[No. 5986.

March 18, 1941]' JOSE RUIZ, plaintiff and appellant,

vs. PELAGIA ATIENZA, defendant and appellee.
1.MARRIAGE; ANNULMENT; DURESS AS GROUND OF; THREAT TO OBSTRUCT ONEs ADMISSION TO THE
BAR
.Where a man marries under the threat to obstruct hisadmission to the Bar by filing charges against
him. for immorality, he cannot avoid the marriageon the ground of duress.2.I
D.; INTIMIDATION NOT AMOUNTING TO FORCE OR VIOLENCE
. The provision of the Marriage Law (Sec. 30, Act No. 3613) referring to "force" or "violence" asground
of annulment of marriage, does not seem to include mere intimidation, at least where itdoes not in legal
effect amount to force or violence.
{Seearticle 1267, Civil Code.)APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First Instanceof Manila. A. Locsin,
J.The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court,
Franco & Reinoso
for appellant.
Lourdes Paredes-San Diego
and
Rafael M. Morales
for appellee.B
ENGZON
,
J.:
,This is an appeal from a decision of the Manila Court of First Instance denying plaintiff's demandfor the
annulment of his marriage with defendant contracted on November 14, 1938, with all theoutward legal
formalities.Previous to February, 1938, Jose Ruiz and Pelagia Atienza, both single, were
sweethearts.Loving perhaps too well, she allowed him, in a moment of weekness, to have his way, with
the result thatnine months later she became an unmarried mother. After the baby's birth, i. e., on
November 14,1938, Pelagia's father Jose Atienza, Atty. Villavicencio (her cousin-in-law), and three other
persons visitedJose Ruiz at the boarding house where he lived, in Oregon street,.JVIanila. They
requested, and after somediscussion conviilcea, him to marry Pelagia. With his cousin Alfredo Asuncion,
he went with Jose Atienzaand companions to Tanduay street, where Pelagia was living; from there the
party, joined by Pelagiaand others, went to the Aglipayan church at Maria Clara street, Manila, then

proceeded to secure amarriage license, and later returned to the same Aglipayan church where the
marriage was celebrated inthe evening.Four days later, alleging that he had been forced into wedlock,
Jose Ruiz brought this suit to secure itsavoidance. His counsel has 'dramatized the visit of Jose Atienza
and companions, and the "plans" drawnto force Jose Ruiz into the marriage, Jose's passive and
downcast attitude, all in an effort to maintainthe proposition that Jose Ruiz went with them that
afternoon "convinced" by the following"arguments": the threats of the father supported by his
"balisong" ; the unveiled intimidation by Atty.Villavicencio that if he would not marry Pelagia Atienza, he
would have difficulty when he would take the bar examinations because, as he said, many have been
rejected admission to the bar on the ground of immorality (pp. 6& and 79, s. t.) ; and the promise of
Atty. Villavicencio that Ruiz would be physically"safe" if he would go with them (p. 40, s. t.). (p. 11,
appellant's brief.)As to the first, it appears that in the course of the conversation during the visit,
Ruizmade the statement that he could not marry Pelagia because he was already a married man.This so
aroused Jose Atienza that he grabbed Ruiz' necktie, exclaiming: "So you mean tofool my daughter!"
Those present intervened quickly, and the dispute stopped. The flare of

anger is easily understandable. But it is not sufficiently established that Jose Atienzadisplayed any
"balisong", or made any threat against the life of Ruiz. In fact, only a one-and-a-half-inch knife was
found in his possession by the policeman whom the companionsof Ruiz called upon seeing what they
believed to be the beginning of trouble:As to the threat to obstruct his admission to the Bar, by filing
charges against himfor immorality, the authorities are unanimous that it is not such a duress as
toconstitute a reason for annuling the marriage.* * * and where a man marries under the threat of, or
constraint from, a lawful prosecution for seduction or bastardy, he cannot avoid the marriage on the
ground of duress; * * *. (38 C. J., sec. 70, p. 1305.)As to the promise by Atty. Villavicencio, it is apparent
that when defendant wasinvited to go with them and marry Pelagia, he had some fears that he might be
subjected to bodily harm in retaliation for the dishonor inflicted upon her family. For this reason, hehad"
to be^$ured by Villavicencio that he would be safe if he went with them. From thisstatement, we cannot
infer what appellant's attorney would cleverly infer, i. e., that Ruizwould not be safe if he did not follow
them.Appellant would make it appear that that afternoon Ruiz was practically kidnapped byPelagia's
relatives until after the marriage ceremony. That cannot be true. He had many occasions to escape, as
pointed out in appellee's brief. He had companions in the housewhom he could have asked for help.
There was even the polioeman. Now, considering that the law presumes strongly the validity of
marriage once the formal ceremonieshave been completed, we are led to the conclusion that although
plaintiff may not have lookedupon the ceremony as the happy culmination of youthful romance, still the
evidence dones not warranta pronouncement that his consent to it was obtained through force or
intimidation. Indeed, we may advert to the provision of the Marriage Law (sec 30, Act No. 3613) which,
referring to "force"or "violence", does not seem to include mere intimidation, at least where it does not
in legal effectamount to force or violence. (See article 1267, Civil Code.) At any rate, it is unnecessary to
pass onthe effect of this legal distinction. For even though appellant has presented his case in the best
possible light, yet appellee's attorney has successfully met the issues, upholding the judge's conclusionof

fact that neither violence nor duress attended the marriage celebration.Judgment affirmed, with costs
against the appellant. So ordered