VALMONTE vs BELMONTE
FACTS : Petitioners in this special civil action for mandamus with
preliminary injunction invoke their right to information and pray that
respondent be directed: (a) to furnish petitioners the list of the names
of the Batasang Pambansa members belonging to the UNIDO and
PDP-Laban who were able to secure clean loans immediately before
the February 7 election thru the intercession/marginal note of the then
First Lady Imelda Marcos; and/or (b) to furnish petitioners with certified
true copies of the documents evidencing their respective loans; and/or
(c) to allow petitioners access to the public records for the subject
information On June 20, 1986, apparently not having yet received the
reply of the Government Service and Insurance System (GSIS) Deputy
General Counsel, petitioner Valmonte wrote respondent another letter,
saying that for failure to receive a reply, "(W)e are now considering
ourselves free to do whatever action necessary within the premises to
pursue our desired objective in pursuance of public interest."
 ISSUE : Whether or not petitioners are entitled as citizens and
taxpayers to inquire upon GSIS records on behest loans given by the
former First Lady Imelda Marcos to Batasang Pambansa members
belonging to the UNIDO and PDP-Laban political parties.
Ruling : Respondent has failed to cite any law granting the GSIS the
privilege of confidentiality as regards the documents subject of this
petition. His position is apparently based merely on considerations of
policy. The judiciary does not settle policy issues. The Court can only
declare what the law is, and not what the law should be. Under our
system of government, policy issues are within the domain of the
political branches of the government, and of the people themselves as
the repository of all State power. The concerned borrowers themselves
may not succeed if they choose to invoke their right to privacy,
considering the public offices they were holding at the time the loans
were alleged to have been granted. It cannot be denied that because
of the interest they generate and their newsworthiness, public figures,
most especially those holding responsible positions in government,
enjoy a more limited right to privacy as compared to ordinary
individuals, their actions being subject to closer public scrutiny The
"transactions" used here I suppose is generic and, therefore, it can
cover both steps leading to a contract, and already a consummated
contract, Considering the intent of the framers of the Constitution
which, though not binding upon the Court, are nevertheless
persuasive, and considering further that government-owned and
controlled corporations, whether performing proprietary or
governmental functions are accountable to the people, the Court is
convinced that transactions entered into by the GSIS, a government-
controlled corporation created by special legislation are within the
ambit of the people's right to be informed pursuant to the constitutional
policy of transparency in government dealings. Although citizens are
afforded the right to information and, pursuant thereto, are entitled to
"access to official records," the Constitution does not accord them a
right to compel custodians of official records to prepare lists, abstracts,
summaries and the like in their desire to acquire information on matters
of public concern.
AQUINO-SARMIENTO v. MORATO
FACTS : In February 1989, petitioner, herself a member of respondent
Movie and Television Review and Classification Board (MTRCB),
wrote its records officer requesting that she be allowed to examine the
board's records pertaining to the voting slips accomplished by the
individual board members after a review of the movies and television
productions. It is on the basis of said slips that films are either banned,
cut or classified accordingly. Petitioner's request was eventually denied
by respondent Morato on the ground that whenever the members of
the board sit in judgment over a film, their decisions as reflected in the
individual voting slips partake the nature of conscience votes and as
such, are purely and completely private and personal On February 27,
1989, respondent Morato called an executive meeting of the MTRCB
to discuss, among others, the issue raised by petitioner. In said
meeting, seventeen (17) members of the board voted to declare their
individual voting records as classified documents which rendered the
same inaccessible to the public without clearance from the chairman.
Thereafter, respondent Morato denied petitioner's request to examine
the voting slips. However, it was only much later, i.e., on July 27, 1989,
that respondent Board issued Resolution No. 10-89 which declared as
confidential, private and personal, the decision of the reviewing
committee and the voting slips of the members.
ISSUE : Whether or notResolution No. 10-89 is valid
 RULING : The term private has been defined as "belonging to or
concerning, an individual person, company, or interest"; whereas,
public means "pertaining to, or belonging to, or affecting a nation,
state, or community at large. As may be gleaned from the decree (PD
1986) creating the respondent classification board, there is no doubt
that its very existence is public is character. it is an office created to
serve public interest. It being the case, respondents can lay no valid
claim to privacy. The right to privacy belongs to the individual acting in
his private capacity and not to a governmental agency or officers
tasked with, and acting in, the discharge of public duties. the decisions
of the Board and the individual voting slips accomplished by the
members concerned are acts made pursuant to their official functions,
and as such, are neither personal nor private in nature but rather public
in character. They are, therefore, public records access to which is
guaranteed to the citizenry by no less than the fundamental law of the
land.
Chavez vs PCGG
Facts:  Petitioner, invoking his constitutional right to information and
the correlative duty of the state to disclose publicly all its transactions
involving the national interest, demands that respondents make public
any and all negotiations and agreements pertaining to PCGG’s task of
recovering the Marcoses’ ill-gotten wealth.  He claims that any
compromise on the alleged billions of ill-gotten wealth involves an
issue of “paramount public interest,” since it has a “debilitating effect
on the country’s economy” that would be greatly prejudicial to the
national interest of the Filipino people.  Hence, the people in general
have a right to know the transactions or deals being contrived and
effected by the government.
Respondents, on the other hand, do not deny forging a compromise
agreement with the Marcos heirs.  They claim, though, that petitioner’s
action is premature, because there is no showing that he has asked
the PCGG to disclose the negotiations and the Agreements.  And even
if he has, PCGG may not yet be compelled to make any disclosure,
since the proposed terms and conditions of the Agreements have not
become effective and binding.
Issues: Whether the constitutional right to information may prosper
against respondents’ argument that the “should be disclosed”
proposed terms and conditions of the Agreements are not yet effective
and binding
Ruling: Yes. Considering the intent of the framers of the
Constitution, we believe that it is incumbent upon the PCGG and
its officers, as well as other government representatives, to
disclose sufficient public information on any proposed settlement
they have decided to take up with the ostensible owners and
holders of ill-gotten wealth, subject to some of the following
recognized restrictions:  (1) national security matters and intelligence
information, (2) trade secrets and banking transactions, (3) criminal
matters, and (4) other confidential information.
UPSU v. Laguesma
FACTS:
               
                The petitioner is a union of supervisory employees. It
appears that on March 20, 1995 the union filed a petition for
certification on behalf of the route managers at Pepsi-Cola Products
Philippines, Inc. However, its petition was denied by the med-arbiter
and, on appeal, by the Secretary of Labor and Employment, on the
ground that the route managers are managerial employees and,
therefore, ineligible for union membership under the first sentence of
Art 245 of the Labor Code, which provides:
Ineligibility of managerial employees to join any labor organization;
right of supervisory employees-Managerial employees are not eligible
to join, assist or form any labor organization. Supervisory employees
shall not be eligible for membership in a labor organization of the rank-
and-file employees but may join, assist or form separate labor
organizations of their own.
                Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, pressing for
resolution its contention that the first sentence of Art. 245 of the Labor
Code, so far declares managerial employees to be ineligible to form,
assit or join unions, contravenes Article III, Section 8 of the 1987
Constitution which provides:
The right of the people, including those employed in the public and
private sectors to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes
not contrary to law shall not be abridged.
ISSUE:
               
                Whether or not Art. 245, insofar as it prohibits managerial
employees from forming, joining or assisting labor unions, violates
Article III, Section 8 of the Constitution.
RULING:
                Art. 245 do not violate Article III, Section 8 of the
Constitution. The real intent of Article III, section 8 is evident in Lerum’s
proposal. The Commission intended the absolute right to organize of
government workers, supervisory employees and security guards to be
constitutionally guaranteed. By implication, no similar absolute
constitutional rights to organize for labor purposes should be deemed
to have been granted to top-level and middle managers. Nor is the
guarantee of organizational right in Art. III, Section 8 of the Constitution
infringed by a ban against managerial employees forming a union. The
guaranteed right in Art. III, Section 8 is subject to the condition that its
exercise should be for the purposes “not contrary to law.”  In the case
of Art 245, there is rational basis for prohibiting managerial employees
from forming or joining labor organization.  For the reason that these
managerial employees would belong to or be affiliated with a Union,
the latter might not be assured of their loyalty to the Union in view of
evident conflict of interest. The union also becomes company-
dominated with the presence of managerial employees in Union
membership.
SSS Employees v. CA
Facts:
On June 11, 1987, the SSS filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City a complaint for damages with a prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction against petitioners, alleging that on June 9, 1987,
the officers and members of SSSEA staged an illegal strike and
baricaded the entrances to the SSS Building, preventing non-striking
employees from reporting for work and SSS members from transacting
business with the SSS; that the strike was reported to the Public
Sector Labor - Management Council, which ordered the strikers to
return to work; that the strikers refused to return to work; and that the
SSS suffered damages as a result of the strike. The complaint prayed
that a writ of preliminary injunction be issued to enjoin the strike and
that the strikers be ordered to return to work; that the defendants
(petitioners herein) be ordered to pay damages; and that the strike be
declared illegal.
It appears that the SSSEA went on strike after the SSS failed to act on
the union's demands, which included: implementation of the provisions
of the old SSS-SSSEA collective bargaining agreement (CBA) on
check-off of union dues; payment of accrued overtime pay, night
differential pay and holiday pay; conversion of temporary or contractual
employees with six (6) months or more of service into regular and
permanent employees and their entitlement to the same salaries,
allowances and benefits given to other regular employees of the SSS;
and payment of the children's allowance of P30.00, and after the SSS
deducted certain amounts from the salaries of the employees and
allegedly committed acts of discrimination and unfair labor practices.
Issue:
Whether or not employees of the Social Security System (SSS) have
the right to strike.
Held:
The 1987 Constitution, in the Article on Social Justice and Human
Rights, provides that the State "shall guarantee the rights of all workers
to self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and
peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance
with law" [Art. XIII, Sec. 31].
Resort to the intent of the framers of the organic law becomes helpful
in understanding the meaning of these provisions. A reading of the
proceedings of the Constitutional Commission that drafted the 1987
Constitution would show that in recognizing the right of government
employees to organize, the commissioners intended to limit the right to
the formation of unions or associations only, without including the right
to strike.
Considering that under the 1987 Constitution "the civil service
embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of
the Government, including government-owned or controlled
corporations with original charters" [Art. IX(B), Sec. .2(l) see also Sec.
1 of E.O. No. 180 where the employees in the civil service are
denominated as "government employees"] and that the SSS is one
such government-controlled corporation with an original charter, having
been created under R.A. No. 1161, its employees are part of the civil
service [NASECO v. NLRC, G.R. Nos. 69870 & 70295, November
24,1988] and are covered by the Civil Service Commission's
memorandum prohibiting strikes. This being the case, the strike staged
by the employees of the SSS was illegal.
Manila Public Schools Teachers Association vs. Laguio Jr
Facts: There were mass actions by 800 Public School Teachers which
was caused by the alleged failure of authorities to act upon the
teacher’s grievances such as the immediate payment of due chalk ,
clothing allowances, 13th month pay arising from the salary
standardization law, and a few others more. Even on September 17,
1990, the mass actions continued which was a Monday and a school
day. Some of the teachers who participated in the mass actions did not
hold classes that day. The secretary of education filed cases against
those teachers who participated in the mass actions on the grounds of
grave misconduct, gross neglect of duty, gross violation of Civil Service
Law, absence without official leave and the likes and placed them on a
90-day preventive suspension period.
Issue: Whether or not employees in public service prohibited in
conducting strikes.
Ruling: Yes, The SC held that the mass actions held by the teachers
shall be considered strikes because their main purpose was the
stoppage of or absence from work. Employees in public service do not
have the right to strike because this constitutes a disturbance in public
service. In addition, employment in the government is governed by law
and the terms and conditions of employment are affected through
statutes and administrative rules and regulations, not by collective
bargaining agreements. In this case the teachers absented from their
work in order to participate in the mass action that was happening on a
Monday.
ESTATE OF JBL REYES v. CITY OF MANILA
FACTS
The case is a petition for review and certiorari filed by the
heirs of J.B.L. Reyes against respondent Court of Appeals and City of
Manila et.al. The case esteemed from the decision of the C.A. for the
issuance of protective custody in favor of respondent on the contested
11 parcels of land owned by the petitioner situated at Sta. Cruz District,
Manila with a total land area of 13, 940 square meters and covered by
TCT no. 24359 issued by the Register of Deeds, Manila.
The land in question was initially occupied and leased by
different tenants, among them are respondents Abiog, Maglonso and
members of Sampaguita Bisig ng Magkakabitbahay, Incorporated
(SBMI). On May 9, 1994, petitioners obtained a favorable judgments
against Abiog pursuant to the decision rendered by the MTC Manila,
Branch 3 in Civil Case No 142851-CV and against Maglonso in Civil
Case No. 144205-CV on May 4, 1995. While the case is under
adjudication, the respondents City of Manila intervenes and file a
complaint for imminent domain (expropriation) on April 25, 1995 based
on its approved Ordinance No 7818 enacted on November 29, 1993
authorizing the City Mayor of Manila to expropriate certain parcels of
land with an aggregate area of 9,930 square meters, more or less. It
argued that the purpose of expropriation is for a socialize housing
project of the city which would otherwise benefit its underprivileged and
homeless citizens. However, petitioner turned down the offer on
various reasons among them, the failure of both to arrive at an
amicable offer for the settlement of the case.
ISSUE
Whether or not the respondent City of Manila complied with
the legal requirements for expropriation provided under Section 9 and
10 of R.A. 7279.
RULING
RA 7279 Sections 9 states the order of priority in the
acquisition of property subject of any expropriation intended for public
purpose. Section 10 thereof, made a significant pronouncement that
“the expropriation may be resorted to only when other modes of
acquisition have been exhausted: xxx underscoring supplied”. Before
respondent City can exercise its power of eminent domain, the same
must be sanctioned and must not violate any law. Reiterating the
provision of R.A. 7279, it would bear stressing that private lands rank
last in the order of priority for purposes of socialized housing. In the
same vein, expropriation proceedings are to be resorted to only after
the other modes of acquisition have been exhausted.
Compliance with these conditions is mandatory because
these are the only safeguards of oftentimes helpless owners of private
property against violation of due process when their property is forcibly
taken from them for public use. The state in its paramount interest of
promoting public good and general welfare cannot simply ignore the
rights of its citizens and such must take precedence over the interest of
private property owners. Individual rights affected by the exercise of
such right are also entitled to protection, bearing in mind that the
exercise of this superior right cannot override the guarantee of due
process extended by the law to owners of the property to be
expropriated. Due to the fatal infirmity in the City’s exercise of the
power of eminent domain, its complaint for expropriation was turned
down by the court. Petitions granted and decision of C.A. was reversed
and set aside.
ESTATE OF JBL REYES v. CITY OF MANILA
FACTS
The case is a petition for review and certiorari filed by the
heirs of J.B.L. Reyes against respondent Court of Appeals and City of
Manila et.al. The case esteemed from the decision of the C.A. for the
issuance of protective custody in favor of respondent on the contested
11 parcels of land owned by the petitioner situated at Sta. Cruz District,
Manila with a total land area of 13, 940 square meters and covered by
TCT no. 24359 issued by the Register of Deeds, Manila.
The land in question was initially occupied and leased by
different tenants, among them are respondents Abiog, Maglonso and
members of Sampaguita Bisig ng Magkakabitbahay, Incorporated
(SBMI). On May 9, 1994, petitioners obtained a favorable judgments
against Abiog pursuant to the decision rendered by the MTC Manila,
Branch 3 in Civil Case No 142851-CV and against Maglonso in Civil
Case No. 144205-CV on May 4, 1995. While the case is under
adjudication, the respondents City of Manila intervenes and file a
complaint for imminent domain (expropriation) on April 25, 1995 based
on its approved Ordinance No 7818 enacted on November 29, 1993
authorizing the City Mayor of Manila to expropriate certain parcels of
land with an aggregate area of 9,930 square meters, more or less. It
argued that the purpose of expropriation is for a socialize housing
project of the city which would otherwise benefit its underprivileged and
homeless citizens. However, petitioner turned down the offer on
various reasons among them, the failure of both to arrive at an
amicable offer for the settlement of the case.
ISSUE
Whether or not the respondent City of Manila complied with
the legal requirements for expropriation provided under Section 9 and
10 of R.A. 7279.
RULING
RA 7279 Sections 9 states the order of priority in the
acquisition of property subject of any expropriation intended for public
purpose. Section 10 thereof, made a significant pronouncement that
“the expropriation may be resorted to only when other modes of
acquisition have been exhausted: xxx underscoring supplied”. Before
respondent City can exercise its power of eminent domain, the same
must be sanctioned and must not violate any law. Reiterating the
provision of R.A. 7279, it would bear stressing that private lands rank
last in the order of priority for purposes of socialized housing. In the
same vein, expropriation proceedings are to be resorted to only after
the other modes of acquisition have been exhausted.
Compliance with these conditions is mandatory because
these are the only safeguards of oftentimes helpless owners of private
property against violation of due process when their property is forcibly
taken from them for public use. The state in its paramount interest of
promoting public good and general welfare cannot simply ignore the
rights of its citizens and such must take precedence over the interest of
private property owners. Individual rights affected by the exercise of
such right are also entitled to protection, bearing in mind that the
exercise of this superior right cannot override the guarantee of due
process extended by the law to owners of the property to be
expropriated. Due to the fatal infirmity in the City’s exercise of the
power of eminent domain, its complaint for expropriation was turned
down by the court. Petitions granted and decision of C.A. was reversed
and set aside.
CITY GOVERNMENT OF QUEZON CITY v. ERICTA
Facts: Section 9 of Ordinance 6118, S-64, entitled "Ordinance
Regulating the Establishment, Maintenance and Operation of Private
Memorial Type Cemetery Or Burial Ground Within the Jurisdiction of
Quezon City and Providing Penalties for the Violation thereof" provides
that at least 6% of the total area of the memorial park cemetery shall
be set aside for charity burial of deceased persons who are paupers
and have been residents of Quezon City for at least 5 years prior to
their death, to be determined by competent City Authorities, and where
the area so designated shall immediately be developed and should be
open for operation not later than 6 months from the date of approval of
the application. For several years, section 9 of the Ordinance was not
enforced by city authorities but 7 years after the enactment of the
ordinance, the Quezon City Council passed a resolution requesting the
City Engineer, Quezon City, to stop any further selling and/or
transaction of memorial park lots in Quezon City where the owners
thereof have failed to donate the required 6% space intended for
paupers burial. Pursuant to this petition, the Quezon City Engineer
notified Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. in writing that Section 9 of Ordinance
No. 6118, S-64 would be enforced. Himlayang Pilipino reacted by filing
with the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal (Branch XVIII at Quezon
City), a petition for declaratory relief, prohibition and mandamus with
preliminary injunction (Special Proceeding Q-16002) seeking to annul
Section 9 of the Ordinance in question for being contrary to the
Constitution, the Quezon City Charter, the Local Autonomy Act, and
the Revised Administrative Code. There being no issue of fact and the
questions raised being purely legal, both the City Government and
Himlayang Pilipino agreed to the rendition of a judgment on the
pleadings. The CFI rendered the decision declaring Section 9 of
Ordinance 6118, S-64 null and void. A motion for reconsideration
having been denied, the City Government and City Council filed the
petition or review with the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether or not the setting aside of 6% of the total area of all
private cemeteries for charity burial grounds of deceased paupers is
tantamount to taking of private property without just compensation.
Held: There is no reasonable relation between the setting aside of at
least 6% of the total area of all private cemeteries for charity burial
grounds of deceased paupers and the promotion of health, morals,
good order, safety, or the general welfare of the people. The ordinance
is actually a taking without compensation of a certain area from a
private cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of the municipal
corporation. Instead of building or maintaining a public cemetery for
this purpose, the city passes the burden to private cemeteries. The
expropriation without compensation of a portion of private cemeteries
is not covered by Section 12(t) of Republic Act 537, the Revised
Charter of Quezon City which empowers the city council to prohibit the
burial of the dead within the center of population of the city and to
provide for their burial in a proper place subject to the provisions of
general law regulating burial grounds and cemeteries. When the Local
Government Code, Batas Pambansa 337 provides in Section 177 (q)
that a Sangguniang panlungsod may "provide for the burial of the dead
in such place and in such manner as prescribed by law or ordinance" it
simply authorises the city to provide its own city owned land or to buy
or expropriate private properties to construct public cemeteries. This
has been the law and practice in the past and it continues to the
present. Expropriation, however, requires payment of just
compensation. The questioned ordinance is different from laws and
regulations requiring owners of subdivisions to set aside certain areas
for streets, parks, playgrounds, and other public facilities from the land
they sell to buyers of subdivision lots. The necessities of public safety,
health, and convenience are very clear from said requirements which
are intended to insure the development of communities with salubrious
and wholesome environments. The beneficiaries of the regulation, in
turn, are made to pay by the subdivision developer when individual lots
are sold to homeowners.
National Power Corporation vs Judge Jocson
Facts:
The petitioner filed 7 eminent domain cases in the acquisition of
right of way/easement over 7 parcels of land in relation to the
necessity of building towers and transmission line for the common
good. Initially, the values of lands concerned were based on tax
declarations which the petitioner paid. Land owners concerned
asserted that the amounts were low and that their lands value is
more than what is being offered. The following day respondent
Judge Jocson increased provisional values of sugar land without
hearing and directed petitioner to deposit the differential amounts
to which the petitioner also complied with. Jocson then ordered
NPC to pay in full the amounts to the landowners 5 days after the
2nd order was complied with. He also refused to issue a writ of
possession until full payment. Petitioners allege that respondent
Judge acted in excess of jurisdiction, in violation of laws and
indereliction of the duty to afford respondents due process when
he issued said orders.
They assert that orders were not valid and the payment required
for the lands specified therein were excessive and
unconscionable amounts. Additionally they state that his refusal to
issue a writ of possession until full payment, even when they had
already deposited the provisional values, was a violation of
the Rules of Court and of PD 42.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent judge Jocson committed grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when he issued the
said orders.
Ruling:
The court ruled that PD No. 42 provides that upon filing in court
complaints on eminent domain proceeding and after due notice to
the defendants, plaintiff will have the right to take possession of
the real property upon deposit of the amount of the assessed
value of the land. The respondent judge failed to observe this
procedure by his failure to issue the writ of possession to the
petitioner. Furthermore, the respondent judge erred in increasing
the provisional value of properties without holding any hearing for
both parties. The instant petition was granted by the court setting
aside the temporary restraining order and directing respondent
judge to cease and desist from enforcing his orders.
There are 2 stages in the action of expropriation:
1. Determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the
power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the
context of the facts involved in the suit; and
2. Eminent domain action is concerned with the determination by
the Court of the "just compensation for the property sought to be
taken." This is done by the Court with the assistance of not more
than three (3) commissioners whose findings are deemed to be
final.
US v. CAUSBY
Facts. Respondents own 2.8 acres near an airport outside of
Greensboro, North Carolina. Respondents’ property contained a house
and a chicken farm. The end of one of the runways of the airport was
2,220 feet from Respondents’ property, and the glide path passed over
the property at 83 feet, which is 67 feet above the house, 63 feet
above the barn, and 18 feet above the highest tree. The use by the
United States of this airport is pursuant to a lease beginning June 1,
1942, and ending June 30, 1942, with provisions for renewal until June
30, 1967, or six months after the end of the national emergency,
whichever is earlier. The United States’ four motored bombers make
loud noises when flying above the property, and have very bright lights.
Respondents’ chicken farm production had to stop, because 150
chickens were killed by flying into walls from fright. In the Court of
Claims, it was found that the United States had taken an easement
over the property on June 1, 1942, and that the val
ue of the property depreciation as the result of the easement was
$2,000.00. The United States petitioned for certiorari, which was
granted.
Issue. Has the Respondents’ property been taken within the meaning
of the Fifth Amendment?
Ruling: 
Yes. But the case is remanded for a determination of the value of the
easement and whether the easement was permanent or temporary.
The court noted the common law doctrine of ownership of land
extending to the sky above the land. However, the court notes that an
act of Congress had given the United States exclusive national
sovereignty over the air space. The court noted that common sense
made the common law doctrine inapplicable. However, the court found
that the common law doctrine did not control the present case.
The airspace is a public highway. But it is obvious that if the landowner
is to have the full enjoyment of his land, he must have exclusive control
of the immediate reaches of the enveloping atmosphere. If this were
not true then landowners could not build buildings, plant trees or run
fences. The airspace, apart from the immediate reaches above the
land, is part of the public domain. The court does not set the precise
limits of the line of demarcation. Flights over private land are not a
taking, unless, like here, they are so low and frequent as to be a direct
and immediate interference with the enjoyment of the land.