EASTERN AIRLINE 401

Lockheed 1011 -1 aircraft

The crash occurred as a result of the entire flight crew becoming preoccupied
with a burnt-out landing gear indicator light, and failing to notice the autopilot had
inadvertently been disconnected. As a result, while the flight crew was distracted
with the indicator problem, the aircraft gradually lost altitude and crashed

Flight 401 departed JFK Airport on Friday, December 29, 1972, at 21:20 Eastern
Standard Time, carrying 163 passengers and 13 crew members on board. [1]:3
The flight was routine until 23:32, when the flight began its approach into Miami
International Airport. After lowering the gear, Stockstill noticed that the landing
gear indicator, a green light identifying that the nose gear is properly locked in the "down"
position, did not illuminate.[1]:3 This was later discovered to be due to a burned-out light
bulb.[1]:9 The landing gear could have been manually lowered regardless. [6]:101 The pilots
cycled the landing gear, but still failed to get the confirmation light. [1]:3
Loft, who was working the radio during this leg of the flight, told the tower that they would
discontinue their approach to their airport and requested to enter a holding pattern. The
approach controller cleared the flight to climb to 2,000 feet (610 m), and then hold west
over the Everglades.[1]:3
The cockpit crew removed the light assembly,[6]:102 and Second Officer Repo was
dispatched to the avionics bay beneath the flight deck to confirm via a small porthole if
the landing gear was indeed down.[1]:4 Fifty seconds after reaching their assigned altitude,
Captain Loft instructed First Officer Stockstill to put the L-1011 on autopilot.[1]:4 For the next
80 seconds, the plane maintained level flight. Then, it dropped 100 feet (30 m), and then
again flew level for two more minutes, after which it began a descent so gradual it could
not be perceived by the crew.[1]:4 In the next 70 seconds, the plane lost only 250 feet
(76 m), but this was enough to trigger the altitude warning C-chord chime located under
the engineer's workstation.[1]:4 The engineer (Repo) had gone below, and no indication
was heard of the pilot's voices recorded on the CVR that they heard the chime. In another
50 seconds, the plane was at half its assigned altitude. [1]:5
As Stockstill started another turn, onto 180, he noticed the discrepancy. The following
conversation was recovered from the flight voice recorder later:
Stockstill: We did something to the altitude.
Loft: What?
Stockstill: We're still at 2,000 feet, right?
Loft: Heywhat's happening here?[1]:5
Less than 10 seconds after this exchange, the jetliner crashed. The location was westnorthwest of Miami, 18.7 miles (30.1 km) from the end of runway Nine Left (9L).[1]:5 The
plane was traveling at 227 miles per hour (365 km/h) when it hit the ground. With the
aircraft in midturn, the left wingtip hit the surface first, then the left engine and the left
landing gear,[1]:8making three trails through the sawgrass, each 5 ft wide and more than

100 feet (30 m) long. When the main part of the fuselage hit the ground, it continued to
move through the grass and water, breaking up as it went.

DRYDEN AIR ONTARIO

shortly after takeoff from Dryden Regional Airport.[1] The aircraft was a Fokker F28-1000
Fellowship.[2] It crashed after only 49 seconds because it was not able to attain sufficient
altitude to clear the trees beyond the end of the runway, due to ice and snow on the wing

The investigation revealed that an unserviceable auxiliary power unit (APU), and no
available external power unit at Dryden Regional Airport, led to questionable decisionmaking which was a critical factor leading to the crash of Flight 1363. If the engines had
been turned off, they could not be restarted again due to the unservicability of the APU
and lack of external power. Therefore, the port engine was left running during the
stopover in Dryden. Snow was falling gently that afternoon and a layer of 0.6 to 1.3
centimetres of snow had accumulated on the wings. The wings needed to be de-iced
before takeoff, but the Fokker F-28 aircraft is never supposed to be de-iced while the
engines are running because of a risk of toxic fumes entering the cabin of the aircraft.
The pilot therefore did not request to have the wings de-iced; at the time, airline
instructions were unclear on this point but the subsequent report was very critical of this
decision.
Fuel needed to be loaded and was done with the engine running while passengers were
on board (known as a hot refuel). Off-loading and reloading passengers would have
taken considerable time and the longer the aircraft stayed on the ground the greater was
the need for the wings to be sprayed with de-icing fluid. To prevent further delay and a
greater possibility of a buildup on the wings, the pilot, Captain Morwood, decided to have
the aircraft fuelled while the engine was running and with passengers on board. This
procedure was not then, and is not now, prohibited by Transport Canada. Airline
instructions were also inconsistent