The Democratic Deficit in the Liberal Party of Canada:

A Prescription for Reform

SHEILA GERVAIS

With a forward by Thomas Axworthy

Centre for the Study of Democracy

Queen’s University
 FORWARD
By Thomas Axworthy

Life in Our Parties

To paraphrase George Washington Plunkitt, the Liberal Party of Canada “ain’t dead,
though it’s been givin’ a life-like imitation of a corpse for several years.” Plunkitt, a
leader of the Tammany Hall Democrats, was a believer in strong parties, though not
strong party democracy. Ms. Sheila Gervais is a believer in both.

Ms. Gervais’ study on “The Democratic Deficit in the Liberal Party of Canada: A
Prescription for Reform,” is a first-hand account of the modern vicissitudes of being a
candidate for a party nomination: this experience is refracted through Ms. Gervais’ long
involvement in party activism, most notably as a former National Director of the Liberal
Party of Canada. Ms. Gervais did not succeed in being nominated as the Liberal Party
candidate in the riding of Ottawa South in 2004, but her story on why this occurred goes
beyond the personal and raises fundamental questions about how the Liberal Party
governs itself, especially on the vital questions of candidate and leader selection. It is not
a pretty picture.

The mission of the Centre for the Study of Democracy at Queen’s University is to study
the basic institutions of government and political systems to see how the mechanics of
democracy are working and how they can be improved. The mandate of the Centre is
both domestic and international – the state of democracy within Canada and how
democratic practice can be promoted abroad. The issue of democratic practice within our
parties is of central concern because parties are still the essential organizers of
democracy. Their job is to take theory and turn it into reality. But they are private
organizations accountable only to themselves. It is a valid question to ask how the public
interest is being promoted by these private interests.

The great American political scientist, E.E. Schattschneider, has written that “political
parties created democracy and that modern democracy is unthinkable save in terms of the
parties.” George Perlin, a distinguished Canadian political scientist, makes the same
point as Schattschneider that, “parties are at the very core of the democratic process in
Canada.” Yet, we take parties for granted.

It was not always so. As Britain evolved in the 18th century from a Monarch-led
executive to parliamentary government, Edmund Burke, right from the start, championed
the role of party. Burke defined a party as “a body of men united for promotion of their
joint endeavors and national interest, upon some particular principle in which they are all
agreed.” Burke’s was a normative definition; parties were to have principles and their
task was to educate, defend, and persuade citizens that their principles were worthy of
support. In Burke’s original definition, parties were not about place, they were about
ideas.

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Ms. Gervais relates her personal experience in the organizational history of the Liberal
Party. I have had a similar engagement in the policy work of the Liberal Party. I was
lucky enough to begin my partisan involvement in the golden age of Liberal Party policy,
from 1960 to 1968. Under Mr. Pearson, Liberals like Mitchell Sharp, Walter Gordon,
and Tom Kent organized the 1960 Kingston Thinkers’ Conference and the 1961 National
Policy Rally. New principles were enunciated. The party platform outlined policy
directions in detail, and after winning the 1963 elections, the Pearson Liberals actually
implemented the party platform. As a young liberal I became close to Walter Gordon and
was an active participant in the famous 1966 rally conference which was a show-down
between Mr. Gordon’s ideas on social policy and foreign ownership, and Mr. Sharp’s
countering position. The key point is that the show-down occurred in a Liberal Party
rally event, in open debate in the ballroom of the Chateau Laurier, not behind closed
doors with a Deputy-Minster, or decided unilaterally by Mr. Pearson’s Prime Minister’s
Office. The Pearson Liberals had used the party as a vehicle to debate and decide upon a
new policy direction for government and they returned to the party as a forum to debate
major policy decisions in 1966. The Conservative Party in 1966 similarly used a party
convention to decide the fate of Mr. Diefenbaker and a few years later, the New
Democratic Party had a great internal debate over the challenge of the new left-Waffle
group. In Canada in the 1960’s, if you were interested in policy, the place to be was on
the floor of a party convention. This critical role of policy formation, debate,
communication, and resolution by the volunteer base of our parties has now been totally
usurped by paid consultants in polling and marketing, advising the inner circle of the
leader’s office. We have replaced party democracy with party oligarchy.

Burke had a positive vision of party as a body made up of people active not just for
personal power, but also because of their belief in their ideas. Unlike Monarchs, party
politicians ruled not by divine right, but only as “temporary possessors” of power,
appointed to serve the nation. Burke also had a fear about party that Ms. Gervais’ study
highlights. Burke’s fear was that opportunists and mercenaries might take over parties
for personal advantage. “The whole chain and continuity of the Common Wealth would
be broken. No one generation would be able to link with the other. Men would behave
little better than flies of a summer.” Ms. Gervais’ study describes how the flies of
summer have come to infect the very structure of the Liberal Party.

Her policy prescription is very sensible. The party volunteers who decide on nominations
and party leadership content should actually be members of the party who join of their
own volition, and have been a member of good standing for at least one year. John
Manley, a former Deputy Prime Minister and candidate for the Liberal Party leadership,
has made a further suggestion that party nomination contests are in such shambles and
subject to such abuse, and Elections Canada should be mandated to supervise the process.
I have a further suggestion on the policy development function of parties. Thanks to Jean
Chrétien’s Bill C-24, parties now receive the vast proportion of their finances from
taxpayers. Voters have the right to ask how their money is being used. German parties,
for example, also receive a public subsidy, but a portion of this is mandated to
independent think tanks and education foundations. German parties are more than

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election machines. As part of the subsidy authorized by C-24, at least 10 percent of the
total should be allocated to public education through the institution and party research
foundations, independent of the National Executive and the Leader’s Office. Our parties
should develop cadres of policy trained individuals, who have thought through how to
apply Liberal, Conservative, and Socialist principles to the nitty-gritty of real life.
Canadian democracy needs parties that think.

Ms. Gervais’ study focuses on party as an organization. My focus is on party as

educator. The Liberal Party, and probably the other parties as well, are failing to provide
Burke’s normative purpose. They are prey to Burke’s fears about manipulators and
personal place-seekers. It is time to restore our parties as the critical mechanisms in our
political system. The future of Canadian democracy will depend on how party
establishments respond to reformers like Ms. Gervais.

Thomas S. Axworthy is Chairman of the Centre for the Study of Democracy, Queen’s
University

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 The Democratic Deficit in the Liberal Party of Canada:
A Prescription for Reform
By Sheila Gervais

I should have had my head examined. In the winter of 2003-04, I was, for a brief period,
a candidate for a Liberal Party nomination. It was one of the most demeaning processes I
have ever encountered. And, I, of all people should have known better. As a party
volunteer for over 25 years, as a former Parliamentary aide in the 1980’s, and as a former
National Director of the Liberal Party of Canada and member of three national campaign
committees, I knew about all of the flaws in the process and why they were there. I knew
the vested interest that kept them there: no matter how objectionable and against your
values a process is, it retains its value because it can be manipulated when political
expediency is required. I knew of all the well-intentioned attempts to fix the problems
and the paths leading to their derailment. I knew that the problems were there, but I went
in anyway because I thought most of the need for political expediency had disappeared
with the election of a new leader and that the expression of Liberal values might once
again mean something in the Party.

The experience confirmed, for me, what the Party needs to do. It needs to return to its
roots as a truly representative, reflective, community-based organization of members
committed to the ideals, not the process of the organization. Political parties are, after all,
at the core of our democratic system, and if they are weak, our democracy too is
weakened. The first step, while not a panacea, would be to entrench the principle that
membership in the Liberal Party has value, and as such, the privilege to exercise its full
rights should be earned through commitment to the Party.

A flawed process: It’s not about representation anymore

All of the negative publicity surrounding the nomination experience also instilled in me a
wee bit of hope, particularly when combined with a Party left jittery after a devastating
minority-government election result. Perhaps the necessity to fix the nomination process
before another election would finally be seen as a requirement to once again be a winning
party.

The contest I partook in was a high profile one and attracted much local and national
media interest. The riding had a long Liberal tradition, and history of providing high
profile members of Cabinet including one who had gone on to be the country’s Prime
Minister. It was the riding held by a high profile MP, Cabinet member and leadership
contender. Its provincial counterpart was the home to the Premier. There were five
candidates, including the brother of the Premier, three candidates from minority
communities, two women, and two who either currently held or had previously held local
elected office. Two of the candidates had lived in the riding all of their lives, and a third,
for virtually all of their life in Canada. It was a highly representative and qualified group
of contenders.

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No surprise, then, for the media interest. Yet virtually every story published or aired
about the nomination contest was about one thing: process. And while at the time, I was
one of those who bemoaned that fact, the reality is that this was exactly correct. The real
story was about process, not substance.

Stories were written about manipulation of the rules by the “central party office” and
about problems with cut-off dates for the submission of new membership applications.
and on the preferential notification to some candidates. Additionally, the media reported
on possible breaches in spending limits and about the purported third-party purchase of
memberships – a long standing practice not only in contravention of the Party’s
constitution and rules, but for the first time, actually in contravention of the recently
amended Canada Elections Act.

For me, this was one of the heartbreaking aspects of the nomination race. Early on, we
had been successful in recruiting several members of minority communities to help us
make inroads there and attract new supporters. One day I received a call from a woman
from the Somali community who was working the already substantial existing
membership list to encourage renewals of members who would agree to support me. I
had encouraged her involvement in the nomination process as an introduction to the
political and democratic processes of her chosen country, given that she came from a part
of the world with few democratic traditions of its own. “I am making very good
progress,” she said. “Many people want to support you and come to the meeting. But
many of them are telling me that they can’t afford the $10 fee, and that they didn’t pay it
before.” I stopped dead in my tracks. How could I make the first act of political
involvement for this woman an illegal one? It was not the only call I received of this
nature.

After a gut-wrenching and emotional time, at our next campaign meeting, I tearfully
explained to the team that I was not prepared under any circumstances to participate in
the purchase of one membership. Heads nodded in agreement, everyone agreed that it
was the right thing to do, some even saying they would quit the campaign if I had made
any other decision. But we all knew the truth. It was game over. While we had made
significant inroads with long-standing members of the local association, and while I had
cajoled friends and neighbours, many of them long-standing and card carrying members
of other parties to “sign-up”, it would be impossible to muster the numbers otherwise.
We would have to concede. After a well intentioned attempt to stay in for the Gipper,
and some wishful thinking, I withdrew my candidacy, heartbroken.

The experience should be a rewarding and stimulating one, regardless of outcome. To

participate in a vigorous debate and contrasting of ideas should be enjoyable and
educational for potential candidates and for party members alike. But it wasn’t about any
of that, it was about mass recruitment, pure and simple.

And to what end? The explanatory concept espoused by Party apparatchik that mass
recruitment is necessary to provide an influx of new blood, money and new ideas, is a
fallacy. The fact is that most members recruited en mass retain little affiliation on an on-

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going basis with the Party and are not interested in policy development or in the Party’s
overall health.

Of the 4200 members recruited during the nomination process in my riding, less than two
dozen, that’s less than 0.5% attended the recent meeting to elect delegates to the
upcoming Biennial Convention of the national party. Some in attendance didn’t know
that the Convention will be a policy convention. The Riding President informed us that
the riding had not held policy discussions or put forward resolutions for debate because a
policy committee had not yet been struck.

Writing on the topical question: “how do you make members of parliament more
responsive to voters concerns?” in 2000, Dr. Bill Cross argues that even though the
electorate seems to favour a weakening of party discipline in Parliament and thus more
policy development power to individual MPs, this action will do and does little to
enhance democracy given the lack of input those MP’s actually receive from their
constituents. During an election, candidates put forward policy positions that derive
solely from centrally-devised, top-down delivered standardized policy platforms. And,
because party members choose the local candidate, the electorate has to “trust” that the
local members to whom they have delegated that choice have brokered policy differences
amongst potential candidates on their behalf. Cross concludes that, “there is no evidence
that voters are endorsing either the general ideology or specific policy positions of a
candidate in electing her to the House of Commons.”i

So, is there any evidence that if nominated candidates are not engaging their electorate in
a policy discussion, that the party members performing the delegated task of choosing
amongst several potential candidates are doing so on their behalf?

In my case, I can vouch for the fact that not one policy debate was held during the three-
month long contest. The nomination consisted of five candidates, 4200 members, and not
one opportunity for interested members to make a head-to-head comparison on substance
between the potential candidates.

Apparently this is not an unusual occurrence, but the norm amongst the mainstream
parties. Cross contends that in the 1993 general election that while four-fifths of Reform
Party’s contested nominations included an all-candidates’ debate, only half that number
occurred in each of the Liberal and Progressive Conservative Parties. He also contends,
however that there is interest in policy discussion during nomination campaigns, given
that contested nomination races that held policy debates seemed to attract larger
percentages of party members to the actual nomination meetings than those that did not.ii

Others argue that this disconnection between parties’ internal selection processes and
policy discussion are at the root of the ancillary disconnection between the public and
their party-affiliated representatives, and a further lack of trust in the abilities and
motivation of politicians in general. True or not, this would appear to be a widely held
view amongst average Canadians. Witness the comments of just one of the hundreds of
private citizens to make submissions to the BC Citizen’s Assembly on Electoral Reform.

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A.N. Thomas Varzeliotis, in a submission entitled The Party Factor, scribes, “We have
been thoroughly conditioned to believe that Democracy and parties go together like a
horse and carriage, or like love and marriage and that you can’t have the one without the
other... But it ain’t necessarily so – Democracy and political parties do not really go
together, they are more adversarial than complementary… Were we to do a thorough
democratization of our political system, the role of parties in elections cannot
conceivably escape scrutiny and my belief is that parties would end up distanced from the
electoral process.”iii

Cross squares the circle quite aptly in the conclusion to his paper.

“All of the available evidence suggests that local candidates are at best a
marginal factor in general electoral outcomes. Similarly, there is little in
the nomination process to suggest that it provides a policy mandate to
candidates. Relatively few Canadians participate, the contests are almost
always decided on the basis of organization and mobilization of
supporters, policy differences rarely play a role, and increasingly national
party officials are interfering in the right of local voters to select their own
candidates. It is then of little surprise that the role of the MP has not
dramatically changed in response to voters’ concerns about a lack of
responsiveness in Parliament.”iv

The nomination process has long sullied the reputation of the Liberal Party, and of those
affiliated with it. In a 2002 piece in the National Post, columnist Andrew Coyne also
laments this fact. “It’s not clear what it would take to wean the parties off their
dependence on regular infusions of instant members. But as the Liberal Party’s current
trials show, the practice is a repeating stain on the Party’s reputation, a perpetual
temptation to political mischief, and an ever-present source of division. As practically
every other Canadian political institution, it is in dire need of reform.”v

And yet, my experience, rather than being an isolated incident, was one in a series of
confrontational and controversial spectacles that the public was forced to endure, the
worst being those which pitted not just Liberal against Liberal, but incumbent against
incumbent. Witness the high profile races between Sheila Copps and Tony Valeri in
Hamilton and Carolyn Parrish and Steve Mahoney, in Mississauga. In other cases, such
as that of former BC local Party President Bill Cunningham, any precept of a democratic
process was negated by his appointment as candidate, in a circumstance where a robust
race was seemingly underway.

No wonder then that in October of 2004 an editorial headline in the Ottawa Citizen
caught my attention: Democratic reform was nice while it lasted, it said.vi My first
thought was that this was about problems with parliamentarians coming to grips with
changes to Parliamentary procedures, or more significantly a process breakdown in a
fledgling democracy like Afghanistan.

No. The editorial was about Paul Martin protecting the nominations of incumbent MP’s
– in October – before any of the “new ones” had even been given a chance to prove, to

-- 8
either their own constituents, or to the party “members” who nominated them in the first
place, whether they were worthy of re-election, re-nomination or both. What was the
motivation for this action? According to the editorial a spokesperson for the Prime
Minister (presumably commenting in capacity as spokesperson for the Leader of the
Liberal Party of Canada) said that “it’s to keep [Liberal MP’s] from having to worry
about rivals organizing against them at home while they’re trapped in the House of
Commons making sure the government wins parliamentary votes.”vii

This statement and the editorial itself held more than an air of familiarity. A wealth of
information has been produced on the topic of party reform in Canada. A series of
articles, news stories and commentary from the early 1980s consistently through to the
present bemoan the Liberal Party’s internal disorganization. There have been Liberal
Party internal reform discussion papers and proposed constitutional amendments and
three special “constitutional conventions” between 1981 and 1992. Party reform has also
been advocated in academic treatises too numerous to count, in the four-volume Royal
Commission examination into Electoral Reform and Party Financing,viii in a number of
statutory reports to Parliament by Canada’s Chief Electoral Officer,ix and through several
bills amending the Canada Elections Act since 1980.x

Despite all of this, the body politic that is the Liberal Party of Canada has turned a blind
eye and a deaf ear to virtually all of it, and paid lip service to the rest. And it would seem
that rather than finding a long term fix for the nomination process, the Party is poised, to
short-circuit local democracy yet again.

Plus ça change…

It may be useful, at this juncture, to review “recent” history of reform and reform
initiatives in the Liberal Party of Canada. This history, related to the power or force of
individual membership begins in 1919 with the “election” of Mackenzie King as a leader
selected by delegated convention, as opposed to parliamentary caucus. And, at a 1966
Policy Conference, the Liberals amended their Constitution to include a resolution
establishing a process for a future Leadership Convention – a review of current
leadership. In support of this resolution, a delegate at the conference argued, “it is very
easy for a Party to have democracy when the Party is out of office. The real test of
democracy in the Party is when the Party is in office.”xi

While the Liberals were the first party to adopt such a measure, the first action on this
front began with the Progressive Conservative Party of Canada. In 1966, propelled by a
desire to remove John Diefenbaker as Leader, the party instituted a review of the
leadership by party members for the first time. Following that, as Andrew Coyne
reminisces in his 2002 column, “[t]he ensuing years could be said to be the nearest thing
to a golden age of party democracy. The conventions that chose Pierre Trudeau in 1968
and Joe Clark in 1976 were relatively open, unpredictable affairs; in both, the winner was
the “outsider”, rather than the candidate of the party establishment. Yet both were clean
races, at least by present day standards.”

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In the Liberal Party, perhaps because of the lengthy tenure of Prime Minister Trudeau,
perhaps because of the “champing-at-the-bit” ambitions of others, the next seminal
reform-oriented event occurred at the 1982 National Convention, held at the Chateau
Laurier in Ottawa, my first as a gainfully employed party “operative”. At that
Convention, speaker after speaker - primarily from the youth wing of the party and
primarily those employed on Parliament Hill – railed about the undue influence of caucus
members and the Party elite in the affairs of the Party and government. According to
journalist and author Susan Delacourt, this was Paul Martin Jr.’s coming out party. I can
recall a young cabinet minister at the time (Lloyd Axworthy) being shouted down as he
attempted to address a policy resolution at the mic. The key results of the Convention
were twofold: the election of former MP and cabinet minister, Iona Campanolo, as the
first (and only) female President of the Party and the institution of the “Reform
Commission.”

As the Reform Commission travelled coast-to-coast, examining the internal ails of the
party, for three years or so, and before the Commission could report, two other, but just
as seminal events occurred: the PC leadership in 1983 and that of the Liberal Party in
1984. Those who pour through newspaper archives – and those who simply lived it –
will recall a deluge of stories about “drunks from the mission pouring off buses” and
dead people showing up to vote at delegate selection meetings across the country. To
paraphrase Andrew Coyne, the rot had set in.

The report of the Liberal Party’s Reform Commission at its special convention held in
1985 attempted to address, not only its mandated commission, but new exigencies
imposed during this period related to the abuses reported in the intervening media stories.

The influence of “party elites” was removed from the governing document, the Party’s
constitution. Unelected members of the Party’s National Executive were removed as
“automatic” or ex-officio delegates to future conventions. The structure of the Party’s
Executive was altered, discussion was held about the policy process, about national
membership, in addition to many other related matters, but few truly substantive changes
were made.

Many of the substantive changes that were made were, unfortunately, later undone. This
process would repeat itself.

As Director of Organization for the Party in 1987, I (and others) became concerned as we
approached an expected general election in 1988. The need for, and pressure to find,
candidates of high calibre, those who could present an alternate government to the
electorate through their sheer impressiveness was great. Efforts to recruit such
candidates across the country and had been quite successful, but in many instances the
much sought after positive media coverage about the quality of the team being advanced
was vastly overshadowed by the stories of huge meetings and shenanigans of the highest
order in the effort for them to win their nominations. “Special interests” were beginning
to understand the power of mass recruitment and instant membership in ensuring the
selection of candidates that met their own, rather than the Party’s policy goals. Well

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organized “single issue” candidates such as Tom Wappel, who snatched the nomination
from high profile social advocate Patrick Johnston (who beyond being recruited, had
been groomed for candidacy) flattened the hopes of candidates like Johnston and the
party alike. Tom Wappel would go on to contest the Party’s leadership barely a year
later.

By 1989, following another electoral defeat and pressure from party militants and the
media, the Party had once again determined that action was required to bolster the health
of the party, and another special Constitutional Convention was called for that fall. High
on the agenda for examination was the entire concept of membership in, and the nature
of, the Federation that is the Liberal Party of Canada. John Turner’s resignation as
Leader of the Party intervened and eventually the Constitutional Convention was
postponed and held together with the Leadership Convention that elected Jean Chrétien in
June of 1990.

As often happens with “intervening events”, with the attention of the Party organization,
the public and the media on leadership and leadership processes, the focus for fixing the
Party’s Constitution shifted to immediate concerns and once again, vested interest. In the
lead-up process the Party held six “Leadership Forums” across the country, where
workshops and debates amongst the leadership contenders were held on both policy and
“Party issues”. Even at that time, the Party’s Forum Primer on party issues recognized
the problems the party was facing:

“Hotly contested nomination meetings in recent years have, in many parts

of the country, become controversial and often embarrassing for the Party.
The current practise of the individual who is most able to sign up new
members in a short period of time, generally winning a nomination, is
fraught with problems. Is it truly democratic for large numbers of people
to join a party only for one very specific purpose? Should more emphasis
be placed on the member who has a proven commitment to the party? In a
perfect world, a candidate would be chosen on the basis of ideas, ideology,
societal representativeness, and organization; not purely organization.”

And yet, the most significant amendments adopted at the Constitutional Convention
related to re-instating the ex-officio delegate status of unelected executive members such
as the Financial Management Committee, and the creation of and provision of delegates
to a new Aboriginal Commission. Both of these sets of amendments were in fact
retroactive. In other words, the Constitution which did not recognize these individuals as
delegates to the Convention when the convention commenced, did recognize them by the
time they were ready to cast their Leadership ballots.

The first convention following the Jean Chrétien’s election as Leader was set for the
winter of 1992. Another election was expected at any time. While complaints about the
process which selected him as Leader and pleas for the Party to complete its unfinished
business were important, the Leader, mindful of the one process that could impact his
tenure the most, the nomination of candidates, created a third task force in 10 years to

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examine the Party’s Constitution. The task force was to make proposals to another
Constitutional Convention to be, again, held in concert with the Biennial. From both a
policy, and an organizational perspective, the convention was shaping up to be a battle
between vested and special interests.

With over 100 proposed amendments to virtually every article of the Constitution, and an
entire day devoted to its discussion, while the Party did institute a national “registry” of
members (a compromise solution to a long sought after national membership with
standard requirements across the country) it failed to make significant changes to the
nomination process. Instead of entrenching the principles under which candidates would
fairly be nominated, the party chose to move virtually the entire setting of parameters for,
and administration of nominations from the constitution to “rules” which would be
developed under the auspices of National and Provincial/Territorial Campaign
committees headed by individuals appointed by the Leader. Some read this move as
giving a Leader the flexibility required to respond to rapidly changing political
circumstances. Others viewed it as a retreat from democracy in the Party and the
protection of an ability to manipulate processes to suit circumstances. Principle gave way
to consideration:

Out of 9 provisions to guide the Campaign Committee in carrying out its responsibilities,
only one (provisions relating to financial limits for expenditures by candidates) can be
viewed as a requirement. The others can only be interpreted as guidelines, given the
language used: to consider the establishment of cut-off dates, appropriate to the
provincial or territorial organization, to consider making membership lists available, to
consider holding all-candidates’ debates, to consider gender equity and minority
representation.xii

With twenty-five years of examination by the Liberal Party itself, journalists, experts and
the public at large, the Ottawa Citizen headline epitomizes the French expression coined
by 19th Century journalist and author Alphonse Karr: “plus ça change, plus c’est la même
chose”.

Representation and Democracy

Earlier in 2004, writing in Policy Options, Thomas Axworthy drew the links between the
three areas most commonly associated with the centrepiece of Paul Martin’s leadership
campaign as articulated in an October 2002 speech: the democratic deficit. To overcome
the democratic deficit, reforms need to be examined in Parliament, in our electoral
system, and in parties themselves. The optimistic view that things were to change was
expressed by Axworthy’s statement that, “[i]f Martin is serious about democratic renewal
and willing to extend his agenda beyond parliamentary reform to a much wider canvass,
he might be promoting the most galvanizing political idea since Pierre Trudeau’s
advocacy of a ‘Just Society’”.xiii

In the best of Burkean tradition, Canada has developed a democratic system in which
political parties form the foundation. It follows therefore that if we have weak parties,

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we also have a weak – or weakened democracy. This premise is brought home by
contrasting the statement of Prime Minister Martin’s spokesperson quoted in the Citizen
and Mr. Axworthy’s discussion of the role of parties in his Policy Options paper, where
he said: “Parties are not just about winning elections, they are also about educating
citizens about issues and ideologies. Parties in some countries take this responsibility
seriously. In Canada, they do not.”xiv

The concept behind parties as the foundation for our democratic system is a simple one.
In voting for a representative to Parliament, the individual voter is delegating the
governance of their lives to an individual to represent their views individually, and the
views of their (mostly) like-minded, and life-style-similar neighbours, collectively. If,
however, every Member of Parliament were an Independent member, how would a
Government be formed? How would policy proposals and laws be formulated without
the ideological drivers that represent the broad differences in perspectives resident in the
general population? While our representatives are chosen to reflect and represent their
constituents broadly, they are also expected to express opinions consistent with the
predictability that the collective, as expressed by party affiliation, provides. Few voters
can rationally believe that their representative can represent 100% of their own views and
priorities, 100% of the time.

"Your representative owes you, not his industry only, but his judgement; and he betrays
instead of serving you if he sacrifices it to your opinion." Sir Edmund Burke

If therefore, parties are indeed at the foundation of our democratic system, what lies at
their foundation? In keeping with the concept of delegation, it is those people who self-
select and commit to the ideological principles held by a party who collectively form that
party: the members. Membership in a political party is intended to provide the necessary
brain power for the formulation of ideological and policy differences from which the
electorate can choose both their representatives, and their Government.

The electorate expects that party members will choose candidates for their ideological
sync with the parties they belong to, and that they will broker the local consensus of
opinion within that ideology on their behalf.

I cannot speak for the experiences of activists in other Canadian political parties, but with
respect to the Liberal Party of Canada, there has been both discontent and frustration for
decades over the inability of “the physician to heal himself.” And yet the solutions, or at
least the repairs, are not as drastic as one might be lead to believe given the historical
adamance of Party “power brokers” to leave the process subject to manipulation, and by
extension, to their superior and fatherly wisdom as compared to the “average” Party
member.

The Party’s inability or unwillingness or both to even attempt to rectify these problems in
the face of such plentiful and plaintive missives, is further evidence of how weak it has
become. And when an important and significant institution like the Liberal Party of
Canada is so weak, the democracy of the country is too, sadly, greatly weakened.

--13
Rebuilding the Foundation

I propose a simple first step in the Party’s path to revitalize its reputation and diminish its
own democratic deficit. . Rebuild the foundation. Make it strong again. Reward it for
its commitment. Build a process that is fair to most, rather than one that is designed to
accommodate the few.

Amend the Party’s Constitution – not the rules called for by the Constitution, but the
Constitution itself – at the upcoming national convention to ensure that in every riding, in
every province and territory, uniformly across the country, that to vote for a leadership
candidate or candidate for nomination, members must be residents of the ridings in which
they will vote, and must have been members for at least one year.

This should not be viewed as an unreasonable restriction on the rights of a new member;
they can still join and participate in most activities, as well as have most of the
obligations, much in the way a landed immigrant in Canada has all of the human rights,
the right to work, the right to a public education for their children, the right to health care
and other social services, and so on, and they must pay taxes too, but they do not hold the
right to vote, until they have proven their commitment to their newly adopted country and
become full citizens.

While not a panacea solution, and while it would need to be accompanied by ancillary
constitutional amendments, this simple solution would accomplish a great deal.

• Greater emphasis on the interests of the Party and less on personality and the
interests of individuals. Members who are attracted by the Party’s philosophy,
ideology and values, and who wish to participate in policy development, will
then, because of their involvement and reciprocated commitment, express that
commitment during elections, by organizing and raising money as well, and
selecting candidates that best articulate policies based on a commonly held
ideology and knowledge of the community. By extension, nominations will focus
more on ideas and less on organization and money.
• A significant reduction in the complexity of rules required for the selection of
candidates; no more contentious cut-off dates, meetings and notices.
• Less influence of money in the process leading to a truly, more level playing field
for candidates (particularly when combined with the recent reforms to the Canada
Elections Act which provides reasonable spending limits for nomination
contestants).
• Less impetus for desperate acts, including the breaking of the law by potential
candidates.
• Potential candidates will always know who their electorate is, providing a
different kind of level playing field; a more attractive, inviting, open and
affordable process for those traditionally challenged at this level of electoral
success: women, minorities and others under-represented in the system.

--14
 Everyone will be fishing out of the same pool, as candidates do in general
elections.
• Less disenfranchisement of long-standing party members whose votes and
influence are often invalidated one-for-one by each instant member recruited, and
who then simply “goes away”
• MP’s will need to validate their public positions back home on a more ongoing
basis, in order to both maintain support and to remain truly representative of both
the Party, and the community
• Leaders can make preferences for a particular candidate known, safer in the
knowledge that 90% of the time, the membership, in fact the same membership
that will have elected them leader, and who after all, know their communities
best, will “do the right thing”
• No more need to protect the nominations of incumbents, who won’t have to be
concerned about mass recruitment drives taking place while they are “trapped in
the House of Commons.” A sitting Member who loses touch with, or loses the
confidence of, a committed, long-standing membership, should have their right to
nomination questioned.

The Liberal Party of Canada has likely made more attempts at internal reform than any
other Party in Canada, not only amending its governing contract with members at
“regular” conventions of the Party, but holding special “Constitutional Conventions” in
1985, 1990 and 1992. Yet time and time again those limited reforms enacted have either
been “undone” by a subsequent conventions – some before they could even be
implemented and some, unbelievably, through the use of retroactive amendment.

More and more guiding principles have been removed from the Constitution and given
over to regulation: Rules, whose mandates stem from the Constitution, and/or National
Executive, but which are drafted, adopted and implemented by unelected, unaccountable
Party-appointed officials.

I do not think I am naïve in believing that the Prime Minister, as Leader of the Liberal
Party of Canada, personally adheres to the importance of this type of proposal to the
health of this most significant democratic institution. But I would be naïve in thinking
that making bold changes are easy when one is at the hub of vested interest. I am sure
that this played a role in former Prime Minister Chrétien’s democratization of the Canada
Elections Act at a time only when he knew it could never impact him, personally, again.

It is the membership, assembled in National Convention, which according to the Party’s

constitution is the highest authority of the Liberal Party. But leadership is required. The
Leader sits on the Constitution and Legal Affairs Committee of the Party, the committee
that proposes constitutional amendments. He also sits on the National Executive which
must approve (most) amendments to be brought forward to Convention.

In recent months, the democratic reforms are being instituted in Parliament, examinations
of electoral reform are being conducted across the land, and in sync with the views of

--15
most Canadians we are exporting our highly respected democratic institutions and
processes around the world.

But if the foundation remains weak and in constant need of repair, there is little hope for
the elimination of the democratic deficit.

Sheila Gervais
January 2005

--16
Notes

--17
i
Dr. Bill Cross. “Members of Parliament, Voters, and Democracy in the Canadian House of
Commons”. Parliamentary Perspectives. Canadian Study of Parliament Group. October, 2000.
ii
Ibid.
iii
A.N. Varzeliotis. “The Party Factor”. B.C. Citizen’s Assembly. 2004. P. 0910
iv
Cross.
v
Andrew Coyne. “Two rivalries at the root of party rot: Once upon a time, instant membership was not
an issue”. National Post. December, 2, 2002.
vi
Editorial. “Democratic reform was nice while it lasted”. The Ottawa Citizen. October 30, 2004.
vii
Ibid.
viii
Canada. Royal Commission on Electoral Reform and Party Financing: Reforming Electoral
Democracy: Final Report, Vol. 1. Ottawa: Royal Commission on Electoral Reform and Party
Financing, 1991.
ix
See: Elections Canada. “Modernizing the Electoral Process: Recommendations of the Chief
Electoral Officer of Canada following the 37th general election”. The Chief Electoral Officer of
Canada. 2001.; and; Elections Canada. “Canada’s Electoral System: Strengthening the Foundation;
Annex to the Report of the Chief Electoral Officer of Canada on the 35th General Election”. The Chief
Electoral Officer of Canada. 1996.
x
See particularly, Canada Elections Act (2000, c9)., and An Act to amend the Canada Elections Act
and the Income Tax Act (political financing) (S.C. 2003, c19)., For a detailed account of reforms to the
Canada Elections Act, see also: James R. Robertson. “The Canadian Electoral System”. Library of
Parliament: Law and Government Division. May 2004.
xi
National Meeting (1966) and Liberal Party Conference. Transcript. October, 1966. Ottawa, Ontario.
xii
Liberal Party of Canada. “The Constitution of the Liberal Party of Canada”. Article 14(8). 2004.
xiii
Thomas S. Axworthy, “The Democratic Deficit: Should this be Paul Martin’s next big idea?”.
Policy Options. December 2003-January 2004. P. 15-19
xiv
Ibid.