Atty. Macababbad EVIDENCE Cases Part.

II. RULE 129

Sec. 1

What Need Not Be Proved

Section 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory. — A court shall take judicial notice, without the
introduction of evidence, of the existence and territorial extent of states, their political history,
forms of government and symbols of nationality, the law of nations, the admiralty and maritime
courts of the world and their seals, the political constitution and history of the Philippines, the
official acts of legislative, executive and judicial departments of the Philippines, the laws of
nature, the measure of time, and the geographical divisions. (1a)

- Sec. 2, Art. II of the 1987 Philippine Constitution

DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES

PRINCIPLES

Section 2. The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy,

adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law
of the land and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom,
cooperation, and amity with all nations.

PEOPLE v. BARTE

Facts:

Under review is the decision promulgated on September 26, 2006, whereby the Court of Appeals
(CA) affirmed the decision rendered on May 18, 2004 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 28, in Mandaue City convicting the accused-appellant of violating Section 5, Article II of
Republic Act No. 9165, as amended, and sentencing him accordingly. Eddie Barte Y Mendoza
was charged in the RTC with a violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, as amended,
following his arrest for selling a quantity of shabu worth P l00.00 to a police officer-poseur
buyer in the evening of August 10, 2002 during a buy-bust operation conducted in Consuelo
Village, Mandaue City.

P02 Rico Cabatingan, a witness for the Prosecution, declared that he and other police officers
conducted the buy-bust operation at about 9:30 in the evening of August 10, 2002 on the basis of
information received to the effect that the accused-appellant was engaged in the sale of shabu.
During the pre-operation conference, P02 Cabatingan was designated as the poseur buyer, and
his back-up officers were P02 Baylosis and P03 Ompad. P/Insp. Grado provided the buy-bust
money with marked serial number to P02 Cabatingan. The buy-bust team then proceeded to
Consuela Village at about 9:10 of that evening on board a Suzuki multicab driven by P03
Ompad. At the target area, P02 Cabatingan met with the accused-appellant, and informed the
latter that he wanted to buy shabu worth "a peso." Upon the accused-appellant's assent to his
offer, P02 Cabatingan handed the buy¬bust money to him, and in turn the latter gave to him a
small sachet with white colored contents. P02 Cabatingan then gave the pre-arranged signal by
touching his head. The other officers rushed forward and identified themselves to the accused-
appellant as policemen. They frisked and arrested him, and brought him to the police station.

In his defense, the accused-appellant declared that he was sitting alone near the chapel of Basak,
Mandaue City near their house in Consuela Village at around 9:30 in the evening of August 10,
2002 when police officers suddenly came and arrested him. In undertaking his arrest, the officers
pointed their guns at him and forced him to go with them. They brought him to the police
precinct on a Suzuki multicab, and upon their reaching the station, the arresting officers searched
his person and found his ID inside his wallet. He was not informed of the reason for his arrest.
He was subsequently detained. The arresting officers only informed him of the charges against
him on the next day.

RTC rendered its decision on May 18, 2004 convicting the accused-appellant, and giving full
credence to the testimony of P02 Cabatingan, and ruled that the Prosecution thereby established
that the accused-appellant had sold shabu to P02 Cabatingan. Upon the appeal of the accused-
appellant, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC decision and likewise denied his motion for
reconsideration on August 8, 2007.

Issue:

Whether or not accused-appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime charged in
violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165.

Ruling:

No, the accused-appellant is not guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime charged in
violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165. Evidently, it is the Court’s
jurisdiction that it convicts the accused only when his guilt is established beyond reasonable
doubt. Conformably with this standard, it is mandated as an appellate court to sift the records and
search for every error, though unassigned in the appeal, in order to ensure that the conviction is
warranted, and to correct every error that the lower court has committed in finding guilt against
the accused.

Courts are cognizant of the presumption of regularity in the performance of duties of public
officers. This presumption can be overturned if evidence is presented to prove either of two
things, namely: ( 1) that they were not properly performing their duty, or (2) that they were
inspired by any improper motive. It is a matter of judicial notice that buy-bust operations are
"susceptible to police abuse, the most notorious of which is its use as a tool for extortion." The
high possibility of abuse was precisely the reason why the procedural safeguards embodied in
Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 have been put up as a means to minimize, if not eradicate such
abuse. The procedural safeguards not only protect the innocent from abuse and violation of their
rights but also guide the law enforcers on ensuring the integrity of the evidence to be presented
in court. In the prosecution of the crime of selling a dangerous drug, the following elements must
be proven, to wit: ( 1) the identities of the buyer, seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2)
the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. On the other hand, the essential requisites
of illegal possession of dangerous drugs that must be established are the following, namely: (1)
the accused was in possession of the dangerous drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by
law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the dangerous drug.

Such non-compliance with the procedural safeguards under Section 21 was fatal because it cast
doubt on the integrity of the evidence presented in court and directly affected the validity of the
buy-bust operation. The failure to prove the chain of custody should mean, therefore, that the
Prosecution did not establish beyond reasonable doubt that the sachet of shabu presented during
the trial was the very same one delivered by the accused-appellant to the poseur buyer.

Therefore, the Court acquits accused EDDIE BARTE y MENDOZA of the violation of Section
5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, as amended; and directs the Director of the Bureau of
Corrections to release EDDIE BARTE y MENDOZA from custody unless he is detained thereat
for another lawful cause.

VDA. DE CATALAN V. CATALAN-LEE 

G. R. No. 183622,  [February 08, 2012]

FACTS:
Orlando B. Catalan, a naturalized American citizen,allegedly obtained a divorce in the United
States from his first wife, Felicitas Amor. He then contracted a second marriage with petitioner.
When Orlando died intestate in the Philippines, petitioner filed with the RTC a Petition for the
issuance of letters of administration for her appointment as administratrix of the intestate estate.
While the case was pending, respondent Louella A. Catalan-Lee, one of the children of Orlando
from his first marriage, filed a similar petition with the RTC. The two cases were consolidated.
Petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the petition filed by the respondent on the ground of litis
pendentia. Respondent alleged that petitioner was not considered an interested person qualified
to file the petition. Respondent further alleged that a criminal case for bigamy was filed against
petitioner by Felicitas Amor contending that petitioner contracted a second marriage to Orlando
despite having been married to one Eusebio Bristol.
However, the RTC acquitted petitioner of bigamy and ruled that since the deceased was a
divorced American citizen, and that divorce was not recognized under Philippine jurisdiction, the
marriage between him and petitioner was not valid. The RTC took note of the action for
declaration of nullity then pending filed by Felicitas Amor against the deceased and petitioner. It
considered the pending action to be a prejudicial question in determining the guilt of petition-er
for the crime of bigamy. The RTC also found that petitioner had never been married to Bristol.
The RTC subsequently dismissed the Petition for the issuance of letters of administration filed by
petitioner and granted that of private respondent. Contrary to its findings in Crim. Case No.
2699-A, the RTC held that the marriage between petitioner and Eusebio Bristol was valid and
subsisting when she married Orlando. The RTC held that petitioner was not an interested party
who may file said petition. The CA affirmed the decision of the lower court.
Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of this Decision. She alleged that the reasoning of the CA
was illogical in stating, on the one hand, that she was acquitted of bigamy, while, on the other
hand, still holding that her marriage with Orlando was invalid. She insists that with her acquittal
of the crime of bigamy, the marriage enjoys the presumption of validity.
On 20 June 2008, the CA denied her motion.

ISSUES:
 1. Whether the acquittal of petitioner in the crim. case for bigamy meant that the marriage
with Bristol was still valid.
 2. Whether the divorce obtained abroad by Orlando may be recognized under Philippine
jurisdiction.

HELD:
It is imperative for the trial court to first determine the validity of the divorce to ascertain the
rightful party to be issued the letters of administration over the estate of Orlando. Petition is
partially granted. Case is remanded to RTC.

1. No. The RTC in the special proceedings failed to appreciate the finding of the RTC in
Crim. Case that petitioner was never married to Eusebio Bristol. It concluded
that, because petitioner was acquitted of bigamy, it follows that the first marriage
with Bristol still existed and was valid.

2. Yes. Under the principles of comity, Philippine jurisdiction recognizes a valid divorce
obtained by a spouse of for-eign nationality. Aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which
may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national
law. Nonetheless, the fact of divorce must still first be proven by the divorce decree itself.
The best evidence of a judgment is the judgment itself.

Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a public
or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof
attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the
Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic
or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the
record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.

Moreover, the burden of proof lies with the “party who alleges the existence of a fact or thing
necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action.” In civil cases, plaintiffs have the burden of
proving the material allegations of the complaint when those are denied by the answer; and
defendants have the burden of proving the material allegations in their answer when they
introduce new matters. It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial
notice of foreign laws. Like any other facts, they must be alleged and proved.
It appears that the trial court no longer required petitioner to prove the validity of Orlando’s
divorce under the laws of the United States and the marriage between petitioner and the
deceased. Thus, there is a need to remand the proceedings to the trial court for further reception
of evidence to establish the fact of divorce.

The petitioner, armed with a marriage certificate, filed her petition for letters of administration.
As a spouse, the petitioner would have been preferred to administer the estate of Orlando B.
Catalan. However, a marriage certificate, like any other public document, is only prima facie
evidence of the facts stated therein. The fact that the petitioner had been charged with
bigamy and was acquitted has not been disputed by the petitioner. Bigamy is an illegal
marriage committed by contracting a second or subsequent marriage before the first marriage has
been dissolved or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by a judgment
rendered in a proper proceedings. The deduction of the trial court that the acquittal of the
petitioner in the said case negates the validity of her subsequent marriage with Orlando B.
Catalan has not been disproved by her. There was not even an attempt from the petitioner
to deny the findings of the trial court. There is therefore no basis for us to make a contrary
finding. Thus, not being an interested party and a stranger to the estate of Orlando B. Catalan, the
dismissal of her petition for letters of administration by the trial court is in place.

Burden of Proving Australian Law

Respondent contends that the burden to prove Australian divorce law falls upon petitioner,
because she is the party challenging the validity of a foreign judgment. He contends that
petitioner was satisfied with the original of the divorce decree and was cognizant of the marital
laws of Australia, because she had lived and worked in that country for quite a long time.
Besides, the Australian divorce law is allegedly known by Philippine courts; thus, judges may
take judicial notice of foreign laws in the exercise of sound discretion.
We are not persuaded. The burden of proof lies with the "party who alleges the existence of a
fact or thing necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action." In civil cases, plaintiffs have
the burden of proving the material allegations of the complaint when those are denied by the
answer; and defendants have the burden of proving the material allegations in their answer when
they introduce new matters. Since the divorce was a defense raised by respondent, the burden of
proving the pertinent Australian law validating it falls squarely upon him.
It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign
laws. Like any other facts, they must be alleged and proved. Australian marital laws are not
among those matters that judges are supposed to know by reason of their judicial function. The
power of judicial notice must be exercised with caution, and every reasonable doubt upon the
subject should be resolved in the negative.

It appears that the trial court no longer required petitioner to prove the validity of Orlando’s
divorce under the laws of the United States and the marriage between petitioner and the
deceased. Thus, there is a need to remand the proceedings to the trial court for further reception
of evidence to establish the fact of divorce.

However, the records show that there is insufficient evidence to prove the validity of the
divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo under
the laws of the U.S.A. In Garcia v. Recio, the Court laid down the specific guidelines for
pleading and proving foreign law and divorce judgments. It held that presentation solely of the
divorce decree is insufficient and that proof of its authenticity and due execution must be
presented. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a
public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy
thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in
the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper
diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in
which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.

Therefore, this case should be remanded to the trial court for further reception of evidence
on the divorce decree obtained by Merry Lee and the marriage of respondent and
Felicisimo. 

Noveras v Noveras
GR No 188289

Facts:
David and Leticia Noveras are US citizens who own properties in the USA and in the
Philippines. They have 2 children, Jerome and Jena. Leticia states that sometime in 2003, David
abandoned his family to live with his mistress. Further, she states that David executed an
affidavit where he renounced all his rights and interest in the conjugal and real properties in the
Philippines. After learning of the extra-marital affair, Leticia filed a petition for divorce
before the Superior Court of California. Upon issuance of the judicial decree of divorce in June
2005, the US properties were awarded to Leticia. Leticia then filed a petition for judicial
separation of conjugal property before the RTC of Baler, Aurora. The RTC regarded the petition
for judicial separation of conjugal property as a petition for liquidation of property since the
spouses marriage has already been dissolved.
It classified their property relation as absolute community because they did not execute a
marriage settlement before their marriage ceremony. Then, the trial court ruled that in
accordance with the doctrine of processual presumption, Philippine law should apply because
the court cannot take judicial notice of the US law since the parties did not submit any proof of
their national law. The court awarded the properties in the Philippines to David, subject to the
payment of the children’s legities.
  Upon Leticia’s appeal to the CA, the CA ruled that the Philippine properties be divided
equally between the spouses and that both should pay their children P520k. David argues that the
Court should have recognized the California judgment that awarded him the Philippine
properties and that allowing Leticia to share in the PH properties is tantamount to unjust
enrichment considering she already owns all the US properties.

Issues
 
Whether the marriage between David and Leticia has been dissolved.
 
Whether the filing of the judicial separation of property is proper.
Held:1.
 
No. the trial court erred in recognizing the divorce decree which severed the bond of marriage
between the parties. Under Section 24 of Rule 132, the record of public documents of a
sovereign authority or tribunal may be proved by: (1) an official publication thereof or (2) a copy
attested by the officer having the legal custody thereof. Such publication must be authenticated
by a seal of a consular official. Section 25 of the same Rule states that whenever a copy of a
document or record is attested for the purpose of evidence, the attestation must state that the
copy is a correct copy of the original. The attestation must be under the official seal of the
attesting officer. Based on the records, only the divorce decree was presented in evidence. The
required certificates to prove its authenticity, as well as the pertinent California law on divorce
were not presented. Absent a valid recognition of the divorce decree, it follows that the parties
are still legally married in the Philippines. The trial court thus erred in proceeding directly to
liquidation.

Sec. 4 RULE 129

Section 4. Judicial admissions. — An admission, verbal or written, made

by the party in the course of the proceedings in the same case, does not
require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by showing that it
was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made.
(2a)

Dimaguila vs Monteiro, GR # 201011,

DOCTRINE:
The hearsay rule, Section 44 of Rule 130 provides that entries in official
records are an exception to the rule. The rule provides that entries in official
records made in the performance of the duty of a public officer of the
Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by
law, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. The necessity of this
rule consists in the inconvenience and difficulty of requiring the
official's attendance as a witness to testify to the innumerable transactions in
the course of his duty. The document's trustworthiness consists in the
presumption of regularity of performance of official duty.
 
FACTS
 
Respondent, Spouses Monteiro et al., filed their Complaint for Partition and
Damages before the RTC, against The Dimaguilas. The complaint alleged that
all the families were co-owners and prayed for the partition of a residential
house. Spouses Monteiro anchored their claim on a deed of sale executed in
their favor by the heirs of Pedro. The Dimaguilas and the other defendants
countered that there was no co-ownership to speak of in the first place. In
their Answer, they alleged that the subject property, then owned by Maria
Ignacio, had long been partitioned equally between her two sons, Perfecto and
Vitaliano, through a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition. upon resumption of the
proceedings, Spouses Monteiro filed their Motion for Leave to Amend and/or
Admit Amended Complaint, which was then granted. The amended complaint
abandoned the original claim for partition and instead sought the recovery of
possession of a portion of the subject property occupied by the Dimagui as and
other defendants, specifically, the portion sold to the couple by the heirs of
Pedro. In amending their complaint, Spouses Montiero adopted the Dimaguilas'
admission that the subject property had already been partitioned between
Perfecto and Vitaliano, through a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition, and that
during their lifetime, the brothers agreed that Perfecto would become
the owner of the southern-half portion and Vitaliano of the northern-half
portion, which division was observed and respected by them as well as their
heirs and successors-in-interest. In their Answer to the amended complaint,
the Dimaguilas admitted that the subject property was inherited by, and
divided equally between Perfecto and Vitaliano, but denied the admission
in their original answer that it had been actually divided into southern and
northern portions. Instead, they argued that the Extrajudicial Partition
mentioned only the division of the subject property "into two and share and
share alike." In effect,they argued the existence of a co-ownership, contrary to
their original position. Sps. Monteiro presented the certified true copy of the
cadastral map of Liliw and a list of claimants/owners.
RTC:
ruled in favor of Spouses Monteiro after perusing evidence aliunde of a
cadastral map of Liliw, Laguna and a corresponding list of claimant as to show
that the property had indeed been partitioned into southern and northern
portions. It also concluded that the Dimaguilas were stopped from denying this
partition and the Bilihan document was regular and authentic absent any
evidence to the contrary.

ISSUE/S
 
Whether or not there was a partition of the subject property

Whether or not the 1/3 portion of the southern half of the subject

property was sold to the respondent spouses

W/N the admission in the original answer operate as proof against

petitioners.

RULING:
YES

Spouses Monteiro, as plaintiffs in the original case, had the burden of proof to
establish their case by a preponderance of evidence. To prove their claim of
partition, the respondent spouses presented the following: deed of extrajudicial
partition, cadastral land map, and
municipal’s assessor’s records.

It appears that the subject property had already been partitioned into definite
portions. The petitioners themselves admitted to this very fact in their original
answer. Section 418 of Rule129 of the Rules of Court provides that an
admission made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same case
does not require proof, and may be contradicted only by showing that it was
made through palpable mistake. Petitioners testified that such admission was
the palpable mistake of their counsel in his rush to file the answer, a copy of
which was not provided to them.

The petitioner’s argument is self

-serving, unsupported by any iota of evidence. This position was adopted by
the petitioners only almost eight (8) years after their original answer was filed,
in response to the amended complaint of the respondent spouses. The
petitioners are now estopped from denying or attempting to prove that there
was no partition of the property.
Section 4 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court provides that an admission made
by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same case does not require
proof, and may be contradicted only by showing that it was made through
palpable mistake. The petitioners argue that such admission was the palpable
mistake of their former counsel in his rush to file the answer, a copy of which
was not provided to them.
Petitioner Asuncion testified:
Q So, why was that allegations (sic) made in the Answer?
A May be, (sic) in his rush to file the Answer, Atty. Paredes filed the same
without giving us a copy ...
This contention is unacceptable. It is a purely self-serving claim unsupported
by any iota of evidence. Bare allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence, are not
equivalent to proof.
  Furthermore, the Court notes that this position was adopted by the
petitioners only almost eight (8) years after their original answer was filed, in
response to the amended complaint of the respondent spouses. In their original
answer to the complaint for partition, their claim that there was already a
partition into northern-half and southern-half portions, was the very essence of
their defense. It was precisely this admission which moved the respondent
spouses to amend their complaint. The petitioners cannot now insist that the
very foundation of their original defense was a palpable mistake.
Article 1431 of the Civil Code provides that through estoppel, an admission is
rendered conclusive upon the person making it, and cannot be denied or
disproved as against the person relying thereon. The respondent spouses had
clearly relied on the petitioners' admission and so amended their original
complaint for partition to one for recovery of possession of a portion of the
subject property. Thus, the petitioners are now estopped from denying or
attempting to prove that there was no partition of the property.

Considering that an admission does not require proof, the admission of

the petitioners would actually be sufficient to prove the partition even without
the documents presented by the respondent spouses. If anything, the
additional evidence they presented only served to corroborate the petitioners'
admission.
The petitioners argue that they timely objected to the cadastral map and
the list of claimants presented by the respondent spouses, on the ground that
they violated the rule on hearsay and the best evidence rule.
Anent the best evidence rule, Section 3( d) of Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court provides that when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document,
no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself, except
when the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is
recorded in a public office.
  Section 7 of the same Rule provides that when the original of a document
is in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office, its contents
may be proved by a certified copy issued by the public officer in custody
thereof.
  Section 24 of Rule 132 provides that the record of public documents may
be evidenced by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody or the
record.
Certified true copies of the cadastral map of Liliw and the corresponding list of
claimants of the area covered by the map were presented by two public officers.
The first was Crisostomo Arves, Clerk III of the Municipal Assessor's Office, a
repository of such documents. The second was Dominga Tolentino, a DENR
employee, who, as a record officer, certifies and safekeeps records of surveyed
land involving cadastral maps. The cadastral maps and the list of claimants, as
ce1iified true copies of original public records, fall under the exception to the
best evidence rule.

As to the hearsay rule, Section 44 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court

similarly provides that entries in official records are an exception to the rule.
  The rule provides that entries in official records made in the performance
of the duty of a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the
performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the
facts therein stated. The necessity of this rule consists in the inconvenience
and difficulty of requiring the official's attendance as a witness to testify to the
innumerable transactions in the course of his duty. The document's
trustworthiness consists in the presumption of regularity of performance of
official duty.
Cadastral maps are the output of cadastral surveys. The DENR is the
department tasked to execute, supervise and manage the conduct of cadastral
surveys.
 It is, therefore, clear that the cadastral map and the corresponding list of
claimants qualify as entries in official records as they were prepared by the
DENR, as mandated by law. As such, they are exceptions to the hearsay rule
and are prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.

Even granting that the petitioners had not admitted the partition, they
presented no evidence to contradict the evidence of the respondent spouses.
Thus, even without the admission of the petitioners, the respondent spouses
proved by a preponderance of evidence that there had indeed been a partition
of the subject property.
Sale of 1/3 Portion of the Southern-half
To prove that 1/3 of the southern-half portion of the subject property was sold
to them, Spouses Monteiro presented a deed of sale entitled Bilihan ng Lahat
Naming Karapatan, dated September 29, 1992, wherein Pedro's share was sold
by his heirs to them, with the acquiescence of the heirs of Esperanza and
Leandro in an Affidavit of Conformity and Waiver.
  The petitioners argue that the Bilihan should not have been admitted
into evidence because it lacked the documentary stamp tax required by Section
201 of the NIRC.
On August 29, 1994, the petitioners filed a motion for the production
and/or inspection of documents, praying that Spouses Monteiro be ordered to
produce the deed of sale, which they cited as the source of their rights as co-
owners. On November 20, 1995, Spouses Monteiro submitted their compliance,
 furnishing the RTC and the petitioners with a copy of the Bilihan. On January
3, 1996, the petitioners filed a notice of consignation, manifesting that they
had attempted to exercise their right of redemption as co-owners of the 1/3
portion of the southern half of the property under Article 1623
 of the Civil Code by sending and tendering payment of redemption to Spouses
Monteiro, which was, however, returned.
By filing the notice of consignation and tendering their payment for the
redemption of the 1/3 portion of the southern-half of the property, the
petitioners, in effect, admitted the existence, due execution and validity of the
Bilihan. Consequently, they are now estopped from questioning its admissiblity
in evidence for relying on such for their right of redemption. Additionally, the
Court notes that the copy of the Bilihan which was originally submitted by
Spouses Monteiro with its compliance filed on November 20, 1995, does in fact
bear a documentary stamp tax. It could only mean that the documentary
stamp tax on the sale was properly paid. The Bilihan was, therefore, properly
admitted into evidence and considered by the RTC.
In any case, as correctly held by the lower court is, the petitioners, as heirs of
Vitaliano, who inherited the northern-half po1iion of the subject property, do
not possess the necessary personality to assail the sale of the southern-half
portion between Spouses Monteiro and the heirs of Pedro. They are not real
parties-in-interest who stand to be benefited or injured by the sale of the 1/3
portion of the southern-half over which they have absolutely no right. As
correctly ruled by the courts below, only fellow co-owners have the personality
to assail the sale, namely, the heirs of Pedro's siblings, Esperanza and Leandro.
They have, however, expressly aquiesced to the sale and waived their right to
the property in the affidavit presented by Spouses Monteiro.

 
Revised Rules on Evidence A.M. No. 19-20-20-SC

RULE-26,SEC.2
ADMISSION BY ADVERSE PARTY
Section 2. Implied admission. — Each of the matters of which an
admission is requested shall be deemed admitted unless, within a period
designated in the request, which shall not be less than fifteen
(15) calendar days after service thereof, or within such further time as the
court may allow on motion, the party to whom the request is directed
files and serves upon the party requesting the admission a sworn
statement either denying specifically the matters of which an admission
is requested or setting forth in detail the reasons why he or she cannot
truthfully either admit or deny those matters.
Objections to any request for admission shall be submitted to the court by
the party requested within the period for and prior to the filing of his or
her sworn statement as contemplated in the preceding paragraph and
his or her compliance therewith shall be deferred until such objections are
resolved, which resolution shall be made as early as practicable.

RULE-130 ,SEC.27
3. Admissions and Confessions Section 27. Admission of a party. – The
act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be
given in evidence against him or her.

Section 2, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court

Expressly states: Sec 2. Plea a/guilty to a lesser offense.
- At arraignment, the accused, with the consent of the offended party and the
prosecutor, may be allowed by the trial court to plead guilty to a lesser offense
which is necessarily included in the offense charged. After arraignment but
before trial, the accused may still be allowed to plead guilty to said lesser
offense after withdrawing his plea of not guilty. No amendment of the
complaint or information is necessary. Section 2, Rule 116 of the Rules of
Court presents the basic requisites upon which plea bargaining may be made,
i. e., that it should be with the consent of the offended party and the
prosecutor, and that the plea of guilt should be to a lesser offense which is
necessarily included in the offense charged. The rules however use word may
in the second sentence of Section See People a/the Philippines v. Naci Borras
y Lascano, G.R. No. 250295, March 15,2021. See Nurullaje Sayre y
Malampadv. Han. Dax Gonzaga Xenos, G.R. Nos. 244413 and 244415 16,
February IS, 2020. 7 See Daan v, The Han. Sandiganbayan (Fourth
Division), G.R. Nos. 16372-77, March 2S,2 OS. Id. 6 Resolution People v.
Manilla, et al. SB-18-CRM-0458 Page 4 of7
x--------------------------------------------x 2, denoting an exercise of discretion
upon the trial court on whether to allow the accused to make such plea.
The prosecutorial discretion inherent in a plea bargaining agreement is
further emphasized in Rule 118, Section l(a) of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure which mandates courts, including the Sandiganbayan, to consider
plea bargaining during pre-trial:
SECTION 1. Pre-trial; Mandatory in Criminal Cases. - In all criminal cases
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial
Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Municipal Trial Court and Municipal
Circuit Trial Court, the court shall, after arraignment and within thirty (30)
days from the date the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the
accused, unless a shorter period is provided for in special laws or circulars of
the Supreme Court, order a pre-trial conference to consider the following: (a)
plea bargaining; (b) stipulation of facts; (c) marking for identification of
evidence of the parties; (d) waiver of objections to admissibility of evidence; (e)
modification of the order of trial if the accused admits the charge but
interposes a lawful defense; and (f) such matters as will promote a fair and
expeditious trial of the criminal and civil aspects of the case.''
We have carefully examined the proposed Plea Bargaining Agreement,
and found nothing objectionable to it. We point out that the consent of the
offended party and the prosecutor has been duly obtained. It is not disputed
that the Office of the Special Prosecutor, upon the authority of the
Ombudsman, has the power to enter into a plea bargaining agreement. As
earlier stated, the Plea Bargaining itself stated that the FIB of the of the
Ombudsman for Visayas, as the nominal complainant in this case, already
manifested that it was not objecting to the accused's plea of guilty to Article
213 of the RPC. Significantly, the Plea Bargaining Agreement bore the approval
of, among others, Ombudsman Samuel Martires and Special Prosecutor
Edilberto Sandoval. It bears reiterating that the acceptance of a plea bargain is
purely upon the discretion of the prosecutor.

Sec.3, Rule 116 Rules on Criminal Procedure

After arraignment but before trial, the accused may still be allowed to plead
guilty to said lesser offense after withdrawing his plea of not guilty. No
amendment of the complaint or information is necessary.
RULE 130
Rules of Admissibility
A. OBJECT (REAL) EVIDENCE
Section 1. Object as evidence. — Objects as evidence are those addressed to
the senses of the court. When an object is relevant to the fact in issue, it may
be exhibited to, examined or viewed by the court. 

Flores vs People, GR # 222861

The Court held that the best evidence rule applies only when the contents of
the document are the subject of inquiry. Where the issue is only as to whether
or not such document was actually executed, or exists, or in the circumstances
relevant to or surrounding its execution, the best evidence rule does not apply
and testimonial evidence is admissible in this case, the marked money was
presented by the prosecution solely for the purpose of establishing its existence
and not its contents. Therefore, other substitute evidence, like a xerox copy
thereof, is admissible without the need of accounting for the original
The presence of ultraviolet fluorescent powder is not an indispensable evidence
to prove that the appellant received the marked money. Moreover, there is no
rule requiring that the police officers must apply fluorescent powder to the
buy-bust money to prove the commission of the offense. In fact, the failure of
the police operatives to use fluorescent powder on the boodle money is not an
indication that the entrapment operation did not take place.[26] Both the
courts a quo did not even give much weight on the laboratory report. The CA
instead stressed on the straightforward, candid and categorical testimony of
France, corroborated by PO2 Ilao, as to how petitioner took the money of
France in exchange for the latter's driver's license. The laboratory report is
merely a corroborative evidence which is not material enough to alter the
judgment either way.