1

PLSC 418 Final Exam Study Guide1

Last Updated 11/25/2012

1.

Constructivism Terms & Key Ideas

a.

Socialization
i. Define
1.

Molding and shaping behavior and identifies through interaction, learning and structure of
membership

ii. Understand a general example of this idea and how you could apply it to IR
1.
b.

Spread of US culture leads to identity change which eventually leads to acceptance of US

values (eg, Democracy)

Institutionalize
i. Define
1.

The internalization of belief, idea, or value so it becomes permanent characteristic of one

identity

2.

Change in belief

ii. Understand a general example of this idea and how you could apply it to IR
1.

2.

Repeated exposure produces familiarity which ultimately leads to institutionalization (eg,

joining a membership then youre going to become one)
a.

Economic growth means more jobs at home

b.

Citizens are safer abroad

c.

Stronger influence in international events

d.

Common exchange/ education system

Atkinsons Theory of Democratic Socialization

i. Define
1.

The enlargement of the community of democratic states and the promotion of democratic
institutions, practices and beliefs for the purpose of furthering world peace and US national
security priorities

ii. What are the three general stages?

1.

Individual belief change

2.

Political institutionilzation in the state

3.

States behave according to the institutionalized belief abroad

Note: this is a list of the major theories, specific theories, and theoretical concepts that I believe are most important for your
upcoming final exam and overall educational experience. You should be able to explain the each of these theories/concepts and detail
an example of how they work. This list is for you to fill out based on class readings, lecture notes, and class discussions.

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iii. Know and be able to explain how Atkinson believes this works in IR
1.

What is the causal mechanism?

a.

2.

Participation in US military educational exchange programs

What are the specific stages and how do they develop (5)?
i. Exposure to civil society
ii. New ideas and dialogue from interaction w/ other
iii. Observing civilian control of military matters
iv. Friendly contacts abroad
v. Changing attitudes back home

iv. Know and be able to explain some implications of this idea

1.

2.

Advantages
a.

Important for democratic peace

b.

Important for regime change

c.

Important for institutional participation

Emerging Trends
a.

3.

Concerns
a.

Drone warfare
i. Imprecise; you need someone who is able to control

b.

Pollution
i. State values polition differently

c.
3.

1.

Socialization for green things

2.

How do you induce pollution?

Cyber warfare

Civil War (Intrastate) General Concepts

a.

Why do we study it?

i. List and explain the major differences compared to interstate wars (9)
1.

Frequency

2.

Lethality

3.

Reccurence

4.

National security

5.

Variety

b.

6.

Classification

7.

Different theories

8.

Casual mechanisms

9.

Measuresments

Define and know the component parts of a civil war (5)

i. Poverty/ development
ii. Population size
iii. Prior war history
iv. Rough terrain
v. Anocracy

c.

Greed Argument for Civil War Onset

i. Define it civil war is caused by greed components; combatants in armed conflicts are motivated by a
desire to better their situation, and perform an informal cost-benefit analysis in examining if the
rewards of joining a rebellion are greater than not joining
1.

Profit (diamonds, oil, land, etc)

2.

Conquering land

3.

Politics

4.

Opportunity Cost

ii. Understand and be able to explain some of the causal mechanisms

d.

1.

Poverty

2.

Development

3.

Looting/Crime

Grievance Arguments for Civil War Onset

i. Define it - people rebel over issues of identity, e.g. ethnicity, religion, social class, etc., rather than over
economics. In practice, even proponents of strong versions of these arguments admit that the opposing
argument has some influence in the development of a conflict.
1.

2.

Political
a.

Leadership

b.

No voting

c.

Uneven representation

d.

Illegitimate ruler

Economic
a.

Food prices

b.

High taxes

3.

c.

Unemployment

d.

Prices

Ethnic/religious
a.

repression

ii. Understand and be able to explain some of the causal mechanisms

4.

1.

Nepotism

2.

Discrimination

3.

Political differences

The Sierra Leone Civil War

a.

Grievance Argument for Participation (3)

i. Discontent
1.

Define: Social class rebelling to change or preserve the status quo

ii. Ethnic Grievances

1.

Define:
a.

Difference between ethnic groups leads to conflicts

b.

Ethnically homogenous factions are central

c.

Social mobility rewards one group over another

iii. Personal Dislocation

1.

Define:
a.

Inability to express preference without non-violent means

b.

They use non-legitimate means to attain goal, such as wealth, power and prestige that
are not available through other channels

iv. Hypothesis:

b.

1.

They are economically deprived (income incentive; lack of education forces them to do so)

2.

They are marginalized from decision making process (excluded from the party)

3.

They are alienated from mainstream political process (no party affiliation)

Selective Incentives Argument for Participation (2)

i. Rational Calculation
1.

Define: rational people will not join a rebellion and do something costly unless its worth
something for them (money, loot, land, positions of authority)

ii. Protection
1.

Define: Comparison of the private benefits of joning vs not joining

a.

Join us or we wont protect you

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iii. Hypothesis:

c.

1.

They expect to receive selective incentives from fighting group (offered money to join)

2.

They believe they would be safer inside a fighting faction than outside it (safety, felt safer
inside the group)

Social Sanctions Argument for Participation (2) both create common bonds and are manipulated to induce
feelings of reciprocity, shaming, reputation threats, and other social sanction behaviors
i. Collective Identities
1.

Define: Poor, ethnic, etc identity that people share

ii. Social Networks

1.

Define: Friendships, etc

iii. Hypothesis:

5.

1.

Members of community are active in the movement (friends, members of group)

2.

Their community is characterized by social structures (access)

Kaufmanns Theory of Ethnic Civil Wars

a.

Know and be able to explain the major differences between Ideological vs. Ethnic Civil Wars
i. Ideological
1.

Contests within the same community over how it should be governed

2.

Youre competing for the same pool- fight for the loyalties of people

3.

Loyalty is flexible
a.

Recruitment is less restricted

b.

Population control is important you dont only recruit people in the area you
control

c.

Pure military success is not enough competition of ideas

d.

Multiple ways to end the conflict

ii. Civil wars

1.

Disputes between different heritages

2.

Competition over the power within economic structure

3.

Extremely rigid
a.

Youre recruiting people from your ethnic group

i. Tend to be imbalance

4.

b.

Switching side is impossible

c.

Struggle to defeat the other side

Pure military success is enough to win- genocide

b.

5.

Territorial control of population is is critical. Information quality is less important

6.

Few ways to end the conflict

Causal Mechanisms for Ethnic Civil Wars

i. Ethnic Identity
1.

Know the be able to explain the four micro-channels

a.

Fixed at birth
i. Joining problem
1.

Appearance

2.

Language

3.

Accent

4.

Religious and culture

5.

Limited social contacts

ii. Leaving problem

b.

1.

What you look like

2.

Abundance social contacts if you leave, youre a traitor

3.

Extremely vulnerable

Extremely vulnerable to elite manipulation

i. Us vs them
ii. Scapegoating is more easy

c.

1.

Pin blame on others

2.

Identity is sticky

Negotiations are difficult

i. Audience cost is more severe
ii. Bargaining range is shrinking
1.

d.

More likely to be punished in bargaining

Identity shrinks choice

i. Threat of social sanctions and high exit costs
ii. Your identity is largely at the whim
1.

Latent condition for genocide

ii. Identifying Loyalties

1.

Know and be able to explain the two micro-channels

a.

Who is who?

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i. Assessing loyalty based on characteristic
ii. Punishing cheater is easier
1.
b.

Collective action problem is less severe

Information is more reliable

i. Finding traitors is easy, so is locating the enemies.

iii. Decisiveness of territory

1.

Know be able to explain the major micro-channel

a.

Population control depends entirely on territorial control

i. Each side can only recruit their ethnicities
1.

Incentivizes seizure of areas populated by co-ethnics

2.

Incentivizes ethnic cleansing

a.

b.

Expulsion, forced relocation, massacre

Military strategy is different than ideological conflicts

i. Cost of territorial loss is extremely high
ii. Battles are intense - landgrabbing

iv. Security Dilemma

1.

Know and be able to explain the two micro-channels

a.

Mobilize to defend your ethnic

i. Group identity is your ticket for protection
ii. Military capability acquired for defense sis perceived as only offensive in
nature

b.

Geography complicates
i. Intermixed communities are more vulnerable
ii. Isolated ethnic lands are harder to hold and take in battle
iii. Mixed areas incentivizes creating homogenous ones that are more pratical

c.

What is an ethnic island? Island that is made up by the same ethnic potential solution for civil wars

d.

How can homogeneity inform us about severity of an ethnic conflict and when it is likely to end? Conflict is
most likely to end when the entire land is homogenized

e.

Know and be able to explain the complications of the following solutions to ending ethnic civil wars
i. Suppression
1.

What is the argument? Complete victory by one side ends conflicts

2.

What are the problem(s) with this argument? Does not happen often due to strong
humanitarian concerns

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ii. Reconstruction of Identities
1.

What is the argument? We can create new identities and attitudes since constructivism argues
that identities are fluid and can be changed
a.

Remove the extremists

b.

Elect moderate leaders who emphasize inclusivity

c.

Create norms that reflect majority values

d.

Change focus from ethnic to national

2.

Know how Constructivism can inform our understanding here

3.

What are the problem(s) with this argument?

a.

Identity may be fluid, but it is really hard to change the perspectives

iii. Power Sharing

1.

What is the argument? Institutions guarantee group representations and association

2.

Know and be able to explain the role of democratic consociationalism

a.

Define
i.

b.

Require state political parties and institutions to include ethnic minorities

and different ethnicities to promote integration and mutual exchange

How does this relate to liberalism?

i. Democratic consciationalism explains that states behave based on their
political behaviors

c.

Know the six micro-channels

i. Power sharing
ii. Proportional distribution
iii. Autonomy on ethnic issues
iv. Minority veto
v. Create a balance of power
vi. Checks and balances

3.

What are the problem(s) with this argument?

a.

Require power sharing arrangements to reduce feelings of grievances and political

exclusion

iv. State Building

1.

What are the arguments (several)?

a.

Administer missing government functions

b.

Provide politics/ economics military assistance

c.

Free and fair elections

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2.

What are the problem(s) with these arguments?

v. International Intervention
1.

2.

What are the three major arguments

a.

Economic sanctions against notable extremist and warring parties that are
committing atrocities -> limit their effectiveness

b.

Military aid to change the balance of power

c.

Intervention forces to stop the bloodshed and resettle communities

What are the problem(s) with these arguments?

a.

Costly

b.

Power transition potential

vi. Separation
1.

2.

What are the two major arguments?

a.

Let each side form their own state

b.

Separate each group geographically as best you can via internationally managed
arrangements

Be able to explain how this influences the security dilemma

a.

Remove security dilemma

i. mixed regions are able to defend themselves
ii. high cost for cheaters
iii. local autonomy to minority groups
iv. draw autonomy border

3.

What are the problem(s) with these arguments?

a.

Mixed ethnicities make conflicts worse

b.

Population transfer causes suffering

i. Not going to resolve hatred

6.

c.

State building extremely expensive

d.

Who should intervene?

Rosss Theory of Development, Democracy, & The Importance of Oil

a.

Rent
i. Define: wealth collected by the state, in which only a few are involved in the generation, distribution
and utilization of wealth
ii. Where do they come from? Minerals/ oil generate rent due to low supply
iii. How are they extracted? Largely captured via export taxes, corporate taxes, state owned enterprises

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b.

What are the differences between resource rents and agricultural rents?
i. Agricultural does not produce a lot of rent
ii. \Export revenues usually go to private sectors
iii. Labor intensive
iv. Large supply - cheap

c.

Know the three causal mechanisms that explains how oil hinders democracy & development
i. Rentier effect
1.

Define: governments use their oil revenues to relieve social pressures that might otherwise
lead to demands for greater accountability

2.

Explain the three micro channels

a.

Taxation effect
i. When rents from sale of commodities are high, they are likely to tax less
heavy or not at all
ii. As a result, public will least likely to demand for accountability

b.

Spending effect
i. Greater spending which dampens pressure for democratization
ii. Leads to oligarch

c.

Group Formation effect

i. Use the money to prevent social groups that demand political rights
ii. Theres no pressure for democracy

ii. Repression Effect

1.

Define: government invest heavily on their internal security system and blocks demand for
democracy through force

2.

Explain the two micro channels

a.

Self interest
i. Given the opportunity to better arm itself and insure its grip on power, an
authoritarian government will do so

b.

Regional Conflict
i. Know how the idea of grievances for civil war onset arise here

iii. Modernization Effect

1.

Allows government to invest more in security force and a larger

army

2.

Geographuically concentrated area may not see the return that may
cause grievance. Resource leave but residents do not see money
coming

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1.

Define: democracy is caused by a collection of social and cultural exchange that includes
occupational specialization, urbanization and high level education due to increasing economic
development

2.

Explain the two micro channels

a.

Democratic is a collection exchanges

b.

Dutch Disease
i. Define: heavy reliance on resources rent generate a decline in
manufacturing and investment, leading to low development and neglect
investment in infrastructure
ii. Social change in education
1.

Higher education = more articulate public = more developed

iii. Social Change in Occupation Specialization

1.
7.

More autonomy in skill = specialized skills = better jobs

Development: The Reversal of Fortunes

a.

What is the Reversal of Fortunes Hypothesis, aka the Institutions Hypothesis?

i. Define: difference in prosperity that we observe today is related to organizations of societies created by
those in the past. Societies that provide incentives and opportunities for investment will be richer than
those who fail to do so.
ii. Explain the two major causal mechanisms
1.

2.

Institutions of private property

a.

Secure property rights for broad section of society

b.

Important for investment and successful economic performance

Extractive institutions
a.

Concentrate power in the hands of small elites creates a risk for expropriation for the
majority of the population

b.

Discourages investment and economic development

iii. What were the major determinants of institutions that were created by European colonists
1.

Economic profitability of alternatives

a.

Define: the conditions favor of extractions

b.

List the five determinants

i. High population density
ii. Easy of transportation
iii. Endowment of rsources
iv. Easy access to resource
v. Existing system of tax administration and tribute

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2.

Whether the Europeans could settle

a.

Define: they are more likely to develop institutions of private property when they
settled in large numbers simply because they are more simply affected by the
insitutitons

b.

List the four major determinants

i. Sparsely inhabited areas
ii. Yellow fever and other diseases
iii. Weather
iv. Resource availability

iv. What is the irony inherent in the reversal of fortunes?

1.

If youre not part of the elites, you probably wont be able to express your entrepreneurial
skills and ideas- you do not have a secure property right

2.

Elites may want to block investment because new groups will be the beneficiaries, thus loss of
profit

3.

Elites fear political struggle

v. How does this relate to Liberalism?

1.

The importance of domestic institutions that dictate how states behave

vi. How does this relate to Institutionalism?

1.

The importance of inertia in colonial and institutional heritage

vii. How does this relate to Realism?

1.

The key actors in world politics are sovereign states that act rationally to advance their
security, power, and wealth in an anarchic international system

viii. What is the major limitation of this reversal of fortunes theory?

8.

Krasners Theory of State Power for Trade

a.

Define: structure of international theory is determined by the interest and power of states acting to maximize
national goals

b.

Explain the four factors that determine a states desire for openness and how they relate to size, development,
and factor endowment
i. Aggregate National Income
1.

Define: the greater the degree of openness, the greater level of aggregate national income

2.

How does state size influence this?

a.

Tends to favor smaller states

i. They have higher ratios for trade to national product
ii. They have fewer factor endowments
iii. They need trade to survive

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3.

How does level of development influence this?

a.

More developed states have more advantage because they are able to regulate the
trade

ii. Social Stability

1.

Define: greater openness exposes the domestic economy changes in the world market

2.

How does state size influence this? Greater in smaller states than the larger ones

3.

How does level of development influence this? Effect of market changes are greater in less
developed states than in more developed ones
a.

More pronounced these effects are, the more instablity

iii. Political Power

1.

Define: relative opportunity cost for trading partners

a.

Remember the idea of closure and exit costs from Institutionalism

i. The higher your relative cost of closure, the weaker the political position
you have

2.

How does state size influence this? Effects will be more severe for small states

3.

How does level of development influence this? Effects will be more severe for
underdeveloped states

4.

What type of state is the notable exception? Why? Big oil producer, they have more leverage
in bargaining

iv. Economic Growth

c.

1.

Define: exposure to trade forces you to be more inefficient in how you allocate your factors of
productions

2.

How does state size influence this? Small states tended to do better

3.

How does level of development influence this? Larger states do not need to protect infant
industries

4.

How do factor endowments influence this? Swap in factors that work without factors that do
not

What type of system are we likely to see when it is composed of highly developed, small states? Open
i. Why?

d.

1.

Aggregate income in increased by openness

2.

Economic growth is also increased

3.

Social stability is mitigated due to high level of development

4.

No loss of political power because cost of closure is symmetric to all members

What type of system are we likely to see when it is composed of unequally developed, large states? Closed
i. Why?

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ii. What happens with respect to:

e.

1.

National income: aggregate income will be modes

2.

Social stability: openness creates more instability

3.

Political power: more vulnerability in political power

4.

Economic growth: impaired because advanced areas will be offset by backward ones

What type of system are we likely to see when there is a hegemon with a variety of different states?
i. Why? Open
ii. Remember the Hegemonic Stability Theory.
1.

What does a hegemon do to influence the system to its benefit?

a.

Diplomacy, coercion, or persuasion, it is actually deploying its "preponderance of

power."
i. Threatens to closure trading relationship
ii. Withhold aid
iii. Military compel opennes

2.

What is this likely to produce in regards to trade openness?

a.

Trade will be more open

b.

Offers access to its large domestic market

iii. How should small states behave in this system?

1.

What happens with respect to:

a.

National income: Increased

b.

Social stability: Unaffected

c.

Political power: Increased

d.

Economic growth: Increased

iv. How should medium and large states behave? Hard to predict. But refer to alliance.
1.

f.

What happens with respect to:

a.

National income: mixed

b.

Social stability: mixed

c.

Political power: mixed

d.

Economic growth: mixed

Explain the three measures of trade openness

i. Tariffs: adding cost to trade
ii. Trade Ratios: when the ratio increase, trade is more open

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iii. Regional Trade Blocs: when these are extremely clear, we can say that trade is becoming more closed

9.

g.

How does this theory relate to issues of colonialism and the Reversal of Fortunes Hypothesis? Implications
for development and trade preferences

h.

How does this theory explain the bipolar system that we saw in the Cold War? Does not explain anything

Rogowskis Theory of Trade & Political Preferences

a.

Explain the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem

i. How does this relate to trade preferences
1.

Protection benefits scare factors and harms abundance factors

2.

Openess benefits abundant factors and hars scare factors

ii. How does this relate to political preferences?

b.

1.

Winners of trade are going to try to accelerate trade, the loser is going to end/ slow it

2.

Those who enjoy a sudden increase in wealth and income as a result of a change in trade
openness will be enabled and willing to willing expand their political influence

3.

Political entrepreneurs will devise mechanism that can amount obstacles to collective actions

Know the General Model of Factor Endowments (see chart in notes)

i. Know how these preferences change as you increase the exposure to trade (see chart in notes)
1.

Know what type of political preferences we are likely to see in each category
a.

Advanced Econ + High L/L ratio = Capital and Land abundant + scarce labor
i. plutocracy

b.

Advance Econ + Low L/L ratio = Capital and Labor abundant + scarce land
i. Radicalism

c.

Backward econ + High L/L ratio = Land abundant + scarce capital and labor
i. US Populism

d.

Backward econ + low L/L ratio = Labor abundant + scarce capital and land
i. Socialism

ii. Know how these preferences change as you decrease the exposure to trade (see chart in notes)
1.

Know what type of political preferences we are likely to see in each category
a.

Advanced Econ + High L/L ratio = Labor abundant + Scarce land and capital
i. US New Deal

b.

Advanced Econ + Low L/L ratio = Land abundant + Scarce capital and labor
i. W. European Facism

c.

Backward Econ + High L/L ratio = Capital and labor abundant + Scarce land
i. American populism

16
d.

Backward econ + Low L/L ratio = Capital and Land abundant + Scarce labor
i. Asia and East European Fascism

10. Rogowskis Theory of Trade & Institutional Performance

a.

How does trade and economic development influence the institutional design of a state? As a state becomes
more economically developed and more reliant on trade, the more likely it is to adopt
i. Proportional political representation
ii. Parliamentary democracy
iii. Large political districts

b.

Explain the three causal mechanisms

i. Proportional Representation
1.

Explain how this creates political insulation

a.

The more minority group dominates an electoral district, the more of a say it will
have
i. You want to increase district size while reducing the number in order to
maneuver policy options

ii. Parliamentary Democracy

1.

Explain how this creates institutional autonomy

a.

Pressure groups are restrained where campaign resources or legal control of

nominators are centralized in the hand of party leader

iii. Large Political Districts

1.

Explain how this can or cannot create policy stability

a.

Parties converge on the position of the median voter in a plurality system with one
dimensional policy space
i. But they are usually multi dimensional
1.

c.

Encourages lobbying

Be able to explain how differences in ethnicity, urbanization, and factor endowments influence/complicate each
of these causal mechanisms

11. Theories of Environment & Conflict

a.

(Neo)Malthusianism
i. Define: social breakdown that results from a lack of food needed to sustain growing population; neo
considers all natural resources
1.

Population growth decreases per capita food production due to diminishing returns of labor
a.

2.

Static cropland, unrestrained growth

Population growth diverts capital from savings and investment to consumption

a.

Less saving

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3.

Large population and high rate of growth overstress the sustainbility

ii. Know the criticisms of this theory

1.

There has ot been social chaos

2.

Development and technology expands productivity

3.

Link between population growth and low saving is imprecise

4.

New farming methods

a.

b.

Slope terracing, drip irrigation, hybrid

Economic Optimism/Cornucopianism
i. Define: properly functioning economic institutions can provide incetives to encourage conservations,
resource substitutions, development of new resources
1.

Necessity is the mother of invention (induced innovation)

ii. Know the criticisms of this theory

1.

Assumes a homogeneity among resources that may not always be sustainable

2.

Ignores the ability and desire for government and leaders to engage in market intervention

3.

Ignores the possibility of monopolies

4.

Strong assumption about historical exceptionalism

5.

Ignores the stickiness of institutional inertia of cultural and historical factors

6.

Ignores the problem of brain drain

a.

c.

The weak will have to sustain themselves

Distributionism
i. Define:
1.

We have enough resources to feed and sustain everyone

2.

Problems stem from maldistribution of resources and wealth

3.

Poverty and suffering are not causes, but consequences of high population growth and
resource depletion

ii. Know the criticisms of this theory

1.

2.
d.

Who decides how resource is distributed?

a.

Problems of collective actions and divergent and interest

b.

Increased greed and grievances

Should some resources be public and others private?

Tragedy of the Commons

i. Define: is the depletion of a shared resource by individuals, acting independently and rationally
according to each one's self-interest, despite their understanding that depleting the common resource is
contrary to their long-term best interests.

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ii. Know and be able to explain an IR example:
1.
e.

Stag hunt?

Eco-Shock
i. Define: A climate related exogenously generated disturbance that negatively impacts personal income,
state wealth and capacity and international tread
ii. Know and be able to explain how this relates to climate change and correlates of conflict

f.

1.

Eco shock leads to increasing grievances (eg reducing income)

2.

Affected people are more open to manipulation and recruitment by rebel (increasing greed)

3.

Increase in international assistance aid increase th greed incentives by rebels looking for
funding in disaster stricken areas

4.

Forces crop substitions for farmers

How does the issue of climate change complicate our theoretical approaches/levels of analysis?
i. Be able to explain how this works
1.

Eco shock influences personal grievances and greed

2.
12. Theories of State Failure
a.

State Failure/Failed States

i. Define
1.

Failure to administer goods and services

2.

Failure to repress and govern unsafe areas

3.

Economic failure and degraded infrastructure

ii. What are some causes?

1.

Ethnic conflicts

2.

Lack of infrastructure

3.

No legitimate government

iii. What are some examples?

1.

Pakistan

2.

Sudan

3.

Somalia

4.

Yemen

iv. Why is this an important concern for IR theory?

1.

Failed states may be threats for global world

2.

Spread migrants, disease, environment isseus

19
3.
b.

Drug cartels vs territory network

State Failure and Terrorism

i. Why do theorists believe that failed states create/promote terrorism?

c.

1.

Train terrorists in failed state is easier

2.

Offer larger pool for recruitments

3.

They may protect terrorist groups

Compellence Dilemma
i. Define: the paradox that results from an attept to compel a change in the unwanted policy of an
adversal state
1.

Threat credibility problem in the eyes of the adversary for threatened state

2.

Incentive by the adversary to misrepresent so threatened does not punish

ii. Explain how this works and why it is a paradox with respect to state failure (failed states)
1.

If the target state faces a low capacity adversary then it never uses harsh punishment (use of
foreign aid instead, eg Pakistan)

2.

If the target faces a recalcitrant adversary, it will use punishment provided that the costs arent
too high and wont increase the power of group in question

3.

If the target faces extremely powerful adversary, theyre unlikely to use punishment fearing
that they would increase the groups power relative to host governmnet

iii. Be able to detail an IR example

d.

1.

Pakistan foreign AID

2.

Iraq - punishment

Brooks Alternatives/Solutions to State Failure

i. What is her argument? State is the best solution among other choices
1.

We need to be considering alternatives to what we currently have because the system does not
appear to be working and it is likely to get worse overtime

ii. What are some alternatives to the state and some solutions to solve failing states?
1.

Distinguish modern government structure vs government structure society requires

2.

Drop the idea that everyone needs to live within international law

3.

Create smaller, more realistic government

4.

Permanence UN administered areas

5.

Let them fail

iii. How does this related to the major IR theory of Constructivism?

1.
13. Theories of a Network

The notion of state is shaped and molded instead of perceived as something natural

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a.

Social Network
i. Define it: a set of units and a rule that defines whether, how, in what way and to what extent any two
units are linked with each other
1.

In IR, networks are a mode of organization that facilitates collective action and cooperation,
exercise influence, or serves as a means of international governance

ii. Be able to compare and contrast this to a levels of analysis framework

1.

A network defines structures as emergent properties of persistent patterns of relations among

agents that can define enable, constrain, enable those agents

2.

Actions and beliefs are interrelated and not in any way independent

3.

Allows us to look multiple level of analysis

4.

Ignores all units

5.

Incorporates all information

iii. Know the advantages and disadvantages of studying IR using a social network
b.

Node
i. Define it: is an agent that can be individual, state, etc
ii. Know how it fits into a social network
1.

c.

Network are composed of nodes

a.

Nodes and their behaviors are mutually dependent

b.

The ties between nodes can be channels of transmission of material or non material
product (belief)

c.

The persistent pattern of association among nodes creates structures that can define,
enable, or restrict behavior of nods

Access Centrality
i. Define it: way to determine how importance of some ties over another
ii. Know how this fits into a social network
1.

Closeness centrality: the length of the path between a node with another

2.

Betweeness centrality: the number of shortest path in network that pass through a particular
node, and therefore measuring dependence of the network on a particular node for
maintaining connectedness
a.

3.
d.

brokerage

Access centrality: the sum of the value of the ties between that node and every other node

Transitivity (Structural Equivalence)

i. Define: a group of nodes which every member has ties of similar strength to every other node in the
network
1.

Friend of my friend is my friend

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2.

Enemy of my enemy is my friend

ii. Know how this relates to a node and fits into a social network (eg, France and Iran)
e.

Preferential Attachment
i. Define: the relationship between when a highly centralized node forms additional ties or unique ties to
a less connected node (eg, China + Pakistan)
ii. Know how this relates to a node and fits into a social network

f.

Homophily
i. Define it: tendency to form based on common attributes
ii. Know how this relates to a node and fits into a social network
1.

g.

Iran and North Korea

a.

Hated the US

b.

Dictatorship

Heterophily
i. Define it: tendency to form nodes ties to share strengths and minimize weakness
ii. Know how this relates to a node and fits into a social network
1.

North Korea and Pakistan

a.

Nuclear?

Things to ask:

Limitation of reversal of fortunes? How do you explain oil rich/ rent seeking states?

Level of development in Aggregate National Income

Political preference of Stolper Samuelson

Be able to explain how differences in ethnicity, urbanization, and factor endowments influence/complicate each of these
causal mechanisms

Tragedy of comons?

How does the issue of climate change complicate our theoritical approaches/ level of analysis