.
69
There is no res judicata in the present case. Petitioner Club Filipino, Inc. filed the illegal strike because
members of CLUFEA allegedly disrupted petitioner Club Filipino, Inc.s business when they staged a strike
without complying with the requirements of the law. For their part, respondents filed the illegal dismissal
case to question the validity of petitioner Club Filipino, Inc.s retrenchment program.
Although there is no res judicata, the actions have the same subject matter. The subject matter of an
action is the matter or thing from which the dispute has arisen. Both the illegal strike and illegal
dismissal cases involve the dismissal of respondents. In respondents action for illegal dismissal, respondents
were found to have been dismissed by virtue of a valid retrenchment program. The NLRC then ordered that
they
be
paid
separation
pay
based
on
the
parties
collective
bargaining
agreement.
70
In petitioner Club Filipino, Inc.s action for declaration of illegal strike, the Labor Arbiters finding that
respondents conducted an illegal strike resulted in their dismissal. Respondents were ordered to receive
separation pay similar in terms with those offered to the employees affected by the retrenchment program
of the club. The Court of Appeals, however, found that the Labor Arbiter gravely abused his discretion in
declaring the strike illegal. It then reversed the Labor Arbiters Decision and awarded some of the
respondents
full
backwages,
benefits,
and
separation
pay.
xxx
All told, the Decision in the illegal dismissal case was not res judicata on the illegal strike case. The NLRC
correctly executed the Court of Appeals Decision in the illegal strike case.
71
2. APOSTOLIC VICAR OF TABUK, INC. vs. SPS. SISON

The RTC dismissed the Vicariate of Tabuk's petition for annulment of judgment because it allegedly failed to
state a cause of action. However, upon reviewing the RTC's 23 November 2009 order and examining the
petition for annulment, we conclude that the dismissal was actually due to lack of a cause of action.
Failure to state a cause of action and lack of a cause of action are not the same. Failure to state a cause of
action refers to an insufficiency of the allegations in the petition/complaint . It is a ground for
dismissal under Rule 16 of the Rules of Court before the defendant or respondent files a responsive pleading.
Notably, the dismissal is without prejudice to the refiling of an amended complaint.
72
On the other hand, the lack of a cause of action refers to an insufficiency of factual or legal basis to
grant the complaint. It applies to a situation where the evidence failed to prove the cause of action alleged
in the pleading. It is a ground for dismissal using a demurrer to evidence under Rule 33 after the plaintiff has
completed presenting his evidence. The dismissal constitutes res judicata on the issue and will bar future
suits based on the same cause of action.
In the present case, the petition for annulment of judgment actually stated a cause of action: that the MCTC
rendered a judgment against the petitioner without acquiring jurisdiction over its person. If the RTC
hypothetically admitted this allegation, the petitioner becomes entitled to the relief prayed for: the
annulment of the MCTC judgment. Thus, the RTC erred when it stated that the dismissal was for "failure to
state
a
cause
of
action."
73
Nevertheless, Rule 47 authorizes the RTC to dismiss a petition for annulment of judgment outright if it has no
substantial merit:
Section 5. Action by the court. Should the court find no substantial merit in the petition, the same may
be dismissed outright with specific reasons for such dismissal. x x x
We
affirm
the
RTC's
dismissal
of
the
petition.
First, in an ejectment suit (action interdictal), the sole issue is the right of physical or material possession
over the subject real property independent of any claim of ownership by the parties involved. Ownership over
the property is immaterial and is only passed upon provisionally for the limited purpose of determining which
party
has
the
better
right
to
possession.
74
The only purpose of an ejectment suit for Forcible Entry (detentacion) is to protect the person who had prior
physical possession against another who unlawfully entered the property and usurped his possession. The
suit is only filed against the possessor(s) of the property at the commencement of action, and not against one
who does not in fact occupy the land. To determine who should be made a party-defendant, we simply look at
who committed the acts amounting to forcible entry and remains in possession of the subject property.
In the present case, it was alleged that it was Fr. Gerry Gudmalin, acting for the Vicar Apostolic of Mountain
Province, who forcibly entered the property previously held by the respondents and who remains in
possession. Hence, the Vicariate of Mt. Province was correctly impleaded as the defendant. While the
petitioner denies the existence of the Vicariate of Mt. Province, this Court cannot pass upon this peripheral
issue
because
we
are
not
a
trier
of
facts.
75
Second, ejectment suits are actions in personam wherein judgment only binds parties who had been
properly impleaded and were given an opportunity to be heard. The MCTC judgment was only rendered
against Fr. Gudmalin and the Vicar Apostolic of Mountain Province, not against the petitioner Vicariate of
Tabuk. Hence, the petitioner can only be bound by the MCTC judgment if it is shown to be: (a) a trespasser,
squatter, or agent of the defendants fraudulently occupying the property to frustrate the judgment; (b) a
guest or other occupant of the premises with the permission of the defendants; (c) a transferee pendente lite;
(d) sub-lessee; (e) co-lessee; or (f) a member of the family, a relative, or other privy of the defendants.
In such a case, a court hearing is required to determine the character of such possession. If the executing
court finds that the petitioner is a mere successor-in-interest, guest, or agent of the defendants, the order of
execution
shall
be
enforced
against
it.
76
Since the judgment was not rendered against the petitioner, it has no legal personality to ask for
annulment of the judgment. Understandably, the petitioner feels aggrieved because it claims ownership
over the subject lot that the MCTC ordered Fr. Gudmalin to turn over to the respondents. However, from a
purely
legal
perspective,
the
MCTC
judgment
did
not
prejudice
the
petitioner.
This is not to say that the petitioner is left without a remedy in law. The petitioner may still avail of the
plenary action of accion reinvindicatoria wherein the issue of its ownership may be thoroughly threshed out in
a fullblown trial after which complete reliefs may be granted to the proper parties.
3. AQUINO vs. QUIAZON
77
The trial court may hold a preliminary hearing on affirmative defenses. However, such hearing is not
necessary when the affirmative defense is failure to state a cause of action. The reception and the
consideration of evidence on the said ground, has been held to be improper and impermissible.
The Court does not discount, however, that there are exceptions to the general rule that allegations are
hypothetically admitted as true and inquiry is confined to the face of the complaint. First, there is no
hypothetical admission of (a) the veracity of allegations if their falsity is subject to judicial notice; (b)
allegations that are legally impossible; (c) facts inadmissible in evidence; and (d) facts which appear, by
record or document included in the pleadings, to be unfounded. Second, inquiry is not confined to the
complaint if culled (a) from annexes and other pleadings submitted by the parties; (b) from documentary
evidence admitted by stipulation which disclose facts sufficient to defeat the claim; or (c) from evidence
admitted in the course of hearings related to the case.
78
Pointing to the exception that inquiry was not confined to the complaint if evidence had been presented in
the course of hearings related to the case, the CA ruled that it was within the trial court's discretion to receive
and consider other evidence aside from the allegations in the complaint in resolving a party's affirmative
defense. It held that this discretion was recognized under Section 6 of Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, which
allowed the court to conduct a preliminary hearing, motu proprio, on the defendant's affirmative defense if no
corresponding motion to dismiss was filed.
The trial court may indeed elect to hold a preliminary hearing on affirmative defenses as raised in the answer
under Section 6 of Rules 16 of the Rules of Court. It has been held, however, that such a hearing is not
necessary when the affirmative defense is failure to state a cause of action, and that it is, in fact, error for the
court to hold a preliminary hearing to determine the existence of external facts outside the complaint. The
reception and the consideration of evidence on the ground that the complaint fails to state a cause of action,
79
has been held to be improper and impermissible. Thus, in a preliminary hearing on a motion to dismiss
or on the affirmative defenses raised in an answer, the parties are allowed to present evidence
except when the motion is based on the ground of insufficiency of the statement of the cause of
action which must be determined on the basis only of the facts alleged in the complaint and no
other. Section 6, therefore, does not apply to the ground that the complaint fails to state a cause of action.
The trial court, thus, erred in receiving and considering evidence in connection with this ground.
4. BAUTISTA vs. LINDO
The core issue is whether the action filed by petitioners is one involving title to or possession of real property
or any interest therein or one incapable of pecuniary estimation.
80
The course of action embodied in the complaint by the present petitioners predecessor, Alfredo R. Bautista,
is to enforce his right to repurchase the lots he formerly owned pursuant to the right of a free-patent holder
under Sec. 119 of CA 141 or the Public Land Act.
The Court rules that the complaint to redeem a land subject of a free patent is a civil action incapable of
pecuniary estimation.
It is a well-settled rule that jurisdiction of the court is determined by the allegations in the complaint and the
character of the relief sought. In this regard, the Court, in Russell v. Vestil, wrote that in determining whether
an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation this Court has adopted the
criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If it is primarily for the
recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether
81
jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the RTCs would depend on the amount of the claim. But where the
basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money, where the money claim is purely
incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, this Court has considered such actions as cases
where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and, hence, are incapable of
pecuniary estimation. These cases are cognizable exclusively by RTCs.
Settled jurisprudence considers some civil actions as incapable of pecuniary estimation, viz:
1. Actions for specific performance;
2. Actions for support which will require the determination of the civil status;
3. The right to support of the plaintiff;
4. Those for the annulment of decisions of lower courts;
5. Those for the rescission or reformation of contracts;
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6. Interpretation of a contractual stipulation.

The Court finds that the instant cause of action to redeem the land is one for specific performance.
The facts are clear that Bautista sold to respondents his lots which were covered by a free patent. While the
deeds of sale do not explicitly contain the stipulation that the sale is subject to repurchase by the applicant
within a period of five (5) years from the date of conveyance pursuant to Sec. 119 of CA 141, still, such legal
provision is deemed integrated and made part of the deed of sale as prescribed by law . It is basic that the
law is deemed written into every contract. Although a contract is the law between the parties,
the provisions of positive law which regulate contracts are deemed written therein and shall limit
and govern the relations between the parties. Thus, it is a binding prestation in favor of Bautista which
83
he may seek to enforce. That is precisely what he did. He filed a complaint to enforce his right granted by law
to recover the lot subject of free patent.
Ergo, it is clear that his action is for specific performance, or if not strictly such action, then it is akin or
analogous to one of specific performance. Such being the case, his action for specific performance is
incapable of pecuniary estimation and cognizable by the RTC.
Respondents argue that Bautistas action is one involving title to or possession of real property or any
interests therein and since the selling price is less than PhP 20,000, then jurisdiction is lodged with the MTC.
They rely on Sec. 33 of BP 129.
xxx
84
At first blush, it appears that the action filed by Bautista involves title to or possession of the lots he sold to
respondents. Since the total selling price is less than PhP 20,000, then the MTC, not the RTC, has jurisdiction
over the case. This proposition is incorrect for the re-acquisition of the lots by Bautista or herein successorsin-interests, the present petitioners, is but incidental to and an offshoot of the exercise of the right by the
latter to redeem said lots pursuant to Sec. 119 of CA 141. The reconveyance of the title to petitioners is solely
dependent on the exercise of such right to repurchase the lots in question and is not the principal or main
relief or remedy sought. Thus, the action of petitioners is, in reality, incapable of pecuniary estimation, and
the reconveyance of the lot is merely the outcome of the performance of the obligation to return the property
conformably to the express provision of CA 141.
Even if we treat the present action as one involving title to real property or an interest therein which falls
under the jurisdiction of the first level court under Sec. 33 of BP 129, as the total selling price is only PhP
85
16,000 way below the PhP 20,000 ceiling, still, the postulation of respondents that MTC has jurisdiction will
not hold water. This is because respondents have actually participated in the proceedings before the RTC and
aggressively defended their position, and by virtue of which they are already barred to question the
jurisdiction of the RTC following the principle of jurisdiction by estoppel.
xxx
Here, we note that aside from the belated filing of the motion to dismissit having been filed nine (9) years
from the filing of the complaintrespondents actively participated in the proceedings x x x
Having fully participated in all stages of the case, and even invoking the RTCs authority by asking for
affirmative reliefs, respondents can no longer assail the jurisdiction of the said trial court. Simply put,
86
considering the extent of their participation in the case, they are, as they should be, considered estopped
from raising lack of jurisdiction as a ground for the dismissal of the action.
5. PNB vs. SPS. RIVERA
We have consistently held that there is a difference between failure to state a cause of action, and lack of
cause of action. Lack of cause of action refers to the insufficiency of the factual basis for the
action. Dismissal due to lack of cause of action may be raised any time after the questions of fact
have been resolved on the basis of stipulations, admissions or evidence presented by the
plaintiff. It is a proper ground for a demurrer to evidence. In this case, the RTC could not have dismissed the
complaint due to lack of cause of action, such ground may only be raised after the plaintiff has
completed the presentation of his evidence.
87
If the allegations of the complaint do not state the concurrence of the elements of a cause of
action, the complaint becomes vulnerable to a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state
a cause of action. The elementary test for failure to state a cause of action is whether the
complaint alleges facts which if true would justify the relief demanded. Stated otherwise, may the
court render a valid judgment upon the facts alleged therein? The inquiry is into the sufficiency, not the
veracity of the material allegations. If the allegations in the complaint furnish sufficient basis on which it can
be maintained, it should not be dismissed regardless of the defense that may be presented by the
defendants. Applying the foregoing principles to this case, the CA correctly found that the complainant filed
by the spouses sufficiently stated a cause of action for annulment of the sale. The allegations of the nonreceipt of the spouses of any notice of the sale make out a cause of action. Whether the allegations are true
or not are inconsequential to a determination of the sufficiency of the allegations in the complaint.
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6.a. PROGRESSIVE DEVELOPMENT CORP. vs. CA
It is likewise basic under Sec. 3 of Rule 2 of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended, that a party
may not institute more than one suit for a single cause of action. Under Sec. 4 of the same Rule,
if two or more suits are instituted on the basis of the same cause of action, the filing of one or a
judgment upon the merits in any one is available as a ground for the dismissal of the other or
others. "Cause of action" is defined by Sec. 2 of Rule 2 as the act of omission by which a party violates a
right of another. These premises obtaining, there is no question at all that private respondent's cause of
action in the forcible entry case and in the suit for damages is the alleged illegal retaking of possession of the
leased premises by the lessor, petitioner herein, from which all legal reliefs arise. Simply stated, the
restoration of possession and demand for actual damages in the case before the MeTC and the demand for
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damages with the RTC both arise from the same cause of action, i.e., the forcible entry by petitioner into the
least premises.
A comparative study of the two (2) complaints filed by private respondent against petitioner before the two
(2) trial courts shows that not only are the elements of res adjudicata present, at least insofar as the claim for
actual and compensatory damages is concerned, but also that the claim for damages moral and exemplary
in addition to actual and compensatory constitutes splitting a single cause of action. Since this runs
counter to the rule against multiplicity of suits, the dismissal of the second action becomes imperative.
Jurisprudence is unequivocal that when a single delict or wrong is committed like the unlawful
taking or detention of the property of the another there is but one single cause of action
regardless of the number of rights that may have been violated, and all such rights should be
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alleged in a single complaint as constituting one single cause of action. In a forcible entry case, the
real issue is the physical possession of the real property. The question of damages is merely secondary or
incidental, so much so that the amount thereof does not affect the jurisdiction of the court. In other words,
the unlawful act of a deforciant in taking possession of a piece of land by means of force and intimidation
against the rights of the party actually in possession thereof is a delict or wrong, or a cause of action that
gives rise to two (2) remedies, namely, the recovery of possession and recovery of damages arising from the
loss of possession, but only to one action. For obvious reasons, both remedies cannot be the subject of two
(2) separate and independent actions, one for recovery of posssession only, and the other, for the recovery of
damages. That would inevitably lead to what is termed in law as splitting up a cause of action. As both
claims arise from the same cause of action, they should be alleged in a single complaint. A claim cannot be
divided in such a way that a part of the amount of damages may be recovered in one case and the rest, in
another.
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*In comparison with.

6.b. CGR CORPORATION vs. REYES, JR.
Section 17, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides: SEC. 17. Judgment. If after trial the court finds that the
allegations of the complaint are true, it shall render judgment in favor of the plaintiff for the restitution of the
premises, the sum justly due as arrears of rent or as reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of
the premises, attorneys fees and costs. If it finds that said allegations are not true, it shall render judgment
for the defendant to recover his costs. If a counterclaim is established, the court shall render judgment for the
sum found in arrears from either party and award costs as justice requires. The recoverable damages in
forcible entry and detainer cases thus refer to "rents" or "the reasonable compensation for the use and
occupation of the premises" or "fair rental value of the property" and attorneys fees and costs.
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The 2006 case of Dumo v. Espinas reiterates the long-established rule that the only form of damages that
may be recovered in an action for forcible entry is the fair rental value or the reasonable compensation for
the use and occupation of the property: Lastly, we agree with the CA and the RTC that there is no basis for
the MTC to award actual, moral, and exemplary damages in view of the settled rule that in ejectment cases,
the only damage that can be recovered is the fair rental value or the reasonable compensation for the use
and occupation of the property. Considering that the only issue raised in ejectment is that of rightful
possession, damages which could be recovered are those which the plaintiff could have sustained as a mere
possessor, or those caused by the loss of the use and occupation of the property, and not the damages which
he may have suffered but which have no direct relation to his loss of material possession.
In asserting the negative of the issue, respondent cites the 1999 case of Progressive Development
Corporation, Inc. v. Court of Appeals.
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Restated in its bare essentials, the forcible entry case has one cause of action, namely, the alleged
unlawful entry by petitioner into the leased premises. On the other hand, the complaint for damages were
based on the alleged forcible takeover of the leased premises by petitioner. The other claims for moral
and exemplary damages cannot also succeed considering that these sprung from the main incident being
heard before the MeTC.
It bears noting, however, that as reflected in the earlier-quoted allegations in the complaint for damages of
herein petitioners, their claim for damages have no direct relation to their loss of possession of the
premises. It had to do with respondents alleged harvesting and carting away several tons of
milkfish and other marine products in their fishponds, ransacking and destroying of a chapel
built by petitioner CGR Corporation, and stealing religious iconsand even decapitating the heads
of some of them, after the act of dispossession had occurred. Surely, one of the elements of litis
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pendentia - that the identity between the pending actions, with respect to the parties, rights asserted and
reliefs prayed for, is such that any judgment rendered on one action will, regardless of which is successful,
amount to res judicata in the action under consideration - is not present, hence, it may not be invoked to
dismiss petitioners complaint for damages. Res judicata may not apply because the court in a forcible entry
case has no jurisdiction over claims for damages other than the use and occupation of the premises and
attorneys fees. Neither may forum-shopping justify a dismissal of the complaint for damages, the elements
of litis pendentia not being present, or where a final judgment in the forcible entry case will not amount to res
judicata in the former. Petitioners filing of an independent action for damages other than those sustained as
a result of their dispossession or those caused by the loss of their use and occupation of their properties
could not thus be considered as splitting of a cause of action.
7. MARILAG vs. MARTINEZ
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The Court holds that petitioner's prosecution of the collection case was barred, instead, by the principle of litis
pendentia in view of the substantial identity of parties and singularity of the causes of action in the
foreclosure and collection cases, such that the prior foreclosure case barred petitioner's recourse to the
subsequent collection case.
To lay down the basics, litis pendentia, as a ground for the dismissal of a civil action, refers to
that situation where in another action is pending; between the same parties for the same cause
of action, such that the second action becomes unnecessary and vexatious. The underlying
principle of litis pendentia is the theory that a party is not allowed to vex another more than once regarding
the same subject matter and for the same cause of action. This theory is founded on the public policy that the
same subject matter should not be the subject of controversy in courts more than once, in order that possible
conflicting judgments may be avoided for the sake of the stability of the rights and status of persons, and
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also to avoid the costs and expenses incident to numerous suits. 32 Consequently, a party will not be
permitted to split up a single cause of action and make it a basis for several suits as the whole
cause must be determined in one action. To be sure, splitting a cause of action is a mode of forum
shopping by filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action, but with different prayers, where the
~round of dismissal is litis pendentia (or res judicata, as the case may be).
In the present case, records show that petitioner, as creditor-mortgagee, instituted an action for judicial
foreclosure pursuant to the provisions of Rule 68 of the Rules of Court in order to recover on Rafael's debt. In
light of the foregoing discussion, the availment of such remedy thus bars recourse to the subsequent filing of
a personal action for collection of the same debt, in this case, under the principle of litis pendentia,
considering that the foreclosure case only remains pending as it was not shown to have attained finality .
While the ensuing collection case was anchored on the promissory note executed by respondent who was not
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the original debtor, the same does not constitute a separate and distinct contract of loan which would have
given rise to a separate cause of action upon breach. Notably, records are bereft of any indication that
respondent's agreement to pay Rafael's loan obligation and the execution of the subject PN extinguished by
novation the contract of loan between Rafael and petitioner, in the absence of express agreement or any act
of equal import. Well-settled is the rule that novation is never presumed, but must be clearly and
unequivocally shown. Thus, in order for a new agreement to supersede the old one, the parties to a contract
must expressly agree that they are abrogating their old contract in favor of a new one, which was not shown
here.
Petitioner's contention that the judicial foreclosure and collection cases enforce independent rights must,
therefore, fail because the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage and the subject PN both refer to one and the same
obligation, i.e., Rafael's loan obligation. As such, there exists only one cause of action for a single breach of
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that obligation. Petitioner cannot split her cause of action on Rafael's unpaid loan obligation by filing a
petition for the judicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage covering the said loan, and, thereafter, a
personal action for the collection of the unpaid balance of said obligation not comprising a deficiency arising
from foreclosure, without violating the proscription against splitting a single cause of action, where the
ground for dismissal is either res judicata or litis pendentia, as in this case . As petitioner had already
instituted judicial foreclosure proceedings over the mortgaged property, she is now barred from availing
herself of an ordinary action for collection, regardless of whether or not the decision in the foreclosure case
had attained finality. In fine, the dismissal of the collection case is in order. Considering, however, that
respondent's claim for return of excess payment partakes of the nature of a compulsory counterclaim and,
thus, survives the dismissal of petitioner's collection suit, the same should be resolved based on its own
merits and evidentiary support.
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8. UMALE vs. CANOGA PARK DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION

We disagree with the petitioner and find that there is no litis pendentia.
As a ground for the dismissal of a civil action, litis pendentia refers to a situation where two actions
are pending between the same parties for the same cause of action, so that one of them
becomes unnecessary and vexatious.
Litis pendentia exists when the following requisites are present: identity of the parties in the two
actions; substantial identity in the causes of action and in the reliefs sought by the parties; and
the identity between the two actions should be such that any judgment that may be rendered in
one case, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other.
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In the present case, the parties' bone of contention is whether Civil Case Nos. 8084 and 9210 involve the
same cause of action. The petitioner argues that the causes of action are similar, while the respondent argues
otherwise. If an identity, or substantial identity, of the causes of action in both cases exist, then the second
complaint for unlawful detainer may be dismissed on the ground oflitis pendentia.
We rule that Civil Case Nos. 8084 and 9210 involve different causes of action.
Generally, a suit may only be instituted for a single cause of action. If two or more suits are instituted on the
basis of the same cause of action, the filing of one or a judgment on the merits in any one is ground for the
dismissal of the others.
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Several tests exist to ascertain whether two suits relate to a single or common cause of action, such as
whether the same evidence would support and sustain both the first and second causes of action (also known
as the "same evidence" test), or whether the defenses in one case may be used to substantiate the
complaint in the other. Also fundamental is the test of determining whether the cause of action in the
second case existed at the time of the filing of the first complaint.
Of the three tests cited, the third one is especially applicable to the present case, i.e., whether the cause of
action in the second case existed at the time of the filing of the first complaint - and to which we answer in
the negative. The facts clearly show that the filing of the first ejectment case was grounded on the
petitioner's violation of stipulations in the lease contract, while the filing of the second case was based on the
expiration of the lease contract. At the time the respondent filed the first ejectment complaint on October 10,
2000, the lease contract between the parties was still in effect. The lease was fixed for a period of two (2)
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years, from January 16, 2000, and in the absence of a renewal agreed upon by the parties, the lease
remained effective until January 15, 2002. It was only at the expiration of the lease contract that the cause of
action in the second ejectment complaint accrued and made available to the respondent as a ground for
ejecting the petitioner. Thus, the cause of action in the second case was not yet in existence at the time of
filing of the first ejectment case.
In response to the petitioner's contention that the similarity of Civil Case Nos. 8084 and 9210 rests on the
reiteration in the second case of the cause of action in the first case, we rule that the restatement does not
result in substantial identity between the two cases. Even if the respondent alleged violations of the lease
contract as a ground for ejectment in the second complaint, the main basis for ejecting the petitioner in the
second case was the expiration of the lease contract. If not for this subsequent development, the respondent
could no longer file a second complaint for unlawful detainer because an ejectment complaint may only be
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filed within one year after the accrual of the cause of action, which, in the second case, was the expiration of
the lease contract.
Also, contrary to petitioner's assertion, there can be no conflict between the decisions rendered in Civil Case
Nos. 8084 and 9210 because the MTC-Branch 71 decided the latter case on the sole issue of whether the
lease contract between the parties had expired. Although alleged by the respondent in its complaint, the
MTC-Branch 71 did not rule on the alleged violations of the lease contract committed by the petitioner. We
note that the damages awarded by the MTC-Branch 71 in Civil Case No. 9210 were for those incurred after the
expiration of the lease contract, not for those incurred prior thereto.
Similarly, we do not find the respondent guilty of forum shopping in filing Civil Case No. 9210, the second civil
case. To determine whether a party violated the rule against forum shopping, the test applied is
whether the elements of litis pendentia are present or whether a final judgment in one case will
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amount to res judicata in another. Considering our pronouncement that not all the requisites of litis
pendentia are present in this case, the CA did not err in declaring that the respondent committed no forum
shopping. Also, a close reading of the Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping (attached to the
second ejectment complaint) shows that the respondent did disclose that it had filed a former complaint for
unlawful detainer against the petitioner. Thus, the respondent cannot be said to have committed a willful and
deliberate forum shopping.
9. THE CITY OF BACOLOD vs. SAN MIGUEL BREWERY, INC.
105
The Court finds appellant's position essentially correct. There is no question that appellee split up its cause of
action when it filed the first complaint on March 23, 1960, seeking the recovery of only the bottling taxes or
charges plus legal interest, without mentioning in any manner the surcharges.
The rule on the matter is clear. Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 2 of the Rules of Court of 1940 which were still in
force then provided:
xx x
Indeed, this rule against the splitting up of a cause of action is an old one. In fact, it preceded the Rules of
Court or any statutory provision. In Bachrach Motor Co., Inc. vs. Icarangal et al.,1 this Court already explained
its meaning, origin and purpose, thus:
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But, even if we have no such section 708 of our Code of Civil Procedure, or section 59 of the Insolvency Law,
we have still the rule against splitting a single cause of action. This rule, though not contained in any
statutory provision, has been applied by this court in all appropriate cases. xxx
The rule against splitting a single cause of action is intended "to prevent repeated litigation
between the same parties in regard to the same subject of controversy; to protect defendant
from unnecessary vexation; and to avoid the costs and expenses incident to numerous suits." (1
C.J. 1107) It comes from that old maxim nemo debet bis vexare pro una et eadem causa (no man shall be
twice vexed for one and the same cause). (Ex parte Lange, 18 Wall 163, 168; 21 Law Ed. 872; also U.S. vs.
Throckmorton, 98 U.S. 61; 25 Law Ed. 93). And it developed, certainly not as an original legal right of
the defendant, but as an interposition of courts upon principles of public policy to prevent
inconvenience and hardship incident to repeated and unnecessary litigations. (1 C. J. 1107).
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In the light of these precedents, it cannot be denied that appellant's failure to pay the bottling charges or
taxes and the surcharges for delinquency in the payment thereof constitutes but one single cause of action
which under the above rule can be the subject of only one complaint, under pain of either of them being
barred if not included in the same complaint with the other. The error of appellee springs from a
misconception or a vague comprehension of the elements of a cause of action. The classical definition of a
cause of action is that it is "a delict or wrong by which the rights of the plaintiff are violated by the
defendant." Its elements may be generally stated to be (1) a right existing in favor of the plaintiff; (2) a
corresponding obligation on the part of the defendant to respect such right; and (3) an act or omission of the
plaintiff which constitutes a violation of the plaintiff's right which defendant had the duty to respect. For
purposes, however, of the rule against splitting up of a cause of action, a clearer understanding can be
achieved, if together with these elements, the right to relief is considered.
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In the last analysis, a cause of action is basically an act or an omission or several acts or omissions. A single
act or omission can be violative of various rights at the same time, as when the act constitutes
juridically a violation of several separate and distinct legal obligations. This happens, for example,
when a passenger of a common carrier, such as a taxi, is injured in a collision thereof with another vehicle
due to the negligence of the respective drivers of both vehicles. In such a case, several rights of the
passenger are violated, inter alia, (1) the right to be safe from the negligent acts of either or both the drivers
under the law on culpa-acquiliana or quasi-delict; (2) the right to be safe from criminal negligence of the said
drivers under the penal laws; and (3) the right to be safely conducted to his destination under the contract of
carriage and the law covering the same, not counting anymore the provisions of Article 33 of the Civil Code.
The violation of each of these rights is a cause of action in itself. Hence, such a passenger has at least three
causes of action arising from the same act. On the other hand, it can happen also that several acts or
omissions may violate only one right, in which case, there would be only one cause of action. Again the
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violation of a single right may give rise to more than one relief. In other words, for a single cause of action or
violation of a right, the plaintiff may be entitled to several reliefs. It is the filing of separate complaints
for these several reliefs that constitutes splitting up of the cause of action. This is what is
prohibited by the rule.
In the case at bar, when appellant failed and refused to pay the difference in bottling charges from July 1,
1959, such act of appellant in violation of the right of appellee to be paid said charges in full under the
Ordinance, was one single cause of action, but under the Ordinance, appellee became entitled, as a result of
such non-payment, to two reliefs, namely: (1) the recovery of the balance of the basic charges; and (2) the
payment of the corresponding surcharges, the latter being merely a consequence of the failure to pay the
former. Stated differently, the obligation of appellant to pay the surcharges arose from the violation by said
appellant of the same right of appellee from which the obligation to pay the basic charges also arose. Upon
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these facts, it is obvious that appellee has filed separate complaints for each of two reliefs related to the
same single cause of action, thereby splitting up the said cause of action.
The trial court held that inasmuch as there was no demand in the complaint in the first case for the payment
of the surcharges, unlike in the case of Collector of Internal Revenue vs. Blas Gutierrez, et al., G.R. No. L13819. May 25, 1960, wherein there was such a demand, there is no bar by prior judgment as to said
surcharges, the same not having been "raised as an issue or cause of action in Civil Case No. 5693." This
holding is erroneous.
Section 4 of Rule 2, above-quoted, is unmistakably clear as to the effect of the splitting up of a cause of
action. It says, "if separate complaints are brought for different parts (reliefs) of a single cause of
action, the filing of the first (complaint) may be pleaded in abatement of the others, and a
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judgment upon the merits in either is available as a bar in the others." In other words, whenever
a plaintiff has filed more than one complaint for the same violation of a right, the filing of the
first complaint on any of the reliefs born of the said violation constitutes a bar to any action on
any of the other possible reliefs arising from the same violation, whether the first action is still
pending, in which event, the defense to the subsequent complaint would be litis pendentia, or it
has already been finally terminated, in which case, the defense would be res
adjudicata. Indeed, litis pendentia and res adjudicata, on the one hand, and splitting up a cause
of action on the other, are not separate and distinct defenses, since either of the former is by law
only the result or effect of the latter, or, better said, the sanction for or behind it.
It thus results that the judgment of the lower court must be, as it is hereby, reversed and the complaint of
appellee is dismissed.
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C. VENUE
1. SWEET LINES, INC. vs. TEVES
There is no question that there was a valid contract of carriage entered into by petitioner and private
respondents and that the passage tickets, upon which the latter based their complaint, are the best evidence
thereof. All the essential elements of a valid contract, i.e., consent, cause or consideration and object, are
present. As held inPeralta de Guerrero, et al. v. Madrigal Shipping Co., Inc.,
It is a matter of common knowledge that whenever a passenger boards a ship for transportation from one
place to another he is issued a ticket by the shipper which has all the elements of a written contract, Namely:
(1) the consent of the contracting parties manifested by the fact that the passenger boards the ship and the
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shipper consents or accepts him in the ship for transportation; (2) cause or consideration which is the fare
paid by the passenger as stated in the ticket; (3) object, which is the transportation of the passenger from the
place of departure to the place of destination which are stated in the ticket.
It should be borne in mind, however, that with respect to the fourteen (14) conditions one of which is
"Condition No. 14" which is in issue in this case printed at the back of the passage tickets, these are
commonly known as "contracts of adhesion," the validity and/or enforceability of which will have to be
determined by the peculiar circumstances obtaining in each case and the nature of the conditions or terms
sought to be enforced. For, "(W)hile generally, stipulations in a contract come about after deliberate drafting
by the parties thereto, ... there are certain contracts almost all the provisions of which have been drafted only
by one party, usually a corporation. Such contracts are called contracts of adhesion, because the only
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participation of the party is the signing of his signature or his 'adhesion' thereto. Insurance contracts, bills of
lading, contracts of make of lots on the installment plan fall into this category"
By the peculiar circumstances under which contracts of adhesion are entered into namely, that it is drafted
only by one party, usually the corporation, and is sought to be accepted or adhered to by the other party, in
this instance the passengers, private respondents, who cannot change the same and who are thus made to
adhere thereto on the "take it or leave it" basis certain guidelines in the determination of their validity
and/or enforceability have been formulated in order to that justice and fan play characterize the relationship
of the contracting parties.
Considered in the light Of the foregoing norms and in the context Of circumstances Prevailing in the interisland shipping industry in the country today, We find and hold that Condition No. 14 printed at the back of
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the passage tickets should be held as void and unenforceable for the following reasons first, under
circumstances obligation in the inter-island shipping industry, it is not just and fair to bind passengers
to the terms of the conditions printed at the back of the passage tickets, on which Condition No.
14 is Printed in fine letters, and second, Condition No. 14 subverts the public policy on transfer of
venue of proceedings of this nature, since the same will prejudice rights and interests of
innumerable passengers in different of the country who, under Condition No. 14, will have to file
suits against petitioner only in the City of Cebu.
Condition No. 14 is subversive of public policy on transfers of venue of actions. For, although venue may be
changed or transferred from one province to another by agreement of the parties in writing t to
Rule 4, Section 3, of the Rules of Court, such an agreement will not be held valid where it
practically negates the action of the claimants, such as the private respondents herein . The
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philosophy underlying the provisions on transfer of venue of actions is the convenience of the plaintiffs as
well as his witnesses and to promote the ends of justice. Considering the expense and trouble a passenger
residing outside of Cebu City would incur to prosecute a claim in the City of Cebu, he would most probably
decide not to file the action at all. The condition will thus defeat, instead of enhance, the ends of justice. Upon
the other hand, petitioner has branches or offices in the respective ports of call of its vessels and can afford
to litigate in any of these places. Hence, the filing of the suit in the CFI of Misamis Oriental, as was done in
the instant case, will not cause inconvenience to, much less prejudice, petitioner.
Public policy is ". . . that principle of the law which holds that no subject or citizen can lawfully do that which
has a tendency to be injurious to the public or against the public good ... Under this principle" ... freedom of
contract or private dealing is restricted by law for the good of the public. Clearly, Condition No. 14, if
enforced, will be subversive of the public good or interest, since it will frustrate in meritorious cases, actions
117
of passenger cants outside of Cebu City, thus placing petitioner company at a decided advantage over said
persons, who may have perfectly legitimate claims against it. The said condition should, therefore, be
declared void and unenforceable, as contrary to public policy to make the courts accessible to all who may
have need of their services.
2. BRIONES vs. CA & CASH ASIA CREDIT CORPORATION
At the outset, the Court stresses that "[t]o justify the grant of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, [the
petitioner] must satisfactorily show that the court or quasi-judicial authority gravely abused the discretion
conferred upon it. Grave abuse of discretion connotes judgment exercised in a capricious and whimsical
manner that is tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. To be considered grave, discretion must be exercised in a
despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and must be so patent and gross as to amount to
118
an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to act at all in
contemplation of law." Guided by the foregoing considerations, the Court finds that the CA gravely abused its
discretion in ordering the outright dismissal of Brioness complaint against Cash Asia, without prejudice to its
re-filing before the proper court in Makati City.
Rule 4 of the Rules of Court governs the rules on venue of civil actions, to wit: x x x
Based therefrom, the general rule is that the venue of real actions is the court which has
jurisdiction over the area wherein the real property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated;
while the venue of personal actions is the court which has jurisdiction where the plaintiff or the
defendant resides, at the election of the plaintiff. As an exception, jurisprudence in Legaspi v. Rep. of
the Phils. instructs that the parties, thru a written instrument, may either introduce another venue
119
where actions arising from such instrument may be filed, or restrict the filing of said actions in a
certain exclusive venue, viz.:
The parties, however, are not precluded from agreeing in writing on an exclusive venue, as qualified by
Section 4 of the same rule. Written stipulations as to venue may be restrictive in the sense that the suit may
be filed only in the place agreed upon, or merely permissive in that the parties may file their suit not only in
the place agreed upon but also in the places fixed by law. As in any other agreement, what is essential is the
ascertainment of the intention of the parties respecting the matter.
As regards restrictive stipulations on venue, jurisprudence instructs that it must be shown that such
stipulation is exclusive
In the absence of qualifying or restrictive words, such as
"exclusively,""waiving for this purpose any other venue,""shall only" preceding the designation
120
of venue, "to the exclusion of the other courts," or words of similar import, the stipulation should
be deemed as merely an agreement on an additional forum,not as limiting venue to the specified
place. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
In this relation, case law likewise provides that in cases where the complaint assails only the terms,
conditions, and/or coverage of a written instrument and not its validity, the exclusive venue stipulation
contained therein shall still be binding on the parties, and thus, the complaint may be properly dismissed on
the ground of improper venue. Conversely, therefore, a complaint directly assailing the validity of the written
instrument itself should not be bound by the exclusive venue stipulation contained therein and should be filed
in accordance with the general rules on venue. To be sure, it would be inherently consistent for a complaint of
this nature to recognize the exclusive venue stipulation when it, in fact, precisely assails the validity of the
instrument in which such stipulation is contained.
121
In this case, the venue stipulation found in the subject contracts is indeed restrictive in nature, considering
that it effectively limits the venue of the actions arising therefrom to the courts of Makati City. However, it
must be emphasized that Briones' s complaint directly assails the validity of the subject contracts, claiming
forgery in their execution. Given this circumstance, Briones cannot be expected to comply with the aforesaid
venue stipulation, as his compliance therewith would mean an implicit recognition of their validity. Hence,
pursuant to the general rules on venue, Briones properly filed his complaint before a court in the City of
Manila where the subject property is located.
In conclusion, the CA patently erred and hence committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing Briones's
complaint on the ground of improper venue.
3. SAMSON vs. SPS. GABOR, et al.
122
We, likewise, agree with the decision of the RTC of Pasig City dismissing petitioners complaint on the ground
that the same should have been filed in the RTC of Morong, Rizal, where the property subject of this case is
situated. Petitioner claims that as shown by the caption of his complaint which reads "For Recovery of
Property or its Value," his cause of action is in the alternative, both real and personal. As such, his action may
be commenced and tried where the petitioner resides or where any of the respondents resides, at the
election of the petitioner. Petitioners argument is misplaced. In Latorre v. Latorre, we ruled that:
Sections 1 and 2, Rule 4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provide an answer to the issue of venue.
Actions affecting title to or possession of real property or an interest therein (real actions) shall
be commenced and tried in the proper court that has territorial jurisdiction over the area where
the real property is situated. On the other hand, all other actions (personal actions) shall be
123
commenced and tried in the proper courts where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs
resides or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides. x x x.
In this jurisdiction, we adhere to the principle that the nature of an action is determined by the allegations in
the Complaint itself, rather than by its title or heading. Itis also a settled rule that what determines the venue
of a case is the primary objective for the filing of the case. x x x While the complaint of the petitioner
was denominated as one for "Recovery of Property or its Value," all of his claims are actually
anchored on his claim of ownership over the one-third (1/3) portion of the subject property. In his
complaint, petitioner sought the return of the portion of the subject property or its value on the
basis of his co-ownership thereof. Necessarily, his alternative claim for the value of the property is
still dependent on the determination of ownership, which is an action affecting title to or
124
possession of real property or an interest therein . Clearly, petitioners claim is a real action which
should have been filed in the court where the property lies, which in this case, is the RTC of Morong, Rizal.
4. BPI FAMILY SAVINGS BANK INC. vs. SPS. YUJUICO,
An action to recover the deficiency after extrajudicial foreclosure of a real property mortgage is a personal
action because it does not affect title to or possession of real property, or any interest therein.
It is basic that the venue of an action depends on whether it is a real or a personal action. The
determinants of whether an action is of a real or a personal nature have been fixed by the Rules of Court and
relevant jurisprudence. According to Section 1, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, a real action is one that
affects title to or possession of real property, or an interest therein . Thus, an action for partition or
125
condemnation of, or foreclosure of mortgage on, real property is a real action. The real action is to be
commenced and tried in the proper court having jurisdiction over the area wherein the real
property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated, which explains why the action is also referred
to as a local action. In contrast, the Rules of Court declares all other actions as personal actions . such
actions may include those brought for the recovery of personal property, or for the enforcement of some
contract or recovery of damages for its breach, or for the recovery of damages for the commission of an
injury to the person or property. The venue of a personal action is the place where the plaintiff or any
of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants
resides, or in the case of a non-resident defendant where he may be found, at the election of the
plaintiff, for which reason the action is considered a transitory one.
126
Based on the distinctions between real and personal actions, an action to recover the deficiency after
the extrajudicial foreclosure of the real property mortgage is a personal action, for it does not
affect title to or possession of real property, or any interest therein.
Given the foregoing, the petitioner correctly brought Civil Case No.03-450 in the Makati RTC because Makati
was the place where the main office of the petitioner was located.
Moreover, the Makati RTC observed, and the observation is correct in our view, that it would be improper to
dismiss Civil Case No. 03-450 on the ground of improper venue, assuming that the venue had been
improperly laid, considering that the respondents had not raised such ground in their Motion to Dismiss. As
earlier indicated, they came to raise the objection of improper venue for the first time only in their reply to
the petitioner's comment on their Motion for Reconsideration. They did so belatedly.
127
We underscore that in civil proceedings, venue is procedural, not jurisdictional, and may be waived by the
defendant if not seasonably raised either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer . Section 1, Rule 9 of the
Rules of Court thus expressly stipulates that defenses and objections not pleaded either in a
motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived. As it relates to the place of trial, indeed,
venue is meant to provide convenience to the parties, rather than to restrict their access to the
courts. In other words, unless the defendant seasonably objects, any action may be tried by a court
despite its being the improper venue.
D. PARTIES
1. RESIDENT MARINE MAMMALS OF THE PROTECTED SEASCAPE TAON STRAIT vs. SEC. REYES
128
*Service Contract No. 46 (SC-46), which allowed the exploration, development, and exploitation of
petroleum resources within Taon Strait, a narrow passage of water situated between the islands of Negros
and Cebu.
Procedural Issues
Locus Standi of Petitioners Resident Marine Mammals and Stewards
The issue of whether or not animals or even inanimate objects should be given legal standing in
actions before courts of law is not new in the field of animal rights and environmental law.
Petitioners Resident Marine Mammals and Stewards cited the 1972 United States case Sierra Club v. Rogers
C.B. Morton, wherein Justice William O. Douglas, dissenting to the conventional thought on legal standing,
opined:
129
The critical question of "standing" would be simplified and also put neatly in focus if we fashioned a federal
rule that allowed environmental issues to be litigated before federal agencies or federal courts in the name of
the inanimate object about to be despoiled, defaced, or invaded by roads and bulldozers and where injury is
the
subject
of
public
outrage,
x
x
x.
Inanimate objects are sometimes parties in litigation. A ship has a legal personality, a fiction found useful for
maritime purposes. The corporation sole - a creature of ecclesiastical law - is an acceptable adversary and
large fortunes ride on its cases. The ordinary corporation is a "person" for purposes of the adjudicatory
processes, whether it represents proprietary, spiritual, aesthetic, or charitable causes.
So it should be as respects valleys, alpine meadows, rivers, lakes, estuaries, beaches, ridges, groves of trees,
swampland, or even air that feels the destructive pressures of modern technology and modem life. The river,
130
for example, is the living symbol of all the life it sustains or nourishesfish, aquatic insects, water ouzels,
otter, fisher, deer, elk, bear, and all other animals, including man, who are dependent on it or who enjoy it for
its sight, its sound, or its life. The river as plaintiff speaks for the ecological unit of life that is part of it. Those
people who have a meaningful relation to that body of waterwhether it be a fisherman, a canoeist, a
zoologist, or a loggermust be able to speak for the values which the river represents and which are
threatened with destruction.(Citations omitted.)
The primary reason animal rights advocates and environmentalists seek to give animals and
inanimate objects standing is due to the need to comply with the strict requirements in bringing
a suit to court. Our own 1997 Rules of Court demand that parties to a suit be either natural or juridical
persons, or entities authorized by law. It further necessitates the action to be brought in the name of the real
party-in-interest, even if filed by a representative, viz.:
131
xxx
It had been suggested by animal rights advocates and environmentalists that not only natural and juridical
persons should be given legal standing because of the difficulty for persons, who cannot show that they by
themselves are real parties-in-interests, to bring actions in representation of these animals or inanimate
objects. For this reason, many environmental cases have been dismissed for failure of the petitioner to show
that he/she would be directly injured or affected by the outcome of the case . However, in our
jurisdiction, locus standi in environmental cases has been given a more liberalized approach. While
developments in Philippine legal theory and jurisprudence have not progressed as far as Justice Douglas's
paradigm of legal standing for inanimate objects, the current trend moves towards simplification of
procedures
and
facilitating
court
access
in
environmental
cases.
132
Recently, the Court passed the landmark Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases, which allow for a
"citizen suit," and permit any Filipino citizen to file an action before our courts for violations of our
environmental laws:
xxx
Explaining the rationale for this rule, the Court, in the Annotations to the Rules of Procedure for Environmental
Cases,
commented:
Citizen suit. To further encourage the protection of the environment, the Rules enable litigants enforcing
environmental rights to file their cases as citizen suits. This provision liberalizes standing for all cases filed
enforcing environmental laws and collapses the traditional rule on personal and direct interest, on the
principle that humans are stewards of nature. The terminology of the text reflects the doctrine first
133
enunciated in Oposa v. Factoran, insofar as it refers to minors and generations yet unborn.(Emphasis
supplied, citation omitted.)
Although this petition was filed in 2007, years before the effectivity of the Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases, it has been consistently held that rules of procedure "may be retroactively applied to
actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage and will not violate any right of a person who
may feel that he is adversely affected, inasmuch as there is no vested rights in rules of procedure."
Moreover, even before the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases became effective, this Court had
already taken a permissive position on the issue of locus standi in environmental cases. In Oposa, we allowed
the suit to be brought in the name of generations yet unborn "based on the concept of intergenerational
responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned." Furthermore, we said
134
that the right to a balanced and healthful ecology, a right that does not even need to be stated in our
Constitution as it is assumed to exist from the inception of humankind, carries with it the correlative duty to
refrain from impairing the environment.
In light of the foregoing, the need to give the Resident Marine Mammals legal standing has been eliminated
by our Rules, which allow any Filipino citizen, as a steward of nature, to bring a suit to enforce our
environmental laws. It is worth noting here that the Stewards are joined as real parties in the Petition
and not just in representation of the named cetacean species. The Stewards, Ramos and EismaOsorio, having shown in their petition that there may be possible violations of laws concerning the habitat of
the Resident Marine Mammals, are therefore declared to possess the legal standing to file this petition.
Impleading Former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
135
as an Unwilling Co-Petitioner
Petitioners Stewards in G.R. No. 180771 impleaded as an unwilling co-petitioner former President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo
for
the
following
reasons,
which
we
quote:
Her Excellency Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, also of legal age, Filipino and resident of Malacaang Palace,
Manila Philippines. Steward Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo happens to be the incumbent President of the Philippine
Islands. She is personally impleaded in this suit as an unwilling co-petitioner by reason of her express
declaration and undertaking under the recently signed ASEAN Charter to protect Your Petitioners' habitat,
among others. She is meantime dominated as an unwilling co-petitioner due to lack of material time in
seeking her signature and imprimatur hereof and due to possible legal complications that may hereafter arise
by reason of her official relations with public respondents under the alter ego principle in political law.
136
This is incorrect.
Section
10,
Rule
3
of
the
Rules
of
Court
provides:
Sec. 10. Unwilling co-plaintiff. - If the consent of any party who should be joined as plaintiff can not be
obtained, he may be made a defendant and the reason therefor shall be stated in the complaint.
Under the foregoing rule, when the consent of a party who should be joined as a plaintiff cannot be
obtained, he or she may be made a party defendant to the case. This will put the unwilling party
under the jurisdiction of the Court, which can properly implead him or her through its processes. The
unwilling party's name cannot be simply included in a petition, without his or her knowledge and
consent, as such would be a denial of due process.
137
Moreover, the reason cited by the petitioners Stewards for including former President Macapagal-Arroyo in
their petition, is not sufficient to implead her as an unwilling co-petitioner. Impleading the former President as
an unwilling co-petitioner, for an act she made in the performance of the functions of her office, is contrary to
the public policy against embroiling the President in suits, "to assure the exercise of Presidential duties and
functions free from any hindrance or distraction, considering that being the Chief Executive of the
Government is a job that, aside from requiring all of the office holder's time, also demands undivided
attention."
Therefore, former President Macapagal-Arroyo cannot be impleaded as one of the petitioners in this suit.
Thus, her name is stricken off the title of this case.
2. GUY vs. ATTY. GACOTT
138
The service of summons was flawed; voluntary appearance cured the defect
Jurisdiction over the person, or jurisdiction in personam - the power of the court to render a personal
judgment or to subject the parties in a particular action to the judgment and other rulings rendered in the
action - is an element of due process that is essential in all actions, civil as well as criminal, except in
actions in rem or quasi in rem . Jurisdiction over the person of the plaintiff is acquired by the mere filing of the
complaint in court. As the initiating party, the plaintiff in a civil action voluntarily submits himself to the
jurisdiction of the court. As to the defendant, the court acquires jurisdiction over his person either by the
proper
service
of
the
summons,
or
by
his
voluntary
appearance
in
the
action.
Under Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, when the defendant is a
corporation, partnership or association organized under the laws of the Philippines with a
139
juridical personality, the service of summons may be made on the president, managing partner,
general manager, corporate secretary, treasurer, or in-house counsel. Jurisprudence is replete with
pronouncements that such provision provides an exclusive enumeration of the persons authorized to
receive summons for juridical entities.
The records of this case reveal that QSC was never shown to have been served with the summons through
any of the enumerated authorized persons to receive such, namely: president, managing partner, general
manager, corporate secretary, treasurer or in-house counsel. Service of summons upon persons other than
those officers enumerated in Section 11 is invalid. Even substantial compliance is not sufficient service
of summons. The CA was obviously mistaken when it opined that it was immaterial whether the summons to
QSC was served on the theory that it was a corporation.
140
Nevertheless, while proper service of summons is necessary to vest the court jurisdiction over the
defendant, the same is merely procedural in nature and the lack of or defect in the service of
summons may be cured by the defendant's subsequent voluntary submission to the court's
jurisdiction through his filing a responsive pleading such as an answer. In this case, it is not disputed
that QSC filed its Answer despite the defective summons. Thus, jurisdiction over its person was acquired
through voluntary appearance.
A partner must be separately and distinctly impleaded before he can be bound by a judgment
The next question posed is whether the trial court's jurisdiction over QSC extended to the person of Guy
insofar as holding him solidarity liable with the partnership. After a thorough study of the relevant laws and
jurisprudence, the Court answers in the negative.
141
xxx
In relation to the rules of civil procedure, it is elementary that a judgment of a court is conclusive and binding
only upon the parties and their successors-in-interest after the commencement of the action in court. A
decision rendered on a complaint in a civil action or proceeding does not bind or prejudice a
person not impleaded therein, for no person shall be adversely affected by the outcome of a civil
action or proceeding in which he is not a party . The principle that a person cannot be prejudiced by a
ruling rendered in an action or proceeding in which he has not been made a party conforms to the
constitutional guarantee of due process of law.
Here, Guy was never made a party to the case. He did not have any participation in the entire proceeding
until his vehicle was levied upon and he suddenly became QSC's "co-defendant debtor" during the judgment
142
execution stage. It is a basic principle of law that money judgments are enforceable only against the property
incontrovertibly belonging to the judgment debtor. Indeed, the power of the court in executing judgments
extends only to properties unquestionably belonging to the judgment debtor alone. An execution can be
issued only against a party and not against one who did not have his day in court. The duty of the sheriff is to
levy the property of the judgment debtor not that of a third person. For, as the saying goes, one man's goods
shall not be sold for another man's debts.
In the spirit of fair play, it is a better rule that a partner must first be impleaded before he could be prejudiced
by the judgment against the partnership. As will be discussed later, a partner may raise several defenses
during the trial to avoid or mitigate his obligation to the partnership liability. Necessarily, before he could
present evidence during the trial, he must first be impleaded and informed of the case against him. It would
be the height of injustice to rob an innocent partner of his hard-earned personal belongings without giving
143
him an opportunity to be heard. Without any showing that Guy himself acted maliciously on behalf of the
company, causing damage or injury to the complainant, then he and his personal properties cannot be made
directly and solely accountable for the liability of QSC, the judgment debtor, because he was not a party to
the case.
xxx
A careful reading of the provision shows that notice to any partner, under certain circumstances,
operates as notice to or knowledge to the partnership only. Evidently, it does not provide for the
reverse situation, or that notice to the partnership is notice to the partners. Unless there is an
unequivocal law which states that a partner is automatically charged in a complaint against the partnership,
the constitutional right to due process takes precedence and a partner must first be impleaded before he can
144
be considered as a judgment debtor. To rule otherwise would be a dangerous precedent, harping in favor of
the deprivation of property without ample notice and hearing, which the Court certainly cannot countenance.
3. VDA. DE ROJALES vs. DIME
Bisecting the first and third issues, this Court notes that the petitioner basically argues that the CA erred in
ordering the consolidation of ownership and title in the name of respondent Dime since his heirs have filed a
motion to dismiss which admitted therein that a ruling of the trial court in respondent's favor is tantamount to
unjust enrichment considering that Villamin provided the funds for the purchase of the subject property.
145
Relying on the principle that the client has the exclusive control of the cause of action on the claim or
demand sued upon, petitioner insists that the filing of the manifestation reflected the intention of the heirs of
respondent to enter into a settlement with the petitioner.
Settled is the rule that a client has an undoubted right to settle her litigation without the intervention of the
attorney, for the former is generally conceded to have exclusive control over the subject matter of the
litigation and may at anytime, if acting in good faith, settle and adjust the cause of action out of court before
judgment, even without the attorney's intervention.
While we agree with the petitioner that the heirs, as the client, has the exclusive control over the subject
matter of litigation and may settle the case without the attorney's intervention, we deny the rationale of the
filing of the motion to dismiss by the heirs. It was alleged that they would be unjustly enriched should the
146
court order the consolidation of the title of Lot 4-A in the name of respondent since the source of the
consideration was Villamin, respondent's common-law wife.
As relevant to the case at bar, Articles 1311 and 1607 of the Civil Code provide:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Article 1311. Contracts take effect only between the parties, their assigns and heirs, except in case where the
rights and obligations arising from the contract are not transmissible by their nature, or by stipulation or by
provision of law. The heir is not liable beyond the value of the property he received from the decedent.
If a contract should contain some stipulation in favor of a third person, he may demand its fulfillment
provided he communicated his acceptance to the obligor before its revocation. A mere incidental benefit or
147
interest of a person is not sufficient. The contracting parties must have clearly and deliberately conferred a
favor upon a third person. (Emphasis supplied).
xxxx
Article 1607. In case of real property, the consolidation of ownership in the vendee by virtue of the failure of
the vendor to comply with the provisions of article 1616 shall not be recorded in the Registry of Property
without a judicial order, after the vendor has been duly heard.
We have consistently held that the parties to a contract are the real parties-in-interest in an
action upon it. The basic principle of relativity of contracts is that contracts can only bind the
parties who entered into it, and cannot favor or prejudice a third person, even if he is aware of
148
such contract and has acted with knowledge thereof. Hence, one who is not a party to a contract,
and for whose benefit it was not expressly made, cannot maintain an action on it. One cannot do
so, even if the contract performed by the contracting parties would incidentally inure to one's
benefit.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
As evidenced by the contract of Pacto de Retro sale, petitioner, the vendor, bound herself to sell the subject
property to respondent, the vendee, and reserved the right to repurchase the same property for the same
amount within a period of nine (9) months from March 24, 1999 to December 24, 1999. Therefore, in an
action for the consolidation of title and ownership in the name of vendee in accordance with
Article 1616 of the Civil Code, the indispensable parties are the parties to the Pacto de Retro Sale
- the vendor, the vendee, and their assigns and heirs.
149
Villamin, as the alleged source of the consideration, is not privy to the contract of sale between the petitioner
and the respondent. Therefore, she could not maintain an action for consolidation of ownership and title of
the subject property in her name since she was not a party to the said contract.
Where there is no privity of contract, there is likewise no obligation or liability to speak about. This Court, in
defining the word "privy" in the case of Republic vs. Grijaldo said that the word privy denotes the idea of
succession, thus, he who by succession is placed in the position of one of those who contracted the judicial
relation and executed the private document and appears to be substituting him in the personal rights and
obligation is a privy.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
For not being an heir or an assignee of the respondent, Villamin did not substitute respondent in the personal
rights and obligation in the pacto de retro sale by succession. Since she is not privy to the contract, she
150
cannot be considered as indispensable party in the action for consolidation of title and ownership in favor of
respondent. A cursory reading of the contract reveals that the parties did not clearly and deliberately confer a
favor upon Villamin, a third person.
xxx
This Court notes that the RTC relied on the bare assertions of the heirs in dismissing the case with prejudice.
The records are bereft of evidence to support the allegation that Villamin has indeed provided the
consideration. Not being a privy to the pacto de retro sale, Villamin cannot be considered to have been
prejudiced with the consolidation of title in respondent's name. Assuming arguendo that she was indeed the
source of the consideration, she has a separate cause of action against respondent. The legal obligation of
151
respondent to her is separate and distinct from the contract of sale pacto de retro, thus, the award of
consolidation of title in her name would be untenable.
4. WEST TOWER CONDOMINIUM CORPORATION vs. FIRST PHILIPPINE INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION,
et al.
Petitioners as Real Parties-in-Interest
On the procedural aspect, We agree with the CA that petitioners who are affected residents of West Tower and
Barangay Bangkal have the requisite concern to be real parties-in-interest to pursue the instant petition.
Residents
152
of
West
Tower
and
Barangay
Bangkal
As defined, a real party-in-interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in
the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Generally, every action must be prosecuted or
defended in the name of the real parties-in-interest. In other words, the action must be brought by the person
who, by substantive law, possesses the right sought to be enforced. Alternatively, one who has no right or
interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as party-plaintiff-in-action for it is
jurisprudentially ordained that every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-ininterest.
In the case at bar, there can be no quibble that the oil leak from the WOPL affected all the condominium unit
owners and residents of West Tower as, in fact, all had to evacuate their units at the wee hours in the morning
of July 23, 2010, when the condominiums electrical power was shut down. Until now, the unit owners and
153
residents of West Tower could still not return to their condominium units. Thus, there is no gainsaying that the
residents
of
West
Tower
are
real
parties-in-interest.
There can also be no denying that West Tower Corp. represents the common interest of its unit owners and
residents, and has the legal standing to file and pursue the instant petition. While a condominium
corporation has limited powers under RA 4726, otherwise known as The Condominium Act, it is
empowered to pursue actions in behalf of its members. In the instant case, the condominium
corporation is the management body of West Tower and deals with everything that may affect some or all of
the
condominium
unit
owners
or
users.
It is of no moment that only five residents of West Tower signed their acquiescence to the filing of the petition
for the issuance of the Writ of Kalikasan, as the merits of such petition is, as aptly put by the CA, not
154
measured by the number of persons who signified their assent thereto, but on the existence of a prima
facie case
of
a
massive
environmental
disaster.
Moreover, the fact that no board resolution was submitted by West Tower Corp. authorizing Manuel Dy
Chuaunsu, Jr. to sign the Verification and Certification of Non-forum Shopping is irrelevant. The records
show that petitioners submitted a notarized Secretarys Certificate attesting that the authority
of Chuaunsu to represent the condominium corporation in filing the petition is from the
resolution of the total membership of West Tower Corp. issued during their November 9, 2010
meeting with the requisite quorum. It is, thus, clear that it was not the Board of West Tower Corp. which
granted Chuaunsu the authority but the full membership of the condominium corporation itself.
As to the residents of Barangay Bangkal, they are similarly situated with the unit owners and residents of
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West Tower and are real parties-in-interest to the instant case, i.e., if they so wish to join the petitioners.
Organizations that indicated their intention to join the petition and submitted proof of juridical
personality
Anent the propriety of including the Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines, Kilusang Makabansang
Ekonomiya, Inc., Womens Business Council of the Philippines, Inc., Junior Chambers International Philippines,
Inc. San Juan Chapter, Zonta Club of Makati Ayala Foundations, and the Consolidated Mansions
Condominium Corporation, as petitioners in the case, the Court already granted their intervention in the
present
controversy
in
the
adverted
July
30,
2013
Resolution.
This is so considering that the filing of a petition for the issuance of a writ of kalikasan under Sec. 1, Rule 7 of
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the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases does not require that a petitioner be directly affected by an
environmental disaster. The rule clearly allows juridical persons to file the petition on behalf of persons whose
constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology is violated, or threatened with violation .
Thus, as parties to the case, they are entitled to be furnished copies of all the submissions to the Court,
including the periodic reports of FPIC and the results of the evaluations and tests conducted on the WOPL.
5. DIVINAGRACIA vs. PARILLA
Absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void not only as to the
absent parties but even as to those present; All persons having an interest in the property are indispensable
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parties in an action for partition; Omission of heirs, which are indispensable parties, renders the complaint for
partition defective; In non-joinder of indispensable parties, the proper remedy is to implead them and not to
dismiss the case
Absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void not
only as to the absent parties but even as to those present
1. An indispensable party is one whose interest will be affected by the courts action in the litigation, and
without whom no final determination of the case can be had. The partys interest in the subject matter of the
suit and in the relief sought are so inextricably intertwined with the other parties that his legal presence as a
party to the proceeding is an absolute necessity. In his absence, there cannot be a resolution of the dispute of
the parties before the court which is effective, complete, or equitable. Thus, the absence of an indispensable
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party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void, for want of authority to act, not only as to the
absent parties but even as to those present.
All persons having an interest in the property are indispensable parties in an action for partition
2. With regard to actions for partition, Section 1, Rule 69 of the Rules of Court requires that all persons
interested in the property shall be joined as defendants. Thus, all the co-heirs and persons having
an interest in the property are indispensable parties; as such, an action for partition will not lie
without the joinder of the said parties.
3. Santiagos contention that he had already bought the interests of the majority of the heirs and, thus, they
should no longer be regarded as indispensable parties deserves no merit. In actions for partition, the court
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cannot properly issue an order to divide the property, unless it first makes a determination as to the
existence of co-ownership. The court must initially settle the issue of ownership, which is the first stage in an
action for partition. Indubitably, therefore, until and unless this issue of co-ownership is definitely and finally
resolved, it would be premature to effect a partition of the disputed properties
4. While it is conceded that Santiago bought the interests of majority of the heirs of Conrado, Sr. as
evidenced by the subject document, as a vendee, he merely steps into the shoes of the vendors-heirs. Since
his interest over the subject land is merely derived from that of the vendors-heirs, the latter
should first be determined as co-owners thereof, thus necessitating the joinder of all those who
have vested interests in such land, i.e., the aforesaid heirs of Conrado, Sr., in Santiagos complaint.
Omission of heirs, which are indispensable parties, renders the complaint for partition defective
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5. Conrado, Sr. has heirs, both legitimate and illegitimate, who are entitled to a pro-indiviso share in the
subject land. However, both Mateo, Sr. and Cebeleo, Sr. pre-deceased Conrado, Sr. and, thus, pursuant to the
rules on representation under the Civil Code, their respective interests shall be represented by their children.
The heirs whether in their own capacity or in representation of their direct ascendant have vested rights
over the subject land and, as such, should be impleaded as indispensable parties in an action for partition
thereof.
6. However, a reading of Santiagos complaint shows that as regards Mateo, Sr.s interest, only Felcon was
impleaded, excluding therefrom his siblings and co-representatives. Similarly, with regard to Cebeleo, Sr., the
complaint impleaded his wife, Maude, when pursuant to Article 972 of the Civil Code, the proper
representatives to his interest should have been his children, Cebeleo, Jr. and Neobel. Verily, Santiagos
omission of the aforesaid heirs renders his complaint for partition defective.
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In non-joinder of indispensable parties, the proper remedy is to implead them and not to dismiss
the case
7. In fine, the absence of the aforementioned indispensable parties in the instant complaint for judicial
partition renders all subsequent actions of the RTC null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the
absent parties, but even as to those present. Therefore, the CA correctly set aside the order of partition
issued by the RTC.
8. However, the CA erred in ordering the dismissal of the complaint on account of Santiagos failure to
implead all the indispensable parties in his complaint. In instances of non-joinder of indispensable
parties, the proper remedy is to implead them and not to dismiss the case.
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9. The non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an action . At any
stage of a judicial proceeding and/or at such times as are just, parties may be added on the
motion of a party or on the initiative of the tribunal concerned. If the plaintiff refuses to implead
an indispensable party despite the order of the court, that court may dismiss the complaint for
the plaintiffs failure to comply with the order. The remedy is to implead the non-party claimed to be
indispensable. (see Heirs of Mesina v. Heirs of Fian, Sr)
6. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CACAYURAN
The core issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the Municipality should be deemed as an
indispensable party to the instant case, and thus, be ordered impleaded herein.
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The Court rules in the affirmative.

"An indispensable party is one whose interest will be affected by the court's action in the
litigation, and without whom no final determination of the case can be had. The party's interest in
the subject matter of the suit and in the relief sought are so inextricably intertwined with the other parties'
that his legal presence as a party to the proceeding is an absolute necessity. In his absence, there cannot
be a resolution of the dispute of the parties before the court which is effective, complete, or
equitable." Thus, the absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and
void, for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present.
Nevertheless, it must be stressed that the failure to implead any indispensable party to a suit does
not necessarily result in the outright dismissal of the complaint. In Heirs of Mesina v. Heirs of Fian,
164
Sr. the Court definitively explained that in instances of non-joinder of indispensable parties, the proper
remedy is to implead them and not to dismiss the case:
The non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an action. At any
stage of a judicial proceeding and/or at such times as are just, parties may be added on the motion of a party
or on the initiative of the tribunal concerned. If the plaintiff refuses to implead an indispensable party despite
the order of the court, that court may dismiss the complaint for the plaintiffs failure to comply with the
order.The remedy is to implead the non-party claimed to be indispensable.40(Emphases and
underscoring supplied)
In this case, a judicious review of the records reveals that Cacayuran's complaint against LBP and the
municipal officers primarily prays that the commercialization of the Public Plaza be enjoined and also, that the
165
Subject Loans be declared null and void for having been unlawfully entered into by the said officers. However,
Cacayuran failed to implead in his complaint the Municipality, a real party-in-interest and an indispensable
party that stands to be directly affected by any judicial resolution on the case, considering that: (a) the
contracting parties to the Subject Loans are LBP and the Municipality; and (b) the Municipality owns the Public
Plaza as well as the improvements constructed thereon, including the Agoo People's Center. x x x
The Court observes that it is only now that the issue of the Municipality's exclusion from the instant case,
despite its status as an indispensable party, became apparent. This recent finding may be credited to the fact
that the initial parties before the Court, i.e., LBP and Cacayuran, have dissimilar interests from that of the
Municipality, and, hence, had no incentive to raise the issue of the latter's status as an indispensable party.
On the one hand, Cacayuran's interest to the case is centered on the declaration of nullity of the Subject
Loans, as well as the enjoinment of the commercialization of the Public Plaza; and on the other hand, LBP's
166
interest to the case is anchored on its capacity as creditor to the Subject Loans. To the mind of the Court, the
municipal officers would have been in the best position to raise this issue; however, they were unable to do
so because their appeal before the CA was deemed abandoned for their failure to file an appellants' brief on
time.
Be that as it may, the Court is not precluded from taking cognizance of the Municipality's status as an
indispensable party even at this stage of the proceedings. Indeed, the presence of indispensable parties
is necessary to vest the court with jurisdiction and, corollarily, the issue on jurisdiction may be
raised at any stage of the proceedings. Thus, as it has now come to the fore that any resolution of this
case would not be possible and, hence, not attain any real finality due to the non-joinder of the Municipality,
the Court is constrained to set aside all subsequent actuations of the courts a quo in this case, including that
of the Court's, and remand the case all the way back to the RTC for the inclusion of all indispensable parties
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to the case and its immediate disposition on the merits. With this, the propriety of the Municipality's present
intervention is now mooted.
7. SPS. LAUS & SPS. KOH vs. OPTIMUM SECURITY SERVICES, INC.
The error springs from the CA's misconception that the alleged real owners of the subject properties, while
real parties in interest, are indispensable parties to the case. The distinction between the two and the
operational parameters as to each are well-settled in jurisprudence.
A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment of the
suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. On the other hand, an indispensable party is a
party in interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action, in contrast to a
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necessary party, which is one who is not indispensable but who ought to be joined as a party if
complete relief is to be accorded as to those already parties, or for a complete determination or
settlement of the claim subject of the action.
x x x "[I]f a suit is not brought in the name of or against the real party in interest, a motion to
dismiss may be filed on the ground that the complaint states no cause of action." However, [the
dismissal on this ground entails] an examination of whether the parties presently pleaded are interested in
the outcome of the litigation, and not whether all persons interested in such outcome are actually pleaded.
The latter query is relevant in discussions concerning indispensable and necessary parties, but not in
discussions concerning real parties in interest. Both indispensable and necessary parties are considered as
real parties in interest, since both classes of parties stand to be benefited or injured by the judgment of the
suit. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
169
Meanwhile, in Plasabas v. CA, it was held that "the non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a
ground for the dismissal of an action. The remedy is to implead the non-party claimed to be
indispensable. Parties may be added by order of the court on motion of the party or on its own initiative at
any stage of the action and/or at such times as are just. If petitioner refuses to implead an
indispensable party despite the order of the court, the latter may dismiss the complaint/petition
for the plaintiffs/petitioner's failure to comply therewith."
In this case, while the alleged real owners of the subject properties may be considered as real parties in
interest for the reason that their supposed rights over these properties stand to be prejudiced, they are not
indispensable parties to the instant suit. Despite its denomination as an action for "damages' in the
complaint's caption, the action, as may be gleaned from the pleading's allegations, is really one for injunction
as it ultimately seeks to permanently enjoin respondent and the other defendants, from restricting
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petitioners' access to the subject properties. The crux of the main case, therefore, is WON respondent and
said defendants were justified in preventing petitioners from conducting the relocation survey on the subject
properties. Damages are also sought as ancillary relief for the acts complained of. These issues can be
resolved independent of the participation of the alleged real owners of the subject properties. Hence, they are
not indispensable parties, without whom no final determination can be had.
In any event, even on the assumption that they are indispensable parties, the non-joinder of indispensable
parties is, as above-discussed, still not a ground for the dismissal of the suit. The proper course of action is for
the court to order that they be impleaded. Only upon refusal of or non-compliance with such directive, may
the complaint be dismissed.
In view of the nature of the case as above-explained, respondent and the other defendants are real parties in
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interest. Clearly, they stand to be directly injured by an adverse judgment. They are the parties against whom
the prayed for injunction is directed and are also alleged to be liable for the resultant damage.
8. NEWSWEEK, INC. vs. IAC, et al.
In the case of Corpus vs. Cuaderno, Sr. (16 SCRA 807) this Court ruled that "in order to maintain a libel
suit, it is essential that the victim be identifiable (People vs. Monton, L-16772, November 30, 1962),
although it is not necessary that he be named (19 A.L.R. 116)." In an earlier case, this Court declared
that ". . . defamatory matter which does not reveal the identity of the person upon whom the
imputation is cast, affords no ground of action unless it be shown that the readers of the libel
could have identified the personality of the individual defamed." (Kunkle vs. Cablenews ---- American
and Lyons, 42 Phil. 760).
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This principle has been recognized to be of vital importance, especially where a group or class of persons, as
in the case at bar, claim to have been defamed, for it is evident that the larger the collectivity, the more
difficult it is for the individual member to prove that the defamatory remarks apply to him.
In the case of Uy Tioco vs. Yang Shu Wen, 32 Phil. 624, this Court held as follows:
"Defamatory remarks directed at a class or group of persons in general language only, are not actionable by
individuals composing the class or group unless the statements are sweeping; and it is very probable that
even then no action would he where the body is composed of so large a number of persons that common
sense would tell those to whom the publication was made that there was room for persons connected with
the body to pursue an upright and law abiding course and that it would be unreasonable and absurd to
condemn all because of the actions of a part." (supra, p. 628).
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X that where the defamation is alleged to have been directed at a group or class, it is essential that the
statement must be so sweeping or all-embracing as to apply to every individual in that group or class, or
sufficiently specific so that each individual in the class or group can prove that the defamatory statement
specifically pointed to him, so that he can bring the action separately, if need be.
We note that private respondents filed a "class suit" in representation of all the 8,500 sugarcane planters of
Negros Occidental. Petitioner disagrees and argues that the absence of any actionable basis in the complaint
cannot be cured by the filing of a class suit on behalf of the aforesaid sugar planters.
We find petitioner's contention meritorious.
The case at bar is not a class suit. It is not a case where one or more may sue for the benefit of all (Mathay
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vs. Consolidated Bank and Trust Company, 58 SCRA 559) or where the representation of class interest
affected by the judgment or decree is indispensable to make each member of the class an actual party
(Borlaza vs. Polistico, 47 Phil. 348). We have here a case where each of the plaintiffs has a separate
and distinct reputation in the community. They do not have a common or general interest in the
subject matter of the controversy.
9. OPOSA vs. FACTORAN, JR.
Before ruling on the very issue at hand, the SC had first made a declaration whether the civil case is a class
suit or not.
Petitioners instituted Civil Case No. 90-777 as a class suit. The original defendant and the present
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respondents did not take issue with this matter. Nevertheless, We hereby rule that the said civil case is
indeed a class suit. The subject matter of the complaint is of common and general interest not
just to several, but to all citizens of the Philippines. Consequently, since the parties are so
numerous, it becomes impracticable, if not totally impossible, to bring all of them before the
court. We likewise declare that the plaintiffs therein are numerous and representative enough to
ensure the full protection of all concerned interests. Hence, all the requisites for the filing of a
valid class suit under Section 12, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court are present both in the
said civil case and in the instant petition, the latter being but an incident to the former.
This case, however, has a special and novel element. Petitioners minors assert that they represent their
generation as well as generations yet unborn. We find no difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves, for
others of their generation and for the succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in
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behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational
responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right,
as hereinafter expounded, considers the "rhythm and harmony of nature." Nature means the created world in
its entirety. Such rhythm and harmony indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization,
management, renewal and conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, offshore areas and other natural resources to the end that their exploration, development and utilization be
equitably accessible to the present as well as future generations. 10 Needless to say, every generation has a
responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and
healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minors' assertion of their right to a sound environment
constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their obligation o ensure the protection of that right for the
generations to come.
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xxx
10. JUANA COMPLEX I HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., et. Al vs. FIL-ESTATE LAND, INC., et. al
Section 12, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court defines a class suit, as follows:
Sec. 12.Class suit. When the subject matter of the controversy is one of common or general interest to
many persons so numerous that it is impracticable to join all as parties, a number of them which the court
finds to be sufficiently numerous and representative as to fully protect the interests of all concerned may sue
or defend for the benefit of all. Any party in interest shall have the right to intervene to protect his individual
interest.
178
The necessary elements for the maintenance of a class suit are: 1) the subject matter of
controversy is one of common or general interest to many persons; 2) the parties affected are so
numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all to court; and 3) the parties bringing the class
suit are sufficiently numerous or representative of the class and can fully protect the interests of
all concerned.
In this case, the suit is clearly one that benefits all commuters and motorists who use La Paz Road. As
succinctly stated by the CA:
The subject matter of the instant case, i.e., the closure and excavation of the La Paz Road, is initially shown to
be of common or general interest to many persons. The records reveal that numerous individuals have filed
manifestations with the lower court, conveying their intention to join private respondents in the suit and
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claiming that they are similarly situated with private respondents for they were also prejudiced by the acts of
petitioners in closing and excavating the La Paz Road. Moreover, the individuals sought to be represented by
private respondents in the suit are so numerous that it is impracticable to join them all as parties and be
named individually as plaintiffs in the complaint. These individuals claim to be residents of various barangays
in Bian, Laguna and other barangays in San Pedro, Laguna.
11. THE LAW FIRM OF LAGUESMA MAGSALIN CONSULTA AND GASTARDO vs. THE COMMISSION ON
AUDIT, et al.
When a government entity engages the legal services of private counsel, it must do so with the necessary
authorization required by law; otherwise, its officials bind themselves to be personally liable for
compensating private counsels services.
180
Petitioner is a real party-in-interest

Respondents argue that it is Clark, and not petitioner, which is the real party-in-interest since the subject of
the assailed decision and resolution was the corporations request for clearance to pay petitioner its legal
fees. - This is erroneous.
Petitioner is a real party-in-interest, as defined in Rule 3, Section 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure:
xxx
Petitioner does not have a mere incidental interest, and its interest is not merely
consequential. Respondents mistakenly narrow down the issue to whether they erred in denying Clark
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Development Corporations request for clearance of the retainership contract. In doing so, they argue that the
interested parties are limited only to Clark Development Corporation and respondents.
The net effect of upholding or setting aside the assailed COA rulings would be to either disallow or allow the
payment of legal fees to petitioner. Petitioner, therefore, stands to either be benefited or injured by the suit,
or entitled to its avails. It is a real party-in-interest.
Clarks BOD, on the other hand, should have been impleaded in this case as a necessary party.
A necessary party is defined as one who is not indispensable but who ought to be joined as a
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party if complete relief is to be accorded as to those already parties, or for a complete

determination or settlement of the claim subject of the action.
The actions of the Board of Directors precipitated the issues in this case. If the petition is granted, then the
officers are relieved of liability to petitioner. If the rulings of respondents are upheld, then it is the Board of
Directors that will be liable to petitioner.
Any relief in this case would be incomplete without joining the members of the Board of Directors.
11. JOEL CARDENAS, et al. vs. HEIRS of SPS. AGUILAR
In assailing the RTC Order, petitioner averred that after the death of the original parties to the case, there was
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no proper substitution of the parties nor was there an appointment of an executor or administrator by the
court. To petitioner, this constitutes a procedural faux pas which renders the proceedings before the lower
court seriously infirmed.
xxx
Even granting that petitioner was in good faith in assailing the execution of the RTC Decision, his argument
that the RTC has no jurisdiction to issue the Writ of Execution absent proper substitution still holds no water.
The pertinent provision of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
Section 16.Death of party; duty of counsel. - Whenever a party to a pending action dies, and the claim is
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not thereby extinguished, it shall be the duty of his counsel to inform the court within thirty (30) days after
such death of the fact thereof, and to give the name and address of his legal representative or
representatives. Failure of counsel to comply with his duty shall be a ground for disciplinary action.
The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased, without requiring the
appointment of an executor or administrator and the court may appoint a guardian ad litem for the minor
heirs.
The court shall forthwith order said legal representative or representatives to appear and be substituted
within a period of 30 days from notice.
If no legal representative is named by the counsel for the deceased party, or if the one so named shall fail to
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appear within the specified period, the court may order the opposing party, within a specified time, to procure
the appointment of an executor or administrator for the estate of the deceased and the latter shall
immediately appear for and on behalf of the deceased. The court charges in procuring such appointment, if
defrayed by the opposing party, may be recovered as costs.
The purpose behind the rule on substitution is the protection of the right of every party to due
process. It is to ensure that the deceased party would continue to be properly represented in the
suit through the duly appointed legal representative of his estate. Non-compliance with the rule
on substitution would render the proceedings and the judgment of the trial court infirm because
the court acquires no jurisdiction over the persons of the legal representatives or of the heirs on
whom the trial and the judgment would be binding.
186
In the case at bar, we find that no right to procedural due process was violated when the counsel for the
respondents failed to notify the court of the fact of death of Simplicia and even if no formal substitution of
parties was effected after the such death. As can be gleaned above, the rationale behind the rule on
substitution is to apprise the heir or the substitute that he is being brought to the jurisdiction of the court in
lieu of the deceased party by operation of law. The said purpose was not defeated even if no proper
substitution of party was made because Melba, the heir of the deceased Simplicia, was already impleaded as
a party-defendant when the latter filed his Amended Complaint. For sure, petitioner is very much aware that
despite the passing of the Spouses Aguilar, the case would still continue because Melba, on her own behalf
and as the legal representative of her deceased parents, possessed the authority to pursue the case to its
end.
In Vda. De Salazar v. Court of Appeals, we ruled that a formal substitution of the heirs in place of the
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deceased is no longer necessary if the heirs continued to appear and participated in the
proceedings of the case.
Although the jurisprudential rule is that failure to make the substitution is a jurisdictional defect, it should be
noted that the purpose of this procedural rule is to comply with due process requirements . The original party
having died, he could not continue to defend himself in court despite the fact that the action survived him.
For the case to continue, the real party in interest must be substituted for the deceased. The real party in
interest is the one who would be affected by the judgment. It could be the administrator or
executor or the heirs. In the instant case, the heirs are the proper substitutes. Substitution gives them the
opportunity to continue the defense for the deceased. Substitution is important because such opportunity to
defend is a requirement to comply with due process. Such substitution consists of making the proper changes
in the caption of the case which may be called the formal aspect of it. Such substitution also includes the
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process of letting the substitutes know that they shall be bound by any judgment in the case and that they
should therefore actively participate in the defense of the deceased. This part may be called the substantive
aspect. This is the heart of the procedural rule because this substantive aspect is the one that truly embodies
and gives effect to the purpose of the rule. It is this court's view that compliance with the substantive aspect
of the rule despite failure to comply with the formal aspect may be considered substantial compliance.
Similarly in this case, the RTC had priorly acquired jurisdiction over the person of Melba after she was served
with summons as a party-defendant to the case and she continuously appeared and participated therein up
to this point. Such jurisdiction previously acquired achieved the purpose of a formal substitution.
E. PLEADINGS
189
ON COUNTERCLAIMS
PINGA vs. HEIRS of SANTIAGO
We hold that under Section 3, Rule 17 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the dismissal of the complaint
due to the fault of plaintiff does not necessarily carry with it the dismissal of the counterclaim,
compulsory or otherwise. In fact, the dismissal of the complaint is without prejudice to the right of
defendants to prosecute the counterclaim.
xxx
The express qualification in the provision that the dismissal of the complaint due to the plaintiff's
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fault, as in the case for failure to prosecute, is without prejudice to the right of the defendant to
prosecute his counterclaim in the same or separate action.
Accordingly, the RTC clearly erred when it ordered the dismissal of the counterclaim, since Section 3, Rule 17
mandates that the dismissal of the complaint is without prejudice to the right of the defendant to prosecute
the counterclaim in the same or separate action. If the RTC were to dismiss the counterclaim, it should be on
the merits of such counterclaim. Reversal of the RTC is in order, and a remand is necessary for trial on the
merits of the counterclaim.
It would be perfectly satisfactory for the Court to leave this matter at that. Still, an explanation of the reason
behind the new rule is called for, considering that the rationale behind the previous rule was frequently
elaborated upon.
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xxx
Whatever the nature of the counterclaim, it bears the same integral characteristics as a
complaint; namely a cause (or causes) of action constituting an act or omission by which a party
violates the right of another. The main difference lies in that the cause of action in the counterclaim is
maintained by the defendant against the plaintiff, while the converse holds true with the complaint. Yet, as
with a complaint, a counterclaim without a cause of action cannot survive.
It would then seemingly follow that if the dismissal of the complaint somehow eliminates the cause(s) of the
counterclaim, then the counterclaim cannot survive. Yet that hardly is the case, especially as a general rule.
More often than not, the allegations that form the counterclaim are rooted in an act or omission
of the plaintiff other than the plaintiff's very act of filing the complaint. Moreover, such acts or
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omissions imputed to the plaintiff are often claimed to have occurred prior to the filing of the
complaint itself. The only apparent exception to this circumstance is if it is alleged in the
counterclaim that the very act of the plaintiff in filing the complaint precisely causes the
violation of the defendant's rights. Yet even in such an instance, it remains debatable whether
the dismissal or withdrawal of the complaint is sufficient to obviate the pending cause of action
maintained by the defendant against the plaintiff.
These considerations persist whether the counterclaim in question is permissive or compulsory. A

compulsory counterclaim arises out of or is connected with the transaction or occurrence
constituting the subject matter of the opposing party's claim, does not require for its
adjudication the presence of third parties, and stands within the jurisdiction of the court both as
to the amount involved and the nature of the claim. The fact that the culpable acts on which the
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counterclaim is based are founded within the same transaction or occurrence as the complaint, is insufficient
causation to negate the counterclaim together with the complaint. The dismissal or withdrawal of the
complaint does not traverse the boundaries of time to undo the act or omission of the plaintiff against the
defendant, or vice versa. While such dismissal or withdrawal precludes the pursuit of litigation by the plaintiff,
either through his/her own initiative or fault, it would be iniquitous to similarly encumber the defendant who
maintained no such initiative or fault. If the defendant similarly moves for the dismissal of the counterclaim or
neglects to timely pursue such action, let the dismissal of the counterclaim be premised on those grounds
imputable to the defendant, and not on the actuations of the plaintiff.
xxx
Thus, the present rule embodied in Sections 2 and 3 of Rule 17 ordains a more equitable disposition of the
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counterclaims by ensuring that any judgment thereon is based on the merit of the counterclaim itself and not
on the survival of the main complaint. Certainly, if the counterclaim is palpably without merit or suffers
jurisdictional flaws which stand independent of the complaint, the trial court is not precluded from dismissing
it under the amended rules, provided that the judgment or order dismissing the counterclaim is premised on
those defects. At the same time, if the counterclaim is justified, the amended rules now unequivocally protect
such counterclaim from peremptory dismissal by reason of the dismissal of the complaint.
CHUAN vs. UY
The RTC granted the Joint MTD upon the behest of Serafin, the plaintiff therein on the main ground that the
case had become moot and academic since his title to Lot 5357 had been allegedly quieted and the reliefs
prayed for were obtained. In the Order denying the motion for reconsideration, the RTC elucidated that:
195
The Court in issuing the dismissal had already made its position on the matter very clearly such that it finds
no reason to disturb the subject order. As clarified, a party-litigant in a civil action like the plaintiff herein,
cannot be compelled to so continuously litigate his case if he does not want to anymore as was obtaining in
this case. More so that the principal reliefs prayed for in the complaint had already been served as was so
admitted by the plaintiff. Being so, this Court finds it repugnant to go on with the hearing of
movants-defendants counterclaim for what is to be countered by the movant when the claim of
the plaintiff, at his own instance, had already been dismissed it having been served and satisfied
as aforestated. And this is so because what is contemplated under the Rules authorizing the
hearing of defendants counterclaim is when the dismissal is not at the instance of the plaintiff.
196
As can be gleaned from the assailed orders, the RTC erred when it dismissed the case when the present rules
state that the dismissal shall be limited only to the complaint. A dismissal of an action is different from
a mere dismissal of the complaint. For this reason, since only the complaint and not the action is
dismissed, the defendant in spite of said dismissal may still prosecute his counterclaim in the same action.
The case of Pinga v. Heirs of German Santiagois quite instructive which this Court finds worth reiterating. In
Pinga, the Court clearly stated that the dismissal of the complaint does not necessarily result to the dismissal
of the counterclaim... The Court held that:
At present, even Section 2, concerning dismissals on motion of the plaintiff, now recognizes the
right of the defendant to prosecute the counterclaim either in the same or separate action
notwithstanding the dismissal of the complaint, and without regard as to the permissive or
compulsory nature of the counterclaim.
197
In the instant case, the petitioners preference to have his counterclaim (and cross-claims) be prosecuted in
the same action was timely manifested. The records show that Serafin and Leopolda furnished the
petitioners counsel with a copy of their Joint Motion to Dismiss by posting it (via registered mail). Said motion
was filed in court the following day. xxx the petitioner filed his Opposition/Comment thereto. xxx the
petitioner expressed his preference to have his counterclaim and cross-claim prosecuted in the same case x x
xcralawlawlibrary
There are valid reasons why the petitioner vehemently objected to the dismissal of the case upon the joint
motion of Serafin and Leopolda and insisted to have his counterclaim prosecuted in the same action.
Serafin instituted the instant case due to the existence of certain documents affecting his title, namely:
Henrys Affidavit of Self-Adjudication with Deed of Sale which names Leopolda as the buyer; and Tax
198
Declaration No. 01532 which was issued in the name of the latter. In his Affidavit of Self-Adjudication, Henry
transferred whatever right and interest he had on the subject lot to Leopolda. Subsequently, by reason of the
amicable settlement between Serafin and Leopolda, the latter waived and abandoned all her rights to Lot
5357.
On the other hand, the petitioner asserts that the subject property was never transferred nor encumbered to
any person during Antonios lifetime. He insists that the deed of sale in favor of Spouses Cabansag is
simulated and spurious, and was intended to defraud the estate of Antonio. Further, he asserts that said
Spouses Cabansag are mere creations of Serafin.
Forthwith, the foregoing contentions touch on the very merits of the case which this Court is not prepared to
rule upon for want of sufficient factual basis since this case was dismissed by the RTC even before the parties
199
were able to present their evidence on the merits. Nonetheless, the records show that Serafin had been
aware of the petitioners claim over the property as descendants of Antonio and Dy Ochay even before the
institution of this case, which was why he impleaded the petitioner in this case. Then, the Joint Motion to
Dismiss was filed by Serafin and Leopolda on the ground that both parties were able to settle their
differences. It is rather intriguing that in said joint motion, it was alleged that Serafin was already able to
secure a certificate of title in his name dated July 26, 2001 and that both parties agreed for its cancellation
and have a title over said property issued in their common names. Clearly, the petitioner was peremptorily
left out of the picture. From the cases inception, the petitioners interests and that of his siblings over the
subject property were vigilantly defended as evidenced by the numerous and exchange of pleadings made by
the parties. It cannot therefore be denied that the petitioner has certainly valid defenses and enforceable
claims against the respondents for being dragged into this case. Thus, the petitioners manifestation of his
200
preference to have his counterclaim prosecuted in the same action is valid and in accordance with Section 2,
Rule 17 of the Rules of Court.
Korea Technologies v. Lerma, 542 SCRA 1
Docket fees required for compulsory counterclaims or cross-claims
On July 17, 1998, at the time PGSMC filed its Answer incorporating its counterclaims against KOGIES, it was
not liable to pay filing fees for said counterclaims being compulsory in nature. We stress, however, that
effective August 16, 2004 under Sec. 7, Rule 141, as amended by A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC, docket fees are now
required to be paid in compulsory counterclaim or cross-claims.
201
OCA Circular 96-2009

TO: All Judges, Clerk of Court/ Accountable Officers
Subject: Docket Fees For Compulsory Counterclaims
It has reached the attention of this Office that some courts are collecting docket fees for compulsory
counterclaims based apparently on a portion of the decision. In Korea Technologies Co. Ltd. vs. Alberto A.
Lerma, etc., et ai., G.R. No 143581, January 7,2008. which stated that:
On July 17, 1998, at the time PGSM filed its Answer Incorporating its counterclaims against KOGIES, it was
not liable to pay filing fees for said counterclaims being compulsory in nature. We stress, however, that
202
effective August 16, 2004 under Sec. 7 Rule 141, as amended by A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC, docket fees
are now required to be paid in compulsory counterclaim or cross-claim." [emphasis ours]
Please be informed that the second sentence of the quoted portion of the decision, more specifically that in
bold font, has been deleted in a revised Issuance.
For the guidance of all concerned, the Resolution of this Court in A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC dated September 21,
2004 suspending payment of filing fees for compulsory counterclaims remains in effect. For ready reference,
the resolution reads as follows:
203
"The Court further Resolved to AFFIRM the actions of the Iionorable Associate Justices, in its informal
meeting held on 20 September 2004, and SUSPEND the new rates of the legal fees under Rule 141, effective
21 September 2004, viz:
"(a) Solemnization of marriage;
(b) Motions; and
(c) Compulsory counterclaims"
August 13 2009.
204
ALBA, JR. vs. MALAPAJO
A counterclaim is any claim which a defending party may have against an opposing party. A
compulsory counterclaim is one which, being cognizable by the regular courts of justice, arises
out of or is connected with the transaction or occurrence constituting the subject matter of the
opposing party's claim and does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties of
whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction. Such a counterclaim must be within the jurisdiction of the
court both as to the amount and the nature thereof, except that in an original action before the Regional Trial
Court, necessarily connected with the subject matter of the opposing party's claim or even where there is
such a connection, the Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the claim or it requires for adjudication the
presence of third persons over whom the court acquire jurisdiction. A compulsory counterclaim is barred if not
set up in the same action.
205
A counterclaim is permissive if it does not arise out of or is not necessarily connected with the
subject matter of the opposing party's claim. It is essentially an independent claim that may be filed
separately in another case.
To determine whether a counterclaim is compulsory or permissive, we have devised the following tests:
(a) Are the issues of fact and law raised by the claim and by the counterclaim largely the same?
(b) Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on defendants' claims, absent the compulsory counterclaim rule?
(c) Will substantially the same evidence support or refute plaintiffs' claim as well as the defendants'
counterclaim? and
206
(d) Is there any logical relation between the claim and the counterclaim? A positive answer to all four
questions would indicate that the counterclaim is compulsory.
xxxx
Petitioner seeks to recover the subject property by assailing the validity of the deed of sale on the subject
property which he allegedly executed in favor of respondents Malapajo on the ground of forgery. Respondents
counter-claimed that, in case the deed of sale is declared null and void, they be paid the loan petitioner
obtained from them plus the agreed monthly interest which was covered by a real estate mortgage on the
subject property executed by petitioner in favor of respondents. There is a logical relationship between
the claim and the counterclaim, as the counterclaim is connected with the transaction or
occurrence constituting the subject matter of the opposing party's claim. Notably, the same
207
evidence to sustain respondents' counterclaim would disprove petitioner's case. In the event that
respondents could convincingly establish that petitioner actually executed the promissory note and the real
estate mortgage over the subject property in their favor then petitioner's complaint might fail. Petitioner's
claim is so related logically to respondents' counterclaim, such that conducting separate trials for the claim
and the counterclaim would result in the substantial duplication of the time and effort of the court and the
parties.
Since respondents' counterclaim is compulsory, it must be set up in the same action; otherwise,
it would be barred forever. If it is filed concurrently with the main action but in a different proceeding, it
would be abated on the ground of litis pendentia; if filed subsequently, it would meet the same fate on the
ground of res judicata. There is, therefore, no need for respondents to pay docket fees and to file a
certification against forum shopping for the court to acquire jurisdiction over the said
208
counterclaim.
We agree with the RTC's disquisition in finding that respondents' counterclaim is compulsory, to wit:
The arguments of the plaintiffs that this transaction is a permissive counterclaim do not convince.
By the manner in which the answer pertaining to this transaction was phrased, the real estate mortgage was
the origin of the Deed of Absolute Sale after the loan of P600,000.00 using the same property as security for
the payment thereof was not settled. In short, it is one of defendants' defenses and controverting evidence
against plaintiffs' allegations of falsification of the Deed of Absolute Sale, the property subject of the Deed of
Sale being one and the same property subject of the mortgage.
209
xxxx
Can the Court adjudicate upon the issues [of whether or not the plaintiff could recover ownership and or
whether or not the title to the property in question may be canceled or declared null and void, and damages]
without the presence of the mother of defendants in whose favor the Real Estate Mortgage of the property
subject of this action was executed?
Definitely, this Court can. That there was an allegation pertaining to the mortgage of the property in question
to defendants' mother is only some sort of a backgrounder on why a deed of sale was executed by plaintiff in
defendants' favor, the truth or falsity of which will have to be evidentiary on the part of the parties hereto. In
short, the Court does not need the presence of defendants' mother before it can adjudicate on WON the deed
of absolute sale was genuine or falsified and WON the title to the property may be cancelled.
210
ON AMENDMENTS
Swagman Hotels and Travel, Inc. v. CA
A complaint whose cause of action has not yet accrued cannot be cured or remedied by an
amended or supplemental pleading alleging the existence or accrual of a cause of action while
the case is pending.
x x x at the time the complaint was filed with the trial court on 2 February 1999, none of the three
promissory notes was due yet; although, two of the promissory notes with the due dates of 7 August 1999
and 14 March 2000 matured during the pendency of the case with the trial court. Both courts also found that
the petitioner had been religiously paying the private respondent US$750 per month from January 1998 and
even during the pendency of the case before the trial court and that the private respondent had accepted all
211
these monthly payments.

With these findings of facts, it has become glaringly obvious that when the complaint for a sum of
money and damages was filed with the trial court on 2 February 1999, no cause of action has as
yet existed because the petitioner had not committed any act in violation of the terms of the three
promissory notes as modified by the renegotiation in December 1997. Without a cause of action, the
private respondent had no right to maintain an action in court, and the trial court should have
therefore dismissed his complaint.
Despite its finding that the petitioner corporation did not violate the modified terms of the three promissory
notes and that the payment of the principal loans were not yet due when the complaint was filed, the trial
court did not dismiss the complaint, citing Section 5, Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which
212
reads:
xxx
Amendments of pleadings are allowed under Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules in order that the actual merits of a
case may be determined in the most expeditious and inexpensive manner without regard to technicalities,
and that all other matters included in the case may be determined in a single proceeding, thereby avoiding
multiplicity of suits. Section 5 thereof applies to situations wherein evidence not within the issues raised in
the pleadings is presented by the parties during the trial, and to conform to such evidence the pleadings are
subsequently amended on motion of a party. Thus, a complaint which fails to state a cause of action may be
cured by evidence presented during the trial.
213
However, the curing effect under Section 5 is applicable only if a cause of action in fact exists at
the time the complaint is filed, but the complaint is defective for failure to allege the essential
facts. For example, if a complaint failed to allege the fulfillment of a condition precedent upon which the
cause of action depends, evidence showing that such condition had already been fulfilled when the complaint
was filed may be presented during the trial, and the complaint may accordingly be amended thereafter. Thus,
in Roces v. Jalandoni, this Court upheld the trial court in taking cognizance of an otherwise defective
complaint which was later cured by the testimony of the plaintiff during the trial. In that case, there was in
fact a cause of action and the only problem was the insufficiency of the allegations in the complaint. This
ruling was reiterated in Pascua v. CA.
It thus follows that a complaint whose cause of action has not yet accrued cannot be cured or
remedied by an amended or supplemental pleading alleging the existence or accrual of a cause
214
of action while the case is pending. Such an action is prematurely brought and is, therefore, a
groundless suit, which should be dismissed by the court upon proper motion seasonably filed by
the defendant. The underlying reason for this rule is that a person should not be summoned before the
public tribunals to answer for complaints which are immature. x x x
We are therefore of the opinion, and so hold, that unless the plaintiff has a valid and subsisting cause
of action at the time his action is commenced, the defect cannot be cured or remedied by the
acquisition or accrual of one while the action is pending, and a supplemental complaint or an
amendment setting up such after-accrued cause of action is not permissible. (Emphasis ours).
Hence, contrary to the holding of the trial court and the CA, the defect of lack of cause of action at the
commencement of this suit cannot be cured by the accrual of a cause of action during the pendency of this
215
case arising from the alleged maturity of two of the promissory notes on 7 August 1999 and 14 March 2000.
GUMABAY vs. BARALIN
The original complaint for forcible entry contained the basic prayer "that the plaintiff be declared the absolute
owner of the land in question". That relief was retained in the amended complaint. The only difference
between the original and amended complaints is that the latter contained the additional allegation that the
"defendants are now asserting and claiming title and absolute ownership over the land in question which is
adverse and against the interest of the plaintiff".
The plaintiff explained that she had to amend her complaint in order that the "real matter in dispute", which
is "the question of ownership", may be "determined in a single proceeding, thereby avoiding multiplicity of
216
suits".
We hold that the trial court's order admitting the amended complaints is in consonance with the object of the
Rules to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action and
proceeding (Sec. 2, Rule 1).
To dismiss the original complaint and to require the plaintiff to file another action to quiet title would have
resulted in circuitour, dilatory and expensive proceeding which, in the case of pauper litigant like Celestina
Gumabay, should have been avoided, as it was a prudently avoided by the trial court.
Defendants' theory that new summons should have been issued for the amended complaint is untenable.
The trial court had already acquired jurisdiction over the person of the defendants when they
217
were served with summons on the basis of the original complaint and when they appeared and
filed a motion to dismiss.
They were personally served with a copy of the amended complaint. The trial court ordered them two times
to answer that complaint. Under those circumstances, there is no basis for defendants' contention that the
trial court should have ordered of making of fetish of a technically. (See Ong Peng vs. Custodio, 111 Phil. 382,
385; Republic vs. Ker & Co., Ltd., 64 O.G. 3761, 18 SCRA 207).
Defendants' 2 lawyers were given plenty of time to answer the amended complaint. Their failure to answer
was inexcusable. The answer attached to their petition for relief form judgment does not contain any
meritorious defense.
218
Therefore, to set aside the judgment by default and grant a new trial would be an Idle ceremony. There is no
probability that defendants evidence would justify a reversal of the judgment by default. (Vda. de Yulo vs.
Chua Chuco, 87 Phil. 448. 449; Gonzalez vs. Amon, 98 Phil. 587; Miranda vs. Legaspi, 92 Phil. 290; Baquiran
vs Court of Appeals, 112 Phil. 764, 771).
CAMPOS RUEDA CORPORATION vs. BAUTISTA
After a responsive pleading has been filed, amendments to correct errors of jurisdiction cannot be filed
anymore.
CIR does not have jurisdiction over respondent Muyot's claims subject matter filed with said court.
219
Respondent Muyot must have finally realized that the CIR had no jurisdiction over his claims for, according to
his answer filed in the present case, he had filed on July 14, 1961- more than 2 years after the filing of his
action - a motion for leave to amend his complaint and to admit the amended complaint attached to his
motion, the amendment consisting precisely in the addition of a third cause of action where, inter alia, he
alleged that on May 31, 1953, he was illegally dismissed by herein petitioner and that, as a consequence, he
was entitled to reinstatement, with back wages from the date of his illegal dismissal up to his actual
reinstatement.
Obviously the purpose of the amendment was to make his case fall within the jurisdiction of the respondent
court. This attempt is, in our opinion, of no avail.
It is settled in this jurisdiction that the jurisdiction of a court is determined by the allegations made in the
220
complaint or petition. On the other hand, we have also held heretofore that this principle applies to
proceedings in the Court of Industrial Relations.
The insufficiency of the allegations of Muyot's complaint to place his action within the jurisdiction of the
respondent court could not be cured by amendment, for in Rosario vs. Carandang, we clearly held that "a
complaint can not be amended so as to confer jurisdiction on the court in which it is filed, if the
cause of action originally set forth was not within the court's jurisdiction."
Moreover, the record does not show at all that the CIR has admitted the amended complaint.
BAUTISTA vs. MAYA-MAYA COTTAGES, INDUSTRIES, INC.
221
Section 2, Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, provides: "SEC. 2. Amendments as a
matter of right. - A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of right at any time before a
responsive pleading is served or, in the case of a reply, at any time within ten 10 days after it is served."
The above provision clearly shows that before the filing of any responsive pleading , a party has the
absolute right to amend his pleading, regardless of whether a new cause of action or change in theory is
introduced. It is settled that a motion to dismiss is not the responsive pleading contemplated by the
Rule. Records show that petitioners had not yet filed a responsive pleading to the original complaint in Civil
Case No. 371. What they filed was a motion to dismiss. It follows that respondent, as a plaintiff, may
file an amended complaint even after the original complaint was ordered dismissed, provided
that the order of dismissal is not yet final, as in this case.
222
Verily, the CA correctly held that in issuing the assailed Order admitting the amended complaint, the trial
court did not gravely abuse its discretion. Hence, neither certiorari nor prohibition would lie.
FORUM SHOPPING/VERIFICATION
CAGAYAN VALLEY DRUG CORPORATION vs. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE
With respect to an individual litigant, there is no question that litigants must sign the sworn verification
and certification unless they execute a power of attorney authorizing another person to sign it. With respect
to a juridical person, Sec. 4, Rule 7 on verification and Sec. 5, Rule 7 on certification against forum
shopping are silent as to who the authorized signatory should be. Said rules do not indicate if the submission
of
a
board
resolution
authorizing
the
officer
or
representative
is
necessary.
223
Corporate
powers
exercised
through
board
of
directors
xxx
In sum, we have held that the following officials or employees of the company can sign the
verification and certification without need of a board resolution: (1) the Chairperson of the Board
of Directors, (2) the President of a corporation, (3) the General Manager or Acting General
Manager, (4) Personnel Officer, and (5) an Employment Specialist in a labor case.
While the above cases do not provide a complete listing of authorized signatories to the verification and
certification required by the rules, the determination of the sufficiency of the authority was done on a case to
224
case basis. The rationale applied in the foregoing cases is to justify the authority of corporate officers or
representatives of the corporation to sign the verification or certificate against forum shopping, being "in a
position to verify the truthfulness and correctness of the allegations in the petition."
Authority
from
board
of
directors
required
In Philippine Airlines v. Flight Attendants and Stewards Association of the Philippines, we ruled that only
individuals vested with authority by a valid board resolution may sign the certificate of nonforum shopping on behalf of a corporation. The action can be dismissed if the certification was
submitted unaccompanied by proof of the signatory's authority. We believe that appending the board
resolution to the complaint or petition is the better procedure to obviate any question on the authority of the
signatory to the verification and certification. The required submission of the board resolution is grounded on
225
the basic precept that corporate powers are exercised by the board of directors, and not solely by an officer
of the corporation. Hence, the power to sue and be sued in any court or quasi-judicial tribunal is necessarily
lodged
with
the
said
board.
There
is
substantial
compliance
with
Rule
7,
Secs.
and
In the case at bar, we so hold that petitioner substantially complied with Secs. 4 and 5, Rule 7 of the 1997
Revised Rules on Civil Procedure. First, the requisite board resolution has been submitted albeit belatedly by
petitioner. Second, we apply our ruling in Lepanto with the rationale that the President of petitioner is in a
position to verify the truthfulness and correctness of the allegations in the petition. Third, the President of
petitioner has signed the complaint before the CTA at the inception of this judicial claim for refund or tax
credit.
226
YAP, SR. vs. SIAO, et al.

In the leading case of Cagayan Valley Drug Corporation v. Commission on Internal Revenue, the Court, in
summarizing numerous jurisprudence, rendered a definitive rule that the following officials or employees
of the company can sign the verification and certification without need of a board resolution:
(1) the Chairperson of the Board of Directors,
(2) the President of a corporation,
(3) the General Manager or Acting General Manager,
227
(4) Personnel Officer, and

(5) an Employment Specialist in a labor case.
The rationale behind the rule is that these officers are "in a position to verify the truthfulness and correctness
of the allegations in the petition."
In Cebu Metro Pharmacy, Inc v. Euro-Med Laboratories, Pharmacy, Inc., the President and Manager of Cebu
Metro was held by the Court as having the authority to sign the verification and certification of non-forum
shopping even without the submission of a written authority from the board. The Court went on to say:
228
As the corporation's President and Manager, she is in a position to verify the truthfulness and correctness of
the allegations in the petition. In addition, such an act is presumed to be included in the scope of her
authority to act within the domain of the general objectives of the corporation's business and her usual duties
in the absence of any contrary provision in the corporation's charter or by-laws.
xxx
Bolstering our conclusion that the certification of non-forum shopping is valid is the subsequent appending of
the board resolution to petitioners' motion for reconsideration. The Board of Directors of Cebu South
Memorial Garden, through a Board Resolution, not only authorized the President of the corporation to sign the
Certificate of Forum-Shopping but it ratified the action taken by Gilbert Yap in signing the forum-shopping
certificate.
229
In Swedish Match Philippines, Inc. v. The Treasurer of the City of Manila, we held that the belated submission
of a Secretary's certification constitutes substantial compliance with the rules
xxxx
Clearly, a defect in the certification is allowed on the ground of substantial compliance as in this case.
Applying the above-mentioned rule, the signatures of petitioners Gabriel Yap, Jr. and Hyman Yap are not
indispensable for the validity of the certification. These petitioners indeed share a common cause of action
with Gilbert Yap in that they are impleaded as officers and directors of Cebu South Memorial Garden, the very
same
corporation
represented
by
Gilbert
Yap.
230
At any rate, any objection as to compliance with the requirement of verification in the complaint should have
been raised in the proceedings below, and not in the appellate court for the first time.
In Young v. John Keng Seng, it was also held that the question of forum shopping cannot be raised in the Court
of Appeals and in the Supreme Court, since such an issue must be raised at the earliest opportunity in a
motion to dismiss or a similar pleading.
FUJI TELEVISION NETWORK, INC. vs. ESPIRITU
The Rules of Court requires the submission of verification
231
and certification
xxx
Effects of non-compliance
against
forum
shopping
Uy v. Landbank discussed the effect of non-compliance with regard to verification and stated that:
[t]he requirement regarding verification of a pleading is formal, not jurisdictional. Such requirement is simply
a condition affecting the form of pleading, the non-compliance of which does not necessarily render the
pleading fatally defective. Verification is simply intended to secure an assurance that the allegations in the
pleading are true and correct and not the product of the imagination or a matter of speculation, and that the
pleading is filed in good faith. The court may order the correction of the pleading if the verification is lacking
or act on the pleading although it is not verified, if the attending circumstances are such that strict
232
compliance with the rules may be dispensed with in order that the ends of justice may thereby be
served. (Citations omitted)
Shipside Incorporated v. Court of Appeals cited the discussion in Uy and differentiated its effect from noncompliance with the requirement of certification against forum shopping:
On the other hand, the lack of certification against forum shopping is generally not curable by the
submission thereof after the filing of the petition. Section 5, Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure provides that the failure of the petitioner to submit the required documents that
should accompany the petition, including the certification against forum shopping, shall be
sufficient ground for the dismissal thereof. The same rule applies to certifications against forum
233
shopping signed by a person on behalf of a corporation which are unaccompanied by proof that said
signatory is authorized to file a petition on behalf of the corporation. (Emphasis supplied)
Effects
of
substantial
with
the
requirement
and certification against forum shopping
of
compliance
verification
Although the general rule is that failure to attach a verification and certification against forum shopping is a
ground for dismissal, there are cases where this court allowed substantial compliance.
xxx
234
Altres v. Empleo summarized the rules on verification and certification against forum shopping in this manner:
For the guidance of the bench and bar, the Court restates in capsule form the jurisprudential pronouncements
. . . respecting non-compliance with the requirement on, or submission of defective, verification and
certification against forum shopping:
1) A distinction must be made between non-compliance with the requirement on or submission of defective
verification, and non-compliance with the requirement on or submission of defective certification against
forum shopping.
2) As to verification, non-compliance therewith or a defect therein does not necessarily render the pleading
fatally defective. The court may order its submission or correction or act on the pleading if the attending
235
circumstances are such that strict compliance with the Rule may be dispensed with in order that the ends of
justice may be served thereby.
3) Verification is deemed substantially complied with when one who has ample knowledge to swear to the
truth of the allegations in the complaint or petition signs the verifcation, and when matters alleged in the
petition have been made in good faith or are true and correct.
4) As to certification against forum shopping, non-compliance therewith or a defect therein, unlike in

verification, is generally not curable by its subsequent submission or correction thereof, unless there is a
need to relax the Rule on the ground of substantial compliance or presence of special circumstances or
compelling reasons.
236
5) The certification against forum shopping must be

otherwise, those who did not sign will be dropped as
circumstances, however, as when all the plaintiffs or
common cause of action or defense, the signature of
shopping substantially complies with the Rule.
signed by all the plaintiffs or petitioners in a case;

parties to the case. Under reasonable or justifiable
petitioners share a common interest and invoke a
only one of them in the certification against forum
6) Finally, the certification against forum shopping must be executed by the party-pleader, not by his
counsel. If, however, for reasonable or justifiable reasons, the party-pleader is unable to sign, he must
execute a Special Power of Attorney designating his counsel of record to sign on his behalf.
There
was
by Fuji Television Network, Inc.
237
substantial
compliance
Being a corporation, Fuji exercises its power to sue and be sued through its board of directors or duly
authorized officers and agents. Thus, the physical act of signing the verification and certification against
forum shopping can only be done by natural persons duly authorized either by the corporate by-laws or a
board resolution.
In its petition for review on certiorari, Fuji attached Hideaki Otas secretarys certificate, authorizing Shuji
Yano and Jin Eto to represent and sign for and on behalf of Fuji. The secretarys certificate was duly
authenticated by Sulpicio Confiado, Consul-General of the Philippines in Japan. Likewise attached to the
petition is the special power of attorney executed by Shuji Yano, authorizing Corazon to sign on his
behalf. The verification and certification against forum shopping was signed by Corazon.
238
xxx
To clarify, Fuji attached a verification and certification against forum shopping, but Arlene questions Corazons
authority to sign. Arlene argues that the secretarys certificate empowered Shuji Yano to file a petition for
certiorari before the Court of Appeals, and not a petition for review before this court, and that since Shuji
Yanos authority was delegated to him, he could not further delegate such power. Moreover, Corazon was
representing Shuji Yano in his personal capacity, and not in his capacity as representative of Fuji.
A review of the board resolution quoted in the secretarys certificate shows that Fuji shall file a Petition for
Certiorari with the Court of Appeals and participate in any other subsequent proceeding that may
necessarily arise therefrom, including but not limited to the filing of appeals in the appropriate venue, and
that Shuji Yano and Jin Eto are authorized to represent Fuji in any other proceeding that may necessarily
239
arise thereform[sic]. As pointed out by Fuji, Shuji Yano and Jin Eto were also authorized to act in the
Corporations name, place and stead to determine, propose, agree, decide, do, and perform any and all of the
following: . . . 5. Such other matters as may aid in the prompt disposition of the action.
Considering that the subsequent proceeding that may arise from the petition for certiorari with the Court of
Appeals is the filing of a petition for review with this court, Fuji substantially complied with the procedural
requirement.
On the issue of whether Shuji Yano validly delegated his authority to Corazon, Article 1892 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines states:
xxx
240
The secretarys certificate does not state that Shuji Yano is prohibited from appointing a
substitute. In fact, he is empowered to do acts that will aid in the resolution of this case.
This court has recognized that there are instances when officials or employees of a corporation can sign the
verification and certification against forum shopping without a board resolution. In Cagayan Valley Drug
Corporation v. CIR, it was held that:
In sum, we have held that the following officials or employees of the company can sign the verification and
certification without need of a board resolution: (1) the Chairperson of the Board of Directors, (2) the
President of a corporation, (3) the General Manager or Acting General Manager, (4) Personnel Officer, and (5)
an Employment Specialist in a labor case.
241
While the above cases do not provide a complete listing of authorized signatories to the
verification and certification required by the rules, the determination of the sufficiency of the
authority was done on a case to case basis. The rationale applied in the foregoing cases is to justify the
authority of corporate officers or representatives of the corporation to sign the verification or certificate
against forum shopping, being in a position to verify the truthfulness and correctness of the allegations in the
petition.
Corazons affidavit states that she is the office manager and resident interpreter of the Manila Bureau of Fuji
Television Network, Inc. and that she has held the position for the last twenty-three years.
242
As the office manager for 23 years, Corazon can be considered as having knowledge of all matters in Fujis
Manila Bureau Office and is in a position to verify the truthfulness and the correctness of the allegations in
the Petition.
Thus, Fuji substantially complied with the requirements of verification and certification against forum
shopping. xxx
UY vs. COURT OF APPEALS, et al.
There was substantial compliance

with the requirements on
243
certification against forum

shopping.
A certification against forum shopping is a peculiar and personal responsibility of the party, an assurance
given to the court or other tribunal that there are no other pending cases involving basically the same
parties, issues and causes of action. It must be executed by the party-pleader, not by his counsel. If,
however, for reasonable or justifiable reasons, the party-pleader is unable to sign, he must
execute a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) designating his counsel of record to sign on his behalf.
Here, the original complaint contained a proper verification and certification against forum shopping duly
signed by Naval-Sai as plaintiff. The verification and certification in the amended complaint, on the other
hand, was only signed by her counsel, Atty. Norberta L. Ela. Atty. Ela was not authorized to sign on behalf of
244
Naval-Sai, as in fact, she assigned one Rodolfo Florentino as agent. The Court of Appeals pointed out that in
the certification in the amended complaint, Atty. Ela specified that it should be taken and read together with
the original complaint. The Court of Appeals took this as a cautionary move on the part of Naval-Sai, justifying
the relaxation of the rules on the ground of substantial compliance. We find, however, that this cautionary
move is ineffectual because under the Rules of Civil Procedure, an amended complaint supersedes the
original complaint. For all intents and purposes, therefore, the original complaint and its
verification and certification ceased to exist. This, notwithstanding, we find there was still
substantial
compliance
with
the
Rules.
In the case of Far Eastern Shipping Company v. Court of Appeals, while we said that, strictly, a certification
against forum shopping by counsel is a defective certification, the verification, signed by petitioner's counsel
in said case, is substantial compliance because it served the purpose of the Rules of informing the Court of
245
the pendency of another action or proceeding involving the same issues. We then explained that procedural
rules are instruments in the speedy and efficient administration of justice which should be used to achieve
such end and not to derail it.
We also find that the prima facie merits of the case serve as a special circumstance or a compelling reason to
relax the rules on certification against forum shopping.
In Sy Chin v. Court of Appeals, we recognized the flaw in the certification against forum shopping which was
signed only by the counsel, and not by the party. In LDP Marketing, Inc. v. Monter, there was initially no proof
that the one who signed the certification was authorized to do so in behalf of the corporation. In these two
cases, we nonetheless chose to overlook the procedural lapses in the interest of substantial justice and the
existence
of prima
facie merit
in
the
petitions.
246
We have ruled that the general rule is that non-compliance or a defect in the certification is not curable by its
subsequent submission or correction. However, there are cases where we exercised leniency and relaxed the
rules on the ground of substantial compliance, the presence of special circumstances or compelling reasons.
The rules on forum-shopping are designed to promote and facilitate the orderly administration of justice and
"should not be interpreted with such absolute literalness as to subvert its own ultimate and legitimate
objective or the goal of all rules of procedure which is to achieve substantial justice as expeditiously as
possible."
MATHAEUS vs. SPS. MEDEQUISO
247
We have held that "Clerks of Court are notaries public ex-officio, and may thus notarize documents or
administer oaths but only when the matter is related to the exercise of their official functions. x x x [C]lerks of
court should not, in their ex-officio capacity, take part in the execution of private documents bearing no
relation
at
all
to
their
official
functions."
Even if it is to be conceded that the CA Petition for Review in CA-G.R. CEB SP No. 04236 is merely a
continuation of the proceedings in Civil Case No. 5579, this Court cannot agree with petitioner's argument
that the notarization of verifications and certifications on non-forum shopping constitutes part of a clerk of
court's daily official functions. We are not prepared to rule in petitioner's favor on this score; as it is, the
workload of a clerk of court is already heavy enough. We cannot add to this the function of notarizing
complaints, answers, petitions, or any other pleadings on a daily or regular basis; such a responsibility can
very well be relegated to commissioned notaries public. Besides, if the practice - specifically title notarization
248
by clerks of court of pleadings filed in cases pending before their own salas or courts - is allowed, unpleasant
consequences might ensue; it could be subject to abuse, and it distracts the clerks of court's attention from
the true and essential work they perform.
Petitioner's procedural misstep forms part of a series of lapses committed in the prosecution of his case. In
the MTCC level, he failed to file a verified Answer to respondents' Complaint. Secondly, he did not furnish a
copy thereof to respondents. As a result, the MTCC expunged his responsive pleading and rendered judgment
against him. This time, at the level of the CA, he committed another mistake; that is, he caused his Petition
for Review to be notarized by the RTC Clerk of Court where his case is pending. At this point, petitioner and
his counsel are expected to be more circumspect in their actions, avoiding the commission of questionable
acts that jeopardize their case.
249
Under Sections 1 and 2, Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a party desiring to appeal from a
decision of the RTC rendered in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction may file a verified petition for review
with the CA, submitting together with the petition a certification on non-forum shopping. Under Section 3 of
the same Rule, "[t]he failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing requirements
regarding the payment of the docket and other lawful fees, the deposit for costs, proof of service
of the petition, and the contents of and the documents which should accompany the petition
shall
be
sufficient
ground
for
the
dismissal
thereof."
Specifically with respect to certifications against forum-shopping, we have repeatedly held that "noncompliance therewith or a defect therein, unlike in verification, is generally not curable by its
subsequent submission or correction thereof, unless there is a need to relax the Rule on the
ground of 'substantial compliance' or presence of 'special circumstances or compelling reasons.'"
250
Taking the foregoing circumstances and considerations to mind, the Court is not inclined to relax the rules for
the petitioner's benefit; it perceives no compelling reasons or circumstances to rule in his favor. Quite the
contrary, the CA pronouncement ordering the dismissal of his Petition for Review is just, and thus should
stand.
DOCKET FEES
NATIONAL TRANSMISSION CORPORATION vs. HEIRS OF EBESA
Whether or not the failure to pay appeal docket fees does not automatically cause the dismissal of the
appeal, but lies on the discretion of the court
251
It has been repeatedly underscored in a long line of jurisprudence that the right to appeal is a mere statutory
privilege and must be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of the law. Thus,
one who seeks to avail of the right to appeal must strictly comply with the requirements of the rules, and
failure to do so leads to the loss of the right to appeal.
Basically, there are three requirements in order to perfect an appeal:
(1) the filing of a notice of appeal;
(2) the payment of docket and other legal fees; and
252
(3) in some cases, the filing of a record on appeal, all of which must be done within the period allowed for
filing an appeal. Failure to observe any of these requirements is fatal to one's appeal.
In the instant case, the NTC bewails the dismissal of its appeal for non-payment of appeal docket fees.
Specifically, it claims that its failure to pay the appeal fees was due to the erroneous advice of the RTC's
receiving clerk. It implores the liberality of the Court that its omission be deemed as an excusable neglect as
it was ready and willing to pay the docket fees.
xxx
Verily, the payment of appeal docket fees is both mandatory and jurisdictional. It is mandatory as
it is required in all appealed cases, otherwise, the Court does not acquire the authority to hear
253
and decide the appeal. The failure to pay or even the partial payment of the appeal fees does not
toll the running of the prescriptive period, hence, will not prevent the judgment from becoming
final and executory. Such was the circumstance in the instant appeal. The NTC failed to pay the appeal fees
without justifiable excuse. That its counsel or his representative was misled by the advice of the receiving
clerk of the RTC is unacceptable as the exercise of ordinary diligence could have avoided such a blunder. It is
apparent from the records that the NTC had ample time to rectify the error or clarify its reservation regarding
the propriety of its supposed exemption from the appeal fees. It received a copy of the RTC Decision dated
January 9, 2006 on January 10, 2006 and the Order denying its motion for reconsideration on February 17,
2006 and had until March 6, 2006 to file a notice of appeal and pay the corresponding docket fees. NTC's
counsel, through his representative, did file a notice of appeal as early as February 17, 2006 but did not pay
the docket fees apparently because of the advice of the receiving clerk of the RTC, although he was ready and
willing to pay the amount at that time. If the NTC came prepared to the trial court with the necessary voucher
254
to settle the docket fees at the time of filing of the notice of appeal, it understood that it was not exempted
from paying the said fees. This can be further deduced from the fact that the NTC was required to pay filing
fees with the RTC at the commencement of the action.
Further, NTC's counsel should have been diligent enough to inquire whether the appeal had been properly
filed and that the corresponding fees were accordingly paid blowing fully well the significance of these
considerations. Had he only bothered to do so, he would have known about the non-payment of the filing fees
and could have easily consulted with other lawyers to settle this uncertainty. The NTC, a GOCC, maintains a
pool of learned lawyers, who must have had exposure with expropriation cases. Fie could have easily
confirmed from them the necessity of paying the docket fees and settled it promptly especially since there
are
still
a
number
of
days
left
after
the
notice
of
appeal
was
filed.
255
The implication of the timely payment of docket fees cannot be overemphasized. "The payment
of the full amount of the docket fee is a sine qua non requirement for the perfection of an
appeal. The court acquires jurisdiction over the case only upon the payment of the prescribed
docket
fees."
Indeed, there are instances when the Court relaxed the rule and allowed the appeal to run its full course.
In La Salette College v. Pilotin, the Court ruled:
Notwithstanding the mandatory nature of the requirement of payment of appellate docket fees, we also
recognize that its strict application is qualified by the following: first, failure to pay those fees within the
reglementary period allows only discretionary, not automatic, dismissal; second, such power should be used
by the court in conjunction with its exercise of sound discretion in accordance with the tenets of justice and
256
fair play, as well as with a great deal of circumspection in consideration of all attendant circumstances.
In Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority v. Mangubat, the payment of the docket fees was delayed by
six (6) days, but the late payment was accepted, because the party showed willingness to abide by the Rules
by immediately paying those fees. Yambao v. Court of Appeals saw us again relaxing the Rules when we
declared therein that "the appellate court may extend the time for the payment of the docket fees if appellant
is able to show that there is a justifiable reason for x x x the failure to pay the correct amount of docket fees
within the prescribed period, like fraud, accident, mistake, excusable negligence, or a similar supervening
casualty, without fault on the part of the appellant." (Citations omitted and italics in the original)
In the present case, the NTC failed to present any justifiable excuse for its failure to pay the docket
fees like in the cases of Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority v. Manguhat and Yambao v.
257
CA. In Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority, the petitioner took the initiative to verify the necessity of
paying the docket fees and paid it outright, albeit six days after the lapse of the period to appeal. Quite the
opposite, the NTC in the present case never lifted a linger until it was required by the CA to present proof of
its payment of the docket fees and paid the same only six months after the period to appeal has prescribed.
The NTC cannot also invoke the ruling of the Court in Yambao as it does not share the same factual milieu as
in the instant case. In Yambao, the petitioner expressed willingness to pay by settling the docket fee of
P820.00 within the period of appeal, however, deficient in the amount of P20.00 due to the erroneous
assessment of the receiving clerk of the RTC. In the instant case, the NTC did not pay at all and solely
attributed the blame on the supposed advice of the receiving clerk of the RTC about its exemption from the
payment of docket fees notwithstanding circumstances that would have expectedly stirred second thoughts.
Its unthinking reliance on the alleged advice of the receiving clerk is utterly irresponsible and inexcusable.
258
17. MONSANTO, et al. VS. LIM

see Jurisdiction no. 17
PRAYER
BUCAL vs. BUCAL
It is well-settled that courts cannot grant a relief not prayed for in the pleadings or in excess of
what is being sought by a party to a case. The rationale for the rule was explained in Development Bank
of the Philippines v. Teston, viz.:
259
Due process considerations justify this requirement. It is improper to enter an order which exceeds the scope
of relief sought by the pleadings, absent notice which affords the opposing party an opportunity to be heard
with respect to the proposed relief. The fundamental purpose of the requirement that allegations of a
complaint must provide the measure of recovery is to prevent surprise to the defendant.
For the same reason, this protection against surprises granted to defendants should also be available to
petitioners. Verily, both parties to a suit are entitled to due process against unforeseen and arbitrary
judgments. The very essence of due process is the sporting idea of fair play which forbids the grant of relief
on matters where a party to the suit was not given an opportunity to be heard.
260
The records do not show that Manny prayed for visitation rights. While he was present during the hearing for
the issuance of the TPO and PPO, he neither manifested nor filed any pleading which would indicate that he
was seeking for such relief.
Neither was it shown that Cherith sought the award of visitation rights for her estranged husband. In fact,
Cheriths RTC Petition specifically prayed that the RTC prohibit Manny from harassing, annoying, telephoning,
contacting or otherwise communicating with her, directly or indirectly (which would tend to occur if
Francheska would be turned-over to Manny during weekends), order Manny to absolutely desist and refrain
from imposing any restraint on her personal liberty and from taking from her custody or charge of
Francheska, and direct Manny and/or any of his family members to stay away from her and any of her
designated family or household members under the limitations set by the court. Further, as above-intimated,
Cherith has repeatedly contested the award of visitation rights during the course of the proceedings before
261
the RTC, but to no avail. While there appears an intercalation of a prayer for visitation rights in Cheriths RTC
Petition, it is evident that she never authorized such intercalation because: (1) she had consistently contested
the grant of visitation rights in favor of Manny, and (2) it was merely penned in the handwriting of an
unidentified person, which, thus, renders the same dubious. Meanwhile, Manny or any of the courts a quo did
not proffer any credible explanation to the contrary.
Hence, for all these reasons, the Court concludes that the grant of visitation rights by the RTC in favor of
Manny, as contained in the PPO, and reiterated in its assailed Orders, being both unexplained and not prayed
for, is an act of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction which deserves
correction through the prerogative writ of certiorari. With this pronouncement, there is no need to delve into
the other ancillary issues raised herein.
262
PAL vs. PAL

x x x a perusal of the prayer in the Complaint shows that PESALA did not specifically pray for the amount of P44,488, 716.41 or for any undeducted amount. But this is understandable because, at the time the Complaint
was filed, PAL had yet to effect the maximum 40% deduction policy and as such, there were yet no
undeducted amounts.
The records of the case show, on the other hand, that the undeducted amount of P44,488,716.41 came about
because PAL failed to comply with the TRO and the injunctive writ issued by the RTC. As discussed earlier, the
Complaint was filed on August 7, 1997 and as early as August 11, 1997, the RTC already issued a TRO
enjoining PAL from implementing the maximum 40% deduction policy. PAL, however, failed to comply with the
263
TRO. On September 3, 1997, the RTC issued a Writ of Preliminary Injunction (WPI) further enjoining PAL from
implementing the maximum 40% deduction policy. Yet again, PAL failed to comply with the RTC's directive.
Verily, it is a settled rule that a court cannot grant a relief not prayed for in the pleadings or in
excess of that being sought. In the case at bar, the records show that PAL was afforded due notice and an
opportunity to be heard with regard to PESALA' s claim of P44,488, 716.41. In fact, in explaining the foregoing
balance, PAL adverted to the "zero net pay" status of their employees' respective accounts, thus concluding
that "there is simply no legal or equitable basis in PESALA' s demand for the remittance of the amount
claimed to be undeducted."
Moreover, the prayer in the Complaint did state that "(o)ther reliefs just and equitable in the premises are
likewise prayed." Undeniably, PESALA's claim of 1!44,488,716.41 is a necessary consequence of the action it
264
filed against PAL. As said claim was duly heard and proven during trial, with PAL being afforded the
opportunity to contest it, the RTC and the Court of Appeals did not err in granting such claim. It is also worth
mentioning that PAL, through its then counsel Atty. Emmanuel Pena and then Labor Affairs OIC Atty. Jose C.
Blanco, acknowledged its liability to PESALA in the amount of P44,488, 716.41. In open court, during the
hearing held on December 4, 1998, Atty. Pena and Atty. Blanco assured that: (1) PAL will regularly remit to
PESALA the full amount per pay period that is due to the latter; and (2) PAL will likewise pay PESALA the
balance of the previously undeducted amount of P44, 488,716.41 by January 1999. These assurances are
transcribed in the Order dated December 4, 1998 of the RTC.
F. Default
MONZON vs. SPS. RELOVA ET AL.
265
The effects of default are followed only in three instances: (1) when there is an actual default for
failure to file a responsive pleading; (2) failure to appear in the pre-trial conference; and (3) refusal to comply
with modes of discovery under the circumstance in Sec. 3(c), Rule 29.
We have in the past admonished trial judges against issuing precipitate orders of default as these have the
effect of denying a litigant the chance to be heard, and increase the burden of needless litigations in the
appellate courts where time is needed for more important or complicated cases. While there are instances
when a party may be properly defaulted, these should be the exception rather than the rule, and
should be allowed only in clear cases of obstinate refusal or inordinate neglect to comply with
the orders of the court. It is even worse when the court issues an order not denominated as an order of
default, but provides for the application of effects of default. Such amounts to the circumvention of the rigid
requirements of a default order , to wit: (1) the court must have validly acquired jurisdiction over the
266
person of the defendant either by service of summons or voluntary appearance; (2) the defendant failed to
file his answer within the time allowed therefor; and (3) there must be a motion to declare the defendant in
default with notice to the latter. In the case at bar, petitioner had not failed to file her answer. Neither was
notice sent to petitioner that she would be defaulted, or that the effects of default shall be imposed upon her.
"Mere non-appearance of defendants at an ordinary hearing and to adduce evidence does not
constitute default, when they have already filed their answer to the complaint within the
reglementary period. It is error to default a defendant after the answer had already been filed. It
should be borne in mind that the policy of the law is to have every litigants case tried on the merits as much
as possible; it is for this reason that judgments by default are frowned upon."
Does this mean that defendants can get away with failing to attend hearings despite due notice? No, it will
not. We agree with petitioner that such failure to attend, when committed during hearing dates for the
267
presentation of the complainants evidence, would amount to the waiver of such defendants right to object
to the evidence presented during such hearing, and to cross-examine the witnesses presented therein.
However, it would not amount to a waiver of the defendants right to present evidence during the trial dates
scheduled for the reception of evidence for the defense. It would be an entirely different issue if the failure to
attend of the defendant was on a hearing date set for the presentation of the evidence of the defense, but
such did not occur in the case at bar.
SABLAS vs. SABLAS
The elements of a valid declaration of default are:
268
1. the court has validly acquired jurisdiction over the person of the defending party either by service of
summons or voluntary appearance;
2. the defending party failed to file the answer within the time allowed therefor and
3. a motion to declare the defending party in default has been filed by the claiming party with notice to the
defending party.
An order of default can be made only upon motion of the claiming party. It can be properly issued
against the defending party who failed to file the answer within the prescribed period only if the
claiming party files a motion to that effect with notice to the defending party.
269
In this connection, Section 3, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court provides: SEC. 3. Default: Declaration of. If the
defending party fails to answer within the time allowed therefor, the court shall, upon motion of the
claiming party with notice to the defending party, and proof of such failure, declare the defending party in
default. x x x.
Where There Is No Declaration of Default, Answer May be Admitted Even If Filed Out Of Time
It is within the sound discretion of the trial court to permit the defendant to file his answer and
to be heard on the merits even after the reglementary period for filing the answer expires. The
Rules of Court provides for discretion on the part of the trial court not only to extend the time for filing an
answer but also to allow an answer to be filed after the reglementary period . Thus, the appellate court erred
270
when it ruled that the trial court had no recourse but to declare petitioner spouses in default when they failed
to file their answer on or before November 5, 1999.
AGUILAR vs. LIGHT BRINGERS CREDIT COOPERATIVE
The rule is that a court can only consider the evidence presented by respondent in the MCTC because the
petitioners failed to attend the pre-trial conference on August 25, 2009 pursuant to Section 5, Rule 18 of the
Rules of Court. The Court, however, clarifies that failure to attend the pre-trial does not result in the "default"
of the defendant. Instead, the failure of the defendant to attend shall be cause to allow the plaintiff to present
his evidence ex parte and the court to render judgment on the basis thereof.
271
In the case at bench, the petitioners failed to attend the pre-trial conference set on August 25, 2009. They did
not even give any excuse for their non-appearance, manifestly ignoring the importance of the pre-trial stage.
Thus, the MCTC properly issued the August 25, 2009 Order, allowing respondent to present evidence ex parte.
The MCTC even showed leniency when it directed the counsels of the parties to submit their respective
position papers on whether or not Aguilar and Calimbas could still participate in the trial of the case despite
their absence in the pre-trial conference. This gave Aguilar and Calimbas a second chance to explain their
non-attendance and, yet, only respondent complied with the directive to file a position paper. The MCTC, in its
Order, dated April 27, 2011, properly held that since the proceedings were being heard ex parte, Aguilar and
Calimbas had no right to participate therein and to cross-examine the witness.
272
Thus, as it stands, the Court can only consider the evidence on record offered by respondent. The petitioners
lost their right to present their evidence during the trial and, a fortiori, on appeal due to their disregard of the
mandatory attendance in the pre-trial conference.
TUNG HO STEEL ENTERPRISES CORPORATION vs. TING GUAN TRADING CORPORATION
We cannot agree with the legal conclusion that the appellate court reached, given the established facts. To
our mind, Ting Guan voluntarily appeared before the trial court in view of the procedural recourse that it took
before that court. Its voluntary appearance is equivalent to service of summons.
Instead of filing an answer, the defendant may opt to file a motion for reconsideration. Only after
the trial court shall have denied the motion for reconsideration does the defendant become
273
bound to file his answer. If the defendant fails to file an answer within the reglementary period,
the plaintiff may file a motion to declare the defendant in default. This motion shall be with
notice to the defendant and shall be supported by proof of the failure.
The trial courts denial of the motion to dismiss is not a license for the defendant to file a Rule 65 petition
before the CA. An order denying a motion to dismiss cannot be the subject of a petition for
certiorari as the defendant still has an adequate remedy before the trial court i.e., to file an
answer and to subsequently appeal the case if he loses the case. As exceptions, the defendant
may avail of a petition for certiorari if the ground raised in the motion to dismiss is lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant or over the subject matter.
274
We cannot allow and simply passively look at Ting Guans blatant disregard of the rules of procedure in the
present case. The Rules of Court only allows the filing of a motion to dismiss once. Ting Guans filing
of successive motions to dismiss, under the guise of "supplemental motion to dismiss" or "motion for
reconsideration", is not only improper but also dilatory. Ting Guans belated reliance on the improper service
of summons was a mere afterthought, if not a bad faith ploy to avoid the foreign arbitral awards enforcement
which is still at its preliminary stage after the lapse of almost a decade since the filing of the complaint.
Furthermore, Ting Guans failure to raise the alleged lack of jurisdiction over its person in the first motion to
dismiss is fatal to its cause. Ting Guan voluntarily appeared before the RTC when it filed a motion to dismiss
and a "supplemental motion to dismiss" without raising the RTCs lack of jurisdiction over its person. In
Anunciacion v. Bocanegra, we categorically stated that the defendant should raise the affirmative defense of
lack of jurisdiction over his person in the very first motion to dismiss. Failure to raise the issue of improper
275
service of summons in the first motion to dismiss is a waiver of this defense and cannot be belatedly raised in
succeeding motions and pleadings.
Even assuming that Ting Guan did not voluntarily appear before the RTC, the CA should have ordered the RTC
to issue an alias summons instead. In Lingner & Fisher GMBH vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, we enunciated
the policy that the courts should not dismiss a case simply because there was an improper service of
summons. The lower courts should be cautious in haphazardly dismissing complaints on this ground alone
considering that the trial court can cure this defect and order the issuance of alias summons on the proper
person in the interest of substantial justice and to expedite the proceedings.
G. SUMMONS
276
ON PURPOSE OF SUMMONS
NATIONAL PETROLEUM GAS vs. RCBC
Service of summons on domestic corporation, partnership or other juridical entity is governed by Section 11,
Rule 14 of the Rules, which states: SECTION 11. Service upon domestic private juridical entity. When the
defendant is a corporation, partnership or association organized under the laws of the Philippines with a
juridical personality, service may be made on the president, managing partner, general manager, corporate
secretary, treasurer, or in-house counsel.
When the defendant is a domestic corporation like herein petitioner, service of summons may be
made only upon the persons enumerated in Section 11, Rule 14 of the Rules. The enumeration of
277
persons to whom summons may be served is restricted, limited and exclusive following the rule
on statutory construction expressio unios est exclusio alterius. Substantial compliance cannot be
invoked. Service of summons upon persons other than those officers specifically mentioned in
Section 11, Rule 14 is void, defective and not binding to said corporation.
The foregoing notwithstanding, We agree with the CA that there was a valid and effective service of summons
upon petitioner corporation through its liaison officer who acted as the agent of the corporate secretary.
Petitioner corporation cannot conveniently rely on the sworn statements of the individual petitioners and
Abante. Upon examination, Angs denial of having spoken with any process server to give instruction to serve
the summons and other pertinent papers to Abante is not incompatible with the Sheriffs Report stating that
[s]aid summons and all pertinent papers, upon telephone instruction of defendant Melinda Ang, were
received by Claudia Abante, [defendants] [Liaison] Officer, as evidenced by her signature at the original copy
278
of Summons and Writ. While it may be true that Ang had not talked to the sheriff or process server, it still
does not rule out the possibility that she in fact spoke to Abante and instructed the latter to receive the
documents in her behalf. As to the Affidavit of Abante, her disavowal of having spoken to Ang or receiving
telephone instructions from her is truly self-serving. Evidence as simple as a telephone billing statement or an
affidavit of a disinterested third person, among others, could have been presented to refute the sheriffs
claim, but there was none. Likewise, no substantial proofs were credibly shown to support Abantes allegation
that the sheriff insisted on having the court processes received and that she was intimidated by the
presence of a court personnel who was quite earnest in accomplishing his task.
It is well to note that the certificate of service of the process server is prima facie evidence of the
facts as set out therein. This is fortified by the presumption of the regularity of performance of official
duty. To overcome the presumption of regularity of official functions in favor of such sheriff's return, the
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evidence against it must be clear and convincing. Sans the requisite quantum of proof to the contrary, the
presumption stands deserving of faith and credit.
The same conclusion, however, could not be said with respect to the service of summons upon the individual
petitioners. Sections 6 and 7 of the Rules of Court (re substituted service) cannot be construed to apply
simultaneously and do not provide for alternative modes of service of summons which can either be resorted
to on the mere basis of convenience to the parties for, under our procedural rules , service of summons in
the persons of the defendants is generally preferred over substituted service. Resort to the
latter is permitted when the summons cannot be promptly served on the defendant in person
and after stringent formal and substantive requirements have been complied with. The failure to
comply faithfully, strictly and fully with all the requirements of substituted service renders the
service of summons ineffective.
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In resorting to the substituted service, the sheriff in this case pithily declared in his Report that he also
served copies to other defendants at their given addresses, but they refused to acknowledge receipt thereof.
Obviously, the Sheriffs Report dated November 13, 2006 does not particularize why substituted service was
resorted to and the precise manner by which the summons was served upon the individual petitioners. The
disputable presumption that an official duty has been regularly performed will not apply where it is patent
from the sheriff's or server's return that it is defective.
In the instant case, it appears that the sheriff hastily and capriciously resorted to substituted service of
summons without actually exerting any genuine effort to locate the individual petitioners. The reasonable
time within which to personally serve the summons 7 days for the plaintiff or 15-30 days for
the sheriff as stated in Manotoc has not yet elapsed at the time the substituted service was
opted to. Remarkably, based on the Sheriffs Report and the narration of petitioners, the personal service of
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summons upon the corporation and the individual petitioners as well as the levy of their personal and real
properties were all done in just one day. Manotoc stresses that for substituted service of summons to
be available, there must be several attempts by the sheriff to personally serve the summons
within a reasonable period which eventually resulted in failure in order to prove impossibility of
prompt service. To reiterate, "several attempts" means at least three (3) tries, preferrably on at
least two different dates.
Despite improper service of summons upon their persons, the individual petitioners are deemed to have
submitted to the jurisdiction of the court through their voluntary appearance. The second sentence of Section
20, Rule 14 of the Rules that [t]he inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other grounds aside from lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant shall not be deemed a voluntary appearance clearly refers to
affirmative defenses, not affirmative reliefs.
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ON VOLUNTARY APPEARANCE
GARCIA vs. SANDIGANBAYAN
In the instant case, it is undisputed that summons for Forfeitures I and II were served personally on Maj. Gen.
Carlos Flores Garcia, who is detained at the PNP Detention Center, who acknowledged receipt thereof by
affixing his signature. It is also undisputed that substituted service of summons for both Forfeitures I and II
were made on petitioner and her children through Maj. Gen. Garcia at the PNP Detention Center. However,
such substituted services of summons were invalid for being irregular and defective.
In Manotoc v. Court of Appeals, we broke down the requirements to be: (1) Impossibility of prompt
personal service, i.e., the party relying on substituted service or the sheriff must show that defendant
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cannot be served promptly or there is impossibility of prompt service within a reasonable time. Reasonable
time being "so much time as is necessary under the circumstances for a reasonably prudent and
diligent man to do, conveniently, what the contract or duty requires that should be done, having
a regard for the rights and possibility of loss, if any [,] to the other party."Moreover, we indicated
therein that the sheriff must show several attempts for personal service of at least three (3) times
on at least two (2) different dates. (2) Specific details in the return, i.e., the sheriff must describe in
the Return of Summons the facts and circumstances surrounding the attempted personal service. (3)
Substituted service effected on a person of suitable age and discretion residing at defendants
house or residence; or on a competent person in charge of defendants office or regular place of
business.
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From the foregoing requisites, it is apparent that no valid substituted service of summons was made on
petitioner and her children, as the service made through Maj. Gen. Garcia did not comply with the first two (2)
requirements mentioned above for a valid substituted service of summons. Moreover, the third requirement
was also not strictly complied with as the substituted service was made not at petitioners house or residence
but in the PNP Detention Center where Maj. Gen. Garcia is detained, even if the latter is of suitable age and
discretion. Hence, no valid substituted service of summons was made.
The stringent rules on valid service of summons for the court to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the
defendants, however, admits of exceptions, as when the party voluntarily submits himself to the jurisdiction
of the court by asking affirmative relief. In the instant case, the Republic asserts that petitioner is
estopped from questioning improper service of summons since the improvident service of
summons in both forfeiture cases had been cured by their (petitioner and her children) voluntary
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appearance in the forfeiture cases. The Republic points to the various pleadings filed by petitioner and
her children during the subject forfeiture hearings. We cannot subscribe to the Republics views.
REICON REALTY BUILDERS CORPORATION vs. DIAMOND DRAGON REALTY AND MANAGEMENT, INC.
SEC. 4, Rule 46 Jurisdiction over the person of respondent, how acquired. - The court shall acquire jurisdiction
over the person of the respondent by the service on him of its order or resolution indicating its initial action
on the petition or by his voluntary submission to such jurisdiction.
A punctilious review of the records, particularly of the certiorari petition filed by Reicon before the CA, shows
that it contains the registry numbers corresponding to the registry receipts as well as the affidavit of service
and/or filing of the person who filed and served the petition via registered mail on behalf of Reicon. These
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imply that a copy of Reicon' s certiorari petition had been served to the R TC as well as to Diamond through
its address at "Suite 305 AIC Burgundy Empire Tower, ADB Avenue comer Gamet Road, Ortigas Center, Pasig
City," in compliance with Section 13, Rule 13 of the Rules on proof of service as well as with Sections 3 and 4
of Rule 46 above-quoted.
On this score, the Court notes that Diamond declared the aforesaid address as its business address in its
complaint before the RTC, and that there is dearth of evidence to show that it had since changed its address
or had moved out. Hence, Reicon cannot be faulted for adopting the said address in serving a copy of its
certiorari petition to Diamond in light of the requirement under Sections 3 and 4, Rule 46 of the Rules as
above-cited, which merely entails service of the petition upon the respondent itself, not upon his counsel.
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The underlying rationale behind this rule is that a certiorari proceeding is, by nature, an original and
independent action, and, therefore not considered as part of the trial that had resulted in the rendition of the
judgment or order complained of. Hence, at the preliminary point of serving the certiorari petition, as
in other initiatory pleadings, it cannot be said that an appearance for respondent has been made
by his counsel. Consequently, the requirement under Section 2, Rule 13 of the Rules, which provides that if
any party has appeared by counsel, service upon him shall be made upon his counsel, should not apply.
Thus, the CA erred when it dismissed Reicon's certiorari petition outright for non-compliance with Section 3,
Rule 46 of the Rules as well as the rule on service upon a party through counsel under Section 2, Rule 13 of
the Rules. The service of said pleading upon the person of the respondent, and not upon his
counsel, is what the rule properly requires, as in this case. On a related note, the Court further
observes that jurisdiction over the person of Diamond had already been acquired by the CA
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through its voluntary appearance by virtue of the Manifestation dated May 5, 2011, filed by its
counsel, Atty. Marqueda, who, as the records would show, had consistently represented Diamond
before the proceedings in the court a quo and even before this Court.
ON IN REM, QUASI IN REM ACTIONS
PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL BANK, vs. ALEJANDRO
The purposes of preliminary attachment are: (1) to seize the property of the debtor in advance of final
judgment and to hold it for purposes of satisfying said judgment, as in the grounds stated in paragraphs (a) to
(e) of Section 1, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court; or (2) to acquire jurisdiction over the action by actual or
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constructive seizure of the property in those instances where personal or substituted service of
summons on the defendant cannot be effected, as in paragraph (f) of the same provision.
Corollarily, in actions in personam, such as the instant case for collection of sum of money,
summons must be served by personal or substituted service, otherwise the court will not acquire
jurisdiction over the defendant. In case the defendant does not reside and is not found in the
Philippines (and hence personal and substituted service cannot be effected), the remedy of the
plaintiff in order for the court to acquire jurisdiction to try the case is to convert the action into a
proceeding in rem or quasi in rem by attaching the property of the defendant . Thus, in order to
acquire jurisdiction in actions in personam where defendant resides out of and is not found in the Philippines,
it becomes a matter of course for the court to convert the action into a proceeding in rem or quasi in rem by
attaching the defendants property. The service of summons in this case (which may be by publication
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coupled with the sending by registered mail of the copy of the summons and the court order to
the last known address of the defendant), is no longer for the purpose of acquiring jurisdiction
but for compliance with the requirements of due process.
However, where the defendant is a resident who is temporarily out of the Philippines,
attachment of his/her property in an action in personam, is not always necessary in order for the
court to acquire jurisdiction to hear the case.
In actions in personam against residents temporarily out of the Philippines, the court need not
always attach the defendants property in order to have authority to try the case. Where the
plaintiff seeks to attach the defendants property and to resort to the concomitant service of
summons by publication, the same must be with prior leave, precisely because, if the sole purpose
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of the attachment is for the court to acquire jurisdiction, the latter must determine whether from the
allegations in the complaint, substituted service (to persons of suitable discretion at the defendants residence
or to a competent person in charge of his office or regular place of business) will suffice, or whether there is a
need to attach the property of the defendant and resort to service of summons by publication in order for the
court to acquire jurisdiction over the case and to comply with the requirements of due process.
In the instant case, it must be stressed that the writ was issued by the trial court mainly on the
representation of petitioner that respondent is not a resident of the Philippines. Obviously, the trial courts
issuance of the writ was for the sole purpose of acquiring jurisdiction to hear and decide the case. Had the
allegations in the complaint disclosed that respondent has a residence in Quezon City and an office in Makati
City, the trial court, if only for the purpose of acquiring jurisdiction, could have served summons by
substituted service on the said addresses, instead of attaching the property of the defendant. The rules on
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the application of a writ of attachment must be strictly construed in favor of the defendant. For
attachment is harsh, extraordinary, and summary in nature; it is a rigorous remedy which exposes the debtor
to humiliation and annoyance. It should be resorted to only when necessary and as a last remedy.
It is clear from the foregoing that even on the allegation that respondent is a resident
temporarily out of the Philippines, petitioner is still not entitled to a writ of attachment because
the trial court could acquire jurisdiction over the case by substituted service instead of attaching
the property of the defendant. The misrepresentation of petitioner that respondent does not reside in the
Philippines and its omission of his local addresses was thus a deliberate move to ensure that the application
for the writ will be granted.
DE PEDRO vs. ROMASAN DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
293
Regardless of the type of action - whether it is in personam, in rem or quasi in rem - the
preferred mode of service of summons is personal service. To avail themselves of substituted
service, courts must rely on a detailed enumeration of the sheriff's actions and a showing that
the defendant cannot be served despite diligent and reasonable efforts. The sheriff's return,
which contains these details, is entitled to a presumption of regularity, and on this basis, the
court may allow substituted service. Should the sheriff's return be wanting of these details,
substituted service will be irregular if no other evidence of the efforts to serve summons was
presented. Failure to serve summons will mean that the court failed to acquire jurisdiction over
the person of the defendant. However, the filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration is
tantamount to voluntary appearance.
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Petitioner insisted in her motion for new trial that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over her person.
She did not allege that fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence impaired her rights. Neither did she
allege that she found newly discovered evidence that could have altered the trial court decision. When her
motion for new trial was denied, she filed a petition for certiorari, insisting that her motion for new trial should
have been granted on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over her person. The Court of Appeals denied the
petition for her failure to allege any ground for new trial. We cannot attribute error on the part of the Court of
Appeals for this denial because, indeed, lack of jurisdiction is not a ground for granting a new trial.
What cannot be denied is the fact that petitioner was already notified of respondent s action for annulment of
petitioners title when she filed a motion for new trial and, later, a petition for certiorari. At that time,
petitioner was deemed, for purposes of due process, to have been properly notified of the action involving her
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title tothe property. Lack of jurisdiction could have already been raised in an action for annulment of
judgment.
Thus, when petitioner erroneously filed her motion for new trial and petition for certiorari instead of an action
for annulment of judgment, she was deemed to have voluntarily participated in the proceedings against her
title. The actions and remedies she chose to avail bound her. Petitioners failure to file an action for
annulment of judgment at this time was fatal to her cause. We cannot conclude now that she was denied due
process.
BANCO FILIPINO vs. VICENTE PALANCA
How Jurisdiction is Acquired
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Jurisdiction over the person is acquired by the voluntary appearance of a party in court and his submission to
its authority, or it is acquired by the coercive power of legal process exerted over the person.
Jurisdiction over the property which is the subject of the litigation may result either from a seizure of the
property under legal process, whereby it is brought into the actual custody of the law, or it may result from
the institution of legal proceedings wherein, under special provisions of law, the power of the court over the
property is recognized and made effective. In the latter case the property, though at all times within the
potential power of the court, may never be taken into actual custody at all. An illustration of the jurisdiction
acquired by actual seizure is found in attachment proceedings, where the property is seized at the beginning
of the action, or some subsequent stage of its progress, and held to abide the final event of the litigation. An
illustration of what we term potential jurisdiction over the res, is found in the proceeding to register the title
of land under our system for the registration of land. Here the court, without taking actual physical control
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over the property assumes, at the instance of some person claiming to be owner, to exercise a jurisdiction in
rem over the property and to adjudicate the title in favor of the petitioner against all the world.
In the terminology of American law the action to foreclose a mortgage is said to be a proceeding
quasi in rem, by which is expressed the idea that while it is not strictly speaking an action in rem yet it
partakes of that nature and is substantially such. The expression "action in rem" is, in its narrow application,
used only with reference to certain proceedings in courts of admiralty wherein the property alone is treated
as responsible for the claim or obligation upon which the proceedings are based. The action quasi rem
differs from the true action in rem in the circumstance that in the former an individual is named
as defendant, and the purpose of the proceeding is to subject his interest therein to the
obligation or lien burdening the property. All proceedings having for their sole object the sale or other
disposition of the property of the defendant, whether by attachment, foreclosure, or other form of remedy,
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are in a general way thus designated. The judgment entered in these proceedings is conclusive only
between the parties.
It is true that in proceedings of this character, if the defendant for whom publication is made appears, the
action becomes as to him a personal action and is conducted as such. This, however, does not affect the
proposition that where the defendant fails to appear the action is quasi in rem; and it should therefore be
considered with reference to the principles governing actions in rem.
BIACO vs. PHILIPPINE COUNTRYSIDE RURAL BANK
If the action is quasi in rem, personal service of summons is essential in order to afford her due process. The
substituted service made by the sheriff at her husbands office cannot be deemed proper service absent any
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explanation that efforts had been made to personally serve summons upon her but that such efforts failed.
Petitioner contends that extrinsic fraud was perpetrated not so much by her husband, who did not inform her
of the judicial foreclosure proceedings, but by the sheriff who allegedly connived with her husband to just
leave a copy of the summons intended for her at the latters office.
Petitioner further argues that the deficiency judgment is a personal judgment which should be deemed void
for lack of jurisdiction over her person.
In this case, the judicial foreclosure proceeding instituted by respondent PCRB undoubtedly vested the trial
court with jurisdiction over the res. A judicial foreclosure proceeding is an action quasi in rem. As
such, jurisdiction over the person of petitioner is not required, it being sufficient that the trial
court is vested with jurisdiction over the subject matter.
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There is a dimension to this case though that needs to be delved into. Petitioner avers that she was not
personally served summons. Instead, summons was served to her through her husband at his office without
any explanation as to why the particular surrogate service was resorted to. x x x
Without ruling on petitioners allegation that her husband and the sheriff connived to prevent summons from
being served upon her personally, we can see that petitioner was denied due process and was not able to
participate in the judicial foreclosure proceedings as a consequence. The violation of petitioner s
constitutional right to due process arising from want of valid service of summons on her warrants the
annulment of the judgment of the trial court.
There is more, the trial court granted respondent PCRBs ex-parte motion for deficiency judgment and
ordered the issuance of a writ of execution against the spouses Biaco to satisfy the remaining balance of the
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award. In short, the trial court went beyond its jurisdiction over the res and rendered a personal
judgment against the spouses Biaco. This cannot be countenanced.
In this case, while the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the res, its jurisdiction is limited to a
rendition of judgment on the res. It cannot extend its jurisdiction beyond the res and issue a
judgment enforcing petitioners personal liability. In doing so without first having acquired
jurisdiction over the person of petitioner, as it did, the trial court violated her constitutional right
to due process, warranting the annulment of the judgment rendered in the case.
IDONAH SLADE PERKINS vs. DIZON
302
In the instant case, there can be no question that the action brought by Eugene Arthur Perkins in his
amended complaint against the petitioner, Idonah Slade Perkins, seeks to exclude her from any interest in a
property located in the Philippines. That property consists in certain shares of stocks of the Benguet
Consolidated Mining Company, a sociedad anonima, organized in the Philippines under the provisions of the
Spanish Code of Commerce, with its principal office in the City of Manila and which conducts its mining
activities therein. The situs of the shares is in the jurisdiction where the corporation is created, whether the
certificated evidencing the ownership of those shares are within or without that jurisdiction. (Fletcher
Cyclopedia Corporations, Permanent ed. Vol. 11, p. 95). Under these circumstances, we hold that the action
thus brought is quasi in rem, for while the judgement that may be rendered therein is not strictly a judgment
in rem, "it fixes and settles the title to the property in controversy and to that extent partakes of the nature of
the judgment in rem." (50 C.J., p 503). As held by the Supreme Court of the United States in Pennoyer v. Neff
(supra);
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It is true that, in a strict sense, a proceeding in rem is one taken directly against property, and has for its
object the disposition of the property, without reference to the title of individual claimants; but , in a large
and more general sense, the terms are applied to actions between parties, where the direct object is to reach
and dispose of property owned by them, or of some interest therein.
The action being in quasi in rem, The Court of First Instance of Manila has jurisdiction over the person of the
non-resident. In order to satisfy the constitutional requirement of due process, summons has been served
upon her by publication. There is no question as to the adequacy of publication made nor as to the
mailing of the order of publication to the petitioner's last known place of residence in the United
States. But, of course, the action being quasi in rem and notice having be made by publication,
the relief that may be granted by the Philippine court must be confined to the res, it having no
jurisdiction to render a personal judgment against the non-resident. In the amended complaint filed
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by Eugene Arthur Perkins, no money judgment or other relief in personam is prayed for against the petitioner.
The only relief sought therein is that she be declared to be without any interest in the shares in controversy
and that she be excluded from any claim thereto.
x x x The Benguet Consolidated Mining Company, in its answer to the complaint filed by Eugene Arthur
Perkins, averred that in connection with the shares of stock in question, conflicting claims were being made
upon it by said plaintiff, Eugene Arthur Perkins, his wife Idonah Slade Perkins, and one named George H.
Engelhard, and prayed that these last two be made parties to the action and served with summons by
publication, so that the three claimants may litigate their conflicting claims and settle their rights among
themselves. The court has not issued an order compelling the conflicting claimants to interplead with one
another and litigate their several claims among themselves, but instead ordered the plaintiff to amend his
complaint including the other two claimants as parties defendant. The plaintiff did so, praying that the new
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defendants thus joined be excluded for any interest in the shares in question, and it is upon this amended
complaint that the court ordered the service of the summons by publication. It is therefore, clear that the
publication of the summons was ordered not in virtue of an interpleading, but upon the filing of
the amended complaint wherein an action quasi in rem is alleged.
Had not the complaint been amended, including the herein petitioner as an additional defendant, and had the
court, upon the filing of the answer of the Benguet Consolidated Mining Company, issued an order under
section 120 of the Code of Civil Procedure, calling the conflicting claimants into court and compelling them to
interplead with one another, such order could not perhaps have validly been served by publication or
otherwise, upon the non-resident Idonah Slade Perkins, for then the proceeding would be purely one of
interpleading. Such proceeding is a personal action, for it merely seeks to call conflicting claimants into court
so that they may interplead and litigate their several claims among themselves, and no specific relief is
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prayed for against them, as the interpleader have appeared in court, one of them pleads ownership of the
personal property located in the Philippines and seeks to exclude a non-resident claimant from any interest
therein, is a question which we do not decide not. Suffice it to say that here the service of the summons by
publication was ordered by the lower court by virtue of an action quasi in rem against the non-resident
defendant.
Respondents contend that, as the petitioner in the lower court has pleaded over the subject-matter, she has
submitted herself to its jurisdiction. We have noticed, however, that these pleas have been made not as
independent grounds for relief, but merely as additional arguments in support of her contention that the
lower court had no jurisdiction over the person. In other words, she claimed that the lower court had no
jurisdiction over her person not only because she is a non-resident, but also because the court had no
jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the action and that the issues therein involved have already been
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decided by the New York court and are being relitigated in the California court. Although this argument is
obviously erroneous, as neither jurisdiction over the subject-matter nor res adjudicata nor lis pendens has
anything to do with the question of jurisdiction over her person, we believe and so hold that the petitioner
has not, by such erroneous argument, submitted herself to the jurisdiction of the court. Voluntary
appearance cannot be implied from either a mistaken or superflous reasoning but from the
nature of the relief prayed for.
ASIAVEST vs. CA
Asiavest cannot now claim that Heras was a resident of Hong Kong at the time since the stipulated fact that
Heras "is a resident of New Manila, Quezon City, Philippines" refers to his residence at the time jurisdiction
over his person was being sought by the Hong Kong court. Accordingly, since Heras was not a resident of
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Hong Kong and the action against him was in personam, summons should have been personally served on
him in Hong Kong.
The extraterritorial service in the Philippines was therefore invalid and did not confer on the Hong Kong court
jurisdiction over his person. It follows that the Hong Kong court judgment cannot be given force and effect
here in the Philippines for having been rendered without jurisdiction. On the same note, Heras was also
an absentee, hence, he should have been served with summons in the same manner as a nonresident not found in Hong Kong. Section 17, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court providing for
extraterritorial service will not apply because the suit against him was in personam. Neither can
we apply Section 18, which allows extraterritorial service on a resident defendant who is temporarily absent
from the country, because even if Heras be considered as a resident of Hong Kong, the undisputed fact
remains that he left Hong Kong not only temporarily but for good.
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VELAYO-FONG vs. AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Petitioner argues that summons should have been served through extraterritorial service since she is a nonresident;
When the defendant is a nonresident and he is not found in the country, summons may be served
extraterritorially. There are only four instances when extraterritorial service of summons is
proper, namely: (a) when the action affects the personal status of the plaintiffs; (b) when the action relates
to, or the subject of which is property, within the Philippines, in which the defendant claims a lien or interest,
actual or contingent; (c) when the relief demanded in such action consists, wholly or in part, in excluding the
defendant from any interest in property located in the Philippines; and (d) when the defendants property has
been attached within the Philippines. In these instances, service of summons may be effected by (a)
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personal service out of the country, with leave of court; (b) publication, also with leave of court; or (c) any
other manner the court may deem sufficient.
Thus, extrajudicial service of summons apply only where the action is in rem, that is, an action
against the thing itself instead of against the person, or in an action quasi in rem, where an
individual is named as defendant and the purpose of the proceeding is to subject his interest
therein to the obligation or loan burdening the property. The rationale for this is that in in rem and
quasi in rem actions, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is not a prerequisite to confer jurisdiction
on the court provided that the court acquires jurisdiction over the res.
Where the action is in personam, that is, one brought against a person on the basis of her personal liability,
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is necessary for the court to validly try and decide the case.
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When the defendant is a non-resident, personal service of summons within the state is essential
to the acquisition of jurisdiction over the person. Summons on the defendant must be served by
handing a copy thereof to the defendant in person, or, if he refuses to receive it, by tendering it
to him. This cannot be done, however, if the defendant is not physically present in the country,
and thus, the court cannot acquire jurisdiction over his person and therefore cannot validly try
and decide the case against him.
In the present case, respondents cause of action in Civil Case No. Q-93-17133 is anchored on the claim that
petitioner and her co-defendants maliciously instituted a criminal complaint before the NBI and a petition
before the SEC which prevented the respondents from leaving the country and paralyzed the latters business
transactions. Respondents pray that actual and moral damages, plus attorneys fees, be awarded in their
favor. The action instituted by respondents affect the parties alone, not the whole world. Any judgment
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therein is binding only upon the parties properly impleaded. Thus, it is an action in personam. As such,
personal service of summons upon the defendants is essential in order for the court to acquire jurisdiction
over their persons.
The Court notes that the complaint filed with the RTC alleged that petitioner is a non-resident who is not
found in the Philippines for which reason respondents initially prayed that a writ of preliminary attachment be
issued against her properties within the Philippines to confer jurisdiction upon the RTC. However, respondents
did not pursue its application for said writ when petitioner was subsequently found physically present in the
Philippines and personal service of summons was effected on her.
Was there a valid service of summons on petitioner? The answer is in the affirmative.
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Petitioners bare allegation that the statement in the Officers Return that she was personally served summons
is inaccurate is not sufficient. A process servers certificate of service is prima facie evidence of the
facts as set out in the certificate. Between the claim of non-receipt of summons by a party
against the assertion of an official whose duty is to send notices, the latter assertion is fortified
by the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed. To overcome the
presumption of regularity of performance of official functions in favor of such Officers Return, the
evidence against it must be clear and convincing. Petitioner having been unable to come forward with
the requisite quantum of proof to the contrary, the presumption of regularity of performance on the part of
the process server stands.
ON SERVICE OF SUMMONS ON DOMESTIC PRIVATE JURIDICAL ENTITY
314
E.B. VILLAROSA & PARTNER CO., LTD. vs. BENITO

A strict compliance with the mode of service is necessary to confer jurisdiction of the court over
a corporation. The officer upon whom service is made be one who is named in the statute;
otherwise the service is insufficient.
The purpose is to render it reasonably certain that the corporation will receive prompt and proper notice in an
action against it or to insure that the summons be served on a representative so integrated with the
corporation that such person will know what to do with the legal papers served on him.
The liberal construction rule cannot be invoked and utilized as a substitute for the plain legal requirements as
to the manner in which summons should be served on a domestic corporation.
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Service of summons upon the branch manager of petitioner at its branch office at Cagayan de Oro, instead of
upon the general manager at its principal office at Davao City is improper. Consequently, the trial court did
not acquire jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner. Fact that the defendant filed a belated
motion to dismiss did not operate to confer jurisdiction upon its person. There is no question that the
defendants voluntary appearance in the action is equivalent to service of summons. Section 20 provides
that the inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction over the
person of the person of the defendant shall not be deemed a voluntary appearance. The filing of a
motion to dismiss, whether or not belatedly filed by the defendant, his authorized agent or attorney, precisely
to object to the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the defendant can by no means be deemed a
submission to the jurisdiction of the court.
ELLICE AGRO-INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION vs. YOUNG
316
Respondents argue that at the time the summons was served upon Domingo she was acting for and in behalf
of petitioner
It is a settled rule that jurisdiction over the defendant is acquired either upon a valid service of summons or
the defendants voluntary appearance in court. When the defendant does not voluntarily submit to the courts
jurisdiction or when there is no valid service of summons, any judgment of the court which has no jurisdiction
over the person of the defendant is null and void. The purpose of summons is not only to acquire jurisdiction
over the person of the defendant, but also to give notice to the defendant that an action has been
commenced against it and to afford it an opportunity to be heard on the claim made against it. The
requirements of the rule on summons must be strictly followed, otherwise, the trial court will not acquire
jurisdiction over the defendant.
317
For service of summons upon a private domestic corporation, to be effective and valid, should be
made on the persons enumerated in the rule. Conversely, service of summons on anyone other
than the president, manager, secretary, cashier, agent, or director, is not valid. The purpose is to
render it reasonably certain that the corporation will receive prompt and proper notice in an action against it
or to insure that the summons be served on a representative so integrated with the corporation that such
person will know what to do with the legal papers served on him
In the present case, the 1996 GIS of EAIC, the pertinent document showing EAICs composition at the time
the summons was served upon it, through Domingo, will readily reveal that she was not its president,
manager, secretary, cashier, agent or director. Due to this fact, the Court is of the view that her honest belief
that she was the authorized corporate secretary was clearly mistaken because she was evidently not the
318
corporate secretary she claimed to be. In view of Domingos lack of authority to properly represent EAIC, the
Court is constrained to rule that there was no valid service of summons binding on it.
Jurisdiction of the court over the person of the defendant or respondent cannot be acquired
notwithstanding his knowledge of the pendency of a case against him unless he was validly
served with summons.
A corporation can only exercise its powers and transact its business through its board of directors and
through its officers and agents when authorized by a board resolution or its bylaws. The power of a
corporation to sue and be sued is exercised by the board of directors. The physical acts of the corporation,
like the signing of documents, can be performed only by natural persons duly authorized for the purpose by
corporate bylaws or by a specific act of the board.
319
In this case, at the time she filed the Answer with Counterclaim, Domingo was clearly not an officer of EAIC,
much less duly authorized by any board resolution or secretarys certificate from EAIC to file the said Answer
with Counterclaim in behalf of EAIC. Undoubtedly, Domingo lacked the necessary authority to bind EAIC to
Civil Case No. 96-177 before the RTC despite the filing of an Answer with Counterclaim. EAIC cannot be bound
or deemed to have voluntarily appeared before the RTC by the act of an unauthorized stranger.
The proceedings had before the RTC and ultimately its November 11, 1999 Decision were null and void.
GREEN STAR EXPRESS, INC. vs. NISSIN-UNIVERSAL ROBINA CORPORATION
320
It is a well-established rule that the rules on service of summons upon a domestic private
juridical entity must be strictly complied with. Otherwise, the court cannot be said to have
acquired jurisdiction over the person of the defendant
NURC maintains that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over it as the summons was received by its cost
accountant, Francis Tinio. It argues that under Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Court, which provides
the rule on service of summons upon a juridical entity, in cases where the defendant is a domestic
corporation like NURC, summons may be served only through its officers.
xxx
321
Here, Tinio, a, member of NURCs accounting staff, received the summons on January 22, 2004. Green star
claims that it was received upon instruction of Junadette Avedillo, the general manager of the corporation.
Such fact, however, does not appear in the Sheriffs Return. The Return did not even state whether Avedillo
was present at the time the summons was received by Tinio, the supposed assistant manager. Green Star
further avers that the sheriff tendered the summons, but Avedillo simply refused to sign and receive the
same. She then allegedly instructed Tinio to just receive it in her behalf. However, Green Star never
presented said sheriff as witness during the hearing of NURCs motion to dismiss to attest to said claim. And
while the sheriff executed an affidavit which appears to support such allegation, the same was likewise not
presented as evidence. It was only when the case was already before the CA that said affidavit first surfaced.
Since the service of summons was made on a cost accountant, which is not one of the designated
persons under Section 11 of Rule 14, the trial court did not vadily acquire jurisdiction over NURC,
although the corporation may have actually received the summons. To rule otherwise will be an
322
outright circumvention of the rules, aggravating further the delay in the administration of
justice.
ON SERVICE OF SUMMONS ON FOREIGN PRIVATE JURIDICAL ENTITY
H.B. ZACHRY COMPANY INTERNATIONAL vs. COURT OF APPEALS & VINNEL-BELVOIR CORPORATION
It was error for the Court of Appeals to declare, on the ground of grave abuse of discretion, the nullity of the
writ of attachment issued by the trial court on 21 March 1990. In the first place, the writ was in fact issued
only on 26 March 1990 and served, together with the summons, copy of the complaint, the Order of 21 March
1990, and the bond, on 27 March 1990 on Zachry at its field office in Subic Bay, Zambales, through one Ruby
Apostol. What the Court of Appeals referred to as having been issued on 21 March 1990 is the order granting
323
the application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment upon the posting of a bond of
P24,266,000.00. In the second place, even granting arguendo that the Court of Appeals had indeed in mind
the 26 March 1990 writ of attachment, its issuance, as well as the issuance of the 21 March 1990 Order, did
not suffer from any procedural or jurisdictional defect; the trial court could validly issue both.
However, the writ of attachment cannot be validly enforced through the levy of Zachry's property before the
court had acquired jurisdiction over Zachry's person either through its voluntary appearance or the valid
service of summons upon it. To put it in another way, a distinction should be made between the
issuance and the enforcement of the writ. The trial court has unlimited power to issue the writ
upon the commencement of the action even before it acquires jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant, but enforcement thereof can only be validly done after it shall have acquired such
jurisdiction.
324
The question is whether or not a writ of preliminary attachment may issue ex parte against a defendant
before acquisition of jurisdiction of the latter's person by service of summons or his voluntary submission to
the Court's authority.
The Court rules that the question must be answered in the affirmative and that consequently, the petition
for review will have to be granted.
It is incorrect to theorize that after an action or proceeding has been commenced and jurisdiction over the
person of the plaintiff has been vested in the court, but before the acquisition of jurisdiction over the person
of the defendant (either by service of summons or his voluntary submission to the court's authority), nothing
can be validly done by the plaintiff or the court. It is wrong to assume that the validity of acts done during
this period should be dependent on, or held in suspension until, the actual obtention of jurisdiction over the
325
defendant's person. The obtention by the court of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is one thing;
quite another is the acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the plaintiff or over the subject-matter or
nature of the action, or the res or object thereof.
xxx
xxx
xxx
A preliminary attachment may be defined, paraphrasing the Rules of Court, as the provisional
remedy in virtue of which a plaintiff or other proper party may, at the commencement of the
action or at any time thereafter, have the property of the adverse party taken into the custody of
the court as security for the satisfaction of any judgment that may be recovered. It is a remedy
which is purely statutory in respect of which the law requires a strict construction of the provisions granting it.
326
Withal no principle, statutory or jurisprudential, prohibits its issuance by any court before acquisition of
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant.
Rule 57 in fact speaks of the grant of the remedy "at the commencement of the action or at any
time thereafter." The phrase "at the commencement of the action," obviously refers to the date
of the filing of the complaint which, as above pointed out, is the date that marks "the
commencement of the action;" and the reference plainly is to a time before summons is served
on the defendant, or even before summons issues. What the rule is saying quite clearly is that
after an action is properly commenced by the filing of the complaint and the payment of all
requisite docket and other fees the plaintiff may apply for and obtain a writ of preliminary
attachment upon fulfillment of the pertinent requisites laid down by law, and that he may do so
at any time, either before or after service of summons on the defendant. And this indeed, has been
327
the immemorial practice sanctioned by the courts: for the plaintiff or other proper party to incorporate the
application for attachment in the complaint or other appropriate pleading (counterclaim, cross-claim, thirdparty claim) and for the Trial Court to issue the writ ex-parte at the commencement of the action if it finds the
application otherwise sufficient in form and substance.
xxx
xxx
xxx
It goes without saying that whatever be the acts done by the Court prior to the acquisition of jurisdiction over
the person of the defendant, as above indicated issuance of summons, order of attachment and writ of
attachment (and/or appointment of guardian ad litem, or grant of authority to the plaintiff to prosecute the
suit as a pauper litigant, or amendment of the complaint by the plaintiff as a matter of right without leave of
court) and however valid and proper they might otherwise be, these do not and cannot bind and affect the
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defendant until and unless jurisdiction over his person is eventually obtained by the court, either by service
on him of summons or other coercive process or his voluntary submission to the court's authority. Hence,
when the sheriff or other proper officer commences implementation of the writ of attachment, it
is essential that he serve on the defendant not only a copy of the applicant's affidavit and
attachment bond, and of the order of attachment, as explicitly required by Section 5 of Rule 57,
but also the summons addressed to said defendant as well as a copy of the complaint and order
for appointment of guardian ad litem, if any, as also explicitly directed by Section 3, Rule 14 of
the Rules of Court. Service of all such documents is indispensable not only for the acquisition of jurisdiction
over the person of the defendant, but also upon considerations of fairness, to apprise the defendant of the
complaint against him, of the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment and the grounds therefor and thus
accord him the opportunity to prevent attachment of his property by the posting of a counterbond in an
amount equal to the plaintiff's claim in the complaint pursuant to Section 5 (or Section 12), Rule 57, or
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dissolving it by causing dismissal of the complaint itself on any of the grounds set forth in Rule 16, or
demonstrating the insufficiency of the applicant's affidavit or bond in accordance with Section 13, Rule 57.
xxx
xxx
xxx
For the guidance of all concerned, the Court reiterates and reaffirms the proposition that writs of
attachment may properly issue ex parte provided that the Court is satisfied that the relevant
requisites therefor have been fulfilled by the applicant, although it may, in its discretion, require
prior hearing on the application with notice to the defendant; but that levy on property pursuant
to the writ thus issued may not be validly effected unless preceded, or contemporaneously
accompanied, by service on the defendant of summons, a copy of the complaint (and of the
appointment of guardian ad litem, if any), the application for attachment (if not incorporated in
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but submitted separately from the complaint), the order of attachment, and the plaintiff's
attachment bond.
It must be emphasized that the grant of the provisional remedy of attachment practically involves three
stages: first, the court issues the order granting the application; second, the writ of attachment issues
pursuant to the order granting the writ; and third, the writ is implemented. For the initial two stages, it is not
necessary that jurisdiction over the person of the defendant should first be obtained. However, once the
implementation commences, it is required that the court must have acquired jurisdiction over the person of
the defendant for without such jurisdiction, the court has no power and authority to act in any manner
against the defendant. Any order issuing from the Court will not bind the defendant.
331
The validity then of the order granting the application for a writ of preliminary attachment on 21 March 1990
and of the issuance of the writ of preliminary attachment on 26 March 1990 is beyond dispute. However, the
enforcement of the preliminary attachment on 27 March 1990, although simultaneous with the service of the
summons and a copy of the complaint, did not bind Zachry because the service of the summons was not
validly made. When a foreign corporation has designated a person to receive service of summons pursuant to
the Corporation Code, that designation is exclusive and service of summons on any other person is
inefficacious. The valid service of summons and a copy of the amended complaint was only made upon it on
24 April 1990, and it was only then that the trial court acquired jurisdiction over Zachry's person. Accordingly,
the levy on attachment made by the sheriff on 27 April 1990 was invalid. However, the writ of preliminary
attachment may be validly served anew.
AM NO. 11-3-6-SC; NEW RULE ON SERVICE OF SUMMONS ON FOREIGN JURIDICAL ENTITIES.
332
AMENDMENT OF SECTION 12, RULE 14

OF THE RULES OF COURT ON SERVICE UPON
FOREIGN PRIVATE JURIDICAL ENTITY
Section 12, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court is hereby amended to read
as follows:
"SEC. 12. Service upon foreign private juridical entity.

When the defendant is a foreign private juridical entity which has transacted business in the
Philippines, service may be made on its resident agent designated in accordance with law for
that purpose, or, if there be no such agent, on the government official designated by law to that
effect, or on any of its officers or agents within the Philippines.
333
If the foreign private juridical entity is not registered in

the Philippines or has no resident agent, service may, with leave
of court, be effected out of the Philippines through any of the
following means:
a) B y personal service coursed through the
appropriate court in the foreign country with the
assistance of the Department of Foreign Affairs;
b) B y publication once in a newspaper of general

circulation in the country where the defendant may be
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found and by serving a copy of the summons and the

court order by-registered mail at the last known address
of the defendant;
c) B y facsimile or any recognized electronic
means that could generate proof of service; or
d) B y such other means as the court may in its
discretion direct."
This rule shall take effect fifteen (15) days after publication in a
newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines.
335
March 15, 2011

ON SERVICE IN PERSON AND SUBSTITUTED SERVICE
AFDAL vs. ROMEO CARLOS
Any judgment of the court which has no jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is null and void.
Service of summons upon the defendant shall be by personal service first and only when the defendant
cannot be promptly served in person will substituted service be availed of
336
The impossibility of personal service justifying availment of substituted service should be explained in the
proof of service; why efforts exerted towards personal service failed. the pertinent facts and circumstances
attendant to the service of summons must be stated in the proof of service or Officers Return; otherwise, the
substituted service cannot be upheld.
Substituted Service; Failure to faithfully, strictly, and fully comply with the statutory requirements of
substituted service renders such service ineffective.It is an extraordinary method since it seeks to bind the
defendant to the consequences of a suit even though notice of such action is served not upon him but upon
another whom the law could only presume would notify him of the pending proceedings. Failure to faithfully,
strictly, and fully comply with the statutory requirements of substituted service renders such service
ineffective.
337
An action for unlawful detainer or forcible entry is a real action and in personam because the plaintiff seeks to
enforce a personal obligation on the defendant for the latter to vacate the property subject of the action,
restore physical possession thereof to the plaintiff, and pay actual damages by way of reasonable
compensation for his use or occupation of the property. In an action in personam, jurisdiction over the person
of the defendant is necessary for the court to validly try and decide the case. Jurisdiction over the defendant
is acquired either upon a valid service of summons or the defendants voluntary appearance in court. If the
defendant does not voluntarily appear in court, jurisdiction can be acquired by personal or substituted service
of summons as laid out under Sections 6 and 7 of Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, which state: x x x
Any judgment of the court which has no jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is null and
void.
338
The 23 August 2004 Decision of the MTC states:

Record shows that there were three attempts to serve the summons to the defendants. The first was on
January 14, 2004 where the same was unserved. The second was on February 3, 2004 where the same was
served to one Gary Akob and the last was on February 18, 2004 where the return was duly served but refused
to sign.
A closer look at the records of the case also reveals that the first indorsement dated 14 January 2004 carried
the annotation that it was "unsatisfied/given address cannot be located." The second indorsement dated 3
February 2004 stated that the summons was "duly served as evidenced by his signature of one Gary Acob
(relative)." While the last indorsement dated 18 February 2004 carried the annotation that it was "duly served
but refused to sign" without specifying to whom it was served.
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Service of summons upon the defendant shall be by personal service first and only when the
defendant cannot be promptly served in person will substituted service be availed of. In Samartino
v. Raon, we said:
We have long held that the impossibility of personal service justifying availment of substituted
service should be explained in the proof of service; why efforts exerted towards personal service
failed. The pertinent facts and circumstances attendant to the service of summons must be
stated in the proof of service or Officers Return; otherwise, the substituted service cannot be
upheld.
In this case, the indorsements failed to state that prompt and personal service on petitioners was rendered
impossible. It failed to show the reason why personal service could not be made. It was also not shown that
340
efforts were made to find petitioners personally and that said efforts failed. These requirements are
indispensable because substituted service is in derogation of the usual method of service. It is an
extraordinary method since it seeks to bind the defendant to the consequences of a suit even though notice
of such action is served not upon him but upon another whom the law could only presume would notify him of
the pending proceedings. Failure to faithfully, strictly, and fully comply with the statutory
requirements of substituted service renders such service ineffective.
Likewise, nowhere in the return of summons or in the records of the case was it shown that Gary Acob, the
person on whom substituted service of summons was effected, was a person of suitable age and discretion
residing in petitioners residence. In Manotoc v. Court of Appeals, we said:
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If the substituted service will be effected at defendants house or residence, it should be left
with a person of "suitable age and discretion then residing therein." A person of suitable age and
discretion is one who has attained the age of full legal capacity (18 years old) and is considered
to have enough discernment to understand the importance of a summons. "Discretion" is defined as
"the ability to make decisions which represent a responsible choice and for which an understanding of what is
lawful, right or wise may be presupposed." Thus, to be of sufficient discretion, such person must know
how to read and understand English to comprehend the import of the summons, and fully realize
the need to deliver the summons and complaint to the defendant at the earliest possible time for
the person to take appropriate action. Thus, the person must have the "relation of confidence" to
the defendant, ensuring that the latter would receive or at least be notified of the receipt of the
summons. The sheriff must therefore determine if the person found in the alleged dwelling or
residence of defendant is of legal age, what the recipients relationship with the defendant is,
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and whether said person comprehends the significance of the receipt of the summons and his
duty to immediately deliver it to the defendant or at least notify the defendant of said receipt of
summons. These matters must be clearly and specifically described in the Return of Summons.
In this case, the process server failed to specify Gary Acobs age, his relationship to petitioners and to
ascertain whether he comprehends the significance of the receipt of the summons and his duty to deliver it to
petitioners or at least notify them of said receipt of summons.
In sum, petitioners were not validly served with summons and the complaint in Civil Case No. 3719 by
substituted service. Hence, the MTC failed to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the petitioners and, thus,
the MTCs 23 August 2004 Decision is void. Since the MTCs 23 August 2004 Decision is void, it also never
became final.
343
MANOTOC vs. COURT OF APPEALS, et al.
Jurisdiction over the defendant is acquired either upon a valid service of summons or the defendants
voluntary appearance in court. When the defendant does not voluntarily submit to the courts jurisdiction or
when there is no valid service of summons, "any judgment of the court which has no jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant is null and void." In an action strictly in personam, personal service on the
defendant is the preferred mode of service, that is, by handing a copy of the summons to the defendant in
person. If defendant, for excusable reasons, cannot be served with the summons within a reasonable period,
then substituted service can be resorted to. While substituted service of summons is permitted, "it is
extraordinary in character and in derogation of the usual method of service." Hence, it must faithfully and
strictly comply with the prescribed requirements and circumstances authorized by the rules. Indeed,
344
"compliance with the rules regarding the service of summons is as much important as the issue of due
process as of jurisdiction."
Requirements for Substituted Service
Section 8 of Rule 14 of the old Revised Rules of Court which applies to this case provides:
xxx
We can break down this section into the following requirements to effect a valid substituted service:
(1) Impossibility of Prompt Personal Service
345
The party relying on substituted service or the sheriff must show that defendant cannot be
served promptly or there is impossibility of prompt service. Section 8, Rule 14 provides that the
plaintiff or the sheriff is given a "reasonable time" to serve the summons to the defendant in person, but no
specific time frame is mentioned. "Reasonable time" is defined as "so much time as is necessary under the
circumstances for a reasonably prudent and diligent man to do, conveniently, what the contract or duty
requires that should be done, having a regard for the rights and possibility of loss, if any[,] to the other party."
Under the Rules, the service of summons has no set period. However, when the court, clerk of court, or the
plaintiff asks the sheriff to make the return of the summons and the latter submits the return of summons,
then the validity of the summons lapses. The plaintiff may then ask for an alias summons if the service of
summons has failed. What then is a reasonable time for the sheriff to effect a personal service in order to
demonstrate impossibility of prompt service? To the plaintiff, "reasonable time" means no more than
seven (7) days since an expeditious processing of a complaint is what a plaintiff wants. To the
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sheriff, "reasonable time" means 15 to 30 days because at the end of the month, it is a practice
for the branch clerk of court to require the sheriff to submit a return of the summons assigned to
the sheriff for service. The Sheriffs Return provides data to the Clerk of Court, which the clerk uses in the
Monthly Report of Cases to be submitted to the Office of the Court Administrator within the first ten (10) days
of the succeeding month. Thus, one month from the issuance of summons can be considered
"reasonable time" with regard to personal service on the defendant.
Sheriffs are asked to discharge their duties on the service of summons with due care, utmost diligence, and
reasonable promptness and speed so as not to prejudice the expeditious dispensation of justice. Thus, they
are enjoined to try their best efforts to accomplish personal service on defendant. On the other hand, since
the defendant is expected to try to avoid and evade service of summons, the sheriff must be resourceful,
persevering, canny, and diligent in serving the process on the defendant. For substituted service of
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summons to be available, there must be several attempts by the sheriff to personally serve the
summons within a reasonable period [of one month] which eventually resulted in failure to prove
impossibility of prompt service. "Several attempts" means at least three (3) tries, preferably on
at least two different dates. In addition, the sheriff must cite why such efforts were unsuccessful. It is only
then that impossibility of service can be confirmed or accepted.
(2) Specific Details in the Return
The sheriff must describe in the Return of Summons the facts and circumstances surrounding the
attempted personal service. The efforts made to find the defendant and the reasons behind the failure
must be clearly narrated in detail in the Return. The date and time of the attempts on personal service, the
inquiries made to locate the defendant, the name/s of the occupants of the alleged residence or house of
348
defendant and all other acts done, though futile, to serve the summons on defendant must be specified in the
Return to justify substituted service. The form on Sheriffs Return of Summons on Substituted Service
prescribed in the Handbook for Sheriffs published by the Philippine Judicial Academy requires a narration of
the efforts made to find the defendant personally and the fact of failure. Supreme Court Administrative
Circular No. 5 dated November 9, 1989 requires that "impossibility of prompt service should be shown
by stating the efforts made to find the defendant personally and the failure of such efforts,"
which should be made in the proof of service.
(3) A Person of Suitable Age and Discretion
If the substituted service will be effected at defendants house or residence, it should be left
with a person of "suitable age and discretion then residing therein." A person of suitable age and
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discretion is one who has attained the age of full legal capacity (18 years old) and is considered
to have enough discernment to understand the importance of a summons. "Discretion" is defined
as "the ability to make decisions which represent a responsible choice and for which an
understanding of what is lawful, right or wise may be presupposed". Thus, to be of sufficient
discretion, such person must know how to read and understand English to comprehend the
import of the summons, and fully realize the need to deliver the summons and complaint to the
defendant at the earliest possible time for the person to take appropriate action. Thus, the person
must have the "relation of confidence" to the defendant, ensuring that the latter would receive
or at least be notified of the receipt of the summons. The sheriff must therefore determine if the
person found in the alleged dwelling or residence of defendant is of legal age, what the recipients
relationship with the defendant is, and whether said person comprehends the significance of the receipt of
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the summons and his duty to immediately deliver it to the defendant or at least notify the defendant of said
receipt of summons. These matters must be clearly and specifically described in the Return of Summons.
(4) A Competent Person in Charge
If the substituted service will be done at defendants office or regular place of business, then it
should be served on a competent person in charge of the place. Thus, the person on whom the
substituted service will be made must be the one managing the office or business of defendant,
such as the president or manager; and such individual must have sufficient knowledge to
understand the obligation of the defendant in the summons, its importance, and the prejudicial
effects arising from inaction on the summons. Again, these details must be contained in the Return.
351
Invalid Substituted Service in the Case at Bar

xxx
A meticulous scrutiny of the aforementioned Return readily reveals the absence of material data on the
serious efforts to serve the Summons on petitioner Manotoc in person. There is no clear valid reason cited in
the Return why those efforts proved inadequate, to reach the conclusion that personal service has become
impossible or unattainable outside the generally couched phrases of "on many occasions several attempts
were made to serve the summons x x x personally,""at reasonable hours during the day," and "to no avail for
the reason that the said defendant is usually out of her place and/or residence or premises." Wanting in
detailed information, the Return deviates from the rulingin Domagas v. Jensen and other related cases
that the pertinent facts and circumstances on the efforts exerted to serve the summons personally must be
352
narrated in the Return. It cannot be determined how many times, on what specific dates, and at what hours of
the day the attempts were made. Given the fact that the substituted service of summons may be assailed, as
in the present case, by a Motion to Dismiss, it is imperative that the pertinent facts and circumstances
surrounding the service of summons be described with more particularity in the Return or Certificate of
Service.
Besides, apart from the allegation of petitioners address in the Complaint, it has not been shown that
respondent Trajano or Sheriff Caelas, who served such summons, exerted extraordinary efforts to locate
petitioner. Certainly, the second paragraph of the Complaint only states that respondents were "informed,
and so [they] allege" about the address and whereabouts of petitioner. Before resorting to substituted
service, a plaintiff must demonstrate an effort in good faith to locate the defendant through more direct
353
means. More so, in the case in hand, when the alleged petitioners residence or house is doubtful or has not
been clearly ascertained, it would have been better for personal service to have been pursued persistently.
Sheriffs Return, which states that "despite efforts exerted to serve said process personally upon the
defendant on several occasions the same proved futile," conforms to the requirements of valid substituted
service. However, in view of the numerous claims of irregularities in substituted service which have spawned
the filing of a great number of unnecessary special civil actions of certiorari and appeals to higher courts,
resulting in prolonged litigation and wasteful legal expenses, the Court rules in the case at bar that the
narration of the efforts made to find the defendant and the fact of failure written in broad and imprecise
words will not suffice. The facts and circumstances should be stated with more particularity and detail on the
number of attempts made at personal service, dates and times of the attempts, inquiries to locate defendant,
names of occupants of the alleged residence, and the reasons for failure should be included in the Return to
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satisfactorily show the efforts undertaken. That such efforts were made to personally serve summons on
defendant, and those resulted in failure, would prove impossibility of prompt personal service.
Moreover, to allow sheriffs to describe the facts and circumstances in inexact terms would encourage routine
performance of their precise duties relating to substituted servicefor it would be quite easy to shroud or
conceal carelessness or laxity in such broad terms. Lastly, considering that monies and properties worth
millions may be lost by a defendant because of an irregular or void substituted service, it is but only fair that
the Sheriffs Return should clearly and convincingly show the impracticability or hopelessness of personal
service.
Granting that such a general description be considered adequate, there is still a serious nonconformity from
the requirement that the summons must be left with a "person of suitable age and discretion" residing in
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defendants house or residence. Thus, there are two (2) requirements under the Rules: (1) recipient
must be a person of suitable age and discretion; and (2) recipient must reside in the house or
residence of defendant. Both requirements were not met. In this case, the Sheriffs Return lacks
information as to residence, age, and discretion of Mr. Macky de la Cruz, aside from the sheriffs general
assertion that de la Cruz is the "resident caretaker" of petitioner as pointed out by a certain Ms. Lyn Jacinto,
alleged receptionist and telephone operator of Alexandra Homes. It is doubtful if Mr. de la Cruz is residing
with petitioner Manotoc in the condominium unit considering that a married woman of her stature in society
would unlikely hire a male caretaker to reside in her dwelling. With the petitioners allegation that Macky de la
Cruz is not her employee, servant, or representative, it is necessary to have additional information in the
Return of Summons. Besides, Mr. Macky de la Cruzs refusal to sign the Receipt for the summons is a strong
indication that he did not have the necessary "relation of confidence" with petitioner. To protect petitioners
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right to due process by being accorded proper notice of a case against her, the substituted service of
summons must be shown to clearly comply with the rules.
It has been stated and restated that substituted service of summons must faithfully and strictly
comply with the prescribed requirements and in the circumstances authorized by the rules.
The procedure prescribed by a statute or rule for substituted or constructive service must be strictly pursued.
There must be strict compliance with the requirements of statutes authorizing substituted or constructive
service.
Where, by the local law, substituted or constructive service is in certain situations authorized in the place of
personal service when the latter is inconvenient or impossible, a strict and literal compliance with the
357
provisions of the law must be shown in order to support the judgment based on such substituted or
constructive service. Jurisdiction is not to be assumed and exercised on the general ground that the subject
matter of the suit is within the power of the court. The inquiry must be as to whether the requisites of
the statute have been complied with, and such compliance must appear on the record. The fact
that the defendant had actual knowledge of attempted service does not render the service
effectual if in fact the process was not served in accordance with the requirements of the
statute.
Based on the above principles, respondent Trajano failed to demonstrate that there was strict compliance
with the requirements of the then Section 8, Rule 14 (now Section 7, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure).
358
Due to non-compliance with the prerequisites for valid substituted service, the proceedings held before the
trial court perforce must be annulled.
The court a quo heavily relied on the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty. It reasons
out that "[t]he certificate of service by the proper officer is prima facie evidence of the facts set out herein,
and to overcome the presumption arising from said certificate, the evidence must be clear and convincing."
The Court acknowledges that this ruling is still a valid doctrine. However, for the presumption to apply,
the Sheriffs Return must show that serious efforts or attempts were exerted to personally serve
the summons and that said efforts failed. These facts must be specifically narrated in the Return. To
reiterate, it must clearly show that the substituted service must be made on a person of suitable age and
discretion living in the dwelling or residence of defendant. Otherwise, the Return is flawed and the
359
presumption cannot be availed of. As previously explained, the Return of Sheriff Caelas did not comply with
the stringent requirements of Rule 14, Section 8 on substituted service.
The presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions by the sheriff is not
applicable in this case where it is patent that the sheriffs return is defective (emphasis supplied)."
While the Sheriffs Return in the Venturanza case had no statement on the effort or attempt to personally
serve the summons, the Return of Sheriff Caelas in the case at bar merely described the efforts or attempts
in general terms lacking in details as required by the ruling in the case of Domagas v. Jensen and other cases.
It is as if Caelas Return did not mention any effort to accomplish personal service. Thus, the substituted
service is void.
ONG vs. CO
360
Lack of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court in rendering the judgment or final order is either lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action, or lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
petitioner. The former is a matter of substantive law because statutory law defines the jurisdiction of the
courts over the subject matter or nature of the action. The latter is a matter of procedural law, for it involves
the service of summons or other processes on the petitioner.
In the present case, petitioner contends that there was lack of jurisdiction over her person because
there was an invalid substituted service of summons. Jurisdiction over the defendant is acquired either
upon a valid service of summons or the defendant's voluntary appearance in court. If the defendant does not
voluntarily appear in court, jurisdiction can be acquired by personal or substituted service of summons as laid
out under Sections 6 and 7 of Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, which state:
361
xxx
In the case at bench, the summons in Civil Case No. 02-0306 was issued on July 29, 2002. In his servers
return, the process server resorted to substituted service of summons on August 1, 2002. Surprisingly, the
process server immediately opted for substituted service of summons after only two (2) days from the
issuance of the summons.
The servers return utterly lacks sufficient detail of the attempts undertaken by the process server to
personally serve the summons on petitioner. The server simply made a general statement that summons was
effected after several futile attempts to serve the same personally. The server did not state the specific
number of attempts made to perform the personal service of summons; the dates and the corresponding time
the attempts were made; and the underlying reason for each unsuccessful service. He did not explain either if
362
there were inquiries made to locate the petitioner, who was the defendant in the case. These important acts
to serve the summons on petitioner, though futile, must be specified in the return to justify substituted
service.
The servers return did not describe in detail the person who received the summons, on behalf of petitioner. It
simply stated that the summons was received "by Mr. Roly Espinosa of sufficient age and discretion, the
Security Officer thereat." It did not expound on the competence of the security officer to receive the
summons.
Also, aside from the servers return, respondent failed to indicate any portion of the records which would
describe the specific attempts to personally serve the summons. Respondent did not even claim that
petitioner made any voluntary appearance and actively participated in Civil Case No. 02-0306.
363
The CA likewise erred in ruling that the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty could be
applied in the case at bench. This presumption of regularity, however, was never intended to be
applied even in cases where there are no showing of substantial compliance with the
requirements of the rules of procedure. Such presumption does not apply where it is patent that
the sheriff's or server's return is defective. As earlier explained, the server's return did not comply with
the stringent requirements of substituted service of summons.
The stricter rule in substituted service of summons was meant to address "[t]he numerous claims of
irregularities in substituted service which have spawned the filing of a great number of unnecessary special
civil actions of certiorari and appeals to higher courts, resulting in prolonged litigation and wasteful legal
expenses.
364
ROBINSON vs. MIRALLES

Summons is a writ by which the defendant is notified of the action brought against him or her. In a civil
action, service of summons is the means by which the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant. Any judgment without such service, in the absence of a valid waiver, is null and void. Where the
action is in personam and the defendant is in the Philippines, the service of summons may be made through
personal or substituted service in the manner provided for in Sections 6 and 7, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of
Procedure, as amended, thus:
xxx
365
Under our procedural rules, personal service is generally preferred over substituted service, the
latter mode of service being a method extraordinary in character. For substituted service to be
justified, the following circumstances must be clearly established : (a) personal service of summons
within a reasonable time was impossible; (b) efforts were exerted to locate the party; and (c) the summons
was served upon a person of sufficient age and discretion residing at the partys residence or upon a
competent person in charge of the partys office or place of business. Failure to do so would invalidate all
subsequent proceedings on jurisdictional grounds.
Petitioner contends that the service of summons upon the subdivision security guard is not in compliance
with Section 7, Rule 14 since he is not related to her or staying at her residence. Moreover, he is not duly
authorized to receive summons for the residents of the village. Hence, the substituted service of summons is
not valid and that the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over her person.
366
We have ruled that the statutory requirements of substituted service must be followed strictly, faithfully, and
fully and any substituted service other than that authorized by the Rules is considered ineffective. However,
we frown upon an overly strict application of the Rules. It is the spirit, rather than the letter of the procedural
rules, that governs.
In his Return, Sheriff Potente declared that he was refused entry by the security guard in Alabang Hills twice.
The latter informed him that petitioner prohibits him from allowing anybody to proceed to her residence
whenever she is out. Obviously, it was impossible for the sheriff to effect personal or substituted service of
summons upon petitioner. We note that she failed to controvert the sheriffs declaration. Nor did she deny
having received the summons through the security guard.
367
Considering her strict instruction to the security guard, she must bear its consequences. Thus, we agree with
the trial court that summons has been properly served upon petitioner and that it has acquired jurisdiction
over her.
368

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A.

Remedial Law Review 1 (Dean Riano)

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1.b. HEIRS SEBE vs. HEIRS SEVILLA

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In Atuel v. Valdez the Court likewise expressly stated that:

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4. SUPAPO vs. SPS. DE JESUS

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6. SAN PEDRO vs. JUDGE ASDALA

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7. BANK OF COMMERCE vs. SPS. SAN PABLO

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8. HEIRS OF SPOUSES RETERTA vs. SPS. MORES and LOPEZ

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9. SPS. SABITSANA vs. MUERTEGUI

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15. SPS. ERORITA vs. SPOUSES DUMLAO

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16. HEIRS OF JULAO vs. SPS. DE JESUS

The assessed value must be alleged

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17. MONSANTO, et al. VS. LIM