Case 601.
They are in fact “interested persons” under constitutional policies of full public disclosure and
Hilado vs. Reyes
Julita Campos Benedicto (private
respondent), is the surviving spouse of the deceased
Roberto Benedicto. She was appointed
Administratrix of his estate and the letters of
administration were issued in her favor. The case
was presided by Judge Amor Reyes (public
respondent). Petitioners (Hilado, et. al.) had during
the lifetime of Benedicto, filed before the RTC of
Bacolod two separate complaints for damages or
collection of sums of money against Roberto
Benedicto et al. Petitioners’ counsel was denied
access to the last folder-record of the case, which,
according to the clerical staff, could not be located
and was probably in the chambers of the public
respondent. The judge denied their request for
access to the files, as they were not parties to the
case. Likewise, their request for certified true
copies of the order issued by the court during
hearing, as well as the transcript of stenographic
notes taken thereon was denied. Thus the present
petition for mandamus and prohibition.
W/N a writ of mandamus may issue to
compel public respondent to allow petitioners to
examine and obtain copies of any or all documents
forming part of the records of the case.
YES. Petitioners’ stated main purpose for
accessing the records—to monitor prompt
compliance with the Rules governing the
preservation and proper disposition of the assets of
the estate, e.g., the completion and appraisal of the
Inventory and the submission by the Administratrix
of an annual accounting49—appears legitimate, for,
as the plaintiffs in the complaints for sum of money
against Roberto Benedicto et al., they have an
interest over the outcome of the settlement of his
estate.
Rule 135, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Court.
MAIN POINT: The right of the people to information
on matters of public concern shall be recognized. As
long then as any party, counsel or person has a
legitimate reason to have a copy of court records
and pays court fees, a court may not deny access to
such records.
Case 602.
Sabio vs. Gordon
Pursuant to Senate Resolution No. 455,
Senator Gordon requested PCGG Chairman Sabio
and his Commissioners to appear as resource
persons in the public meeting jointly conducted by
the Committee on Government Corporations and
Public Enterprises and Committee on Public
Services. Chairman Sabio declined the invitation
because of prior commitment, and at the same time
invoked Section 4(b) of EO No. 1: “No member or
staff of the Commission shall be required to testify
or produce evidence in any judicial, legislative or
administrative proceeding concerning matters
within its official cognizance.” Gordon’s Subpoenae
Ad Testificandum was repeatedly ignored by Sabio
hence he threatened Sabio to be cited with
contempt.
Whether or not the above-stated section
runs counter against constitutional provision
ensuring people’s access to information.
YES. Consequently, the conduct of
inquiries in aid of legislation is not only intended to
benefit Congress but also the citizenry. The people
are equally concerned with this proceeding and
have the right to participate therein in order to
protect their interests. In other words, the right to
information really goes hand-in-hand with the
honesty in the public service. It is meant to enhance
the widening role of the citizenry in governmental
decision-making as well as in checking abuse in the
government.
MAIN POINT: Section 4(b) limits or obstructs the
power of Congress to secure from PCGG members
and staff information and other data in aid of its
power to legislate.
CASE NO. 603
Bantay vs. COMELEC
COMELEC issued Resolution No. 7804
which prescribed the rules and regulations to
govern the filing and submission of names under the
party-list list of representation. Petitioner Bantay
Republic Act (BA-RA 7941) and Urban Poor for Legal
Reforms (UP-LR) filed with the COMELEC an urgent
petition to disqualify the nominees of certain party-
list organization and requested for the list of the
group’s nominees. COMELEC issued an en banc
Resolution declaring the names as confidential.
Petitioners commonly seek to compel the COMELEC
to disclose or publish the names of the nominees of
the various party-list groups.
WON COMELEC has violated the right to
information and free access of documents as
guaranteed by the Constitution
YES. The refusal of the COMELEC to reveal
the names of the party-list seats violates the right of
the people to information on matters of public
concern. The people have the right to elect their
representatives on the basis of an informed
judgment. While the vote cast in a party-list
elections is a vote for a party, such vote, in the end,
would be a vote for its nominees, who, in
appropriate cases, would eventually sit in the House
of Representatives. The Court frowns upon any
interpretation of the law or rules that would hinder
in any way the free and intelligent casting of the
votes in an election.
MAINPOINT: Section 7, Article III of the
Constitution, viz: Sec.7. The right of the people to
information on matters of public concern shall be
recognized. Access to official records, and to
documents, and papers pertaining to official acts,
transactions, or decisions, as well to government
research data used as basis for policy development,
shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such
limitations as may be provided by law.
CASE NO. 604
Berdin vs. Mascarinas
The Sangguniang Bayan of Tubigon
enacted a Tax Ordinance increasing the taxes and
fees of the municipality. Petitioner Berdin, as
President of the Tubigon Market
VendorsAssociation, wrote to respondent Municipal
Treasurer requesting a copy of Tax Ordinance No.
88-11-36. They assert the ordinance does not exist
by virtue of respondent officials’ delay in furnishing
them with a copy of the questioned ordinance.
WON the ordinances are valid and
enforceable
YES. The Municipal Treasurer in the case
at bar exercised this discretion by requiring
petitioners to pay for the cost of reproduction of
Tax Ordinance No. 88-11-36. Such a requirement is
reasonable under the circumstances considering
that the ordinance is quite voluminous consisting of
more than a hundred pages. So Petitioners’
misgivings on the existence of Tax Ordinance No.
88-11-36 are baseless. The reason for the delay was
adequately explained and was even attributed to
petitioners’ failure to pay for the cost of
reproduction of the ordinance.
MAINPOINT: The right of the people to information
on matters of public concern is recognized under
Sec. 7, Art. III of the 1987 Constitution and is subject
to such limitations as may be provided by law. Thus,
while access to official records may not be
prohibited, it certainly may be regulated. The
regulation may come either from statutory law and
from the inherent power of an officer to control his
office and the records under his custody and to
exercise some discretion as to the manner in which
persons desiring to inspect, examine, or copy the
record may exercise their rights.
CASE NO. 605
Chavez vs. NHA
In his capacity as taxpayer, Solicitor
General Francisco Chavez petitioned the Court
directly for, among other things, access to all
documents and information relating to the Smokey
Mountain Development and Reclamation Project,
including its underlying Joint Venture Agreement
between the National Housing Authority, a
government body, and R-II Builders, Inc. for it is a
state sponsored infrastructure development project
that had gone awry.
WON the NHA must be compelled to
disclose all information related to the Project
YES. Article II, Section 28 and Article III,
Section 7 of the Constitution, taken together as
“twin provisions,” adopt a policy of full public
disclosure on all transactions involving public
interest and acknowledge the people’s right to
information.” Because no enabling law exists
providing government agencies with the procedural
mechanics to disclose such information, the NHA
cannot be faulted for an inability to disclose.
Nevertheless, where a duty to disclose does not
exist, there still may exist a duty to permit access,
and so the Court ordered the NHA to permit access
to all information related to the Project
MAINPOINT: The 1987 Constitution provides that
there is a duty on the government to permit access
to information related to government projects and
policies even though there is no enabling law that
imposes a duty on government bodies to publicly
disclose such information.
CASE NO. 606
Senate vs. Ermita
The Senate Committees sent invitations to
various officials of the Executive Department and
AFP officials for them to appear before Senate. The
President issued EO 464, effective immediately,
which, among others, mandated that “all heads of
departments of the Executive Branch of the
government shall secure the consent of the
President prior to appearing before either House of
Congress.”
WON EO 464 violates the right of the
people to information on matters of public concern
YES. Although there are clear distinctions
between the right to Congress to information which
underlies the power of inquiry and the right of the
people to information on matters of public concern,
any executive issuance tending to unduly limit
disclosures of information on investigations in
Congress necessarily deprives the people of
information which, being presumed to be in aid of
legislation, is presumed to be a matter of public
concern.
MAINPOINT: The right of the people to information
on matters of public concern is recognized under
Sec. 7, Art. III of the 1987 Constitution and is subject
to such limitations as may be provided by law.
CASE NO. 607
Suplico vs. NEDA
Pres. GMA, acting in her official capacity
informed Pres. Hu Jintao of China that the Philippine
Government had decided not to continue with the
ZTE-NBN project. It was settled that there is no
more justiciable controversy for the Court to
resolve. Petitioners pray that they be furnished
certified true copies of the contract or agreement
covering the NBN project but respondents further
oppose petitioners claim of the right to information,
which they contend is not an absolute right. They
contend that the matters raised concern executive
policy, a political question which the judicial branch
of government would generally hesitate to pass
upon
WON petitioners be furnished of the
certified true copy of the contract
YES. It appears that during one of the
Senate hearings on the NBN project, copies of the
supply contract were readily made available to
petitioners. Evidently, the said prayer has been
complied with and is, thus, mooted.
MAINPOINT: The right of the people to information
on matters of public concern is recognized under
Sec. 7, Art. III of the 1987 Constitution and is subject
to such limitations as may be provided by law.
CASE NO. 608
Neri v Senate
the case is about the claim of executive
privilege by the President, on the one hand, and the
respondent Senate Committees’ assertion of their
power to conduct legislative inquiries, on the other.
Petitioner appeared before respondent
Committees and testified for about eleven (11)
hours about the "NBN Project” a project awarded by
the DOTC to ZTE. Petitioner disclosed that COMELEC
Chairman Benjamin Abalos offered him P200 Million
in exchange for his approval of the NBN Project. He
further narrated that he informed President Arroyo
of the bribery attempt and that she instructed him
not to accept the bribe. However, when probed
further on President Arroyo and petitioner’s
discussions relating to the NBN Project, petitioner
refused to answer questions involving the president,
invoking "executive privilege.
WON there is a recognized presumptive
presidential communications privilege in our legal
system
YES. There are certain types of
information which the government may withhold
from the public, that there is a "governmental
privilege against public disclosure with respect to
state secrets regarding military, diplomatic and
other national security matters"; the courts, or the
public, is recognized only in relation to certain types
of information of a sensitive character. While
executive privilege is a constitutional concept,
a claim thereof may be valid or not depending on
the ground invoked to justify it and the context in
which it is made.
Mainpoint: the right to information does
not extend to matters recognized as ‘privileged
information’ under the separation of powers, by
which the Court meant Presidential conversations,
correspondences, and discussions in closed-door
Cabinet meetings
CASE NO. 609
Akbayan v Aquino
The Petitioners demanded the full text
of the Japan-Philippines Economic Partnership Agre
ement (JPEPA) including the Philippine and Japanese
offers submitted during the negotiation process. The
respondent alleged that the request of the
Petitioners must be denied on the ground that the
issue is under the executive privileged and is due
confidential. The petitioners argue that the contents
of the JPEPA are matter of public interest, and thus
it covers by their right to information.
WON the negotiation of the JPEPA
is under the executive privileged and thus must be
confidential
YES.  By disclosing the documents of the
JPEPA negotiations, the Philippine government runs
the risk of betraying the trust reposed in it by the
Japanese representatives. In determining whether
an information is covered by the right to
information, a specific "showing of need" for such
information is not a relevant consideration, but
only whether it is a matter of public concern. The
government has claimed executive privilege, and it
has established that the information is indeed
covered by the same. The party demanding it, if it is
to overcome the privilege, must show that that the
information is vital, not simply for curiosity, but for
its ability to effectively and reasonably participate in
social, political, and economic decision-making
MP BOLD
CASE NO. 610
Province of North Cotabato v GRP peace panel
 Government of the Republic of the
Philippines (GRP) and the MILF, through the
Chairpersons were scheduled to sign a for
Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral
Domain (MOA-AD) Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli
Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur. The
outcome of the meeting was the GRP-MILF Tripoli
Agreement 2001 containing the basic principles and
agenda on the following aspects of the negotiation:
Security Aspect, Rehabilitation Aspect,
and Ancestral Domain Aspect. The Province of North
Cotabato and Vice-Governor Emmanuel Piñol filed a
petition Invoking the right to information on matters
of public concern, petitioners seek to compel
respondents to disclose and furnish them the
complete and official copies of the MOA-AD
including its attachments, and to prohibit the
signing of the MOA-AD, pending the disclosure of
the contents of the MOA-AD and the holding of a
public consultation thereon. Supplementary,
petitioners pray that the MOA-AD be declared
unconstitutional.
WON there is a violation of the people's
right to information on matters of public concern  MainPoint: The people’s constitutional right to
YES. The MOA-AD is a matter of public
concern because sovereignty and territorial integrity
of the State, which directly affects the lives of the
public at large. The policy of full public
disclosure enunciated complements the right of
access to information on matters of public concern.
The right to information guarantees the right of the
people to demand information.
MP BOLD
CASE NO. 611
Guingona v COMELEC
Petitioners filed a special civil action for
mandamus invoking the right to suffrage and
information compelling respondent COMELEC to
fully explain the complete details of its preparations
the May 100 2010 elections
WON the petitioner in his mandamus can
compel COMELEC to disclose informations
the constitutional duty to disclose
information of public concern may be compelled by
mandamus. In order that a petition for mandamus
may be given due course, it must be instituted by a
party aggrieved by the alleged inaction of any
tribunal, corporation, board, or person, which
unlawfully excludes said party from the enjoyment
of a legal right However, if the petition is anchored
on the people’s right to information on matters of
public concern, any citizen can be the real party in
interest. The requirement of personal interest is
satisfied by the mere fact that the petitioner is a
citizen, and therefore, part of the general public
which possesses the right. There is no need to show
any special interest in the result. It is sufficient that
petitioners are citizens and, as such, are interested
in the faithful execution of the laws.
information is intertwined with the government’s
constitutional duty of full public disclosure of all
transactions involving public interest. For every
right of the people, there is a corresponding duty
on the part of those who govern to protect and
respect that right.
CASE NO. 612
Antolin v Domondon
Petitioner took CPA Board Exams,
unfortunately, petitioner did not make it. Convinced
that she deserved to pass, she wrote to respondent
Domondon, Acting Chairman of the Board of
Accountancy, and requested that her answer sheets
be re-corrected. Petitioner argues that she has a
right to obtain copies of the examination papers so
she can determine for herself why and how she
failed and to ensure that the Board properly
performed its duties. She argues that the
Constitution as well as the Code of Conduct and
Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees
support her right to demand access to the
Examination Papers
WON she has the right to demand access
to the Examination Papers.
No. Any claim for re-correction or
revision of her 1997 examination cannot be
compelled by mandamus PRC has the power to
review, coordinate, integrate and approve the
policies, resolutions, rules and regulations, orders or
decisions however, the PRCs power to review and
approve in Section 5(c) only refers to appeals in
decisions concerning administrative investigations
and not to instances where documents are being
requested
Mainpoint: The function of reviewing and re-
assessing the petitioner’s answers to the
examination questions is a discretionary function of
the Medical Board, not a ministerial and mandatory
one, hence, not within the scope of the writ of
mandamus. 
CASE NO. 613
Center for People v. COMELEC
This case concerns the duty of the
COMELECCommission on Elections to disclose the
source code for the AESAutomated Election System
technologies it used in the 2010 national and local
elections. Petitioner CenPEG Center for People
Empowerment in Governance wrote respondent
COMELEC, requesting a copy of the source code of
the PCOSPrecinct Count Optical Scan programs, the
BOC CCSBoard of Canvassers
Consolidation/Canvassing System programs for the
municipal, provincial, national, and congressional
canvass, the COMELEC server programs, and the
source code of the in-house COMELEC programs
called the DCSData Capturing System utilities.
CenPEG invoked the pertinent portion of Sec. 12 of
R.A. 9369, which provides: Once an AES technology
is selected for implementation, the Commission
shall promptly make the source code of that
technology available and open to any interested
political party or groups which may conduct their
own review thereof. The COMELEC granted the
request for the source code of the PCOS and the
CCS, but denied that for the DCS. Still, the COMELEC
apparently did not release even the kinds of source
code that it said it was approving for release for the
reason that the source code CenPEG wanted did not
yet exist. CenPEG filed a petition for mandamus in
this case notwithstanding the fact that the elections
for which the subject source code was to be used
had already been held. It claimed that the source
code remained important and relevant not only for
compliance with the law, and the purpose thereof,
but especially in the backdrop of numerous
admissions of errors and claims of fraud.
WON the petition for mandamus should
be granted.
YES. The pertinent portion of Section 12
of R.A. 9369 is clear in that once an AES technology
is selected for implementation, the Commission
shall promptly make the source code of that
technology available and open to any interested
political party or groups which may conduct their
own review thereof. The COMELEC has offered no
reason not to comply with this requirement of the
law. Indeed, its only excuse for not disclosing the
source code was that it was not yet available when
CenPEG asked for it and, subsequently, that the
review had to be done, apparently for security
reason, under a controlled environment. The
elections had passed and that reason is already
stale.
MAIN POINT IN BOLD.
CASE NO. 614
Francisco, Jr. v. TRB
There are 4 consolidated petitions
(Francisco Jr. v. TRB included) which are special civil
actions under Rule 65Injunctions and Restraining Orders, assailing
and seeking to nullify certain statutory provisions,
presidential actions and implementing orders, toll
operation-related contracts and issuances on the
construction, maintenance and operation of the
major tollway systems in Luzon. The petitions
likewise seek to restrain and permanently prohibit
the implementation of the allegedly illegal toll fee
rate hikes for the use of the NLEX North Luzon Expressway,
SLEXSouth Luzon Expressway and the SMMSSouth Metro Manila Skyway.
WON the TRBToll Regulatory Board is authorized to
approve the initial toll rates without the necessity of
a hearing.
YES. A clear distinction must be made
between the statutory prescription on the fixing of
initial toll rates, on the one hand, and of
periodic/interim or subsequent toll rates, on the
other. First, the hearing required refers to notice
and hearing for the approval or denial of petitions
for toll rate adjustments or the subsequent toll
rates, not to the fixing of initial toll rates. By express
legal provision, the TRB is authorized to approve
the initial toll rates without the necessity of a
hearing. It is only when a challenge on the initial
toll rates fixed ensues that public hearings are
required. As to subsequent toll rate adjustments,
such are mandated by law to undergo both the
requirements of public hearing and publication.
In the instant consolidated cases, the fixing of the
initial toll rates may have indeed come to pass
without any public hearing. Unfortunately for
petitioners, and notwithstanding its presumptive
validity, they did not assail the initial toll rates
within the timeframe provided by law which was
within the period of 90 days after the date of
publication of the initial toll rate.
MAIN POINT IN BOLD.
CASE NO. 615
Initiatives v. PSALM
PSALMPower Sector Assets and Liabilities Management is a
government-owned and controlled corporation
created by virtue of the EPIRA Electric Power Industry Reform Act of
2001
. The EPIRA provided for the privatization of the
assets of the NPCNational Power Corporation thereby
mandating PSALM to commence with the auction of
the AHEPPAngat-Hydro-Electric Power Plant. K-Water was the
highest bidder. The sale to K-Water was sought to
be enjoined by petitioners who contend that PSALM
gravely abused its discretion when, in the conduct
of the bidding it violated the people’s right to
information without having previously released to
the public critical information about the sale.
(a) Whether or not the bid documents,
etc. used in the on-going negotiation for the
privatization and sale of AHEPP may be accessed via
the right to information; and
(b) Whether or not the duty to disclose
information the same with the duty to permit access
to information on matters of public concern.
 (a) Yes. The court reiterated that the
constitutional right to information includes official
information on on-going negotiations before a final
contract. The information, however, must constitute
definite propositions by the government and should
not cover recognized exceptions like privileged
information, military and diplomatic secrets and
similar matters affecting national security and public
order.
(b) No. Unlike the disclosure of
information which is mandatory under the
Constitution, the duty to permit access to
information requires a demand or request for one
to gain access to documents and paper of the
particular agency. Moreover, the duty to disclose
covers only transactions involving public interest,
while the duty to allow access has a broader scope
of information which embraces not only
transactions involving public interest, but any
matter contained in official communications and
public documents of the government agency
MAIN POINT: The people’s constitutional right to
information is intertwined with the government’s
constitutional duty of full public disclosure of all
transactions involving public interest.
CASE NO. 616
Belgica v. Executive Secretary
Aside from seeking the Court to declare
the Pork Barrel System unconstitutional—as the
Court did so in the context of its pronouncements
made in this Decision—petitioners equally pray that
the Executive Secretary and/or the DBM be ordered
to release to the CoA and to the public: (a) the
complete schedule/list of legislators who have
availed of their PDAF and VILP from the years 2003
to 2013 and (b) the use of the Executive‘s lump-
sum, discretionary funds, including the proceeds
from the Malampaya Funds and remittances from
the PAGCOR from 2003 to 2013.
WON the right to information under Sec.
7, Article III accord petitioners the right to compel
custodians of official records to prepare lists,
abstracts, summaries and the like in their desire to
acquire information on matters of public concern.
NO. Although citizens are afforded the
right to information and, pursuant thereto, are
entitled to "access to official records," the
Constitution does not accord them a right to compel
custodians of official records to prepare lists,
abstracts, summaries and the like in their desire to
acquire information on matters of public concern.
Further, case law instructs that the proper remedy
to invoke the right to information is to file a
petition for mandamus. It must be stressed that it
is essential for a writ of mandamus to issue that
the applicant has a well-defined, clear and certain
legal right to the thing demanded and that it is the
imperative duty of defendant to perform the act
required. The request of the petitioners fails to
meet this standard, there being no duty on the part
of respondent to prepare the list requested. Aside
from the fact that none of the petitions are in the
nature of mandamus actions, petitioners did not
assert any law or administrative issuance which
would form the bases of the latter‘s duty to furnish
them with the documents requested. While
petitioners prayed that said information be equally
released to the CoA, it must be pointed out that the
CoA has not been impleaded as a party to these
cases nor has it filed any petition before the Court
to be allowed access to or to compel the release of
any official document relevant to the conduct of its
audit investigations.
CASE NO. 617
Villafuerte, Jr. v. Robredo
CoA conducted an examination and audit
on the manner the local government units utilized
their IRAInternal Revenue Allotment for the calendar years
1993-1994. The examination yielded an official
report, showing that a substantial portion of the
20% development fund of some LGUs was not
actually utilized for development projects but was
diverted to expenses properly chargeable against
the Maintenance and Other Operating Expenses (MOOE), in stark
violation of Section 287 of R.A. No. 7160 Local Government
Code of 1991 (LGC)
. In 2010, Jesse Robredo, in his capacity
as DILG Secretary, issued the assailed MC Memorandum
Circular
No. 2010-83 (Full Disclosure of Local Budget and Finances, and Bids
andPublic Offerings)
which aims to promote good
governance through enhanced transparency and
accountability of LGUs. Robredo issued another
MC, reiterating that 20% component of the IRA shall
be utilized for desirable social, economic and
environmental outcomes. It also enumerated a list
for which the fund must not be utilized. Villafuerte,
then Governor of Camarines Sur filed the instant
petition for certiorari, seeking to nullify the assailed
issuances of the respondent.
WON the issuances went beyond the
letter and spirit of Section 352 of the LGC and R.A.
No. 9184 Government Procurement Reform Act , by requiring that
budgets, expenditures, contracts and loans, and
procurement plans of LGUs be publicly posted.
NO. The Constitution strongly summoned
the State to adopt and implement a policy of full
disclosure of all transactions involving public
interest and provide the people with the right to
access public information. Section 352 of the LGC is
a response to this call for transparency. It is a
mechanism of transparency and accountability of
local government officials and is in fact incorporated
under Chapter IV of the LGC which deals with
“Expenditures, Disbursements, Accounting and
Accountability.” In the same manner, R.A. No. 9184
established a system of transparency in the
procurement process and in the implementation of
procurement contracts in government agencies. It is
the public monitoring of the procurement process
and the implementation of awarded contracts with
the end in view of guaranteeing that these contracts
are awarded pursuant to the provisions of the law
and its implementing rules and regulations, and that
all these contracts are performed strictly according
to specifications.
CASE NO. 618
Volkschel Labor Union vs. Bureau of Labor
Relations
Petitioner was once affiliated with the
Associated Labor Union for Metal Workers
(ALUMETAL). Both unions, jointly entered into a
collective bargaining agreement with respondent
companies. One of the subjects dealt with is the
payment of union dues. Later on, a majority of
petitioner's members decided to disaffiliate from
respondent federation, ALUMETAL, in order to
operate on its own as an independent labor group.
ALUMETAL wrote respondent companies advising
them to continue deducting union dues and
remitting them to said federation.
WON petitioner union’s disaffiliation from
respondent federation valid.
YES. The right of a local union to
disaffiliate from its mother union is well-settled. It
has been held that a local union, being a separate
and voluntary association, is free to serve the
interest of all its members including the freedom
to disaffiliate when circumstances warrant. This
right is consistent with the Constitutional guarantee
of freedom of association. The disaffiliation was
prompted by the federation's deliberate and
habitual dereliction of duties as mother federation
towards petitioner union. In the case at bar, it
would go against the spirit of the labor law to
restrict petitioner's right to self-organization due to
the existence of the CBA. Nowhere in the record
does it appear that the contract entered into by the
petitioner and ALUMETAL prohibits the withdrawal
of the former from the latter.
CASE NO. 619
Occena vs. COMELEC
Petitioner challenges the constitutionality
of some sections of the Barangay Election Act of
1982 (BP Blg. 222) which prohibits any political
party, political group, political committee from
intervening in the barangay election, i.e., from
representing or allowing himself to be represented
as a candidate of any political party; and prohibit
any party from giving aid or support, directly or
indirectly, favorable to or against a barangay
candidate’s campaign for election.
WON the ban on the intervention of
political parties in the barangay election violates the
right to form associations.
NO. The right to form associations for
purposes not contrary to law is neither absolute
nor illimitable; it is always subject to the pervasive
and dominant police power of the State and may
constitutionally be regulated or curtailed to serve
appropriate and important public interests. The
ban is narrow, not total. It operates only on
concerted or group action of political parties.
Members of political and kindred organizations,
acting individually, may intervene in the barangay
election. The law is intended to meet a clear and
imminent danger of the debilitation of the electoral
process and also the danger of disenabling barangay
officials from adequately performing their function
as agents of a neutral community.
CASE NO. 620
UPCSU vs. Laguesma
The petitioner is a union of supervisory
employees. The union filed a petition for
certification on behalf of the route managers at
Pepsi-Cola Products Philippines, Inc. However, its
petition was denied by the med-arbiter and, on
appeal, by the Secretary of Labor and Employment,
on the ground that the route managers are
managerial employees and, therefore, ineligible for
union membership under the first sentence of Art
245 of the Labor Code, which provides that
managerial employees are not eligible to join, assist,
or form any labor organization. Petitioner contends
that the first sentence of Art. 245 of the Labor Code,
contravenes the right to form association.
WON Art. 245, insofar as it prohibits
managerial employees from forming, joining or
assisting labor unions, violates Article III, Section 8
of the Constitution.
NO. The guaranteed right in Art. III,
Section 8 is subject to the condition that its
exercise should be for the purposes “not contrary
to law.”  In the case of Art 245, there is rational
basis for prohibiting managerial employees from
forming or joining labor organization. For the reason
that these managerial employees would belong to
or be affiliated with a Union, the latter might not be
assured of their loyalty to the Union in view of
evident conflict of interest. The union also becomes
company-dominated with the presence of
managerial employees in Union membership.
CASE NO. 621
Bel-Air Village Association vs. Dionisio
he Transfer Certificate of Title covering
the subject parcel of land issued in the name
of Virgilio Dionisio, contains an annotation to the
effect that the lot owner becomes an automatic
member of Bel-Air Village Association, and must
abide by such rules and regulations laid down by the
Association in the interest of the sanitation, security
and the general welfare of the community.
The petitioner questioned the collection of the dues
on many grounds, one of them is that the acts of
plaintiff in compelling the defendant to be a
member is unconstitutional and outside the scope
of its corporate power.   Subsequently, the said lot, together with the
WON such annotation violate the right
freely to join or not to join associations.
NO. The fact that the obligation is
annotated in the title does not make it a
government act forcing one to join an association.
Rather, the buyer freely buys the lot knowing that
the purchase will entail an obligation. The SC held
that the purchasers of a registered land are bound
by the annotations found at the back of the
certificate of title covering the subject parcel of
land. The constitutional proscription than no
person can be compelled to be a member of an
association against his will applies only to
governmental acts and not to private transactions
like the one in question. The petitioner cannot
legally maintain that he is compelled to be a
member of the association against his will because
the limitation is imposed upon his ownership of
property.  If he does not desire to comply with the
annotation or lien in question, he can at any time
exercise his inviolable freedom of disposing of the
property and free himself from the burden of
becoming a member of the association.
CASE NO. 622
PADCOM vs. Ortigas Center Asso Inc.
Petitioner Padcom Condominium
Corporation (PADCOM) owns and manages the
Padilla Office Condominium Building (PADCOM
BUILDING). The land on which the building stands
was originally acquired from the Ortigas &
Company, Limited Partnership, by Tierra
Development Corporation (TDC) under a Deed of
Sale with a condition that the transferee and its
successor-in-interest must become members of an
association for realty owners and long-term lessees
in the area later known as the Ortigas Center.
improvements thereon, was conveyed by TDC in
favor of PADCOM in a Deed of Transfer.  M. Jimenez, holding that NHC "being a government-
Thereafter, respondent Ortigas Center Association,
Inc. (ASSOCIATION) was organized to advance the
interests and promote the general welfare of the
real estate owners and long-term lessees of the lots
in the Ortigas Center and sought the collection of
membership dues from PADCOM. In view of
PADCOM'S failure and refusal to pay its arrears in
monthly dues, the Association filed a complaint for
collection of sum of money before the trial court.
petitioner claimed that the provisions of the
Associations By-laws and the Deed of Transfer did
not contemplate automatic membership. RTC
dismissed the complaint. On appeal, the CAreversed
and set aside the trial court's dismissal. Hence, this
petition where petitioner argued that it could not be
compelled to become a member without violating
its right to freedom of association.
WON the contention of petitioner was
correct?
NO. PADCOM was never forced to join the
association. It could have avoided such membership
by not buying the land from TDC. Nobody forced it
to buy the land when it bought the building with the
annotation of the condition or lien on the Certificate
of Title thereof and accepted the Deed. PADCOM
voluntarily agreed to be bound by and respect the
condition, and thus to join the Association.
CASE NO. 623
TUCP v. NHC
TUPAS filed a petition for the conduct of a
certification election with Regional Office No. IV of
the Department of Labor in order to determine the
exclusive bargaining representative of the workers
in NHC. It was claimed that its members comprised
the majority of the employees of the corporation. 
The petition was dismissed by med-arbiter Eusebio
owned and/or controlled corporation its
employees/workers are prohibited to form, join or
assist any labor organization for purposes of
collective bargaining pursuant to Section 1, Rule II,
Book V of the Rules and Regulations Implementing
the Labor Code." 
From this order of dismissal, TUPAS
appealed to the Bureau of Labor Relations  where,
acting thereon, Director Carmelo C. Noriel reversed
the order of dismissal and ordered the holding of a
certification election.This order was, however, set
aside by Officer-in-Charge Virgilio S.J. Sy in his
resolution of November 21, 1978  upon a motion for
reconsideration of respondent NHC. Hence seeks
reversal
WON employees of NHC undoubtedly
have the right to strike?
YES. The workers or employees of NHC
undoubtedly have the right to form unions or
employees' organizations. The right to unionize or
to form organizations is now explicitly recognized
and granted to employees in both the governmental
and the private sectors. The Bill of Rights provides
that “(t)he right of the people, including those
employed in the public and private sectors, to form
unions, associations or societies for purposes not
contrary to law shall not be abridged.” This
guarantee is reiterated in the second paragraph of
Section 3, Article XIII, on Social Justice and Human
Rights, which mandates that the State “shall
guarantee the rights of all workers to self-
organization, collective bargaining and negotiations,
and peaceful concerted activities, including the right
to strike in accordance with law.
CASE NO. 624
SSS Employees vs. CA
 The petitioners went on strike after the
SSS failed to act upon the union’s demands
concerning the implementation of their CBA. SSS
filed before the court action for damages with
prayer for writ of preliminary injunction against
petitioners for staging an illegal strike. The court
issued a temporary restraining order pending the
resolution of the application for preliminary
injunction while petitioners filed a motion to dismiss
alleging the court’s lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter.  Petitioners contend that the court
made reversible error in taking cognizance on the
subject matter since the jurisdiction lies on the
DOLE or the National Labor Relations Commission as
the case involves a labor dispute. The SSS contends
on one hand that the petitioners are covered by the
Civil Service laws, rules and regulation thus have no
right to strike. They are not covered by the NLRC or
DOLE therefore the court may enjoin the petitioners
from striking.
WON SSS employers have the right to
strike?
NO. in the absence of any legislation
allowing government employees to strike,
recognizing their right to do so, or regulating the
exercise of the right, they are prohibited from
striking by express provision of Memorandum
Circular No. 6 and as implied in E.O. No. 180.
CASE NO. 625
MPSTA vs. Secretary of Ed
There were mass actions by 800 Public
School Teachers which was caused by the alleged
failure of authorities to act upon the teacher’s
grievances such as the immediate payment of due
chalk, clothing allowances, 13th  month pay arising
from the salary standardization law, and a few
others more. Even on September 17, 1990, the mass
actions continued which was a Monday and a school
day. Some of the teachers who participated in the
mass actions did not hold classes that day. The
secretary of education filed cases against those
teachers who participated in the mass actions on
the grounds of grave misconduct, gross neglect of
duty, gross violation of Civil Service Law, absence
without official leave and the likes and placed them
on a 90-day preventive suspension period.
WON employees in public service
prohibited in conducting strikes?
YES, The SC held that the mass actions
held by the teachers shall be considered
strikes because their main purpose was the
stoppage of or absence from work. Employees in
public service do not have the right to strike
because this constitutes a disturbance in public
service. In addition, employment in the government
is governed by law and the terms and conditions of
employment are affected through statutes and
administrative rules and regulations, not by
collective bargaining agreements. In this case
the teachers absented from their work in order
to participate in the mass action that was happening
on a Monday
CASE NO. 626
Jacinto v. CA
Petitioners (except Jacinto and Agustin – 6
months suspension), all public school teachers
within the Metropolitan Manila area, were meted
with the penalty of dismissal for their involvement
in the staged mass actions (unauthorized absences)
against the government, pressuring the latter to
grant their demands (to fully implement laws
favorable to them). They were faced with several
administrative charges including gross neglect of
duty and unjustified abandonment of teaching
posts. The CA confirmed CSC’s decision on the basis
that the right to strike did not extend to civil service
employees.
WON public school teachers have the right
to organize for the purposes of strike to pressure
the Government to accede to their demands?
NO. There is no question as to the
petitioners rights to peaceful assembly to petition
the government for a redress of grievances and, for
that matter, to organize or form associations for
purposes not contrary to law, as well as to engage in
peaceful concerted activities. However, these rights
are not absolute; they are subject to regulation (not
be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others
having equal rights, nor injurious to the rights of the
community or society).
Specifically, in the right of civil servants to
organize themselves there are standards for
allowable limitations such as the legitimacy of the
purposes of the association , the overriding
considerations of national security and the
preservation of democratic institutions.
Government employees may, therefore, through
their unions or associations, either petition the
Congress for the betterment of the terms and
conditions of employment which are within the
ambit of legislation or negotiate with the
appropriate government agencies for the
improvement of those which are not fixed by law.
But employees in the civil service may not resort to
strikes, walkouts and other temporary work
stoppages, like workers in the private sector, to
pressure the Government to accede to their
demands.
CASE NO. 627
GSIS v. Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa ng GSIS
(KMG)
Members of herein respondent (a public
sector union of GSIS rank-and-file employees) were
among the participants in a four-day (service-
disruptive effect) concerted demonstration, rallies
and en masse walkout waged/held in front of the
GSIS main office in Roxas Boulevard, Pasay City
targeted against herein petitioner Garcia and his
management style. Hence, administrative charges
were filed against members of KMG. CA nonetheless
ruled in favor of KMG and held that the organized
demonstrating employees did nothing more than air
their grievances in the exercise of their "broader
rights of free expression."
WON GSIS employees may conduct mass
rallies in the exercise of their freedom of expression
and assembly.
NO. The SC observed that while the CA’s
decision and resolution do not explicitly say so, it
equated the right to form associations with the right
to engage in strike and similar activities available to
workers in the private sector. Even though the
freedom of expression and assembly and the right
to petition the government for a redress of
grievances stand on a level higher than economic
and other liberties, any suggestion, however, about
these rights as including the right on the part of
government personnel to strike ought to be trashed.
MAIN POINT: The freedom of assembly does not
include the right to strike for a government
personnel.
CASE NO. 628
In Re: Edillon
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
Board of Governors adopted a resolution
recommending to the Court the removal of the
name of the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys
for "stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues"
to the IBP. The respondent argues that the provision
on the effect (suspension and removal) on non-
payment of dues constitutes an invasion of his
constitutional rights in the sense that he is being
compelled to be a member of the IBP and to pay the
corresponding dues.
WON a lawyer is compelled to be a
member of the IBP to exercise his legal profession.
YES. State-organized, an integrated Bar is
an official national body of which all lawyers are
required to be members. Members are, therefore,
subject to all the rules prescribed for the
governance of the Bar, including the requirement of
payment of a reasonable annual fee. The integration
of the Philippine Bar was obviously dictated by
overriding considerations of public interest and
public welfare thus legally justifies the restrictions
that integration imposes upon the personal
interests and personal convenience of individual
lawyers. The practice of law is not a vested right but
a privilege, a privilege moreover clothed with public
interest because a lawyer owes substantial duties to
his client, profession, courts, and takes part in the
administration of justice (important function). Thus,
the holder of this privilege must submit to a degree
of control for the common good.
MAIN POINT: An "Integrated Bar" is a State-
organized Bar, to which every lawyer must belong.
Membership is mandatory as a valid exercise of the
State’s police power over an important profession.
CASE NO. 629
Heirs of Alberto Suguitan v. City of Mandaluyong
For the purpose of the expansion of the
Mandaluyong Medical Center, the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Mandaluyong City issued a resolution
authorizing then Mayor Benjamin S. Abalos to
institute expropriation proceedings over the
property of Alberto Sugui located in Mandaluyong
City. Consequently, the then mayor wrote a letter to
Suguitan offering to buy his property, but Suguitan
refused to sell. Nonetheless, the trial court issued an
order (acting on the complaint for expropriation)
allowing the City of Mandaluyong to take immediate
possession of Suguitan's property upon the deposit
of P621,000. Petitioner assert that the city of
Mandaluyong may only exercise its delegated power
of eminent domain by means of an ordinance as
required by section 19 of Republic Act (RA) No.
7160, and not by means of a mere resolution.
Respondent refute the above by claiming that an
ordinance is required only in order to appropriate
the funds for the payment of just compensation.
WON local government units may exercise
the power of eminent domain without an
ordinance.
 NO. Eminent domain is the right or power
of a sovereign state to appropriate private
property to particular uses to promote public
welfare. The exercise of such power, nonetheless,
is not without limit. Thus, our own Constitution
provides that "[p]rivate property shall not be taken
for public use without just compensation."
Furthermore, the due process and equal protection
clauses act as additional safeguards against the
arbitrary exercise of this governmental power.
Furthermore, the power of eminent domain is
essentially legislative in nature. It is firmly settled,
however, that such power may be validly delegated
to local government units, other public entities and
public utilities, although the scope of this delegated
legislative power is necessarily narrower than that
of the delegating authority and may only be
exercised in strict compliance with the terms of the
delegating law.
The exercise of the power of eminent domain by
local government units have the following
requisites (section 19 of RA 7160):
1. An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative
council authorizing the local chief executive, in
behalf of the local government unit, to exercise the
power of eminent domain or pursue expropriation
proceedings over a particular private property.
2. The power of eminent domain is exercised for
public use, purpose or welfare, or for the benefit of
the poor and the landless.
3. There is payment of just compensation, as
required under Section 9, Article III of the
Constitution, and other pertinent laws.
4. A valid and definite offer has been previously
made to the owner of the property sought to be
expropriated, but said offer was not accepted.
The law in this case is clear and free from ambiguity.
In the present case, the City of Mandaluyong seeks
to exercise the power of eminent domain over
petitioners' property by means of a resolution, in
contravention of the first requisite. Section 19 of the
Code requires an ordinance, not a resolution, for the
exercise of the power of eminent domain.
CASE NO. 630
NHA v. Heirs of Isidro Guivelondo
The National Housing Authority (NHA)
filed an Amended Complaint (CEB 2333-86) for
eminent domain against herein private respondent
(claimants/owners of a land in Cebu City). Petitioner
intends to develop the land of petitioner as a
socialized housing project. Respondent did not
object the above expropriation complaint to which
the trial court ordered that NHA now has a lawful
right to expropriate. So, the trial court
recommended that the just compensation of the
land of respondent be fixed at P11,200.00 per
square meter. Petitioner NHA now assails the
amount of just compensation to which the NHA filed
with the trial court a Motion to Dismiss Civil Case
No. CEB-23386 alleging that the implementation of
its socialized housing project was rendered
impossible by the unconscionable value of the land
sought to be expropriated, which the intended
beneficiaries can not afford.
WON in an expropriation proceeding the
plaintiff (the one taking) may at any time, for any
ground withdraw its action.
NO. The Court ruled that a plaintiff (the
one taking) in an expropriation action (during its
pendency) may dismiss such action when public
necessity no longer exists. However, such rule does
not apply where the case had been decided and the
judgment had already become final and executory.
Expropriation proceedings consists of two stages:
first, condemnation of the property after it is
determined that its acquisition will be for a public
purpose or public use and, second, the
determination of just compensation to be paid for
the taking of private property to be made by the
court with the assistance of not more than three
commissioners. In both orders/stages, outcomes of
such are final but appealable nonetheless. In the
case at bar, petitioner did not appeal the Order of
the trial court which declared that it has a lawful
right to expropriate the properties of respondent
Heirs of Isidro Guivelondo. Hence, the Order
became final and may no longer be subject to
review or reversal in any court. Furthermore,
respondent landowners had already been
prejudiced by the expropriation case. Petitioner
cannot be permitted to institute condemnation
proceedings against respondents only to abandon it
later when it finds the amount of just compensation
unacceptable.
Case No. 631
Mactan v. Lozada
Lozada acquired Lot No. 88 in Lahug, Cebu
City during pendency of expropriation proceedings
of said lot, initiated by RP through Civil Aeronautics
Administration (CAA), for the expansion and
improvement of the Lahug Airport. TC ruled in favor
of the RP and ordered to pay Lozada the fair market
value of the lot with consequential damages from
time the lot was first occupied by the airport. Later,
a memo to DOT was issued directing the transfer of
the Lahug Airport to the Mactan International
Airport before the end of 1990 which led to closure
of the Lahug Airport. Since the institution of the
expropriation proceedings up to present, the public
purpose of the said expropriation was never actually
initiated, realized, or implemented. Thus, petitioner
filed complaint for recovery of possession and
reconveyance of ownership of said lot. RTC ruled in
favor of Lozada. Petitioners appealed to CA. CA
denied.
WON the taking of private property is
subject to the condition that the property be
devoted to the specific public purpose for which it
was taken.
YES. With respect to the element of public
use, the expropriator should commit to use the
property pursuant to the purpose stated in the
petition for expropriation filed, failing which, it
should file another petition for the new purpose. If
this particular purpose or intent is not initiated or
not at all pursued, and is peremptorily abandoned,
then the former owners, if they so desire, may
seek the reversion of the property, subject to the
return of the amount of just compensation
received. (Main point in bold.)
Case No. 632
Vda De Ouano v. Republic (Reversion)
Mactan-Cebu International Airport’s
predecessor agency pursued a program to expand
the Lahug Airport, Cebu. Government promised the
owners of subject lands reconveyance or repurchase
of said property so long as Lahug ceases its
operation or transfer its operation to Mactan –
Cebu Airport. Some owners refused to sell, and that
the CAA filed a complaint for the expropriation of
said properties for the said expansion. TC then
declared in favor of CAA and ordered it for just
compensation to the land owners. In 1991, Lahug
Airport ceased its operation and transferred to the
Mactan-Cebu airport. This then prompted the land
owners to demand for the reconveyance of said
properties. Hence these two consolidated cases
arise. In G.R. No. 168812, MCIAA is hereby ordered
by court to reconvey said properties to the land
owners plus attorney’s fee and cost of suit, while in
G.R. No. 168770, the RTC ruled in favor of the
petitioners Ouano’s and against the MCIAA for the
reconveyance of their properties but was appealed
by the latter and the earlier decision was reversed,
the case went up to the CA but the CA affirmed the
reversed decision of the RTC.
WON the taking of a private land in
expropriation proceedings is always conditioned on
its continued devotion to its public purpose thus
MCIAA should reconvey the lands to petitioners.
YES. The taking of a private land in
expropriation proceedings is always conditioned
on its continued devotion to its public purpose.
Once the purpose is terminated or peremptorily
abandoned, then the former owner, if he so
desires, may seek its reversion subject of course to
the return at the very least of the just
compensation received. (Main point in bold.)
CASE NO. 633
Iron and Steel Authority (ISA) v. CA
Iron and Steel Authority (“ISA”) was
created by P.D. No. 272, to develop and promote
the iron and steel industry in the PH. The
organization has been ordered to stay for 5 year but
an extension was made to 10 years. National Steel
Corporation (“NSC”) subsidiary of a GOCC embarked
on an expansion program embracing, among other
things, the construction of an integrated steel mill in
Iligan City. The construction of such a steel mill was
considered a major industrial project of the
Government. Certain portion of the land is occupied
by Maria Cristina Fertilizer Corporation ("MCFC")
NSC was authorized to "negotiate with the owners
of MCFC,  for and on behalf of the Government, for
the compensation of MCFC's present occupancy
rights on the subject land.  petitioner ISA was to
exercise its power of eminent domain and to initiate
expropriation proceedings. Negotiations between
NSC and private respondent MCFC did fail.
petitioner ISA commenced eminent domain
proceedings against private respondent praying that
it (ISA) be places in possession of the property
involved upon depositing representing ten percent
(10%) of the declared market values of that
property. During the ongoing trial , however, the
statutory existence of petitioner ISA expired. MCFC
then filed a motion to dismiss, contending that no
valid judgment could be rendered against ISA which
had ceased to be a juridical person.
WON the expiration of term of an agency
(ISA) also terminates the proceeding or claims for
eminent domain
No. From the foregoing premises, it
follows that the Republic of the Philippines is
entitled to be substituted in the expropriation
proceedings as party-plaintiff in lieu of ISA, the
statutory term of ISA having expired. Put a little
differently, the expiration of ISA’s statutory term
did not by itself require or justify the dismissal of
the eminent domain proceedings.
CASE NO. 634
Philippine Press Institute v. COMELEC
Philippine Press Institute, Inc. (“PPI”)
assails the constitutional validity of Resolution No.
2772 issued by (“Comelec”) and its corresponding
Comelec directive dated 22 March 1995, through a
Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition. This
resolution states that COMELEC should be given free
printing space of not less than one half (1/2) page in
at least one newspaper of general circulation in
every province or city for use as ‘Comelec Space’
that should be available to all candidates but subject
to approval of the commission. Court issued a
Temporary Restraining Order enjoining Comelec
from enforcing and implementing Section 2 of
Resolution No. 2772. Office of the Solicitor General
filed its Comment on behalf of respondent Comelec
alleging that Comelec Resolution No. 2772 does not
impose upon the publishers any obligation to
provide free print space in the newspapers as it
does not provide any criminal or administrative
sanction for non-compliance with that Resolution.
WON COMELEC may institute to take print
space from publishers as part or eminent domain?
No. The taking of private property for
public use is, of course, authorized by the
Constitution, but not without payment of “just
compensation” (Article III, Section 9). And
apparently the necessity of paying compensation for
“Comelec space” is precisely what is sought to be
avoided by respondent Commission, whether
Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 is read as
petitioner PPI reads it, as an assertion of authority
to require newspaper publishers to “donate” free
print space for Comelec purposes, or as an
exhortation, or perhaps an appeal, to publishers to
donate free print space,
CASE NO. 635
Telebap v. COMELEC
Petitioners is an organization  is an
organization of lawyers of radio and television
broadcasting companies and GMA Network
challenge the implementation and validity of
Section 92, B.P. No. 881 which provides:
“Comelec Time-  The Commission shall
procure radio and television time to be known as
the “Comelec Time” which shall be allocated equally
and impartially among the candidates within the
area of coverage of all radio and television stations. 
For this purpose, the franchise of all radio
broadcasting and television stations are hereby
amended so as to provide radio or television time,
free of charge, during the period of campaign.”
WON §92 of B.P. Blg. 881 constitutes to
taking property without due process of law and
without just compensation
NO. Petitioners contend that §92 of BP
Blg. 881 violates the due process clause and the
eminent domain provision of the Constitution by
taking airtime from radio and television
broadcasting stations without payment of just
compensation. Petitioners claim that the primary
source of revenue of the radio and television
stations is the sale of airtime to advertisers and that
to require these stations to provide free airtime is to
authorize a taking which is not “a de minimis
temporary limitation or restraint upon the use of
private property.” Petitioners’ argument is without
merit. All broadcasting, whether by radio or by
television stations, is licensed by the government.
Airwave frequencies have to be allocated as there
are more individuals who want to broadcast than
there are frequencies to assign. A franchise is thus a
privilege subject, among other things, to
amendment by Congress in accordance with the
constitutional provision that “any such franchise or
right granted . . . shall be subject to amendment,
alteration or repeal by the Congress when the
common good so requires.”
As radio and television broadcast stations do not
own the airwaves, no private property is taken by
the requirement that they provide air time to the
COMELEC.  
CASE NO. 636
Estate of Heirs v. City of Manila
Jose B. L. Reyes and petitioners Heirs of
Edmundo Reyes are the pro-indiviso co-owners in
equal proportion of 11 parcels of land situated at
Sta. Cruz District, Manila These parcels of land are
being occupied and leased by different tenants
there was ejectment case filed against of those
tenants during the pendency of the cases of Abiog
and Maglonso, respondent City filed a complaint for
eminent domain (expropriation) for the said lands.
According to the ordinance, the said properties
were to be distributed to the intended beneficiaries,
who were “the occupants of the said parcels of land
who (had) been occupying the said lands as lessees
or any term thereof for a period of at least 10 years.
Respondent City sent the petitioners a written offer
to purchase the subject properties but the same
was rejected.
WON ORDINANCE NO. 7818 ENACTED BY
THE CITY OF MANILA IS VIOLATIVE OF THE EQUAL
PROTECTION CLAUSE. Thus expropriation is invalid
NO. Private lands rank last in the order of
priority for purposes of socialized housing. In the
same vein, expropriation proceedings are to be
resorted to only after the other modes of
acquisition have been exhausted. Compliance with
these conditions is mandatory because these are
the only safeguards of oftentimes helpless owners
of private property against violation of due process
when their property is forcibly taken from them for
public use.
CASE NO. 637
Lagcao v. Labra
This is a case where after a deed of sale of
a lot, located near the Capitol of Cebu, was
executed between the Province of Cebu and the
petitioners, and in favor of the latter, is being
expropriated to be used for socialized housing,
under the Ordinance No. 1772 and 1843 made by
the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Cebu City. And
there being no basis as to why the lot sold to the
petitioners where chosen and the only lot in the
area to be part of such project.
WON the exercise of the power of
eminent domain in this case is justifiable.
NO. Although the exercise of the power to
expropriate is within the foundation of RA 7160
(Local Government Code), the passage of the said
ordinances failed to justify the need to expropriate
the said lot. Accordingly, due process was not
attendant.
MAIN POINT: There are two legal provisions which
limit the exercise of eminent domain:
(1) no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law, nor shall any
person be denied the equal protection of the laws
(Art 3, Sec 1 Consti); and
(2) private property shall not be taken for public
use without just compensation. (Art 3, Sec 9 Consti)
Thus, the exercise by local government
units of the power of eminent domain is not
absolute. In fact, Section 19 of RA 7160 itself
explicitly states that such exercise must comply with
the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent
laws.
CASE NO. 638
Greater Balanga v. Municipality of Balanga
The Sangguniang Panglungsod of the
Municipality of Balanga revoked the business permit
issued to petitioner, Greater Balanga Development
Corporation, which was owned by the Camacho, to
operate privately the public market. The revocation
of such permit was according to a prior judgment
made on the disputed land in the public market,
which was awarded in favor of the petitioners
(Leona Dizon et. al.). However, Greater Balanga
contends that the disputed land in this case was not
one of the lots awarded in the previously settled
case.
WON the previous case adjudging in favor of the
petitioners (Leona Dizon et. al.) released the right of
the Greater Balanga to the disputed lot.
NO. The court ruled in the case of Leona
Dizon et. al. v. Camacho that there was a default in
the sale through the acts of Camacho, but the
disputed lot is not one of those awarded to the
petitioners. Thus, rights over property is still with
the Greater Balanga and they should not be
deprived of it until expropriation proceedings.
MAIN POINT: Until expropriation proceedings are
instituted in court, the landowner cannot be
deprived of its right over the land.
CASE NO. 639
Velarma v. CA
An ejectment case was filed by the
Pansacolas, private respondent, against the
Velarma, petitioner, to vacate the land (owned by
the Pansacolas) that they have been unlawfully
squatting on. Their refusal to vacate was on the
ground that Pansacolas did not have a cause of
action because the ownership of the said property
has been given to the government during a session
in the Sangguniang Panglungsod, that a sale was
promised by the owners to the government.
However, no deed of sale was made during that
session.
WON the lot owner’s agreement to sell
the property to the government as evidenced by the
minutes of a meeting of the Sangguniang Bayan,
absent a formal deed, constitute a sufficient ground
to defeat a ejectment suit.
NO. Property right still belongs to the
Pansacolas because of failure to create a deed of
sale in favor of the government. There was no
formal transfer of such property rights to the
government.
MAIN POINT: Unless and until the transfer is
consummated, or expropriation proceedings
instituted by the government, the owner continues
to retain ownership.
CASE NO. 640
Solanda v. CA
A parcel of land located in Tondo, Manila,
were owned by Quijano and were leased to tenants
including private respondent Manlatuc. A sale was
consummated, without giving the tenants the
preemptive rights under PD 1517, in favor of
petitioner Solanda Enterprises Inc of said parcel of
land. After, the same land, by the Quijano, was
offered to the tenants for sale and an action for
ejectment was filed by Solanda against the private
respondents. During this dispute, the mayor of
manila issued Ordinance 7806 expressing intent to
expropriate the disputed land.
WON the Ordinance 7806, expressing
intent to expropriate the said land will bar the
ejectment action by the petitioner.
 NO. Said Ordinance does not show that
the disputed land, when expropriated, will be
awarded or sold to the private respondent. It does
not demonstrate or touch upon private
respondent’s right of possession over the disputed
land. It is, at best, speculative and not a bar to an
action for ejectment.
CASE NO. 641
Republic v. Salem
BP Blg 340 was enacted to appropriate
parcels of land which covers the lot owned by
Milagros and Inocentes de la Ramas. After five years
from the enactment of said law, Inocentes de la
Ramas initiated a sale with Alfredo Guerrero to sale
a portion of the land included in which to be
expropriated. The Republic of the Philippines in
pursuance of BP Blg 340 initiated a civil suit to
expropriate said parcels of land. The de la Ramas
and Guerrero now in conflict as to who will be
receiving the payment under BP Blg. 340.
WON the issuance of BP Blg. 340
constituted an immediate appropriation thus the
compensation of such parcel from the government
should be given to the de la Ramas.
NO. It merely commenced the
expropriation of the subject property. It is only upon
payment of just compensation that title over the
property passes to the government. Therefore, until
the action for expropriation has been completed
and terminated, ownership over the property being
expropriated remains with the registered owner.
Since ownership was still vested to the de
la ramas, the sale constituted a transfer of
ownership thus Guerrero now has the right to
receive the just compensation from the
Government.
MAIN POINT: Private property shall not be taken for
public use without just compensation.
CASE NO. 642
Republic v. Vda. De Castelvi
After the owner of a parcel of land that
has been rented and occupied by the government in
1947 refused to extend the lease, the latter
commenced expropriation proceedings in 1959.
During the assessment of just compensation, the
government argued that it had taken the property
when the contract of lease commenced and not
when the proceedings begun. The owner maintains
that the disputed land was not taken when the
government commenced to occupy the said land as
lessee because the essential elements of the
“taking” of property under the power of eminent
domain, namely (1) entrance and occupation by
condemnor upon the private property for more
than a momentary period, and (2) devoting it to a
public use in such a way as to oust the owner and
deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the
property, are not present.
Whether or not the property in question
has already been taken (expropriated) by the
government upon the signing of the contract of
lease.
NO. It is clear that the following elements
were not attendant for the taking of such land by
the government:
(1) the expropriator must enter a private property;
(2) the entrance into private property must be for
more than a momentary period;
(3) the entry into the property should be under
warrant or color of legal authority;
(4) the property must be devoted to a public use or
otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously
affected; and
(5) the utilization of the property for public use
must be in such a way as to oust the owner and
deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the
property.
CASE NO. 643
Garcia v. CA, 102 SCRA 597
Herein petitioners own Lot 633 and Lot
634 located in Mexico, Pampanga. Private
respondent, National Power Corporation, through a
document titled “Permission to Occupy Land”
occupied as early as 1957 portions of the two (2)
lots for the construction of ‘steel towers and high
power lines for 230 KV Ambuklao-Manila Line and
69 KV Mexico-Tarlac Line.’ The portions of the two
(2) lots occupied has an area of 20,439 square
meters. On May 8, 1969, the NPC instituted the
instant action for expropriation of a ‘right-of-way
easement’ over a portion of the two (2) lots. Total
area to be expropriated is 2835sqm. Petitioners
pray that private respondent compensate them for
the actual occupied area of 20,439sqm with interest
at the legal rate from date of actual occupation.
WON there had been “taking” at the time
NPC first occupied the lots, thus requiring the
computation for compensation be from 1957.
NO. As the private respondent’s entry was
gained through permission, it did not have the
intention to acquire ownership either by voluntary
purchase or by the exercise of eminent domain. And
the fact remains that the private respondent never
completed the negotiation as to compensation.
Where there is no taking of property for purposes
of eminent domain nor condemnation proceedings
instituted, the basis for determination of just
compensation is the time when the trial court
made its order of expropriation. Further, the
computation should be for the total area occupied
which is 20,439sqm.
CASE NO. 644
City Government of Quezon City v. Judge Ericta and
Himlayang Pilipino, Inc., 122 SCRA 759
Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64
provides that at least 6% of the total area of the
memorial park cemetery shall be set aside for the
charity burial of deceased persons who are paupers
and have been residents of Quezon City for at least
5 years prior to their death. As such, the Quezon
City engineer required the respondent, Himlayang
Pilipino Inc, to stop any further selling and/or
transaction of memorial park lots in Quezon City
where the owners thereof have failed to donate the
required 6% space intended for paupers burial.
Petitioners argued that the taking of the
respondent’s property is a valid and reasonable
exercise of police power and that the land is taken
for public use as it is intended for the burial ground
of paupers.
WON Section 9 of the ordinance in question is a
valid exercise of police power.
NO. There is no reasonable relation
between the setting aside of at least six (6) percent
of the total area of all private cemeteries for charity
burial grounds of deceased paupers and the
promotion of health, morals, good order, safety, or
the general welfare of the people. The ordinance is
actually a taking without compensation of a certain
area from a private cemetery to benefit paupers
who are charges of the municipal corporation.
Instead of building or maintaining a public cemetery
for this purpose, the city passes the burden to
private cemeteries.
MAIN POINT: An ordinance of Quezon City requiring
memorial park operators to set aside at least six
percent (6%) of their cemetery for charity burial of
deceased persons is not a valid exercise of police
power, and one that constitute taking of property
without just compensation.
CASE NO. 645
US v. Causby, 328 US 256
Thomas Lee Causby owned a chicken farm
outside Greensboro, North Carolina. The farm was
located near an airport used regularly by the United
States military. According to Causby, noise from the
airport regularly frightened the animals on his farm,
resulting in the deaths of several chickens. The
problem became so severe that Causby was forced
to abandon his business. Under an ancient doctrine
of the common law, land ownership extended to the
space above and below the earth. Using this
doctrine as a basis, Causby sued the United States,
arguing that he owned the airspace above his farm.
By flying planes in this airspace, he argued, the
government had confiscated his property without
compensation, thus violating the Takings Clause of
the Fifth Amendment.
WON the flying of planes by the United
States military over Causby's farm constitute a
violation of the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment.
YES. The Court concluded that the ancient
common law doctrine "has no place in the modern
world." It was noted that, were the Court to accept
the doctrine as valid, "every transcontinental flight
would subject the operator to countless trespass
suits. Common sense revolts at the idea." However,
while the Court rejected the unlimited reach above
and below the earth described in the common law
doctrine, it also ruled that, "if the landowner is to
have full enjoyment of the land, he must have
exclusive control of the immediate reaches of the
enveloping atmosphere." Without defining a specific
limit, the Court stated that flights over the land
could be considered a violation of the Takings
Clause if they led to "a direct and immediate
interference with the enjoyment and use of the
land."
MAIN POINT IN BOLD.
CASE NO. 646
People v. Fajardo, 104 Phil. 443
Fajardo was mayor in Baao, Camrines Sur
when the municipal council passed the ordinance
that prohibits the construction of a building that
blocks the view of the town plaza. Moreover, it
redirects the grant of permission to the mayor. After
his incumbency, Fajardo applied for a building
permit beside the gasoline station near the town
plaza. The request was denied, for the reason
among others that the proposed building would
destroy the view or beauty of the public plaza.
Defendants reiterated their request for a building
permit, but again the mayor turned down the
request. Whereupon, appellants proceeded with the
construction of the building without a permit,
because they needed a place of residence very
badly, their former house having been destroyed by
a typhoon.
WON the ordinance is a valid exercise of
police power.
NO. The ordinance is unreasonable and
oppressive, in that it operates to permanently
deprive appellants of the right to use their own
property; hence, it oversteps the bounds of police
power, and amounts to a taking of appellant’s
property without just compensation. Every
structure that may be erected on appellants' land,
regardless of its own beauty, stands condemned
under the ordinance in question, because it would
interfere with the view of the public plaza from the
highway. The appellants would, in effect, be
constrained to let their land remain idle and unused
for the obvious purpose for which it is best suited,
being urban in character.
CASE NO. 647
Republic v. PLDT, 26 SCRA 620
PLDT entered into an agreement with RCA
Communications Inc., an American corporation,
whereby telephone messages coming from the US
and received by RCA’s domestic station, could
automatically be transferred to the lines of PLDT,
and vice versa. The plaintiff through the Bureau of
Telecommunications, after having set up its own
Government Telephone System, by utilizing its own
appropriation and equipment and by renting trunk
lines of the PLDT, entered into an agreement with
RCA for a joint overseas telephone service. Alleging
that plaintiff is in competition with them, PLDT
notified the former and receiving no reply,
disconnected the trunk lines being rented by the
same. Thus, petitioner commenced a suit against
PLDT praying for the right of the Bureau of
Telecommunications to demand interconnection
between the Government Telephone System and
that of PLDT, so that the Government Telephone
System could make use of the lines and facilities of
the PLDT. Respondent contends that it cannot be
compelled to enter into a contract where no
agreement is had between them.
WON interconnection between PLDT and
the Government Telephone System can be a valid
object for expropriation.
YES. While the Republic may not compel
the PLDT to celebrate a contract with it, the
Republic may, in the exercise of the sovereign
power of eminent domain, require the telephone
company to permit interconnection of the
government telephone system and that of the PLDT,
as the needs of the government service may
require, subject to the payment of just
compensation to be determined by the court. The
use of lines and services to allow inter-service
connection between both telephone systems,
through expropriation, can be a subject to an
easement of right of way.
MAIN POINT: Republic of the Philippines may
require telephone company to permit
interconnection of the government telephone
system and that of the PLDT.
CASE NO. 648
NPC v. Jocson
Petitioner filed 7 eminent domain cases
for the acquisition of a right-of-way easement over
alleging that it urgently needs said lands to enable it
to construct its Negros-Panay Interconnection
Project. Respondent Judge later issued an order
fixing the provisional market values of the subject
areas and for NPC to deposit the amount with PNB,
but the owners of the lands filed an MR for re-
evaluation of the provisional values as it had been
set much too low. Respondent Judge increased the
same and directed NPC to pay, while suspending the
issuance of the writ of possession until said
payment has been received by the land owners.
Hence, the petition. Petitioner NPC claims that
respondent Judge acted in excess of jurisdiction.
WON respondent Judge erred when he
fixed and increased the provisional values on the
basis of the market value and the daily opportunity
profit petitioner may derive, and in suspending the
issuance of the writ of possession until after the
land owners have received the payment.
YES. There are 2 stages in every action of
expropriation:
(1) The determination of the authority of
the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent
domain and the propriety of its exercise in the
context of the facts involved in the suit.
(2) The determination by the Court of the
"just compensation for the property sought to be
taken.
However, upon the filing of the complaint
or at any time thereafter, the petitioner has the
right to take or enter upon the possession of the
property involved upon compliance with P.D. No.
42 which requires the petitioner to deposit with
the PNB "an amount equivalent to the assessed
value of the property for purposes of taxation."
This assessed value is that indicated in the tax
declaration. Further, P.D. No. 42 removes the
discretion of the court in determining the
provisional value. What is to be deposited is an
amount equivalent to the assessed value for
taxation purpose. 
Petitioner deposited the provisional value fixed by
the court. As a matter of right, it was entitled to be
placed in possession of the property involved in the
complaints at once. However, respondent Judge
chose to ignore and overlook it. Moreover, upon
separate motions for reconsideration filed by the
landowners, he issued a new Order increasing the
provisional values of the properties involved therein
and no hearing was held on the motions.

CASE NO. 649
Penn Central Transportation v. NY City
Under the Landmarks Law, a building may
be designated as a landmark and the owner thereof
must secure the Landmarks Preservation
Commission’s approval for any exterior alterations
made thereon. The Grand Central Terminal (owned
by Penn Central) was designated as a “landmark”.
To boost its income, Penn Central entered into a
lease with UGP properties to construct an office
building atop the Terminal, which the Commission
denied. Hence, the petition. Petitioners argue that
the Landmarks Law has deprived them of any
gainful use of their "air rights" above the Terminal
and that the city has "taken" their right to this
superjacent airspace, thus entitling them to "just
compensation".
WON the Landmarks Law had "taken"
petitioner’s property without just compensation.
NO. The application of the Landmarks Law
to the Terminal property does not constitute a
"taking" of appellants' property. The Court
concluded that there was no "taking," since the
Landmarks Law had not transferred control of the
property to the city, but only restricted appellants'
exploitation of it. In deciding whether particular
governmental action has effected a "taking," the
character of the action and nature and extent of
the interference with property rights are focused
upon, rather than discrete segments thereof.
Consequently, appellants cannot establish a
"taking" simply by showing that they have been
denied the ability to exploit the superjacent
airspace, irrespective of the remainder of
appellants' parcel.
CASE NO. 650
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto
The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and
Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) authorizes the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to use data
submitted by an applicant for registration of a
covered product, in evaluating the application of a
subsequent applicant and to publicly disclose data.
However, pursuant to the 1978 amendments
(effective October 1, 1978), applicants now are
granted a 10-year period of exclusive use for data.
Section 10, as amended in 1978, authorizes public
disclosure of all health, safety, and environmental
data even though it may result in disclosure of trade
secrets. Monsanto is an inventor of pesticides,
seeking to protect his health, safety, and
environmental data which are valuable to his
competitors. He alleges that the data-consideration
and data-disclosure provisions of FIFRA effected a
"taking" of property without just compensation.
WON the data-consideration and data-
disclosure provisions of FIFRA effected a "taking" of
property without just compensation
NO. With respect to any data submitted
to EPA on or after October 1, 1978 (effective date of
the 1978 FIFRA amendments), Monsanto knew that,
for a period of 10 years from the date of
submission, EPA would not consider those data in
evaluating the application of another without
Monsanto's permission, but after 10 years, it may
do so. Thus, as long as Monsanto is aware of the
conditions under which the data are submitted,
and the conditions are rationally related to a
legitimate Government interest, a voluntary
submission of data in exchange for the economic
advantages of a registration can hardly be called a
taking.