Francisco Chavez vs. PCGG et al., GR No.

130716, December 09, 1998

Facts:Petitioner, instituted a case against public respondent to make public any negotiations and/or agreements
pertaining to the latter's task of recovering the Marcoses' ill-gotten wealth. The respondents argued that the action
was premature since he has not shown that he had asked the respondents to disclose the negotiations and
agreements before filing the case.
Issue: Does the petitioner have the personality or legal standing to file the instant petition?
Held:The instant petition is anchored on the right of the people to information and access to government records,
documents and papers- a right guaranteed under section 7, article III of the Philippine Constitution. The petitioner
a former solicitor general, is a Filipino citizen, and because of the satisfaction of the two basic requisites laid down
by decisional law to sustain petitioner's standing i.e
(1) ENFORCEMENT OF A LEGAL RIGHT
(2) ESPOUSED BY A FILIPINO CITIZEN
we rule, that the petition at bar be allowed.
Chavez v. PEA
The Public Estates Authority (PEA) is the central implementing agency tasked to undertake reclamation projects
nationwide. It took over the leasing and selling functions of the DENR (Department of Environmental and Natural
Resources) insofar as reclaimed or about to be reclaimed foreshore lands are concerned.
PEA sought the transfer to the Amari Coastal Bay and Development Corporation, a private corporation, of the
ownership of 77.34 hectares of the Freedom Islands. PEA also sought to have 290.156 hectares of submerged
areas of Manila Bay to Amari.
ISSUE: Whether or not the transfer is valid.
HELD: No. To allow vast areas of reclaimed lands of the public domain to be transferred to Amari as private lands
will sanction a gross violation of the constitutional ban on private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable
land of the public domain.
The Supreme Court affirmed that the 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now
covered by certificates of title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public domain. The 592.15 hectares of
submerged areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable natural resources of the public domain. The transfer (as
embodied in a joint venture agreement) to AMARI, a private corporation, ownership of 77.34 hectares of the
Freedom Islands, is void for being contrary to Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits private
corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. Furthermore, since the Amended JVA
also seeks to transfer to Amari ownership of 290.156 hectares of still submerged areas of Manila Bay, such
transfer is void for being contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits the alienation of
natural resources other than agricultural lands of the public domain.
Neri v. Senate Committee
FACTS: On April 21, 2007, the Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC) entered into a contract
with Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) for the supply of equipment and services for the National
Broadband Network (NBN) Project in the amount of U.S. $ 329,481,290 (approximately P16 Billion Pesos). The
Project was to be financed by the Peoples Republic of China. The Senate passed various resolutions relative to the
NBN deal. In the September 18, 2007 hearing Jose de Venecia III testified that several high executive officials and
power brokers were using their influence to push the approval of the NBN Project by the NEDA. Neri, the head of
NEDA, was then invited to testify before the Senate Blue Ribbon. He appeared in one hearing wherein he was
interrogated for 11 hrs and during which he admitted that Abalos of COMELEC tried to bribe him with P200M in
exchange for his approval of the NBN project. He further narrated that he informed President Arroyo about the
bribery attempt and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe.
However, when probed further on what they discussed about the NBN Project, petitioner refused to answer,
invoking executive privilege. In particular, he refused to answer the questions on:
(a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project,
(b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and
(c) whether or not she directed him to approve.
He later refused to attend the other hearings and Ermita sent a letter to the senate averring that the
communications between GMA and Neri are privileged and that the jurisprudence laid down in Senate vs Ermita be
applied. He was cited in contempt of respondent committees and an order for his arrest and detention until such
time that he would appear and give his testimony.
ISSUE: Are the communications elicited by the subject three (3) questions covered by executive privilege?
HELD: The communications are covered by executive privilege
The revocation of EO 464 (advised executive officials and employees to follow and abide by the Constitution,
existing laws and jurisprudence, including, among others, the case of Senate v. Ermita when they are invited to
legislative inquiries in aid of legislation.), does not in any way diminish the concept of executive privilege. This is
because this concept has Constitutional underpinnings. The claim of executive privilege is highly recognized in
cases where the subject of inquiry relates to a power textually committed by the Constitution to the President,
such as the area of military and foreign relations. Under our Constitution, the President is the repository of the
commander-in-chief, appointing, pardoning, and diplomatic powers. Consistent with the doctrine of separation of
powers, the information relating to these powers may enjoy greater confidentiality than others.
Several jurisprudence cited provide the elements of presidential communications privilege:
1) The protected communication must relate to a quintessential and non-delegable presidential power.
2) The communication must be authored or solicited and received by a close advisor of the President or the
President himself. The judicial test is that an advisor must be in operational proximity with the President.
3) The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified privilege that may be overcome by a showing of
adequate need, such that the information sought likely contains important evidence and by the unavailability of
the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.
In the case at bar, Executive Secretary Ermita premised his claim of executive privilege on the ground that the
communications elicited by the three (3) questions fall under conversation and correspondence between the
President and public officials necessary in her executive and policy decision-making process and, that the
information sought to be disclosed might impair our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the Peoples
Republic of China. Simply put, the bases are presidential communications privilege and executive privilege on
matters relating to diplomacy or foreign relations.
Using the above elements, we are convinced that, indeed, the communications elicited by the three (3) questions
are covered by the presidential communications privilege. First, the communications relate to a quintessential
and non-delegable power of the President, i.e. the power to enter into an executive agreement with other
countries. This authority of the President to enter into executive agreements without the concurrence of the
Legislature has traditionally been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence. Second, the communications are

received by a close advisor of the President. Under the operational proximity test, petitioner can be considered
a close advisor, being a member of President Arroyos cabinet. And third, there is no adequate showing of a
compelling need that would justify the limitation of the privilege and of the unavailability of the information
elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.
Respondent Committees further contend that the grant of petitioners claim of executive privilege violates the
constitutional provisions on the right of the people to information on matters of public concern.50 We might have
agreed with such contention if petitioner did not appear before them at all. But petitioner made himself available
to them during the September 26 hearing, where he was questioned for eleven (11) hours. Not only that, he
expressly manifested his willingness to answer more questions from the Senators, with the exception only of those
covered by his claim of executive privilege.
The right to public information, like any other right, is subject to limitation. Section 7 of Article III provides:
The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records,
and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government
research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as
may be provided by law.
Center for People Empowerment v. COMELEC
This case concerns the duty of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to disclose the source code for the
Automated Election System (AES) technologies it used in the 2010 national and local elections. On May 26, 2009
petitioner Center for People Empowerment in Governance (CenPEG), a non-government organization,[1] wrote
respondent COMELEC, requesting a copy of the source code of the Precinct Count Optical Scan (PCOS) programs,
the Board of Canvassers Consolidation/Canvassing System (BOC CCS) programs for the municipal, provincial,
national, and congressional canvass, the COMELEC server programs, and the source code of the in-house
COMELEC programs called the Data Capturing System (DCS) utilities. CenPEG invoked the following pertinent
portion of Section 12 of Republic Act (R.A.) 9369, which provides:
Once an AES technology is selected for implementation, the Commission shall promptly make the source code of
that technology available and open to any interested political party or groups which may conduct their own review
thereof.
Section 2(12) of R.A. 9369 describes the source code as the human readable instructions that define what the
computer equipment will do. This has been explained in an article:
Source code is the human readable representation of the instructions that control the operation of a computer.
Computers are composed of hardware (the physical devices themselves) and software (which controls the
operation of the hardware). The software instructs the computer how to operate; without software, the computer is
useless. Source code is the human readable form in which software is written by computer programmers. Source
code is usually written in a programming language that is arcane and incomprehensible to non-specialists but, to a
computer programmer, the source code is the master blueprint that reveals and determines how the machine will
behave.
Source code could be compared to a recipe: just as a cook follows the instructions in a recipe step-by-step, so a
computer executes the sequence of instructions found in the software source code. This is a reasonable analogy,
but it is also imperfect. While a good cook will use her discretion and common sense in following a recipe, a
computer follows the instructions in the source code in a mechanical and unfailingly literal way; thus, while errors
in a recipe might be noticed and corrected by the cook, errors in source code can be disastrous, because the code
is executed by the computer exactly as written, whether that was what the programmer intended or not x x x.
The source code in voting machines is in some ways analogous to the procedures provided to election workers.
Procedures are instructions that are provided to people; for instance, the procedures provided to poll workers list a
sequence of steps that poll workers should follow to open the polls on election morning. Source code contains
instructions, not for people, but for the computers running the election; for instance, the source code for a voting
machine determines the steps the machine will take when the polls are opened on election morning.
[2] (Underscoring supplied)
On June 24, 2009 the COMELEC granted the request[3] for the source code of the PCOS and the CCS, but denied
that for the DCS, since the DCS was a system used in processing the Lists of Voters which is not part of the voting,
counting and canvassing systems contemplated by R.A. 9369. According to COMELEC, if the source code for the
DCS were to be divulged, unscrupulous individuals might change the program and pass off an illicit one that could
benefit certain candidates or parties.
Still, the COMELEC apparently did not release even the kinds of source code that it said it was approving for
release. Consequently, on July 13, 2009, CenPEG once more asked COMELEC for the source code of the PCOS,
together with other documents, programs, and diagrams related to the AES. CenPEG sent follow-up letters on July
17 and 20 and on August 24, 2009.
On August 26, 2009 COMELEC replied that the source code CenPEG wanted did not yet exist for the reasons: 1)
that it had not yet received the baseline source code of the provider, Smartmatic, since payment to it had been
withheld as a result of a pending suit; 2) its customization of the baseline source code was targeted for completion
in November 2009 yet; 3) under Section 11 of R.A. 9369, the customized source code still had to be reviewed by
an established international certification entity, which review was expected to be completed by the end of
February 2010; and 4) only then would the AES be made available for review under a controlled environment.
Rejecting COMELECs excuse, on October 5, 2009 CenPEG filed the present petition for mandamus, seeking to
compel COMELEC to immediately make its source codes available to CenPEG and other interested parties.
COMELEC claimed in its comment that CenPEG did not have a clear, certain, and well-defined right that was
enforceable by mandamus because COMELECs duty to make the source code available presupposed that it already
had the same. COMELEC restated the explanation it gave in its August 26, 2009 letter to CenPEG.
In its manifestation and omnibus motion, CenPEG did not believe that the source code was still unavailable
considering that COMELEC had already awarded to an international certification entity the review of the same and
that COMELEC had already been field testing its PCOS and CCS machines.
On February 10, 2010 COMELEC filed a manifestation, stating that it had already deposited on February 9, 2010
the source code to be used in the May 10, 2010 elections with the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas. Required to
comment on this, CenPEG said on February 22, 2010 that the manifestation did not constitute compliance with
Section 12 of R.A. 9369 but only with Section 11 of R.A. 8436.
In its earlier comment, COMELEC claimed, reiterating what it said in its August 26, 2009 letter to CenPEG, that it
would make the source code available for review by the end of February 2010 under a controlled
environment. Apparently, this review had not taken place and was overtaken by the May 10, 2010 elections.
On June 21, 2010 CenPEG filed a manifestation and omnibus motion, reiterating its prayer for the issuance of a
writ of mandamus in this case notwithstanding the fact that the elections for which the subject source code was to
be used had already been held. It claimed that the source code remained important and relevant not only for

compliance with the law, and the purpose thereof, but especially in the backdrop of numerous admissions of errors
and claims of fraud.
The Court finds the petition and this last manifestation meritorious.
The pertinent portion of Section 12 of R.A. 9369 is clear in that once an AES technology is selected for
implementation, the Commission shall promptly make the source code of that technology available and open to
any interested political party or groups which may conduct their own review thereof. The COMELEC has offered no
reason not to comply with this requirement of the law. Indeed, its only excuse for not disclosing the source code
was that it was not yet available when CenPEG asked for it and, subsequently, that the review had to be done,
apparently for security reason, under a controlled environment. The elections had passed and that reason is
already stale.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for mandamus and DIRECTS the COMELEC to make the source codes
for the AES technologies it selected for implementation pursuant to R.A. 9369 immediately available to CenPEG
and all other interested political parties or groups for independent review.
In Re: Edillon
FACTS: The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing Attorney in the Philippines. The IBP Board of
Governors recommended to the Court the removal of the name of the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for
stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues assailing the provisions of the Rule of Court 139-A and the provisions
of par. 2, Section 24, Article III, of the IBP By-Laws pertaining to the organization of IBP, payment
ofmembership fee and suspension for failure to pay the same. Edillon contends that the stated provisions
constitute an invasion of hisconstitutional rights in the sense that he is being compelled as a pre-condition
to maintain his status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues,
and that as a consequence of this compelled financial support of the said organization to which he is admitted
personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty and properly guaranteed to him by the
Constitution. Hence, the respondent concludes the above provisions of the Court Rule and of the IBP By-Laws are
void and of no legal force and effect.
ISSUE: Whether or not the court may compel Atty. Edillion to pay hismembership fee to the IBP.
HELD: The Integrated Bar is a State-organized Bar which every lawyer must be a member of as distinguished
from bar associations in which membershipis merely optional and voluntary. All lawyers are subject to comply with
the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar including payment a reasonable annual fees as one of
the requirements. The Rules of Court only compels him to pay his annual dues and it is not in violation of his
constitutional freedom to associate. Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is
free to attend or not the meeting of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its election as he
chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues. The Supreme Court in order
to further the States legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional legal services, may require thet the
cost of the regulatory program the lawyers.
Such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the State. The right to practice law before the
courts of this country should be and is a matter subject to regulation and inquiry. And if the power to impose the
fee as a regulatory measure is recognize then a penalty designed to enforce its payment is not void as
unreasonable as arbitrary. Furthermore, the Court has jurisdiction over matters of admission, suspension,
disbarment, and reinstatement of lawyers and their regulation as part of its inherent judicial functions and
responsibilities thus the court may compel all members of the Integrated Bar to pay their annual dues.
Malabanan v. Ramento
Facts: Petitioners were officers of the Supreme Student Council ofrespondent University. They sought and were
granted by the school authorities a permit to hold a meeting from 8:00 A.M. to 12:00 P.M, on August 27, 1982.
Pursuant to such permit, along with other students, they held a general assembly at the Veterinary Medicine
and Animal Sciencebasketball court (VMAS), the place indicated in such permit, not in thebasketball court as
therein stated but at the second floor lobby. At such gathering they manifested in vehement and vigorous
language their opposition to the proposed merger of the Institute of Animal Science with the Institute of
Agriculture. The same day, they marched toward the Life Science Building and continued their rally. It was outside
the area covered by their permit. Even they rallied beyond the period allowed. They were asked to explain on
the same day why they should not be held liable for holding an illegal assembly. Then on September 9, 1982, they
were informed that they were under preventive suspension for their failure to explain the holding of an illegal
assembly. The validity thereof was challenged by petitioners both before the Court of First Instance of Rizal against
private respondents and before the Ministry of Education, Culture, and Sports. Respondent Ramento found
petitioners guilty of the charge of illegal assembly which was characterized by the violation of the permit granted
resulting in the disturbance of classes and oral defamation. The penalty was suspension for one academic year.
Hence this petition.
Issue: Whether on the facts as disclosed resulting in the disciplinary action and the penalty imposed, there was an
infringement of the right to peaceable assembly and its cognate right of free speech.
Held: Yes. Student leaders are likely to be assertive and dogmatic. They would be ineffective if during a rally they
speak in the guarded and judicious language of the academe. But with the activity taking place in the
schoolpremises and during the daytime, no clear and present danger of public disorder is discernible. This is
without prejudice to the taking of disciplinary action for conduct, "materially disrupts classwork or involves
substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others."
The rights to peaceable assembly and free speech are guaranteed students of educational institutions.
Necessarily, their exercise to discuss matters affecting their welfare or involving public interest is not to be
subjected to previous restraint or subsequent punishment unless there be a showing of a clear and present danger
to a substantive evil that the state, has a right to present. As a corollary, the utmost leeway and scope is accorded
the content of the placards displayed or utterances made. The peaceable character of an assembly could be lost,
however, by an advocacy of disorder under the name of dissent, whatever grievances that may be aired being
susceptible to correction through the ways of the law. If the assembly is to be held in school premises, permit must
be sought from its school authorities, who are devoid of the power to deny such request arbitrarily or
unreasonably. In granting such permit, there may be conditions as to the time and place of the assembly to avoid
disruption of classes or stoppage of work of the non-academic personnel. Even if, however, there be violations of
its terms, the penalty incurred should not be disproportionate to the offense.
United Pepsi Cola v. Laguesma
FACTS: Petitioner is a union of supervisory employees. It appears that on March 20, 1995 the union filed a petition
for certification election on behalf of the route managers at Pepsi-Cola Products Philippines, Inc. However, its
petition was denied by the med-arbiter and, on appeal, by the Secretary of Labor and Employment, on the ground
that the route managers are managerial employees and, therefore, ineligible for union membership under the first

sentence of Art. 245 of the Labor Code, which provides: Ineligibility of managerial employees to join any labor
organization; right of supervisory employees. Managerial employees are not eligible to join, assist or form any
labor organization. Supervisory employees shall not be eligible for membership in a labor organization of the rankand-file employees but may join, assist or form separate labor organizations of their own. Petitioner brought this
suit challenging the validity of the order, dismissed.
Hence, this petition. Pressing for resolution its contention that the first sentence of Art. 245 of the Labor Code, so
far as it declares managerial employees to be ineligible to form, assist or join unions, contravenes Art. III, 8 of the
Constitution which provides: The right of the people, including those employed in the public and private sectors, to
form unions, associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged.
ISSUES: (1) whether the route managers at Pepsi-Cola Products Philippines, Inc. are managerial employees and
(2) whether Art. 245, insofar as it prohibits managerial employees from forming, joining or assisting labor unions,
violates Art. III, 8 of the Constitution.
HELD: YES and NO As a class, managers constitute three levels of a pyramid: (1) Top management; (2) Middle
Management; and (3) First-line Management [also called supervisors].
FIRST-LINE MANAGERS The lowest level in an organization at which individuals are responsible for the work of
others is called first-line or first-level management. First-line managers direct operating employees only; they do
not supervise other managers. Examples of first-line managers are the foreman or production supervisor in a
manufacturing plant, the technical supervisor in a research department, and the clerical supervisor in a large
office. First-level managers are often called supervisors.
MIDDLE MANAGERS The term middle management can refer to more than one level in an organization. Middle
managers direct the activities of other managers and sometimes also those of operating employees. Middle
managers principal responsibilities are to direct the activities that implement their organizations policies and to
balance the demands of their superiors with the capacities of their subordinates. A plant manager in an electronics
firm is an example of a middle manager.
TOP MANAGERS Composed of a comparatively small group of executives, top management is responsible for the
overall management of the organization. It establishes operating policies and guides the organizations
interactions with its environment. Typical titles of top managers are chief executive officer, president, and
senior vice-president. Actual titles vary from one organization to another and are not always a reliable guide to
membership in the highest management classification. A distinction exists between those who have the authority
to devise, implement and control strategic and operational policies (top and middle managers) and those whose
task is simply to ensure that such policies are carried out by the rank-and-file employees of an organization (firstlevel managers/supervisors). What distinguishes them from the rank-and-file employees is that they act in the
interest of the employer in supervising such rank-and-file employees.
Managerial employees may therefore be said to fall into two distinct categories: the managers per se, who
compose the former group described above, and the supervisors who form the latter group.
#1: It appears that this question was the subject of two previous determinations by the Secretary of Labor and
Employment, in accordance with which this case was decided by the med-arbiter. To qualify as managerial
employee, there must be a clear showing of the exercise of managerial attributes under paragraph (m), Article 212
of the Labor Code as amended. Designations or titles of positions are not controlling. As to the route managers and
accounting manager, we are convinced that they are managerial employees. Their job descriptions clearly reveal
so (Workers Alliance Trade Union (WATU) v. Pepsi-Cola Products Philippines, Inc., Nov. 13, 1991)
This finding was reiterated in Case No. OS-A-3-71-92. entitled In Re: Petition for Direct Certification and/or
Certification Election-Route Managers/Supervisory Employees of Pepsi-Cola Products Phils.Inc.
* doctrine of res judicata certainly applies to adversary administrative proceedings Thus, we have in this case an
experts view that the employees concerned are managerial employees within the purview of Art. 212. At the very
least, the principle of finality of administrative determination compels respect for the finding of the Secretary of
Labor that route managers are managerial employees as defined by law in the absence of anything to show that
such determination is without substantial evidence to support it.
The Court now finds that the job evaluation made by the Secretary of Labor is indeed supported by substantial
evidence. The nature of the job of route managers is given in a four-page pamphlet, prepared by the company,
called Route Manager Position Description, the pertinent parts of which read:
A. BASIC PURPOSE
A Manager achieves objectives through others.
As a Route Manager, your purpose is to meet the sales plan; and you achieve this objective through the skillful
MANAGEMENT OF YOUR JOB AND THE MANAGEMENT OF YOUR PEOPLE.
These then are your functions as Pepsi-Cola Route Manager. Within these functions managing your job and
managing your people you are accountable to your District Manager for the execution and completion of various
tasks and activities which will make it possible for you to achieve your sales objectives.
Xxxx Distinction is evident in the work of the route managers which sets them apart from supervisors in general.
Unlike supervisors who basically merely direct operating employees in line with set tasks assigned to them, route
managers are responsible for the success of the companys main line of business through management of their
respective sales teams. Such management necessarily involves the planning, direction, operation and evaluation
of their individual teams and areas which the work of supervisors does not entail.
The route managers cannot thus possibly be classified as mere supervisors because their work does not only
involve, but goes far beyond, the simple direction or supervision of operating employees to accomplish objectives
set by those above them.
While route managers do not appear to have the power to hire and fire people (the evidence shows that they only
recommended or endorsed the taking of disciplinary action against certain employees), this is because thisis a
function of the Human Resources or Personnel Department of the company.
# 2: Constitutionality of Art. 245
Art.245 is the result of the amendment of the Labor Code in 1989 by R.A. No. 6715, otherwise known as the
Herrera-Veloso Law. Unlike the Industrial Peace Act or the provisions of the Labor Code which it superseded, R.A.
No. 6715 provides separate definitions of the terms managerial and supervisory employees, as follows:
Art. 212. Definitions. . . .
(m) managerial employee is one who is vested with powers or prerogatives to lay down and execute
management policies and/or to hire transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, discharge, assign or discipline employees.
Supervisory employees are those who, in the interest of the employer, effectively recommend such managerial
actions if the exercise of such authority is not merely routinary or clerical in nature but requires the use of
independent judgment. All employees not falling within any of the above definitions are considered rank-and-file
employees for purposes of this Book.
The distinction between top and middle managers, who set management policy, and front-line supervisors, who
are merely responsible for ensuring that such policies are carried out by the rank and file, is articulated in the
present definition. 30 When read in relation to this definition in Art. 212(m), it will be seen that Art. 245 faithfully

carries out the intent of the Constitutional Commission in framing Art. III, 8 of the fundamental law. *Framers
Intent: MR. LERUM. My amendment is on Section 7, page 2, line 19, which is to insert between the words people
and to the following: WHETHER EMPLOYED BY THE STATE OR PRIVATE ESTABLISHMENTS. In other words, the
section will now read as follows: The right of the people WHETHER EMPLOYED BY THE STATE OR PRIVATE
ESTABLISHMENTS to form associations, unions, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged.
Nor is the guarantee of organizational right in Art. III, 8 infringed by a ban against managerial employees forming
a union. The right guaranteed in Art. III, 8 is subject to the condition that its exercise should be for purposes not
contrary to law. In the case of Art. 245, there is a rational basis for prohibiting managerial employees from
forming or joining labor organizations.
PETITION is DISMISSED.
Acosta v. CA
Facts: Petitioners are teachers from different public schools in Metro Manila. On various dates in September and
October 1990, petitioners did not report for work and instead, participated in mass actions by public school
teachers at the Liwasang Bonifacio for the purpose of petitioning the government for redress of their grievances.
Petitioners were administratively charged with such offenses as grave misconduct, gross neglect of duty, gross
violation of civil service law, rules and regulations and reasonable office regulations, refusal to perform official
duty, gross insubordination, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and absence without official
leave. Petitioners failed to answer these charges. Following the investigations conducted by the DECS
Investigating committees, Secretary Cario found petitioners guilty as charged and ordered their immediate
dismissal from the service. Petitioners appealed and the CSC modified the said orders of Secretary Cario to six (6)
months suspension without pay.
Appeal to CA: Denied
ISSUE: Whether Petitioners participation in the mass actions was an exercise of their constitutional rights to
peaceably assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances
HELD: These mass actions were to all intents and purposes a strike; they constituted a concerted and
unauthorized stoppage of, or absence from, work which it was the teachers sworn duty to perform, undertaken for
essentially economic reasons.
The ability to strike is not essential to the right of association. In the absence of statute, public employees do not
have the right to engage in concerted work stoppages for any purpose. Further, herein petitioners, are being
penalized not because they exercised their right of peaceable assembly and petition for redress of grievances but
because of their successive unauthorized and unilateral absences which produced adverse effects upon their
students for whose education they are responsible. As aptly stated by the Solicitor General, It is not the exercise
by the petitioners of their constitutional right to peaceably assemble that was punished, but the manner in which
they exercised such right which resulted in the temporary stoppage or disruption of public service and classes in
various public schools in Metro Manila. For, indeed, there are efficient and non-disruptive avenues, other than the
mass actions in question, whereby petitioners could petition the government for redress of grievances. It bears
stressing that suspension of public services, however temporary, will inevitably derail services to the public, which
is one of the reasons why the right to strike is denied government employees. It may be conceded that the
petitioners had valid grievances and noble intentions in staging the mass actions, but that will not justify their
absences to the prejudice of innocent school children. Their righteous indignation does not legalize an illegal work
stoppage.